

# PM Gives Hard Facts On Defense

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OTTAWA—Prime Minister Diefenbaker laid the hard truth before the Commons yesterday — Canada can't afford to defend herself alone in the nuclear age.

He spoke near the windup of the Arrow-defense policy debate — to "emphasize that simple fact," to call for a non-partisan approach to defense problems, and to admit frankly that he himself didn't have the answers to all the problems.

As to national sovereignty, one of the main Opposition talking points in the two-day debate, he scorned suggestions that Canada lost it through joint defense arrangements with the U.S.

"There is no sovereignty without survival," he added.

Mr. Diefenbaker pledged a continuing battle to win for Canada a bigger share of joint defense spending, but at the same time he produced figures to show that the U.S. is actually spending more defense money in Canada than Canada is in the U.S.

"In 1957 and 1958, United States expenditures in Canada exceeded Canadian expenditures in that country by \$20,600,000 and \$16,800,000 respectively," the Prime Minister said.

But he stressed that the Government had made it clear to the U.S. "that sharing in production is mandatory, and that Canada will not be satisfied with crumbs."

"We shall insist on our fair share of production and cost-sharing in production . . . because a partnership will not work if one has the loaf and the other has the crumb."

Mr. Diefenbaker said Canada will have a full and equal participation in all decisions of common defense, but he admitted that U.S. assurances on production sharing "we have not achieved—not in their entirety."

The Government crushed two Opposition no-confidence motions by votes of 176 to 42 and 175 to 42.

The Liberal one condemned the Government for failing to provide for "the effective use

of Canada's defense production facilities and manpower" and the CCF one added the observation that this was causing the erosion of national sovereignty. The theme of the Prime Minister's speech was that there can be no defense of Canada without co-operation with the U.S.

The Government's purpose was "to ensure that Canada will have that defense which her financial situation will permit, her international responsibilities demand and which co-operation and partnership should ensure."

The Prime Minister was in a conciliatory mood through most of the speech, urging all-party agreement on general defense policy.

In the arguments over the Avro Arrow cancellation and the question of sovereignty, however, he poured scorn and sarcasm on the opposition.

## EAGERLY AWAITED

The Prime Minister's appearance in the debate had been eagerly awaited by MPs, and the chamber was filled right through his speech.

There were frequent long interruptions by desk-thumping Conservatives and a short running argument between Mr. Diefenbaker and Liberal Leader Pearson over the Liberal record in dealings with the U.S.

Some of his ammunition against the Liberals came from a speech made last summer by Mr. Pearson.

In it, Mr. Pearson predicted that the Conservatives would find it as impossible to sell the Arrow to the U.S. as the Liberals had found it to sell the CF-100.

The Prime Minister said that Liberal and CCF claims that defense links with the U.S. were leading to a loss of sovereignty were an attempt to create "frenzied fear" in the hearts of Canadians that "co-operation with the U.S. means subordination."

"It means nothing of the kind," he said. His party stood for "the necessity for Canadian sovereignty within Canada and particularly maintaining a sense of international responsibility."

## NO TALK THEN

The Liberals, said Mr. Diefenbaker, had never talked of loss of sovereignty when they were allowing the U.S. to build the Dew Line and Pine Tree Line radar defense.

The Arrow decision had no bearing on sovereignty. "Is there any loss of sovereignty by reason of the fact that we fail to continue to produce an aircraft whose outermost range at subsonic speed is not more than 500 miles and at supersonic speed is about three-quarters of that amount?" he asked.

To hammer home his point, the Prime Minister quoted three extracts from what he described as "one of the better editorials on this question of sovereignty."

Crediting The Toronto Telegram of Feb. 24, he read the House the following:

The charge that cancellation of the production contract for Arrow aircraft involves any degree of surrender of Canadian sovereignty is wholly wrong.

It is far-fetched beyond the limits of common sense, for the Arrow decision is, in fact, an exercise of independence by Canada without precedent in the history of our military alliance with the United States, which dates from 1940.

Canadian security demands co-operation with the United

States, and Canada co-operates in continental defense for its own benefit, and it is wise to recognize that the same motives apply in Washington.

The only pressure upon the Canadian Government in deciding to abandon the Arrow was

to serve the best interests of Canada and its defense needs.

There is no suggestion of outside pressure, no reason to argue that Canadian sovereignty has been in any way prejudiced.

If Canada needs U.S. help, the U.S. also needs Canada's help, said the Prime Minister.

"There must be co-operation. Without co-operation there is no survival, either for the people of Canada or of the U.S."

Doubt dogs the footsteps of

the West's defense planners because Russia's intentions and achievements are unknown, the House was told.

Recent expenditures on expense "may prove to have been made on weapons that are obsolete or that have become obsolete during the intervening years."

The weapons of offense have developed faster than those of defense.

## MUST GIVE AID

Besides defense spending, Canada must be prepared to aid

countries of the uncommitted world and "have the spiritual things properly brought to the attention of the uncommitted world."

