Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project

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JIC Assessment
Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action
Against North America, 1 July 1957
ACAI 24 52-10-15 52-08-22

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DECISION ON A.C.A.I. 24

15 October 1952

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A.C.A.I. 24

15 October 1952

CANADIAN-UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE

DECISION ON A.C.A.I. 24

(Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Against North America - 1 July 1957)

1. On 14 October 1952 the Canadian-United States Joint Intelligence Committees amended and approved the military estimate attached to A.C.A.I. 24.

2. Holders of A.C.A.I. 24 are requested to substitute the attached revised pages 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 34, 37 and 40 and added page 40 a, and to destroy the superseded pages by burning.

Done

3. This decision becomes a part of A.C.A.I. 24 and shall be attached as the top page thereof.

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CORRIGENDUM TO A.C.A.I. 24

2 September 1952

47

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2 September 1952

CANADIAN-UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE

NOTE TO THE HOLDERS

of

A.C.A.I. 24

(Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Against North America - 1 July 1957)

CORRIGENDUM

Holders of A.C.A.I. 24 are requested to make the following pen and ink corrections to the estimate attached to that paper:

1. Page 7, paragraph 19, line 7: Change "then" to "than".

2. Page 8, paragraph 23 a, line 3: Change "maybe" to "may be".

3. Page 21, paragraph 55 b, line 1: Change "probable" to "probably".

4. Page 25, paragraph 59, line 4: Change "natuical" to "nautical".

5. Page 28, paragraph 66 d, lines 1 and 2: Change "Hydro-foils" to "hydrofoils".

6. Page 32, paragraph 69 c, line 5: Change "their" to "its".

7. Page 35, paragraph 71 a, line 2: Add "and" between "D-day" and "by".

47

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A.C.A.I. 24

22 August 1952

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A.C.A.I. 24

22 August 1952

CANADIAN - UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE

A.C.A.I. 24

(Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Against North America - 1 July 1957)

On 21 August 1952, the Canadian and the United States intelligence working teams agreed to the attached intelligence estimate for concurrent submission to the Canadian and United States Joint Intelligence Committees.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST NORTH AMERICA - 1 JULY 1957

THE PROBLEM

1. To prepare an agreed U.S.-Canadian intelligence estimate of Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Against North America in a Major War Commencing 1 July 1957.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. a. Allied capabilities for early detection of Soviet military preparations, both inside the Soviet Union and in Soviet-occupied Europe, and for positive evaluation as to whether such preparations are for maneuvers or for hostile aggressive action are inadequate and will probably remain so at least until 1957. In addition, the Soviet armed forces are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with little or no additional mobilization. In consideration of the foregoing factors, it is necessary to assume that there would be little or no warning prior to the actual initiation of hostilities.

b. It is also assumed that the war breaks out at such short notice that the Soviet Union will not have had sufficient time significantly to alter the current allocation and use of its economic resources.

c. For planning purposes in this paper, the date of 1 July 1957 has been assumed arbitrarily for the outbreak of war since intelligence does not indicate whether or not a Soviet time-table or definite date to initiate hostilities exists.

POLITICAL FACTORS

POLITICAL ALIGNMENT

Soviet Bloc

3. a. The following countries will be aligned with the Soviet Union:

Albania	Czechoslovakia	Outer Mongolia
Bulgaria	Eastern Germany	Poland
Communist China	Hungary	Rumania

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

b. The USSR will continue to have control of the Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin, even though its legal possession of these areas has not been established by mid-1957. In addition, the Soviet Union will have the use of the base at Porkkala (Finland).

c. While it is possible that Soviet troops will have been withdrawn from Eastern Austria by 1957, it is assumed that the USSR will still have control of the territory and resources of that area at that time.

Western Powers

4. a. The following countries, together with their dependent territories, will be allied or aligned with the United States and Canada:

Australia	Italy	Philippines
Belgium	Luxembourg	Portugal
Denmark	Nationalist China	Turkey
France	Norway	United Kingdom
Greece	Netherlands	Western Germany
Iceland	New Zealand	

b. Japan's military potential, and to some degree its economic capabilities, will have increased by 1957. Consequently, it may be in a stronger bargaining position than at present. Despite this possibility, it is considered likely that Japan will support the West.

c. The Latin American countries are committed by the Rio Treaty to support the United States in the event of any hostilities which may endanger the peace and security of the American Continent. Countries such as Colombia and Brazil may, in varying degrees, afford active military assistance in the event of general war.

d. While there is no doubt that South Africa will align itself with the Western Powers in the event of a major war,

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

if racial conflicts continue the possibility of internal disorders might compel it to keep its troops within its borders.

e. The Western Powers will have access, at least initially, to the territory and resources of Western Austria and Trieste. They will have access to bases in Ceylon, Liberia, Libya, Ryukyus and Saudi Arabia. They will also have defense rights in Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt, but in view of the prevailing nationalism in these countries there might be some difficulty in fully exercising these rights. If the present negotiations between the United States and Spain are successfully concluded, the Western Powers will have access to naval and air facilities in Spain.

Korea and Indochina

5. The situation in Korea and Indochina cannot be determined for mid-1957.

a. It is possible that some settlement will have emerged in Korea by that time. However, under such a settlement, North Korea would continue to be aligned with the Soviet Bloc while South Korea would be oriented toward the West.

b. There are no current indications of a settlement in Indochina. If present conditions continue until 1957, the Viet Minh forces would be aligned with the Soviet Bloc and the Vietnamese forces would be aligned with the Western Powers.

Other States

6. In the event of war, the political alignment of the states listed below would be less certain than that of the countries mentioned in subparagraphs 3 a and 4 a.

Switzerland	Israel	Indonesia
Sweden	Arab States	Thailand
Ireland	Iran	Burma
Finland	India	Spain
Yugoslavia	Pakistan	

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

ENEMY GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES

Soviet Union

7. The Soviet regime is firmly established. It faces various internal problems, but potential sources of disaffection can be kept in check sufficiently to enable the government to remain in full control of the country. Although the transfer of power following the death of Stalin may cause some temporary instability, it would not seriously weaken Communist control in the USSR.

8. In time of war, the potential opposition in the Soviet Union could reduce the war effort seriously only if the mechanisms of control were thoroughly disrupted or if effective Allied support for disaffected groups were immediately at hand.

European Satellites

9. The governments of the European satellite countries came to power under Soviet auspices. There is evidence of hostility among the peoples of the satellite countries to their Communist regimes, but there are no indications of effective resistance. Continued improvement in Communist methods of control will hinder the development of effective opposition.

10. In time of war, the Soviet Union will be able to maintain such control over the satellite governments that the latent hostility among their peoples to the governments will not be able to take the form of effective resistance to the Soviet war effort unless the Western Powers provide assistance and direction from a nearby area.

Communist China

11. The Soviet Union is less able to exert direct pressure on Communist China than on the European Satellites, but can exert considerable influence on Communist China. Thus far, there have been no clear-cut indications of divergencies between the policies of Communist China and the Soviet Union. A common ideology, fear

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

and hatred of the West, and a high degree of military and economic dependence will probably keep China aligned with the Soviet Union at least until mid-1957.

