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Fortune favored the brave: A history of the 334th infantry, 84th division

Perry S. Wolff

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FORTUNE FAVORED THE BRAVE




334TH INFANTRY • 84TH DIVISION

A HISTORY
OF THE 334TH INFANTRY

84TH DIVISION

BY
CPL PERRY S. WOLFF





Colonel Charles E. Hoy,
Commanding Officer.

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This book is dedicated to the men of
the 334th Infantry Regiment who died
in action during the campaign in the
European Theatre of Operations.

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Preface

'History', Napoleon once said, 'is a fable agreed upon.' While the statement is excessive, it is a good example of the epithets a military historian must face. A report of an action is not the action, and it is reasonably certain that someone from Army to squad will label the report inaccurate, biased, or say, 'why in hell doesn't he get up here and see for himself?' Consider, for example, the communiqués the day our First and Second Battalions took Müllendorf and Würm. SHAEF said:

'The Ninth Army front was quiet...'

Ninth Army said:

'Local attacks...'

84th Division said:

'The 334th Infantry straightened its lines...'

334th Infantry said:


'After an intensive artillery preparation our First and Second Battalions captured Müllendorf and Würm. There were few casualties.'

What the friends of the casualties said is not known, but they probably considered the action more important than the report handed down from SHAEF. Which of the above statements is true? All are true, none is less true; yet the first contradicts the last. Obviously, the historian's choice is dictated by the audience for whom he is writing. Even a regiment is divided into three battalions and five special units, each with a different view of an action. The Third Battalion's interest in the Würm-Müllendorf attack was more cousinly than apt.

It must be confessed that this History will satisfy only those whose point of view is similar to ours. Yet there is a sense of belonging, an interest in one's family, which dough-boys feel about a regiment and do not feel about austere echelons such as Corps or Army. It is certainly true that the actions of a regiment exceed the combined actions of its component parts and that there is an ineffable spirit or characteristic about a regiment which distinguishes it from another regiment. Ask an infantryman, 'What's your outfit?' and the first or second unit he names will be his regiment.

It is because this spirit exists that we feel a regimental history is of interest. Perhaps each company will feel it has been slighted for the profit of another, but it is a good idea that a History of the 334th Infantry be written while it is new in our minds. If the History is no more than a spring-board into a pool of remembrances, it has done its job.

P. S. W.



TWO YEARS OF PREPARATION

The 334th Infantry Regiment was activated 15 October 1942 at Camp Howze, Texas. For a regiment which was later to grind its way through the Siegfried Line, disorganize three of Germany's finest divisions in the Ardennes, and spearhead the Ninth Army's drive across the Roer and into the German heartland, the beginnings were not sensational. In 1942 Selective Service began to look more carefully into the manpower pool, and the Army began to develop a reservoir of Infantry. Many original men of the regiment had been classified 4F by lenient draft boards who subsequently reclassified them when the quotas were made more stringent.

In October 1942 the War was nine months old, and while many men were convinced it should be fought, few were volunteering for the Army, and fewer for the Infantry. The Air Forces were called the Air Corps, a place for gentlemen and adventurers, and the Infantry was coolie labor, a tutored mob. The first men to join the regiment had a "raw deal" they told themselves around the beer tables in the PX. First, they didn't like the Army; second, they weren't physically fit; third, their talents were not being used. As the men looked around and listened, they invented a satisfying rumor, compensation for their "raw deal," a rumor that was going to last until we heard the first sounds of Long Toms and 240's outside Gulpen and Waalwiller, Holland:

"We're a replacement outfit. The 334th isn't going anywhere. If it does, we're Army of Occupation. Man, they can't send this outfit into combat!"

Although the lines at sick call were long with misfits and hopefuls, the Regiment started 13 weeks of basic training: Physical Training, the School of the Soldier, Sanitation, First Aid, hikes, care and cleaning of equipment — a rigid minute-by-minute training designed to turn out a uniform soldier with a basic knowledge of his arms and tasks in the Infantry. A few men extended themselves, noting the vacancies for non-commissioned officers.

But Camp Howze was a collection of tar shacks on the treeless hills of the Texas prairie, and during the first winter of training the temperature dropped to 15 degrees below zero.

A steady stream of arrivals and departures went on, the normal traffic in Army circles. The men spent their evenings in Gainesville or Munster, Texas, and spent weekend passes in Dallas and Fort Worth. Though Lieutenant General Leslie McNair had pointed out that every man in the Army Ground Forces was being trained for overseas service, fascism was distant, the training program was immediate, and many men doubted if they would see combat.

After three months of basic training, the Regiment had lost most physically unfit men. Training progressed from individual to unit programs. An attempt was made to rotate men from one job to another. Increasingly more time was spent in the field, culminating in a "D" training series before maneuvers.

Every group has one or two activities which are remembered as the peaks of an operation, and it is unique that an Army remembers most the moments it suffered, rather than the times it completed its mission well. Newcomers to the barracks were told of "D" Series when the weather was particularly adverse. "You should have been with us on 'D' Series!" gave way in later days to "When we crossed the Sabine during maneuvers . . ." and later, "Back in Camp Howze" or "Seventeen days in the field," and "From Palenberg to Prummern and Beeck . . ." These were the phrases of the 334th Infantry entitling the teller to a respect different from that paid to stripes or bars. The rapid turnover in personnel meant the newcomer would have a phrase of his own in a short time.

The Regiment left Camp Howze 12 September 1943 for the Louisiana-Texas Maneuver Area. Maneuvers were undergone for sixty days in the field. They consisted of tactical problems spaced in five or six day intervals. Again, weather conditions were adverse but the attitude was "garrison" which meant no equipment other than authorized could be used. While maneuvers were disliked intensely, they were the best possible training for combat. The later rigors of the mud in the Siegfried Line and the cold in the Ardennes were extremes of what the Regiment faced in the Texas-Louisiana area.

Maneuvers and other problems were particularly valuable even in light of the turnover in personnel. A few men in key positions learned how to handle their jobs; wire crews, In-



Direct hit on First Battalion
CP, Prummern.



Reverse slope near Beeck.

telligence and Reconnaissance Platoons, Ammunition and Pioneer Platoons could learn their work only in the field. In the last evaluation, the Infantry's job is in the field. The Infantry is not designed for garrison or rear echelon duties. Maneuvers simulated combat; our action around Prummern demonstrated that they were the most valuable part of training in the Zone of the Interior.

It was during maneuvers that the Regiment was first called upon to supply men for overseas duty. This call, coupled with discharges given to physically unfit men, lowered the personnel of the Regiment far below that called for in the Tables of Organization. When the Regiment arrived at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, its next permanent station, it was far understrength.

At Claiborne the Regiment was in its sophomore period. It had maneuvered without a full complement of anti-tank guns, and the AT Company had supplemented its issue with wooden guns. The men who didn't want to go overseas were certain that the Regiment had not done a good job during maneuvers. None of the officers had seen combat. To the outsider it would have seemed that the organization of the Regiment as well as its military snap was strong, but to individual soldiers, framed in khaki and unable to see far beyond the platoon, it seemed that the training would go on forever. The platoons were at times only squad strength, and squads consisted of three or more in some rifle companies. The framework of the Regiment needed filling out if the 334th were to become a combat outfit.

It was in this period, about 1 April 1944, that men separated from the Army Specialized Training Program were sent to the Regiment as fillers. The advent of these men created a morale problem and strain only erased when the Regiment went into action. The ASTP Trainees had been told that they were a selected group in the Army, that there was a strong possibility of a commission after graduation, and they had been excused from most military training so that the rigors of a four year college course condensed into eighteen months would not be too extenuating. The press of events forced the Army to discontinue the program and send most of the trainees to the Infantry. The Infantry was not yet regarded as the Queen of Battle, and the ASTP men thought it the drudge and lackey of the Army. Some non-coms



There's a sniper to the left. The tank's machine gun is firing Geilenkirchen.

viewed the "college boys" suspiciously, feeling they were after the stripes which represented "D Series and the Sabine." When the trainees came, they were treated curtly and responded in an equal manner. They were "you new men" and they banded together with the ASTP cry of "Habba, habba, habba!"

Garrison life is not private. It was not long before the "new men" were hitchhiking to Alexandria with the old men in their squads, or lending nickels in the company day room to older members of the Regiment. The problem eased down. After combat there were only the remembrances of college life, but the situation was poignantly put when the tattered remnants of K Company pulled out of the line near Verdennes, Belgium. They had not shaved for six days, they were stained with combat, wrapped in blankets of many nationalities, and numbed with battle fatigue. One tattered rifleman saw a friend and roused himself from his weariness long enough to remark, "Habba, habba, chum."

"Damn college boy," growled a squad leader.

Camp Claiborne was a slightly better garrison than Camp Howze, but it was none too comfortable. The camp was so large that a whole division, over 15,000 men, was only a small section of the total military population. Training continued with emphasis on larger units; battalion and regimental problems were common.

The Regiment was spending more time in the field. While there was talk of the 334th being nothing more than a training regiment from which replacements would be drawn, the invasion of Europe on 6 June 1944 and the checking of the Allied northward drive in Italy were indications that strong forces of Infantry would be needed before the war in Europe was over.

Louisiana was hot in the summer of 1944. In Army slang, the Regiment was "getting hot" — available for overseas shipment. Nobody was certain. On one hand, the outfit was given new clothing, stored away in duffel bags after being marked, and everyone knew what that meant. On the other hand, a group of physically unfit men were kept in the Regiment even though it was obvious they could not pass the Overseas Physical. The wives of the soldiers in Alexandria were adept at noting tendencies. In the hotels and restaurants there were always rumors to be picked up:

"They're getting them POM qualified."

"They haven't had landing boat training. They'll be going to Europe."

"There's a buck sergeant in the 784th Ordnance who saw two warehousefuls of white helmets with 'MP' written on them. At least that's a safe job."

"My aunt works with the railroad. She says that passenger trains scheduled to carry a whole regiment are coming in on . . ."

Stay or go, there were rumors substantiating each. But suddenly the furlough rate went up to 15%. That was the tip-off. A new Army directive had been published providing that every man shipped overseas would have a furlough six months prior to departure. The **Alexandria Town Talk** was filled with advertisements of rooms to let. The Regiment's radio program, **Fatigues and Leggings**, went off the air two days before the 334th entrained. Two hundred wives became alarmed and drove to the camp entrance, pleading for a last look. Church attendance increased. Strict censorship was clamped on the mails, telephone connections were discontinued on 5 September, and on 6 September the Regiment moved to Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, its staging area.

Two weeks were spent at Kilmer and passes were given freely. New York City was an hour's ride away with concerts, shows, women, liquor, churches: a man could say goodbye any way his experiences had taught him to act the word.

We were one of the first regiments to be issued the new combat jacket. New York, fashioned-minded and crowded with soldiers, paid more attention to the combat jackets than to the new fall suits in the windows of Fifth Avenue. The city was friendly, strangers entertained at most bars, and the soldiers were costumed in a new attitude - significance.

At this time the XXI Group was attempting to flank the Siegfried Line at Arnhem with the First Allied Airborne Army. As the men waited for shipment, Orientation, a subject which had been tucked away in the training program, appeared important. Although the men did not know combat, they were infantrymen and they could guess. "We'll be there for the big push" was the most popular statement, said more regretfully than militantly. Radio commentators said the war would be over in six weeks. The soberest military commentators predicted four months. That was the note of


optimism which hung in our throats when the Regiment embarked from the Brooklyn Navy Yard, 20 September 1944.

The trip was pleasant, with little rough weather. Long periods of letter writing, augmented by a regimental newspaper named **The Daily Duffelbag**, prepared shows, and daily spontaneous programs all helped relieve tedium. Most popular were the poker games, one of which continued steadily for ten days. The ship was the **USAT Barry**, a reconverted luxury liner.

Although the personnel of the Regiment was not informed, contact with numerous submarines was made. The convoy changed course several times, delaying the crossing by a few days. Near the coast of England the convoy was dispersed. A few faster ships, including the **Barry**, were brought around southern England, and the rest of the group was spread from Scotland to Southampton. The original plan had been to land the 84th Division in France at Cherbourg, but the harbor was choked with shipping. The 334th debarked at Southampton and proceeded to an assembly area near Winchester on 10 October 1944.

Autumn was a few days away. The lanes near Winchester had a harvest of blackberries which the men plucked as they took conditioning hikes. Training was no longer rigorous but special care was taken to inform the troops in English customs. The First and Second Battalions with the Special Units were billeted in the barracks of the Royal Winchester Rifles near the center of town. The Third Battalion was sent to Titchborne Abbey, near Alresford, and quartered in Niessen huts. Almost every man received one pass to London and every other evening off. Amusements were plentiful, from the roaring Picadilly Circus in London to the ancient austerity of Winchester Cathedral. England was different, no doubt of that; there was weak, warm beer instead of Budweiser, bread pudding instead of ice cream, and left side driving which left Service Company in continuous apprehension. The people were shy but friendly. Everyone wore a uniform, and in contrast to the States, service seemed neither dramatic nor unique. There were hundreds of differences, some of which irked the Americans. Yet this interval was the most pleasant month in the European Theatre.

The Regiment re-embarked on 31 October, this time for France. The Channel was smooth but the Regiment was



ROUTE OF THE 334th INFANTRY REGIMENT IN EUROPE
 ROUTE OF TRAVEL
 INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES (JAN. 1, 1938)
 0 50 100 200
 MILES

BRUNNEN 3301/36

packed in several LCT's and the converted cruiser **H. M. S. Cheshire**. The landing was made at Omaha Beach, near the neck of the Cherbourg peninsula, on the afternoon of 1 November. The hedgerows had not been cleared of mines, necessitating a ten-mile forced march to a bivouac area near Mosle, France. Three days were spent here awaiting orders. On 5 November 1944 the 334th moved via truck to another bivouac area near Dreaux, France. It was in this move that we first saw signs of battle; Carentan and Saint Lo had been swept back from the streets where they had lain. There were a few knocked out enemy vehicles. The reaction of some was, "It's just like the movies." But reality was only a few days away.

The climb across northern France continued. In the next day's motor march we passed through Paris; through the Bois de Boulogne, and along the right bank of the Seine. We glimpsed the Champs Elysees and the Eiffel Tower. One of the serials in the convoy had lunch beside Le Bourget Airfield where Lindbergh had landed in his first flight across the Atlantic. Swaybellied C47's were landing on the airstrip every thirty seconds. This day's march finally brought us to a bivouac one mile east of Laon, France.

Two days were spent in this area. On the 7th we entrucked for a cold ride to Wittem, Holland, via Charleroi, arriving in the morning hours of the 8th. As we stepped from the trucks, to the east we could hear our artillery firing against the Siegfried Line. The preparation was over. We were ready for battle.

THE "BIG PICTURE"

The 334th never should have entered combat. The Germans should have quit before we arrived at Wittem. After the disaster in France, the Wehrmacht had fallen back to the Siegfried Line, content to hold a defensive position. It was obvious that the Germans could not win the war. It was further obvious that the rest of the fighting was to be, with the exception of the Ardennes campaign, on German soil. The Germans had fallen into a mysticism, born of their Fuhrer's astrological hunches, in which they depended on a Secret Weapon to defeat the Allies. The V Bombs were heart-breaking harassments, yet they did not slow the Allied advance. Stated simply, there is no weapon to defeat Infantry, other than stronger and more strongly supported Infantry. The German General Staff must have known this. Having waged war on other countries they also must have known what a military campaign would do to the German homeland. Their decision to fight when there was no mathematical chance for victory was not motivated by any loftier ideal than that of saving their necks and social positions.

Roughly, the Siegfried Line ran from a point outside Arnhem, Holland, to the Swiss border. It varied in depth from six to thirty miles. The pillboxes were permanent fortifications, some with steel reinforcing concrete to a depth of six feet. Most were mutually supporting, so that if one were attacked others could come to its defense. There was little chance of brilliant tactical maneuvering. The Line could be breached only by frontal pressure; surprise was impossible except in local engagements. The Germans knew exact distances from point to point, enabling them to shell road crossings and other tactically important positions without forward observers. The terrain was slightly undulating, offering little defilade. The Germans had taken advantage of the undulation, for, as Captain Charles Hiatt, the CO of G Company put it: "The hills fit the trajectory. We were exposed to grazing fire on a reverse slope." It was the most highly fortified area in the world, yet it was taken in part by the "civilians in uniform" of the 334th.

The Ninth Army, called in those days a "ghost army"

because it had not been reported since it had captured Brest four months previously, was assembled on the left flank of the American First Army, and on the right flank of the British XXX Corps. The 84th Division held the northernmost sector of the Ninth Army front, which meant it was the division on the left flank of the AEF.


The overall strategy of the British and the American Ninth was to seize the commanding ground overlooking the Cologne-Dusseldorf plain by seizing the high ground on the west bank of the Roer River. The first step in the 84th Division sector was the capture of the railroad junction of Geilenkirchen, and the high ground to the north on which the city of Prummern stood. Geilenkirchen was to be taken frontally by the 333d Regiment, while the British on the left were to be one wing of a double envelopment. The 334th, with the mission of taking Prummern, was the other wing of the envelopment, as well as a threat to Lindern, Brachelen, and the Roer River. This was the first battle.



Pfc Waggle, F Company, looks over the flat terrain.



Würm — Leiffarth



18 NOVEMBER — 18 DECEMBER

THE SIEGFRIED LINE

D Day and H Hour were chosen as 0700, 18 November 1944. The First Battalion was on the right, the Second Battalion on the left, and the Third Battalion in reserve. Each attacking battalion had attached one platoon of anti-tank guns, one-half a mine platoon, and a squadron of British tanks, the Sherwood Rangers. The mine fields were cleared a few hours before the attack and two gaps were marked with tape, one for each attacking battalion. An intensive artillery preparation was fired. We were to move through the gaps, deploy on the other side in the high ground between the front lines and Prummern, and move forward in assault. The ground was soggy, the weather was cold, and the attack, scheduled for sunrise, pushed off under cloudy skies that gave only a grey hint of morning.

The first difficulty was that the tanks could not get through the left gap. The sluggish mud was causing them to belly down. The infantry was ordered through the gaps without tank support, and the tanks were ordered to catch up when possible. The lead companies, A and E, went through the gaps without difficulty, the second companies, B and F, met some fire, but the reserve companies, C and G, met intensive 88, mortar and small arms fire when they attempted to follow the lead companies. B and G Companies started a slow infiltration through the gaps by creeping and crawling. In the meantime, the first two companies of each battalion were deploying into their first objectives, the high ground before Prummern. A Company ran into six pillboxes during this deployment. The assault company of the Second Battalion also ran into the expected heavy resistance. As planned, the leading letter companies of each battalion were left as battalion reserve while C and G Companies which had infiltrated by 1000, took their places in the assault. The advance continued. F Company knocked out six machine guns on the west flank of Geilenkirchen. The First Battalion moved on Prummern; the Second Battalion moved toward the high



Pillbox near Prummern



German pillboxes and communication trench near Leiffarth (Note Panther Tank by pillbox)

ground west of the town, high ground which would command both Prummern and Geilenkirchen.

The Germans could see us coming. They were strongly emplaced, well armed, and were only slightly surprised by the attack. It was later revealed that they had been expecting a push in this sector and had fortified it with two new divisions. The strongest part of these divisions were being held up at Linnich by our air support which was keeping the roads reasonably free of German vehicles.

By noon, the German prisoners had been started back in a steady stream. A Company had found 200 in a trench beside the railroad between Breil and Prummern. Interrogation revealed we were meeting the 9th Panzer Division, the 15th Panzergrenadier Division, and the 343d Regiment of the 183d Volksgrenadier Division. They had been forewarned of our attack and had made preparations for it. The day before the 334th jumped off, the American 102d Division and 2d Armored Division had attacked on our right. The intensity of the attacks made the Germans apprehensive in all sectors. "We had been told that we were to be attacked by green troops," said one officer at the 343d, "and we thought it would be easy. I have fought in Africa and Russia, and have never seen soldiers attack with the ferocity of your division."

The Regiment pushed forward aggressively. The Second Battalion forced itself onto the objective, the high ground southwest of Prummern, guaranteeing the 333d's attack on Geilenkirchen. At 1510 this ground was secure. On the right, the First Battalion moved into Prummern frontally. B and C Companies were the first to enter the town. The sky was darkening, and our air cover was less useful.

At 1600 higher headquarters issued an order for a continuation of the attack. The First Battalion was to take the ground directly north of Prummern; the Second Battalion was to continue north of its present position.

We knew little of the strength and positions of the Germans in the new objective. We had made plans for a continuation of the attack as far as the Roer, but past Prummern the method of action was more sketchy and not as detailed. As the new plans were being put into effect the First Battalion reported heavier resistance inside Prummern. The ruined buildings were excellent hideaways for German snipers who were making the streets untenable. Enemyartil-

lery was shelling the town. The German reserves, previously hindered by our air support, were moving up to counter-attack. The First Battalion moved to an area in the southwest corner of Prummern, an orchard, and dug in for the night. An oversight was the failure to notify the Chaplain, the First Battalion Medics, and the attached platoon of anti-tank guns of the move. This weak force constituted the only Americans in Prummern that night. The AT guns engaged six German tanks moving into Prummern in a column. The third of the six was knocked out, blocking the road. The lead tank ran over one gun, but was knocked out by another, and the second tank broke through the defense but was wrecked by a mine field on the west edge of town.

The Second Battalion was attempting to reach its new area, but was halted by intense mortar and artillery fire. A concerted effort was made at 2400, and the Battalion advanced perhaps one hundred yards, but it made no sizeable dent in the German defense. It was time to use our reserves. The Third Battalion was in an assembly area near Breil. Orders were issued sending it to Prummern in a column of companies. The Third was to deploy on the near side of the town, and pass around the right flank of the city. The First Battalion was to move through Prummern, and with the help of the Third Battalion take the ground between Beeck and Prummern. The attack was to move forward at 1200, 19 November. We had hit the enemy a strong body blow the day before; we were trying for a knockout on the 19th. "Move forward if possible" was also a part of the orders passed down to Regiment, which meant that if we took the low ground between Prummern and Beeck, we were to continue to the hill beyond Beeck.

At 1145 the Third Battalion executed its flanking movement and closed with the enemy. The First Battalion had started its move through the town, and in the face of heavy machine gun fire moved through Prummern and into the fields beyond. The Germans were on ground above them watching their movements. When they were approximately 200 yards north of the town, the Germans threw in tremendous concentrations and forced the Battalion to dig in. The Third Battalion carried the attack, alone. At 1550 the British XXX Corps Artillery shelled the area and rolled the barrage toward Beeck. Following closely behind the artillery, the



Third Battalion Aid Men help German shot in stomach at Lindern.

Third Battalion moved into the assigned area between Prummern and Beeck. The First Battalion continued to consolidate the ground it had taken the day before.

To comply with the order „move forward if possible,” and to exploit the potency of the barrage, I and K Companies tried to move from the low ground. They moved only a short distance, but were under perfect German observation, and were halted. L Company was committed from battalion reserve and swung around the right of the battalion. The move helped very little. The German positions on the high ground were so strong that continuation was impossible. “We were looking into their throats,” said Pfc Paul Leger of K Company, “and their tonsils were on fire.” The Third Battalion moved into defilade and dug in for the night.

We attacked again on 21, 22, 23 November, but the story was a carbon copy. We would kill, capture and wound many Germans, take a few pillboxes, and meet the same frustrating fire from above. On the 23d the Third Battalion attacked with the 405th Infantry on our right. Physically led by Major Charles R. Murrah, the Third Battalion advanced 1000 yards, 200 yards short of Beeck, but could not gain the town. The Third Battalion had heavy casualties. We jabbed at the left side, right side, and center of the town with combinations of battalions. After seven continuous days of combat and attack, we were relieved by fresh battalions of other regiments. We moved to Palenberg for reorganization. The rest of the month, 26—30 November, was spent in division reserve.

What had happened in this first attack? The first day we had moved like a Rose Bowl football team until 1600. At 1600 we had lost our drive and from 19—26 November our attacks were consistently frustrated in terms of geographic gain. Were we just a poor unit, as many men had been saying? The enemy didn't think so. Or had we hit something too large for a regiment?

There is a clear answer. Lindern was taken before Beeck. Later we took Leiffarth before Würm and Müllendorf. There is a ridge running west of Gereonsweiler through Beeck, Würm and Müllendorf. This ridge was the strongest section of the Siegfried Line from the Dutch border at Rimburg to the Roer River. In our sector this was the strongest part of the strongest line in the world. In no other engagement did the Germans resist as they did our first week in combat, and

never again did we have to pay the price per foot that we paid before the evil smelling debris of Beeck.

