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A.P. HAMANN AND SAN JOSE'S MANIFEST DESTINY

pt. 1 of 2

INTRODUCTION

During the 19 year tenure of former City Manager A.P. (Dutch) Hamann San Jose reached its present geographical limits. one of the most important periods in its history, yet one that to date has been little documented. This essay is an attempt at beginning such an effort. It traces the mushrooming growth of the city from 1950 to 1969, Hamann's vision for the city and the evolution of the annexation wars that swept the Santa Clara Valley during that period.

On March 5, 1950 the San Jose City Council by a single vote majority appointed Anthony Peter (Dutch) Hamann to be its new city manager.¹ It is probable that neither Hamann, the seven members of the City Council or the approximately 92,000 persons living in San Jose at the time realized at the time how fateful this decision so narrowly reached was to become.

Hamann's appointment ushered in his era in San Jose's municipal history and set in motion a revolution in the shape, size and future of San Jose that has not ended.

It also marked the opening of hostilities in the annexation wars that raged between Santa Clara County cities during the 1950s and which ultimately ended in the municipal boundaries that exist today in the Santa Clara Valley.

For better or worse, the events that took place during Dutch Hamann's 19 year tenure as San Jose's chief administrative officer have shaped the San Jose of today; indeed, have shaped the San Jose that will exist for the rest of this century.

Hamann is the architect of present San Jose. It was his vision (or, as his foes would say, his lack of it) that laid down the network of streets and roads, established the industrial base, created the political balance, set out the boundaries of the political subdivisions that have spread urbanization from the Mt. Hamilton Range to the Santa Cruz Mountains.

Because of his foresight (and also perhaps because of his lack of it) the San Jose of today is what it is. For good or ill, or perhaps both, San Jose remains deeply in his debt.

It may not be so easy to see this today. Today's San Joseans have become so used to gridlock, the high price of housing, shattering downtown redevelopment and the lack

of a physical unity to their city that they tend to forget it was not always so.

Certainly it was not that way when Hamann took over in 1950.

Then San Jose was a small community surrounded by orchards and centered on a North-South First street axis. The northern end of the axis was Hart's Department Store, the southern, Hale's. There were no shopping malls, no freeways (excepting U.S. 101) and no satellite bedroom communities. The city was compact and historic. Downtown had been laid down over a pattern established two hundred years before by Spanish colonists who had subdivided the muddy banks of the Guadalupe River. Since then, there had been the slow spread of a grid of streets east and west from this beginning, none of them with much planning, but also without much urban trauma.

The city was the hub of a valley rich first in grain and then in fruit trees. It owed its prosperity to agriculture, not to industry.

But it had several significant advantages. One was its location near San Francisco and its port facilities. Another was its position at the junction of California's major north-south highways and railroads. A third was the possibility of converting its agricultural acreage to housing and industry. These advantages were becoming apparent in 1950, but they were not all that obvious.

What was certain, however, was that even before Hamann took office, significant events were changing California. World War II was just over. It had brought thousands of servicemen to the Santa Clara Valley.

Like Burt Bacharach, the author of the popular song, "Do You Know the Way to San Jose?" who had passed through what was then a small town while he was in the armed forces, they remembered, they wanted to come back. California, in general, was a pleasant memory for thousands of former soldiers, sailors and marines. They became the westward tilt of the nation after World War II. First in a trickle and then in a flood these relocating Midwesterners and former residents of the South

and East arrived in the Santa Clara Valley from Iowa, Michigan, New York, New Jersey, Alabama and Louisiana to stay.

Second, the nation had begun the relocation of its industrial base from the Rust Belt of the Northeast to the Sunbelt of the West and Southwest. Much of this relocation was so-called smokeless industry, electronic, aerospace and similar kinds of manufacturing, industry ideally suited to new plants on new land in new places.

Third, the dam holding the pent-up demand for new housing that had accumulated during World War II had broken. Even though the Korean War began in 1950 most Americans were more concerned with reaching the better life they had been promised during the war than in again saving the world from communism.