12. The stability of the Communist regime in the period under review is not likely to be seriously affected by opposition to its policies, by the current anti-Communist guerrilla activities or by the continuation of the present measures taken against Communist China by the non-Communist nations.

13. In the event of war, Communist China and the Soviet Union will continue to cooperate against the Western Powers in pursuing their objectives in Asia and, if Japan or states allied with Japan were involved, the two countries would be bound to joint action against the West by the Sino-Soviet alliance. It is possible, however, that Communist China in particular will fulfill its responsibilities under the Treaty only if the decision to act had been taken on other grounds.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

14. The Soviet policy of unremitting hostility towards the West is guided by Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine and by considerations affecting the position of the Soviet Union as a world power. As a result of the deliberate identification of the security of the Soviet Union with the ideals of Communism, Soviet leaders are able to enlist the support of foreign elements for Soviet national interests.

15. The Soviet Union commands in this way the allegiance of Communist Parties, legal or underground, in most countries of the world. These parties attempt to advance Soviet interests through parliamentary activities and propaganda. Members of foreign Communist Parties can also be employed in subversion, sabotage, espionage and even armed insurrection.

16. Communists have infiltrated trade unions and women's and youth organizations in most parts of the world. In addition, a variety of national and international front organizations function as further instruments of Soviet policy. The World Peace Congress, for example, seeks to undermine popular support for Western policies which are not consonant with Soviet objectives and to promote Soviet solutions to international problems. In time of crisis, the USSR would use this movement as a means of direct mass action against preparations for war.

POLITICAL WARFARE

17. The Soviet Union is now engaged in psychological warfare on a large scale. Through intensive propaganda, as well as political and economic actions, it attempts to build up support for Communist policies and to prevent rival sources of power (whether entrenched in office or contesting for influence) from taking steps which would interfere with Soviet plans. It is expected that the Soviet propaganda campaign will continue during the period under consideration. While the intensity and tactics of its propaganda effort will vary from time to time, no fundamental change in the Soviet Union's objectives is anticipated.

18. The Soviet Union is also engaged in espionage and subversion within the United States and Canada, but to date there is no evidence of the existence of Soviet-directed physical sabotage operations. While specific information on future activities is lacking, it is expected that the USSR would use these methods in seeking its objectives whenever it is advantageous to do so.

a. The Soviet Union has shown great versatility in perfecting its world-wide subversive apparatus and in devising new tactics. As a result, Soviet capabilities in this field are constantly improving.

b. The Soviet Union will possess an increasing capability for employing chemical and biological agents for sabotage

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

operations between now and 1957. The effectiveness of these and other forms of physical sabotage will depend largely on the efficiency of security measures in the areas threatened. The most critical period would be from the opening of the sabotage campaign until the time when security arrangements are in full force. Little warning can be expected and sabotage would probably be timed with military efforts.

19. Communist Party membership in the United States and Canada is generally on the decline and no change in this trend is expected. The Party will continue to be available for employment by the Soviet Union for subversion, sabotage, and psychological warfare and is a force to be reckoned with particularly during the initial stage of hostilities.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

20. Economic Potential. The basic economic strength of the USSR lies in the fact that it has resources of nearly all important raw materials within its boundaries, a large and increasing population, and a well-developed industrial base for the manufacture of capital goods and military end-products. During the next five years it is expected that the Soviet economy will continue to expand substantially. It is estimated that the 1957 gross national output of the USSR will be roughly 25 to 30 per cent higher than in 1952.

a. The present distribution of the national product among civilian consumption, capital investment, and military expenditures is not likely to change significantly by 1957. About 53 per cent of the current total consists of goods and services for civilian consumption. The same percentage of the estimated 1957 national product would permit per capita consumption to rise 16 per cent above the 1952 level. A somewhat more moderate rise in living standards is considered likely; hence, there will probably be a slight reduction in the proportion of the national product devoted to consumers goods and services.

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

b. The USSR will continue its traditionally high rate of capital investment. At least one-quarter, and more likely 27-28 per cent, of the 1957 national product will consist of capital goods--primarily for heavy industry and transportation.

21. Production of goods and services in the European Satellites may increase somewhat more rapidly than in the USSR. Currently, their estimated combined output is about 44 per cent of the Soviet national product; by 1957 it may be approximately one-half that of the USSR. A somewhat greater proportion of the Satellite national product consists of civilian consumption, but the present trend is toward reducing this component in favor of increased investment.

22. The industrial development of China, which has been generally hampered in recent years, may also be fairly rapid. Given the very low output of Chinese industry, however, even rapid expansion would not materially alter the Chinese economic contribution to the Soviet military effort in the next five years.

Possible Defense Effort in 1957

23.a. Soviet military expenditures currently amount to almost 20 per cent of the national product. This proportion will probably remain the same in 1957, but may be slightly increased. However, it is believed unlikely that military expenditures would significantly exceed this proportion until the USSR is put on a complete war footing. Conversely, such expenditures would probably not be reduced below the present percentage unless there were a broad relaxation of East-West tension.

b. Satellite defense expenditures are small relative to those of the USSR (about 7 per cent of the Satellite's combined national product in 1951). However, they increased considerably in 1952 and may reach 15 per cent of the Satellite National product by mid-1957.

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

c. On the assumption that the personnel strength of the Soviet armed forces in 1957 will not be significantly larger than in 1952 the bulk of the increased resource devoted to defense will go to research and development and to the manufacture of improved military end-products. Assuming that the proportion of resources allocated to defense is unchanged and even allowing for the increasing cost and complexity of modern weapons, the conclusion is inescapable that an increase in the output of military end-products can be attained over the next five years.

SCIENTIFIC FACTORS

24. During the postwar period the Soviet Union made great efforts to train more scientific manpower. The number of scientists emerging from the Universities has increased annually, and is likely to continue to grow. This expansion will, by 1957, supply Russia with a considerable number of scientists and technicians, some of whom will, by that date, have acquired a certain amount of practical experience. However, the number of first class scientists probably is well below the number in the West and, below the top level, there will continue to be a shortage of really good research workers and technicians.

25. Soviet research and industrial laboratories are expanding steadily, and should be able to supply Soviet requirements in applied science. During the post World War II period the Soviet Union has made notable advances in the quality of military equipment in a number of fields, including aircraft, radar and other electronics, atomic energy, antiaircraft artillery, and probably guided missiles and submarines. While the vast effort concentrated in the nuclear energy program has reduced the scientific resources available for other fields, it must be expected that significant progress will continue along several lines. It is not thought likely that the Soviet Union will do more basic research than is absolutely necessary, but will rather apply the results of Western basic work to its own needs.

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

26. The Soviet Union is closing the gap which separated its scientific capability from that of the West by expanding its training facilities and by exploiting through both open and covert means the scientific potential of the West. The Soviet capability to exploit Western developments while largely concealing its own may permit the Soviets to equal or surpass the West in some fields.

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

MILITARY FACTORS*

Ground Forces

27. It is estimated that the standing Soviet Army contains 2,500,000 men. In addition, the internal security forces consist of an estimated 400,000 men. While there is no evidence pointing toward an increase in these figures by 1957, additional manpower of about 1,000,000 could be devoted to the army and security forces even with continued industrial expansion and continued growth of other arms.

