

Must We Become a Satellite?

With the Diefenbaker Government's decision to scrap the all-Canadian Arrow interceptor in favor of the all-American Bomarc anti-aircraft missile, and to have, on Canadian soil, American nuclear warheads under American ownership and control, the stage is set for a great debate on Canada's entire foreign policy.

That debate must concern Canada's present and future relationship with the United States and, following from that, Canada's present and future relationship with other countries—among them, for example, China. The Canadian Government's decision, concurred in by the Liberals, to seek better relationships between itself and the Government at Peking, is one of many such decisions which Canada has to make—and has to make on her own.

Much has been said in this and other Western nations about the lowly condition of the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe; how they are subjected to Russia's military domination or Russia's economic domination or both. But in what essential way, if present attitudes persist to their conclusion, will Canada's condition differ from that of Poland, or Czechoslovakia? Are we not coming increasingly under the military and economic domination of the United States? Are we, ourselves, not in danger of becoming a satellite?

In all the contacts and conversations Canada has had with Russia, it has been made very clear that the burning question with the Soviet leaders is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Canada's membership in it. We have always been able to tell them that we had a prominent part in founding NATO; that we entered it of our own free will and can leave it of our own free will; and that we contribute to it on the basis of our ability to pay and to provide.

Does this remain true? Let us make sure that it does. Let us closely watch our position in NATO; for if we become dependent upon U.S. arms, U.S. bases, U.S. squadrons, then—no matter what Parliament or the Government may say—we are putting ourselves in the position of a satellite; we are making ourselves subject to a lot of penalties for the sins (of omission, of commission) of the nation which is sovereign over us.

What Canadians should question in particular is the wisdom or necessity of accepting nuclear warheads from the U.S. Here, surely, is a point at which Canada should make a stand, and make a choice. Let us

either go into nuclear defense wholeheartedly, and on our own; or else stay out of it completely. Certainly, no one can build nuclear bases in Canada on the proposition that they, and they alone, control them. And certainly, we do not add to our stature in the concert of nations by pretending that, while we have nuclear weapons, we are not really a nuclear Power, because those weapons are under someone else's control.

No serious person will suggest that we should leave NATO; or that we should refuse the integration of defense imposed upon us by geography; or that, as some voices are beginning to propose, we should disarm completely—stop making weapons, stop even having them. But most Canadians, we believe, are in agreement that if we are going to be in NATO, it must be as an equal, and sovereign, partner with the U.S.; that if we are going to integrate our continental defenses with those of the U.S., it must be with similar regard for our equality and sovereignty; and that if we are going to make and have weapons, it must be in ways that serve, or at least do not damage, our national (and international) interests.

To sum up, we must maintain, we must zealously guard, as much as possible of our independence—military (within the framework of the common defense), economic and, above all, political. Canada has a role to play in this hemisphere and in this world. We cannot play that role by becoming, or appearing to have become, a U.S. satellite. Nor can we, in assuming any such stance, proceed vigorously and confidently with what must for many years be our prime task—the building of Canada into a powerful and prosperous nation.

Delaying Action

The three-day discussion last week between members of the Dominion Cabinet and officials of the A. V. Roe Company cleared up two important points. In agreeing to pay half the salary of 1,000 technical personnel for six months, the Government has acknowledged that at least the nucleus of the Avro team should be kept intact. The Government has also recognized that it has, itself, some responsibility in the matter.

Aside from Ottawa's implied acceptance of those principles, there is little cheering news in the announcement made by Finance Minister Fleming on Friday. The proposal

appears to be nothing more than an expedient, a makeshift arrangement which puts a six-month sentence on the 1,000 engineers and technicians.

What will they do during that period? Even the company is uncertain. With the Arrow project written off, there is little to occupy them. Undoubtedly a good many, with the future so bleak, will accept the first decent offer made by another company; and who can blame them?

Several Cabinet Ministers spent a good deal of time with Mr. Crawford Gordon, Avro's president, and his associates last week. How much better it would have been if those meetings had taken place months ago—before the anguish, before the confusion, while there was still time to consider rational and reasonable alternatives to the Arrow program. But having finally got together, facing an emergency and with the Government acknowledging its share of the responsibility, the participants should have produced something better than a stay of execution.

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