Finally, the baby boom, another product of World War II was about to roll over the nation with its need for more bedrooms, bathrooms, schools, parks and playgrounds.

Whether San Jose's new city manager sat down and delineated these civic needs or whether, as a part of the time in which he lived, he simply absorbed them will never be certain. What is clear is that the circumstances produced a match. A man and his time came together and San Jose would never be the same again.

In retrospect, this seems plain enough; it was not so certain at the time. The Council's vote was one indication of this uncertainty. A second was that Hamann's name had been proposed as city manager at an earlier time and he had not been appointed. ²

In 1946 when the city sought a chief executive the old boy network of University of Santa Clara graduates existent in city and government had suggested his name. While Hamann's qualifications, even then, may have seemed doubtful, his membership in this group was not.

Hamann was very much a product of the University of Santa Clara. He matriculated there in 1928 after completing high school in Orange County. Four years lat-

er, in 1932, he graduated from SCU with a degree in philosophy. After attending, but not completing law courses both at SCU and Loyola Law Schools, Hamann coached football, basketball and track at the university.

In 1937 he was appointed the university's publicity director and alumni secretary, a post he yielded three years later to become a Chevrolet dealer in Salinas.³ He quit the automobile business to join the Navy in 1942. He was mustered out of the service as a lieutenant commander in 1945 and went back to the University of Santa Clara to become its business manager and assistant to its president.

It was in this position that Hamann found himself in 1946 when he was proposed as city manager of San Jose for the first time. contractual obligations made it impossible to take the San Jose post then (even if he had been approved by a Council majority) and the job went to O.W. (Hump) Campbell instead.

But four years later when Campbell left to become city manager of San Diego, Hamann's name went on the list of candidates again and this time, free of his SCU contract, got the job.

Even then, however, there were those who doubted his qualifications. Their contention, repeated frequently during the 19 years of his reign, was that Hamann had neither the training or vision needed to make San Jose into a major city. Somewhat scornfully, some of them insisted he was a public relations man and a salesman, not an administrator.

But, as it turned out, this was an advantage, not a detriment. What San Jose needed in the 1950s was someone not only to see its possibilities but to tout them, not as they were, but what they might be. What was required was a vision not of the San Jose that was, but of the city that was to be.

San Jose's City Charter might have made this the responsibility of an elected, not appointed city leader. But it didn't. Instead, the city's government, one of the earliest city manager systems in the county, operated under a charter that gave

power and leadership to him, not to an elected Council. Indeed, the charter depended on a compliant city council. The office of mayor was honorary and ceremonial, not dependent on charisma or leadership. It was passed from one city council member to another annually in sequence.

The city's manager was the force that drove the civic engine. He was the one who selected and appointed city department heads (with the council's confirmation). He set the city's course, not the council. His vision became the city's vision.

Hamann's vision may not have been everyone's, but it was his. Moreover, it was buoyant and upbeat like the new manager himself. It was the kind that inspired the confidence and enthusiasm of city boosters of all kinds. And more and more city boosters were arriving.

Not the least of these was the new publisher of the San Jose Mercury and News, Joseph B. Ridder, who recognized that the more residents San Jose had the more subscribers there were likely to be for its newspapers. Or, as Ridder once succinctly put it, "Prune trees don't read newspapers."⁴

The newspapers quickly moved to support San Jose's manifest destiny as seen by Dutch Hamann.

Hamann's view of the coming wars for annexation was, "I'm a farm boy, at least I love orchards, but now they're gone. I'd like to say they're still here, but things don't happen that way."⁵

Hamann and Ridder's views were not isolated in the San Jose of the 1950s and early 1960s. They represented the way most San Joseans felt about their city. They became the theme that was personified in A.P. Hamann.

In time it would become increasingly difficult to separate the drive for civic expansion from the man. A.P. Hamann, in a sense, became San Jose, and San Jose, at least for a time, became Hamannville. It was municipal manifest destiny, at times blatant expansionism, the dream of an Imperial San Jose.

