

Minding Your Business

Ottawa—Canadian foreign policy, with the inseparably linked question of national defense, will be the major continuing issue in this session of Parliament. There is a growing awareness here that Canada has come to a crossroads—and in fact may already have taken a turn without enough understanding of where the new direction is leading. Perhaps a dramatic incident was needed, a blow-out like the Arrow decision, to stop the bus. Now everybody is having a closer look at the countryside, consulting maps, squinting into the dust ahead and wondering whether this really is the way to the Promised Land.

Foreign affairs debates normally do not make popular news, possibly because the term implies a mysterious, top-secret business comprehensible only to a handful of specialists, and a game called diplomacy which is far removed from the day-to-day experience of ordinary citizens.

The great debate developing now, however, can be reduced to some very simple propositions. Similarly, the sequence of events leading to the present situation (of which the Arrow fiasco was a symptom) can be essentially stated in simple terms.

After the breakup of the great East-West alliance that beat Nazi Germany, Canada joined the rest of the Western World in re-arming for protection against the threat of

Communist power. We joined NATO and helped fight the Korean War, and developed a strong industrial base for defense production. Until fairly recently, Canada's contribution to Western strength was a distinct national effort. Military forces served as separate units, and their weapons were mainly supplied by Canadian industry.

Now we have to face the fact that it is no longer possible to maintain this kind of co-operative independence. We cannot keep up independently with modern military technology. The Arrow was not the only expensive flop in the futile effort to do so; there was also the Velvet Glove air-to-air missile, abandoned before it saw service because the American Sparrow was better.

In a word, Canada has been outclassed. The Super-Powers, and to some extent Britain, can afford to develop super-weapons. But no country of Canada's size can afford to keep up, even proportionately to population and resources of industrial production. The alternative is integration; if we cannot have a balanced national force to play a distinct role in Western defense, we have to look for more specialized jobs, fulfilling an equivalent responsibility.

Or so the argument runs. The trouble is that when the small firm merges with the big corporation, while it may gain or preserve certain advantages, it loses virtually all influence over basic policy.

In defense planning, Canada is heading for more and more integration with the United States. We seem to be integrating pretty much on U.S. terms, however; no doubt this makes military sense for North American defense, but it has unfavorable consequences in foreign relations generally. It means we are more and more committed to accept every political move the U.S. makes. If the U.S. gets into a Far East power play with Communist China, and the situation becomes dangerous, NORAD is alerted, and that means Canadian forces are ready for action in support of the American position.

In such a situation, a Canadian Foreign Minister would look silly trying to be the mediator in a crisis. To the rest of the world, and particularly to the other side in the dispute, everything he said or did would be suspect because he would appear to be merely an errand boy for Washington.

In the debate over the NORAD arrangements in 1957, Government speakers tried desperately to establish an effective link between NORAD and NATO. The reason for Government sensitivity to Opposition questions and criticism was obvious: In the wider context of the NATO alliance, Canadian independence would have been much better assured.

Now integration is proceeding to new stages—the establishment of missile bases with atomic weapons on Canadian territory, and integration of defense production (which for all the Government has been able to say about it, seems to mean that Canada will buy American weapons, while Canadian companies try very hard to get contracts for producing some of them).

We are steadily being drawn into the orbit of U.S. defense policy. Are we thereby becoming a prisoner of American world policy? One of the reasons for having defense forces in the past, and participating in the Western Alliance against the Communist world, was to have a voice in the direction of Western policy. If the Canadian contribution is now to be merged with the American, Canada will speak increasingly with Washington's voice.

In the supply debate that began Monday, Opposition Leader Pearson again raised the question of defense policy. This indicates he will try to bring it before Parliament on every possible occasion. In fact, this session of Parliament can have nothing more important to debate. If there are alternatives to present policy, they should be thoroughly discussed. If there are none feasible, at least we will know where we are heading.

For once it seems possible that a definite difference of principle will develop between Government and Opposition.