28. The Soviet Army is organized into 175 line divisions, of which 105 are rifle; 40 are mechanized; 25 are tank; and 5 are cavalry divisions. In addition, there are an estimated 45 artillery and antiaircraft artillery divisions. Any increase in this strength will probably result in a greater proportion of rifle divisions even if the increase occurs before the beginning of hostilities. On the other hand, there is limited evidence to suggest that the Soviets may plan that one-third of their divisions shall be tank or mechanized. Accordingly, the long or medium term organization of Soviet forces may result in only a slightly lower proportion of tank and mechanized divisions than at present. The present disposition of the 175 line divisions is believed to be as follows:

Location	Divisions
Germany-Poland	24
Austria-Hungary-Rumania	6
Northwestern Military Districts	14
Western Military Districts	49
Caucasus Military Districts	19
West Central Military Districts	19
East Central Military Districts	14
Far Eastern Military Districts	26
Far East Outside USSR	4
TOTAL	175

* While Satellite forces are considered capable of contributing to the Soviet effort elsewhere, they are not considered capable in 1957 of major participation in offensive operations against Canada and the United States.

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

29. There are no firm indications of the size and organization of Soviet airborne forces. It is estimated, however, on the basis of the extensive training known to have taken place, that at least 100,000 paratroops are available. In addition, it is estimated that about 100,000 line troops have received elementary air transportability training. Principal limitations on the employment of airborne forces will be the availability of transport lift. By 1957, it can be expected that the number of airborne units will have increased.

30. It is estimated that the army possesses stocks of material adequate for 175 divisions in combat in Europe and Asia for about one year, independent of current production. Supplies and reserves of equipment are believed to be located at widely separated places inside and outside the Soviet Union, so that any potential theater would be able to draw on regional stores for several months. By 1 July 1957, it is not likely that serious shortages will exist, but it is possible that much equipment will be obsolete or obsolescent.

31. Potential speeds of mobilization are estimated to be as follows:

Period	Line Divisions	Total Divisions	Strength of Ground Forces
M-day	175	175	2,500,000
M + 30 days	320	345	8,000,000
M + 180 days	320	470	11,000,000
M + 365 days	470	520	12,000,000

This potential exceeds estimated requirements.

32. It is expected, unless a radical change in the armies of the Western Powers takes place in the intervening years, that the Soviet Army in 1957 will still be the most powerful and effective ground combat force in being in the world. The peak of combat effectiveness of Soviet divisions is considered to be represented

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

by the present forces in being. Additional mobilization will tend to lower unit efficiency, but increased numbers will partially offset this unfavorable effect.

33. The total strength of the European Satellite ground armies, including East Germany, is estimated at 1,212,000 personnel, comprising approximately 70 line divisions. It is estimated that by 1957 the personnel strength will have increased to 1,750,000 comprising 120 line divisions, of which 25 will be tank or mechanized divisions. The field forces of Communist China are estimated at about 2,255,000 men, organized into 69 armies, totaling about 230 divisions. In addition, there are about 1,450,000 Military District troops in China. No significant increase in the strength of the Chinese Communist army is expected by 1957. Equipment and training, rather than manpower, will continue to be limiting factors.

34. Combat efficiency and morale of the European Satellite armies are considered satisfactory and should improve through 1957. Providing the USSR furnishes material assistance, there is little doubt that the Chinese Communists can produce a well-balanced ground force designed for service anywhere in East and South Asia.

35. The European Satellite, as well as the Chinese Communist, forces will continue to be almost wholly dependent upon Soviet sources of supply for equipment.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Naval Forces

36. Surface Fleet - 1957:*

Type	Northern Baltic	Black Sea	Pacific	Total
OBB	1	2	-	3
MON	1	-	-	1
CA	2	2	2	6
OCA	-	1	-	1
CL	25 (23)**	11 (8)	4 (2)	40*** (33)
OCL	-	1	-	1
DD	65 (96)	30 (41)	25 (47)	120 (184)
ODD	27 (3)	7 (3)	15 (3)	49 (9)
DC	7 (14)	5 (7)	6 (15)	18 (36)
ODC	11 (4)	2 (0)	9 (0)	22 (4)
OE	1 (9)	0 (2)	2	3 (13)

37. Submarines - 1957:****

	Northern Baltic	Black Sea	Pacific	Total
Improved Ocean Patrol and Ocean Patrol	174 (140)**	19 (20)	43 (50)	236 (210)
Medium Range	36 (49)	5 (10)	34 (36)	75 (95)
Coastal	163 (150)	85 (50)	44 (100)	292 (300)
Total	373 (339)	109 (80)	121 (186)	603 (605)

38. Concentration of Naval Strength. Due to wide separation of the maritime frontiers and lack of overseas bases, the Soviet Navy has not the mobility of other navies and it would be virtually impossible to effect a rapid concentration of forces in any given area from the various Russian fleets.

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* The Canadian estimate assumes that more emphasis will be placed on destroyer construction than in the U. S. view. The U. S. estimate assumes that all facilities capable of constructing cruiser size vessels will be so employed during the period under consideration. Forty destroyers and 18 destroyers (coastal) have been moved to the "old" group in the U. S. estimate, and 10 ocean escorts have been dropped as becoming unserviceable due to age.

** Figures in parenthesis are the Canadian View.

*** Cruiser type vessels of varying size.

**** The U. S. estimate has assumed a slightly higher construction rate for the improved ocean patrol type than has the Canadian estimate but has further assumed submarines to be unserviceable after 20 years, while the Canadian estimate has assumed a refitting program to keep them in service. U. S. distribution was made on basis of present deployment, while Canadian distribution assumed the transfer of a certain percentage of new construction from building areas to the Pacific.

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

39. During the period under consideration the personnel strength will increase in proportion to the increased order of battle. Present naval personnel strength is estimated as follows:

Forces Afloat (With attendant rear services)	300,000
Coastal Defense " " " "	275,000
Naval Air Forces " " " "	80,000
In Training	100,000
Total	755,000*

40. European Satellites and Communist China. The navies of these countries are small and would make no significant contributions to Soviet capabilities against North America.

41. Mobilization Potential. Since the Soviet Navy does not maintain a large reserve fleet, but maintains its ships in operational readiness, the mobilization of the Navy would not be a major problem.

Air Forces

42. It is estimated that the total establishment of the Soviet air forces for aircraft in operational units in mid-1957 will be on the order of 20,500 aircraft. While units at present vary as to percentage of authorized aircraft strength actually assigned, there is no apparent reason why the establishment could not be filled or expanded from reserves of aircraft readily available by mid-1957 or any time within a few months after the decision to do so is taken. The aircraft establishments of the various components of Soviet military aviation are estimated for mid-1957 as follows:

* An additional 125,000 VNOS and SNIS personnel perform naval duties but are believed under MGB control.

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Role	Force	Jet	Piston
Day Fighter	Tactical	5,500	
	Naval	1,600	
	PVO	2,000	
All-Weather Fighter	Tactical		
	PVO	1,000	
		10,100	
Ground Attack	Tactical	2,450	
	Naval	150	
		2,600	
Light, Mine and Torpedo Bomber	Tactical	2,500	200
	Naval	800	100
	LRAF	150	
		3,450	300*
Medium Bomber	LRAF	350**	500**
Heavy Bomber	LRAF		200-250***
Reconnaissance	Tactical	600	200****
	Naval	200	100****
		800	300
		Medium*****	Light
Transports	Tactical		700
	Naval		200
	LRAF	200	
	Airborne	300	300
		500	1,200

* Canadian view. The U. S. considers that as many as 500 piston light bombers may remain in service in 1957.