It was based on several important pillars.

The first was the approval and cooperation of a variety of figures interested in a bigger San Jose, not only the local newspaper, but a host of others who had much to gain from a growing city: developers, who had much to gain from turning orchards into housing tracts, members of the often nebulous San Jose establishment; large downtown land owners who foresaw increased property values in a growing San Jose and those simply interested in seeing San Jose prosper.

This aggregation never became a formal political machine, but Hamann backers eventually did gather into a body, an informal organization for the support for the city manager's policies. For a time the group had no name and then, more or less as a joke, because it met monthly the aggregation came to be known as "The Book of the Month Club."⁶

But San Jose's expansion also had more several practical bases. Hamann's manifest destiny for the city evolved from the fact that it was necessary to annex territory to any municipality by making its boundaries contiguous with the city. Thus, when early in the 1950s International Business Machines, now known as IBM Corporation, decided to build a new West Coast headquarters at the junction of Cottle and Monterey roads south of San Jose, Hamann had to devise a way to bring it into San Jose.

At first glance this seemed an impossibility. The nearest city limit was some miles away. The plant, however, had to be within the city limits to receive city services: fire protection, sewage, water, streets, lighting, curbs, etc. Hamann resolved the problem by getting the city council to approve an extension of the city's southern limits down Monterey road to and around the plant site.

The action was the first strip annexation to be undertaken and it was to set the pattern for many more to come in the years ahead.⁷

Annexation worked like this:

Most of the land around the then city boundaries was orchard and uninhabited.

Because it was uninhabited, no annexation election had to be held to bring the land into the city. In cases where orchard land was intended for development as a tract of homes the orchard's owner usually was not only happy but willing to agree to annexation. In most cases it enhanced the value of his property when it was sold.

In cases where friendly farmers might not be available the city resorted to strip annexation. Under state law it was possible to extend the city's boundaries for any distance so long as private land was not involved and so long as the annexation did not create an "island", a piece of land not a part of the annexation completely surrounded by annexed territory.

The theory behind this requirement was that by permitting an "entrance," somewhat like a channel makes possible sailing into an atoll through its reef and unincorporated area would not be denied any services provided by the county.

This sounded well in theory. In practice it developed strange and sometimes bewildering lines on a map that wiggled and squiggled here and there, always leaving an opening to unincorporated territory, but making immediately coherent San Jose's boundaries almost an impossibility. In practice, too, the land inside the almost surrounded, not quite "island" eventually came into the San Jose because it was impossible for another municipality to breach the barrier erected by the strip annexation..

The annexation process was assisted not only for San Jose, but for other cities by a law passed by the State Legislature early in the 1950s, AB 1, the first measure authored by the then freshman Assemblyman Bruce Allen of San Jose . The law permitted a city to add land to its boundaries without disturbing the boundaries of existing school districts. This offered existing cities immense advantages because until this measure was approved, municipalities had been required to seek approv-

al of their residents before annexation could be completed.

Hamann learned the pitfalls of traditional annexation methods early in his administration. In 1952 he tried to take a large portion of San Jose east of Highway 101 into the city, but its residents, apprehensive of increased taxes, voted the measure down.

It was a lesson the city manager did not forget. He warned East San Jose residents he would nibble them into the city a few blocks at a time (and he did.)⁸

From then on strip annexation became a tool in the Hamann plan to extend the boundaries of the city in all directions. Annexation became an almost every day occurrence. Like the tendrils of a plant (or, as his foes liked to think, like the arms of an octopus) San Jose boundaries began to creep outward from the city center.

Before long they extended half a road wide 20 miles south to the northern limits of Morgan Hill and into the fertile truck gardens and pear orchards north of San Jose, that portion of the city now lovingly known to some as The Golden Triangle.