Our next assignment was to the east, between Linnich, Lindern, and Brachelen. The area enclosed by this triangle was the objective of our Corps, the XIII. It was the high ground overlooking the Roer River, necessary for any large scale crossing of the river. The key to the area was control of a hard surface road between Linnich and Lindern. To protect the attack, to flank Würm, Müllendorf, and Lindern, the First Battalion was ordered to take Leiffarth, north of Beeck and west of Lindern. The Second Battalion was to take the southwest portion of the Linnich—Lindern—Brachelen triangle, and the Third Battalion was to seize the balance.


This attack was almost as difficult as our last mission. It started far less successfully, and met the same German units. The Germans were not surprised, and not unprepared.

The attack was to start at 0730, 30 November. The Second Battalion moved from Palenberg to Apweiler where it was shelled. From Apweiler it continued to Gereonsweiler. We were taking over another unit's area, and this unit, the 405th Regiment of the 102d Division, had just finished an exhausting attack. Somewhere in the switch, proper liaison and reconnaissance between the two units was not made. Major (then Captain) James Johnston reported that the Second Battalion met resistance 1500 yards farther back than expected. The Third Battalion was engaged in heavy fighting two hours before it was due at the line of departure. Heavy fire was pouring from enemy positions in Linnich on our right front. By H hour we had sustained heavy casualties and some disorganization. The First Battalion jumped off at 0730 for Leiffarth. It fought its way from Prummern into an incomplete tank-trap east-northeast of Beeck. The enemy artillery had the trap pinpointed and threw an intensive concentration at the First Battalion, forcing it to dig in.

The First was stopped; the Second and Third were in a state of disorganization which negated a continuance of the attack until later in the afternoon. We had fought our way to the line of departure, but had lost contact with the Regiment on our right, the 405th, further delaying the attack. Liaison was finally effected, and another attack went forward at 1500. We moved to within 200 yards of the Linnich—Lindern road, but were unable to cross even with an attempt



This German is attached to a tellermine. Pfc William Farmer, B Company, cuts the wire leading to the booby trap.



H Company digs in near the Linnich—Lindern road

at infiltration. The fire, principally small arms and mortar, was coming from the northeast, outside the regimental boundary. The Germans were throwing heavy interdictory fire over the road. This attack was also discontinued.

Our toughness brought us a few reluctant gains on 1 December. Our Second and Third Battalions continued the attack with the roughest sort of reorganization. Men were counted off, assigned to platoons, squads and companies without regard for previous assignments. The Germans were counter-attacking on our left flank at Lindern, and to ease the pressure against the 335th, which had placed two battalions in the town, we tried again to seize the high ground over the Linnich—Lindern road. We jumped off at 1500 and came within 300 yards of the road before we were halted. Both battalions dug in.

To provide flank protection for the First Battalion assault on Leiffarth, the Third Battalion was moved to an area 1000 yards due south of Lindern. The Third was to support the 335th in its defense against the German counter-attack. The Second Battalion had to take the Corps' objective. The First Battalion, held under orders after its halt in the tank trap near Beeck, had yet to take Leiffarth.

We did it. The Third Battalion moved into the west edge of Lindern at 1300, 7 December. The First Battalion moved from its area into Leiffarth. At 0400, in a night advance, the Second Battalion move across the Linnich—Lindern road and into the high ground beyond. The Second's advance was so swift and quiet that the Germans were surprised. H Company machine gunners were amazed to see a German chow line operating in the early morning hours. As the Germans lined up for food, the machine guns opened up.

The First Battalion's advance was equally as rapid. The 326th Field Artillery, our blocking back, provided interference into Leiffarth with a heavy barrage. The doughboys climbed from their holes and sprinted for the objectives. First Battalion followed the shells so closely that it looked as if the barrage were falling into the forward elements. The German attempt to defend Leiffarth with small arms fire was quickly overcome. The town was ours half an hour after we had assaulted it. We had mopped up our sector of Lindern with the Third Battalion.


After the attack phase which lasted from 30 November

to 3 December the 334th Infantry went into a holding phase and Colonel (then Lt Col) Charles E. Hoy assumed command. Although it could not be seen at the time, the Ninth Army drive had put an enormous amount of pressure on the Germans, so much that the Germans must have been forced to plan their future Ardennes attack to relieve the threat to the Roer. The 84th Division had erased the Geilenkirchen salient in our lines and had stuck a raw finger into the German defense along the Roer. We were not far from the Roer which meant we were not far from the end of the Siegfried Line. If the Germans chose to defend strongly the west bank of the Roer, there was danger that they would be pushed back against the river in the Linnich—Lindern area. In turn, there were two things the Germans could do. The first was a counter-offensive of such magnitude as to relieve the pressure along the Roer. The other was to contain our salient and others which had probed close to the Roer. In our sector they were to attempt to retake Leiffarth and regain control of the high ground, Leiffarth—Würm—Müllendorf, while shelling any roads, crossroad or towns available to us as supply instruments for the crossing of the river.

There was little activity until 16 December 1944. The units were rotated between the lines and Palenberg. Palenberg was a safe place to be, but in the damp, unlit cellars or in the settled dust of a three-month old shelling there was little connection with the things the men had left in September. Mail call mated a man's eyes and throat. Reinforcements were so numerous it seemed as if the Regiment had a new face. Trench foot was common. Yet from the sufferings the men had undergone in the field, from the danger and much they had shared, there began a comradeship and a pride in the units, from squad to Division, which was later to be one of the prime factors in the historic Ardennes stand. Call the 334th a "replacement outfit," or say "we couldn't fight our way through a paper bag," the catch words of the Howze-Claiborne days, and there was an immediate reaction and a hundred tales to illustrate how good a unit the 334th was. In the Palenberg cellars where the exhausted men lay, so quiet that the candlelight was frozen and the cigarette smoke hung in punctuating tiers through the room, the men talked of the soldiers who didn't make it: Fred Fluty, Mercer Yeagar, Ben Goodman, David Powell, Don Smith,



The supporting chemical mortars swing into action at Prumern.



The Germans knew the exact coordinates of this street corner in Geilenkirchen. There was no speed limit for Service Company drivers.

Edward Acuna and so many others that the names were a poetic rollcall. The Siegfried Line seemed interminable. It was no longer "if I get it" it was "when I get it." Everyone knew the United Nations were going to win the war, but if the Siegfried Line stretched to the Rhine it would cost us a generation. Although the Russians were advancing, that was a symbol and not a fact. A fact was the destruction of a Panther tank near Lindern, a fact to be seen, touched, and cheered. What the flannel-suited commentators said about six million Russians was to be heard attentively, but what was real was the throttled Panther west of Lindern.

The Germans counter-attacked in the Leiffarth sector on the morning of 16 December 1944. A heavy artillery barrage was laid on our lines and the German infantry followed none too closely to retake our salient in their high ground. The First Battalion was struck by a German battalion attempting envelopment from the northeast and northwest. Our artillery was effective in dispersing the enemy's reserve company. The attacking companies penetrated our lines but were eliminated in a sharp fire fight. Those that infiltrated were either killed or captured. We stood fast. In total 80 Germans were killed, 200 wounded, and 73 prisoners taken, including those casualties inflicted when they continued their attack at 1800. The evening attack came from Würm, with the strength of one company. Our artillery fired eleven battalions, and the First Battalion had been reinforced with a Tank Assault Team. The attacking forces were unable to take any ground.

There was plenty of time to plan the next attack. To protect our Leiffarth salient and to roll up the high ground to the west, the next targets were Würm and Müllendorf. The CO made exhaustive plans for the attack. There were many pillboxes in the area, and many choices had to be made in the attack. Every possible eventuality was considered, and alternate plans were made should the primary plans be frustrated. Men were briefed, from battalion commanders to squad leaders. The houses were numbered, groups were informed of particular targets and shown their line of attack on sand tables. 125 guns were to support our attack. The First Battalion was to seize Würm; the Second, Müllendorf. "D" was 18 December 1944. "H" for the Second was contingent upon the First Battalion's success.

The 125 guns blew Würm and Müllendorf into history

shortly before 0900. At 0900 a red smoke shell was fired and the doughs climbed from their foxholes, following the artillery barrage within fifty yards, running at top speed for their objectives, disregarding weak fire sent by the Germans. Our prisoners were so dazed by the speed and ferocity of our Infantry and Artillery that they were weeping when captured. Five minutes after the attack began we were in Würm, silencing the scattered fire coming from a few strong places. The infantry broke through to the fields beyond the town and dug in, awaiting further orders. We had very light casualties: two men slightly burned.

After Würm was attacked, the Second Battalion assaulted Müllendorf. Jumping off from the direction of Beeck, the Second followed its supporting artillery as closely as had the First. Thirty minutes after the attack started, the town was secure. In the attack phase we took 114 PW's and had only four wounded. The operation was well planned and well executed. The troops advanced with marching fire. The Germans were caught off-balance. No counter-attack was met except a mortar barrage thrown into the newly captured towns.


The first and last days of our first month in combat were our most spectacular. Between them we become a combat outfit. We had learned how to kill Germans most efficiently without being killed ourselves. We had carved through the Siegfried Line until we stood a few thousand yards from the Roer River, which was to be the last natural boundary in the west. We had bled and won. It is for others to say how significant our actions were, but it is true that we had ripped a hole in Germany's strongest defense. Now it was time to block her last offensive.



High Ground North of Gellenkirchen.



The draw is under observation and fire from Würm. The doughboys sprint for safety, one at a time.



Coming from foxholes K Company assaults Beeck. A few moments later enemy artillery halted the advance.



WINTER IN BELGIUM DEFENSE

It is only in retrospect, or at a safe distance from the front, that action seems dramatic. Engaged in an action, there is only room for fear and planning; drama comes in re-telling or remembering. If the soldier comes out safely, the experience of danger achieves lustre and hue. The action in Belgium which threatened at four times to disorganize the Regiment, became the most talked-of campaign among the veterans of the Regiment. As Major James Johnston said, "I would never go through the fighting again, but I would not give up my experiences for the staff's payroll."

Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt had thrown sixty divisions against ten American divisions in an attack which commenced 16 December. Rundstedt's intention was to drive through the hilly Ardennes to the Meuse and cut our main supply route between Liege and Namur. What the further objectives were would depend upon the success of the attack. Another prime reason for the drive was the intense pressure being put on the Siegfried Line by the concerted British and American drive in the North. He did not cut the Liege—Namur road nor reach the Meuse, partially because our Marche—Hotton stand blocked his northward movement, but he did achieve time for his defense of the Siegfried Line.

There was little warning of our mission in the defense of the Marche—Hotton sector. After the Würm—Müllendorf attack we shifted battalions in the lines. Everyone talked of



Artillery killed this German at Hotton, Belgium.

two week's rest in Holland. The **Stars and Stripes** we received were three days old and gave no hint of the German drive. SHAEF had put a clamp on radio news, and all that was heard was a report of small scale counter-attacks in the First Army sector.

It was in this atmosphere of speculation that the Regiment received its orders. The first orders were simple. "Go to Verviers, Belgium," At Verviers an Army representative met Colonel Hoy and told him to proceed to Marche, Begium. "Check at some point near there before entering to see if the town is clear of Germans. You may have to fight your way in."

On 20 December we moved as a combat team to Marche, via Aachen and Verviers. "You may have to fight your way into the town." Colonel Hoy led the convoy in the lead jeep. Darkness came early but speed was essential. The vehicles turned on their headlights after half the fifty-mile trip was accomplished. As far as we knew, the only safe ground was that before our headlights.

The Regiment moved into Marche and set up a perimeter defense, a circle of riflemen 360 degrees around the city. Most of the Regiment was billeted in and around a central school-house while the staff opened the new maps to see what they were up against.

It was a bewildering picture. Where were the Germans? No one knew. A report came in that the Germans were in Hotton, a town about six miles northeast, and through which our convoy, lights blazing, had passed an hour before. Service Company heard burp guns as they passed through the town. What was the terrain? Unlike the Siegfried Line: heavily wooded half-mountains, deep cuts and wooded gorges through which an enemy force could infiltrate without observation. The weather was cold, the ground frozen. The men around the periphery of Marche reported, "45 minutes to dig a foxhole near Prummern. Five hours here." Where were our forces? Simply, there were none, excluding a company of combat engineers who had built few road blocks between Marche and La Roche. Some cooks and bakers of the 3d Armored Divison had belied their rear-echelon status and with a platoon of F Company under Lt. Clifton L. Mac Lachlan fought off an armored attack across the Ourthe in Hotton after we passed. As far as we knew, we had no unit on the flanks. The only thing certain was that we would defend Marche.



Third Armored Division's rear echelon knocked out this tank at Hottot, Belgium.

The first problem was to estimate the direction from which the Germans would attack. We could assume the local attack would come in the same direction as the major attack, east to west. It was equally probable that the Regiment was on one flank of the German salient which meant the line should be established against a drive from the south. The latter was chosen as the most probable direction of attack. Our line was set on a ridge a mile and a half southeast of the Marche-Hotton road. The line was six miles long, more than three times the length of the line we had left in Germany. The left anchor was the Ourthe River. The right anchor was established the next day when another regiment of the Division moved into the west end of Marche. A series of small villages were between ridges: Verdenne, Marenne, Menil, Hampteau, Hotton. Originally, the Third Battalion held the line from the right anchor to Menil and the Second from Menil to Hampteau and along the Ourthe River to Hotton. When the fight began, it was necessary to shift units into these areas and to commit the First Battalion, which was the Regiment's reserve.

A glance at the map will show that the principal problem in the defense of Marche was the control of the Marche—Bourdon—Hotton road. Should the Germans cut the road at Bourdon the Second Battalion would have no route of withdrawal, other than over the Ourthe or through bad secondary roads to the North. While Marche was our primary point of defense, the Marche—Hotton road was its key.

We took up the line in the morning hours of 21 December 1944. The Second Battalion sent a platoon of F Company to this area, in light of previous reports telling of German strength in Hotton and Hampteau. In Hotton, Company F met seven Mark V tanks, a half-track, and 20 infantrymen. In a sharp fight two tanks were knocked out and the Germans withdrew. A patrol from E Company found Hampteau swarming with Germans. E Company drove the Germans from the town and took up defensive positions. The Third Battalion went into line with less difficulty. C Company had been posted in an Outpost Line, 2000 yards ahead of our main line of resistance.

The regiment was far understrength. Foxholes were 150 yards apart over a six mile line. As the men waited for the inevitable attack there was an understandable loneliness,

accentuated by the overpowering silence of tall hills and thick pine forests. The first snows of winter hung in some crevices, a beautiful treachery revealing marks of patrols and foretelling the gigantic drifts soon to fall.

On the 22d there was a trickle of information. The Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon was sent out to make contact with the enemy. It found him at Hamoul and engaged in a fire fight. A large enemy patrol engaged F Company at Hotton but withdrew after suffering casualties. We captured a German officer motorcycling to Verdenne as an advance billeting detail. At this time it was revealed we were in the sector of the 116th Panzergrenadier Division, a tough outfit composed principally of young men. AT Company laid hundreds of mines throughout the area, constructed roadblocks, and helped prepare demolition charges in the bridge at Hotton. There was not as yet any indication of the enemy's strength, nor the area from which his attack would come.

The 23d was also spent on the razor's edge. The reports from other sections of the Ardennes front showed that the German's drive to the east had been halted at the tip. The stand of the 101st Airborne at Bastogne slowed the southern expansion of the drive. The Germans were to force northward and we stood in their way. By the 23d, enemy reconnaissance had increased in our sector: a sign of attack.

On the night 23—24 December the Germans shelled Bourdon on the Marche—Hotton road. Simultaneously, 120 German infantry infiltrated through an uncovered draw into a small woods between Marche and Bourdon. Although they were behind our lines, for a few hours there was no indication of their presence. At 0630 the Germans captured a platoon leader, and a platoon sergeant of I Company. An I Company patrol followed the footprints from the foxholes occupied by the men. Strangely, the tracks led to the rear, into the woods where the Germans had infiltrated. The patrol was fired on. At the same time, a PW reported the position to the Interrogation Team. Little time was lost. K Company, which had been in Third Battalion reserve, was brought to the northeast edge of the woods, while A Company and a platoon of tanks moved up from Marche to the southwest portion. The enemy was to attack at the same time we attacked him, according to a captured document. He was late organizing, and our companies were attacking the woods in

Verdenne, left; Mareenne, right; Bourdon, top. The clump of trees in the center is the location of the pocket.



a bayonet and small arms action. While the woods were being flushed, the Germans complicated matters by attacking Verdenne, in the center of our MLR and in the area covered by K Company before it had been pulled out to flush the pocket. It is thought that both German forces, the one in the woods and the one which attacked Verdenne, were coordinated in a single drive to cut the Marche—Hotton road at Bourdon and between Bourdon and Marche. Our attack in the woods was successful and the Germans plans were upset.

At 1550 the other tine of Germans attacked Verdenne. The First and Second Platoons of I Company, vastly outnumbered and without support from K Company which had been moved to the right, were overrun. The remainder of I Company withdrew to the vicinity of Bourdon for reorganization. K Company, back from the attack, was put on a ridge behind Verdenne to limit the enemy's penetration.

The situation was tense. There were no reserves between our lines and Bourdon. Control of Verdenne, the center of our lines, meant the enemy had improved his chances to cut the Marche-Hotton road. Marenne could be easily flanked, and our ridge along the Marenne—Menil—Hampteau line could be made untenable, if the enemy had enough force. It was either retake Verdenne or retreat. The decision was to attack.

From the shallow trenches outside Verdenne where our Third Battalion lay, the doughboys could hear the Germans celebrating Christmas Eve. The Nazis had a merry Christmas Eve. Hitler had promised them that New Year's Day would find them standing at the English Channel. All that lay before them were a few Americans, a few infantrymen from the 334th Regiment. Some of the Germans were happily drunk. A few doughboys from I Company's Second Platoon, hidden in a chickencoop in Verdenne, heard the laughter. The Americans outside the town were cold and apprehensive. German tanks were probing the woods around Verdenne.

L Company, 333d, and K Company, 334th, were designated to retake Verdenne. L Company, 333d, part of division reserve, was brought up through Bourdon, but the guide took an incorrect turning and brought the support too far to the left. They engaged in a fire fight with an enemy group moving through the woods toward Bourdon.

In the meantime, the Artillery had promised us all possible support. All available artillery, including the chemical mortars, were mustered for the barrage.


K Company jumped at 0100 Christmas Day 1944. The artillery preparation had been so heavy and so thorough that the Germans were stunned. K Company's first wave, 13 men, overran the town, and its second wave mopped up Verdenne. 305 PW's were taken Christmas Day, all from the 116th Panzergrenadier. Many Germans were wearing American equipment taken when Rundstedt's divisions had captured American supply dumps.


In the slow light of Christmas day it was discovered that another threat to the Marche—Hotton road remained. Sometime before the artillery preparation on Verdenne, another large force of Germans had moved behind our lines into the same wooded area between Bourdon, Verdenne, and Marche. The size of this pocket was not known. Parts of A and B Companies were sent to engage the enemy forces and report their strength. These small groups ran into heavy fire from armor and infantry. Reinforcements were needed.

Again, part of the Division reserve was committed. A and B Companies, 333d, were to move on the pocket at 0300 26 December in a night attack. These companies were repulsed and the pocket was further strengthened by German tanks which engaged our A Company the next morning and joined the pocket.

This pocket behind our lines was now a greater threat than the attack at Verdenne had been. German strength in this area totaled over thirty armored vehicles and more than two hundred infantry. This group, had it wished, could have seized Marche lying a few thousand yards below, defended by parts of AT Company and Headquarters Company. It could have taken Bourdon, severing the all-important Marche—Hotton road. For some reason, never explained, the Germans sat in the woods. This error killed the majority. From a bare farmhouse on a treeless ridge across the road, the Third Battalion Headquarters was able to observe the exact position of the enemy.

That day, 26 December 1944, was the wildest day in our action in the European Theatre. We beat off German attacks all day and all night. In the morning of the 26th all troops were cleared from the area above Bourdon and an emergency





concentration was fired into the pocket. A ten minute barrage was fired in our support by 4.2 mortars, the 326th FA Battalion and our Cannon Company, a battalion of 155 mm howitzers, and a battalion of 240 howitzers. Tree bursts, time fire, high explosive and armor piercing shells left wreckage never since equalled in the regimental areas. The few Germans still alive tried frantically to regain their lines. When our patrols went into the area at midnight, 200 Germans were dead, and 25 armored vehicles were destroyed.

The artillery was shifted to the threat on the left flank of the Third Battalion where Germans were engaging L Company, 333d. The artillery dispersed this attack. When the artillery stopped firing, the 326th had only six rounds of ammunition left.

The defeat at Verdennes and the fiasco in the Bourdon pocket cost the Germans more vehicles and men than they could afford. Twice they had been within 2000 yards of their objectives, and twice numerically inferior American forces had stopped them. The German cry "Too much quantity beat us" was not supported by facts. The Regiment had met them understrength and had thrown them back. This was not all. Our third victory in four days took place a few hours after the Bourdon pocket had been cleared.

During the afternoon hours of the 26th the Germans struck at G Company in Hampteau, using a full battalion. Hampteau was in a valley. The Germans seized control of one slope and a road leading into the town along the river. G Company fought back, driving the Germans off the ridge and to the right. In the meanwhile F Company was brought from its reserve position in Hotton to block a road leading from the hills to Hotton. The Germans slid off to the right and engaged F Company. Second Battalion Headquarters Company was the only reserve left to the Battalion. It threw up a horseshoe defense at the junction of the road from the hills and the Marche—Hotton road. The Germans struck E Company shortly after hitting F Company. The Second Battalion was completely engaged along its MLR. The Germans penetrated the lines far enough to cut the Menil—Hampteau road.

Meanwhile another large force of German armor and infantry suddenly swung from the hills to the road between Verdennes and Marenne. This force swung into Marenne,

defended by a few L Company men. It was useless to fight. The men hid in the houses when it became apparent the Germans were not going to stop in the town. These two forces had radio communication and were aiming to strike at Menil simultaneously from the right and front. Our forces in Menil were radioed to be prepared. E Company, a platoon of Anti-Tank Company, and I Company, 333d, were in town.

In the time it took for the German armor to traverse the distance to Menil "daisy chains" were set out, and a few riflemen moved to foxholes along the road. AT Company had sown the area around Menil with mines, but the firmness of the frozen earth had made it impossible to bury the charges. The only communication open was a small SCR 300 set manned by Pfc Raymond Beauchamp, and after the initial warning every set in the regiment and many in the division tried to pick him up. A real fight was coming.


Our meager plan was to allow the first tank to come into town where a bazooka team headed by Pfc William Ivler would knock it out. The second tank was to be "daisy chained" by a crew hidden in a cellar. From then on it was anybody's fight. In the meanwhile, the artillery had fired an emergency concentration of the Menil—Hampteau road, forcing the Germans to come into Menil frontally.

Beauchamp reported that the head of the column was in sight. A motorcycle led the column, blinking a green headlight. When the column closed near the town the motorcycle allowed the first tank to pass. The first tank, earmarked for a bazooka shell, tried to make a small turn in the street and slammed against eleven anti-tank mines piled against the building. Sixty-six pounds of TNT went off. The tank was destroyed.

The German column began to deploy. The few American rifleman opened up. Beauchamp went off the air "to catch himself a couple of Krauts." Led by the German infantry, the deployed tanks came to a mine field on the south edge of town. Their infantry did not warn them or did not see the mines. The first tank hit a mine and was knocked out. The second vehicle, a half-track, echeloned slightly to the rear, struck a mine a moment later and was knocked out. In quick succession the rest of the column found mines on which to destroy themselves. Panic stricken, three halftracks




Cannon Company goes into action near Samree.





First Battalion Medics evacuate wounded at Marcouray.

swung beyond the minefield only to destroy themselves in a secondary field in the southwest corner of town. As the balance fled, our artillery continued destroying more vehicles. Except for the mopping up, the battle was over. We had knocked out four Panther tanks, 13 half-tracks, and eight motorcycles and had captured over 100 prisoners. Again Cannon Company and the 326th FA supported us so fully that only forty rounds were left when the battle was over.

That was the last defensive action in the sector. We held Marche, even though the war map at SHAEF and in the **Stars and Stripes** had given it to the Germans on 22 December 1944. We were now ready to attack.





BRADSHAW, 1894/1900




WINTER IN BELGIUM ATTACK

The Germans had failed to reach the Meuse, cut the Liege—Namur road, or take Marche. A slow withdrawal from the tip of the Bulge had begun by 1 January 1945 when the 334th was moved from the Marche—Hotton sector across the Ourthe River. In the attack to follow, a coordinated drive by the 84th Division and the 2d Armored Division, the 334th was initially in division reserve.