** The U. S. considers that as many as 600 jet medium bombers may be in service in 1957. If the jet force is as low as 350, the piston medium bomber force would be correspondingly larger.

*** Total may include piston, jet, and/or turboprop types.

**** If the Soviets choose, the reconnaissance force may consist entirely of jet types. However, there may be a continuing requirement for piston-engine reconnaissance aircraft. Some basic long range bomber types will be modified for reconnaissance, and may be used for long range reconnaissance missions in connection with both naval and air operations.

***** This total includes all medium transports which may be in service in 1957. It is possible that some medium transports will be allocated to Civil Aviation rather than to military aviation.

(Page revised by Decision On - 14 October 1952)

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

43. Barring unforeseen changes in the strategic requirements of the Soviet Union, the allocation of Soviet air forces for mid-1957 is expected to be:

Facing Scandinavia	3,500
Facing Western Europe	5,500
Facing Mediterranean and Middle East	5,600
Facing Far East	5,500

The disposition of Long Range Aviation, which is included in the above totals, will probably be approximately two-thirds west of the Urals and one-third in the Far East.

44. The three Soviet base areas closest to North America are the Chukotski Peninsula area in Northeastern Siberia, the Kola Peninsula area around Murmansk and the Baltic area. Although the Chukotski Peninsula area is the closest of these to North America and is therefore now considered the most important, there exist no known bases in this area capable of sustained medium bomber operations. By 1957, however, it is considered that these base areas will have lost much of their importance, as a Soviet strategic bomber in the long range class will be able to operate from other areas where the logistic difficulties are not so great. The need for staging bases as far forward as possible will still persist, however. By 1957 the adequacy of air bases in these areas should not be a limiting factor in the capabilities of the Soviet Union to mount attacks against North America.

45. At present the maintenance of Soviet aircraft, though probably less complete and thorough than that required by the United States or Canada, is improved over the standards of World War II. Maximum operational capabilities for medium/heavy bombers is estimated to be approximately 85 per cent of the number in operational units, providing operations are preceded by a maintenance stand-down. Sustained capability is estimated to be not more than 50 per cent of the number in operational units over a three-month period.

46. The Civil Air Fleet, which is a semimilitary organization under the control of the Minister of War, can supplement military transport aircraft in time of war. It is considered that by mid-1957 the strength of this organization will be approximately 2,000 light transports and possibly a few medium transports. About half of this number could be made available for military purposes intermittently during wartime.

47. The European satellites are expected to have well-equipped tactical air forces with a total strength of approximately 3,000 aircraft, of which at least 50 per cent probably will be jet fighters. The combined Chinese and Korean air forces are expected to have a similar strength and composition.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

48. Atomic Warfare. Soviet capabilities for the creation of an atomic bomb stockpile by mid-1957 can only be speculated upon because of the uncertainties involved in estimating the volume of fissionable material production and the substantial increase or decrease in the number of weapons which could be made possible by changing weapon design. Projection of estimates made for earlier years would indicate the availability of some 550 or more weapons by mid-1957. This figure is highly tentative and the upper and lower limits might range between 1,100 and 300 on the basis of present information. Under any circumstances the stockpile will be of sufficient size to represent a major factor in Soviet war planning. It should be expected that the Soviets will possess a diverse arsenal of atomic weapons.

49. Thermonuclear Weapons. No definite statement can be made now as to the ability and the will of the Soviet Union to produce some type of fusion bomb by 1957. There is no evidence that the Soviets have tested thermonuclear weapons

or that their program is being directed toward this end. However, new approaches to the thermonuclear weapon problem cannot be ruled out and the possibility that the USSR may produce such weapons during the period between now and mid-1957 must be recognized.

50. Radiological Warfare. In view of the many limitations and complications connected with the use of radiological weapons, it is considered probable that they will not be a factor in Soviet capabilities in 1957.

51. Biological Warfare. The Soviets are in possession of all the necessary basic knowledge for the production of most BW agents on any scale desired. If they chose to do so, they would be able to construct or operate plants for BW production long before 1957, and weapons for dissemination could be available in adequate numbers.

52. No information is available about Soviet work in the field of BW against animals or crops. However, since the Soviets have considerable numbers of competent biologists, it must be assumed that research in this field of BW is being carried out, and that agents will be available.

53. Chemical Warfare. The Soviet Union is now capable of large-scale employment of standard CW agents. The available intelligence suggests that the Soviets have been producing at least one of the nerve gases since 1949. Hence, it is estimated that by mid-1957 the Soviets will be capable of extensive employment of nerve gases. Raw material demands, e.g., chlorine, might, however, limit the duration of such employment.

54. It is considered that GB is the most lethal war gas which the Soviets are capable of producing. However, they may have other nerve gases with better cold-weather performance or greater persistance, or which are more easily produced. By 1957, the Soviets will have a well-fitting respirator; improved detectors for G-agents and clothing with improved resistance to nerve gases should be available. It is possible that new drugs will be developed which give better protection than those now in use.

Development of New Weapons

55. Guided Missiles. While no Soviet guided missiles are known to be operational at the present time, the Soviet Union could have several types operational by 1957. This estimate is based upon an assessment of reasonable progress in the further development of missiles based on the World War II German program, which served as the starting point for the Soviet program. However, it should be noted that although some Soviet organizations responsible for conducting research applicable to guided missiles have been identified, the nature of their work and rate of progress is largely unknown. Missile characteristics in each of the major fields are expected to be generally as outlined below:

a. Surface-to-Air. The surface-to-air missile which could be available for at least limited operational use in mid-1957 is expected to be a winged rocket employing solid rocket booster and radar command with homing guidance. Its slant range could be approximately 25 nautical miles at about 75,000 feet altitude. Earlier missiles, which might be available in greater quantities, would be available with a maximum slant range of 15 miles at 70,000 feet. In either case, the slant range would be increased at lower altitudes.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

b. Air-to-Surface. Possibly by 1954, but more probably by 1955, a high subsonic speed rocket powered glide bomb could become operational. It could have a range of 20 nautical miles and a pay load of 3,000 pounds, and could employ radar command and homing guidance, possibly employing TV. In the period 1955-1957, slight improvements could be made to increase speeds, ranges, and accuracies. Other weapons which could be available would include the earlier developments such as the FX-1400 controllable bomb, the HS-293 powered glide bomb and the HS-294 powered glide torpedo. In addition, an earlier model powered glide bomb employing radar and radio command could be available for operational use. Accuracy (50 per cent dispersion radius) of the best weapons should be on the order of 200 feet.