In February, 1952 only 222 annexations to the city had been filed. From then on they averaged 72 a year. By the time Hamann left office in 1969 San Jose had added almost 2,000 annexations to its territory. This growth also is reflected in square miles. In 1950 two years after Hamann took office San Jose encompassed only 17 square miles. By 1969 when he retired the city had grown to 135 square miles.⁹

At first Hamann's expansionism went unchecked. But it was not long before other communities in the Santa Clara Valley began to take notice. The first was Milpitas, which until the 1950s often was the butt of Bay Area comedians. They used its name as a symbol of rural hickdom.

Milpitas was awakened from its slumbers by the Ford Motor Company's when it announced it would relocate its Northern California automobile assembly plant from Richmond to a site near the crossroads that Milpitas always had been.

To forestall this Hamann tried to repeat his IBM coup, but he was thwarted when the San Jose City Council refused to approve the extension of water and sewer lines to the site. Milpitas promptly incorporated itself, elected a city council of its own and gathered to its municipal breast the large tax base that the new plant represented.

Other areas of the valley, alarmed, took similar action. Campbell formally incorporated Jan. 26, 1954; Cupertino Oct. 10, 1955, and Saratoga Oct. 22, 1956.¹⁰ Similar incorporations had been taking place in the northern half of the county at about the same time, not so much because of San Jose, but because of the southern spread of Palo Alto.

But perhaps the most unusual incorporation of them all was the birth of Monte Sereno, the somewhat inappropriately named "Peaceful Mountain," an area of 3,000 foothill homes and a single industry (a restaurant) along the foothill fringes of the Santa Cruz Mountains. Monte Sereno's defensive incorporation was to prevent the westward movement not of San Jose, but of Los Gatos and was engineered by a group of retired naval officers headed by Vice Admiral Tom Inglis.

San Jose's annexation campaigns also drove already incorporated areas into action. The most vociferous of these was Santa Clara, San Jose's western neighbor. Led by its mayor, Peter Gianinini, Santa Clara competed with San Jose for territory along the length of Stevens Creek Boulevard, around the growing San Jose Municipal Airport to the north of downtown San Jose and westward toward Cupertino.

This battle began when Valley Fair, the Santa Clara Valley's first super shopping center was constructed (in newly annexed San Jose territory) near what was to be the junction of Highway 17 and Interstate 280, two major freeways.

Santa Clara promptly began annexation moves along the northern side of Stevens Creek Boulevard and before long a map of the two cities there had all the ap-

pearance of a plate of spaghetti. A reporter who covered San Jose City Hall at the time remembers hearing of how Santa Clara annexed the sidewalks of a street between Pruneridge avenue and Stevens Creek Boulevard, rendering the street effectively Santa Clara's possession, but requiring San Jose to maintain the street.¹¹

In time Santa Clara and Sunnyvale its neighbor to the west were to war over a prospective site for a new General Motors assembly plant. The plant originally was to have been built on land south of Highway 101 and east of the present Lawrence expressway, but partly as a result of the struggle between the two cities over the site, General Motors eventually located in Fremont instead.

To the north of San Jose the small town of Alviso also lay already incorporated, indeed, it had been a "city" for 116 years. Hamann cast an acquisitive eye at this part of the valley, too, sometimes repeating the dreams of a by-gone era that Alviso would become a deepwater port on San Francisco Bay. Eventually Alviso, by a narrow margin, voted itself into San Jose. This eased the annexation of territory of "The Golden Triangle" industrial park to San Jose's northern edge and blocked the northeastern expansion of Santa Clara.

But it was an annexation with a steep price. In the El Nino floods of 1981 and 1982 much of Alviso went under water and San Jose discovered a civic responsibility it would have preferred not to shoulder. As for Santa Clara, the untimely death of Mayor Gianinni and a "Treaty of Pruneridge avenue" eventually brought peace between San Jose and its neighbor to the west.

All this was in the future, however, during the height of the annexation wars. Then there seemed no limit to how far and how fast San Jose might grow. In fact, Hamann, now aware of the opposition of San Jose's neighbors to his manifest destiny for the city, drew an even grander dream of what might come to be.

It was theme echoed in some of Hamann's rhetoric of time.

