

30,000

For Substance
John the Continuant
Logic
Broad on McTaggart
Nature of Continuant or
Substance

Hart T. Th 12 Schools <-->

Jouffrin S 12 "
Science & Common
Sense

Schelling T Th 12 "

W 5:15 Mag. <-->

Synagri. M 5:15 New Bod. <-->
Pears

Descartes & Locke Dick W.F. 12 Balliol ? 12 8 hrs.

Aristotle Th. 5:30 Lincoln 118 <-->
Cox & Wood

Concepts T. 5:30 New College ? 12 12
Price

2 hrs per week - Descartes & Leib

4 Peter's essays

1 Thesis planning

Papers to write on L. D. N.

Views of space + time

Place of mathematics

Hart: Phil. Prob: April 27

Internal Trouble

1. People say: we know a how force or electricity operated but don't know what they are.
2. Justification of induction.

Types of philosophical solution:

Skepticism:

1. ^{Locke} Something we believe in but know not what.

Limits of human knowledge with aching problems beyond.

2. ^{Relief in} Induction is not knowledge but emotion.

Dichotomy of world:

~~that is~~ Subjective world of perceptions & objective of science.

Something wrong with the question:

We know behavior but what is thing ^{at} itself?
Is distinction between properties & what possesses them a sensible one?

Standards of knowledge:

Mathematical surety.

Normal standards of certainty

Don't take doubt hyp. seriously & say that that we are in this room is only highly probable because probable means frequently occurring & the doubt is over all occurrences.

In all cases of philosophical doubt there are four marks of importance.

Don't alter behaviour.

Philosophic doubt arises in ordinary cases



Normal doubt arises only in unusual, unfavorable conditions. There is no particular defect in cases of phil. doubt.

Phil. doubt if adopted would remove distinction between normal & dubious cases.

If "it seems" is universally applicable, then it is meaningless. Meaningful only by contrast to your ~~present~~ standards appropriate to question at issue.

Should tell the doubter that an X-ray is doing a different job from a photograph & he should not judge a photograph by standards of an X-ray. Don't confuse standards and apply one standard to field when it is inappropriate. Don't treat word "know" as if it had one meaning. Varies ~~in~~ in context. Knowledge isn't uniform process. Examine different procedures for getting knowledge & ask in each different case what is appropriate standard. Substitute discrimination for doubt.

Further philosophic task — ~~to~~ decide why you have ^{different} standards you do in different fields of research.

Two levels: ~~a~~ lower level — ~~is~~ Is this a doubtable case? (factual) Apply appropriate criterion.

Higher level — decide about what (or why) standards there should be. Not factual

Get some
polyhedrons
(from Simon)

Ramsey

Rules expressed in imperative & in indicative. Some rules in the imperative sound wrong. "If I find a ψ I shall expect it to be a ϕ " different from "If you" ... assume it to be a ϕ ."

If the ϕ is ψ ...

Rules are not expressed in imperatives.

Rules of two kinds: Rules of chess. ^A "I always make it a rule to say a friendly word." Ramsey's use of "rule" is more like B. ^B orders, request, advice

To change B to imperative would make it lose its meaning. Imperatives can better be derived from A.

Variable hyp. can be negated. Ramsey says not. "If I meet a ϕ I won't regard it as a ψ " Otherwise some causal laws couldn't be false.

Discussion

Ramsey: ψ is singular ϕ & ψ .

ψ is ϕ ... ϕ is ψ ...

Ramsey restricts too much use of word proposition.

Variable hyp. is formula 2 - 1 & derive propositions.

Would be useless unless you could derive predictions or retrodictions. Is not business - assert - C & D P or derive props 2 - 1.



Senses of derive?

1. "Tom is shorter than Willie" can derive or conclude from "Willie is taller than Tom."

Ramsey B. var. hyp. as premises from 1.0
get conclusions. From a formula 2.1 $C \rightarrow 2.1$
2.1 $C \rightarrow 2.1$

var. hyp. "c whenever" appear (c) appear in derived prop. Different
b. deriving 2.1 $C \rightarrow 2.1$ a concrete prop. 2
another.

If anything is a lolo then it has white teeth ~~Doesn't function as premises.~~

This is a dedo

...

steps analysis.

Satisfies protasis.

IS not a singular statement.

Notion of factual statement satisfying variable.

Logicians rules of inference are not premises. But

causal general law is not premises either.

Can derive from logicians rule, $P \cdot Q \supset P$

And Jack & Jill went up the hill $\rightarrow$ can deduce Jill went up.

$\rightarrow$ Not as premises but in accordance

Variable hyp. functions as that in accordance with which one deduces.

In accordance with "defined as concrete props

satisfying general law apod. & protas.

"Any" or "some" can only occur with "if" or with "which"

Are rules ^{always} such that there $\checkmark$ (infinite number of violations?)

"It's 0 — $\checkmark$. $\checkmark$ No shall $\checkmark$ / as a $\checkmark$." — Not autobiographical.
But performative like "I promise." But this is
not proper analysis because causal law $\checkmark$ (valid
for everybody — i.e. should be based on good ^{inductive} reasons.

Against Kneale.

If you had disjunctive hyp. you would only deduce singular
prop. if you didn't know all its $\checkmark$ ^{or general} ~~distinct~~ ^{distinct}
Enumerative hyp. ~~is not~~ is not in nature but for
speaker whether he has seen all Roman coins or
only a selection. Enum. hyp. can have sing. hyp.
deduced from it if speaker is not enumerative — $\checkmark$

Test for whether something is a law don't coincide

Grice:

→ an event of occurrence of a word.

* 9

Type-token distinction.

But do you ever call a mound of ink a word? What does the word mean? What does the ink blotch mean? Blot out the ink patch.

Blot out the word.

Suggests useful distinction between definition

& usage. Tenses & tenses of "mean."

