

# What Mr. Pearkes Had to Say

*The following is an abridgment of the speech given by Defence Minister George Pearkes at the recent annual banquet of the AITA.*

All of us are aware that the concept of war does not remain static, that it changes as science and technology give rise to weapons that are increasingly effective and destructive. We know that the concept of war has been altered radically by the advent of nuclear weapons and long-range jet bombers, and by the imminence of [the] ICBM.

The concept of war is rapidly becoming so terrifying and awful that we must do our utmost to deter aggression and prevent war. From 1945 to 1949, the atomic striking power of the U.S. Strategic Air Command served to maintain the general peace, though it did not stop Russian aggression in Europe and other parts of the world.

Realizing the precariousness of their position, 12 nations, including Canada and the U.S., formed the NATO alliance and agreed to pool their military resources to provide a deterrent of sufficient size to prevent Russian aggression.

That NATO is an obstacle to Russian ambition, there can be little doubt. Russia has made every attempt—short of aggression—to destroy the unity of NATO. Canada's primary aim is the same as NATO's—to prevent war. This aim has been largely responsible for our defence policy, which embraces not only the defence of Canada and the joint defence of Canada and the U.S., but also support of the UN and NATO.

Achievement of our aim is unalterably linked to the strength of the NATO alliance.

To be effective—that is, to discourage unfriendly nations from trying to destroy NATO's retaliatory power—our forces must be streamlined and armed with the latest weapons. Timing is, therefore, significant. Ideally, the composition and posture of the defensive forces must outrun the threat; at the worst, they must keep pace with it.

The air defence frontiers of NATO extend from Alaska to Norway and from Norway to Turkey, a perimeter distance of some 7,800 miles. The North American air defence system is a part of this overall air defence system.

A defence system comprises aircraft and missiles, the ground environment of radar, the communications links, the automatic reporting machines, the command posts, the airfields and missile bases. It also includes the command structure which controls and exercises the judgment to fight the battle.

In a joint enterprise with the U.S., the RCAF has built an elaborate warning and control system. To back it up, we are keeping nine squadrons of CF-100 aircraft on the alert 24 hours a day. But the time

is near at hand when we must augment our air defences.

We are looking ahead to the threat for the period 1961-65 and are determining what equipment the RCAF must add to be truly effective. Some people suggest that we put our faith in missiles for this period . . . I do not consider that ground-to-air missiles and manned aircraft have yet reached the point where they should be considered competitive. They will become complementary.

The Russian claims for ICBM have made us look to the period beyond 1965. We now must plan to meet our requirements for defence in two time periods: that in which the main threat is posed by manned bombers, and that in which the ICBM will be fully operational and will probably be used to supplement the manned bomber.

We believe that for the next few years the manned bomber will constitute the main threat. But we are not overlooking the probability that long-range missiles will be used in conjunction with airplanes. While the West proceeds with the development of guided missiles that can be used in a defence against manned bombers and missiles, we must be prepared to meet the threat with manned interceptors.

In the meantime we have decided to go ahead with the program to develop the Arrow. . . . We believe that it will give us the added height and speed we will need to cope with the latest versions of Russian bombers. Of course, as aircraft fly higher, additional radar coverage is called for; and as they increase their speed, faster processing of information is required.

The improvement of our radar coverage and of our automatic reporting processes is a problem we have to solve. In keeping with long-range planning, it is desirable that improvements to our radar coverage make provision for the control of surface-to-air missiles, which may be introduced as needed to bolster our air defence system.

At the same time, forward planning requires us to accommodate anti-ICBM measures in our air defence system, as soon as they are available.

All of this is expensive. The rising costs of complex equipment, of engineering services, of testing and development—all combine to increase the price we must pay for defence.

In an effort to provide the best defence-in-being, we are searching out areas of duplication and doubtful value and reducing them to a minimum, so that we may apply savings against ever-rising costs. There is one fundamental principle which we must observe: we must meet the costs of air defence within a budget that will not strain the nation's economy.

ments in successfully launching earth satellites, Mr. Notman said: "It certainly presents a challenge to our technology, but perhaps more than that, it is a challenge to our complacency, and should shatter completely the notion that technological superiority in the Cold War is necessarily the private preserve of the West.

"Nor am I a partisan of the school which suddenly declares obsolete all other defence plans and preparations that have been made till now, including our programs for manned aircraft and our radar warning systems.

"What has happened is that the task of air defence has now become more differentiated, not necessarily superseding previous programs but requiring new and supplementary solutions to new problems. The new threat of the guided missiles must be met. A variety of missiles now exist for a variety of specialized tasks, but this does not supersede the manned air force and our own radar warning systems, whose specific defence tasks will continue to play a key role in our strategy for many years to come."

**Important Decisions:** The government would have to take some important decisions in the next year both in regard to the general economic issues facing Canada, Mr. Notman said, as well as the role in defence which Canadians would assume. He called attention to the policy set forth in the Speech from the Throne to the effect that the government would "maintain modern defence forces in being which, together with those of our allies, will continue to act as a deterrent to attack upon any part of that alliance."

Commenting on this statement, Mr. Notman continued: "In this regard we would like to make certain general observations which we hope will serve to guide the formation of policy.

"Firstly, from a strategic point of view, it should be realized that an industry as dynamic as the aircraft industry cannot mark time or stand still. Advanced teams of engineering and technical personnel are soon disbanded if no work is forthcoming, and later, as we have found out, these personnel can only be replaced at great additional expense over a long period of time. There is the loss as well, of the long-term benefits of the learning

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