In 1954, he declared, "The San Jose area has the world's greatest potential and must be provided with facilities to enter into an eventual population of 1.5 to 2 million." ¹²

In 1956 he called the state laws governing annexation to be "archaic" and asked "Is it (not) better to have a few large metropolitan areas, rather than small ones? Is it (not) better to have a large number of unincorporated areas under county government attempting to operate as cities or a large number of small cities or just one governmental agency which is a combination city-county government?" ¹³

Hamann's obvious answer to these two questions came in 1956 when he drafted and presented to the City Council a borough plan for a county-wide city-county government.

The city manager had seen such a plan in action in Toronto, Canada, where many small cities surrounding Toronto had joined together to form a super legislative body in which each city or borough had a vote. Hamann foresaw the day when such a plan might unite San Jose and its fifteen municipal neighbors in a single borough form of government. ¹⁴ There seems little doubt Hamann believed San Jose would be the dominant force in any such organization.

But though the plan appealed to Hamann, it never got very far with the City Council or San Jose's neighbors. Nor did the county's growing county governmental structure think much of the plan. About all that grew out of the proposal was an organization of cities that met regularly to discuss common problems.

San Jose's rapid expansion, of course, could not have come about without the fuel of municipal government: money. The spread of city services to new subdivisions as they replaced orchards required new storm and sanitary sewer lines, new streets, street lights, new fire stations, additional police, parks, libraries and other civic amenities.

For the early years of Hamann's tenure as bonds were the way such money

was raised. A record number of bond issues, general obligation bonds, bonds for special services and revenue bonds for such items as parking garages were approved by the city's voters.¹⁵

The easily won approval of such money measures has to be measured against the time in which they were proposed. The nation and particularly California were in the upward spiral of a rapid economic expansion. New jobs were opening up everywhere. For the new Californians suddenly arrived in the midst of a city whose limits were still being defined, it was all too obvious that new services were needed. The street on which one lived could have been the clods of a prune orchard only a few short months before. The nearest fire house might be several miles away. One could not be sure if a police car, a sheriff's office car or any police protection was about.

In such a climate of demand most new residents of San Jose could appreciate the need for the piling on of bond issues, not only for civic improvements, but also for new schools and new state projects. Bond issues were the method of choice in paying later for the Hamann revolution of now.

It was only near the end of his reign in the late 1960s that voter opposition began to grow. By then much of the necessary work of building the new city of the future either begun or was being planned.

Some of this, the construction of the county's present system of expressways, for instance, was undertaken with other agencies. But much of the work of laying out new streets, widening existing thoroughfares and building additional freeways fell to the city to carry out. Hamann had a master plan for this part of his program. It depended on the acquisition of land, a slow and often expensive process. In some places Hamann and City Engineer Harold W. Flannery devised a system of building half of a street. In others sections of streets interrupted by orchard or empty land appeared, to be completed at a later date. In other areas streets stopped abruptly,

waiting for eminent domain and time before they could be driven through to connect with other thoroughfares. All these handicaps left many of Hamann's boulevards, parkways and expressways still uncompleted when he left office. Some remain so to this day. Others simply did not come to pass. One such was the extension of the Southwest Expressway from Meridian road westward to Bascom avenue, there to connect as a major artery leading to Highway 17. The route followed an abandoned Southern Pacific Railway right of way. The street was eventually completed, but it remains something less than an expressway. It begins properly enough, but disgorges its traffic onto Bascom without a direct connection to the freeway.

A similar fate befell another Hamann project, a proposed 17-mile strip of parkway down the Coyote River. As Hamann saw it, this would provide bicycle riding and walking trails, picnic sites and other park facilities along or in the river bed. Four miles of the bicycle trail has been built from Hellyer Park south, but the larger park remains unrealized.

Hamann also drew up several programs of cultural civic improvement in addition to neighborhood parks, many of them built and most of them named after sitting city councilmen. These included a 19,000 seat stadium, much like the Oakland coliseum, a zoo (partly realized in Kelly Park), a civic opera house or theater like the present Center for the Performing Arts, another downtown hotel (he would have been pleased with the Fairmont) and at least one major department store to draw residents to the downtown area.