"Father means" male parent, He meant by

"father" a priest.

Р. В. В. В. В.

to a cousin who is a
very good person.

Verzinsung (p) - 0.0

Line

P.S. Dis ✓ ✓ ✓ (2) 2/2
"because" 9/10/14 d. 2/2

$\frac{0.00}{\dots} \rightarrow 0.009$

$$\neg (p \vee q) \rightarrow p \wedge q$$

Personal Identity: February 1.

Hart: PAS 48-49

Defensible concept: one which is not defined by sufficient conditions for applicability: unless — unless grounds are too ~~vague~~ vague to be formulated. Can't define in terms of common ~~abstract~~ quality.

Law: Doesn't say mad man & sane men are different persons but only that mad men are irresponsible.

Corporate persons in law.

Feb. 3.

Wisdom: "Other Minds."

Rival hypotheses + rival talk.

When you expect different ^{facts} events. When you don't expect anything ^{different}.

If it is a rival hypothesis then it is irrelevant to philosophic problems.

If rival talk then misleading. Fact about ~~these~~ people

can't influence what we mean by people

Ryle PAS 1930 - 32 Systematically Misleading Expressions!

Discussion By Davis

14.

Don't confuse meaning with verification

Personal identity ^{is} ~~personal identity~~

Can't define in terms of memory because you can forget & have false memories.

Or have amnesia.

It is sensible to say "I can't ~~remember~~ ^{remember it} but I may have done it."

"I remember it, but I may be wrong."

"Remember" as success verb — can't (logically) remember what didn't happen. Don't confuse with what you can factually remember.

Possible Thesis Topic:

Concept of Matter:

Heavy, portable, living, inorganic, astatic, actable
 Subject matter, reading matter: how this metaphorical
 use misleads when applied to what you can carry

Berkeley, Hobbes controversy - show origins of mistake
 Criticize Bertrand Russell!

Relation of physical physics entities to ordinary ^{matter} motion of

Occasions for using word "matter."

→ adjective material - as opposed to
 immaterial ~~means~~ means hard + impenetrable.

As opposed to "mind." See it as characteristic of activities, i.e. of
 activities to which "intelligent" and "careful" would be
 completely inapplicable. Purposeless. Inert.

Negative negative meaning as opposed to mind. Positive as opposed to
 immaterial. But mind is frequently called immaterial.

Used as contrast word. Adjectives of matter don't describe a
 substratum, but the objects (grammatical) of sentences.

Asked questions:

Relation between concepts applied chiefly to touch + those applied
 chiefly to seeing.

i.e. "impenetrable" applies to steel + not to minute bodies
 "really" impenetrable because logically indivisible.

See how confusion between scientific + common sense
concepts of matter has lead to philosophic "puzzles."

Logical behavior of event, process, & thing words.

January 30

12.18. *

* * *

lowest theories smart? $\rightarrow$ called fundamental

Simplest kind of measurement (which does not presuppose another kind of measurement), - ... with standard-sized pieces of wood. To first place decimal by dividing one standard piece into ten.

Numerical laws which lead to derived magnitudes:

~~$S = \frac{1}{2}gt^2$~~

Much implicit in law not stated in formula i.e. about apparatus you have etc.

Mass is proportional to Volume

$\rightarrow$ but "mass" wouldn't mean what it does otherwise i.e. if you ~~push~~ lumps together touching they would weigh more.

$\sin \alpha = p \sin \beta$

$\alpha + \beta$ $\checkmark$ (fundamental)
because measurement of derived magnitude

Distinguish between absolute constants & those which change according to change in unit used.
 $\rightarrow$ Derived magnitudes appear as constants in laws.

Very soon introduce theory & seemingly derived experimental magnitudes are not.

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Fanchon August
Samsville College
166 Banbury Rd.

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4 May 19

21.

1. Universality of Time

Statements () - contradictory

In fact statements about time are not frequently used.

Kant: Different times are not coexistent but successive

Usually said ()

Time intuited as a line.

1. Has only one dimension

2. Movement in time takes place in only one direction

Dum: 2 entails 1 directly

Ans: 2 is metaphorical.

2 - for a move?

1. If 2 or 2 origins in coordinate then

2 is dated on coordinate.

Falsifiable by:

A. Unstable events

B. Parallel event series

C. Events requiring more than a date.

A. Are there 2 events when happens?

Dreams, stories, Fictions. Can't ask

2 happens? because it didn't happen at all. Question is

Dream 2 events? If events happen + so

Inapplicable. If you don't know whether you

dreamed it or not + can't properly date it then

you will be convinced that it didn't really happen.

B. Might there be series of events logically unobservable by us?

C. Two different observers giving different dates for same events. Want to find experimental error.

Would first say there are two events before 1 &

12 ~ 2 events having one state, part criteria of being one event.

Time has only one ^{direction?} ~~direction~~ Can't go back in time?

What is going back in time?

If everything happened backwards. A B C D C B A

Memory: — we would remember what hadn't happened. Couldn't remember it was repeating or we wouldn't really be coming back to previous stage.

If memory ~~worked~~ in ordinary way why couldn't we say "here I am back at time A" as you say "here I am back in same place"? If universe were ^{periodic} pendulum & went A B C D C B A we could remember it would not be interesting to say this was the 5th B. Would only record various states. People would not be able to do anything or introduce novelty in time pendulum.
 → So would say that times recur.

Logical aspect of Time

Before & after are used transitively

Descriptive aspect of Time

Dates are specified by events which happened then

The logical aspect does not prevent exactly similar 2nd happening.



Dear E. H. O.
I am sorry we didn't manage to meet ~~in London~~ when I was in London. Next time I shall arrange things in a more orderly way and write to you in advance (to save relying on the

Oxford
February 1

23.
Hart April 25 Doubt.

Philosophers doubt ordinary, accepted beliefs.

List of their doubts:

Is there an external world?