The fight to drive the Germans from our sector in Belgium was a puzzling, difficult job. The fight was more often up and down than in a compass direction. Steep mountains were wooded so heavily that a fighter could not see ten feet ahead of his path. Fields of fire were correspondingly short and frustrated. Roads were icy and almost impossible to use. In many cases supplies were carried by hand. As the Germans retreated they had time to strew many anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. The weather was the climax of hardship: thick snow lay over the countryside, masking the ground and freezing any unwary soldier who slept. From the infantryman's point of view it was an unsolvable problem. The fighting called for a clear head and continuous use of intelligence, but there was little chance for sleep. The tactician had to think constantly in terms of ground elevation and in a series of interlocking actions which would dislodge the enemy from positions of advantage. There is a popular saying that war is

Devantave, right. The single house in the center is Consy, behind which runs Consy Ridge.





A Mark V tank mounting an 88 is searched near Marcouray.

like chess. If it is, we were playing three dimensional chess in the Ardennes.

Our first objective was Consy Ridge overlooking Marcourt, a village due west of Marcouray. The second objective was Marcouray. If these two objectives were taken, the Germans would be forced to cross the Ourthe at Marcourt under direct observation. There was also a chance to seal enemy forces against the Ourthe, north of Marcourt. The Second Battalion moved for Consy Ridge at daylight 7 January.

Great amount of mortar, nebelwerfer, and small arms fire from the objective and the ridge before it caused the attack to be delayed. It was here the Second Battalion lost several of its medical personnel, who, although plainly marked and in open ground, were shot down by German machine gunners.

Consy Ridge was a key point in the German defense between the Aisne and the Ourthe, and the enemy was not disposed to withdraw without a fight. The ridge had held up the 84th's attack for several days. In an open field one ridge short of Consy the Second Battalion was met by fire from twelve machine guns on three sides. A courageous attack was made across the open field into the woods from which the fire was coming, and the Battalion overran the machine gun positions. Consy ridge was attacked the next day from the south, over an "impossible" rear slope. On the 7th the Second was unable to secure the ridge because of tough opposition, exhausting terrain, and early darkness. The fire fight had left the Battalion short of ammunition.

At 1500 the same day the First Battalion moved from Daventave to Marcouray through a tick forest, assaulting Marcouray from the northeast at 1500. Captains Sam Adams and Earl Jackson led A and C Companies which came into the town against scattered and surprised resistance. The two companies used marching fire and entered the town a short time after the artillery lifted, capturing 36 vehicles and killing 40 Germans.

The road leading into Marcouray was a driver's nightmare. The final vehicles of the First Battalion's convoy, two anti-tank guns, slid off the road blocking traffic until morning. There was a sliver of an intermittent moon, otherwise the night was completely unlit. Sand on the road was partially helpful but two prime movers and two tanks went over the side. Enemy artillery was interdictory.



Top; Marcouray. Bottom right, Cielle.



C rations and a stove look good to these Second Battalion men at Biron, Belgium.

But the capture of Marcouray eased the Second Battalion's problem, for Marcouray flanked the fire which the Second was receiving. A continuation of the attack was successful. We had perfect observation into Marcourt and the bridge over the Ourthe. Occupation of Marcourt was not necessary but the Second Battalion sent a patrol into the town the next morning.

The next objective was Cielle, a First Battalion target. Lt Col Roland L Kolb led the First Battalion from Marcouray to Cielle, and the Second Battalion moved into Marcouray. B and C Companies went into the assault on Cielle, with A Company in reserve. The men came through the woods northwest of Cielle, scrambling through the snow. Small arms fire was met, but the town fell without too much trouble. A Company, in reserve, followed closely behind to secure billets for the night. Immediately after Cielle was captured, the Second moved down the Marcouray—Cielle road. The road was mined. Eleven vehicles passed over the mines, one returned and was destroyed. Later the 309th Engineers removed fifteen mines from the road; several had the paint scratched by the tire chains on our vehicles. During the afternoon we lost the Regimental Commander, Colonel Charles E. Hoy, the Second Battalion Commander, Lt Col Joseph E. Williams, and the S-2, Major John J. Williams; all wounded.

In spite of tremendous difficulties, plans were being carried out with continuous success. The attack was going forward in a column of battalions; the First at Marcouray, the Second at Marcourt. The First at Cielle, the Second at Hez de Harze. We were like a fighter with two right hands. The enemy's retreat was constantly off balance. We were pressing him faster than he liked: our efficiency in the attack was evidenced by the disproportionate amounts of material we were capturing. In the rear, our reserve battalion, the Third, was ready to take over after Hez de Harze.


Hez de Harze was a mountain overlooking LaRoche. High ground is valuable because it allows observation into objectives and because it decreases defilade for the enemy. Hez de Harze, three hundred feet above LaRoche and 150 feet above Cielle had to be taken. The enemy knew we had to take it, and they knew the way we had to come. They dug in one hundred infantry on a carefully chosen position and waited for the Second Battalion to swing around the road from



Cielle, left top. The directional arrow is over Hez de Harze.
Bottom right, La Roche.



Christmas is a month late for Cpl Bob Reilly, Pfc Raymond Collarini and Cpl William C. Arnold of Cannon Company.



Samree.

Cielle. We called for artillery. H Company mortars and machine guns went to work. The doughboys bellied down in the snow and moved against the mountain, leaving grey-white trails where they slid in the snow. Meanwhile, the water-cooled heavy machine guns from Cielle went to work on the dug- in German infantry and the supporting tanks. It was like a fight between two skyscrapers: on one level, G Company crawled up the mountain; above them in overhead fire went the bullets of the supporting machine guns. The Germans, even though on a higher level, could not stand the attack and pulled out. The Second occupied Hez de Harze which was so heavily wooded that LaRoche could not be seen. The men watched their sweat generated by the climb turn to ice, but at 1600 we held the mountain.

The I and R platoon of Headquarters Company plus a squad from F Company reconnoitered LaRoche on the 10th of January.

By taking this high ground we had pinched ourselves against the Ourthe. The First Battalion remained in Cielle, the Second went to Biron, and the Third relieved two battalions of another regiment near Samree. Our positions were taken over by a Cavalry Group.

It was felt that the Germans were holding a hard periphery over a vacuum, consequently the next attack was aimed at breaking this crust. We wanted to take as much ground as possible in an attempt to meet the Third United States Army driving from the south. Our two-battalion team was the First and Third. On our left, however, the "Hell on Wheels" 2d Armored Division was held up at Wibrin and our attack was extended to two small towns on the south flank of Wibrin, Petite-Mormont and Grande-Mormont.

We were not sure of what resistance lay before us. Division Reconnaissance troops were assigned Berismenil, but could not get near the town. A patrol from the First Battalion was sent forward to reduce a roadblock but was caught in an anti-personnel minefield. The Third Battalion was ordered to take the roadblock the next morning and found it undefended. The Third Battalion moved through the woods while the First Battalion took high ground overlooking Berismenil. When the Third emerged from the woods, it was hit by a heavy concentration of artillery. The First was ordered



M Company mortarmen, Pfc Huiell C. Harkins and Cpl Carl Johnson, dig in near Samree, Belgium.



The Mormons.



Nadrin-Ollomont.



The contact patrol has chocolate while waiting for nightfall.

to take another high area closer to Berismenil while the Third attacked Nadrin.

The First Battalion took its objective on schedule, but enemy fire was heavier in the woods where the Third Battalion was moving toward Nadrin. Nadrin was therefore assigned to the First Battalion which took it the next day from the northeast, while the Third bypassed through a creek bed to Filly. The First drove through Nadrin to Ollomont and secured both towns while taking 150 PW's. Meanwhile, the Third was wading through snow waist high, forming a salient pointed at Filly. The 2d Armored again failed to take Wibrin, and had the First Battalion failed at Nadrin, the Third would have been in danger of encirclement. To make matters more complicated, higher headquarters issued an order for the Third to split up and take Petite-Mormont and Grande-Mormont in the 2d Armored's sector. L Company took Filly alone while the rest of the Battalion veered for the Mormonts.



It was dusk and the Third Battalion made a lucky error. It captured a small collection of houses north of the Mormonts and was forced to strike due south to capture its objective. The Germans had been expecting an attack from direction of Filly, west of the Mormonts. They were caught with their machine guns down the wrong road. The towns were subdued shortly before midnight. It was a record haul, five towns in a single day: Nadrin, Ollomont, Filly, Petite-Mormont and Grande-Mormont, taken in bitter cold and deep snow.

A 33-man volunteer patrol left Filly in the morning of 15 January 1945 to make contact with the Third Army. The Ourthe was crossed in rubber boats dragged over the snow covered approaches. Originally intending to meet the Third Army's patrol in an old barn near Grinvet, the patrol changed its plans because of the severely cold night. There was no reason not to investigate Engreux to see about the possibility of warm billets. When the town was found clear of Germans (indicating that the Regiment could have pushed farther south had it been ordered), Lt Byron Blankenship bedded his patrol down for the night. Contact was finally made 17 January 1945 while press correspondents and photographers, fully as numerous as the patrol members, spent the afternoon recording the meeting.



Beho.

BELGIUM



• BRISTOGNE

• +

• BARVAUX

• BIRON

• HOTTON

• HAMPTERU

• MARCHE

• BEFFE

• MARCOURT SAMREE

• LAROCHE

• BERISMENIL

• WIBRIN

• HOUFFALIZE

• HALCONREUX

• COURTIL

• BOVIENY

• BEHO

GRUBERMAN, 33rd Ave

WINTER IN BELGIUM


BEHO


Armor was not too effective in the First Army counter-attack on the north flank of the Bulge. We had come to the aid of the 2d Armored in the previous campaign, and in our final action in Belgium, at Beho, we aided the 3d Armored. Roads were too slick, temperatures too low, and forests too thick for tanks. A Sherman tank at a standstill is at best a dubious pillbox, and at worst draws enemy fire. The 3d Armored needed assistance in its drive against the southern flank of St. Vith, the last German strongpoint in the Ardennes. We passed through the 83d Division.

The 334th was moved into position on 21 January. Beho was to be taken by a fairly complicated maneuver in which the Second Battalion was to swing from Halconreux through the woods southwest of Beho, while the Third Battalion moved parallel to the Bovigny—Beho road. The 333d Infantry also had Beho as an objective in a drive starting farther north. The southern flank was cleared by the 335th Infantry, nucleus of Task Force Church.

The weather was as bad as it had been in the previous phase of the campaign. It was an impossible problem for the infantryman. Even with the best of care he stood a good chance of frostbite. Too much clothing would restrict him in an attack; too little would freeze him in the preparation. Physical exertion would make him sweat; rest would freeze the perspiration. Dry socks were passed out in chow lines and men wore a pair around the neck to keep them dry with body heat. Overcoats were discarded for many layers of clothing. Typically, a man wore two or three wool undershirts, a wool sweater, two shirts, and a combat jacket. Some men preferred two combat jackets, one to wear normally, the other to be wrapped around the feet in stationary positions. Men let their hair grow long and slept with helmets on to gain the last possible heat.

Both battalions moved out at dawn, 22 January. The Second ran through Halconreux with little difficulty, but in the woods between Halconreux and Beho the enemy had set






Two anti-tank guns have slipped off the road near Cielte. The resulting traffic jam took ten hours to clear.

a defensive line of tanks and infantry which delayed the attack. This resistance seemed to be the right flank of a defensive line established against the 335th Infantry. Although the Second was halted in its attack, it flanked this line by moving to the left, thus opening the defense and relieving pressure on the 335th. The Third Battalion had less trouble. By 1600 it was prepared to attack Beho. It had moved along a road parallel to the Bovigny—Beho road and had found the enemy prepared to defend the primary road, but flanked by the Battalion's line of march. The Battalion reduced the opposition and waited for the Second Battalion. The Second was late and the Third was ordered to take Beho alone. The Third Battalion attacked at 1715 after a heavy artillery preparation. The town was captured and clear by 2000. The Second Battalion moved into the southern portion of the town.

The next morning found the Second Battalion moving out to the high ground east of Beho. E Company had occupied a stone farmhouse when an enemy counter-attack moved against it. Tanks, 200 SS infantry, and artillery menaced the position. It seemed as if the company would be overrun. An artillery barrage was called when the German tanks were only seventy-five yards away. E Company was totally committed; F and K Companies were on the way to assist when fire power turned the Germans back. This was the last action in Belgium, except for a holding action in the 75th Division's sector by our Second Battalion. We were the first to enter and the last to leave, an indication of our fighting ability.





Third Battalion Medics were aided by these weasels.




Linnich, base of operations for the Roer crossing.



OVER THE ROER

After the Ardennes campaign the 84th Division turned north, back to the Ninth Army Sector. There was an old score to settle near Lindern and Linnich. We had paid a terrible price for the six miles between Palenberg and the Roer; now it was time the Germans reached for the check. Beyond the Roer lay the Cologne plain; flat ground with a road net which invited tank action. This plain was the initial objective of the Ninth Army's XIII Corps. It stretched for thirty miles between the Roer and the Rhine, transversed by small streams.

To protect the Roer, the Germans had blown several upstream dams which inundated the valley and forced us to put our plans aside for a few weeks. The dams were blown 12 hours before our assault was to begin. During this time the Regiment established an assembly area in the vicinity of Waubach—Eygelshoven, Holland. It was the first rest the men had received since combat began on November 18th. Two theatres were maintained in Eygelshoven and one in Waubach. Beer and Coca-Cola were trucked from Belgium. Although the move was made under secrecy—all shoulder patches and unit insignia removed—we were in the same area as that occupied by our rear echelon troops during the first month of combat. Old friends billeted the men in neat Dutch houses. Many men felt as if they had acquired a second family, so friendly were the civilians. Holland was starving and only half-liberated. Many straight-faced soldiers went through the mess lines two or three times each meal, feeding



the family with whom they were billeted. The Dutch were friendly because we were Americans, infantry, and had been through their towns before. They were "Mama" and "Papa", and we were the "Vier und Achtsig Diviz."

This friendliness had the effect of unveiling the secrecy with which the move had been made. "Berlin Sally", the adenoidal traitor broadcasting from Radio Arnhem, welcomed us back to the Ninth Army front the day after our arrival and gave us the night's password. She had also ascertained our code name and joked about it. When the attack came, however, the Germans were surprised at its time, strength, and position.


The 333d Infantry maintained the river line and we kept one battalion in reserve. Cannon Company took position and rotated its crews.

Plans were laid carefully. Again, as in the Würm—Mülendorf attack, the opening phases of the Prummern attack, and the offensive in the Ardennes, every possibility was analyzed and every precaution taken. Boat drills were held on the Würm and Meuse rivers.

The First Battalion crossed the Roer at 0330, 23 February with the 335th Infantry secure the Corps front, after which the 333d would pass through our positions. The artillery feinted each night for two nights preceding the attack. Smoke was generated to mask the work of our combat engineers who prepared the bank for crossing. The enemy responded with nebelwerfer fire.

The First Battalion crossed the Roer at 0330 23 February 1945 after the most intensive barrage of the war. C Company was on the left, A on the right, and B in reserve. The artillery barrage was so violent that the enemy was unable to respond against the leading elements of the First Battalion. The crossing was smooth. Behind the leading elements row on row of weapons fired overhead support, from AA 50-81 mm mortars pounding the beach to knock out mines, through the 105's, 155 howitzers and rifles, and our largest field pieces, the 240's. The artillery numbered 27 battalions in support of the Regiment. By 1400 the AA guns had fired three hundred thousand rounds from their positions.

A and C Companies scrambled ashore and regrouped along a railroad parallel to the river. B Company, in reserve, met



The sunlit site is the crossing area for our assault over the Roer.



Caught by machine gun fire, these five soldiers from Company C were dead before the boat crossed the Roer.

stronger fire when it came across, but the leading companies were moving from the track by this time. The combat engineers were unable to build footbridges for the Third Battalion.

The right boundary of the First Battalion was Glimbach, an objective of the 102d Division. Glimbach was a risk. To assault Korrenzig from the south meant a chance that the First would be flanked if the 102d did not reach Glimbach in time. As soon as B Company was across it was deployed around the town to protect the flank. At 0720 Korrenzig was taken against moderate resistance. By this time the enemy had discovered our crossing site and was shelling it heavily. The Third Battalion was crossing, to be followed by the Second, but there was no bridge as yet.

Rurich was next. The attack went off without artillery preparation. The First Battalion met small arms fire in the town, but secured it by 1415, a few minutes before the final elements of the Third Battalion were across the river. A footbridge had been secured and a bridge for heavier equipment was under construction. The attack continued in inverse order of Battalions: Third, Second, and First in reserve. We had secured the Corps bridgehead and were to widen the base by seizing Baal.

The expected counter-attack was started by the Germans about 1500 in the 102d Division's area. We caught bits of action, particularly strafing from enemy aircraft who were after the heavy bridge near our area. The Third moved into Baal against light resistance but was met by three or four strong counter-attacks. The Rurich—Baal road was made untenable by German artillery and sniper fire, causing the Second to swing off into a wooded area on the right where they encountered and dispersed small forces of infantry and tanks.

The Third Battalion was heavily counter-attacked again, shortly before midnight. Baal crackled with small arms fire, as the Third Battalion's outposts were driven in. The Germans drove into the city, forcing the Third to fall back behind railroad tracks which bisected the town. There were a few blocks of disputed territory in which the Germans held one house and the Americans the next. In other instances, the Germans held the bottom floor and the Americans the top floors. They shot through the ceiling and we fired down. The Second Bat-



The Roer at Linnich from the East and West.





"Krokodiles" wait for the Roer crossing.



Last Outpost before Würm.

talion supported the Third. The fight continued into morning. Resistance was overcome.

Throughout the first four days of combat we moved against spotty resistance to Granterath, Hetzerath and Matzerath. Hetzerath was taken by the First Battalion. A command post was established in a schoolhouse near the town. Suddenly six German TD's appeared, supported by infantry. Communications were poor but the radio attempted to reach the supporting artillery. The Battalion headquarters was reduced to M1 fire until artillery support arrived. The Third Battalion again had its outposts in Granterath driven in, but the Germans were blocked.

These counterattacks could not disguise the effectiveness of our position. All German resistance was uncoordinated and their attacks became weaker. Resistance to the front had ceased. We had broken through.

To exploit the breakthrough, Task Force Church, led by Brigadier General John H. Church, was formed. The Task Force which spearheaded the drive into the Cologne plain consisted of the 334th Infantry, the 771st Tank Battalion, the 84th Reconnaissance Troops, with Anti-Aircraft and Service units attached. As Captain Charles Willson, S-3 of the Second Battalion, put it, "It was a new kind of front, twenty miles deep and one tank wide."

It was hard for the doughboys of A Company to understand their part in the action. Previously tanks had been helpful, but it was an unwritten axiom to stay a respectful distance from them because they drew enemy fire. "My heart was in my mouth," said Pfc Royce MacDougal of A Company, "when they told us to get on the tanks. I reckoned we would go about three hundred yards before we dismounted. I felt like a movable clay duck in a shooting gallery."

A Company went ten miles the first day of the breakthrough. Behind the tanks stretched twenty miles of trucks carrying equipment and personnel. This was strange warfare. It had taken us four days to move 1100 yards across the Linnich—Lindern road; we were now covering the same distance in four minutes. It was a comfortable war, towns were taken which had electric light and dry rooms. One German major was interrupted at breakfast by doughboys who took him and his staff just as they were sitting down. The hungry infantrymen finished the German breakfast. Com-



This railroad station was a hotspot at Korrenzig, but L Company took over.



These Germans are glad to quit at Hetzerath.



309th Engineers move through Erkeienz. The twigs on the ground and the torn up trees are the result of the artillery preparation.

munications were in with the German rear, and a few men were calling Berlin to inform the German General Staff that the 334th was on its way.


Our prisoners were of all classes: Air Force, Service, even a few sailors of the German Navy. They were searched and sent on foot to the rear of the convoy in a continuous stream. There was varying resistance to the front. The column was cut in half at one point when a bridge was blown. At Waldneil stronger resistance was met, necessitating the deployment of the First Battalion.

The area around Waldneil was a refitting place for a German paratroop army. We bypassed Waldneil against resistance and took a few towns to form a perimeter defense for the night 27—28 February. The Germans were attempting to make a stand in this area for we found continually stronger resistance and a Nazi artillery unit moving up. We were not equipped to fight a night action, and this delay allowed the Germans to build strong defenses east of Waldneil. The key to this defense was the position Eicken—Berg, two small towns straddling our route of advance. In the most brutal small arms fight of the campaign, G Company killed 49 of 50 Germans in an assault which developed into a bayonet and hand to hand fight.


All three battalions were committed in the perimeter defence near Waldneil, but after the Berg—Eicken fight there was little resistance. We had been advancing continually for six days without rest under the unduplicated tension of infantry attack. Nerves were raw, tempers immediately apparent, but the combat efficiency built of previous battles did not depart.

After the Waldneil fight the Third Battalion, led by K Company, moved to the front of the column. At one point near Boisheim, when it was important the enemy knew nothing of our approach, the Third Battalion used silent "commando" tactics. Here 197 PW's were disarmed without a shot being fired. Communications to Boisheim were cut so the alarm would not be spread.

The Third Battalion raced in to Boisheim, completely surprising the garrison. Resistance was haphazard and an artillery unit was captured moving into position. We were so far front that it was necessary to halt and wait for the rest of the Division to catch up. Also, Task Force Church was dis-



Small arms fire in the model village before Waldniel.



The small arms has become heavier, and everyone has found a sheltered spot.


solved and the change of command required a shift in organization. We kept one company of our tanks.

At 1400 2 March 1945 the First Battalion again mounted tanks, drove east, and took St Tonis. Strong antitank resistance in the town kept our tanks buttoned up and the infantry hugging the ground. The tanks pulled into defilade but could not move. German infantry went after our vehicles. The infantry riding the tanks fought off the Germans. C Company walked from St Tonis to Holz. In the meantime, higher headquarters ordered a 90 degree turn to the north. We swung around the outskirts of Krefeld and made for Homberg, opposite Duisburg on the Rhine. From Krefeld to Moers was a slow task.

The Germans were attempting to hold an area on the west bank of the Rhine at Wesel and our advance struck the flank of this "bridgehead". At daylight the Third Battalion passed through the First. The enemy defense around Moers took time for us to solve.

On the southern outskirts of Moers the Second Battalion passed through the Third. Parts of both Battalions were resting in a large chateau near the town when the Germans counter-attacked strongly with artillery. It was a dark night and little could be seen. The attack was principally mortar fire, but enough small arms was intermingled to signify a large force. Artillery support was called and fire dispersed over the area from which the attack was thought to be coming. The enemy pulled out in the direction of Moers. Our attack moved forward again.

The enemy made a strong fight near the outskirts of Moers, holding up the Third Battalion. The Second Battalion was sent around the left of the force, but it was held. The First Battalion moved between the other two, artillery was used, and the enemy fell back from the southwest corner of Moers. In the southeast portion of Moers the First Battalion was halted by emplaced riflemen and machine guns in a skirmish line along the crest of a railroad. The battalion flanked the opposition and continued. It was completely dark and the individual riflemen of the attacking battalions were in danger of losing flank contact. Every noise had become an enemy, and sleepless doughboys identified the shuttling black shadows of Moers and Homberg as hostile strangers. Moving across a deserted railroad net in darkness was a difficult job-



The Air Force had worked over Krefeld.




The reserves close up to the Rhine. The Germans had a stiff defense along this railroad embankment.




Resistance to the front has slowed up Task Force Church.

and when the report came down that the First Battalion had encountered mines, even the earth seemed unfriendly.

The infantrymen did not worry much about who would have the credit for reaching the Rhine. We had spearheaded the XIII Corps for 42 miles, collected 8500 prisoners and had fought continuously since 23 February. K and I Companies reached the Rhine abreast at 0100, 5 March 1945. F and G Companies, with a First Battalion patrol, came to the Rhine at 0420. The important thing was that we had reached our objective. The bridge was out, discontinuing our attack. The 334th had done all it had been asked.






German wreckage on the road to Waldnietel.



The Germans don't trust us, and we don't trust them. Rurich, Germany.



Pfc Cecil F. Kerliney, Pfc James Lovette, Cpl Theodore Darden,
Pfc Martin Arroyo, Pvt John De Boer and Pfc Archie Doll
clean a 57mm AT gun near Marcouray.



Brigadier General John H. Church.



638th TD's move through Grantenath.

THE RHINE TO THE ELBE

Homberg was our first taste of military occupation. A strict non-fraternization policy was in force, but the stay was relatively pleasant, for we had clean sheets, warm water, and long sleeping hours. We maintained 50% of two battalions on the Rhine River line, but there was only scattered action; a few shells, and scattered patrols. It was a difficult job occupying and holding the line. It was, as one soldier put it, "Get in the foxhole, but keep your shoes shined." The Germans were attempting to find out about us and they stared as often as we stared back. One thing was obvious: there were no Nazis in Germany. Every German told us he had hated Hitler for years, was glad the war was over, and had several relatives in the States. There was no reason why the Germans and Americans could not get along, the war was going to be over soon, and if the Americans would only understand how barbaric Russia was, it would be easier for the Germans and Yanks to be friends. Their talk had little effect.