To this set of plans, he added his own prayer:

"We pray every day (although we may not be joined by some in which case we pray alone) for more IBM's, more Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., more General Electrics, more Lockheeds, more Westinghouses, more Fords and we hope more General Motors." ¹⁶

But by the middle of the 1960s the favorable climate Hamann had enjoyed had begun to register storm clouds. The first of these appeared Jan. 3, 1962 . Hamann publicly denied in the *San Jose News* that he had any plans to resign. It was the first time he had made such a denial , but it was not the first opposition to the manager or his policies. Foes, some of them represented by Mrs. Virginia Schaffer, elected a member of the San Jose City Council on the strength of her opposition to the manager, had begun attacking his program.

Hamann remained apparently undeterred, certain he represented the majority of San Jose's citizens. As proof of this trust Hamann often pointed to his seven "votes of confidence."

Because of a peculiar requirement of the San Jose City Charter , Hamann was required to stand for such a vote every two years. The vote, a non-binding plebiscite, amounted to a popularity poll on how the manager was doing.

Hamann's first vote of confidence took place only a few weeks after he took office in 1950. He won it handily. Every two years thereafter the plebescite came before the voters. In all, Hamann was , in effect, to be elected by popular vote six more times before he retired. In each instance he received an overwhelming majority of the votes cast.

Hamann also had some other triumphs to celebrate. In 1961 San Jose was officially declared "an All-American" city . In the same year the San Jose Redevelopment Agency, newly formed, began the redevelopment of the city's downtown, a process that was to take more than twenty years to complete.

On March 22, 1965 the city officially launched the Park Center redevelopment, the first of several redevelopment programs that were to bring a drastic reshaping of the now declining North and South First street central city. At almost the same time, in a contradictory move the City Council approved the destruction of the venerable San Jose City Hall and the removal of city offices from downtown to its

northern edge. There a new City Hall and other civic buildings became part of a joint city-county complex. . Although sporadic efforts to return City Hall to the downtown area were to follow, none of them was successful.

Other events of the 1960s also added to a gradual waning in Hamann's effectiveness as the city's chief administrative officer.

Two scandals, one the theft of money from the city treasurer's office by the city treasurer, the other the skimming of parking lot fees by lot attendants, broke. Neither was directly the result of Hamann's inattention to his job, but both added fuel to his critics' fires. Then, in 1966, Hamann broke publicly with his long-time supporter, Publisher Ridder, over a plan to build a meat packing plant on the northeast edge of The Golden Triangle.¹⁷

Hamann was convinced it would add jobs and additional tax revenues to the city, but Ridder had just completed a new multi-million dollar newspaper plant on Ridder Park Drive, downwind from the proposed packing plant site. Infuriated at the prospect of being next door to an abattoir, Ridder waged a successful campaign both in his newspaper and in private to prevent the plant from locating in San Jose.

In 1967, despite efforts by the manager, Robert Morgan, San Jose attorney and founder of the Triton Museum, angered at San Jose's lack of response to his proposed gift of the museum's basic collection to the city, decided to move it to Santa Clara. The museum, based on Morgan's own collection of paintings, might have been a successful beginning to what later was to become the San Jose Art Museum. Instead it went on to a highly successful future in Santa Clara.

Finally, rumbling in the background was a growing national concern for the environment. Growth, once a description of what a city should be, became a dirty word. The dream of a Greater San Jose remained, but was a dream that had to face the reality of many civic tasks still unfinished and of the growing difficulty in fi-

ancing such dreams. The San Jose A.P. Hamann had hoped to build had been, but in its construction there had developed some serious side effects" traffic congestion, a dearth of cheap land for home construction, mounting taxes, especially property taxes, an uncertain civic unity and a change in generations. Hamann may also have been disheartened by personal affairs. His wife, Mary Jane, had died after an eight year struggle with polio.