Does it exist when we don't see it?

Is space real? Is time real?

Is anything really the same? Is change & motion real?

Are there other minds?

Do we have good reason for predicting future. Induction

Is floor really solid? (Electrons)

Is anybody really responsible for his actions.

" there " a distinction between right & wrong.

Why do philosophers do this? Difference in philosophic doubt & normal usage of "doubt".

* Modern philosophy's attitude is most apparent in subj. of doubt.

Also throws light on subj. matter of phil. There are no special phil. objects as there are physics objects like electrons (For electrons & Categories have ^{analogous} same place in theory).

Answers to: What is phil. about?

Phil. studies everything

" is not a body of knowledge but attitude ~~or~~ activity.

What sort of activity? Phil. flourishes when there is

uprush of scientific theory ^{contrasting with} ~~ordinary~~ ^{challenging} ordinary points of view

Descartes: ~~first~~ source of worry: discrepancy

between mathematical thought's clarity &

vagueness of ordinary thought. Takes

mathematics as standard of certainty (French: no

he doubts also mathematics & needs goodness

of God to say what he clearly perceives is true.)



Locke: Science's language of primary qualities accepted as true account of "out there", Sensations as "in here".
 Another alternative description of world: from personal pt. of view. Sense data.

Are these ways of describing world rivals? If not how are they put together? Which is the right method of obtaining knowledge? Then what is knowledge?

Phil. is not worry about how to know certain facts. Phil. is on second layer & puts together first layer knowledge about worlds.

Easier to use terms than to define them. Philosophers define words. This is also second level, i.e. talking about words.

Two sorts of trouble Phil. discovers when he sets about tidying up & giving definitions etc. ^{External Trouble} Apparent clash between ways of describing world. Floor seems solid but it is made up of separated electrons.

Internal Trouble: Phil. finds something wrong in methods of science or ordinary life, i.e. over & above what one says ^{gold is i.e. qualities} there remains something that is difficult to say (substance having the qualities). This is assumption that is made in ordinary talk ~~by~~ ^{Locke} says Locke, Newton's force of gravitation. Can show its measurable effects. Phil. question: what is ~~the~~ ^{this force} & how does it produce its effect? Phenomena as opposed to nature or essence.

January
February
March
April
May

Space and Time:

Problem of time:

▣ Made of extensionless moments.

Measurement of time different from of space
because beginning of ^{time} interval is no longer
present at end.

"Time as a whole."

Space:

Visual + physical space: Could an experiment
determine if blind man ^{gaining} returning to sight
associate the feeling of ^{touch} cube with its appearance
+ so is ~~so~~ visual language ^{coordinated}
through experience with tactile languages

Read Kant: Trans. Aesthetic

Bradley, McTaggart - notion of change
Mind 1908



How far can we change our spatial notions — i.e.

replace procedure of measuring by another. ^{what compensating} ^{to be made?}

Questions Raised:

What can be determined about space + time by experiments.

what is relation between ^{geometric} point & ^{ordinary things} ordinary use.
 "blume" in ordinary speech is abstract noun
 in geometry the name of a thing, Ref
 to usages.



... as well as ...

From a universal statement, that ...

... of ...

... of ...

From universal statement:

Let x be an arbitrary element of E .
 If x is ... then $K(x)$...
 ... of x ...

... in the ...

Natural ...

(a) ...

... of x ...

May ...
 ...
 ...

For Modal Propositions:

The Contrary to Fact Conditional

Chisholm subjunctive

Knowledge expressed as contrary to fact conditional

"If the peace treaty had been different, the second war would not have occurred."

Problem of the paper:

Can the subjunctive statement be expressed as an indicative?

Usages:

1. When we believe antecedent false.
2. When we don't know whether antecedent is false
to prevent realization of antecedent.
Precautions/ because you believe conditional
If I fall through ice, then I would get wet.
3. I am deliberating on consequences of something.
4. Implicit in dispositional adjectives
It is fragile. If I would drop it, it would break.

I. Inadequate to translate ^{subj.} conditional by " $\supset$:"

"If this vase ^{or} were dropped, it would break." $\neq$

"... is dropped $\supset$ it will break" or as alternation
when antecedent is false ($\neg PV \phi$)
because later would be true if vase were never dropped.

Material conditional does not without a subj. afford a
ground for action. "If this ^{vase} were dropped, it would
grow into an oak," is false even though ~~cor~~ corresponding
 $\supset$ translation is true if vase is not dropped.

with

the same date as the date of the act that caused it.

It is a common mistake to suppose that

the date of the act is the date of the act, when it is
the date of the act that is the date of the act.

It is a common mistake to suppose that

the date of the act is the date of the act.

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It is a common mistake to suppose that

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It is a common mistake to suppose that

Chisholm: 2.

To apply this must reformulate sentences like:

"Even if you were ^Pto sleep all morning, you would ^Qstill be tired." $\sim (P \supset \sim Q)$

It is false that "not be tired."

Difficulty:

Universal conditionals describing "accidents" in the additional information.

Information that the only two people on a certain bench at a certain time were Irish. From this can you infer

* subj. conditional "If I had been on the bench at that time he would have been Irish. Is not warranted. But how do you exclude these accidental

conditional from L? Only distinction is that they do not warrant inference of subj. cond. Can infer

from non-accidental conditional: (x) (Wolf ^{x is} x is ferocious)

If a were a wolf a would be ferocious.

This is distinction between law statements & accidental generalities. But is based on subjunctives. So without making the distinction in another way independently, cannot reduce subjunctives to indicatives. If you cannot do this, extensional logic must be changed.

More difficulties:

Answers to objections

"If Apollo were a man" $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{he would be mortal.} \\ \text{at least one man would be immortal.} \end{array} \right.$

Is ambiguous which term is assimilated to other
but ordinary convention is that first becomes like second.
Should make this explicit in formulation of antecedent.

