

the plan moved through proposal, authorization, implementation and operation was a miracle of cooperation among all branches and agencies of the federal government. It was a mobilization of men, material and transportation on a scale never before known in time of peace. From FDR's inauguration on March 4, 1933, to the induction of the first enrollee on April 7, only 37 days had elapsed.

Logistics was an immediate problem. The bulk of young unemployed youth was concentrated in the East, while most of the work projects were in the western parts of the country. The Army was the only agency with the slightest capability of merging the two and was in the program from the beginning. Although not totally unprepared, the Army nevertheless devised new plans and methods to meet the challenge. Mobilizing the nation's transportation system, it moved thousands of enrollees from induction centers to working camps. It used its own regular and reserve officers, together with regulars of the Coast Guard, Marine Corps and /navy to temporarily command camps and companies.

The Army was not the only organization to evoke extraordinary efforts to meet the demands of this emergency. Agriculture and Interior were responsible for planning and organizing work to be performed in every state of the union. The Department of Labor, through its state and local relief offices, was responsible for the selection and enrollment of applicants. All four agencies performed their minor miracles in coordination with a National Director of ECW, Robert Fechner, a union vice-president, personally picked by FDR and appointed in accordance with Executive Order 6202, dated April 5, 1933.

The administration of the CCC was unprecedented. The same Executive Order that authorized the program and appointed Fechner also established an Advisory Council. Composed of representatives of the Secretaries of War, Labor, and Agriculture and Interior, the Council served for the duration. It had no book of rules. There were none. Never before had there been an agency like the CCC. It was an experiment in top-level management designed to present redtape from strangling the newborn agency. Fechner, and later James McEnree, would have their differences with the Council, but unquestionably, each contributed greatly to the success of the CCC.

Fechner and the Council were aware that the CCC was FDR's pet project. This attachment, in time, complicated the Director's operations. Technically, Fechner held complete authority. However, the President retained final approval of certain aspects. Decisions as to the location of camps often stagnated on the President's desk until he found time to act. Nevertheless, Fechner proved to be an honest, fairly capable, although often reluctant administrator. However, he was the man for the job, and Roosevelt never regretted the appointment.

The program had great public support. Young men flocked to enroll. A poll of Republicans supported it by 67 percent, and another 95 percent