Late in 1968 he announced he was resigning from office. A mammoth civic celebration was held at his honor. San Joseans from the Book of the Month Club, but also from many other organizations and walks of life, rose to pay him tribute. After he stepped down, the former city manager returned to the University of Santa Clara, to semi-retirement and to an untimely death with his second wife in a terrible Canary Islands airplane crash.¹⁸

A new City Charter, strengthening the office of mayor and weakening the city managership, was one immediate result of Hamann's tenure. An interest in consolidation of the city Hamann's expansionism had created was another. A City Council elected by districts and not at large was a third. Finally, under the administration of a new stronger mayor, San Jose took renewed and intense interest in its neglected downtown. None of these things would have happened had it not been for Hamann's years in office. Nor would the San Jose of today exist were it not for his administration.

Ironically, however, Hamann left no other legacy, no memorial. A park is named for his wife, but there is no civic slab of marble, no statue, no street, no building in the city that bears his name. Even his administration has slipped from the memory of many San Joseans.

Yet they have only to look about them to see his imprint on their lives. Were it not for him, San Jose would be a different place. Whether it would be a better place or not remains, in the end, unanswerable and probably immaterial. What is certain

is that A.P. Hamann created the San Jose of the latter days of the Twentieth Century. For good or ill, for better or worse, because of his vision or because of the lack of it, we live as we do because of him.

NOTES

¹ *San Jose Mercury*, Nov. 21, 1969

² Ibid.

³ An unkind (and untrue) canard often used by Hamann's enemies was that he was a "shoe salesman." He never sold shoes. He never sold cars directly, either. He was the agency's manager.

⁴ A remark heard by several *San Jose Mercury* employees and one widely passed on by them to others as a kind of newspaper legend.

⁵ *San Jose Sun*, Nov. 1969, interview of Hamann on his retirement by Sue Beving.

⁶ The Book of the Month Club's history, alas, remains to be written and should be before many more of its members pass on.

⁷ *San Jose Mercury*, Nov. 21, 1969.

⁸ Sue Beving interview cited above.

⁹ *San Jose Mercury*, Nov. 21, 1969.

¹⁰ *History of San Jose*, Clyde Arbuckle, Smith McKay, San Jose, 1985.

¹¹ Interview with John Spalding, former San Jose city hall reporter and still a member of the San Jose Mercury staff.

¹² *San Jose News*, Aug. 25, 1954.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ *San Jose News*, Dec. 20, 1956.

¹⁵ The San Jose bond proposals in 1960, for example, totaled \$46.8 million. There were additional county and state bonding proposals on the ballot that year, as well.

¹⁶ *San Jose Mercury*, Jan. 8, 1959.

¹⁷ Ridder and the San Jose newspapers had followed City Hall north and had moved from their location on Almaden and Santa Clara street to Schallenberger road.

¹⁸ More than 500 people, including the Hamanns, on their way to a tour of Greece and the Mediterranean, were killed when two 747s, both fully loaded, crashed as they were taking off at Tenerife.

A NOTE ON SOURCES

Because the Hamann era lies so close to the date on which this essay was written and because so little has been written of it newspaper files and the memory of living men remain the two best sources of information. Some of that memory is my own. I was a reporter on the *San Jose News* through all of the Hamann era. I arrived at work on the *San Jose News* for the first time July 2, 1948 and I left the paper, but not San Jose in May 1969. Thus, I have drawn on my own memories of the time for some of this essay and on the memories of other Mercury and News employees. I should especially like to thank and acknowledge the help of John Spalding and Dale Lane. Any errors created by faulty recollection, however, are mine, not theirs. I should also like to acknowledge the assistance of the library staff at the *San Jose Mercury-News* and at the San Jose Historical Museum. I also owe a special debt of gratitude to Boyd Haight of the *San Jose Mercury-News* staff for his help.

The annexation wars and the Hamann administration badly need a more thorough examination than they have received here or elsewhere. The fact that many of those who took part in creating the manifest destiny of San Jose are still alive and rational cries out for some kind of oral history taking. I commend such a history to the California Pioneers as a / project for their consideration