Editorial

VICTORY BY MANAGEMENT

George F. Metcalf, an executive of the General Electric Company, recently warned that management ability, not technology, will be the determining factor in the outcome of any future world conflict. Said Mr. Metcalf: "We must recall that we are working in the transient, ever-changing background of science, and that the ultimate limit on our ability to lower the time required for the development and use of new weapons is the limit on our ability to manage this vast and growing body of knowledge. It is our ability to co-ordinate, catalogue, and apply this knowledge, in short to forge it into a useful military tool. If our enemies are able to do this faster and better than we, we are certainly lost, even though we have a superior technical knowledge. It is not what we know but what we have reduced to practice that counts in the final test."

YOU NAME IT

Generations whose parents did not even exist when World War I came to a close, still envisage instantaneously a beautiful female spy at the mention of the name "Mata Hari". Nearly 40 years have passed since Mata Hari faced a reluctant firing squad at Fontainebleau and still her name is familiar to all of us; 40 years from today, Mata Hari will still be a synonym for the more seductive marks of espionage agents. Would this be so if Mata Hari had been known as, say, X-10?

Name or Number? Names are important. The movie industry has long since learned this lesson; so has the advertising and sales promotion business. On the other hand, the Canadian aircraft industry hasn't quite got the idea yet. That it is possible for Canadian to choose for their aeronautical products names that are somehow "right", is amply demonstrated by such singularly choice examples as the Beaver, the Otter, the Chipmunk, the Orenda, and the Chinook. However, too many Canadian airlpanes are either poorly named or not named at all, and so become known, like criminals, by numbers.

Not only Canadian-designed airplanes are in need of proper and unmistakably Canadian names, but also ones that are merely built in this country under license . . . the Sabre, for example. Had it been given a distinctively Canadian name, there wouldn't have been such frequent confusion about who had given nearly 400 Sabres to Mutual Aid for use by the RAF. We know we gave them, but half the world thinks that since they are Sabres, they came from the U.S. Let's not make the same mistake with the CS2F, which is already being confused with its U.S. counterpart.

On this subject of names for airplanes, the "Joint Services Recognition Journal", an official British publication, recently had some remarks to make about the CF-100 Mk. 4, in the course of comparing its recognition features with those of the Banshee. Said the Journal: "Here is one example of good naming and one of the evils of designation. How excellent is the name 'Banshee' for a weapon of war ('a female spirit whose wailings forewarn families of the approaching death of a member') and how inadequate and meaningless is CF-100 for a fighter aircraft."

Not the People's Choice: It is true that the CF-100 has actually been officially named the "Canuck", but the Journal is to be forgiven for not being aware of this. For, though this name may have been considered appropriate at the time it was chosen, it has not been accepted by either the service which flies the airplane, the company who builds it, or the Canadian public, who, after all, buy it. Thus the CF-100 is fated to go through its life being described in all manners, ranging from that of the precise type, who carefully enunciates it as "Cee Eff One Hun Dred", to that of the mumbler, who refers indecipherably to the Cee-effahunner.

However, our purpose at this time is not to rehash old arguments about the suitability or otherwise of the name "Canuck", but merely to emphasize that a little more thought should be given to this matter of name selection, unimportant though it may seem at first. What about the CF-105? What is it to be called? Will it go through its life being confused with the USAF's F-105? After all, its parentage is quite legitimate . . . it deserves a name.

Editorial

YOU NAME IT (PART II)

Further to our comments last month relative to the importance of giving Canadian-built airplanes distinctive names, we would like to make a few suggestions that might be applicable to the CF-105, and in some cases could be suitable for the CS2F or the CL-28. While none of these names may be acceptable to those in charge of naming names, nevertheless, if they do inspire more suitable titles, then these few lines will not have been in vain. The animal kingdom is always a popular source of names for aircraft . . . for instance: Lynx, Grizzly, Wolf, Tercel (male of the Peregrine Falcon), Gyrfalcon, Snowbird, Falcon, Junco. Or we could turn to the arsenal for inspiration: Arrow, Arrowhead, Spear, Archer, Lance, Lancer, Arcus (Latin for "bow"), Arbalest, Dagger, Epée (triangular-bladed duelling sword) Stylette (a dagger-type weapon for thrusting frequently having a three-edged blade), Rapier, Spearhead, Cinquedea or Anlace (a dagger with a very wide tapering double-edged blade), Trident (a three-pronged weapon originally developed from a fishing spear . . . for the CL-28 or CS2F?). Then there are Indian names and words which are especially suitable: Warrior, Tribesman, Sachem (peace chief), Oneida, Algonquin, Redskin or Iroquois. And why not an airplane called the Eskimo? Or the Arctic, Astra, Prowler, Terror, Cat, Taboo, Shield, Aquila, Arcturus, Fireking, Skyfire, Firehawk, Fleetfire, Fleetfalcon, Nightfire, Warbird, Watchkeeper Devilbird, or Storm. And it is surprising that the name Thunderbird has not been applied to an airplane before this. The possibilities are endless . . . which only makes it all the more surprising so many Canadian airplanes are nameless.

PLAYING SAFE

Every once in a while an accident or series of accidents brings sharply to mind the necessity never to forget that air safety must be the guiding tenet in every action of the Aviation Industry.

According to J. Carlton Ward, Jr., of the Flight Safety Foundation, "if maximum flight safety is to be attained . . . human problems must be recognized, evaluated, and dealt with constructively." First and foremost, Mr. Ward says, there is a man's attitude toward his job. Whether the man is manager, pilot, mechanic, builder or designer, he continues, complacency has no place in his work. Yet the very fact that a good job is being done in accident prevention will tend to lull a man into this sense of complacency. This is human, and to counteract it, the human aspects of the problem must be considered.

Contradictory: An example of the lack of awareness of the problem of flight safety may be cited where the management of an air line issued one directive, ordering employees to keep the matter of safety foremost in their minds; and at the same time issued what amounted to punitive regulation requiring on-time performance. The man at the end of the line . . . the pilot or mechanic, or the station manager . . . must know that safety is foremost, but he is under pressure to get the airplane out on time. What does he do under these circumstances?

Sometimes what may seem like a minor consideration, such as the relocation of safety equipment in the airplane, may be a key to greater safety. For instance, the shifting of life rafts nearer the door where they are most readily accessible for ditching. It is easy for management to say: "We have run this line for so many years without trouble, and we're going to keep on doing it the way we have been doing it." In one reported case, an air line official said to an air line pilot: "We haven't had a crash in seven years, so why bother?"

From the Top Down: Men down the line are naturally governed by top management's attitude. They have a sixth sense which recognizes the fine line of difference between what the boss says and what he means. The beginning of flight safety must start at the top. Safety problems dealt with at the operating level can only be solved with the support of top management.

The increasing safety record of the air lines indicates that this philosophy of top management generally prevails, but it must continue to grow until every source of complacency is rooted out. Where complacency or unawareness persists, accidents will occur. It is axiomatic that there would be no preventable accidents if those who could prevent them knew they were going to happen.