c. Surface-to-Surface. Evidence of Soviet activity in this field has included limited assembly and launching of V-1 type missiles which could result in some increase in range and/or pay load. Launching of V-1's from submarines appears to have been investigated, and the Soviets are considered capable of employing an atomic warhead for use in this type of weapons before 1957. Although there is no evidence that the Soviets have developed a turbo-jet pilotless aircraft, this is a logical trend of development. By 1954 if they so choose, they could develop this type, which could be launched from a submarine and guided to a range of 400-500 miles, at speeds approaching 600 knots, with sufficient accuracy at least for area bombardment. By 1957 it might have sufficient accuracy to justify the use of an atomic war head. Limited production and flight testing of modified V-2 missiles, and design work on a 120-metric-ton thrust engine indicate a Soviet interest in missiles having ranges considerably in excess of that of the V-2. A ballistic V-2 type, delivering 35 metric tons thrust and capable of

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

carrying a one-ton war head to a range of 350 nautical miles could be operational now. Initial flight tests of a single stage ballistic missile, powered by the 120-metric-ton thrust engine could begin in late 1952. A prototype operational version could become available in 1954 and a glide version in 1956. A prototype version of a two-stage ballistic missile (first stage 120 metric tons, second stage 35 metric tons) could be available in late 1955. It would be capable of carrying a one-ton pay load approximately 1,400 nautical miles, but guidance would remain a problem. By further development of the two-stage ballistic type missile with the 120-metric-ton motor, the Soviets may be able to produce a prototype intercontinental missile by 1957. However, the performance of this missile would probably be marginal at best, and they could be available only in small numbers.

d. Air-to-Air. There is no information of any Soviet interest in this field. However, two German projects, X-4 and HS 298--both subsonic--could be currently operational using visual and radio command guidance. A supersonic winged rocket, with the same type of guidance, could also become available by mid-1953 but more probably in 1954. Possibly in 1954, but more probably by 1956, a "homing-all-the-way" supersonic rocket could be available. In the period 1956-1957, slight improvements could be made to increase speeds, ranges and accuracies.

56. Rockets

a. Air-to-Air. The Soviets are considered capable of introducing in 1952, a 2.25-3 inch air-to-air rocket capable of delivering a one-pound to two-pound war head (depending on the size of the rocket selected) at an all-burnt velocity of 2,000-2,200 feet per second. By 1955 rockets in the same general size range would be capable of all-burnt velocities at 2,500 feet per second. Possibly in 1956, but more probably in 1958, a similar size rocket capable of delivering a one-pound war head at an all-burnt velocity of 3,000 feet per second could be introduced.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

b. Air-to-Ground. The Soviets employed air-to-ground rockets extensively in World War II and presumably have large stocks of them available for operational use at the present time. By 1953, improved types ranging in size from 3.25 to 5 inches and in total weight from 22 to 100 pounds could be available. War head size would be 2 pounds for the 3.25 and up to 8 pounds for larger sizes. In the period 1956-1957, similar diameter rockets incorporating war heads ranging in weight from 2.2 pounds to 15 pounds could become available. These types would have all-burnt velocities of 3,000 feet per second for the smaller and 2,500 feet per second for the larger rockets. Limited numbers of rockets of larger caliber, up to 12 inches, may be made available for specialized requirements at any time during the period.

c. Surface-to-Air. The Soviets are considered capable of producing a successful unguided antiaircraft rocket for operational employment in mid-1953 and improving and refining it through 1957. The Soviets' new fire control system, which incorporates the SCR 584 type radar and probable new director, could probably be adapted for utilization with such a rocket as could improved versions upon operational appearance. It is estimated that the addition of this type of rocket to the Soviet antiaircraft artillery system would lift its maximum effective ceiling to between 50,000 and 60,000 feet by 1957. Because of the excessive dispersion at higher altitudes, effectiveness could be attained only by resorting to the mass fire principle, and it is therefore considered likely that these rockets would be used only as an interim and supplemental measure until effective ground-to-air guided missiles become available.

57. Proximity Fuzes. It is estimated that the Soviets will have adequate operational quantities of proximity fuzes for low velocity missiles by 1957. The Soviets are considered capable of initiating the production of fuzes capable of withstanding high accelerations.

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

58. Aircraft Development. The following table lists the estimated maximum operational performance capabilities of Soviet aircraft for 1957. It should be noted that the great majority of aircraft in Soviet units will be earlier types not capable of the maximum performances listed below:

BOMBERS

Type	Power Plant	Max Speed (kts) Sea L.	Max Speed (kts) Alt*	Combat Range	Combat Radius (NM) No Re-fuel	Combat Radius (NM) One Re-fuel	Bomb Load (lb)	Serv Ceiling (ft)
Light**	Jet	550	525	1,900	950	---	6,600	50,000
Medium	Jet	535	485	4,000	2,100	2,950	10,000	48,000
	Conv	300	375	5,000	2,650	3,700	10,000	40,000
Heavy	Jet	450	425	7,000	3,500	4,900	10,000	45,000
	Prop	350	400	8,000	4,000	5,600	10.000	42,500

PENETRATION FIGHTERS

Power Plant	Maximum Speed (kts) SL	Maximum Speed (kts) 30,000 ft	Service Ceiling	Combat Range (NM)	Combat Radius (NM)
Jet	620	570	50,000	1,600	640

TRANSPORTS

Power Plant	Maximum Speed (kts/ft)	Combat Range/Freight Load (nm/lbs)	Combat Radius/Freight Load (nm/lbs)
Jet	450/SL	3,000/10,000	1,500/10,000
Conv	350/15,000	3,000/50,000 4,000/25,000	1,650/50,000 2,200/30,000

* Performance at altitudes based on 20,000 feet for light bombers, 30,000 feet for medium and heavy bombers.
** Jet power plants could include turboprops. Afterburners or some auxiliary power could be employed for short bursts of speed which is not included in the performance.

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

59. Radar. It is estimated that by the year 1957 the Soviets will have an early warning radar capable of detecting a medium bomber flying at 30-40,000 feet altitude at a range of 160 ~~nautical~~ NAUTICAL miles and be able to detect a fighter bomber, at the same altitude, at 85 nautical miles range. Expected accuracies would be on the order of ± 3 nautical miles for range and ± 1° in azimuth.

a. Ground Control Intercept. It is expected that by 1957 the Soviet GCI radar will be an improved version of the V-beam TOKEN that is presently being used. Altitude coverage can be expected to be effective up to 50,000 feet with ability to detect a medium bomber at 130 nautical miles and a fighter aircraft at 80 nautical miles, with accuracies of ± 0.5 nautical miles in range, ± 0.5° in azimuth, and ± 500 to 1,000 feet in altitude.

b. Airborne Radar. The Soviet bombing and navigational radar, by 1957, should be capable of operating at 50,000 feet, given a range of 180 nautical miles for navigation with range accuracies of ± 1 per cent of range and accurate to ± 2° in azimuth. Airborne intercept radars will be available.

60. Navigation Aids. It is probable that the Soviet Union will have an efficient medium-range navigation system, probably operating in the 150 kilocycle/sec region, covering both European Russia, the Far East and possibly the Arctic. Blind landing equipment may be in wide use.

61. Anti-Radar. The Soviets may have some effective anti-radar paints which would be available at least for limited applications.

62. Communications. By 1957 in the communications field, it is considered that emphasis will be placed on VHF and UHF equipment. All fighters may have VHF radio. Decimeter links, and long-distance lines will carry a great deal of the communications traffic now on high-frequency point-to-point links. Jamming equipment will

be given a high degree of priority, both for radar and communications. Attempts will be made to produce jammers capable of interfering with missile-guidance systems and VT fuzes.