If information $(x)(x \text{ is man} \supset x \text{ is mortal})$ but
the only men are A, B, & C cannot infer from
"Ap. is a man" to "Ap. is mortal."

$\Rightarrow$ expand this to "Ap. has all the characteristics
that men have."

Non-accidental ^{universal conditionals} ~~can~~ always be replaced by accidental one,
 $(x)(x \text{ has drunk from that well, } x \text{ is poisoned}).$

$\Rightarrow$ one such person born at $P_1 + T_1$, another at $P_2 + T_2$ etc.

$(x)(x \text{ was born at } P_1 + T_1 \vee P_2 + T_2 \text{ etc.}, x \text{ is poisoned}).$

Non-accidental connections are in way we describe things ^{i.e. by its properties of things}
& not just in enumeration.

Can define subj. conditional in terms of properties of things

$(x)(\phi \text{ if } x \text{ were } \phi \text{ then } x \text{ would be } \psi)$ means

$\phi + \psi$ are connected. Poiree & Whitehead.

Last objection:

Have defined subjunctive cond. in terms of additional information
in proposition L which need never be stated nor written.

What is such a proposition? See Remarks

Is Economics a science? = Does it consist of decidable statements or ~~statements~~ are its only? hyps. ~~are~~ refutable by experiments.

Phenomenalism turns ordinary categorical statements into set of conditionals, many of which are contrary to fact.

Dispositions: "He knows" means "he would say p under certain circumstances. Statements have about dispositions have irreducible indefiniteness & undecidability which is the point of subj. cond.

Solj. cond. are not strictly scientific but express interpretations

Different functions of 'you' in subj. cond. = as particular person, as one would generally limit

only history one more combinatorial but you
mean by saying this particular man
limiting conditions in physics
Attractive forces.

only history are more complicated. But you mean by saying "this particular man" conditions in physics. Attractive forces.

3 Science excludes forms which do not vary in regular ways
 enough for saying there would be more of less the same

partner - gas not in but ~~not~~ that 50% of gas and you are interested in the particular man ~~with~~ ^{with} because largely of

and not with history because you are not interested in the

Both could theoretically be turned into ^{an} ~~general~~ general statement

If Hitler had come he would have

Science



Figure 10. A small, stylized drawing of a person sitting on the ground, possibly a monk or a scholar, with a small object (possibly a book or a box) next to them.

Ramsey on Contrary to Fact Conditionals

Meaning of General Propositions

Variable hypotheticals are not conjunctions.

→ All men are mortal.

Differences

Cannot be written as conjunction:

Don't use it as a conjunction in clear thinking, ^(except for finite classes)

~~∞~~ Infinite conjunction goes beyond what we want to say.

Relevant degree of certainty is about finite number of cases.

Sameness:

Contains all lesser conjunctions: — as infinite product.

Would be true if every x were ϕ . When we regard it as ^{is not, how can it be}

↳ true or false prop. must regard it as conjunction, right or wrong?

Ways in which truth or falsity of prop. occurs

1. To man making prop. when he makes truth function of it.

But for general prop. law of nature I don't consider as alternatives P i.e. $(x) \phi x$ + $\sim P$ i.e. $\phi(x) \phi x$ but which would be the case if you had P or didn't have it.

2. To onlooker who says man's belief in P is right if he ^{or stupid} agrees, wrong if he disagrees or wrong if man believes it

+ onlooker doesn't think there is sufficient evidence to decide.

Many different cognitive attitudes one can have toward prop.

(Many sentences express cognitive attitudes without being props.)

True of ordinary hyp. for we apply law of excluded middle to consequent only. ~~More~~ More so for variable hyp.)

35. Habit results from enunciation according to psychological law which makes meaning of "all".

Possible attitudes to variable hyp. "All men are mortal"

1. Believe it.
2. Not to have considered it.
3. Not to believe it because it is unproven
4. Not " " " " convinced that certain type of man
5. who might exist ~~might~~ would be immortal.
6. " " " " " " a ~~certain~~ ^{particular} man is immortal

1. General enunciation + habit of singular belief that any man that appears is immortal.

3. Idea of general statement rises & is dropped.

Two people ~~do~~ with different variable hypotheticals disagree even if facts accord with both. Could have been otherwise, Couldn't.

Variable hyp. are not judgements but rules for judging.

"If I meet a ϕ , I shall regard it as a ψ " Can be negated but disagreed with.

→ Is a habit. All belief involves habit.

Universal of law ^{is one} believed on grounds not demonstrative.

Objections:

Some not believed at all e.g. unknown causal laws.

" universals of fact are believed on grounds not demonstrative

" derivative universal of law are believed on demonstrative grounds.

Ramsey: General Laws

Causal generalization is not one which is simple, but one we trust. . . . i.e. evidence for variable hypothetical is conjunction & distinguished from other conjunctions in that we trust it as guide for new instances. "Prop. P is law of nature" means we assert P after manner of

variable hypothetical.

Assertion of causal unknown law: means there are such singular facts as would lead us to ^{but we know them} assertion of var. hyp. which must not itself mislead us. → according to our method of inductive reasoning which according to psychological law would lead to a habit of expecting.

Is causation a reality or a fiction? Do variable hyp. play essential role in thought?

That we use think explicitly in general terms is at root of praise & blame. i.e. by considering what might have happened if a man ~~is~~ otherwise. This unfulfilled conditional cannot be interpreted as material implication.

Deliberation: "If I do p then q will result" differs from ordinary disjunctive because p. members is in my power.

"If p, q will probably result." Degree of probability is in q given p.

Beliefs in hyp. with unfulfilled antecedent can differ although all facts are the same.

Have degrees of expectation about outcome of any state of affairs — ambiguity in regard to state of affairs: "if man had acted differently." Are apt to introduce facts which the man didn't know. But when sort is clearly defined, we expect the same in similar cases.

