



SPIES, SABOTEURS AND PLANT SECURITY

AS THE Canadian aircraft industry increases in size and complexity, the twin menace of espionage and sabotage will multiply. Indeed, the nature of the crisis indicates that these dangers-from-within will be much more critical than in the war against Germany. A series of sensational betrayals by trusted atomic researchers has emphasized the importance of precautions against the spy and the saboteur.

Most aircraft plants have well-organized and efficient security staffs but without full co-operation of plant

personnel they can't hope to cope with the enemy within the factory walls.

Recognizing the seriousness of the problem, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation has detailed the following advice to its thousands of employees:

1. Watch what you say about your job. Our enemy is interested not only in advanced aircraft information but details of our industrial capacity. Many facts that sound harmless by themselves can fit into a pattern that will mean a great deal to spies.

The Department of Defense limits what we may say on all classified projects, our production schedules, rates of delivery, future production planning, sources of supply, use of strategic or critical supplies, movements or storage of supplies and material and information on plant security measures.

2. If you handle classified material in a restricted section, follow your security restrictions to the letter. If you have any questions, ask your supervisor of plant protection.

3. Be on the lookout for psychological sabotage. Don't believe or spread frightening rumors. We're likely to have more of this than property damage. We're not talking about everyday gripes and gossip. But we do want to know about people whose purpose is to damage our military

production, to lower morale and undermine our work effort.

4. Report suspicious things to your supervisor of plant protection. We'll keep your information confidential and will carefully investigate it. But make sure you report only reasonable facts. We're not interested in idle rumor or malicious gossip. Don't repeat it—to us or your neighbor. And don't try to play detective. Leave that to the professionals.

Under modern security methods, the plant guards, patrols, fences, and floodlights form only the readily-visible inner ring of protection. Other protective rings such as employee selection methods, plant investigations, military defense, and federal intelligence work, surround the plant.

The military authorities classify all important material as "top secret", "secret", "confidential", or "restricted". All such classified information is under careful guard and only employees who have passed special security clearance for a given level of restriction have access.

THE Lockheed plan for disaster control started with a meeting a year ago. By the time fighting broke out in Korea, company officials had a pretty thorough background in A-bomb damage and what could be done about it.

As the North Korean Communists made their first push south over the 38th parallel, an emergency planning committee was formed to complete the study and work out a company-wide plan for action in the event of an atomic bomb disaster.

By Nov. 15, the basic plan had been formed and accepted. The organization was headed by an executive control officer. The plant safety engineer was placed in charge of medical, welfare, and radiological services. A plant engineer took charge of crews



"... Many facts that sound harmless can fit themselves into a pattern that will mean a great deal to spies ..."



"... Look out for people who have a strange interest in your job. If you have a good reason ... tell plant protection ..."

trained in repairing utilities and buildings. The transportation manager was made responsible for transport and rescue crews. The plant protection manager was placed in charge of communications, technicians, guards and firemen. The entire plant was divided into zones, each headed by a zone control officer and alternate.

The thoroughness with which this company has planned for the "1,000-to-one" chance of an atomic bomb attack is indicated by the following report:

"Plant defense experts will direct the entire organization from our recently-completed control centre. Protected by heavy concrete, this centre has its own power plant, independent telephone communication with each plant, radio transmitter and receiver, and direct wires to civilian disaster and military officials. In communication with all points in the plant, the centre can direct fire and damage crews rapidly where needed.

"We have surveyed all plants and picked out protective areas where our employees will have the best possible protection in existing buildings in the event of disaster or enemy attack. We are studying the problems of locating and using atomic bomb shelters in case civil defense experts and government decide they should be built. We have organized and trained skeleton crews and are training others—fire fighters, first aid workers, Geiger counter men—as rapidly as possible.

"Each zone officer has overall responsibility for defense measures in his area under the direction of his plant control officer. Each has formed his own organization of auxiliary guards, firemen, first aid teams, and communications crews to make his zone as nearly self-sufficient as possible.

"Any major disaster calls for hun-

dreds of men and women, each trained to move in instantly and handle his vital share of the work calmly and efficiently. We trained hundreds of such volunteer helpers during the last war and we are training them again.

"Twenty-six-man teams have completed basic and advanced first aid courses, and another 20 teams have begun classes. Four eight-man teams have been trained in handling radio-activity detecting instruments. All medical people have completed special courses in caring for wounds caused by atomic explosion and treating radiation sickness.

"All members of manufacturing supervision are trained auxiliary firemen, and auxiliary guards appointed by zone control officers are getting special schooling.

"Special structures crews are learning to clear away wreckage, prop up slightly damaged buildings and knock down dangerous ones. Other trained crews will cut off oxygen, acetylene, compressed air, gas, water and power supplies in an emergency and turn on reserve power and water supplies afterward.

"Special relief crews of riggers, crane operators, and bulldozer drivers

have training in moving wreckage and giving first aid.

"All Lockheed drivers have instructions for moving in after emergencies to haul equipment and supplies.

"Our plans have been worked out carefully, but without your help they will fail."

AVIATION LAW

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was guilty of either a breach of orders or gross negligence.

Although it can be concluded that there is a higher degree of care expected from a bailee for reward than from a gratuitous bailee, nevertheless the following case is an interesting example of the fairly high standard of care expected, even from a gratuitous bailee.

This case dealing with a gratuitous bailment was tried in England a few years ago (Hill & Son Limited vs. British Airways Limited). In this case the plaintiffs left their aircraft in the custody of the defendant company under an arrangement whereby there was to be no charge for its storage.

The defendant company decided to move the aircraft out of the hangar to make way for another machine. Apparently it was a very windy day with heavy winds blowing from 35 mph up to 80 mph. While the plane was being moved, it was caught by a violent gust of wind and overthrown, resulting in serious damage to the aircraft.

The court held that the defendant was liable, having been negligent in taking the plane out of the hangar into the open when, as the defendant knew or ought to have known, the wind was so strong as to make it unsafe to do so and that the violent gust could not be considered an Act of God.

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