

QUARTERLY REPORT OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

March 18 to June 30, 1942

Created on March 18, 1942 by Executive Order of the President as a specialized wartime resettlement agency, the War Relocation Authority was concerned during the first quarter-year of its existence almost exclusively with people of Japanese birth or Japanese ancestry removed by order of the Army from military areas of California, Oregon, Washington, and Arizona.

Under terms of the Executive Order, the Authority was charged with the responsibility of relocating or re-establishing 110,000 of these people away from the military zones. Largely as an expedient--to provide places where the evacuees might live and work in relative seclusion pending development of orderly plans for their re-assimilation into American life--efforts were directed during the first quarter toward establishment of Federal relocation centers at inland points. At ten sites spotted across the vast territory between the Sierra Nevada Mountains and the Mississippi River, a substantial start was made on the development of these pioneer communities. By June 30, roughly one-fourth of the people involved in the Pacific Coast evacuation had been received at three of these centers and were beginning to settle down and adjust themselves to their new surroundings. Meanwhile definite plans were being drawn up for making positive use of evacuee skills and energies in the battle of production that is taking place behind the fighting fronts of the war.

The Pacific Coast Evacuation

From the beginning, the events of evacuation and relocation moved with almost incredible speed. On March 2 the Commanding General of the Nation's western defenses decided that military security required the removal of all persons of Japanese ancestry from areas to be designated in California, Oregon, Washington, and Arizona. Less than two weeks later, on March 14, the Wartime Civil Control Administration was created by the Western Defense Command to employ designated military personnel and enlist the cooperation of civilian agencies in carrying on the evacuation. Within four days after that action, the War Relocation Authority was established as a civilian agency to handle the long-range job of resettling people evacuated from military areas. And by March 23 the first contingent of 1,000 voluntary evacuees from the Los Angeles area was on its way to the Manzanar Reception Center (as it was then called) in the Owens Valley section of eastern California. From that time forward throughout the first quarter, relocation efforts were aimed primarily at keeping pace with the swift, steady progress of widening evacuation.

Following issuance of the Executive Order of February 19 (authorizing the designation of military areas for evacuation), the Western Defense Command urged the people of Japanese descent in the western half of the Pacific Coast States and the southern part of Arizona to evacuate voluntarily and to relocate outside the military

zones on their own initiative. During the latter part of February and throughout most of March approximately 8,000 responded to this urging and moved out--some to eastern portions of the coastal States and others to the intermountain region of Utah, Colorado, and neighboring States. Developments quickly revealed, however, that voluntary evacuation would not be a feasible solution to the problem. The situation which developed was vividly described by Director Eisenhower in testifying before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on June 15:

"There was wide-spread and bitter opposition in the intermountain States for a number of reasons: First, the States did not wish the evacuees to acquire real property, as some did. Evacuees moved to localities where there had previously been a small Japanese population and difficulties arose there. Second, demands arose that the Government should guarantee that evacuees would be removed from the States to which they were going as soon as the war was over. Third, the demand was made that evacuees be permitted to move only under military guard. Serious trouble was threatened. At one location in Oregon and at another in Nevada Japanese were arrested. In Utah a stick of dynamite was set off in protest against the arrival of 25 evacuees. In Colorado and other places mass meetings were held in protest.

"Practically every governor of the Western States protested the dispersal of the Japanese. I think their feeling was, as expressed publicly, that if a danger existed in the military zone, then a similar danger existed in the intermountain States where there are a number of strategic works."

By March 27 the situation had become so acute, particularly in the intermountain States, that the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command decided to halt all further voluntary evacuation. At midnight March 29, after two days' warning, all people of Japanese descent in Military Area No. 1 (roughly the western half of the Coastal

States and the southern half of Arizona) were forbidden to leave the Area until ordered to leave by the Army. Since that time the evacuation has been carried forward under a series of civilian exclusion orders issued by the Army in accordance with an orderly and systematic plan.

The first area to be evacuated under civilian exclusion order was Bainbridge Island in Puget Sound. Next came Terminal Island in Los Angeles Harbor where hundreds of fishermen of Japanese descent had long made their base. Then followed in rapid succession more than 100 exclusion orders covering mainland areas all up and down the Coast and throughout the great interior valleys. By June 7, nearly 100,000 people of Japanese stock--both aliens and American-born--had been concentrated in assembly centers in Military Area No. 1. Five days earlier steps had been taken to evacuate the eastern half of California. Actual removal of evacuees from this area was about to begin at the end of June.

To provide temporary gathering places for the evacuees inside the Military Area, the Wartime Civil Control Administration swiftly established a chain of 15 assembly centers stretching from Puyallup, Washington, 20 miles south of Seattle to the small town of Mayer in central Arizona. The other 13 centers were located at North Portland in Oregon and at Fresno, Marysville, Merced, Pinedale, Pomona, Sacramento, San Bruno, Salinas, Arcadia, Stockton, Turlock, and Tulare in California.