Causal laws:

"If p then q " means that " $p \supset q$ " is deducible.

Evidence $\rightarrow$ is said even when one knows that p is false or q true & so conditional is evidently true, q is inferrible from p along with certain facts & laws indicated by context.

Cause without

If clause gives reason for being. "If p had happened q would have happened." $p \supset q$ must follow from hypothetical (x) ($\phi x \supset \psi x$) & some facts τ .

$p \supset q$ is instance of $\phi x \supset \psi x$, Causal law.

~~Why~~ How deduction of effect from cause is so

radically different from vice versa. Difference between past & future: not in knowing for you can discover new truths about past; But in that present willing cannot affect our pasts. For classifying difference between past & future is irrelevant, is relevant in tracing planning results of action.

Chavez et al. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence* 2012, **27**:122



Rule: Inference Jan. 24.

How does validity of argument involve truth of corresponding hypothetical? To the

is the hyp. of silent premises? Achilles & Tortoise regress.

Silent premisses & sort 'Fingerprints uniquely correspond to different people.'

Valid argument is in accordance with corresponding hyp & does not have it as premiss. Like railroad route which is not part of starting pt. nor arrival pt.

Like moving in accordance with rules of chess.

Hypotheticals occur when you are having post mortem on arguments. More sophisticated than argument like $P \rightarrow Q$

Difference between premisses & principles of inference

"If Prof. Price is Prof. at Oxford then he is fellow."

is not premiss of argument leading to conclusion, "He is a fellow."

Only use hyp. when you aren't sure how to move & have to ask for advice of referees

See Axioms
Prin. Math.

Not P without Q $\sim(P \sim Q)$

~~Phil. Studies~~ More Phil. Studies 303

Eaton Gen. Logic. 226-30

Stebbing ^{Mod} Ind. to Log. 223

Quine Math. L. 14-18

Russell ~~Pr~~ 1-6 Long Chap. 14.

... is not a logical word ...
... is not a logical word ...
... is not a logical word ...

any, etc.

... is not a logical word ...

How can we abstract from ...

By using varying words ...

Inference pivots "all", "some", "not" are neutral between different topics.

It is wrong that ~~if~~ some words are completely typically neutral ^{some inference pivots all} others are descriptive.

Typically neutral with no inference value.

Very, rather, much, although, but, in, to, by, the, an.

Logicians don't concentrate on these.

Many of these don't occur in other languages or can be dispensed with.

"More ^x rich than" is logical. Can be put in ~~xx~~ then ^{is inflection}.

Grammatical rules of inflection have inference force but are difficult to abstract.

Can express hyp. without "if-then". Had I served my God as I have my king, I would not be x.

Can't make list of logical words. Many valid arguments whose logical roots are not abstractible in certain words.

Logician doesn't use logical words as we do in ordinary language. Some logically means not none. Ordinarily mean more than 1.



... logically doesn't count you to existence of specimens.
... When don't want to

Hypotheticals & Contrary to Fact Conditionals:

Quine:

To what extent does " $\supset$ " conform to ordinary usage of "if... then"?

Subj. conditional ^{used} when speaker believes antecedent false & indicative condition "I want to" ~~true~~, leave antecedent unprejudiced. Subj. conditional

usage does not conform. Acceptable for indicative?

One who affirms conditional normally doesn't know truth values of parts. Believes that falsifying instance is not the case, but is uncommitted on others. Truth functional ~~or~~ commits itself where usage doesn't. One doesn't bother ^{with} conditional if he knows consequent. Also only affirm cond. in which there is some relevance of antecedent to consequent, ... for which there is some law connecting matters which ant. & cons. affirm. Conditional somehow inferred from general law which is not itself ~~exactly~~ a conditional.

$(x)(\neg x \supset x)$ For (x) confers universality & remainder has no separate status & as a statement for it contains ^{variables} ~~pronouns~~ which refer to original part & lose meaning in isolation. Has effect of simultaneous ~~assertion~~ assertion of many conditionals.



Predicates

"False" is metalinguistic correspondent of "n"

"Is true" attaches to name of a statement — is predicate by which $\{$ statements $\}$ attach to statements.

statement connectives

"Implies" says two named statements stand in certain relation.

"P" implies "Q" when "P $\supset$ Q" is logically true.

What could be accomplished by using subj. conditional can be accomplished by talking about statements — using implication relation (or even probability relation).

"If Perth were then Perth would be"

instead use:

"Perth is" implies "Perth is"

Statements logically compatible except when denial of their conjuncture is logically true.

"Is true" "Is compatible with" "implies" do not admit of iteration as do " $\sim$ " " $\vee$ " " $\supset$ " because first apply to names to statements & produce statements to which not being names they can't apply again.

~~$(P \vee Q) \supset R$~~

Tag! Say "truth of fact" instead of empirical or synthetic
" " logic for analytic.
Say job instead of function.
Model Propositions:

47.

With "must" "can" "may"

there are other uses of these as in commands
But here concerned with "must" & "can" ^{in props.} that
we can argue with & can be right & wrong.

Modal + hypothetical sentences are same.


~~if... then~~
What can be said with "must" & "can" can also be said with "if... then".
e.g. "I walk" "I ladder" →

Neg: "I ... necessarily ladder"
→ "I ... ladder"

"Must" is in open hypotheticals

"Everything that goes up must come down."
→ "or does always"

Logicians assumed that every propos & attributing
predicate to subject. Tried to reword hypotheticals
as S-P. But modal statements are difficult
because they don't assert different facts, No
modal facts, No negative facts, No future facts,
Asserts something factual & says something about
state of mind of author. "Must" "may" are
only rhetorical in effect. But valid arguments



depend on these $\rightarrow$ (1) (logicians,

to call propos necessary: $\neg(p \vee q) \wedge (\neg p \wedge \neg q)$

1. $\neg(p \vee q) \wedge (\neg p \wedge \neg q)$ truths,

" $\neg(p \vee q) \wedge (\neg p \wedge \neg q)$ " $\rightarrow$ $\neg p$

$\neg(p \vee q) \wedge (\neg p \wedge \neg q)$ state truths, contingent truths $\rightarrow$ false.

