

U.S. Department
of Transportation

United States
Coast Guard



Commandant
U.S. Coast Guard

2100 Second Street S.W.
Washington, DC 20583-3001
Staff Symbol: J-CP-4
Phone: (202) 267-3946
5750

This form is in response to your inquiry. I am answering you in this manner to reduce costs and to service a larger number of requests.

The material you requested:

✓
_____ is enclosed.
_____ may be researched through the works cited in the enclosed bibliography. Access to these may be gained through your local library.
_____ may be available through the National Archives, 7th and Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C., 20408.
_____ may be available through the National Archives II, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, MD 20740.
_____ may be available through the National Personnel Records Center, 9700 Page Blvd., St. Louis, MO, 63132.
_____ may be available through the Naval Historical Center, 901 M Street SE, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C., 20374.
_____ may be available through the US Lighthouse Society, 244 Kearny Street, 5th Floor, San Francisco, CA 94108.
_____ are shared between the Coast Guard and the National Archives, whose address is cited above. Due to the size of my staff, I am unable to undertake this research for you. If you wish to research Coast Guard controlled materials, please make an appointment.
_____ is out of print and the Coast Guard has no plans to reissue the work. I suggest you try to gain access through your local library.
_____ in accordance with Federal Law, we retire our historical photography to the National Archives, whose address is above, I suggest you write to them.
_____ may be purchased through this office. Each 8x10 print costs \$7.50. Please describe the photographic materials you are seeking before sending a check. Do not send cash. Checks should be made payable to the U.S. Coast Guard.
_____ please remit \$_____ for the enclosed photography. Checks should be made payable to the U.S. Coast Guard.

Comments:

Photos are on the way to the lab

If I may be of further service, please write.

Sincerely,

R.M. Browning Jr.
R.M. BROWNING JR

Historian, U.S. Coast Guard

15 July, 1962

From: District Coast Guard Officer, Etahikan, 13th Naval District
To: Commander, Alaskan Sector
Subject: Attack on submarine by VP 251 and U.S.C.G.C. McLANE
Inclosures: (a) Chart of encounter.
(b) Statements of Commanding Officers VP 251 and McLANE.
(c) Completed report forms.

1. Inclosures are herewith submitted for your information. The inclosed chart shows the approximate courses of the McLANE and VP 251 at the times that the main contacts were made. This information was obtained from the logs of the two vessels. The following pertinent facts were brought out from this action:

(a) The need of US equipment being installed on all patrol vessels.

(b) The fact that submarines have been lurking in the vicinity for a period of time and that the reports received heretofore from fishing vessels with respect to submarines were probably, in the majority of cases, correct.

(c) The need for constant patrol in the vicinity of Sumner Strait, Chatham Strait and Dixon Entrance.

Upon the arrival of the vessels in port, and prior to their leaving together, this office obtained the reports of the commanding officers and also numerous reports from members of the crews of the two vessels. The reports of the commanding officers are submitted, while the statements of the crew members are retained in the files of the district office. This office, having thoroughly digested the reports, is of the opinion

(a) that contacts were made as indicated.

(b) that there is a possibility that the submarine attacked and probably sunk was the one that was bombed by the Royal Canadian Air Force stationed at Annette Island the night previous, and that the submarine was damaged at that time.

(c) that the submarine evidently attempted to reach a safe harbor and was seen by a fishing vessel, the report of which brought the patrol vessels to the scene.

501 CONFIDENTIAL
15 July, 1942

(d) That the peculiar actions of the submarine indicate that it had been damaged prior to contact by the patrol vessels, but there was nothing to show that an additional submarine was present although that seems to be the consensus of opinion.

(e) That the submarine was damaged after the first attack after the torpedo was gone, as was evidenced by the fact that considerable heavy substance looking like rock was seen to the surface and remained in that vicinity for some time and that also a large oil slick was seen with bubbles.

(f) That the damaged submarine was unable to leave the scene of activity and evidently was attempting to make an estimate of the situation prior to the last attack, when the UP 251 saw the periscope close off the starboard bow. It was at that time that the concentration of depth charges set at 200 and 100 feet respectively probably seriously damaged the submarine, because it was from that point on that the oil and many bubbles were seen.

(g) That although both the Ketchikan and the UP 251 were actively engaged in these maneuvers, the predominating reason for the destruction was the successful operation of the sound signal device installed on the Ketchikan, the coordinated efforts of the two vessels under the direction of Lieutenant (jg) J. V. Brown, and the alertness on the part of both crews.