63. Electronics Countermeasures. It is estimated that by 1957 the soviets will be in a considerably improved position to conduct electronics countermeasures against the Western Powers, that they will thoroughly study and analyze many of the radiations from Western sources and that they will have planned countermeasures against these radiations. Present information does not provide an adequate basis for estimating the degree of success which Soviet countermeasures might achieve against the type of equipment likely to be operated by the Western nations in 1957.

64. Infrared. Considerable basic research in infrared material is in progress in the Soviet Union. The operational simplicity of infrared equipment, and its technical promise coupled with indications of Soviet research suggest that the USSR may develop new operational uses of infrared in various fields by 1957.

65. Army Weapons and Equipment. By mid-1957 the following new equipments are expected to be in service. These estimates are based on estimated Soviet requirements:

a. Improved medium tank. Increased armor, better performance, gun stabilization and an improved 85mm or 100mm gun.

b. Improved gun performance of the 122mm in the JS-3 heavy tank.

c. Improved ammunition design for field and anti-tank guns with possible introduction of squash head ammunition for use against tanks.

d. Improved fire control equipment for AAA and new antiaircraft guns.

e. Individual infantry anti-tank weapon of the Panzerfaust type.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

f. New, probably recoilless, anti-tank weapon using shaped charge ammunition for use within the infantry battalion.

g. New machine carbine (submachine gun).

h. New semiautomatic or automatic rifle.

i. Possibly a new heavy tank.

j. Possibly short-range AT/close support tactical guided missiles.

k. Improved methods of mine-detection and clearance.

l. An improved man-portable flame thrower with greater range than that of the ROKS-3.

66. Underwater Warfare and Naval Weapons

a. Submarines. By 1957 Soviet work on closed-cycle engines may have reached the stage at which submarines of considerably improved performance have been produced. It is also possible that the Soviet Union will, by that date, have some boats powered by nuclear energy. Anti-sonar coatings may be in use by 1957.

b. Mines. It is thought that future improvement in mines will be mainly in the field of actuating devices. The Soviet Union is capable of manufacturing the highly sensitive equipment required for good influence actuating devices, and is likely to produce mines which will not be easily swept. Atomic explosives will be available for mine-filling.

c. Torpedoes. The main improvement in the field of torpedoes will probably be the construction of better seawater batteries, enabling torpedoes to attain high speeds and better ranges. It is possible that the Soviet Union will develop oversize torpedoes for coastal defense. Various improved homing devices may appear, and radio or wire-guidance may be employed, particularly in coastal defense. Good long range pattern-running torpedoes will also be available.

d. Hydrofoils. Soviet work on hydrofoils may by 1957 have advanced sufficiently for them to build hydrofoils in the vicinity of 100 tons which should be capable of transporting about 100 troops or a commensurate amount of supplies.

67. Medical

a. Soviet advances in medicine are likely to follow the Western pattern fairly closely. By mid-1957 antibiotic production should have expanded considerably and should be able to supply all normal requirements, both in quantity and type. The standard of public health and sanitation is likely to improve gradually, as more trained doctors become available.

b. In the field of aviation medicine, there will be further improvements in anti-G-suits, which will contribute to the effectiveness of fighter aircraft. Better methods will become available for the prevention of motion sickness, particularly among troops in aircraft or at sea.

c. The Soviet Union will be likely to follow Western work in the search for drugs to protect against the effects of nerve-gases and bacteriological warfare agents and will investigate methods of alleviating radiation sickness.

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

ENEMY CAPABILITIES

Strategic Concepts

68. The ultimate objective of Soviet policy is the establishment throughout the world of Communist regimes directed from Moscow. The Soviets recognize the English-speaking democratic nations as being the group which offers the greatest intellectual and moral opposition to the doctrines of Communism while simultaneously being capable of the strongest resistance to any Soviet attempt to install the Communist system by military action. The industrial strength and population of Canada and the United States make them, in combination, by far the most powerful of the anti-Communist nations of the North Atlantic Community; their strategic location makes them the most difficult of the North Atlantic Nations for the Soviets to attack but simultaneously requires them to maintain a long line of communications with their European Allies. Accordingly, it is considered that in a major war beginning in 1957, the military strategy of the Soviet Union might range between two widely differing concepts. On the one hand, the Soviets might attempt to disrupt and isolate the war-making potential of the United States and Canada until the Soviet land armies could complete the occupation of the Eurasian land mass. The Soviets might thus hope to confront the remaining members of the alliance with a military task of such proportions as to discourage them from further prosecution of the war. On the other hand, the Soviets might attempt to use the minimum of force necessary to seize critical objectives in Eurasia, backed by the threat of further force, while simultaneously concentrating their military efforts against North America. Under this concept, the Soviets might hope to destroy with finality the industrial and military power of the two North American nations and thus possibly clear the way for the final establishment of world communism with a minimum of military effort in other areas. In

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

either case an important objective would be the occupation and control of the Eurasian land mass. A wide variety of concepts might lie between these two, and the ultimate selection of a strategic concept and its translation into an over-all war plan would depend on the results of Soviet analysis of its military position versus that of the Western Allies. Intelligence cannot predict what these positions will be.

However, assuming that Soviet military development is substantially as outlined in the preceding portions of this paper, it is considered that the following are the most likely Soviet strategic objectives:

a. To defend the Soviet Union against attack, including Soviet offensive operations against all Western forces capable of significantly threatening the Soviet Union.

b. To neutralize or disrupt and isolate the war-making potential of the United States and Canada for an extended period, or until c below is accomplished.

c. To establish Soviet control over the Eurasian land mass and to control or neutralize the United Kingdom and the island chain of the Far East.

Possible Courses of Action Against North America

69. Atomic Attack

a. Atomic attack is the principal military means by which the Soviet Union can reduce the North American war effort. Because of the great preponderance of industrial war plants in the United States as compared with Canada, the Soviet Union will consider targets in the former country of primary importance. Therefore, most, if not all, of the atomic bombs delivered on North America will be directed against the United States. These atomic attacks could be supplemented by biological warfare and chemical warfare attacks.

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

b. Atomic weapons could be delivered by the following methods:

(1) By bomber aircraft.

(2) Shipment of atomic bomb components as household effects or supplies, under cover of diplomatic immunity. Shipment of an assembled atomic bomb by this method is also possible.

(3) As "in transit" commercial shipments, thereby allowing substitution or "switching" en route since customs inspection is not usually made at the port of entry.

(4) Covertly by bomber and commercial type transport aircraft disguised with Canadian or U.S. markings or major commercial air carriers of foreign registry.

(5) Smuggled by Soviet agents with U.S. or Canadian tugs, yachts, fishing schooners or other small seagoing vessels.

(6) Guided missiles launched from merchant ships or more probably submarines.

(7) Torpedoes fired into key harbors from submarines.

(8) As bombs detonated in the hold of a merchant ship while in a key harbor.

(9) As mines laid in key harbors by merchant ships (not necessarily of Soviet registry) or submarines.

