

The Choice for Ottawa—

Get a UN Police Force or Adopt Nuclear Arms

By HAROLD GREER

The only alternative to a defense policy based on nuclear weapons appears to be placing Canada's armed forces at the disposal of the UN.

There is considerable bipartisan support for such an approach in Ottawa. Liberal Leader Pearson and External Affairs Minister Smith both look kindly upon it.

Prime Minister Diefenbaker's government has continued, as a matter of official policy, the St. Laurent administration's offer to contribute Canadian forces to a permanent UN police force.

Mr. Diefenbaker was careful to assure the UN General Assembly, soon after taking office, that the change in government meant no change in Canada's support of, and commitment to, the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East.

About 1,000 men—mainly the second battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment at London—are kept at 24-hour readiness by defense headquarters for sudden UN use.

The Canadair company at Montreal is building eight 4,000-mile, 120-passenger transports to replace the North Stars of the RCAF's air transport command.

The de Havilland company at Downsview has specialized in short takeoff aircraft such as the Otter and the Caribou, which can land on the most primitive of airfields.

But before such a policy could be further developed, there will clearly have to be a radical change of heart among the members of the UN.

Canada, which had high hopes that the Suez affair had clearly demonstrated the need for a permanent UN military organization, found at last fall's

General Assembly that there was no significant support for it.

The major powers have always been against any kind of UN military arm. Some of them, especially the United States, have paid lip service to it, only to ignore it when it was available.

The United States intervened in Lebanon on the ground the government was being subverted by external infiltration, despite the fact that UN observers were on the spot and reporting they could find no evidence of it. Secretary of State Dulles was warned by Canada and others that President Eisenhower would give the "peace force" idea the kiss of death if he proposed it to the Assembly last fall, but the president went ahead anyway.

Latin American countries, who make up one-fourth of the Assembly's membership, want no part of a standing UN police force because they fear it might be used either to prevent or to encourage their revolutions.

Most important, the neutralist nations—which are decisive in this matter—have become apathetic and even hostile to the idea because, after the Suez and Lebanon affairs, they suspect a UN force would be used to keep reactionary regimes in power—a Chamoun in Lebanon, a Nuri as-Said in Iraq, or the Shah of Iran.

The lesson for Canada in this, according to many politicians and officials in Ottawa, is that Canadian aspirations for the UN can no longer be reconciled with the nation's traditional

associations with the United States, the United Kingdom and Western Europe.

Many instances of the growing conflict have occurred in recent years. The UNEF adventure—certainly one of Canada's greatest triumphs—almost fell through because the Canadian troops were called the Queen's Own Rifles, and because it was proposed to transport them to Suez in a light aircraft carrier whose silhouette was painfully familiar to local residents.

Canada explored for many months the chances of putting a UN force along the Algerian-Tunisian border. France would have none of it, and the Arabs were suspicious. The Canadian Government would recognize Communist China tomorrow if the United States could be outvoted on the UN membership issue and a way could be found to remove Nationalist China from the Security Council.

The men whose job it is to worry about these problems say the conflict cannot be reconciled; it can only be compromised.

The policy of deterrence, it is said, is sound military strategy. From the beginning of time, nations who have disavowed the initiative have relied on defensive strength and retaliatory power to deter an attack. The Maginot line would have worked if it had not been left unfinished and if the French had maintained, as they were supposed to do, a counter-offensive strategic reserve.

But with the advent of the hydrogen bomb and the long-range ballistic missile, deter-

rence has assumed a new order of magnitude. Defenses must be kept so near perfection that little or no money is left for non-nuclear strategy. Flexibility, perhaps the most important element in military planning and foreign policy, is lost.

That is the dilemma confronting the Canadian Government today. Its armed forces must either be integrated into the collective security system which has been erected on the nuclear deterrent or else withdrawn from it.

The policy of the deterrent has not changed materially since Mr. Dulles issued his famous declaration in January, 1954: "To depend principally upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing."

Its major elements were, and continue to be:

That the United States would develop and incorporate into its military establishment a whole family of nuclear weapons for use in all conceivable situations.

That the control and the decision to use these weapons in collective defense would rest with the United States alone.

Other countries have found it impossible to live with this policy. The larger powers—Britain and France—have embarked on nuclear weapons' programs of their own. The smaller nations—Australia, Norway and Denmark for example—have refused to get involved.

What does a middle power such as Canada do?

Some Government advisers and politicians in Ottawa argue that the country's military resources should be used, in the way best calculated to prevent a world war and to produce stable political conditions. That was the idea when Canada entered NATO, they say, but it hasn't worked out that way.

The only logical political corollary of nuclear deterrence, it is argued, is disengagement—a mutual pulling-back from areas of friction. Instead, deterrence has found diplomatic expression in the non-recognition, non-acceptance policies of Mr. Dulles and a massive effort, at best, to maintain the uneasy status quo.

The basic difficulty, it would appear, is that Canadians and Americans differ in their estimate of the military threat.

The United States accepts, as a premise for its military and foreign policy, the inevitability of a Soviet attack if Russia ever gains a clear and decisive offensive superiority. Gen. Thomas Power, commander of the Strategic Air Command, for example, declared in a policy speech in Washington in December, 1957:

"It would be folly to assume that the Soviet dictators, in building up the largest military machine of all time, intend to use that machine merely for deterring the free world from resisting their diplomatic chicaneries."

"A realistic appraisal of their record permits no other conclusion than that the sole purpose of their spectacular mili-

tary buildup is to use it for aggression and that they will use it against us when they think they are stronger than we are."

The Canadian Government does not accept all the implications of that statement. Nor does the leader of the Opposition, nor, it is fair to say, does the majority of the Canadian public.

Instead, Ottawa feels that an attack—by either side, for that matter—will result only from such a deterioration in international relations that war will appear inevitable and whatever advantage there may be in get-

ting in the first blow will be seized.

The objective of Canadian defense policy, and the foreign policy which flows from it, must therefore be to prevent such a deterioration in world conditions from taking place. This involves, it is argued, Canada's taking a more intermediary role than its present defense commitments permit.

But few Ottawa observers would care to bet that the government will accept the political consequences of this analy-

sis, however much some of its members wish they could.

The consensus, rather, is that Canada will continue to go down the nuclear highway, hoping to back-seat drive and praying for the best.

Last of a Series

2872