A movie theatre was put into operation 400 yards from the Rhine but the friendly Germans found a way to communicate the position to their artillery across the river, and the theatre was bracketed. There were no casualties. Some friendly young German males were caught signaling a strafing plane, pointing out the location of the Regimental Command Post. The Germans were terribly glad we were there instead of the barbaric Russians, but they lodged hundreds of complaints against the American soldiers at the local Military Government office. They fawned: be friendly, can we do your washing, will you have a beer? But the men in F and G Companies remembered the plainly marked medics whom the Germans had killed at Devantave. If a man wanted to remember, there were plenty of reasons to keep away from the Germans. We carried out the non-fraternization program.

The training also seemed incongruous to the men. They were taken from the front lines to classes in familiarization with new weapons, hikes, ballfields, showers, and critiques of past actions. Road marches, calisthenics and organized



Liberated Italians, Russians, Poles and French start home from Lohne, Germany



T/Sgt Henry S. Yarborough, M3 under arm, rides herd on PW's in Moers.

athletics were also conducted. We fired at targets of opportunity, generated smoke as a feint and sent patrols across the Rhine.

German civilians were stopped and their papers examined. We took eight hundred prisoners in March, many of whom were soldiers hiding in civilian clothes. Everybody was willing to talk about German positions and arms, but it all added to the same thing: Germany "kaput," there are no defenses in Duisburg. One day the troops could see white flags waving from the houses in Duisburg, across the river. The next day the flags were gone. They appeared and disappeared throughout the month. On the day three armies, the Ninth, British Second, and Allied Airborne, seized a bridgehead near Wesel the flags reappeared again and a daylight patrol from F Company was told by citizens of Duisburg that they would be happy to surrender. Within a short time the 75th Division reported friendly troops across the Rhine, and Ruhrort was taken by troops of the XVI Corps, pinching out the Second Battalion.

In the last week of our stay, the Ninth Army crossed the Rhine at a point farther north in a movement which was later to envelop the Ruhr by meeting the First Army. Our Corps was in reserve, to be committed when the XVI Corps swung south for the encirclement. The British were across north of the Ninth Army bridgehead, and the 17th Airborne Division had been committed near Wesel to secure the bridgehead. The play was around another end. We could see only the interference: artillery and constant swarms of fighters and bombers.

We were to move on 1 April, twenty-five days after arriving in Moers. The 335th was on the north, the 333d on the south, and we were the middle, behind the 5th Armored Division, the latter engaged in a slashing tank move which prepared the way for the Infantry. Our job was to mop up scattered pockets of resistance behind the leading elements and to prevent the Germans from reforming after the tanks had moved through their positions. We crossed the Rhine 1 April and reached the Elbe 14 April, an advance of 250 miles in a fortnight. The Roer—Rhine advance had been a preparation for this move.

The 334th Infantry became Regimental Combat Team 334 when the 326th FA, D Battery 557 AAA, 1st Platoon Co. B



Germans loot their stores at Bad Oeyenhausen.



H Company machine gunners walk unconcernedly through Hannover.



The Jerries had this road zeroed in. A TD is knocked out, and a recon car of the 638th TD's moves ahead.

309th Engineers, Co. B 638th TD Battalion, and Co. B 309th Medics were attached.

We waited for one day in the vicinity of Erle, Germany, for the leading elements to clear Munster. Local security was sent out and a captured hospital was guarded. On 3 April we made a move to another assembly area near Appelhausen, waiting for clear roads ahead. In the previous day's move we passed wreckage of the gliders which had carried the 17th Airborne, part of the Allied Airborne Army. Gliders were strewn in every position and at every angle among the trees and fields of the assembly area. This was a spectacular sight.

As we moved, the shiny brass lid over the German cesspool was taken away. Lining the streets in our path were thousands of liberated Allies, prisoners of war and slave laborers. This was the day for which they had been waiting. Many, including the Russians and the Poles, were headed west. Some stood on a street corner saluting every vehicle in a thirty mile convoy. They had saved their uniforms for this day, and although the weather was in a slow turn to German spring, they stood in full uniform including overcoat. When we halted they came to our trucks, telling us unbelievable stories of suffering, of thousands killed and millions starved, of unmentionable cruelties. A British soldier captured at El Alemein in Africa asked how we had ever built as much might as he had seen passing through. Sniffing the warm "C" rations and noting the frightened Germans around him, he begged us to take him along. "I'm still a fighter."


Munster was completely destroyed as we passed through, so pulverized that a mist of rubble hung in the air. On the walls, punctured by shrapnel and small arms fire were the impotent German mottoes: "Our Victory is Adolf Hitler," "Germany Saves Europe from Bolshevism," and later the explanatory "Germany is all Europe." The Germans stood in the streets or peered from windows from which a white rag was displayed. The white rags and the smell of battle were good indications of how far away the front was. When we were close the streets were deserted, a window would fly open allowing a white flag to be thrust out, and then be slammed. The smell of battle which we had learned so well at Prummern hung over the towns where there had been resistance. The usual procedure was to roll up to the town, announce over the loudspeaker that resistance was hopeless




The Rhine separates Homberg and Duisburg.



L Company deploys at Buckburg.



Baal, Germany. Note sign on tree.



First Battalion moves up to the Roer.

and talk to the burgomeister. If the town resisted, it was flattened. If a sniper shot from a house, the house was burned down.

We moved to Bad Oeynhausen 4 April 1945 and found the bridges over the Weser blown. We were to cross at a bridge in the 335th sector and take the north flank, which would put us on the north flank of the AEF.

The Third Battalion led. The river crossing took all night 5—6 April because of the steep approach on the opposite side of the river. The Germans had dug in on a wooded ridge and constructed a familiar type of road block near Buckburg. The Third Battalion flanked the block and the Combat Engineers removed the obstacle. Farther up the line of advance the Third Battalion ran into a strong enemy force, dug in and supported by self-propelled guns. L Company, leading the convoy, deployed. The resistance was very stiff frontally, there were a few casualties, and the rest of the Battalion was thrown into the fight. This was the first action since we had crossed the Rhine.

As the fight continued, it was apparent that the Germans had about 800—1000 men in prepared positions around the town. If we were to force Buckburg it meant that we would have to commit the major portion of the Regiment. Our mission at the time was to secure the bridges across the Leine River. The Regimental Commander decided to bypass Buckburg. Reconnaissance elements and tanks were sent around the left flank to discover resistance. There was little to be found. The First Battalion moved to the north with the rest of the Regiment following. Deinsen held up the tanks and the First Battalion for a short while, but the town was cleared. The Third Battalion was ordered to disengage and follow the Second Battalion. This move prevented a delay of our forward movement, which meant the Germans would not have time for a stand elsewhere, and flanked Buckburg for the 335th which cleared it the following day.

So completely disorganized were the Germans, and so dark was the night that enemy units attached vehicles to our convoy. We did not see them nor they us, but a few were recognized when they attempted to pass through the convoy. Six or eight of them were riddled by pointblank fire as they moved through our line. In the rear of the convoy Cannon Company had converted an empty two and a half ton truck

into a PW cage. As we flushed Germans and motioned them to the rear, the men of Cannon Company put the Nazis in the truck. When the truck became too full it was unloaded at the nearest MP post.

The First Battalion cleared Stadthagen by 0215, 8 April 1945. We had been moving continuously all night, and the armor leading the column was manned by quiet soldiers. As the Germans slept behind blackout shutters they heard the sound of our armor and did not hear any noises of battle. It was natural for them to believe the sounds they heard were their Panzer divisions moving about to meet the American offensive. The next morning the civilians opened their shutters amazedly to find American soldiers building fires along the road and cooking emergency rations. A few soldiers knocked on the door and asked for warm water for coffee and shaving. Wehrmacht rear echelon troops were awakened with varying gentleness from their beds, told to dress, and sent to PW cages at the rear of the convoy. Every house held a few soldiers, some of whom displayed discharges issued the day before.

The Regiment was approaching Hannover. Originally the Germans had intended to defend Hannover strongly. The outer defense was to be conducted in the circle of small villages which surrounded the town.

The defensive preparations were in varying depths, but our sector started twenty miles from the center of town. The enemy used every possible weapon in the outer defenses including batteries of flak guns. At one point A and C Companies deployed over flat terrain against four batteries of flak guns. Cannon Company and the 326th FA were used in counterbattery fire. Although men were dropping, A and C Companies did not hesitate in the advance. The guns, manned by Italians commanded by German officers, were finally abandoned. At this time the Second Battalion was fighting slowly through Meyenfeld, Berenbostel, and Stalingen.

At 2300 the Second Battalion was ordered to secure the bridges into Hannover. The German OPL had Engelbostel as one anchor, and it was through this town that F Company moved to take the bridges over the Weser—Elbe Canal. The tanks were sent to the rear of the column because they were too noisy for a night movement. The First and Second followed F Company at an hour's interval. The move was quiet. A



Duisburg, foreground. Homberg, background.




771st Tankers found some resistance in Bielefeld.



BERLIN



Burgomnik, 3349/16



German soldier approached the column and asked "Was ist das Companie?" "I'll be a crock . . .!" shouted an E Company man. The German ran away. F Company bypassed several tanks and took the objectives.

Hannover was taken by all combat units of the Division, but our night work and drive the next morning made the job easier than was expected. Second and Third Battalions mounted tanks and trucks after the 309th Engineers had removed demolition charges. We tore into Hannover in the early morning hours of 10 April 1945. The Second Battalion trucks zig-zagged through the streets searching for resistance. The speed of our move flanked many German positions in the town.

The streets were lined with refugees and Germans cheering our troops. The SS had organized the Volkssturm resistance, and then pulled out of town, realizing the position was hopeless. The departure of the SS and the speedy drive of our Second and Third Battalions were signals to burn the Volkssturm armband, get rid of the panzerfaust, and hang the white flag from the window. We drove through the streets between five story tenement houses, alternately watching the civilians and the top story windows which were excellent places for snipers. The First Battalion moved through the city and secured bridges for the next day's advance. RCT 334 billeted in Hannover for one night.

On 11 April 1945 we moved forward to Burgdorf after a short fight at Altwarmbuchen.

The fall of Burgdorf was a signal to change our tactics. The separate Battalions were sent on roughly parallel routes through the entire area of our advance. There was no danger in spreading the Regiment more thinly because resistance to the front had become little more than roadblocks, destroyed bridges and small bands of infantry. The terrain had become wooded and hilly, offering more chance of concealment for the enemy.

All the towns we passed through looked alike to the men on the trucks. Our casualties after Hannover did not exceed two figures. Near Flettmar the Third Battalion met a strong force of infantry, half-tracks, and self-propelled guns which veered off to the area where Service Company was billeted. This was part of Division von Clausewitz which operated in our rear for several days. Its attack was headed off by our




Total war. The man on the left was not too old to fire a machine gun from a pill box. The young boy was outside Waldneil and ran screaming to our lines from no man's land.

Third Battalion and the Third Battalion, 333d Infantry. The First Battalion had been ordered to the Elbe, attached to the 5th Armored Division, to secure a bridgehead. When the Battalion arrived at the Elbe, reconnaissance showed that the Germans we had been chasing for 250 miles were across the river, prepared to fight. It would take more than a battalion of infantry to establish a bridgehead. At 2100 14 April, two weeks after crossing the Rhine, the Regiment was deployed near the banks of the Elbe River. We had made our last advance in the European Theatre.

Generally, the Elbe front was quiet. The Germans attempted one counter-attack in the Third Battalion area but it was stamped down with artillery fire. We were dug in on the west side of the river. Our patrols showed that the Germans were along the levee on the east side of the river. We maintained outposts, laid trip flares and conducted all defensive measures. Behind us were few Allied troops. Our supply columns were attacked by a few German units which were later bottled in the Harz Mountains. A fully loaded mail truck was lost.

The Russian offensive near Berlin, only 50 miles away, sent a backwash of refugees to the German side of the Elbe. A few civilians and soldiers came across the river to us, seared, they said, by the hot breath of the Russians. We knew it would not be long before we met the Soviet forces.

The prisoners came across in increasing numbers. A hospital on barges floated from Berlin by canal and tied at a wharf in the Third Battalion area. At first we took all who wanted to come across, but soon the far bank of the river was filled with frightened Germans. We could not permit civilians to cross, nor had we facilities for the wounded. Thousands of able-bodied German soldiers wanted to surrender. Whole German divisions marched to the river bank and obediently waited for boats to transport them. At times the Regimental PW cages held prisoners numbering three times the strength of the Regiment. When we ran short of diesel fuel for the barges, the Germans drained the vehicles with which they had driven to the bank. Hysterical men and women stripped to swim the Elbe. Nazi propaganda had invented a ridiculous rumor that the British and Americans had declared war on Russia. Many asked if they would have to continue fighting the Soviets.




The last front — the Elbe.

Several patrols were sent across the River to make contact with the Reds, but all returned unsuccessfully. First contact was made by the 69th Division farther south. At 1810 2 May 1945 contact was made in the Third Battalion sector when a Russian captain rowed across to make liaison with American Headquarters. Later in the day the Russians closed up along the Elbe, ending our campaign in the European Theatre of Operations.

VE day was announced five days later, an official end to the fight. We had gone seven thousand miles from Claiborne and Howze, and had changed a mindful of ideas in seven months of combat. It was over, and many of our friends were dead. That was the principal feeling when VE was announced. The men had gone into battle as tutored civilians, and had come out as succesful veterans in a crack regiment. We had done a good job. We were glad it was over.



Twenty separate units make up a regiment. Consequently twenty separate histories make up a regiment's history. In the process of selection and compilation many episodes were regretfully put aside because of technical limitations. To compensate, each company has submitted one story it believes should be told, taken from the mass of incidents which make its history.



WALDNIEL

Our second day of the spearhead from the Roer to the Rhine was almost as eventful as the first. Company A men won't forget Waldniel.

After our first day on tanks we stopped at what we called the "Model Village." We spent the night under shelling from Jerry. We were all pretty fagged out after the day we had just gone through, but Jerry didn't want us to get any rest at all. We stuck it out okay.

The following day we were to push off again through Waldniel and towards the Rhine. The town of Waldniel was supposedly in friendly hands.

We approached the town through a low cut in the road. Hell cut loose. The heavy boom of a panzerfaust sounded and the Jerries scored a direct hit on the lead tank ridden by S/Sgt Charles Slifco, Sgt Paul M. Vasington and Pfc Robert L. Curtis.

Another tank had tried to break through and was knocked out farther down the road. Three tankers were wounded and had taken cover beneath the tank. Between us and the tankers was approximately 150 yards of open road covered by deadly machine gun fire. The tankers needed help badly and A Company had to get to Waldniel and knock out the opposition.

T/Sgt James W. Kuykendall, acting first platoon leader, Lt Myron Henitzman and T/Sgt James A. Strodel, platoon leader and platoon sergeant of the second platoon, quickly deployed their men on each side of the road. The third platoon, led by Lt Richard K. Hawkins, was rushed forward to give help.

A dugout just at the edge of the clearing was manned by several Krauts with bazookas and rifles. Sgt Kuykendall and Sgt Mack L. Morris went after it with guns blazing and grenades flying. Six Germans surrendered; three died.

Sgt Kuykendall and Sgt Morris advanced to the burning tank for temporary cover. Sgt Kuykendall called for Sgt Morris to take up a firing position to relieve some of the pressure on the tankers. Sgt Vasington and Pfc Otha G. Smith reached the wounded tankers and dragged them to the

comparative safety of a nearby ditch where they gave them first aid.

The attack on the buildings and trenches was launched. Pfc Curtis slammed a bazooka shell into the building from which the most fire was coming. Some Germans retreated to the trenches in the rear, some chose to stay and hold out. Pfc's Thomas Fabiano, Elrey Phaup, and Fred R. Pritchard assaulted those remaining in the house with grenades and rifle fire, capturing several Germans. Sgt Strodel brought his platoon around to the right. A machine gun burst wounded him.

Sgt James H. Foster took his squad around to the side of a building and ran into another machine gun. Before the gunner could collect his wits, one of the boys in Foster's squad shot him. The other gunner surrendered.

By now we had all the houses, but most of the Jerries had retreated to the trenches behind and were pouring it on us. Sgt Morris after an effective barrage of grenades and small arms fire from the house led an attack against the trenches. When he reached the head of the trench he lobbed a grenade, killed several Krauts, and everyone cut loose. It was then that Jerry started to get wise. 125 Germans were in the trench when we started. When we finished about half came out with their hands up screaming "Kamerad". The rest were in the trench to stay.

We then dug in and secured the town. Jerry lobbed in a lot of shells and pulled a counter-attack, but it failed and our lines held. We were ready to push on again for our next objective.



Pfc James H. Griffith — Sgt Roy D. Moore



Sgt Mack L. Morris — Sgt Paul M. Vasington — Pfc Thomas A. Fabiano



S/Sgt Manuel De Ferreire — Cpl Jack Ecroyd — Sgt Raymond L. Gould



Lt Richard K. Hawkins — Lt Myron H. Heintzman

THE BATTLE FOR LEIFFARTH

Every campaign can be broken down into many stories. Stories of regiment, battalions, companies, platoons and individual soldiers. The story that stands out prominently in the minds of the men of B Company is the battle for the town of Leiffarth. In pre-war Germany the small town was a whistle stop but during the Siegfried battle it was a link that the enemy gave up only after a fanatical defense.

The original plan was for B Company to assault, take, and hold the high ground in front of Leiffarth. This accomplished, A and C Companies were to move through and take the town. Capt Alcee L. Peters, Jr led the company out of the tank trap IP at 0700 the morning of 1 December with the first platoon on the right, the third on the left and the second in reserve. Advancing only four or five hundred yards after a five minute artillery preparation, the entire company was checked by murderous machine gun and 88 fire from six dug-in German tanks and two pillboxes. Supporting the enemy tanks were mortars and artillery.

Casualties were very heavy in this encounter and the attack was momentarily halted. The light machine guns manned by Sgt Raymond S. Stahler, Pfc Charles W. Black, Sgt James G. Watson and Pfc Charles W. Chambers returned fire effectively until a direct hit killed Pfc Stahler and wrecked the gun. Mortarmen Sgt Delbert A. Sloan and Pfc Harold A. M. Shock and Enoch J. Sellars badly damaged one of the enemy tanks.

The men rapidly dug in and by noon the sector was pretty quiet until it was decided to advance again to take the high ground. Under the leadership of T/Sgt Clyde W. Montgomery, the first platoon set out at the appointed time to accomplish the mission but the fire was so intense that Capt Peters called them back.

In view of the heavy casualties and the apparent strength of the enemy, the attack was delayed until 3 December after two nights and one day in the foxholes. On 1300 of D-Day the first and second platoon assaulted while the third was in reserve. A five minute preparation preceded our advance into the town, and we followed the artillery barrage by seventy-

five yards. We so surprised the enemy that our entrance into the town did not prove too difficult.

The mopping up was accomplished quickly under the platoon leaders, S/Sgt Ira D. Munday, Lt Howard Buchanan, Lt Tomlinson C. Ulbricht, and T/Sgt John Simco. T/Sgt Addison Mc Clung led a small group into the neighboring village of Würm, captured fifteen prisoners and a mortar, but withdrew.

As soon as Leiffarth was taken, a defensive line was dug at the edge of the town and buildings were selected for the Company CP and aid station. S/Sgt Robert O'Horo was killed at this time as he was preparing the defenses. By the time the reorganization was complete, the enemy was shelling the town heavily and any movement was extremely hazardous. It was not until after dark that communications could be established and contact maintained between all units of the company. Runners Pfc's Leslie O. Fulton, Delbert A. Gwinnup, Walter H. Mitton and Arthur W. Jacob, Jr were kept busy throughout the operation. In the meantime, C Company moved into the town and helped to strengthen the defense by filling in the gaps in the line.

During the night it was impossible to bring in rations or water and at 0400 the enemy launched the first of several counter-attacks. Throughout the night tanks were heard rumbling in the distance and as the sound grew closer, the men grew more alert. Aided by the "artificial moonlight" provided by mammoth searchlights, we finally spotted the tanks some hundred yards away. Backing up the tanks were about one hundred riflemen. Our men fired at the attackers but the direct fire from the tanks' guns proved to be too much for the doughs and the majority of the third platoon with several men from the first and fourth platoons were taken prisoner. This left open our entire left flank. The enemy was stopped, however, by very effective artillery and mortar fire. Pfc's Walter R. Davis and Howard Rasmussen, the two radio operators, played a most important part in stopping this attack by staying at their radio throughout the night. Davis had received a face wound during the attack but refused treatment until safety was assured for the company.

The next morning T/Sgt Addison McClung and Sgt Lewis F. Newsom took the remnants of the third platoon and, with a machine gun section from D Company, filled in the gap



T/5 Terrell Teutsch



Sgt Charles Chambers — S/Sgt Hughart Stump — Sgt Cecil Brown —
Pfc Walter Mitton



Pfc Walter Davis — Sgt George Johnson — Pfc Arthur Jacob



Pfc Edwin Rosenthaler — Sgt Joseph Vierra — Pfc Charles Carter
T/Sgt Addison McClung

created by the capture of the men. That night Sgt George N. Johnson, Jr made two perilous journeys back into our lines to obtain reinforcements; an armored infantry company from the 7th Armored Division.

Except for enemy patrols, the next few days were relatively quiet. Lt Buchanan led one our own patrols into Würm but heavy machine gun fire forced them to return. Fortunately, the supplies of foodstuff were sufficient and they supplemented the C and K rations brought by litter bearers and mortarmen. Pfc Joseph P. Vierra, utilizing available supplies of food in the town, kept the men from hunger with at least one hot meal a day. Pfc William L. Desmarais, Ford O. Roan, Samuel C. Carone and Cleon A. Nelson came up from the kitchen and supply area to act as litter bearers.

The following night under mortar fire, we withdrew from Leiffarth to return to Geilenkirchen for a much needed rest. We all thought that the Leiffarth incident was closed, but after three days in Geilenkirchen, we again headed for the dreaded town. The heavy losses inflicted on us were reflected by the handfull of men who embarked on our second trip to Leiffarth. We started back with visions of a terrible stay in the town, and we were right. The next night the enemy launched the most vicious counter-attack we had ever seen.

At 0400 S/Sgt Munday and Pfc Richard C. Youngblood were standing guard at a listening post on the edge of the town when a movement was heard coming from Würm. It proved to be a company of Germans, and the two guards immediately woke an AT crew in the basement. The enemy stopped near the listening post after setting off a trip flare. Pfc Youngblood threw a grenade in their midst causing many casualties. Using all the weapons available, the two men completely confused the attacking force. Only after the enemy had damaged the house, were they finally repulsed. In another part of town the attackers gained entrance into Charley Company's CP but they were also forced to withdraw after having caused many casualties.

All this time Capt Peters was directing artillery on the German force. The results of the attack were disastrous to the Germans who lost 70 percent of their force. After daylight Pfc Gerald E. Rosenfeld and Pvt Fred A. Lesser, under a white flag, went into a mine field to remove enemy wounded.

Medics T/5 Terrell Teutsch, Pfc Samuel Gionourakos, and Pvt Virgil L. Parker worked tirelessly throughout the entire action, caring for their wounded comrades. Several times they ventured to the dug-in positions through merciless artillery poundings to carry litter patients to safety.

THE REGIMENT'S EYES

T/O strength for a rifle company is 193 men, including officers. When Charley Company counted off after the non-stop ride to Belgium, there were only 67 men to answer "here" to roll call.

No one knew anything about the disposition of the enemy or the direction from which his attack would come. Tactically, we were blind. To give the Regiment eyes and to warn of the German's approach, Charley Company, one third strength, was chosen to be the outpost company. We were sent 2000 yards ahead of our main line of resistance to build and man on outpost line on the forward slope of a ridge running parallel to the lines. There were five outposts, commanded by Lt Henry C. deGrummond, Jr. Each observation post was placed before a town. Communications were installed on 22 December and we waited for Jerry to show up.

We didn't have to wait long. At Outpost Two on the 23d appeared a German lieutenant on a motorcycle. S/Sgt Ambrose Cerrito's crew covered him with rifles and forced him to surrender. The documents we secured from him gave us our first information as to the units and direction of the German attack. Shortly after we had taken the German, we were warned of the approach of an enemy armored column and Outposts One and Two withdrew to Verdenne.

On the 24th we were at Outpost Two when the Germans shelled us heavily. Again, an armored column, part of the force which took Verdenne, swung up to the outpost. S/Sgt Albert F. Goetze reported the enemy to higher headquarters and moved the personnel back. We were cut off from Verdenne and somewhat confused. A truck from Anti-Tank Company was taking off like a big, fast bird, but the driver stopped long enough for us to crawl on. About a mile farther we were stopped by an officer who told us to dig in. We helped K Company seal off the German penetration.