RCAF Craft Not Available For West

By CLARK DAVEY

Globe and Mail Staff Reporter

Ottawa, March 2 — Bomarc anti-aircraft missiles fired from sites just below the U.S. border and U.S. interceptors operating for short periods from Canadian bases will plug the gap across the Canadian prairies in North America's air defenses.

Defense Minister Pearkes spelled out for the first time officially tonight in the Commons the new plan for air defenses over much of Canada.

In many respects his speech, from the broad philosophy of Canada's defense arrangements down to the cost of particular items of defense hardware, seemed like a sneak preview of the Government's white paper on defense, now in preparation in the minister's department.

He told the Commons that changes would be made in Canadian airfields, particularly in the west, to accommodate U.S. jet interceptors temporarily or for short periods.

(In Washington it was reported that the aircraft involved would be F-105 jet interceptors and special anti-submarine patrol planes equipped with radar and atomic depth charges.)

The two Bomarc stations being built in Canada, one close to North Bay and the other north of the Ottawa-Montreal area, will be the eastern extension of a line of similar stations just below the U.S. border through the west. These U.S.-based missiles will be able to provide anti-aircraft protection over most of the major Western Canadian cities.

In essence, the minister was confirming stories which have been coming out of Ottawa since last September's defense policy announcement heralded the death of the Avro Arrow.

There were stories, some of them inspired by conversations with Mr. Pearkes, about the new concept of Canada's air defense role. This country would get out of the interceptor field concentrating its efforts in the Bomarc defense of the industrial triangle of Southern Ontario and Montreal and on increased radar warning facilities.

And that's just about the way the minister set it out today. In passing he showed that there was really no contest between the Arrow and the Bomarc systems. The 100 Arrows required for duties between North Bay and Bagotville, Que., in defense of the Canadian industrial heart and certain Strategic Air Com-

cost of the Arrow herself and share in the SAGE-Pinetree support system.

Mr. Pearkes said five of the seven new Pinetree radar stations, which help to guide interceptors and missiles in attacking enemy aircraft, would be built in Western Canada, the other two in Northern Ontario and Quebec. They will push the area of controlled interception further north and make it more effective.

All seven, he stressed, will be manned by the RCAF, a break from previous practice where the USAF manned part of the line. Canada has even taken over some of these USAF stations in the past two years, Mr. Pearkes said.

He said there were no plans for Canadian Bomarc sites west of North Bay. Asked by Harold Winch how U.S.-based Bomarcs, with roughly the same range as the Avro Arrow, could provide protection for the Canadian cities between Vancouver and Porth Arthur-Fort William, the defense minister said some of them would be just outside the Bomarc range.

The Bomarcs and the U.S. supersonic interceptors will supplement each other. But the Government, from Mr. Pearkes' statement, has not made up its mind to have U.S. interceptors permanently based on the Western Canada airfields.

The defense minister referred to the NORAD provision that squadrons from either country could cross the international boundary temporarily or for short periods of time.

"In order to facilitate that there will be certain developments made at some of our airfields, particularly in Western Canada where we have no defense provided by the RCAF."

He conceded that even today Canada is relying on the U.S. Air Force to provide protection against enemy bombers over large areas. Canada has no interceptors between North Bay and Comox, on the northern end of Vancouver Island, and the eastern flank of the continent is defended by two U.S. interceptor squadrons operating from leased bases in Newfoundland and Labrador.

It was suggested that there is a new work force. Company had to recruit and increased substantially if the that operating costs would be maintained. They also noted that work force can be results if the production facilities and Canada would yield States and Canada in the United and missile field in the aircraft paid for orders in the aircraft that an aggressive campaign. The industrialists were closed out overnight. ties that should not be virtually tant national production facilities in their view, represent important. The Avro and Orenda plants, employment. maintain a fairly high level of round up enough orders to feel that given time, Avro could existing work force intact, they available that could keep the concede that there is nothing While these industrialists other purposes. could be adapted or sold for of components and materials of the millions of dollars worth experimental use and what part planes could be completed for erment to decide how many This would enable the Gov- and related supply situation. Avro inventory of the Arrow through a joint Government- work force could be achieved hat an orderly reduction in the

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