~~Syllogistic argument~~ Can dispense w necessary
(suitable $\neg p \vee \neg q$) $\wedge$ see Arist.

Any modal $\neg p \wedge (\neg p \vee \neg q)$ paraphrased $\neg p \vee \neg q$
" $\neg p \vee \neg q$ " etc. $\neg p \vee \neg q$ $\rightarrow$ down

"involves should"

{ sentence 2 $\neg p \vee \neg q$ subjunctive $\neg p \vee \neg q$ is subjunctive
{ 1 $\neg p \vee \neg q$ independent sentence + so
whole thing is $\neg p \vee \neg q$ prop. 1 $\neg p \vee \neg q$.
metalevel,

49.

Difference between material implication
& hypothetical?

⑧ ~~Test~~
9 8 / 2 3 / 1 2 3
→ these are not whole ^{indicative} sentences so

Paraphrasing of modal statement into

$P \supset Q$ is misleading & treats P & Q as
whole sentences & bricks as the same.

⑨ ~~9 8 / 2 3 / 1 2 3~~ hyp. /
& 1 2 3 vice versa.

→ ~~9 8 / 2 3 / 1 2 3~~ force.
§ "if then" (factual force).
"because" "therefore"

There is a usage of "true & false" in which hyp. are
true or false but different from true & false
of indicative sentence.

Bibliography

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 Lewis^C Analysis $\rightarrow$ ~~Value~~ $\rightarrow$ Better
 Chisum^A $\rightarrow$ ~~Is~~ $\rightarrow$ 1946
 Kneale^C ~~Wrong~~
 Quine^C Math. Logical Subjunctive $\rightarrow$ ~~LA~~



Discussions:

Non-modal uses of if ... then

In betting, "If he wins then I shall pay you."

What is the contradictory of

"If he is out he is at the Golden Stag"?

" " " + " " not " " "

or " " + he may not be " " " " ,

or I saw him out + ~~observed~~ in the garden,)

Contradicts + adds info,

"Must" means "I haven't found it out by looking but by inferring."

We want to find out differentials of "must,"



$P \supset Q$ P is unasserted

Difference between $P \supset Q$

$P \therefore Q$ P is asserted

What is an unasserted statement, Notion of

statement is tied up with ~~for~~ being a premiss



Ryle: Inference: January 17

Philosophical Problem is one which: has knottiness about it,
Is about a peculiar kind of concept that arises in an
ordinary kind of knowledge or science.

{ i.e. what is relation + difference between logical truths
& mathematics + knowledge propositions which inform about ^{world}.
→ This is a question in logical theory.

Verb: to infer Noun: inference: Instead of these use
'to argue' + 'argument' because:

Use infer for non-verbal conclusions.

Can 'infer' at a moment i.e. discover something or reach ^{conclusion} for ^{first} time.

This discovery cannot be repeated but argument can.

Argument could be written down.

What is an argument?

Set of sentences in which "so" or "therefore" occur.

What is function of "so" and "therefore"?

Arguments used for discovery or validation.

But what makes up cogency of an argument?

Question: What is the difference between an argument &
a hypothetical proposition?

See Strawson Entailment

Inference: January 19

Differences between inferences ^{arguments} & statements.

Arguments are either valid or fallacious.

Statements are .. true .. false, ^{or information or misinformation}

Can negate or contradict statement.

Cannot " " " argument.

One believes or disbelieves statement

Cannot " " " argument

One Rejects or accepts an " "

Argument is deriving one piece of info from another, but is not itself a piece of information.

An argument cannot function as premises or conclusion.

Connections between arguments & statements

$P \therefore Q$ $P \circ Q$ Q because P $P \supset Q$

" If P then Q " asserts implication, ^{Logicians' word,}

Not P without Q $\sim(P \supset Q)$

Not metalanguage

" London is North of Brighton so — "

Metalanguage

" London " " " implies "

Arguing is 1 & 2 jointly asserting but if you are entitled to assert premiss & argument is valid, then conclusion is valid.

If argument " $P \supset Q$ is correct ^{i.e. valid + with true premiss} then it is true to say

~~"~~ " Q because P " is true +
" If P then Q " is a true statement

Important

If argument " $P \therefore Q$ " is valid, then hypothetical statement " $P \supset Q$ " must be true.

" $P \supset Q$ " could be true without " $P \therefore Q$ " being correct
 $\rightarrow$ but would be valid.

This distinction to clarify job of hypothetical (all laws are hypothetical statements).

Achilles & the Tortoise

~~But~~ $P \supset Q \therefore Q \supset P$ could only be true if

premise is true & hypothesis " $P \supset Q \supset Q \supset P$ " is true.

Premise $\swarrow$ } $P \supset Q$ & $\searrow$ Ad infinitum.

Among premisses of any valid arguments.

Case d. (6) $\vdash P$ Case 5 $\vdash P$ conclusion is valid.

Ryle's Inference, Jan. 24.

RPA

Lewis says in 2g.

Feb. 1947

... (E is subj. ...)

... subj. ...

... subj. ...

Trinullig: ... subj. ... ante. ...

Will's article:

By ... contraposition ... put ... antecedent ... consequent, ...

Only bound variables can occur in ante. or consequ. ...