So far the attacks had been at the right flank. On the 25th the Jerries hit our other flank, guarded by Outposts Three, Four and Five. Seven Kraut tanks and supporting infantry overran Three, capturing S/Sgt Maxie Horner and Burt L. Giese. OP Three was in touch with Regiment by radio. We

could hear him: "There are German vehicles approaching, blinking lights. They are supported by infantry, but I can't tell how many. They are past me on the left. They have flanked me on the right and are opening fire. We are surrounded and their fire is getting heavier. Shutting down." Outpost Three was captured.

Outpost Four spotted a heavy reconnaissance patrol, complete with vehicles. Our elements in Hampteau were notified and the patrol withdrew.

On the 26th T/Sgt Walter C. Erickson and his crew at Outpost Four again spotted a heavy German attack. Simultaneously Outpost Five, commanded by Sgt George H. Hall, was hit by heavy forces. Lt deGrummond was heading a patrol to regain contact with Outpost Three. Later we were told that we had sent back warning of an attack of battalion strength. Outpost Four knocked out a Jerry jeep and armored recon car. It was too hot to handle and we again withdrew, to Hotton and later to Bourdon. The Regiment had been prepared for every German attack by the work of Charley Company, the eyes of the 334th.



S/Sgt Ambrose A. Cerrito - Pfc James A. Corr, Jr. - S/Sgt Anthony De Andrea



Pfc James M. Jennings — T/5 Eugene C. Peckham — Sgt Glenn E. Slusser



Lt Layton Smith — T/Sgt George H. Hall — T/4 Elroy Homuth



Sgt Joseph G. Curtis — Pfc William H. Corwin — T/Sgt Curtis C. Robirds —
Sgt Norbert C. Burlinsky

RED-LETTER DAY

OBJECTIVE: Hetzerath

D Company, under command of Capt Theo E. Kerhulas, red-lettered 26 February 1945 for the battalion assault on that German town.

With the first platoon attached to A Company, the second platoon to C Company and the mortar platoon in battalion support, Capt Kerhulas moved into the attack with the forward command group. From this position they directed the deployment of the company and effectively established the perimeter defense later set up by the weapons.

The first platoon moved with A Company north along the main road to the town. Receiving small arms fire from the right flank, the platoon cut across a gully toward the town cemetery. Pfc James F. Maloney was killed by small arms fire in this action. From a position to the right of the cemetery, the platoon emplaced its three guns and offered direct fire on Germans and on two strong points.

Lt Varnum scouted the approach and located a strong point on the right. The platoon then moved forward to the center of the town, one squad at a time. Sgt Robert W. Staples took the first squad through an open field to the left flank. S/Sgt Joseph J. Barron led the remaining section while being covered by S/Sgt Clifford D. Leguin and Pfc Dewey L. Crisp. Leguin, while giving this covering fire, received a burst of enemy fire and was wounded.

In the town Pfc Loren V. Richardson was wounded in attempting to fire on the German strong point on the right.

The platoon set up northeast of Hetzerath in perimeter defense after the complete capture of the town.

Under T/Sgt Vints E. Shumate, the second platoon moved to high ground before Hetzerath in support of C Company. From this position, under the direction of S/Sgt Joseph L. McCarthy, two guns opened fire on entrenched Germans. Overhead fire was laid until the progress of C Company masked the support.

In the evening Pfc Roger R. Yeatter was wounded by concussion during a shelling prior to a German counter-attack. Pfc Samuel M. Brandli led the opening of fire on the

attacking German infantry and the machine guns were effective in the stopping of the attack in this sector.

The 81mm mortar platoon was in position in Baal. Until the final phase of the assault on the objective they had done very little firing. As the line companies prepared to jump off, S/Sgt Michael L. Kordeleski, forward observer, called a barrage from all six guns on the near side of Hetzerath. The weapons were being used at extreme range. The quota of ammunition to be used was to have been thirty rounds per gun. However, the second section, under S/Sgt Ernest A. Trowbridge, was limitlessly supplied by H Company and continued to fire until the cease fire order which was given fifteen minutes after the barrage started.

Lt Williams S. Miller, Jr, Lt Lester C. Kendig, and Cpl James H. Schaub had moved forward before the barrage started to investigate a route of approach to Hetzerath. A route was found which necessitated hand-carrying the weapons. Cpl Schaub was sent to the Baal position to guide the platoon forward.


The mortar platoon moved into positions on the southeast side of Hetzerath while under small arms fire from a German strongpoint on the right. In this position they were rejoined by forward observer team of S/Sgt Kondeleski and Pfc William R. Huber. The weapons were then set up for a perimeter defense of the town. Our fight was over.




Lt Robert F. Hollister — Cpl James H. Schaub — Lt Edward F. Sinclair



F/Sgt Arthur J. Harpold — S/Sgt Arthur B. Roberts — Pfc Loren V. Richardson



Lt Lester C. Kendig — T/Sgt Otis A. Gaylord — Lt Nelson E. Varnum



ROER CROSSING

At the time of the crossing of the Roer River, Headquarters Company, First Battalion, played a large role in the initial waves. Close coordination with the rifle companies was essential, and each man was thoroughly rehearsed on the part he was to play in the operation. Sand tables prepared by the Battalion S-2 Section under the guidance of 1st Lt Robert H. King, assisted by S/Sgt Arthur Bouret and Pvt Kenneth Rowan, clearly showed the terrain and enemy installations of the east bank of the Roer. From the Battalion OP on the west bank of the river, S-2 personnel noted each detail and movement of the enemy forces and installations. No details were left to chance. Each building in both Korrenzig and Rurich, the initial towns to be assaulted, were numbered to aid in hasty identification and to facilitate movement.

Just after dark on 22 February, a detail from the Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon under the command of 2nd Lt Clarence F. Rhea and consisting of T/Sgt Woodrow W. Arceneau, Sgt Lewie A. Burner, T/5 Thomas B. Weaver, Pvt Roy C. Call and several men from the AT platoon set out for Linnich to sandbag the second floor of the old slaughterhouse on the bank of the river. They piled 317 sandbags during four enemy mortar barrages, which on one occasion came so close as to dislodge the piled bags and cause a temporary halt in the operation. But the crew completed the task in just under three and a half hours.

The rest of the company, which was billeted in Leiffarth, made last minute checks of equipment and tried to snatch a few hours sleep. At 2300 S/Sgt Miguel R. Nieves and his kitchen crew put out hot coffee, doughnuts and hot cakes as the last hot meal that the boys would get for a long time. Shortly after chow each man made the final check of his equipment and prepared to move up to the river.

At 0245 the artillery shattered the night with a 45 minute barrage which plastered the river bank and swept over the surrounding area and into the towns of Korrenzig and Rurich. The first wave of the "Fightin First" piled into the assault boats promptly at 0330 and started through the smokey dark-

ness to the other shore. Headquarters Company had its boats mixed with the boats of the rifle companies. AT had two bazooka teams in the first wave commanded by Lt Richard M. Deasy, consisting of S/Sgt Baldwin T. Cecchini, and Elra L. Faulkner, Pfc John J. Flynn, Ralph A. Gaeta, James B. Smith, Douglas J. Harvey, Norman T. Haskins, Fidele Marinone and Robert N. Gessner. Each of the ammunition bearers carried four rounds of ammunition to make 12 rounds for each bazooka. The second Headquarters boat carried the wire teams whose task was to pick up the lines at the rivers edge and string them from the boats to the other side. Two wire teams were made up of S/Sgt Clinton R. Caudill, Sgts Byron McAllister and Charles H. Spencer, T/4 John P. Dzuray, T/5 George P. Morley, Pfc Robert J. Herman, Lawrence H. Carter, Henry A. Darrah, and Charles F. Rockford. The wire crews quickly spliced the line and successfully laid it across the river from the assault boat while under enemy fire. Upon reaching the other bank, Sgt Spencer's crew remained near the water's edge to repair severances.

The second wave brought two more bazooka teams from the AT platoon led by T/Sgt Joseph Cosari, Jr., and consisting of S/Sgt Larren B. Davis, Cpl Sid L. Conrad, Pfc Elmer G. Webb, William H. Rogers, Robert E. Anderson, Edward R. Mello, Robert M. Newbill, Alejandro Zamora, William G. Williams and Billy A. Ford. The second crew carried antitank mines in addition to their ammunition. On the other side, both teams united and followed along behind Baker Company, skirmishing along the way and blasting enemy dugouts. Once in the town of Korrenzig, they set up the anti-tank defense of the town in conjunction with the rifle companies.


The radio section of the company was posted in the slaughterhouse by the river and as soon as the assault troops were across and the foot bridge in, the men carried their 300 radios to join the assault of the troops driving on Korrenzig. T/4 Glen O. Odman crossed over and set up a relay with the CP in Linnich and later went on into Korrenzig after the town was taken. T/4 William A. Keller, Pfc Thomas H. Stone, Jr., and Edward T. Ledd hand-carried the command 284 to the other side of the river over the foot bridge and set up operations along with the command group. S/Sgt B. F. Lancaster handled the radio jeep with the other



Capt William W. James — Capt Robert H. King



Sgt. Kenneth Kowan



Sgt John Berry



S/Sgt Clinton Caudill — Sgt Byron McAllister



Lt Clarence Rhea — T/Sgt Woodrow Arcenau

284, and set out across the treadway with the first vehicles to race up the road through Rurich and join the attack.

The remainder of the Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon handcarried mortar ammunition across with the second wave and followed closely over the shell swept terrain to turn the ammunition over to Dog Company in Korrenzig. The group consisted of Sgts George S. Hutchison, Marvin C. Halloway, Pfc's Clarence Breaux, Guadelupe V. Arredondo, Tillman W. Dean, Howard Allgeier, Jr., Lawrence H. Finley, Nelson B. Marcy, Leroy E. Barnette, Roy T. Dunn, Elo A. Mueller, R. A. Alvin Camp, Emerson J. Haug, Joseph S. Polinsky, Jr., and Lloyd Stroub. Each man was burdened with six rounds of 81mm Mortar HE light and any fragment could have touched off these rounds. All the men reached Korrenzig safely, turned over their ammunition, and set up an ammunition dump in the town while waiting for T/Sgt Arceneau to come across the treadway with the ammunition trucks.

Thus Headquarters Company and their specialized platoons played a large part in the operation and aided materially in assaulting the Nazi river stronghold. The "Fightin First" with a highly coordinated attack had secured initial objectives and was on the move again.



BATTLE OF BEHO

From a wooded assembly area deep within the heart of the Ardennes on 22 January, Easy Company moved out in a night attack. Although the men were veterans of many battles and knew well the enemy they were about to engage, they were glad to be moving after spending cold, miserable hours in foxholes.

We had gone only a short distance when our supporting tanks were forced to fall back because of icy roads and deep snow drifts. Easy Company men then realized that this next battle would be typical of the Belgian battles: thick woods with the Jerries holding more favorable positions. It was snowing much harder now and the infantry continued the attack down each side of a heavily mined road.

From distant high ground we drew artillery fire, and the battalion commander decided on an alternate route. This route afforded us excellent concealment but carried us through heavy woods and deep snow. Sixteen hours after our jump-off we found our way into Beho, arriving at 0100 on 23 January.

We barely had time to eat a "K" ration and get partially thawed out before we pushed off again at 0500. Weary, cold, and hungry doughs were ordered to continue the attack after spending over 20 hours exposed to the elements of an Ardennes winter.

Our orders were to dig in on the high ground about a 1000 yards outside of Beho but before we reached this ridge, we were fired upon by German outposts. Lt James V. Morgia, the executive officer and acting company commander, ordered an immediate attack. The Germans were completely surprised and were unable to man their previously dug positions. The second platoon actually bypassed some Germans who were sleeping in the buildings of the Mansion Neuve Monastery. These were easy prey for our riflemen, although in the darkness it was difficult to distinguish them from our own men. Everyone was shouting and orders could be heard in both English and German.

We ran into machine gun fire from tanks and infantry forcing us to withdraw into a barn. About twenty Germans


in the barn fired at us, but our surprise and superior power forced them to retreat via the near door toward some tanks. Even though these Jerries were armed with automatic weapons, in the confusion that followed they were afraid to fire, and chose to follow their tanks. Meanwhile S/Sgt Walter E. Wright crawled into the barn after neatly disposing of a well concealed machine gun nest firing only thirty feet from where he was lying. He scored a tree burst directly over this enemy position with a rifle grenade. Small arms fire came into the barn from three sides. S/Sgt William H. Lumpkin Jr. had his steel helmet shot from his head while placing his BAR man at an upstairs window. We won the first phase of the battle by occupying the enemy's positions; however, our company was disorganized. The second and third platoons had lost their platoon leaders, Lt Marvin W. Jamison and Lt Clyde S. Laurant Jr.

Sergeants resumed command and we reorganized, treated our wounded, and set up a defense for an expected counter-attack. The Germans counter-attacked twice, first with infantry and then with tanks. The first attack was repulsed with rifle and BAR fire. As BAR's barked from the second story windows, enemy tanks began using their 20mm high explosive shells in the second attack on the stone buildings. The intense small arms fire proved ineffective, and we received a terrific shelling. Three enemy tanks were forced to retreat because of our accurately observed 105mm fire.

The situation was so precarious at one time that the forward observer destroyed his radio. Pfc Robert E. Epley ran back to Beho to get the badly needed artillery support which came just in time to force the retreat of the battered German units. These numbered between 200 and 400 infantry troops and three tanks before the retreat.

We dug in on the ridge and manned outposts until dark.

1st Lt William Thompson



S/Sgt Wesley Muffett
S/Sgt George Mathews
S/Sgt William Lumpkin
Sgt Carl Steubing
Front row:
Pfc Robert Solmon
S/Sgt Sidney Amanuel





Pfc George Karas — Pfc Robert Epley



1st Lt James Morgia

A PERFECT OPERATION

During the long and bitter history of World War II the term "perfect operation" has been applied to a few important battles, but to the men of F Company only one action can ever bear the term "perfect": the capture of Müllendorf, Germany on 18 December 1944. In the words of a crack officer, "That was the day this outfit came into its own as an attacking force. That day we really demonstrated the use of marching fire."

Two days before the jump off the Second Battalion had been relieved at Leiffarth, and was sent to Geilenkirchen to prepare for the Müllendorf battle. On 16 December each platoon leader in Fox Company was informed of the coming operation. We were to coordinate with the First Battalion's attack on Würm. The platoon leaders received many maps and aerial photographs delineating the terrain features, pillboxes and communication trenches. The men were told, "This will be a tough and speedy operation." Due to the closeness of the fighting, men were equipped with M3 machine pistols, additional bazookas, grenade launchers, and BAR's.

With all preparations completed, the company moved to an assembly area in Beeck early in the morning of 18 December. Each man was given rations and additional ammunition. Bazooka teams carried from nine to twelve rounds. As Pfc Edward Rosol said, "If the Jerries had hit me, I would have gone off like an ammunition dump." Rifle grenadiers carried six grenades. M3 men and "ordinary" rifleman were armed with extra magazines (as were BAR teams) and additional bandoliers, plus six grenades per man. It was obvious that this attacking force meant business.

The company was scheduled to leave the assembly area at 1000 and move into a draw outside of Müllendorf which was free from observation. Here they waited for the terrific artillery barrage to lift before opening their attack. Two assault engineers were assigned to the second platoon, designated by Lt Edward Gedrich, company commander, as the leading attack element. Each of the engineers carried a "satchel" charge, in case it became necessary to blast the pillboxes. Before the attack one of the engineers told T/Sgt Harry C. Kelly, "I just want your boys to keep the embrasures

buttoned up with rifle fire, while we move in toward the pillbox." As it later turned out, the engineers never had to use their charges, but did some fancy firing with their M1s instead.

A red flare suddenly shot up indicating the last round of the barrage had been fired. Kelly moved his platoon forward on the double and across a railroad track. The third, led by Lt George M. Hardy, and the first, led by T/Sgt Clarence E. Stephens, followed close behind. As the company poured through the gap, they encountered small arms and sniper fire from nearby shattered houses and pillboxes. Sgt Kelly, firing his M1 with one hand and carrying a 536 radio in the other, ordered his men to return the fire and they immediately cut loose with terrific bursts from all weapons. Sgt Kelly and S/Sgt John Greslick Jr., second squad leader, each attacked enemy pillboxes, tossing smoke bombs down the ventilators. When enemy fire was discovered coming from a pillbox on the left flanks, Pfc Raymond Fusselman Jr. and Charles Danajovits fired two WP rounds into the position and continued moving forward with their platoon. S/Sgt Irvin K. Pierce followed behind the first wave and captured 16 Jerries in a shattered pillbox.

By keeping up a continuous fire the company reached the last objective, a well-covered pillbox, listed on aerial photographs as a "doubtful haystack." The Jerries poured out of the pillbox and attempted to set up a defense in a nearby trench. One Kraut came out with a MG 42 and beltfull of ammunition, but was immediately cut down by a long burst from Pvt Steve Wozenski's BAR. A Jerry captain drew a bead on Pfc Frederick Nock with a Schmeisser, but a burst from Pfc Fusselman's M3 caused the "Hauptmann" to toss away his weapon and give up. A steel bayonet, ably handled by Pfc Marion J. Fuchs aided in this capture.

Suddenly the men discovered "it was all over" as Major James V. Johnston, Battalion CO, rushed to the last trench and told the men, "You did a great job. We've got Müllendorf. Set up for a counter-attack."

The rest was anti-climatic. Everyone felt "great", especially after learning that their company had cleared out 16 pillboxes had taken 84 prisoners, and best of all, suffered NO casualties in the entire operation.

The "post-mortem" lectures gave deserved credit to the




F/Sgt Luther Barker



T/Sgt Ishmel Green



S/Sgt Irvin K. Pearce — T/Sgt Morris Lauwereins — Sgt Julian B. Palmer —
T/Sgt Clarence Stephens — T/Sgt Dale M. Faas



Pfc William Wileox — Pfc Pedro Ornelaz



Pfc Marion J. Fuchs — Pfc Robert Koenig

brilliant planning and coordination, the devastating artillery fire, which drove the Jerries out of the trenches and into the pillboxes, and the able way many dangerous mines were cleaned out. But greatest praise was given to the men, who double timed through mine-laden orchards and fired like hell to teach the vaunted Wehrmacht what "perfect operation" means.

DEATH IN TWO CITIES

This is the story of Company G and its title is "Death in Two Cities."

It is also the story of the 334th's Roer River breakthrough. Company G learned at a terrific price that the dash to the Rhine was a costly thing.

The night of the first day of the Task Force Church drive found the regiment fanned out in defense positions north of the traffic hub of Wegberg. While the men dug in for the night and waited for a counter-attack, word came down that the attack would be resumed the following day. The Second Battalion would lead off. Immediate objectives were the towns of Berg and Eicken, later termed by Company G infantrymen the "Cities of Death."

Company G jumped off from a WPA-like German settlement, known as the "model village," which lay near a road junction not far from the town of Waldniel. The company, operating with the reduced strength of 125 men, led the Second Battalion's drive. To reach the road leading to the two towns it was necessary to cross an open field for 300 yards. When the company reached the road, the doughboys pushed forward, the third platoon swinging up the left side of the highway, the first on the right, and the second in support. The light machine gun section moved with the third platoon, and the mortars stayed behind in the village to provide support for the advancing troops.

Company G had gone about 300 yards toward the town of Berg when they ran into the first of their troubles. They were trapped in the cross-fire of four machine guns. One lay off to the right and north of the highway. The other three were firing from behind a slope to the immediate front. A rifleman pumped lead into the machine gun on the right. He crawled for a while, got up on his knees to fire, crawled some more, raised himself up again to fire. A machine gun bullet killed him.

A recent Company G battlefield commission, Lt Harold L. Howdieshell, was about 25 yards ahead of the company. Both of his scouts were with him. The lieutenant spotted the machine gun that was hitting the first platoon. It was the

one off to the right of the main road. He pushed his scouts down into the ditch by the road and then pegged about four hand grenades into the gun position. Just as he was starting to pull the pin from the fifth grenade, the machine gun cut loose and killed him outright.

The two scouts were saved by Lt Howdieshell's quick thinking. (Later in the day, when there were only two German prisoners taken from the pitched battle that followed down the road, one of the scouts, Pfc Lemon R. Burrows, rushed toward the two Germans in an attempt to compensate for the death of his lieutenant. He was restrained by the other scout, Pfc Lonnie J. Davis, who grabbed him and quietly declared: "No, we've got to take them prisoners to stop this bloodshed.")

The dead lieutenant's bravery removed one obstacle from the direct path of the first platoon. A second machine gun was spotted. It was firing from a building at the front and to the left of the road. The continuous spatter of bullets kept the first platoon hugging the road. But about half the platoon managed to crawl up to a sugar beet mound. The mound absorbed some of the machine gun fire and afforded temporary protection. The platoon leader, Lt Jack F. Schaper, and his platoon sergeant both made their way to the shelter. Lt Schaper snaked his way to one of the mounds to observe the position of the gun.

The lieutenant was hit just as soon as his head was far enough around the end of the mound to observe. Fortunately he was only wounded. Then one of Company H's lieutenants — Lt Daniel Fochesato — ran to aid the wounded lieutenant. He was killed outright by the same machine gun. Then the platoon sergeant took over. Just as he raised his head the machine gunner hit him between the eyes.

It was the most accurate shooting that Company G had ever run into. The accuracy of the German machine gunners was uncanny. They couldn't miss. Almost all of the dead and wounded suffered direct head hits.

Lt Milton Rabinowitz, in charge of the company's light machine guns, ran back to report to the company commander, Capt Charles E. Hiatt. He told the captain of the "slaughter" that was taking place. Capt Hiatt went up to the road, pressed himself against the embankment, and crawled up to the bend of the highway. He then sent his second platoon

on a flanking movement to the far left. They were to go through a patch of woods, circle around, and knock out the deadly gun from the flank. Lt Rabinowitz was to reorganize the third platoon.

The second platoon picked up 15 prisoners in the woods — every one an NCO or officer — and continued on to knock out the gun. Advancing cautiously, the second finally reached the house where the machine gun was firing. It was a low, one-story affair. The gun was rattling from the window. The second platoon assaulted with marching fire and charged right into the "house of death." Their catch amazed them: a full Nazi colonel at the trigger of a doublebarreled machine gun.

The colonel had hit some of Company G's best men. Some one wanted to murder him.

But the catch was too important to kill. Company G's idea was to take as many prisoners as possible, get the Germans out of their holes, thereby reducing the company's casualties. Still full of arrogance and hatred for his Yankee captors, the colonel was sent off to the rear.

The platoon looked out of the building and in a minute they understood the German plan. The colonel's double-barreled gun had covered the crest of the slope behind which the Germans were dug in.

It was a perfect reverse slope defense. The Germans had every avenue of approach thoroughly covered by machine gun fire. With the colonel's gun immobilized, the third platoon could vault the crest of the slope and stab at the Jerries dug in behind it. It was decided to rush them. Company G didn't make much distance on the first effort. The Germans replied with a barrage of lead. Another machine gun cut all around the soldiers. Burp guns and small arms fire increased the German counter-attack.

George Company hugged their side of the slope after a few yards and waited for the fire to quiet down. The Germans had to be uprooted from their trenches. It was a risky business. Every one took a turn at the enemy, raising himself up, letting go with a slug, and then ducking back to the ground. The Germans replied again and again. They weren't the ordinary run-off-the-mill soldiers the company had encountered in previous action. Company G later found out



T/Sgt John Hartline



T/5 Adam Skoloda



Sgt Lonnie Rhea - Pfc Pritchett Harris - S/Sgt Leonicio Frausto - Sgt Louis Foss



Pfc Lonnie Davis — Pfc Cleatus Ewton



Lt Milton Rabinowitz

that they were special paratroopers that were flown in to stop the Yanks at any price.

The Germans were determined fanatics. They wouldn't come out of their holes to surrender. They wanted to fight to the last man and hold the slope until kingdom come. Some one said: "To hell with this jack-in-the-box game. Let's rush them."

Company G rushed the Germans and charged the crest of the slope with fixed bayonets. They dived into the trenches and pushed their bayonets into the stomachs of the Germans. When they couldn't get at the Krauts with bayonets they used hand grenades. The Germans fought back with bull's eye small arms fire, dying one by one as they hit back. They were no match for the infuriated soldiers of Company G, who bayoneted and grenaded every German in sight until finally only two remained. They were the only prisoners taken.

The company felt physically whipped after the wild fight. But they had to continue on to take the town of Berg. The first platoon reached the road. There was no opposition now. Going from house to house in Berg they rounded up 75 Germans. Most of them had changed into civilian clothes, but the battle-wise soldiers were not fooled.