Most of the assembly centers were set up at race tracks (e.g. the Santa Anita establishment in Arcadia and the Tanforan track in

San Bruno) or at fairgrounds (e.g. Stockton) where facilities such as water and electric power were readily available. Evacuee capacity of the centers ranged from Mayer with only 250 to Santa Anita with a potential capacity of almost 20,000. Although the great majority of evacuees were housed in assembly centers for a period of weeks or even months following their evacuation, several thousand (particularly in the eastern half of California) were transferred directly from their homes to relocation centers.

Virtually all qualified observers agree that the evacuation was carried out, on the whole, with extraordinary efficiency and real consideration for the people involved. Commenting on the attitude adopted by the evacuees themselves, Director Eisenhower in his testimony before the House subcommittee declared, "I just cannot say things too favorable about the way they have cooperated under the most adverse circumstances." Other officials have paid similar tribute to the Army and the various civilian agencies which cooperated in handling the enormous detail work attendant on the unprecedented movement.

In a movement of this kind, however, it was probably inevitable that some mistakes would be made and that some people would suffer. Perhaps the most serious difficulties arose in connection with disposal of the evacuees' property. On this subject, Director Eisenhower made the following statement to the House subcommittee:

"Before the War Relocation Authority was established the Treasury Department had accepted the responsibility for establishing, through the Federal Reserve bank on the coast, a voluntary system to aid the Japanese in disposing of their property in the military zone by sale, lease, storage, or otherwise. A little later the President signed an Executive order setting up an Alien Property Custodian. Rather than to have two agencies dealing with the property problem on the coast, the Alien Property Custodian delegated all of his authority to the Treasury and the Federal Reserve bank.

"When the War Relocation Authority was set up the Executive Order contained a brief section to enable the Authority to cooperate in handling the property problem. Again to avoid duplication, I also delegated such authority as I had to the Treasury. So the Treasury, through the Federal Reserve bank, has worked with the evacuees to the extent that the evacuees wished, in giving them a voluntary service in disposing of their property.¹ Those who owned land in most instances leased it. However, very serious problems were encountered, where there were verbal leases and complicated debtor-creditor situations. Some--in fact, a good portion--of the household furniture, was stored. Much other property was sold. There is no doubt that the evacuees made many financial sacrifices. That was inherent in the situation."

Selecting the Relocation Sites

While the evacuation was moving forward under supervision of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, the War Relocation Authority and the Army began an extensive search for areas where the evacuees might settle down to a more stable kind of life until plans could be developed for their permanent relocation in communities outside of the evacuated areas. Because of the very nature of the relocation program, the

¹ It should be noted that this statement applies only to evacuee properties of the urban type. Responsibility for assisting evacuees in the disposal of farm properties was delegated by the Treasury Department to the Farm Security Administration.

possibilities were sharply limited. Requirements for sites were announced by the Authority on April 13 as follows:

- "1. All centers must be located on public land so that improvements at public expense become public, not private, assets. Any land required for this purpose will remain in public ownership.
- "2. Because of manpower needs in the armed services and because the minimum guard unit can guard 5000 persons as easily as smaller groups, first attention will be given to sites adequate for large projects.
- "3. Each center must provide work opportunities throughout the year for the available workers to be located there.
- "4. All centers must be located at a safe distance from strategic works."

To aid in the job of site selection, the Authority enlisted the cooperation of technicians from a number of Federal and State agencies. More than 300 proposals were considered on paper and nearly 100 possible sites were actually examined by field inspection crews. Some were rejected because they were too small; others were turned down by the Army for military reasons; and still others were found unsuitable for a wide variety of causes.

By June 5, ten sites were selected for relocation areas; two in California, two in Arizona, two in Arkansas, and one each in Idaho, Utah, Wyoming, and Colorado. By June 30, three of these were in partial operation; four were under construction; and the remaining three were in the contract-letting and blueprint stages.

Following is the list and status of the relocation areas as of June 30:

	<u>Name</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Capacity</u>	<u>Population</u>
IN PARTIAL OPERATION	Colorado River	Arizona	20,000	8,754
	Tule Lake	California	16,000	9,308
	Manzanar	California	10,000	9,704
UNDER CONSTRUCTION	Gila River	Arizona	15,000	. . .
	Minidoka	Idaho	10,000	. . .
	Heart Mountain	Wyoming	10,000	. . .
	Granada	Colorado	8,000	. . .
AREAS APPROVED BUT NOT YET UNDER CONSTRUCTION	Central Utah	Utah	10,000	. . .
	Rohwer	Arkansas	10,000	. . .
	Jerome	Arkansas	<u>10,000</u>	. . .
TOTALS			119,000	27,766

The Ten Areas

Colorado River Relocation Area in extreme western Arizona is situated in dry, desert-type country on a previously undeveloped part of the Colorado River Indian Reservation. Comprising roughly 72,000 acres, it has a relatively rich soil and a warm climate which should provide good agricultural possibilities once the evacuees have cleared away the tall, tough mesquite and developed an irrigation system. The Center is divided into three communities, one with a capacity of 10,000

evacuees and the other two with 5,000 each. Plans for this particular relocation center were developed by the Army and the Department of the Interior even before the War Relocation Authority was created. Under terms of an agreement between the Office of Indian Affairs and the Authority, the area has been administered since arrival of the first evacuees by the former agency under policies established by the latter.