(h) That although both vessels' depth charges contributed to the damage and probable destruction of the submarine, the last two depth charges set off by the Ketchikan at 100 and 200 feet respectively were the real cause for the disappearance of the submarine.

(i) That the theory of the probable destruction is based on the fact that the patrol vessels remained in the vicinity for over six hours and no further contacts by UG were obtained nor was the submarine seen again and that the position in which the air bubbles and oil were seen did not change and oil was constantly seen coming to the surface during the time that the patrol vessels were in the vicinity.

3. Both Commanding Officers speak very highly of the "Manual of Anti-Submarine Warfare for Small Craft," (Confidential) and it is believed that the information contained in this book, plus the instructions given to the personnel by the Commanding Officers was responsible for the successful coordinated efforts of the two vessels, notwithstanding the fact that most of the members of the crews were new men in the service.

CONFIDENTIAL
15 July, 1942

fatal

The Commanding Officer of the *McKean* had taken on board samples of the oil in a bucket which was to have been brought into port for further investigation. The engineers of both vessels are positive that the oil that came to the surface was diesel oil as they not only handled it but tested it and used it. Upon the arrival in port, through some unforeseen cause the oil was thrown overboard. It is regretted that this incident occurred and it is further regretted that a copy of Pacific Fleet Memorandum 128-42 of May 11, 1942, Serial 2115, was not on hand until 14 July, 1942 at which time it was received from the Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station Alameda.

F. A. KENDLER

FAK:W

Copies to:

Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet
Commander, Northwest Sea Frontier
Chief of Staff Headquarters
Commanding Officer, NAS, Alameda
Commander, 17th Naval District

Statement of Ralph Ralph Burns, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. T-37, 1944

On 22 July 1944, at 0800 hours, I was in the T-37, and at 0800, the submarine put about and brought contact about 1000 yards. It moved to close in for attack. Following the contact at 0800, the submarine stopped. It dropped one depth charge at 300 feet which failed to explode. It picked up contact again about 0900 and followed contact to 1000 with intermittent sound. Apparently the submarine was running at short intervals and zigzagging through all this time. At 1000 contact was finally lost. It arrived in the vicinity of this contact about 1010 when we again made contact on the 11 contact. It put about and followed this contact and at 1030 dropped two depth charges. The first charge was set at 200 feet and the second charge at 100 feet for position of the contact. Then put about to cover over the same area and at 1040 dropped two more charges set at 200 and 300 feet. These were dropped about 200 yards from the first contact. At 1050 sighted numerous air bubbles in vicinity of depth charges. Bubbles varied in size from 1 to 2" in diameter. At 1100 we closed contact of the T-37 and a torpedo passed under our bow. I was standing in the bow and saw the torpedo coming, resembling a yellow head and green body, and heard it hiss. Saw the bow about 100 feet as it came toward the ship and saw it go right under the bow. The bubble was 10 feet above the T-37 in the bow of the ship. We went full speed ahead in the direction from which the torpedo came. In the meantime the T-37 dropped one depth charge in the position in which the torpedoes were sighted. We lost contact and made at 1100. At 1105 we saw a smoke trail that the T-37 dropped one 10, about one half mile north of where we were. It proceeded to the vicinity and dropped two more charges in the position marked by the smoke trail, set at 100 and 200 feet. We did not make contact at that time. Remained in that vicinity attempting to make contact. Then a large oil slick came on the water. This slick remained for about an hour in view of the ship. This oil slick was probably 100 yards long, 25 to 100 yards in width. It was about 1/4" thick. There were many bubbles of oil there. We continued making search of area until 1135 when the T-37 reported sighting torpedoes and dropped one charge. It made contact and dropped two more charges set at 200 and 100 feet respectively and then lost contact. We had no more contacts after that. There was oil on the water and bubbles. The maximum distance between the second and third contact was at the most 500 yards. We remained in that area until 0137 the next morning attempting to get contact. As long as we passed through that area we saw bubbles. After the second contact the area had considerable hairy substance looking like rock wool. I believe that we did get the submarine from the amount of air bubbles that came up for the length of time and the amount of oil. We saw bubbles for at least three hours. They were good big ones.