The company reported by radio to battalion: "Objective taken. We're moving on to our next objective."

The mortars laid down a small barrage in preparation. The plan was for the second platoon to lead off to the left of the road, with the third moving abreast on the right of the highway. The second platoon was within 150 yards of Eicken when it had to stop. It was the bitter Berg experience again. The Germans had the route of approach perfectly covered with the cross fire of three machine guns. For good measure the Jerries had an 88 dug in with the two machine guns to the front.

The German fire was murderous. The second platoon assaulted with 25 men and soon was hit hard. One by one the men were cut down by the rapid fire of the machine guns. The 88 was firing flat trajectory point-blank fire. The shells were exploding a few inches from the ground. There wasn't a sliver of protection.

When the German fire eased up, six men remained in the second platoon. Two of the company's medics were casualties. Pfc Victor W. King braved heavy machine gun fire to ad-

minister first aid to the wounded. He tried to reach more, but it was suicide. S/Sgt Artis C. Britton realized to remain in the open ground was certain death. He jumped up from his prone position and dashed toward the 88 and machine gun, side by side.

When the sergeant was in range he hurled two hand grenades at the weapons. The Germans threw back two potato mashers. Britton threw two more grenades. The Germans didn't throw anything back. He had scored direct hits. Both weapons were knocked out. Their crews were dead. But the heroic sergeant was wounded.

The guns knocked out, the surviving six exhausted men of the second platoon stayed to guard the positions. One of the six, Pfc Cleatus W. Ewton, returned across the field under withering machine gun fire to report the success. When he reached the CO, he was so exhausted that he fell down right where he stopped. He managed to utter: "We got them. The road is open," before losing consciousness.

Capt Hiatt then sent the third platoon up the right side of the road toward Eicken. The platoon traveled about 200 yards when a machine gun, snuggled in a haystack, opened up on the advancing column. The platoon took cover in a drainage ditch along side of the road. All along the ditch were culverts. The platoon slowly made its way through the ditch, but the culverts, spaced 25 yards apart, barred progress. It was impossible to get through. Some jumped up on the road, ran across the culverts, and hopped back into the ditch. But the machine gun caught them every time they put their heads above the ditch.

The column halted. The CO worked his way up to the ditch. He asked the lead man what was holding them up.

"Sir," he said, "we can't move. That machine gun has our number."

"Well, we can't stay here," the captain replied, "We've got to get into that town. Follow me."

Capt Hiatt jumped up and made a dive for the next opening. The platoon followed at his heels. The machine gun sniper never let up for a minute. He was perfectly zeroed in. The platoon lost nine men. The wounded lay sprawling in the ditch. There wasn't an aid man available.

The last culvert led to the first house in Eicken. By constantly leap-frogging and "hoping the bastard wasn't

looking when he jumped," the platoon finally made it into town. Company G had made the second "City of Death." The day's work was finished-almost. The men wanted that last machine gun out of the way. The CO sent Lt Charles C. Baker and a patrol of four men to wipe out the machine gun under the haystack.

The patrol worked its way back to the haystack. They reached

a position in front of the gun. While the remainder of the patrol kept the gunner busy with small arms fire, Pfc Max L. Slater worked around to the left of the haystack and approached it from the rear. Slater moved a little and removed a match from his pocket. Then, as calmly as though he were lighting a cigarette, he struck the match and set the hay afire. The gun was wiped out. The battalion could pass through safely.

In Eicken the weary soldiers of Company G tried to get some rest. The breakthrough would go on.

For this action G Company was later awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.



Major Charles E. Hiatt

HOW HIGHLIGHTS

H Company's combat diary reveals the active part that unit played in the story of the 334th. Here are some day-by-day highlights:

18 November 1944. Unit jumps off against the Siegfried Line at Breil, Germany. Members of H Company take the first enemy prisoners from a dugout by the railroad just outside Breil. The 81mm mortar platoon learns to use battery fire and the 300 radio in preference to dispersed gun positions and sound-power telephones.

28 November 1944. Gereonsweiler Germany. Moving up to Gereonsweiler, unit nearly walks through enemy lines at one point because of faulty information. T/4 Robert E. Ward, company aid man, establishes his name throughout the Regiment as "Doc" Ward. The tireless, efficient work that he is performing in combat has given him Associated Press recognition and his name is becoming a legend in this battalion.

20 December 1944. Regiment pulls out of Siegfried Line and moves to Marche, Belgium, to meet the German counter-attack. After assuring the Marche civilians that the enemy was "beaucoup" miles away, members of the company move out with other companies of the battalion to establish positions of contact with the enemy in Hotton and Hampteau. The night of 23 December the battalion is alerted for an enemy attack of an approximate strength of a corps. When Lt Daniel L. Fochesato goes to one of the gun positions of his machine gun platoon to inform his men of the situation and asks if they can hold the line, the immediate reply is, "Hell, yes!"

24 December 1944. First section of the mortar platoon under S/Sgt James E. Bush is exposed and attacked by the enemy at Hampteau, Belgium. At one time, firing at a range of less than 400 yards, they drove the enemy back to a range of 1800 yards by their efficient concentrations. On this same day a section of machine guns under S/Sgt Thomas R. Clutter breaks up an enemy combat patrol firing almost point-blank into the enemy.

7 January 1945. Having moved from their positions around Marche, the regiment prepares to attack Marcouray, Belgium, with the Second Battalion jumping off at Devantave, Belgium. During this attack Cpl Ralph M. Rogers, radio operator for the



T/Sgt Cecil Sanders — Cpl George Culp — S/Sgt Charles Ripple



Sgt Alex Savko — S/Sgt James Hall — Pfc Dutch Titlow — T/Sgt Clifton Dasson



T/Sgt James Roberts — S/Sgt George Johnson — Capt Dale C. Lawrence



Lt Ogle Pieper — Lt Joseph Schul

mortar observer, voluntarily charges and knocks out an enemy machine gun position with his M3 while carrying the 300 radio.

9 January 1945. On high ground above LaRoche, Belgium, machine gunners have a "field day." One machine gun under Sgt Edward G. Martinez drives an enemy force directly into the line of fire of another machine gun of Sgt Cecil Hayes. The enemy force was completely annihilated.

At Cielle, Belgium, the entire H Company organic transportation passes over a mine field of approximately 50 mines in the road without mishap. When the mine field is uncovered a few hours later, some of the mines are found to have the paint worn on them and some of them have even been turned up on an angle by the weight of the vehicles passing over.

16 January 1945. A regimental patrol led by Lt Byron Blankenship of H Company meets General Patton's Army.

22 January 1945. In the battalion attack on Beho, Belgium, Cpl Jerome P. Wohlstadter pieces together one workable radio out of his own radio and that of the Company F radio operator, both sets having been knocked out. Having accomplished this under heavy enemy fire, he then continues to observe, direct fire, and maintain communications for both companies.

On this same day a section of machine guns under the command of T/Sgt Clifton R. Dason enters a courtyard on the outskirts of Beho, Belgium, and his men become mixed with a group of SS Germans who are wearing the same type of snowsuits as the H Company men. After Sgt Dason has succeeded in separating his men and taking cover, the SS men counter-attack. As the H Company men are outnumbered, their only means of breaking up the attack is to call their own artillery on their position. They are forced to break up two such attacks in this manner.

23 February 1945. In the crossing of the Roer River, H Company's weapons fire in support of the First Battalion. In this one operation the mortar platoon fires 3200 rounds, and the two machine gun platoons fire approximately 50,000 rounds, burning out an average of two barrels per machine gun.

27 February 1945. Having broken through the main enemy resistance on the east side of the Roer, the H Company

forces become a part of the motorized column of the 334th that breaks through to the Rhine.

2 April 1945. The unit becomes part of the motorized operation to continue the drive into the heart of Germany.

9 April 1945. Because of the darkness and fog which prevent tank operations, the Second Battalion spearheads on foot part of the coordinated regimental drive on Hannover. Under the cover of darkness, H Company, preceded only by part of one rifle company, walks through the enemy's lines and establishes positions on the outskirts of Hannover. At one time during this move we are within a few yards of an enemy tank covering an underpass. At daylight the men are suddenly startled by a loudspeaker announcing to the Germans that it is the best for them to surrender. Immediately Germans begin to come from several directions with their hands over their heads. With the infantry holding its strategic positions, the tanks are able to move through and the motorized column is resumed.

During a temporary halt of the column in the heart of Hannover, a party from H Company is sent out to clear houses of enemy personnel. Pfc Homer R. Boissonneault, along with Pfc George W. Gross and others, gets ahead of the party, stops an enemy command car, and is in the process of taking its occupants prisoners when a German armored column pulls up and fires upon them. Gross and the others are able to elude the enemy and make it back to the company, but Boissonneault is cut off and is forced to take cover in a nearby church. Though the enemy searches for him, he later escapes and rejoins his outfit.

14 April 1945. After taking Hannover on April 9, the regiment resumes its motorized advance into Germany and continues without serious resistance until it reaches the Elbe River. The Second Battalion is pulled back from its position a few miles from the river to occupy Salzwedel, and to take over several displaced persons camps and local targets. H Company's mission consists of guarding targets and conducting motor patrols.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND REMEMBERS

We remember the time we were shelled at Gereonsweiler and the Krauts hit an ammunition dump in the front yard. The dump went off, sounding like hell's belches. Somebody yelled, "Let's get out!" but the front door was just a few feet away from the exploding ammunition. We piled up the steps leading from the cellar and out the back door. There was a convenient trench nearby. We sweated out the ammunition pile and the target it made for the Kraut artillery.

We remember 28 February 1945 when the call came down that the Krauts were dug in around Waldneil, supported by tanks. 2nd Lt Winthrop P. Murray invented "Murray's scurry" as he whipped the third squad of his Anti-Tank platoon into action. S/Sgt Norbert H. Bockerstette and Cpl William R. Haskin swung into the fight. The gun was brought up to a position outside Eiken and set up. Meanwhile the tank had spotted the crew and was firing at them, attempting to knock the gun out before it could get into action. It was no time to be orthodox. The book says to bracket the target, but if the crew followed the book, the medics would have followed them. They fired one shot and knocked out the tank setting it on fire.

While this was going on, up ahead G Company was engaging in a horrible small arms and hand-to-hand fight with Germans paratroopers. Casualties were so heavy that the medics could not handle all the wounded properly. The Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon went forward to assist the medics. Lt Sheldon L. Palmer led litter parties to the culverts and open fields where the G Company wounded lay. Under intense enemy fire the litter bearers moved their comrades to safety. Pfc's Claud Bark, Fred Nance and Robert E. Russell made trip after trip to the evacuation areas.

We remember Capt Seymour B. Stone, Pfc's Edmund J. Brown and Douglas N. Jennings in a billeting team which took on more than twice their strength in Engelbostel during the drive for Hannover. Capt Stone, our company commander, moved into Engelbostel directly behind the front lines to secure billets for the Battalion CP, thus insuring an efficient position from which to work. As the jeep containing

Stone, his driver, Jennings, and his interpreter, Brown, moved down the street they noticed a house filled with Germans. Capt Stone immediately dismounted, slung his carbine from the shoulder and pumped lead into the house which later we discovered held seven Nazis.

The Nazis were preparing a machine gun nest to ambush the next troops moving down the streets. They were not quite prepared when the three men moved in on them. The Germans in the front yard ducked into the house and our men moved in on them.

The three Americans cleared the ground floor of the house. Jennings went to the cellar door and jerked it open. In the cellar below, traversing a machine gun to meet him, was a German soldier. Jennings reacted instantly. He drove down the stairs, kicked the machine gun to one side and fired a burst that killed the German.

During the encounter Capt Stone was killed from a German automatic weapon's burst.

All in all, the three men of Headquarters Second killed, captured, or wounded the seven Germans, and averted a possible ambush for the troops following behind.

These are some things that Headquarters Second remembers






Cpl William R. Haskin — S/Sgt Nobert H. Bockerstette



Cpl Sidney L. Freeman — Cpl Hyder A. Neely — Sgt Morris Davis



S/Sgt Joe Green — Plt Charles S. Speece — F/Sgt Paul R. McFall —
Sgt William F. King



CHRISTMAS PATROL

Lines were thin and foxholes were pretty far apart in the Item company sector of the line before Verdenne, Belgium. It was little wonder that on the morning before Christmas, men of the second platoon discovered two foxholes empty. Jerries had been infiltrating through the lines all night, and there was little our men could do about it but shoot at anything they heard, or at shadowy figures they might chance to see. Second platoon's leader, Lt Norman Seidensticker, T/Sgt Ray Owen, and Pfc's Edward Prince and Oscar Delgado were gone, and their empty foxholes meant a wide breach in the single front line of the company.

It wasn't hard to guess what had happened to them. The Jerries were up to all their tricks to pierce the Marche—Hotton line, and footprints on the frosty ground showed that the I Company men had been overpowered and captured. Strangely, however, all the footprints leading away from the emptied foxholes led to the rear of the I Company lines.

As soon as it was light enough to be able to follow the trail in the snow, two of Lt Seidensticker's men, Sgt William Emmons and Pfc William Neil started on their own private reconnaissance. They were soon joined by Sgt Uriah G. Lucas and Pfc Glenn Whitfield. The tracks led on and on, down the road, across an open field. The men knew the risk involved in becoming separated from their outfit in the Battle of the Bulge. They went back for a little more support.

By 0900 a volunteer patrol of thirteen men was ready to look for the missing men. They were Lucas, Emmons, Whitfield and Neil, and T/Sgt Frank Telesz, S/Sgt Carl Wilson, S/Sgt Albie Jarvis, S/Sgt John Heath, Sgt Ralph Zindel, and Pfc's Jose Bonney, John Alejo, Benjamin Rivera and Michael Balash.

Again following the footprints in the snow, the patrol took off. When they reached the open field they formed a skirmish line and proceeded toward the woods. Several of the men got fleeting glimpses of Jerries sneaking through the underbrush. They opened fire. However, instead of being greeted by the return fire of a few rifles, which they fully expected, machine guns and burp guns opened up on them.

German troops, they discovered, had set themselves up for the winter in the woods. They had prepared defences, cut fields of fire, and channelized the approaches to the woods. The patrol had only one recourse. Covering each other as best they could, they beat a hasty retreat across the open field. Expecting to be mowed down at any moment by Jerry fire, they were relieved when they made it back without the enemy opening up on them. They returned quickly to the Company CP to report their experience.

At the Company CP, it was obvious that something would have to be done immediately to relieve the threat to the rear of the I Company lines. Already over-extended, and expecting an attack at any moment, the company's situation was perilous. Calling back to battalion for some support, I Company prepared to defend both front and rear from attack.

Fifteen hundred was the jumping-off time for K company to clean up the pocket discovered by the I Company patrol. At the same time, Jerry made a frontal attack on I Company, expecting the two companies of German troops which had infiltrated behind the I Company lines to attack from the rear. But they were otherwise occupied with K Company and three attached tanks. The attack stalemated, the line held, and after a see-saw battle on Christmas Eve, the line was thoroughly secured.

The patrol, which had been sent behind their own lines to find four of their own men, discovered instead the well-concealed Jerry plans to effect a breakthrough, and made possible the timely liquidation of the attack. It might be added, too, that K company found Lt Seidensticker and his men who had been taken prisoner. They had been treated well, they were lightly guarded, and were none the worse for their experience, but glad to be out of the hands of their captors.



T/Sgt Ray Owen — Lt Seidensticker



S/Sgt Carl Wilson
T/Sgt Frank Telesz
Sgt Ralph Zindel
Sgt William Neil



Pfc Benjamin F. Rivera — S/Sgt Albie J. Jarvis
Pfc Jose E. Bonney — S/Sgt John A. Heath

VERDENNE

K Company's "toughest battle" began on 21 December 1944. On that date, K Company moved into a defensive position around the grand chateau north of Verdennes, Belgium. There were no reports as to enemy position or strength; just the information that the Germans might and probably would attack somewhere on this Verdennes—Marenne—Bourdon triangle.

The digging was tough, the cold ate right through one's bones, and the tension mounted. For greatly needed information, on 24 December a four man patrol, S/Sgt Jose S. Correa, Pfc Thomas A. Weiss, Sgt Joseph E. Beaudin, and Pvt Jack A. Reynolds, was sent out to reconnoiter and make contact with the enemy in the woods to the east of Verdennes.

Then the expectancy and tension was shattered like glass when word came that the German had infiltrated two recon companies behind our lines into the woods to the west of the town. At approximately 1500, 24 December, the company, with all excess equipment left behind, attacked and cleaned out this area with a loss to the enemy of 67 prisoners and a large amount of German and American equipment.

The patrol of four men returned to the chateau after completing their mission to find 1/Sgt Paul Z. Long and four men there. Around 1600 the German attack started with a concentrated shelling of the chateau. As the nine men prepared to defend the position, the order was given to withdraw from the building. The four man patrol, with Pfc Anthony F. Guerra, moved to the woods to the northwest and dug in to defend the strategic crossroads. Just as they were settled, they were forced to withdraw with the 84th Recon Troop when warned by the approach of firing enemy tanks.

In the meantime, one platoon, led by Lt Bruce C. Chapman and Sgt Anton T. Milosevich, moved out to lay barbed wire in front of the town. When the enemy attack started, Lt Chapman led a patrol back into the town, and returned with sixteen prisoners and the information that the town was full of the enemy. With no other route open, they made their way back to Marche with the information and prisoners.

Back in the woods, the company was forced to dig in

along the ridge to the west of the town and await further orders. The enemy had overrun the chateau and captured all equipment. Due to the rapid action of 1/Sgt Long, the company records and all important papers were saved.

Now came the Christmas present that everyone expected; attack the town, take it, and hold it at all costs. With half a K ration per man, and freezing from the persistent cold, the men tried to adjust themselves, and prepare for the attack. A little later the order was cancelled, and with frozen sighs of relief, the men walked back to their holes. But then it came again, this time for keeps take Verdenne.

For almost twenty minutes-supporting artillery laid the most concentrated, and if possible to say, the most beautiful barrage ever seen; the sky was continuously lit up almost like daylight. At 0100, K Company, composed of approximately forty men with Lt Richard S. Bullens in command, and L Company of 335th moved ahead to carry out the difficult mission given them.

In the attack across the open field on the approach to town, Lt Kenneth D. MacInnis, platoon leader, was lost to the company when a shell hit near him. Just as we entered the town, both Lt Bullens and Lt William C. Himburg were shot down by enemy rifle fire. The company was now without an officer, and left with only a handful of men.

While the company fought through the rest of the town, thirteen men, under T/Sgt Charles Termine and Sgt John M. Siegel, moved through the place to dig in on the east and prepare a defense. They steeled themselves for the strong enemy counter-attack that was inevitable. Thirteen men dug in.

Pfc Raymond Guiducci was standing in a doorway with Pfc Charles L. Stepanick when he noticed someone walking down the street into town. It looked like a GI so he let him go by. But when another, followed by fifteen more came, he exclaimed, "Damn it, those guys aren't GI's," and they both opened fire.

For three hours they fought off the enemy counter-attack, which grew in force as reinforcements were thrown in. Finally, after a bitter battle, this small vanguard of defenders beat the enemy back, and the first phase of "hold at all costs" was completed.

The next day, 25 December, the company, commanded by Sgt Siegel, started out to flush the town. In this operation



S/Sgt Thomas Weiss — Sgt Joseph Beaudin



Sgt Charles Stepanick — Pfc Thomas Farmer — S/Sgt John Siegel



S/Sgt Anton Milosewich



Pfc Alexander Intrator — F/Sgt Paul Long — Pfc Anthony Guerra

a large number of prisoners was taken. Then at 1000 that day Lt Chapman arrived with seven tanks of the 771st Tank Battalion. Pfc's Alexander M. Intrator and Dudley T. Briggs had gone to lead them up. With this group as reinforcements, the small group of men commenced to flush out the town again, this time with more ease. For two days, twice a day, it became necessary to flush every house and cellar for the enemy, who had infiltrated into the town during the night. The grand total after two day's of cleaning up was 472 prisoners for K Company alone.

All during the attack and defense, for five consecutive days, Sgt Warren N. Pedersen, assisted by S/Sgt Carol L. Nutter and Pfc's Guerra, Intrator, and Thomas L. Farmer, were forced to walk the wire lines continuously to keep communications intact. Without these communications, this small vanguard of fighters, still classed as a T/O Company, would never have been able to "hold at all costs."

Finally, as the backbone of the last effort in the German counter-offensive was broken, events took place with more calm and ease, and the company settled down to reorganization. During this time, a number of less effective counter-attacks were launched by the enemy, but supporting artillery was the greatest aid in stopping them. On one occasion Lt Wood, attached FO, directed fire of Cannon Company, M Company's 81mm mortars, Division and Corps artillery all at one time by sound alone. Through his effective fire direction, a large number of enemy tanks and half tracks were effectively destroyed and chalked up as a loss to the weakening enemy.

On 1 January 1945, the exhausted men of K Company were relieved by the British, after a job well done. Final score was 472 prisoners, countless dead, and a large number of enemy tanks and half tracks and other equipment captured, including large stores of American equipment being used by the enemy.

COUNTER-ATTACK

Korrenzig and Rurich had been taken in the swift rush of the initial attack over the Roer, and L Company, was poised on the edge of Rurich to smash forward to Baal.

Held in reserve in the initial stages of this action, L Company had moved up through heavy artillery fire following the First Battalion's river crossing. Since the footbridges could not be maintained during the enemy barrage, the company had crossed the Roer in assault boats. Moving swiftly into defensive positions on the edge of Korrenzig, they discovered a strong enemy defense line along the railroad to Rurich.

Between Rurich and Baal was a large chateau surrounded by pillboxes and tanks. Rocket-firing Typhoons hammered and slammed the chateau as the doughs ran into fire from tanks and a pillbox concealed beneath a haystack. Fighting hard, the third platoon, aided by the mortar section, managed to set the hay camouflage ablaze.

Silhouetted in the glare of the burning pillbox, the second platoon, with a machine gun squad attached, moved through the lowering darkness toward the objective. They had gone only a few hundred yards when they were flattened by bursts from an enemy machine gun. Quickly grasping the situation, Lt Frederick M. McConnell swung his third platoon to the left, found concealment for his men in an anti-tank ditch, and moved to the flank of the enemy. This action forced the Germans from their bunkers and freed the second platoon under Lt William L. Nelson to strike forward again. Moving up as close as possible, they awaited the artillery preparation which enabled them to strike a dazed and confused enemy.

Initially, opposition was light. However, when L Company moved toward the main street of the town where coordination was to be effected with I and K Companies, Jerry burp guns opened up. Despite this interruption, two platoons kept moving, the second platoon continuing to the juncture point, while the third platoon set up a defensive position near the center. More than 30 prisoners were taken by the leading platoon as they moved toward the railroad underpass which marked the limits of their advance. In the meantime, the



S/Sgt Russel Hamner — T/Sgt Harold L. Sweeney — Pfc Charles Stine —
Sgt Joseph Wasserman



Pfc Roy B. Turner — Pfc Daniel G. Smith — Sgt Bob A. Trilton



Lt Fredrick McConnel



Lt William Nelson



Pfc Paskel H. Ashmore — Pfc Jessie J. Gerardo

first platoon had swung right to clear its sector. The town, we thought, was ours.

But the Germans thought otherwise, and in the hours which followed, the enemy challenged every resource of the fighting men of L Company. Striking without warning from the rear, three enemy tanks came rumbling out of their hiding place in the nearby woods. They blasted the Company CP with point-blank fire, and moved on to the center of town, surprising and confusing our elements on every hand. With guns blazing at the slightest evidence of opposition, the three tanks moved on up the street over the same path recently cleared by the L Company platoons.

At the far end of the town these disquieting sounds were heard by the second platoon, which was beginning to have plenty of trouble of its own. German machine guns had opened fire along the railroad embankment cutting off those men who were deployed beyond the underpass. Then, just before the tanks came roaring along the street with headlights blazing, someone reported that they were friendly. Waving and shouting, several men attempted to warn the tankers of the machine gun fire. For their trouble, the GIs received a guttural challenge and a sudden burst of lead from the tanks. Raking the buildings as they went, the tanks continued through the underpass and out of town. With them went Pfc Harry Kuchmanich Jr, taken as prisoner.

Lt Nelson hastened to reorganize his scattered platoon, but before he could do so, the enemy began a counter-attack in strength. From the 30-foot railroad embankment and concrete recesses in the underpass itself, machine guns and rifles opened up on the battered building in which the defense of the vital underpass and road junction had been set up. Two breathless men from the first platoon dashed in to report that their platoon had been completely surrounded and only a small group had been able to escape.