Tule Lake Relocation Area in northeastern California lies in an old lake bed drained by the United States Reclamation Service. Like the Colorado River Area, it has limited rainfall and good soil. Because of the northern location and the elevation of nearly 4,000 feet, however, Tule Lake is much colder than Colorado River in winter and has a far shorter growing season. It includes about 26,000 acres and portions of it will be developed by the evacuees for irrigation in line with the plans of the Reclamation Service.

Manzanar Relocation Area in the Owens Valley of east-central California is on land owned by the City of Los Angeles and is operated by War Relocation Authority under permit from the Army. First established by the Wartime Civil Control Administration as a reception center, it was transferred to the administration of the War Relocation Authority on June 1 and since has been operated as a relocation center. Although the area includes about 6,000 acres, agricultural possibilities are distinctly limited by the porous character of the soil and the comparatively high cost of irrigation water.

Gila River Relocation Area is located in central Arizona not far from Phoenix and includes about 16,000 acres of the Gila River Indian Reservation. Like the Colorado River Area, it has a low rainfall, a mild climate, and a highly fertile soil. Nearly half of the land is already under irrigation and ready for immediate cultivation; all but about 1,800 acres of the remainder is suitable for development. Designed to accommodate a top population of 15,000 evacuees, the center is divided into two communities roughly four miles apart.

Minidoka Relocation Area is in south-central Idaho on a portion of the Minidoka Reclamation Project. Although the Relocation Area includes nearly 68,000 acres, it is broken up by lava outcroppings in such a way that only about 25 per cent of this land will be suitable for cultivation. Lying at an elevation of about 3,800 feet in one of the northernmost tier of States, Minidoka has a cold climate and a comparatively short growing season. Since precipitation averages only about 10 inches a year, irrigation development in accordance with the plans of the Reclamation Service will be necessary.

Heart Mountain Relocation Area in northwest Wyoming near the eastern gateway to Yellowstone National Park embraces some 45,000 acres of the Shoshone Reclamation Project. Probably the coldest of all the relocation areas in winter, it has a relatively brief growing season and a low average annual rainfall. Canals and laterals, however, have already been constructed for irrigation of nearly 10,000 acres (as soon

as the land is leveled) and ample water is available from Shoshone Reservoir for further development.

Granada Relocation Area in southeastern Colorado is one of the two WRA areas made up in large part of land formerly in private ownership and involving Federal purchase rather than agreement between public agencies. Of the 10,000 acres in the area, about 5,500 are already under irrigation and available for immediate cultivation. Repair and extension of the irrigation system should make it possible to grow crops on an additional 1,000 acres in 1943. Designed to accommodate 8,000 evacuees, Granada will be smallest of the relocation centers from the standpoint of population.

Central Utah Relocation Area, situated about 140 miles south of Salt Lake City, is the other WRA project involving purchase of a substantial acreage of privately-owned land. It contains nearly 20,000 acres and includes, in addition to the purchased tracts, State-owned land as well as public domain. Lying at an elevation of nearly 5,000 feet above sea level, it has a limited growing season and an average precipitation of about eight inches. Nearly half the acreage has been under cultivation at some time in the past.

Rehner Relocation Area in the Mississippi Delta Section of southeastern Arkansas comprises about 10,000 acres leased by the War Relocation Authority from a cooperative organization sponsored by the Farm Security Administration. In sharp contrast with the western

relocation areas, it has an abundant rainfall and involves a problem of drainage. Most of the land is now covered with brush or second-growth timber and will have to be cleared before crop production can begin.

Jerome Relocation Area, situated in the same general section of Arkansas as Rohwer and about 35 miles farther south, is another area where drainage will be the principal agricultural problem. Like Rohwer, it has the rich agricultural soil characteristic of the Mississippi Delta section and a comparatively long frost-free growing season. The 9,500 acres that make up the area are being leased from an FSA-sponsored cooperative.

