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JIC Secretary to CSC Secretary 52-04-01

Revision of the ACAI Papers

Differences in Canadian and US Views on Soviet Bomber Threat

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IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. CSC 7-26-5 (JIC)



CANADA

Department of National Defence

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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ADDRESS REPLY TO.
SECRETARY
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,
OTTAWA.

1 Apr 52

The Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff.

Revision of the ACAI Papers

1. The MCC and CUS Planners requested that the US-Canadian agreed intelligence (ACAI) papers be revised by 1 Mar 52 in order that the MCC Short Term and the CUS Short and Medium Term Plans could be revised by 1 Jul 52. Although working teams representing the US and Canadian JIC's met late in February to amend the papers, final agreement between the two JIC's has not been reached as yet as there are significant differences between the US and Canadian views on:

- the overall size of the Soviet Long-Range Air Force;
- the maximum number of atomic bombs which the USSR might employ in a single raid on Canada and the US; and
- the maximum probable number of aircraft which the USSR might employ in any one raid.

The views of the JIC and the way in which they differ from the US views are set out at Appendix "A".

2. The JIC has gained the impression that the US authorities are firmly committed to their views and that they would not agree, at any level, to a substantial modification of that view. On the other hand, the JIC considers that the Canadian view is a more reasonable assessment.

3. In reconciling this problem the only recourse appears to be the expression of both views in a compromise statement worded in general terms and omitting all figures or clear references to scales. Even though such a statement would reduce the value of the papers to the MCC and CUS Planners it would be preferable to not producing agreed intelligence papers at all.

4. The JIC requests that the Chiefs of Staff note:

- (a) the differences in the US and Canadian opinions on the Soviet air threat to North America; and
- (b) that any major change in the views expressed is unlikely.

Enc.

JEB/5459/fp

c.c. JIC
JIS

J.E. Beswick
(J.E. Beswick)
Major,
Secretary.

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APPENDIX " A " TO CSC 7-26-5(JIC) of ~~12 Mar 52~~

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19 Apr 52

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Revision of the ACAI papers

Difference in US and Canadian views.

1. During the discussions between the working teams, it was established that no major facts are available to one side and not to the other, and that the facts on past and present medium bomber production and order of battle are so few that only estimates of low reliability can be made. The differences in estimates arise from differences of interpretation and not from differences of fact.
2. The differences in the estimates of the numbers of medium and heavy bombers available in operational units in mid-1953 is nearly 2 (U.S.) to 1 (Canada). The differences are not the result of a few major points, but of the accumulation of successive differences on both aircraft production and order of battle. Taken individually, most of the differences are difficult to justify one way or the other, but considering the overall picture obtained, we consider that our estimates of production and of order of battle are closer to past and present situations and present trends as we know them. On almost every point the Canadian choice was for lower levels of production, smaller operational forces and lower capabilities, while the U.S. choice was towards the higher values.
3. The two views agree on the very important fact that the enemy have the capability of producing enough aircraft to carry all the atomic bombs they may seek to deliver against the U.S. and Canada, even if they should seek to deliver their entire stockpile.
4. From the working team discussions and the figures originally proposed as revisions by the U.S., it is known that the U.S. working team envisage enemy attempts to deliver the bulk of their available atomic bomb stockpile against targets in Canada and the U.S. as distinctly probable, and consider that the probable maximum number of medium and heavy bombers that could be available for any one attack is of the order of 800 to 1,000 aircraft. As no agreement could be reached on these points the present paragraph (para 138) was put in the paper by the working teams allowing for such capabilities but expressing no opinion on whether they are likely courses of action.
5. The view of the JIC is that for the enemy to employ the bulk of their atomic bomb stockpile against the U.S. and Canada at the outset of a war in 1953, would be to gamble on crippling the U.S. to such an extent that success in other areas was virtually certain, since they would by such an attack have expended, before the outcome of critical operations elsewhere could be discerned, those atomic weapons and aircraft which they might need to use later in support of those operations. We think such a gamble is improbable in the extreme in view of their small atomic bomb stockpile, the extreme difficulties of operating TU-4 aircraft against North America, and in the face of the uncertainty which must remain about the success of their operations in other areas. It might be argued on the other extreme that these same considerations might even lead them to do no more than to attempt to divert an overlarge part of our resources to the defence of North America by the use of a very few atomic bombs. However, since the North American war effort is one of the principal strategic considerations, and atomic attack is the principal means

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by which they can reduce this war effort, we consider that by 1953 it is most probable that they would employ a substantial portion of their atomic bomb stockpile against North America, with some possibility that they might initially use up to half of their A-bomb stockpile for this purpose.

6. It is our view that the maximum number of aircraft which would probably be engaged in an initial raid against the U.S. and Canada would be confined to the atomic bomb carriers and the supporting aircraft necessary to provide countermeasures, to supplement attacks on the same targets as the atomic bombs, and to create other diversions. It is considered that these supporting aircraft would be kept to a minimum because of the limited results achieved by other weapons compared to the great effort and possible wastage represented by each TU-4 mission, having regard to the employment of one-way missions or aerial refueling, the difficulties of operations and logistics, and the availability of bases. In view of all these considerations, it is considered that the maximum number of aircraft which would probably be engaged in initial raids against the U.S. and Canada would be of the order of 200 to 300 aircraft.

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