(10) Possibly by guided missiles launched from Soviet territory, depending upon the success of the Soviet development program in the guided missiles field.

c. Considering the technical difficulties of bomb assembly and adjustment and the probable shortage of specialized personnel, and the size and weight of the package necessary for introducing an assembled bomb, it would appear that methods (2) to (5) are not likely to be

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

employed. In addition, detection would cost the Soviets complete loss of strategic surprise. As for methods (6) and (7), there is no evidence that such missiles have been developed by the Soviets and in the case of method (7) operational problems are presented which discourage ~~their~~ its selection. Method (8) does not involve any special engineering problems or unusual skills but would not be as effective as an underwater burst which would result from the employment of method (9). Therefore, it is considered that the latter is the more likely of the two. However, as most of the targets are inland and not suited to this type of attack, it is considered that the majority of atomic bombs allotted to North America must be delivered by bomber aircraft or by methods (6) or (10). Delivery of even a small portion by method (6) (a possible capability) would involve comparatively little risk to the submarine and would necessitate large scale defensive countermeasures. Although the likelihood of use of method (6) is remote, it is becoming less so. While it is considered possible that suitable intercontinental missiles will be developed by this time, it is probable that their performance would be marginal at best for delivery at the distances required, and it is therefore believed that the majority of bombs would be delivered by method (1), bomber aircraft.

70. Air Operations

a. An air offensive could be launched against North America prior to or simultaneously with other campaigns. It is estimated that the Soviet Union will have the capability to attempt the following long-range bombing operations from base facilities discussed in paragraph 44:

(1) Two-way missions by heavy bombers from bases in Soviet controlled territory against targets in any part of Canada and the United States.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

(2) Two-way missions by medium bombers from bases in Northeast Siberia, with the newest jet models capable of reaching that northwesterly segment of North America bounded by a general line passing through Seattle and Edmonton. The best piston models, of which a number are expected still to be in service, would be capable of reaching that northwesterly segment of North America bounded by a general line passing through San Francisco, Salt Lake City and Winnipeg.

(3) Two-way missions by medium bombers operating from bases in Northeast Siberia or other areas with aerial refueling. With a single outbound refueling, the newest jet models would have a maximum combat radius of 2,950 nautical miles and the best piston models a radius of 3,700 nautical miles. These radii would permit jet bombers to reach that northwesterly segment of North America bounded by a general line through San Diego, Denver, eastern part Lake Superior, south tip of James Bay, and piston bombers to reach that northwesterly segment of North America bounded by a general line through Mazatlan (Mexico on east side of Gulf of California at southern end), New Orleans and Norfolk.* From the Murmansk area, jet medium bombers operating with a single outbound refueling could reach the area of North America northeast of a general line through Cape Sable, Quebec, Skagway (Alaska), and Nunivak Island (off Alaska). Piston medium bombers could reach the area northeast of a general line passing through Cape Hatteras, St. Louis, and Portland (Oregon). Although there is some evidence of Soviet interest in aerial refueling, it does not provide an adequate basis for assessing the extent to which equipment will be available and techniques

* All distances are measured from Tanyurer; relation to geographic points in North America is approximate.

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

developed for its use in 1957. Because of the relative simplicity of aerial refueling, it should be expected that the Soviets will have developed capabilities by 1957 for missions employing at least one aerial refueling.

(4) One-way missions by medium bombers from bases in Soviet controlled territory against any target in the United States or Canada.

b. The Soviets will not have the means for delivering conventional bombs in North America in sufficient strength to effectively disrupt our war effort. One-way missions on a large scale are unlikely, although attacks on a very limited scale against particularly vital targets not suited for atomic attack are a possibility. On the other hand, the Soviets would probably be willing to expend aircraft and crews to deliver atomic weapons on one-way missions. Therefore, aircraft carrying atomic bombs may attack from any suitably located base under Soviet control, but aircraft carrying high explosive and incendiary bombs are more likely to come from the Northeast Siberia area only.

c. Should the Soviets choose to direct the main weight of the initial atomic attacks against targets in North America, they will have sufficient aircraft to deliver the bulk of the estimated stockpile of atomic bombs in one operation. The Soviet Long Range Air Force will have the capability of carrying out attacks at any height from 2,000 to 45,000 feet, although low-level attacks would probably be confined to coastal targets. It is estimated that most strategic attacks will be made at a height above 20,000 feet and under all-weather or night conditions. It is also considered that most, if not all, attacks will be made with atomic bombs, although some aircraft may carry incendiary, bacteriological, chemical or

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

conventional weapons. It is probable that individual targets will be attacked either by single atomic bomb carriers or by a group of one to four aircraft carrying atomic and other weapons. In any case, it is not thought that saturation raids on any one target will be carried out, but that the probable attacking force will consist of one to four bombing aircraft, or will be a composite force of twenty or less aircraft. It is considered that most raids will be two-way missions either by long-range aircraft or by medium-range aircraft employing one aerial refueling. One-way missions will only be carried out under exceptional circumstances.

d. Operations Against Alaska. While the Soviets have made considerable improvement in some of the base facilities in the Northeast Siberia area opposite Alaska, and probably will continue to improve facilities there, it is considered that adverse weather conditions and logistics difficulties in the area will limit operations against Alaska. However, the Soviet Union will have considerably improved its light bomber and fighter capabilities against the important areas of Alaska by introduction in numbers of longer range aircraft capable of reaching the principal areas of Alaska, and possibly by development of small A-bombs. While it is considered that base facilities in Northeast Siberia will not be adequate to accommodate a large force, it is estimated that 400 or more tactical aircraft might be employed against the Alaskan area. Important targets in Alaska will be well within the range of surface-to-surface guided missiles which the Soviets may possibly have available in 1957.

71. Naval Operations. The sea offensive against the United States and Canada could include:

a. The mining of ports and approaches by merchant ships and submarines before and on D-day/AND by submarines after D-day.

b. Submarine and raider attacks on shipping. It is to be expected that long-range Soviet submarines will be on station in North American coastal waters before D-day and that possibly some raiders will be on station in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

c. Small amphibious operations to land sabotage teams from submarines.

d. Attacks on ports and coastal areas possibly including attacks by submarine-launched guided missiles with conventional and atomic warheads and atomic bombs introduced by merchant ships before or on D-day or by submarines. Although midget submarine attacks could be carried out on shipping in harbors and approaches, it is unlikely that they would be employed in view of the distance involved. The extent of mining of ports and approaches is limited only by the number of long-range submarines available for this type of operations. It is considered that Soviet submarines could be maintained on station in North American coastal waters. It is further considered that any amphibious operation employing submarines would be confined to a very few attacks on isolated targets of prime military importance.

72. Amphibious Operations. Assuming they could maintain sea and air control of the area, it is estimated that Naval sealift available to the Soviets in the Far East would be capable of transporting, under optimum conditions, 8,000-12,000 troops for the assault phases of amphibious operations against lightly held or undefended objectives on the Bering Sea Coast of Alaska or in the Aleutians. Soviet merchant shipping available could transport a follow-up force of about 30,000-40,000 troops providing suitable unloading facilities could be seized or established. A consideration of limitations imposed by the lack of suitable ports and landing

beaches, logistics considerations (including the dependence of Northeast Siberian bases on sea lines of communication) and the fact that few airfield sites in the target area have a suitable harbor on the same island or nearby would probably reduce the amphibious capability against Alaska to a maximum of 4,000-6,000 troops in assault. Climatic conditions would limit amphibious operations to the period July to November. Operations against Alaska would probably have as their tactical objective the destruction of coastal installations of military importance or be in the nature of strategic diversions.