Establishment of the Centers

Once a site for relocation was selected and approved by both the War Relocation Authority and the Army, construction of basic facilities--evacuee living quarters, mess halls, recreation halls, bath-and-laundry buildings, hospitals, warehouses, water-supply and sewage-disposal systems--was undertaken by the Army Corps of Engineers. Type of construction was similar to that in assembly centers, and is essentially Army "Theatre of Operations" construction. Barracks 100 feet long and 20 feet wide, divided widthwise usually into four compartments, were built to provide 20 by 25 feet of space for each average-size family. Twelve of these barracks plus one community mess hall, one bath-and-laundry building, and one recreation hall made up a standard block.

Each family living compartment was provided with standard Army cots and with a stove for heating purposes.

Practically all construction and improvement work over and above this subsistence base was carried out by the evacuees themselves after their arrival at the center. The plan followed was to bring into each center first a small contingent of evacuee specialists--such as cooks, stewards, doctors, and nurses--in order to prepare for the mass arrivals later. Then, as the center began to fill up and the people had a chance to become settled, improvements on individual family quarters and on the community as a whole were undertaken.

During the initial construction period, each relocation center was under jurisdiction of the Army officer in charge of construction work. Once the basic housing was completed, however, each center (except Colorado River, which is managed by the Indian Service) was turned over to the War Relocation Authority for administration.

Evacuee Employment

The tenth of a million people involved in the West Coast evacuation--roughly two-thirds of whom are American citizens--have only one readily distinguishable characteristic in common: Japanese racial stock. In practically every other respect, they are as heterogeneous a group as--for example--the 110,000 residents of the State of Nevada. Occupationally, they run the gamut from learned doctors of philosophy

to muscular young men without special training or skills. The group includes doctors, lawyers, and business executives as well as farmers, fishermen, and truck drivers. Despite a marked concentration in some occupations (such as agriculture and retail trade) and a subnormal proportion in others (such as engineering), the evacuee population as a whole embraces virtually every major occupational group.

Effective employment of this sizable reservoir of manpower and talent has been one of the most pressing tasks of the War Relocation Authority. Mass idleness, clearly, would be damaging to evacuee morale, costly to the taxpayer, and inexcusable in a national period of decreasing manpower and all-out production. Almost since March 18, the Authority has concentrated a major share of its attention on finding and creating suitable work opportunities for the evacuees and on gearing their activities into the war effort of the Nation. At first, as Director Eisenhower told the House subcommittee, the Authority

"...had in mind what might be thought of as a five-point program. We planned for relocation centers in such places that there would always be public works to do, such as conservation, subjugation of land, and so on.

"Second, there would be opportunities for producing agricultural crops.

"Third, we would establish some small industries.".....

"Fourth, if there developed definite labor shortages in the Western States, particularly in Montana, parts of Utah, Idaho, Colorado, eastern Oregon and elsewhere, we have hoped from the first that conditions could be worked out so it would be possible for the evacuees to engage in private employment during portions of the year particularly in agricultural work.

"And, fifth, certainly in the beginning, we hoped it would be possible for many of the evacuees to establish their own communities and to be entirely self supporting."

This was the program which was presented by the Authority for discussion at a conference held with officials of 10 western States at Salt Lake City on April 7. At that conference the trend of opinion among State officials was sharply against private resettlement and even antagonistic to private employment. Some of the officials present served notice that they would assume no responsibility for the safety of evacuees brought into their States unless the evacuees were kept under constant and vigilant guard. Others expressed serious concern that the evacuees might purchase land in their States and thus become permanently established.

As a result of this meeting and of similar comments made publicly by other State officials, the Authority decided to lay aside for the time being plans for private resettlement and to concentrate on the first four phases of the program.

In order to provide employment at the centers and hold down the costs of program administration, the Authority early determined that each relocation community should be as nearly self-sufficient as possible. One step in this direction was the selection of areas with distinct agricultural potentialities so that evacuees with farm experience might produce a maximum of the foods needed for their own community kitchens. Another was the planning of Government-sponsored manufacturing projects at relocation centers to turn out articles needed by the individual

evacuees (such as clothing) and goods required by the communities as a whole (such as school furniture). A third step along this line was the employment of evacuees in (1) construction of buildings other than basic housing, (2) a whole range of community service occupations at the centers, and (3) various clerical and other phases of project administration and maintenance.

The task of planning work projects at relocation centers was complicated to some extent by the peculiar age distribution of the American Japanese people. Because the early wave of immigration from Japan to the Western United States (before 1908) consisted mainly of single men and married workers who brought their wives over at a later date, there was a marked tendency among alien Japanese families to have children relatively late in life. This trend, combined with the virtual non-existence of Japanese immigration since 1924, has produced in 1942 a population with an abnormally heavy concentration of elderly people and adolescents or children and a marked sparseness of individuals in the supposedly most productive years of middle life. Because of this situation, it was necessary in planning the work program at relocation centers to place special emphasis on jobs requiring relatively limited skills and on tasks which the older evacuees could perform without undue physical hardships.