The enemy bullets began pounding the rear of the building. Germans seemed to be everywhere, but in the darkness they could not be spotted. Concentrated rapid fire from the attached heavy machine gun and from the BAR's held the attackers back, but the ammunition was running very low. The situation became so critical that the only solution was to call down artillery fire on the spot.

The decision made, runners were dispatched on the

hazardous mission. Though these men never reached the CP, Captain Garland did receive a report that the position had been broken through and called for artillery at the underpass.

While the artillery crashed and pounded around them intermittently for an hour, the men of the second platoon stuck to their position—only 25 yards from the underpass target. Only a minimum number of men could be kept above the ground, but these had to be there, for the Germans resumed sniping during any brief cessation of the artillery's shelling.

Sgt John R. Murillo, who continued to fire a BAR from the rear entrance of the building, was hit by our own shell fragments as was T/Sgt Wilmer D. Haley, who was firing at the enemy on the railroad and in the underpass.

Finally beaten and dazed, the Germans called out, pleading to surrender and begging for the shelling to be lifted. Fearing a ruse, Pfc Charles M. Stine told the Germans that they would have to surrender under fire. In small groups they charged across the road to surrender, some of them dragging or carrying wounded comrades with them. Soon 23 were jammed in the already packed cellar.

These troops claimed to be all that remained of more than 200 men who had begun the attack. Two runners, Pfc Roy B. Turner and Daniel G. Smith, attempted then to get back to the CP to have the artillery fire lifted. They stepped out and were cut down by shell fragments. Two more men, Pfc Russell N. Hamner and S/Sgt Harry L. Sweeney Jr tried again. Both were wounded but managed to make the long trip back to the CP. In the meantime, T/4 Joseph T. Stark worked feverishly in the crowded basement to treat the wounds of the injured Americans and Germans.

The second platoon did not have all the fight that night. The Germans introduced themselves to the second squad of the first platoon with a hand grenade and surrender demand. Pfc John L. Purdy Jr 's answer was a withering burst of BAR fire, while the rest of the squad pulled out and barely missed being surrounded.

The third squad of the first platoon was not so fortunate. Together with Pfc Jesse L. Hailey and Pfc Robert A. Tilton of the second platoon, they were surrounded in a house. When the Germans told them to surrender, their answer was a well-placed hand grenade. Bazooka fire opened up and

forced them to the second and third floors. They couldn't see what was going on outside, but shouting and throwing grenades was their solution. The Germans couldn't get in and they couldn't get out. Finally, the artillery began removing the top floor so the men again returned to the ground floor.

To top the night in which the company had already repulsed three enemy companies, three German tanks accompanied by some infantry appeared just before the dawn, heading toward the underpass. Taking stock, Lt Nelson found that he had no machine gun ammunition, only one bazooka round, and no grenades. There was nothing to do but sweat it out. After the platoon waited tensely for an hour, the tanks moved away.

The long night was over. Casualties were heavy. Of the 38 second platoon men who had crossed the Roer the morning before, only 16 remained. But Baal was ours and a major threat to the Roer crossing had been decisively beaten back.

THROUGH GRANTERATH

The time was set at 2230 hours, 22 February 1945. Company M, commanded by Capt Edward Latta, assembled in the battered town of Würm, Germany. At 0040 hours, 23 February, we were underway with two platoons of heavy weapons, leaving the third platoon, consisting of 81mm mortars, in the rear. They were to follow the company a few hours later.

After a march of three miles to the outskirts of Linnich, Company M dug in and awaited the "go" signal to make the crossing.

Our artillery barrage began at 0245 hours and continued for 45 minutes while A and C Companies made a night crossing.

Daylight appeared, and Company M, under observation of the enemy at all times and receiving heavy artillery fire and long range machine gun fire, approached the banks of the Roer River. There they were driven back by the most intense enemy artillery barrage since the days of the Siegfried Line.

At this point, Lt Richard W. Lindquist took charge of the operation and brought order out of the confusion. He gave the command to secure equipment and move forward. Double timing under heavy loads and through heavy fire, the doughs reached the bank of the river and found only 11 riddled boats remaining from the original fifty.

Due to the rapid current of the river and the excitement of the task before them, doughs of Mike Company landed on the opposite shore in many different ways. Squad leader Sgt Frank Wallar, Pfc John M. Koniowski, James B. Reynolds, Richard M. Donnelly, Pvts James Ryan and Gyles H. Walker were caught in an entanglement of barbed wire placed by the enemy to slow the crossing. After a futile effort to free the boat, they were forced to go overboard and swim to shore with all equipment.

After finding shell holes for protection, they awaited the crossing of the third platoon. This turned out to be only a short break before going on into the attack on Korrenzig,



Pfc Walter P. Wallawender — Pfc Paul D. Dorwart — Pfc Ray O. Lindsey



Pvt Frank Wallar — Pvt Kyle E. Woodford — S/Sgt Ed. Miller



Sgt John Konkowski — Cpl James B. Reynolds — Lt Richard W. Lindquist

their first objective before Granterath. All platoons were quickly reorganized and set off to the attack. They found little resistance in Korrenzig, except for small arms and some artillery fire.

After the capture of Korrenzig, headquarters platoon established its CP with the mortar platoon and defended the town.

The machine gun platoons were ordered to advance on their next objective. As they neared the town, they met strong fire and were ordered to dig in once more. After establishing positions, the machine gunners immediately went into action. Sighting a small force of Germans two hundred yards distant, S/Sgt Harvey R. Stewart, Pvts Cherry K. Whisenhunt, Donald L. Shinskey, Irvin H. Schaber and Pfc Ray O. Lindsey opened fire, inflicting 100 per cent casualties on the group. The town was captured in one hour and at 1430 was cleared of all enemy troops.

COMBAT STORY

On 4 March 1945, the Third Battalion was approaching Moers and Homberg. They had started early in the morning in trucks, but had been forced to detruck and fight, and then continue on foot. The Nazis apparently had had a little time to set up some kind of defense on the west bank of the Rhine.

In the afternoon the battalion traveled north, parallel to the German lines, then suddenly turned and headed directly into the German positions. For a brief time there was a sharp fire fight, which ended with the coming of darkness. The Battalion pulled into a chateau just outside of Moers to spend the night. At 2300 Headquarters Company set up the Battalion CP. Part of the Battalion, about one-fourth of it, dug in around the chateau while the remainder found some place to sleep, either in the cellar or the barns. Most of Headquarters Company was in the main building.

It was thought that the enemy forces which we attacked in the evening were a covering force for troops retreating across the Rhine, and that we had dispersed them. We were wrong. At 0330 a curtain of enemy fire was laid upon the chateau from every kind of weapon that the Germans had on hand. Under its cover, infantry attacked simultaneously from the left rear and the right front. They made their way easily through the foxhole outposts and approached the walls of the buildings. Everyone, groggy from the lack of rest, — we had attacked practically without sleep for nine days — staggered to his feet once again and manned the defense. Dog-tired, the men found it hard to regain their senses, even with the sounds of battle about them and streams of tracers flying in the windows.

Capt John W. Busby, Battalion S—3, hastily organized the defense of the chateau. Our tanks were outside and the crews could not get out through the fire. Two were severely damaged by mortar fire. Men were being hastily assembled in the courtyard when the Germans began a mortar barrage. Many casualties were sustained. Room after room was taken for an aid station as casualties multiplied.

The men took up firing positions at the windows, firing



T/5 Albert J. Coburn — Pfc Lew G. Knight — Pfc Chester B. Murray



Sgt Robert J. Steininger — S/Sgt William M. Sherman — Pfc Luther Capps



Pfc Basilio Salazar — Pfc Harry Bartlebaugh



Pfc Walter C. Frydryk — S/Sgt John L. Sherman

into the fire-spitting darkness outside, although every window was intermittently covered with German small arms fire. Communication was completely out. All radio jeeps were almost immediately destroyed. The telephone which connected to units of the battalion worked for a time, but no one could get near it because of a stream of 50 caliber slugs that were whizzing in the window and over the table on which it was placed. A barn caught fire and in its glare our men were firing at the roofs of the buildings to keep the Germans from climbing up. Cooks, bakers, clerks, and drivers, took up weapons and joined in the fray that night.

Many riflemen had been asleep in the cellar. They seized their weapons and dashed up the cellar stairs, frequently to be blown back by the concussion of shells landing near the stairs. The stairs to the upper part of the house, from which we were doing the defending, were mostly uncovered by shell fire which blew down part of the outer wall. To reach the upper floors it was necessary to jump and dodge over the shattered, debris-piled stairs in direct exposure to enemy fire.

The night was punctuated by hundreds of stabs of flames as the enemy was gradually driven back from the walls of the chateau. At 0400 the tempo of the counter-attack had slowed. At 0500 the battle had ceased and by 0630 the Third Battalion was ready to resume its attack on Moers and Homberg.

Particular credit is due to First Sergeant Joseph B. Eisenhower. In the midst of the confusion, he dashed about, setting up firing positions and outposts, and organizing the men into an effective core of resistance. It was while he was engaged in this task that he was killed.


HEADQUARTERS COMPANY COWHIDE OPERATOR

The soldier grabbed the field phone and spun the crank. He waited a full five seconds and then turned to his buddy, "Those operators! Probably asleep in a chair with a magazine, a drink . . ." Meanwhile the operator was pulling cord after cord, arguing with the GI who wasn't sure where his Platoon Leader was, but would he mind putting in a circuit call to all units immediately?

If Operations is a regiment's brain, Communications is its nervous system. Especially under fire, Communications is essential. For instance, the crossing of the Roer

We had laid fifty miles of wire in preparation for the crossing. A good deal of it was laid under fire and by hand. We had improvised a communications system over the Jerry connections in pillboxes we had captured. Many lines were dragged by hand through tunnels from basement to basement. Two wiremen, T/5 Carl S. Leonard and Pfc Lester S. Regillo, were fired on so vigorously by enemy machine guns while laying wire that it took the combined efforts of the 326th FA and H Company, 333d to extricate them.

While the Third Battalion was crossing, the wiremen were forced to work standing upright in the middle of a barrage. It was at this point that S/Sgt Howard V. Isbell was killed. He had brought the wire to the water's edge and was awaiting a boat when a mortar exploded near him. The wire was finally taken by hand across a footbridge by T/5 Afredo G. Contreras and Pfc Rice Ratliff, Pfc's Milford B. Davis and Lawrence G. Swanguarim, switchboard operators who volunteered for the detail. On the night 22—23 February Pfc Jim Leverett constructed twelve new lines from the switchboard to the radio section, a distance of only 250 yards. Several times Leverett would start up the street with the end of the wire, only to find when he arrived at the destination that the line had been cut by shell fire behind him. During the next night a 170mm shell crashed into message center, severely wounding six of eight men in the room, and blowing the Communications Officer through the wall into the next room. But messages and communications were kept in by wire, radio, or messenger. That is our job and our story.



Pfc Milford B. Davis — Pvt Alfredo C. Contreras — Pfc Jim Leverett — Pfc Lester S. Regillo

HOT SPOT

A patrol mission near Marche was the assignment of the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon on 22 December 1944. This mission consisted of a series of small patrols, connecting several towns and keeping a motorized eye on the surrounding country and adjacent roads. This seemed to be, from all outward appearances, the simplest of missions, for on that morning the whole route was travelled by two jeeps and eight men without the slightest mishap.


On the afternoon of that day three jeeps and nine men took off at about 1300 on the same route. One jeep, which was led by Sgt Edward C. Podzinski, mounted a 50 caliber flexible machine gun. The patrol proceeded according to plan until it reached the village of Hamoul, where the jeeps continued down the main street and stopped a short way from the Ourthe River. At the end of this street was a blind spot around which, several moments later, came two German motorcycles and an American jeep. Upon seeing the parked reconnaissance vehicles the Germans opened up with a 30 caliber machine gun. The street being straight as a die, it was impossible to escape the fire except by taking refuge in the surrounding houses. An attempt was made by Cpl Robert R. Willett to fire back with the 50 caliber machine gun, but the gun failed to fire after two rounds. Willett was forced to give in and take refuge with the rest of the men.

At this point the patrol was split up, and no more than two or three men were together at a time. These small groups managed, with the help of the Belgian civilians, to make their way from house to house and barn to barn until they had extricated themselves from the town. During the scramble, Pvt Leon Eisenberg, who had never driven a car before, realized the necessity for transportation and rushed into the street amid the flying lead, turned a jeep around, and drove it to the edge of town, where one of the other jeeps had been left originally. It was there that the men met and took to the road again. One jeep had been captured by the Germans, who had forced the civilians to roll it to them at the point of a gun.

One jeep managed to escape some time before the other, as the second had been hit three times. The second jeep had



S/Sgt Bryce Burton — Pfc Richard Turner — T/5 John Robas



T/5 Edgar B. Adams — Sgt Broda H. Webb — Pfc Leon Eisenberg

was almost back to the American lines when the occupants discovered that a bridge had been blown in their path. Artillery was falling in the area. The men took to the road on foot and waded across the stream on the ruins of the bridge. Once on the opposite bank the men saw one of their jeeps unoccupied and shot to pieces by small arms fire. Upon approaching it, they heard a call for help in a neighboring field and upon investigation found their friends, all badly wounded and Willett dead.

The wounded men, Sgt Podzinski, Pfc Oliver P. Wimmer, and Pvt Jimmie L. Smith, told how they had been ambushed by a German tank and raked with fire from its machine guns. They asked for a man to remain with them, while the rest ventured to get medical aid. Pfc Broda H. Webb, Jr volunteered to stay. The remaining men, Lt Charles W. Jermy, Pfc George C. Armstrong, T/5 Edgar B. Adams and Pvt Eisenberg then sought out our own lines, and after two hours of infiltrating through enemy positions, ran into a 335th Infantry outpost. It was four hours later that a group of 309th aid men and a small group of guards found the wounded men under the guidance of Lt Jermy. They found that Webb, in a vain effort to comfort the wounded, had all but stripped himself of his clothing to keep them warm and was himself on the verge of passing out from the sub-zero cold.

COWHIDE COPS REPORT

The many duties of the MP platoon make it impossible to remember any one incident in which all men participated at once. But all the men had their share of thrills and excitement, often alone or with two or three of their buddies. Even a routine job like posting a road for a convoy often became an exciting adventure. There were snipers at night or artillery barrages on crossroads, and more than once the MP's have waved on the trucks from foxholes at the side of the road.

They remember the night they posted the road to Marche, and didn't get back for three days. Jerry cut the road after the troops got through and it was necessary to make a huge circle tour to get to them. S/Sgt Bruce R. Burton had his troubles in Marche keeping the CP properly guarded. The men stood seven hour shifts and that was a long time to stand in the cold. Alerts every night kept the men from enjoying comforts of their billets very often. We lived in a fine jail. It was very handy too. We just put the prisoners in the cells and locked the doors.

Sgt Willard Meadows, Pfc Harold Monoson, Horace Humphries, Richard DeLeo and Richard Crumpley remember trying to evacuate a cellar full of civilians from a house 400 yards from the enemy in Hotton one night. They had gotten five out of the house when a Jerry patrol was discovered outside. That ended the evacuation.

Yes, all the towns bring back exciting memories. Each man has his own ideas of the worst and best experiences. But all will agree that Linnich was a hot little town. No one walked or strolled the streets. When they went anywhere it was on the double, and via the shortest route. The Cowhide Cops did not have to break up groups of soldiers hanging around corners. Those rockets broke up everything. Still the CP had to be guarded and the men stood against the building, behind a semicircular sand bag wall, 24 hours a day.

T/5 John Robas, Pfc Ian Turner and Richard Turner spent more time in Linnich than most men. They moved into town some 10 days ahead of the CP to secure and hold the buildings. They worked by day when the town was quiet.

By night they sat locked in the cellar, listening to bursts of mortar shells and rockets.

The climax of the MP's work came in Lichterfeld when they handled 8,000 PW's in the period of 24 hours. It took a lot of hard work by all 34 men to search, count and evacuate that many prisoners.

Now some have gone home but most of the platoon still remains. They continue the more routine duties of patrolling and guarding the CP, checking civilian passes and listening to various complaints and troubles. Occasionally they talk of the past, but mostly they speculate on the future and wonder how Jap prisoners will act or whether there will be any.

SLUGGING IT OUT

The stakes were high, and the seasoned fighters were punching out victory in round after round. Now 334th's hard hitting combat team faced a stiffer test in the Roer—Rhine area. A wary foe was parrying after rocking back on his heels at Korrenzig, Baal, and Waldniel.

Going had been rough at Waldniel, and beyond Boisheim there was work for the heavy sluggers on Task Force Church's team. Heavy slugging is the role of the 334th Cannon Company's M3 105mm howitzers.

The doughs had Boisheim well in hand that March morning but there was trouble ahead at Lobberich when Capt Theodore L. Beasley's cannoneers pulled in. Parallel forces smashing toward the Rhine had been outdistanced.

Lt John A. Burns, Lt Peter Relac, and Pfc Donald B. Boylan reconnoitering, carried the fight to the foe, 2 miles beyond the front. Drawing enemy fire, the two officers directed their battery successfully to destroy an 88 and its vehicle while Pfc Boylan's M1 kept approaching attackers away. Then concentrated Jerry fire made the observation point untenable.

"A short distance in front of our lines," related Lt Burns, "we met a reconnaissance unit of an armored division, which captured us."

"After we proved our identity, an officer asked us if we could give artillery support to armored infantry attacking Lobberich. Since their own division artillery wasn't in position to fire this field, we went with the leading elements making the attack and laid a concentration on the town, and fired by request at targets they observed."

First Sergeant Henry D. Young aided the armored artillerymen in locating good gun positions, some few hundred yards to the right of his own company's battery. In the meantime, accurate firing data was being computed in Cannon Company's fire direction center by Cpls William Weeden, Eric Vero, and Leonard Seikmeier.

From data supplied by these men, and without the benefit of the usual surveys, the armored division's self-propelled mounts, 105mm, threw in their first round only 50 yards off

target. It was then an easy matter for the forward observers to direct the two batteries in a scorching barrage which raked the objective from end to end.

T/Sgts William Bowers, Thomas Senier, and Clifford Reese, platoon sergeants, all reported excellent work by their gun crews and pointed to the next day's reconnaissance reports as evidence. Four Panther tanks, three anti-tank guns, three 88 field pieces, seven vehicles, and ammunition dump were destroyed in that action which helped to make German opposition ineffective in Lobberich.

"We were really on the beam that night and the next day too," said Sgt Donald Swanberg, typical section chief. "Then we knocked out a battery of 170mm field guns, a Panther tank, two scout cars, two heavy trucks, two anti-tank guns, a mortar position, and numerous personnel. That was at St. Tonis."

Cannoneers will always remember the sticky mud of the Geilenkirchen beet fields where they learned the lessons of self-preservation and teamwork in attack. Whether firing as platoons in battalion support or tied in as a battery with division artillery, the men grew wise and seasoned in the lore of battle. They learned the power of their weapons and the skill of their leaders. They became a successful unit of a successful team. Prummern, Lindern, Beeck, Würm, and all the rest, became blasted symbols of what they, and others, had learned.

"Our toughest test came in the Ardennes," declared Cpl William Niedermuller, who was one of the eight men whose Purple Heart tells something of the hardships in that sector. A persistent foe, aided by the vagaries of the winter weather, called forth a full measure of resourcefulness as Cannon Company contributed to the saga of Verdenne, Hampteau, Marcouray. Icy roads, sharp cold, waist deep snow, and rock hard soil doubled the toil of all while the 334th sought, and gained, successful completion of its mission.

The Siegfried line and the Ardennes campaigns were seasoning experiences which made effective Cannon Company's contributions to the Roer and Rhine drives. Cannoneers had learned to throw a heavy punch quickly; they had become 334th's "heavy sluggers".



Lt John A. Burns — Pfc John Wayne — T/Sgt William D. Bowers



Pfc Louis Emproto — T/Sgt Thomas X. Senier — Cpl Alfred T. Humphreys



Pfc Donald B. Boyland — S/Sgt John D. Williams — Pfc Arthur Lonto — Pfc George Handy

SKETCHES FROM SERVICE

The men who kept the 334th fed and clothed, and passed the ammunition have their record to speak for itself. Moments to remember are noted here.

Palenberg, December 1944

The Jerry planes are back making nuisances of themselves this morning. Everyone seems to know just what to do now. T/5 Joseph E. Blankenship takes off to man the AA mounted. 50 cal machine gun in the back yard, assisted by the CO and Sgt Leonard Guiher, mess sergeant. So far we haven't shot down a single one. Either we're poor shots or the planes are out of effective range. The Luftwaffe is furnishing us our Christmas tree decorations this year. It seems that the Jerry pilots drop tinfoil strips to throw our radar devices off their trail. Anyway, the tinfoil makes for a beautiful tree. Under some protest Capt Steinhausen had a large tree brought into our crowded CP and mounted on the table. Capt William G. Willard, Jr, Regimental Motor Officer, remarked that the tree was taking up valuable "eating space", meaning that he puts his mess kit on that particular table while eating his chow. "Anyway, the tree stays," said Capt Richard A. Steinhausen, CO, and so it did. Now, all are beginning to tolerate and even to appreciate it. Lt Frank A. Pinto came in about noon bringing some decorations for our tree. He even had little figures comprising a manger scene.

The favorite breakfast with our troops is hotcakes and bacon. Most mornings the fellows are willing to forego breakfast in order to get a few more winks of sleep. But if there is scarce mention the night before that hotcakes will be served for breakfast, the fellows will come out of their holes all over town and converge on the kitchen a quarter of an hour early. Our orderly room has taken on an air of distinct gaiety despite the war. Pin-ups are increasing in number on the walls.

Marche, 24 December 1944

There was one crystal clear moment last night that we all would have liked to have preserved; Christmas carols on the radio, the warm comfort radiated from this well-decorated

room and its small heater. A definite refinement and peace, marred only by our dirty uniforms and heavy army equipment . . . just seated around the room, no one saying anything, and with the "Battle of the Bulge" shaping up scarcely a mile distant.

Gros Chene, 25 December 1944

Christmas Day was, for the most part, just another day in the war. Our favorite breakfast of hotcakes was served at the usual 0700 to 0730. For our noon meal we had ham, potatoes, green peas and coffee. Our "big" meal with turkey, potatoes, brown gravy, corn, hot tea, grapefruit juice, (We could have a 46 oz can apiece if we wished), hard sugar candy and fruit cocktail, was served at 1900. . . . The Luftwaffe in the form of a lone FW190 came over about 1300 and, after strafing our barn, dropped a bomb aimed at the nearby intersection which fell into an adjacent field, causing little damage but tossing huge chunks of frozen earth all over the surrounding ground for several hundred yards.

Gros Chene, 27 December 1945

The sky is clear today and the air is full of our planes. High in the blue one can see the vapor trails of some fighters winding their way into the Rhineland to the east. To their right and much higher, 32 Fortresses are moving steadily across the sky . . . they seem to hang there without a sign of motion they are so high . . . Flak is blossoming quietly above the German lines.

Biron, January 1945

The house housing our CP is also occupied by an old man, his wife and three children. And, oh yes, three cows. One of the children is always singing the "Star Spangled Banner," flat. T/5 Claude A. Martin of Forest Hills, Louisiana, was up front driving last night and reported back to the CP that he had gone too far down the wrong road and had run smack into a Nazi convoy and had turned around and beat it before the Jerries had realized what he was. (Note: The Germans at this time are using many of our vehicles which they had captured during the initial successes of Rundstedt's offensive). T/5 Martin observes that the Jerries are not making any effort to heed blackout precautions and that their trucks are lit up like Christmas trees.



Capt Richard Steinhausen



Lt Julius H. Porter — Lt Robert F. Jordan — WOJG Allen L. Law



Lt Charles B. Raymond — 1st Sgt Adam M. Yablonski



Cpl Robert Willimon — Cpl George Tullus — S/Sgt Ed. Skeldon

Eygelshoven, February 1945

Hundreds of hungry civilians crowd around our mess. When the meal is over and the scraps and leavings are brought out by the cooks for disposal, the civilians -- most of them very young children, scoop the buckets they carry into the swill and make their way jubilantly back through the throng. A little girl about 5 years of age wears a German rifle thong of beadlike construction about her neck and a American ETO ribbon on her little coat.

Service Company's job is primarily to "get the supplies through." This is what Service Company did. Our greatest credit should go to those who supervised and drove our convoys up to the carrying parties, convoys loaded with vital supplies: Capt Benjamin H. Tuthill, Jr., Lt Charles B. Raymond, Lt Frank A. Pinto, Lt Robert F. Jordan, Lt Ronald L. Nonnemacher, S/Sgt Edgar C. Skelton, S/Sgt Walter A. Clements, S/Sgt Herman N. Gibson, Cpl George A. Tullos, Cpl Donald A. Price, Cpl Estle M. Woods, Sgt Burdell F. Schwartz, and their assistants.