73. Airborne Operations

a. The Soviets could now employ airborne operations utilizing light transport aircraft to seize lightly held airfields, to destroy military installations and to otherwise create a situation requiring considerable countereffort to destroy or dislodge the invaders. Existing base facilities in Northeast Siberia probably will place some limitation on the employment of transport aviation if other tactical aircraft, bombers and fighters, are using the same base facilities.

b. By 1957, the Soviets may have 500 medium transport aircraft in operational units. Assuming that 200 medium transport aircraft could be allocated in the light of requirements in other theaters, and that the Soviets will have the logistics capability to support the force, as many as 12,000 paratroopers with their associated equipment could be airlifted in a single operation to any part of Alaska and those parts of Northwest Canada within range. Any part of this force could be used against individual targets. These could come from bases as far away as Markovo on the upper Anadyr River in Siberia, or Magadan and Semychan which are located even further within Siberia. The use of these bases would greatly ease logistics problems and provide

considerable assurance of surprise. Resupply could be undertaken from bases nearer Alaska. Light transport aircraft based nearer Alaska might also be used in airborne operations against Anchorage or Fairbanks. Obsolete bomber aircraft, or transports, might also be used to tow gliders under favorable weather conditions.

74. Operations Against North Atlantic Island Approaches

a. Iceland. The Soviet Union will be capable of air, naval and airborne operations against Iceland, and landing small assault or sabotage forces from cargo vessels in Icelandic waters on D-day. Assuming that a suitable airfield were secured and 200 medium transport aircraft allocated to the support of subsequent operations in Iceland, the Soviets would be capable of airlifting approximately 500 short tons of cargo per day into Iceland. This tonnage might support a force slightly in excess of one combat division, plus supporting elements. If Iceland were secured and the entire estimated medium transport force of 450 (minimum) aircraft allocated to its support, approximately 1,200 short tons per day could be airlifted into Iceland.

b. Greenland. The Soviet Union will be capable of submarine attack against sea lines of communication, and limited air attacks and airborne operations against Greenland.

c. Spitzbergen. The Soviet Union probably will be able to seize Spitzbergen at the outset of hostilities.

75. Internal Threat

a. While the Communist Party membership in the United States and Canada will undoubtedly represent a potential internal threat, the magnitude of this threat in 1957 and the degree to which it may be counterbalanced by governmental measures will depend on developments which cannot now be foreseen. The present trend is toward a decrease in membershi

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

in the Communist Party. The magnitude of the threat, however, may not be reduced proportionately because of the remaining members' single-minded devotion to Soviet Communism.

b. The Communist Parties of both countries will seek through their propaganda organs to promote the idea that the Western Powers forced the war upon an unwilling Soviet Union. They could distort local issues to foment discontent and could camouflage their work behind front organizations. Because of the existence of underground organizations, the Parties will be capable of these actions even if they are declared illegal, their presses banned and their overt leaders interned.

c. The Communist Party will be capable of sabotage by encouraging slowdowns and inciting labor unrest with a view to causing strikes in strategic industries. The Communist Party will continue its program for infiltration of basic industries.

d. In the event of war, the better known sabotage agents such as fire, explosives and abrasives could be used. In addition, the Communist Parties are considered capable of employment of BW and CW for sabotage. The use of RW agents by saboteurs is considered improbable.

e. It is expected that native communists will commit widespread sporadic acts of sabotage at the outset of war with the USSR. Implementation of security countermeasures is expected progressively to decrease Communist effectiveness. The Communists could also attempt a carefully planned and controlled sabotage operation. This action would be most effective if directed against vital installations and industrial complexes slightly prior to or concurrent with the outbreak of war. Such a campaign could be mounted only at the risk of losing strategic surprise. It is believed that an organized sabotage campaign later in the course of the war can be coped with by alert police action.

Most Probable Courses of Action Against North America

76. It is estimated that the most probable courses of action against North America will initially be as follows:

a. Atomic attacks, employing a substantial portion of the Soviets' atomic stockpile. Though some atomic bombs may be laid as mines in key harbors by merchant ships or submarines and others may be delivered by guided missiles, it is believed that the majority of bombs allocated to North America will be delivered by aircraft by the following methods:

(1) Two-way missions by heavy bombers employing atomic bombs, other weapons of mass destruction, or conventional bombs from bases in Northeast Siberia, the Kola Peninsula, or the Baltic area against any part of the United States or Canada.

(2) Two-way missions by jet medium bombers employing atomic bombs, other weapons of mass destruction, or conventional bombs from bases in Northeast Siberia against targets in North America northwest of a general line, Seattle-Edmonton.

(3) Two-way missions by piston medium bombers employing atomic bombs, other weapons of mass destruction, or conventional bombs from bases in Northeast Siberia against targets in North America northwest of a general line, San Francisco, Salt Lake City and Winnipeg.

(4) Possible two-way attacks by jet medium bombers with one aerial refueling employing atomic bombs, other weapons of mass destruction, or conventional bombs, from bases in Northeast Siberia against targets in North America northwest of a general line, San Diego-Denver-Eastern Lake Superior--south end of James Bay. Two way attacks by piston medium bombers with one aerial refueling employing similar weapons against targets in North America northwest of a general line, Mazatlan (Mexico), New Orleans, and Norfolk. Two-way attacks by jet medium

bombers operating from the Murmansk area with one outbound refueling against targets in North America northeast of a general line through Cape Sable, Quebec, Skagway (Alaska), and Nunivak Island (off Alaska). Two-way attacks by piston medium bombers operating from Murmansk with a single outbound refueling against targets in North America northeast of a general line through Cape Hatteras, St. Louis, and Portland (Oregon).

Page added by Decision On - 14 October 1952)

b. Relatively small scale air attacks--possibly including the use of atomic or other mass destruction weapons--against important targets in Alaska, possibly coordinated with g below.

c. The mining of ports and approaches by merchant ships and submarines before and on D-day and by submarines after D-day, possibly including the use of some atomic weapon.

d. Submarine attacks on shipping. It is most probable that long range submarines will be on station in North American coastal waters before D-day.

e. Submarine-launched guided missile attacks on coastal areas.

f. Small amphibious operations against isolated targets of prime military importance employing sabotage teams from submarines.

g. Amphibious, airborne or combined amphibious-airborne operations against installations of military importance in Western Alaska and the Aleutians, and airborne operations against other areas such as Nome, Fairbanks, and Anchorage. Airborne operations against Canada would probably be confined to a few operations by small numbers of medium transports; operations probably would be directed against installations of military importance in isolated areas in northwestern Canada.

h. Attacks against the North Atlantic island approaches in the form of airborne and naval operations against Iceland, possibly including the landing of assault forces on D-day, political subversion and sabotage; limited air and airborne attacks against Greenland; and the seizure of Spitzbergen at the outset of hostilities.

i. Attempts to cause dissension and disaffection through psychological warfare and subversion.

j. Attempts to encourage slowdowns and incite labor unrest with a view to causing strikes in strategic industries, and in addition physical sabotage employing fire, explosives and abrasives and on a limited scale, employing BW and CW.