The question of compensation for evacuees working at relocation centers under War Relocation Authority supervision was one of the most difficult problems which the Authority faced in its early days. Purely

from a public relations standpoint, it seemed unwise to pay evacuees at the centers a higher wage than the minimum wage of the American soldier, which was then \$21 a month. On the other hand, in fairness to the evacuees, the scale had to be set sufficiently high to provide some incentive for productive work, and to enable the workers to purchase needed items not furnished by the Authority. After considering a variety of plans, the Authority finally decided to provide all evacuees with food, shelter, and medical care (plus education for the children) and to pay those who worked on relocation projects at the rate of \$12, \$16, or \$19 a month. Tentatively, the \$12 category was defined to cover unskilled or semi-skilled workers; the \$16 category to include the skilled workers; and the \$19 group those with professional skills or supervisory responsibilities.

Opportunities for private employment outside the centers first began to develop on a significant scale during the latter part of May and the early weeks of June. At that time the deepening manpower shortage in agricultural sections of the West was beginning to be acutely felt and the need for labor in the sugar beet fields was especially urgent. At the suggestion of public officials in some of the principal sugar-beet producing States, plans were developed by the Authority and the United States Employment Service to recruit groups of evacuees in assembly and relocation centers for agricultural work. Under the plans as developed, recruitment during May and June was handled on a wholly voluntary basis by the Employment Service in cooperation with representatives of the sugar companies.

In order to protect the interests of both the evacuee and of the general public, the War Relocation Authority and the Wartime Civil Control Administration established a number of definite requirements which had to be met before evacuees could be employed in any specific agricultural area. These were (1) written assurance from the State governor and local law enforcement officials that law and order would be maintained, (2) provision by the employer of transportation from the assembly or relocation center to the place of employment and return, (3) payment of prevailing wages, (4) no displacement of local labor, and (5) certification by the United States Employment Service that satisfactory housing would be provided to the evacuees without cost in the area of employment. Although these conditions were established jointly by the War Relocation Authority and the military authorities (because much of the recruiting took place in assembly centers), in actual operation compliance phases of the program were handled by the Authority.

By the end of June, more than 1,500 evacuees were at work in the beet fields of eastern Oregon, Idaho, Utah, and Montana. Through their efforts, large acreages of a vitally needed crop were saved. In fact, this work was probably the most direct and forceful contribution to the war effort made by the evacuees during the first quarter-year of the relocation program.

Work Corps

The War Relocation Work Corps was established on March 18 by the same Executive Order which created the War Relocation Authority. Chief purpose contemplated for the Corps was to provide a means for mobilizing employable evacuees, for classifying their skills, and for safeguarding the interests of those who might leave the centers on private employment. During the first quarter-year of the program, enlistment in the Corps was actually carried forward at only one relocation center--Colorado River. At the other two operating centers--Manzanar and Tule Lake--evacuees requesting employment were simply assigned to work without the necessity of enlisting in the Corps. At the close of the quarter the Authority was engaged in a thorough re-examination of the whole concept of the Corps--its possible functions, structure, values, and limitations.¹

Public Works

Because most of the relocation centers are situated in wilderness-type areas, the principal public works activity planned for evacuees in the immediate future is the job of bringing raw, undeveloped land into agricultural production. Through this type of work, the residents of the relocation communities will make a valuable permanent contribution to the welfare of the sections in which the centers are located and to

¹ Under provisions of Administrative Instruction No. 27 issued on September 1, evacuees are now being automatically enrolled in the Work Corps--without necessity of enlistment--as they are assigned to specific jobs at relocation centers.

the Nation as a whole. Eventually they should add many thousands of acres to the country's actively productive land resources.

Of the 10 centers, all but the two in Arkansas are in arid or semi-arid sections of the country and will need irrigation work. Tule Lake, Minidoka, and Heart Mountain, lying within the boundaries of projects of the Bureau of Reclamation, will be developed in line with the plans and specifications of that agency. Colorado River and Gila River, both located on Indian reservations, include lands that were earmarked for irrigation by the Indian Service before the outbreak of war. Manzanar, although limited in agricultural potentialities, will be irrigated so that subsistence crops may be produced on a few hundred of the most fertile acres. Granada and Central Utah already have irrigation systems which will require some repair, reconditioning, or extension to meet the agricultural needs of the evacuee populations.

The Arkansas areas--Rohwer and Jerome--lie in the fertile Mississippi Delta section where rainfall averages better than 50 inches a year. At both centers one of the major jobs planned for the evacuees is the construction of drainage systems to keep the community farms clear of surplus water. Like the western relocation areas, however, Rohwer and Jerome will also need clearing and levelling before crop production can move into full swing. Both areas are now covered in large part by rather dense stands of second-growth timber (in contrast to the brushy cover of the more arid western areas) and farm land will almost literally have to be hacked out of the woods.