Transl. for a were the case c would be case.
 must not be sufficient for c not ~ a,
 (∃P) (P is true & P ⊃ (a ⊃ c))
 entail c



on conjunctive $\bar{c} \vee (x)(Px \supset Qx)$
 Appollo: $\supset$ $\bar{c}$
 Appollo: $\supset$ $\bar{c}$ + is mortal
 parts: $(x)(Px \supset Qx)$

End of Chisholm: There is $\{ \} \supset \{ \} \vee \{ \} \supset \{ \} \vee \{ \}$

Does 'If Hannibal & marched on Rome he /) $\bar{c}$,
 entail $\bar{c}$ / $\bar{c} \supset \bar{c}$, ? $\bar{c} \supset \bar{c} \supset \bar{c}$
 is it just a linguistic slip?

Different senses of "might ^{not}" without miracles,
 political, strategic (number of soldiers) kind of
 corresponding to different reasons you
 would give for "might not".
 It was luck.

Same ambiguity in "must" (when not used logically)

Read Ramsey

Ryle: Dispositions + Occurrences:

Difference between capacities + tendencies

"Know" is capacity verb signifying that someone can get things right. Same family as skill words.

Ask how do you know?

Believe — tendency verb not signifying that something is got right. Belief can be passionate, intermittent, "obstinate", words which apply to "trust", "bent", "addiction", "habit". Can be induced by tricks.

Person Can be urged to believe or not believe something, Same family as motive words, Ask why do you believe?

Has Sources — what makes you believe.

Operate in same field. Sorts of things that can be known are sorts of things that can be believed.

Mongrel categorical or semi-hypothetical.

You did do X + it is just the sort of thing you would be likely to do.

"You would miss the train." Open hypothetical partially satisfied — not completely ^{satisfied} because it could predict that if he had gone to a telephone booth (which perhaps he did not) he would not have had the right change, etc.

"Bird migrating" — more episodic than "migratory" but more dispositional than flying South. Is law-like so you can say "It is flying south because it is migrating."

Achievement words:

Are special class of episodic words because you can

"repeatedly" "at a certain moment" about them.

"Gettings" happen at a moment. "Keepings" over a period of time.

Distinction between Task Verb Achievement Verb

Looking

Seeing

Running

Winning

Seeking

Finding

Listening

Hearing

Say some state of affairs obtains beyond that of the performance of the task verb. Running & being first. Seeking &

having thing where indicated. Achievements &

failures are not special activities but task activities

with a certain result. * & So not objects of

immediate awareness because you don't know results.

Perception verbs like seeing do not stand for performances —

Question "What are you doing?" Cannot be answered by

"seeing", "concluding."

Ryle:

Dispositions + Occurrences:

Many words describing behavior signify dispositions instead of episodes, ... able to do certain things when necessary or prone to.

"Know" or "aspire" do not behave like "run."

Don't say "He knew it for five minutes then stopped."

Use in talking about what can be relied upon to happen instead of what is happening. For explanations,

Dispositional like "He is cigarette smoker" could not be true unless ^{many} episodic were true "He is smoking now."

"Know", "believe", "aspire" signify tendencies to do many various things of a certain ~~type~~ kind, & so there is not one episodic word corresponding to each of them.

These dispositional words have other functions than as reporting matters of fact.

Assertions that individuals have capacities, tendencies etc. have similarities with law statements.

Law: Open hypothetical. — i.e. its protasis has "any" ^{"whenever"} ~~for~~.

Must first learn to use matter of fact statements before law statements.

Are true or false but different from T. & F. of factual statements. Law is used as inference ticket from matter of fact to matter of fact. Or explaining ticket or bringing about apodosis by making protasis.

Stating facts, arguing from fact to fact & giving warrant for arguing are three different sentence jobs. Dispositional statements are not laws because they mention particular persons.

Learn to make dispositional statements about individuals before learning to correlate them in laws. ^{i.e. rational feathered animals}

Dispositional ~~can~~ terms can be expressed with "could" or "may"

Logic of modal words. Can, may, is necessarily.

"Must be" functions as inference ticket.

"Necessarily not" " " " " " to its not being the case.

"Can or may be" - refusal of inference ticket

"If... then" sentences can be paraphrased by modal & have the same force. Other uses of both which are not equivalent. "Can" & "must" used for non-theoretical commands & permissions. Ethical statements are to order-givers & licenses to give orders of certain kind.

Some "can" verbs are verbs of success like "arrive", "solve", "persuade", "Can spell" "is a competence". Can mispell "liability". Cannot + logically + mispell correctly or prove invalidly or observe incorrectly.

Tendencies: "Would if... " is not just possibility but license to expect.

Find different adjectives that apply to these contrast-senses of matter + show that they are adjectives of the common world of actions etc. Matter as opposed to mind I. (65)
vacuum II.
energy III.
universe.

Usage of Term "Matter" or "Material"

"Mind over matter." "Dead or inert matter." "The material universe."
"Science has at last found the key to the nature of matter." "Is there a bit of matter in the telescope tube?" "No, it is empty."

Analogical uses: Reading matter, etc.

Show that people do not talk about matter as one extended universal substance but as many bodies separated by what is not called matter. i.e. by showing that maybe that the adjectives of matter ~~some~~ in some places apply (are sensible & relevant) & in some places not.

Ordinary matter can be seen. Air is admitted as matter because it can be weighed etc.

Work out common usages of all of the scientific terms

"Force", "mass", "density", "acceleration" + especially "particle".

Analyze a scientific theory to show that its terms do not refer to something underlying + unobservable. But they do!
+ show mistakes + problems that arise when you ask questions suitable to material objects about electrons.

Take each of these commonly used words, see how it is distinguished from the others by a somewhat arbitrary (to fit into the theory) verbal definition + way of measuring. in physics
Then see the concept of matter that results in physics. (As dependent on ~~not~~ ^{observations} ~~as~~ are chains + tables + everyday bits of matter on observations, but not more to that extent ~~attack~~ + the logical construction so. i.e. See if you can ~~construct~~ ^{physics} the lines of attack against sense datum theory.

But show that scientific language is not incompatible with normal language.

