



CANADIAN AIR DIVISION Avro Aircraft CF-100 Mk.5's are already on Zulu readiness at Marville, France; said to be best all-weather fighter NATO has today.

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RCAF's Air Division

CF-100's in new NATO strategy

By Victor Koby

METZ, France — 1957 began like any other year of the last ten. The year dawned on a world at crisis. Again, fortunately, the catastrophe of a World War III had been averted. But it was not by luck.

Only three months ago the air forces of NATO had been alerted along with the navies, armies and the global U. S. Strategic Air Command. These provided the iron fist to the diplomats' velvet glove. The warning was clear. Suez and Hungary did not become World War III. The world relaxed and turned to Christmas.

But at Metz, Marville, Grostenquin, Zweibrücken, Baden-Söllingen and Langar, bases of the RCAF's Canadian Air Division, there was no relaxation. The guns remained loaded as they still are day and night. The newly arrived Avro CF-100 squadron was already at work with the Canadair Sabre VI's in guarding NATO's retaliatory forces.

Plan of Strategy

The massive Strategic Air Command's deterrent force is regarded as holding the security of the Western world, the threat of retaliation. But Canadians in Canada and those serv-

ing with the NATO forces are well aware that security also lies in warning and defense.

The first warning of an all-out atomic attack on the North American heartland may not come from the Distant Early Warning Line in Canada's north. It could just as easily come from Yellowjack, Radar 61, Canada's new radar surveillance and control centre situated only 12 jet minutes away from the Iron Curtain. It is just part of a defensive and offensive organization of the North Atlantic Treaty powers which could turn or stem the tide of war before it reaches Canada's cities. This is the reason for the Canadian Air Division.

Those accustomed to thinking in terms of global atomic air strategy envisage a near atomic stalemate of USAF and Russian Strategic Air Commands poised for attack against each other's bases and the secondary targets of industrial centres and cities.

If it happens, the grand strategy of thermonuclear war calls for some 7,000 aircraft of 12 national air forces in Europe to play a major role by: assisting SAC's strategic bombing mission with reconnaissance and tactical atom bombing; making it impossible for Russia's land army masses to mount an assault on Western Europe.

Such is the concept of NATO's air forces in global strategy.

But the possibility of war is not so clear cut. Should a local or Korea-type war develop anywhere from the Middle East to the shores of Western Europe, the world's political leaders on both sides may be loath to immediately use this as a stepping stone to an all-out suicidal thermonuclear war. Again, such as was the case in Korea, by unwritten mutual consent (a precarious position) the war may be limited in action and weapons.

Under such conditions the striking power of NATO's 7,000 aircraft will be needed to make up the deficiencies in land forces as against the ground might of the Eastern bloc. (Some 175 Soviet Divisions plus 75 satellite divisions, 20,000 Soviet jets and 2,500 satellite aircraft of various types.)

To deter "local" wars as distinct from global wars, the NATO forces have tactical atom bombers, short-range ground-to-ground missiles and atomic artillery. The NATO air forces have been designed to gain air superiority and in every way support the ground forces in crushing the enemy's ability to mount an offensive whether by ground or air. The simultaneous role is of destroying the enemy's own air defenses and defending NATO's deterrent forces.