During the first quarter, possibilities for other useful public projects to be undertaken by the evacuees off the relocation areas (such as road construction, reforestation, soil conservation, flood control, and the like) were explored with a number of public agencies. No definite plans, however, were formulated for works of this kind.

Agriculture

Since nearly 45 per cent of all the gainfully employed evacuees were engaged in agriculture (as managers, operators, or laborers) prior to evacuation, farm work will naturally occupy a prominent place in the employment program at relocation centers. Primary aim of this activity at each center will be to produce a maximum proportion of the foods needed by the resident population. A secondary goal will be to raise a surplus for shipment to other relocation centers. And a third objective will be to grow crops especially needed in the Nation's war effort or for shipment under the Lend-Lease Program. Although some of the centers such as Manzanar will probably never be able to grow vegetables in sufficient quantity to meet the community needs, others such as Colorado River and Gila River are expected eventually to contribute substantial amounts of food and fiber toward the winning of the war.

In the first quarter-year of the program, the most active relocation center, agriculturally, was Tule Lake where much of the land was ready for planting when the first evacuees arrived toward the end of May. By June 30, about 2,500 acres of the area's fertile loamy soil had been planted in barley and a variety of table vegetables. Through-

out the fall of 1942, the Tule Lake farm lands were expected to supply all the needs of the community for cabbage, carrots, beets, potatoes, onions, rutabagas, turnips, parsnips, and spinach and to produce a surplus of most of these crops for shipment to other centers. To pick up the burden of food production in the latter months of the year when the harvest at Tule Lake begins to taper off, plans were made at Gil River for an intensive planting program during the winter season. Because of the warm, dry climate of this area and the existing irrigation system extending over nearly half the land, the prospects were that it would be one of the principal sources of winter vegetables for evacuee communities in the first year of the relocation program.

Due to the expense connected with establishment of dairy or beef herds at relocation centers, livestock plans for the evacuee communities were confined mainly to the raising of hogs and poultry. At some of the centers, however, shortages of local milk supply seemed to indicate the need for a dairy program within the centers, at least on a limited scale.

Manufacturing

To provide work opportunities for evacuees with manual skills, the Authority explored a wide range of comparatively simple industries which might be established at relocation centers. Here again, the primary objective was to meet requirements of the evacuee population.

A secondary goal was to produce items which are needed in the war effort and which are not now being turned out in sufficient quantity by the private industries of the Nation.

With only 27,000 evacuees in relocation centers on June 30, the industrial program of the Authority remained chiefly in the blueprint stage during the first quarter. The only industry in actual operation at the close of the fiscal year was a camouflage net factory at Manzanar developed in cooperation with the Army Corps of Engineers. Here, nearly 500 evacuees were employed in garnishing simple nets with colored pieces of fabric in summer, winter, and desert patterns at a rate of several thousand nets a month. Plans for expanding this project and for establishing net-garnishing factories at other centers were being formulated at the close of the quarter.

Aside from the Manzanar net factory, the three chief industrial projects in prospect on June 30 were (1) a clothing factory at Manzanar, (2) a furniture plant at Tule Lake, and (3) a tent-making establishment also at Tule Lake. Both the clothing and furniture factories will employ between 300 and 500 people and both will produce for relocation community needs. Tents produced at Tule Lake, however, will be sold to the Army.

In keeping with the Geneva Convention of 1929, alien evacuees were not permitted to work on projects involving production of goods

for the Nation's armed services. Although the Geneva Convention applies only to prisoners of war and was not ratified by the Japanese government, both the United States and Japan have recently agreed through neutral diplomatic channels to extend its applicable provisions so as to cover alien civilians who are interned (in either country) as well as Japanese subjects in the United States who are quartered at relocation centers.¹

Community Consumer Enterprises

In addition to agriculture, manufacturing, and land development, community consumer enterprises provide a fourth major field for employment of evacuees at relocation centers. Like any other community with a population of 10,000 or 15,000 people, each relocation center will need a variety of establishments--such as retail stores, barber shops, beauty parlors, newspapers, motion picture theaters, and credit agencies--to provide goods and services over and above the subsistence items supplied by the War Relocation Authority. Community enterprises are defined to include all such undertakings.

¹ A sharp distinction should be drawn at all times between residents of relocation centers--even the aliens--and prisoners of war or civilian internees. The aliens residing at relocation centers have been found guilty of no crime and no acts or intentions against the security of the United States. They have simply been evacuated as a group, in the interest of military security, from specific military areas. Prisoners of war, on the other hand, are members of the enemy armed forces seized in combat operations. Civilian internees are aliens of enemy nationality--Japanese, German, or Italian--who have been apprehended by the FBI and found guilty by enemy alien control hearing boards of acts or intentions against the national security. They are confined in internment camps administered by the Army and not quartered at relocation centers.