Liberal Paul Hellyer, who followed the Prime Minister as the debate neared its end, said that the Bomarc stations being built in Canada to take the place originally intended for the Arrow were "not designed for the defense of Canada" but for U.S. defense.

The rest of the Bomarc line is in the northwestern U.S. If it had been moved 300 or 400 miles farther north "it might play some part in the protection of Canada," he said.

"We are letting our armor down," he charged. "We have decided for the moment at least to pursue a course of no defense at all."

Canada's joining with the U.S. in defense was "not the joining together of a marriage as partners but rather

a joining together in the way Jonah joined the whale."

Mr. Hellyer accused the Government of shifting responsibility for the Arrow decision to the chiefs of staff, the deficit on the Liberals, the unemployment on the international situations, and mass Avro layoffs on the company.

## 'A HABIT'

"This is getting to be a habit," he said.

Mr. Hellyer said Government statements in the defense de-

bate had given the impression that "whereas the CF-100 interceptor is not obsolete, the CF-105 is, and that is the reason it is not being put into squadron service."

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OTTAWA—Prime Minister Diefenbaker gave by far the best Government speech in the two-day defense debate that ended Tuesday night. Except toward the end, when he lapsed into the familiar pot-shooting at the Liberal record in office, the Prime Minister gave a clear and reasoned presentation of the Government position. Which is not to say that all the questions hanging over Canadian defense policy have been answered.

In the circumstances of this debate — a formal, set-piece exchange of speeches on a motion of non-confidence—Mr. Diefenbaker, Defense Minister Peckes and Defense Production Minister O'Hurley could not be examined closely and in detail on their statements and judgments. That will come later, when the House is in committee considering departmental estimates. The rules then permit the brief question-and-answer exchange, and point-by-point argument which is the real test of policy. And in the meantime the Government will have produced the promised White Paper on defense policy.

The basis of the Opposition attack in this debate was the charge that the Government has been limping breathlessly after circumstances in defense planning. The Arrow decision was too long delayed, and its replacement was a hasty, makeshift expedient. Having been outclassed in weapons technology, Canada under this Government had drifted into the obvious alternative of integration with the United States, without considering whether this was the only alternative, without sufficiently weighing the consequences, and without adequate safeguards for sovereign independence.

Having accepted the trend toward integration, Mr. Diefenbaker defended it. Canada did not have the population to look after its own defense on a separate national basis. The only possibility, therefore, was co-operation with the U.S. Complete, unqualified sovereignty would be wonderful, but "there is no sovereignty without survival," and the present course of accepting direct U.S. aid was the only one possible.

On the practical question of defense production sharing, the Prime Minister made the strongest Government statements so far heard. Sharing is "mandatory," he said; "we shall insist on our fair share . . . a partnership will not work if one has the loaf and the other has the crumb."

The Oxford Dictionary definition of mandatory is "of, conveying a command," so perhaps the choice of word was not quite exact. Canada has not recently been able to command the U.S. to do anything. If the Prime Minister meant that production sharing is a basic condition for defense integration, the Opposition is entitled to ask (and probably

will) how this has been guaranteed. The NORAD agreement is formal and fairly precise; there is definite agreement about who shall do the paying for the Bomarc bases being established in Canada.

Where, then, is the precise assurance about production sharing, and what does Canada have to insist with? If, because of U.S. domestic political pressures or informal misunderstanding in the joint committees, Canada does not get more than a crumb from the loaf, what recourse has the Canadian Government got?

This question should be answered before the work on Bomarc bases and new radar installations is begun. Similarly there are questions about the whole idea of defense integration. Integration certainly is necessary, but not necessarily with the United States. In this modern One World, Canada's basic obligation is not merely to help the U.S. defend this continent. It is to help defend the whole free world community represented by NATO. We have the responsibility to devote a certain part of our national resources to the collective defense of the West against the threat of Communist power; Canadian forces serve this purpose just as well in Europe as they do on Canadian territory.

Militarily, the air defense of North America has to be a unified operation. That means it has to be primarily a U.S. operation. It does not follow that Canada can only do its part by accepting a subordinate and obscure job in the North American defense system.

We might quite reasonably leave North American defense entirely to the U.S. (which is going to plan it the way it wants to anyway) and make our contribution to Western defense in some other way. That would be in line with a policy of real integration of Western defense capacity, not merely a North American integration in which, no matter what anyone says, Canada will become less and less a consulting partner, and more and more a subordinate taking orders.

If, for instance, Canada were to develop a highly specialized force designed to deal with the small, nibbling threats from the Communist world, it might be a more satisfactory role than helping to defend the retaliatory capacity of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, the ultimate defense. With such a force, we would make a more independent contribution to Western security—preserving a distinct place and an independent voice in the world—and at the same time help reduce the danger of all-out nuclear warfare. Because the less the West is equipped to deal with small threats in a small way and locally, the greater is the temptation (even the necessity) to use the ultimate weapon as the counter-threat.

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