Arrived in US 231. It was rough sea. At 0645 met HOLLAND which came alongside for orders where submarine had been reported located. Commenced a search pattern until 0830 the following morning. That is the 9th of July. At this time the HOLLAND was observed to be out of formation and acting strangely. About ship and towards her at top speed, at general quarters. At 0924 within one mile of HOLLAND. Stopped engine and drifting with all electrical meters and down as an aid to intercept with HOLLAND's flashing device. Notified HOLLAND of the fact that all of our generators and engines were stopped. HOLLAND flying overboard promptly. At 0950 the HOLLAND signalled that she had a good submarine contact. A 150 foot line with 5 lbs. lead was promptly put over the side as an aid to determining the speed and direction of the drift. There was a fresh northerly wind and small sea. At 1045 the HOLLAND came along side and said she had a good submarine contact and had dropped depth charges which had failed to explode. Ordered HOLLAND to continue the search. At 1100 ascertained the drift of the vessel to be 540 hours about one knot per hour. At 1100 the HOLLAND came along side again and said she had lost all sub contact. She was ordered to proceed five miles due south and continue the search in that area. At 1200 was 5 miles south of the original submarine contact position. Started up engines and headed in that direction to resume the search pattern. At 1615 they ran plane passed over head and south. Signals exchanged. At 1700 another plane came up. At 1720 HOLLAND came up astern with her commanding officer in the bow, requesting orders. The commanding officer of the HOLLAND stated that he had excellent sub contact on bow and a half before the depth charge did not explode and that he had no sub contact. While we were talking the HOLLAND was 20 yards astern of us. A shadow was observed to be a shadow. It appeared to be a vertical shadow about 12 to 15' in height, and passed just on or in front of the bow of the HOLLAND from bow to stern. The HOLLAND shouted "Warning" and the bow of the HOLLAND was down by at least 12' and on the US 231. Bow life was given and full speed ahead. The HOLLAND also went full speed. Signed very faintly what appeared to be a periscope and dropped a depth charge and for 10 feet right at top of it. HOLLAND put over and passed making a turn. Then above the third way around the US 231 appeared to be hanging over some object just like going over a sand bar, in other words, first the explosion and then a minute later the keel bulging. The US 231 drove 12' up. We passed west the spot where the depth charge was exploded and there was a patch of oil approximately 15 feet in diameter with numerous bubbles. Dropped anchor back on spot and steamed away at full speed. HOLLAND came up a few minutes later and dropped depth charges in same spot where anchor back was. Then steamed four miles from this spot and commenced circling the HOLLAND about four miles distant from her. HOLLAND remained in immediate area waiting for sub contact while I circled outboard of him. Some time later returned to HOLLAND after receiving signals that she had lost sub contact or hadn't gotten any contact. Instructed HOLLAND to take position off of my starboard quarter. Approximately 15 minutes later the sun at the stern pointed out a periscope about 15' at the starboard bow, approximately 100

yards distant. This periscope was seen by at least four men. The periscope was black in color, about 2 1/2 feet out of water and was moving at a slow speed at almost a right angle to its course to the sternward. Eight fall mines and several minutes later dropped depth charge or what was thought to be directly over the top of the submarine. At the same time the depth charge was dropped, the mine bombs were released. The mine bombs fell in the water. He notified the Helix that we had just dropped a depth charge over periscope of submarine and to come in and finish the job. At 1200 Helix was in and depth charged same spot which was marked by mine bombs. Much oil was seen over the area after the Helix had depth charged. He cruised until 1 o'clock in the morning. Both this vessel and the Helix, in this area to cause a sub should surface. The weather was fine and clear and visibility on the water practically unlimited. Oil was visible all during this patrol and oil was apparently still trickling to the surface. At 0100 10 July assigned the Helix by Hinkle to proceed to Cape Canmay and investigate air battles reported sighted there. Remained and patrolled in area until 0130 and during this time nothing was sighted.

It is my belief that after the first bombing the hull of the submarine was damaged because of the fact that oil came to the surface. I went up wind in direct path of torpede and to the point where I saw a periscope momentarily came to the surface, and dropped a depth charge. After the charge was dropped and exploded, the hull contacted that was probably the submarine. Having seen oil at that point I feel we must have damaged him at that time. A hour and a half later I again fired the position of the submarine at the first depth charging. The periscope when it was seen the second time was very near the same position. The second depth charge was dropped directly over the submarine and the mine bombs released in the same place. Several minutes later the Helix depth charged the same area. From the oil which came up and remained for many hours, and from the air battles, the size of the battles and the manner in which they exploded, the manner in which they seemed to grow larger and expand, I am positive in my own mind that the vessel was damaged twice by depth charges, and the last time was mortally hit, and in view of the Helix having dropped a number of depth charges in the same position afterwards, and in view of the fact that no submarine came to the surface during the next nine hours, that the submarine was without question destroyed. No submarine came to the surface in that area between 3 o'clock the morning of the 9th to 5 o'clock the morning of the 10th. The Helix cruised in that same area and could get no submarine contact with the listening device at any time.