During the first three months of the relocation program, community enterprises of various kinds were established by the War Relocation Authority at all operating centers. By June 30, community stores or canteens were doing business at all three centers, with an average weekly turnover of several thousand dollars. At Manzanar and Tule Lake, mimeographed newspapers were being published daily by evacuee staffs of editors, reporters, and typists working under War Relocation Authority supervision. Barber shops and beauty parlors were also beginning to make their appearance. Through all such developments, life at the centers was beginning to rise slowly but steadily above the subsistence level.

At the same time plans were being made for eventual transfer of these enterprises to evacuee management and for the establishment of community enterprises in the future along consumer cooperative lines.

Community Services

As distinguished from community enterprises, the field of community services includes those jobs which are directly connected with operation and maintenance of the relocation centers. In accordance with established WRA policy, properly qualified evacuees are used to the greatest possible extent in all such occupations.

During the first quarter-year of the program, more evacuees were employed in community service jobs than in any other field of employment at relocation centers. While plans for agriculture, manufacturing, land development, and community enterprises were being developed and gradually

was initiated at the Colorado River Center under Indian Service supervision and plans were made for similar courses at the other centers. Recruitment of teachers for all relocation centers--both evacuee and Caucasian--will be carried forward in accordance with standards prevailing in the State where each center is located.

Because school buildings are not among the basic housing units provided by the Army Corps of Engineers at relocation centers, arrangements were made directly by the War Relocation Authority to construct schools at all three operating centers.

With the War Relocation Authority providing education at relocation centers only through the high school level, special arrangements have been necessary to provide for continuance or initiation of college and university studies. Almost since the beginning of evacuation, a number of non-governmental organizations, most notably the American Friends Service Committee, have been working on this problem. With the formation of the National Student Relocation Council in the latter part of May, the efforts of these groups were amalgamated and brought into sharper focus.

The Council, established with the express approval of the War Relocation Authority and the War Department and composed of a number of college presidents and other prominent educators, rounded out its formal organization in a meeting held at Chicago on May 29. President John W. Nason of Swarthmore College was elected chairman and national headquarters were established in Philadelphia. During June the activities of the

Council were carried forward by two coordinate groups. The West Coast subcommittee, operating under the leadership of Joseph Conard, concentrated its efforts on registration of students wishing transfer and on investigation of their academic fitness and financial status. The eastern group, with President Robbins W. Barstow of Hartford (Conn.) Theological Seminary as executive secretary, meanwhile directed its efforts toward determining which colleges or universities outside the evacuated area would accept evacuee students and how many evacuees might thus be transferred. Clearance of colleges with the War and Navy Departments was handled by the War Relocation Authority.

At the same time the Authority was exploring with a number of college officials the possibilities of extension or correspondence courses in relocation centers so as to provide for the needs of students unwilling or unable to transfer to outside institutions.

Medical Care

Considered against the background of swift evacuation and wilderness-type surroundings, the health record at relocation communities during the first quarter year of the program has been highly encouraging. There have been no serious epidemics at any of the three operating centers. The most serious health problem has been eye strain caused by the glaring sun and blowing dust at all three centers.

Hospitals, ranging in size from 150 to 250 beds, were built at each of the operating centers by the Army Corps of Engineers and furnished by the Army with necessary supplies. In staffing the hospitals, the

Authority (in line with its over-all employment policy) recruited as many doctors and nurses as possible from the evacuee population. Early in the program, however, it became apparent that there would be some shortage of doctors and a serious shortage of nurses among the evacuees. Caucasians will be recruited for the positions which cannot be filled by qualified persons of Japanese ancestry.

Since home medical facilities were almost completely lacking in relocation centers, the scope of hospital operations was considerably more extensive than would be expected in normal communities of similar size. Virtually every illness of any real consequence was, of necessity, a case requiring skilled medical attention. At Manzanar, for example, the hospital staff between March 22 and June 30 handled 568 in-patients, 6,528 out-patients, 116 surgical cases, 19 births, and 28,000 typhoid inoculations. The other two centers, established at a somewhat later date, produced a comparably heavy load for the medical staff.

Dental offices were also established at the three centers and staffed with evacuee dentists. Although the War Relocation Authority was unable to provide suitable facilities for these offices during the first quarter-year, the evacuee dentists at Manzanar brought their own equipment into the center and were able to provide comparatively high-quality treatment for approximately 2,500 patients.

In Washington the United States Public Health Service has provided technical guidance in development of the War Relocation Authority's over-all medical program. An Assistant Surgeon General, assigned to the Authority as medical consultant in late May, spent virtually full time

in June on organization of the medical program and on establishment of public health standards for the relocation centers.