Each of us has our memories of fear and action. Many of us consider what happens to us as trivial in the light of the much larger events happening just ahead of us. We were all aware that anything could happen at any time. The picture we will all carry with us from the war will be that of several GI's loading packing cases of material onto the sturdy back of the familiar 2 ½ ton truck. That was our mission; that was what we did.



T/5 Claude A. Martin — T/5 Estle M. Woods — S/Sgt Herman Gibson — Sgt Burdell Schwartz

IN THE THICK OF IT

Defense of the Hotton—Marche line was a Battle of the Bulge "must". If the German breakthrough succeeded at this point the vital Liege road would almost certainly be cut. To defend this line against mechanized attack, Anti-Tank Company was assigned to three key points.

Capt Harry M. Deck disposed his defenses at road points on which the enemy's armor was most likely to appear. The third platoon placed its 57mm AT guns at Verdenne at the extreme right flank; the first platoon took the center at Menil; and the second gun platoon was emplaced at the extreme left flank at Hampteau. The mine platoon was centered at Menil and laid mine fields at all three positions. Before many hours had passed each of these units was involved in hot actions.

At Verdenne the AT units consisted of three 57mm guns. Other units including a platoon of rifle troops and a section of heavy machine guns were deployed in the area. At 1600 24 December German infantry began infiltration to a point about 300 yards from the positions at the right flank of the town. Under cover of heavy mortar and artillery fire the enemy charged. The 57mm gun was knocked out and its squad withdrew to the guns at the center and left.

Concentrated enemy small arms fire soon made the center position untenable although the crew put up what resistance it could with small arms and a bazooka. By this time, all friendly units except one heavy machine gun squad and the AT gun Platoon had withdrawn from the town. Then five Mark V tanks approached from the southeast.

Unable to man the AT guns, the men of the squad fired bazookas and small arms but did not stop the enemy. About 1800 hours orders came for a withdrawal into the woods northeast of Verdenne. However, two men, T/Sgt Cranston Bolling and S/Sgt Arthur Lewis, were cut off by the tanks and were obliged to take shelter in a house. From this position they sniped at enemy foot troops in the vicinity.

A counter-attack by regimental units was made a few hours later and Verdenne was retaken. AT gun crews were among the first elements and these men manned their guns to fire at the retreating enemy vehicles.



S/Sgt Arthur Lewis — Pfc Raymond Beauchamp



Lt Carl Palm



Cpl Earl I. Mirsky

At Hampteau the second platoon began its action by attacking two enemy strong points which overlooked the town and prevented any movement of second battalion troops. The first squad under S/Sgt Ray T. Harner eliminated these enemy posts after some excellent firing by the gunner, Cpl Earl I. Mirsky.

On 26 December at 1600 the AT positions were attacked by numerically superior forces of an estimated company strength. Lacking rifle support the second squad was soon overrun. They, with members of the mine and mine clearing platoon, then withdrew according to orders to a more advantageous position already occupied by the first and third squads.

The full force of this drive hit the second platoon positions which were reinforced by a squad of men from E Company. The viciousness of the enemy attack soon forced the platoon from the hill back into town. There the unit was reorganized and with the support of machine gun fire from E Company the platoon launched a successful counter-attack. Quick action of the third squad under S/Sgt Everett D. Hicks brought AT fire to bear on the woods occupied by retreating enemy and prevented the Germans from reorganizing. The enemy withdrew with his wounded under the cover of darkness.

The AT platoon at Menil was attacked at 1800 26 December by German armor and infantry. With a well-outlined plan of action in mind, the AT gun squads waited tensely as the columns of vehicles approached. But chance played its part and the ensuing events hardly could have been anticipated.

It all started when the lead tank, finding difficulty in negotiating the narrow roadway, had to swerve slightly into the ditch to pass. It struck a daisy chain of mines which AT men had planned to pull across the path, and was knocked out. The second tank, close behind, stopped and fired around at the nearby house, and was abandoned. As if in parade formation, other tanks and vehicles swung across the field to the east, echeloned to the right rear and ran head on into a large mine field.

Three half-tracks missed this field but wheeled around to hit 18-mine road block which knocked them out. The total number of vehicles destroyed by mine fields was four Mark V tanks, 13 half-tracks, and eight motorcycles. Nearly 200 prisoners were taken in this decisive action.



Pfc William Goldschmidt



T/Sgt Cranston Bolling — Pfc Gilmartin



WE PAY TRIBUTE . . .

To every man in the 334th "November 18" and "Prummern" will always be the keys to a store of memories. Only a few men can speak with mutual understanding of those trying days when the impossible was achieved simply because it had to be done.

The Medics earned the respectful praise of every Rail-splitter in their trial before the Siegfried defenses and their deeds since then have been no less admired. The men who wore the Red Cross brassard on their sleeves and the brightly-painted Red Cross on their steel helmets performed their duty with honor.

These pages, we hope, will serve as some acknowledgment of the debt every man in the regiment owes to the officers and men of the Medics. Consistently, they forgot self and performed their service in the face of great danger. Their story is not that of a single day.

First Battalion doughboys remember their medics' devoted service at Prummern. That first day, November 18, these men cared for 102 casualties, more than half of them from other units of the 334th, 405th, and the British Sherwood Rangers. And for days that followed, the aid station was crowded with more than 50 casualties daily.

This service was rendered despite constant artillery, mortar, and small arms fire, for the aid station itself was within 100—150 yards of the front lines. For a time it was necessary to maintain the station in the open and several medics and infantrymen were wounded while in or near the area.

The very real threat of capture faced the medics when they set up their station in Prummern. Battalion pulled out, leaving the medics virtually surrounded by enemy troops, but they chose to remain to attend the 20—25 casualties awaiting evacuation. For three days aid station personnel had to evacuate wounded from the front to the aid station and from there to rear. Ambulances could not reach them.

Aid station personnel evacuated casualties to the rear by jeep, passing over roads known to be mined. Evacuation from the front was entirely by hand litter-carry for distances up to 1000 yards, so broad was the front being covered. Many times this litter carrying was through mine fields.

Deeds like these and many others are what the infantryman thinks of when he speaks of what the Medics have done. They must of necessity be thanked as a group, but every man will think of some particular Medic that helped a buddy in his dark hour.

They are the men such as T/4 Robert E. Ward — “Doc” Ward to his friends in the Second Battalion — who lived to become a battlefield legend, who gave unselfishly through shellfire and bitter weather, who died during the Roer breakthrough as he always wanted: with scissors and bandage in his hands while he dressed the wounds of a fallen soldier.

There is Pfc Archie Nail, the Company A aid man, who, during the first hellish minutes of the First Battalion's baptism of fire, wandered from wounded to wounded, disregarding his own safety, giving aid and comfort to an injured soldier even while his own legs were ripped by mortar fire and death was only a few hours off.

Soldiers like Archie Nail and “Doc” Ward buried once and for all the “pill rollers” tag that had haunted the medics from Camp Howze days until the jump-off on November 18, 1944. Never again would the front-line soldiers scorn the men whose only weapons were a medical kit and soothing words. They had won their rightful place in the affections of the doughboys.

. . . . Following this page is a list of the men who died in the actions of the 334th Infantry Regiment.



Headquarters Company

Capt Robert L. Kimmel	T/5 Russell B. Brooks
S/Sgt Howard V. Isbell	Pvt Oliver P. Wimmer
Cpl Robert R. Willett	

Anti-Tank Company

T/4 William F. Myers	Pfc John H. Herrman
Pfc Robert L. Hall Jr	Pvt Donald C. Black

Cannon Company

S/Sgt Charles A. Strebel

Medical Detachment

S/Sgt Buck R. Hale	Pfc Archie N. Nail
T/4 Robert E. Ward	Pfc John G. Wargo
T/5 William E. Mathias	Pvt Pat C. Campbell
T/5 Virgil L. Parker	Pvt Rolen S. I. Cline
Pfc Hoover H. Kemp	Pvt George D. Kirsch
Pfc Clarence R. Miller	

Headquarters Company First Battalion

S Sgt William G. Thompson	Pfc Roger A. Jacobs
T/4 Louis J. Tuscano	Pvt David P. Keimel
T/5 Fred Gratzon	

A Company

2d Lt William R. Marsh	Sgt Edward B. Acuna
T/Sgt Fred Fluty	Sgt Luther E. Snipes, Jr
S/Sgt Leo H. Angiolini	T/5 Angelo J. DiBlasi
S/Sgt Jessie O. Hooper	T/5 Charlie M. Jones
S/Sgt George G. Pearson	Pfc Haden E. Barkley



Pfc Elver J. Brown
Pfc John Buck
Pfc Frank W. Chenga
Pfc Francis J. Dailey, Jr
Pfc Robert F. Davidson
Pfc Emilio Di Benedetto
Pfc Harry J. Fassold
Pfc William E. Fry
Pfc Jack Fuller
Pfc Max E. Garrett
Pfc Enrique G. Garza
Pfc Charles E. Gibbons
Pfc Donald F. Gottfried
Pfc Donald R. Hadden
Pfc William R. Hannye
Pfc Bart W. Kiernan
Pfc Leo Lichten
Pfc John R. Malinowski
Pfc Charles M. Maneer
Pfc Edward A. Nahaney
Pfc Olin D. Neil
Pfc Lively E. Nunn
Pfc Harry J. Rogers

Pfc Donald R. Schneider
Pfc Horace L. Sherry
Pfc Irving W. Skaff
Pfc Arnold E. Stamper
Pfc Frank F. Tamandli
Pfc Wilbur S. Theuerkauf
Pfc Jose C. Villasenor
Pvt Henry J. Bell
Pvt David L. Castro
Pvt Isac W. Frazier
Pvt Stephen Gallegos
Pvt Faris M. Glover
Pvt Eugenesz Janicki
Pvt Herbert A. Kelch
Pvt Norberto C. Martinez
Pvt Sidney B. Meyer
Pvt Thomas R. Olding
Pvt Sidney L. Schiffman
Pvt Maynard F. Simpson
Pvt Marshall R. Sims
Pvt Louie F. Sosnoski
Pvt Anthony L. Valenti
Pvt Harold B. Woodman

B Company

1st Lt Howard M. Buchanan
S/Sgt Anthony J. Cavallo
S/Sgt Byron T. Coveney
S/Sgt Oliver F. Dwyer
S/Sgt Robert O'Horo
S/Sgt James M. Stone
S/Sgt James G. Watson
Sgt George M. Asmus
Sgt Fred A. Lesser
Sgt Raymond F. Stahler

Sgt Richard P. Youngblood
Pfc Kermit C. Bowling
Pfc Albert E. Barlow
Pfc George C. Clark
Pfc Segal Q. Coon
Pfc Wayne M. Cox
Pfc Charles T. Eades
Pfc Michael A. Garippo
Pfc Donald R. Houtz
Pfc Joseph T. Kondrat



Pfc Fred A. Kullmar, Jr
Pfc Harry D. Locker
Pfc Clennie Marshburn
Pfc John C. McDaniel
Pfc David C. Myers
Pfc Adrian L. Paci
Pfc Paul P. Ribera
Pfc Charles A. Rocchio
Pfc Robert L. Slocum
Pfc Abraham I. Smith
Pfc Stephen Stancik
Pfc Howard J. Vanas
Pfc Roger T. Van Tuyl
Pfc John A. Zipoy
Pvt Edward F. Bowles

Pvt Glen M. Brown
Pvt James W. Byrum
Pt Leo F. Corwin
Pvt Lloyd E. Davis
Pvt Robert J. Fortier
Pvt Willie B. Gallimore
Pvt Lyman W. Gresham
Pvt Herbert L. Kelly
Pvt Joseph N. LaBlane
Pvt Clarence J. Merchant
Pvt Gerald F. Rosenfeld
Pvt Lorenzo Salgado
Pvt Norman A. Sanders
Pvt Theodore D. Sechrist

C Company

Capt Woodrow W. Fox
Capt Earl L. Jackson
2d Lt Robert E. Balaban
2d Lt Henry G. DeGrummond, Jr
T/Sgt Orvis F. Hill
T/Sgt Edward T. Marshok
T/Sgt Clyde L. Williford
S/Sgt James E. Fannin
Sgt Thomas A. Forrest
Sgt Charles G. Rapp
T/5 Russell C. J. Marik
Pfc Laurence T. Benson
Pfc David Carson
Pfc Frank R. Diesl
Pfc Patrick B. Dillon, Jr
Pfc Spero T. Eugenis
Pfc Roy W. Evans
Pfc Ralph V. K. Jones

Pfc Forrest B. Koontz
Pfc Clancy V. Lucas
Pfc Faustino R. Lara
Pfc Ira P. Lawless, Jr
Pfc Philip W. Mutchler
Pfc Anthony T. Nagy
Pfc James H. Nugent
Pfc Billy F. Parker
Pfc John E. Plaster
Pfc Charles F. Pritchard
Pfc Howell L. Reaves
Pfc Dave L. Reese
Pfc Holly A. Richards
Pfc Walter Stimach
Pfc Robert C. Washack
Pvt Ermal E. Armstrong
Pvt Walter G. Berteletti
Pvt Patrick J. Halpin



Pvt Harold V. Hardrick
Pvt Donald A. Heinen
Pvt Fernald J. Hillman
Pvt Thaddeus A. Kwiatkowski
Pvt Benny M. Laspagnoletta
Pvt William H. Lauster
Pvt Richard E. Laver

Pvt Willie V. Leath
Pvt Leo Minkoff
Pvt Eugene E. Mudd
Pvt Alvin H. Smith
Pvt John J. Snook
Pvt Harold H. Way, Jr
Pvt Miller A. Yates, Jr

D Company

1st Lt Don Smith
Sgt John J. Bresky
Cpl Bruce C. Grubb
Pfc Maurice W. Byall
Pfc George F. Chappelle
Pfc Michael C. Esposito
Pfc Clifford A. Goodnoh
Pfc Glenn L. Humbert
Pfc Morris F. Knox, Jr
Pfc John F. Lane
Pfc Clyde A. Puckett

Pfc Osborne Sam
Pfc Charles M. Traylor
Pvt Jame E. Amason
Pvt Thomas D. Biery
Pvt Androclus R. Fisher
Pvt Neil E. Junkin
Pvt James F. Maloney
Pvt Silvin D. Matheny
Pvt Gordon P. Mattison
Pvt William F. Montgomery
Pvt Caserio J. Toniola

Headquarters Company Second Battalion

Lt Col Joseph Williams
Major James V. Johnston
Capt Seymour B. Stone
1st Lt Guy W. Earnest
Sgt William M. Smith

Cpl Daryl E. Price
Pfc Charles R. Altom
Pfc Warren C. Rieger
Pvt Duane S. Campbell

E Company

2nd Lt Marvin W. Jamison
2nd Lt Clyde S. Laurent, Jr
2nd Lt Harrel R. Needham
T/Sgt Stephen J. Banik

T/Sgt Vincent Clementi
S/Sgt Antone Angotti
Sgt Zacarias D. Esparza
Sgt Loren R. Hall



Sgt Park M. Prine
Pfc Robert A. Ashmore
Pfc Samuel F. Biddlecomb
Pfc Homer A. Compton
Pfc Jewell I. Dilsaver
Pfc Lyman B. Hart
Pfc Robert B. Hayman
Pfc William M. Lamb
Pfc Kenneth L. Loving
Pfc Harold J. Morrison
Pfc Vann B. Nash
Pfc Alois P. Reiser
Pfc Thomas F. Schultz

Pfc Jean W. Scoggin
Pfc Merle F. Shepherd
Pfc Milton B. Smith
Pfc Hubert W. Spivey
Pfc Troy W. Swindell
Pfc Walter Talik
Pfc Samuel H. Vickers
Pfc Claxton O. Ward
Pvt Nelson Grant
Pvt Norman S. LaPointe
Pvt G. C. E. Lett
Pvt Joseph T. Lippi
Pvt Eugene Stobak

F Company

2nd Lt Harry C. Kelly
S/Sgt Bernard Bernstein
S/Sgt John Greslick, Jr
S/Sgt Francis L. Hinson
S/Sgt Grady C. Morris
S/Sgt Ralph H. Reed
S/Sgt Clifford H. Taylor
Sgt Albin J. Molen
Sgt George J. Wlasak
T/5 Thomas P. Martini
Pfc Edwin E. Brocklesby
Pfc Robert E. Colebank
Pfc Carl F. Danajovits
Pfc John G. Endres
Pfc Raymond Fusselman, Jr
Pfc Robert R. Hainline
Pfc Edward P. Karpovich

Pfc Johnnie J. Minghelli
Pfc William S. Moran
Pfc Raymond M. Oberdorf
Pfc Elwood D. Miska
Pfc Herbert B. Ronk
Pfc Albert Teti
Pfc Calvin F. Towne
Pfc Michael J. Veneziale
Pfc Frank L. Walters
Pfc William J. Wareny
Pvt Jewel H. Hurt
Pvt David McGraw
Pvt Lloyd H. Redfern
Pvt Claron O. Reed
Pvt Clemente Ribera
Pvt Edward E. Sedlacek
Pvt Robert E. Townsend



G Company

1st Lt Glenn L. Van Ocker	Pfc Theodore White
2nd Lt Claude W. Hinsley	Pfc Francis Yankosky
2nd Lt Harold L. Howdieshell	Pvt Michael S. Adamczyk
T/Sgt William B. Hawk	Pvt Randolph D. Austin
T/Sgt Bernard S. Reed	Pvt Lewis R. Bannister
S/Sgt Leon J. Reed	Pvt Alex G. Barber
S/Sgt Michael J. Skrbich	Pvt Salvatore P. Cannici
Sgt Dossie L. Dixon	Pvt Carmelo Cemino
Pfc Stanley Amdur	Pvt Robert G. Chaddock
Pfc Thomas R. Austin	Pvt Alexander F. Eisinger
Pfc Horace M. Franklin	Pvt George A. Gerstenmaier
Pfc Guillermo M. Gamez	Pvt Severin M. Meldgaard
Pfc Theodore W. Kuett	Pvt J. C. McMahan
Pfc Adolph S. Negri	Pvt Mariano T. Rodriguez
Pfc Norman Nessimoff	Pvt Arnel F. Ryan
Pfc Emil H. Schenkel	Pvt J. M. Scharf
Pfc Christopher Schiraldi	Pvt Arthur D. Smith
Pfc Elsworth L. Seel	Pvt Frank L. Torelli
Pfc James A. Seitz	Pvt Joseph W. Von During
Pfc Leroy K. Shettler	Pvt Emile D. Wolford
Pfc Ralph Stallworth	

H Company

1st Lt Dean C. Harding	Pfc Claude H. Perkins
2nd Lt Daniel L. Fochesato	Pvt Stanley A. Bell
S/Sgt K. C. Mulanex	Pvt Thelbert D. Lambert
T/5 Tip Hancock	Pvt Ronald E. A. MacLaughlin
Pfc Freddie E. Hilliard	Pvt Lawrence J. McDonald
Pfc William D. Kelley	Pvt Augustine D. Nolli
Pfc Frank Longoria, Jr	Pvt Edward G. Smith



Headquarters Company Third Battalion

1st Sgt Joseph B. Eisenhauer
S/Sgt Leon H. Deck
Pfc William W. Applewhite

Pfc John E. Cullen, Jr
Pfc Miller D. Womble

I Company

1st Lt Ralph B. Smith
T/Sgt Walter K. Smith
S/Sgt Perry P. Corder
S/Sgt William C. Emmons
S/Sgt Richard C. Smiley
S/Sgt Wendal W. Verser
Sgt Rodger Ball
Sgt Ernest L. Gorum
Sgt James B. St Clair
Sgt Conwell H. White
T/5 Herbert Z. Davidson
Pfc Stanley N. Batdorf
Pfc Lester Blount
Pfc Patrick H. Bruce
Pfc Charles W. Cope
Pfc Charles A. Flanagan
Pfc Ronald Gardner
Pfc Fred G. Gonzales
Pfc Henry A. Gost
Pfc Peter J. Handley
Pfc Austin J. Hersh
Pfc Edward Prince
Pfc Sofio C. Rossitto
Pfc Hymen R. Rothblut
Pfc John H. Rouse
Pfc George W. Rushmore
Pfc Glynn W. Whitfield

Pvt Royal E. Barnes
Pvt Peter V. Carlino
Pvt Orrin H. Carlson
Pvt Elbert I. Clark
Pvt Arthur F. Collett
Pvt Allen Collins
Pvt Ross C. Danford
Pvt Ceabern J. Derauf
Pvt Melvin R. Elizer
Pvt Owen J. Grady
Pvt Glenn C. Harris
Pvt Clarence B. Hogg
Pvt James F. Kelly
Pvt Antone Kokai
Pvt Floyd D. Koziol
Pvt William R. Lackie, Jr
Pvt Silvio P. LaNunziata
Pvt Cleo McCall
Pvt Clarence E. McCollum
Pvt Duane G. Newman
Pvt Eway Rider
Pvt Melvin A. Roberts
Pvt Leslie H. Roseberry
Pvt Joseph M. Ross
Pvt Edward Schalit
Pvt Ralph C. Stickle
Pvt Edward L. Worley



K Company

1st Lt Harry E. Queer	Pfc Frank C. Poland
2nd Lt Bruce C. Chapman	Pfc David T. Powell
2nd Lt Loyal E. Leffler	Pfc Jack A. Reynolds
2nd Lt Edgar M. Rothschild	Pfc Robert Rosik, Jr
2nd Lt Mercer A. Yeager	Pfc Joseph E. Santore
T/Sgt Donald E. Zug	Pfc Robert A. Schmidt
S/Sgt Joseph A. Carafa	Pfc Oliver R. Weissert
Sgt Curman J. Begnaud	Pfc Frank A. Werner
Sgt Thomas N. Black, Jr	Pfc Charles L. Wescott
Sgt Nicholas C. Gotses	Pfc Jesse J. Wright
Sgt Carlton O. Harris	Pvt Glenn L. Belcher
Sgt John B. Lovely	Pvt R. C. Booth
Sgt William S. McFadden	Pvt Benjamin H. Goodman
Sgt John D. Schantz	Pvt Eugenio Gonzales
Sgt Manley R. Yeckley	Pvt Edward J. Lamorie
T/4 Peter M. Mohs	Pvt James S. McClure
Cpl Gerald R. Burm	Pvt William H. Reeder
Cpl Orval J. Grell	Pvt Ofcar L. Reuff
Pfc Wofford H. Brown	Pvt Peter J. Riso
Pfc Ell G. Daniels	Pvt Harrison L. Runyon, Sr
Pfc Willard G. Gibson	Pvt Robert F. Savin
Pfc Raymond Guiducci	Pvt Edward G. Sheets
Pfc John T. Gunter	Pvt Henry A. Stark
Pfc Martin Kostik	Pvt Howard W. Whitmer
Pfc Hyman Litzky	Pvt Dewey W. Willis

L Company

T/Sgt William B. Salyer	Sgt Wilson H. Lancaster
S/Sgt Alfred Fausak	Sgt Melvin H. Price
S/Sgt Joel N. Grubb, Jr	Sgt Alphonse J. Simard
S/Sgt Robert E. Holmes	Pfc Edmund Biles
S/Sgt Dave W. Kaufman	Pfc Floyd W. Brim
S/Sgt Joseph J. Monteleon	Pfc Harold J. Brogan



Pfc Oscar T. Claxton
Pfc Wesley R. Doty
Pfc James E. Falk
Pfc Theodore W. Kaufman
Pfc Kenneth S. Latham
Pfc Ira O. Lawrence
Pfc Hudson J. Moak
Pfc Deris L. Morris
Pfc Luchis G. Overton
Pfc John M. Owens
Pfc Richard M. Petter
Pfc Barnet C. Ramsey

Pfc James L. Robison
Pfc Joe Wells, Jr
Pvt Curtis W. Behnke
Pvt Merle G. Bork
Pvt Frank A. Cox
Pvt Joseph R. Knack
Pvt Edward J. Schroeder
Pvt Bernard Seemon
Pvt Morris Shuldiner
Pvt Henry J. Smits
Pvt Melvin E. Steinmueller

M Company

Capt Edward T. Latta
T/Sgt Kenneth L. Lindsay
S/Sgt Paul L. Montgomery
Sgt Milton K. Rabell
Sgt Robert F. Ross
Cpl William A. Young
Pfc Edgar L. Ford
Pfc Robert E. Gee
Pfc Arthur Herbin
Pfc Louie Kaloczowski

Pfc James W. Ray
Pfc Samuel A. Rizzo
Pfc Alfred L. Roush
Pfc Benedict G. Schmitt
Pfc Thaddeus C. Sopyla
Pvt Earl R. Billings
Pvt John Franco
Pvt Charles N. Leshman
Pvt George B. Lynch
Pvt Joseph B. Versaggi

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