Community Government

From the beginning, one of the basic aims of the War Relocation Authority has been to provide the evacuees with the fullest possible measure of autonomy in the conduct of their community affairs at relocation centers. Since only one of the centers--Manzanar--was occupied close to its full capacity during the first quarter, nothing more than a rough beginning on community government was possible. At all three of the operating centers, however, evacuee governments of a temporary nature were established and functioning by the end of June.

At Manzanar, the block (comprising roughly 250 evacuee residents) was the basic unit of the tentative governmental structure. As each block filled up, an election was held by all employable evacuees over 16 years of age to choose a representative. These block representatives performed two broad types of functions. As individuals, they cooperated with the administrative staff at the center in transmitting official instructions and policies to the residents of each block. As a group, they formed the temporary community council advising the administrative staff on all matters affecting community welfare and serving as an intermediary body between the official staff and the community at large. At this center alone, both alien and American-born evacuees were eligible for elective office, and the community council actually chosen contained a majority of older, non-citizen residents.

At Colorado River and Tule Lake, where the community governments were organized somewhat later, the pattern was different in several respects. Administrative and legislative functions were handled by two wholly distinct groups of evacuees. The administrative work was carried out by block managers--either alien or American-born--who were appointed by the project directors. The legislative community councils at these two centers, however, were made up not of the block managers, but of American-citizen evacuees over 20 years of age chosen by ballot of all residents of each block over 16 years and able to work.

Internal Security

By proclamation of the Western Defense Command issued on May 19, all relocation centers either established or projected in any of the eight far western states (including the three centers in operation on June 30) were designated as military areas subject to external military control. Protective services around the exterior boundaries of each operating center were accordingly provided by a company of military police. Maintenance of security and order within each center, however, was left largely in the hands of the evacuee residents working under the direction of WRA internal security offices.

As early contingents of evacuees arrived at the centers, tentative arrangements for internal security were made by the War Relocation Authority staff. At both Manzanar and Tule Lake, staff officers responsible for security operations were appointed and on the job before the end of June. At Colorado River, however, this position

on the administrative staff was not filled during the first quarter and security operations were supervised by the project director. At all three centers, actual patrolling operations and enforcement of internal security regulations were handled by unarmed staffs of evacuee patrolmen.

Since no formal judiciary committees were established at the centers during the first quarter, minor offenders were generally given warnings or confined for short terms in makeshift jails. Arrangements were also made to turn those who might be apprehended for more serious offenses over to authorities outside the centers.

Fire protection at the centers was handled by volunteer crews of evacuee fire fighters operating under supervision of the internal security officer or some other member of the project staff. Due to the dry climate of the centers, the inflammable nature of construction, and the frequent high winds, the fire hazard was uncommonly high and special efforts were made to inform all residents regarding precautionary measures. Although a number of minor fires occurred at the centers, there were no serious conflagrations.

Community Activities

As evacuees arrived at relocation centers from assembly centers or--in some cases--directly from their homes, the social life of the new communities gradually began to take form. People with similar background interests tended to draw together and form various clubs and associations. Church services were held regularly for Buddhists, Catholics, and

Protestants. Discussion groups were formed. A rough beginning was made on adult education. Steps were taken to establish local chapters of national organizations such as the Red Cross, the YMCA, the YWCA, the Boy Scouts, the Campfire Girls, and the American Legion.

But in these somewhat abnormal communities, where children and adolescents made up an uncommonly large part of the total population, the most striking manifestation of social life was the prominence of sports and recreation. Although facilities for organized recreation were not provided by the Federal government, the evacuees lost little time in organizing a program of leisure-time activities. Making use of equipment which they brought into the centers or simple facilities donated by church and welfare groups, the younger residents in particular were soon engaged in a variety of athletic contests and other forms of play. In firebreaks between the blocks, baseball diamonds and other playing fields were laid out, and baseball or softball teams were quickly organized by both the boys and girls. At Manzanar, for example, there were upwards of 100 such teams organized into approximately a dozen leagues by the end of June. In all three centers, evacuees formed dramatic clubs, presented vaudeville shows, dances, and wrestling contests, participated in public forums, and developed many other similar activities and organizations.

Fiscal and Personnel

Since the War Relocation Authority was established by executive

order rather than by Congressional enactment, funds for operation during the first quarter were provided from the President's Fund for Emergency Operations. Three allotments, totalling \$8,000,000 were made to the Authority from this fund before the end of June. To cover relocation operations in the fiscal year starting on July 1 and ending on June 30, 1942, an estimate of \$70,000,000 was presented to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress for consideration.

As of June 30, the Authority's administrative staff was composed of 272 employees, at the following locations:

Washington Office	50
San Francisco Office	132
Denver Office	2
Manzanar*	21
Tule Lake	61
Colorado River**	6
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TOTAL	272

* Part of project staff still on payroll of Wartime Civil Control Administration.

** Bulk of staff on payroll of Indian Service.