For historical analysis:

See how for L. D. & N. concept of matter is different as it is opposed to different things — its place in the system — and the ^{what concepts} place in the systems of the others have the function of matter in closed systems. What emphasizes each of these concepts brings to attention. How they all contrast with common sense notion but all draw attention to particular aspect of common sense notion otherwise obscured.

List problems & riddles arising from mixing common sense conception of matter with scientific one.

scientific section: Perhaps it is not the actual ^{laboratory} experiments that I, D. theories are trying to relate but ~~phen~~ things happening in the everyday world. Experiments only check the theories & usually do not suggest them. Make lab. experiments always in the context of some theory.

1. To Explore physics concept of matter
2. Laws of matter:

Isn't it surprising that the laws governing matter are so beautifully simple? Example: Gas laws
 Particles ^{molecules} moving at random all cooperate so that $P=VT$
 Not so surprising because particles were posited to explain this.

Descartes' *Principles of Phil.*

Matter: 4.

Consider whether one would say there was matter if there was nowhere any hardness. What would such non-resisting matter be like?

Opposition of force + extension ~~as~~ as chief attributes of matter

Consider "impenetrability" as combining hardness + extension
 With extension view of matter if ~~matter~~ is logically impenetrable, with hardness — is it ^{logically} or physically ^{always?} not even?

Body can change its extension (or shape) but can't be without any.
 Can also change its hardness + heaviness but can't be without any.
 i.e. water resistance + fire is light in comparison with air. How different?

Distinctions he has & those he drops:

By emphasizing dichotomy of mind & matter he must abolish distinction between matter & void. But does the work of this by distinction between internal & external space?

What moves ^{what remains is} position (relative to other bodies)

Matter: ²³ XXIII. If motion of internal space is only way of consideration of extension as particularized, how can extension be particularized (i.e. how do properties arise) by motion?

1. Analysis of language
2. "philosopher's usages"
3. "physicist's"



Concept of Matter: Thesis: Oxford Analysis.

(68.) ~~under~~ Conditions under which it is relevant or normal to ask is matter here or is there a body here?

Ghosts. Certain scientific effects.

Relevant criterion

Systematic variation according to context: usually don't say air is a body unless you are contrasting it with a vacuum.

Handwritten notes on the left margin: "Handwritten notes" and "varies with these things said of it".

Filled with "Heavy" "Takes the place of" "Being green" "Impenetrability" "Having power or energy" "Being light" "Being animated" "Moving itself or being moved." "mechanical" "how wide" "how fast" "how long (in time)" "breakable" "Hot" "not much used. Why?"

Examine all the notions connected with billiard balls!

Primary & Secondary qualities: solve by reference to appearance (secondary quality) of ruler, etc.

See why they want to make distinction & why it is misleading.

Aim: A la Ryle to make ~~secondary~~ ^{primary} qualities ^{material substance} merge into secondary qualities as Ryle does with minds. Thinking takes place in common world of actions on things. Matter is in common perceived world of things. (Not underlying). Ryle doesn't want to make mental events private. I don't want to have matter belonging to nobody.

Hypotheticals & Sturgeson:

Truth functional interpretation never gives meaning of a hypothetical... even in confirming case

~~If John had~~

"If John refuses to play, then the game will be called off."

Both components could be true but you would not agree with the hyp. if the game was called off because of rain. Hyp. seems to give the reason.

But is not equivalent to ~~so~~ ^{Exist} ^{Some} general law or some other evidence together with ^{which} ~~the antecedent~~ ^{is John refuses to play} implies ~~the consequent~~ the game will be called off. Because this "some" is too vague ~~statement~~ ^{to be} to be an interpretation of this specific statement. Not like

"Somebody came into the room." means "X or Y or Z came in." But the statement should not be confused with the evidence for it. ^{you} Don't specify the general laws ~~and~~

Instead the hypothetical is a ^{or injunction} license to expect ~~it~~ in this particular case. Sentence tells or enjoins you to expect that the game will be called off, if you know John refused to play. Contrary-to-fact acts as stimulus to imagination.

Attempts to make Hypotheticals Function Inductively!

Non-inductive function

Criticism of Hampshire: In some cases you would
 say a ^{subjective} hypothetical was true or false.

Say "certain" when you have doubted, & the doubt is removed *

For General laws: ~~For the case of~~ All swans are white

Distinguish truth functional interpretation $\sim \exists$ a non-white swan.
 from grounds for validity of an inference ticket
 $\rightarrow$ i.e. your evidence

Strawson

Logical Form

Strawson: On Logical Form

Should distinguish descriptive types ~~from~~ logical liaisons, and logical form.

Only two ^{sentences with} expressions of same descriptive type can have logical liaisons — i.e. resolving of contradictions by showing that ~~the~~ they aren't of same type.

Logical form — i.e. logical constant arrangement with descriptive constants replaced by variables — goes through all logical types. How do you separate logical constants from other words with ^{implicative power} ~~implicative power~~? 1. By their having no descriptive function — but they do have some in normal language. 2. By their being necessary ~~in order to state facts~~ individual variables & property variables, ~~not involved~~

in any description (because it must be of limited application in order to be meaty). Yes, but aren't some type distinctions too? Also all logical constants aren't necessary & only some of them. "If... then" is useful because of regularity in the world. "Necessary" is very vague. By what words logicians have chosen to deal with. Then they change as new logics are developed. Why have logicians chosen to deal with just these words? 4. By ^{applicability to all} ~~going through of all~~ ~~types~~ types. But so do "of" "for" etc. → Maybe end with Popper.

Descriptive type ^{criterion} cannot be ~~given~~ simply that two words are of same type if ~~whenever~~ substituted ~~for each other~~ if substitution of one for the other does not make nonsense of a ~~sense~~ sentence that was sense. Because in some contexts two words may be substitutable.

Don't think that because an expression is substitutable for another /
in one sentence that it is in all nor because it is not in one sentence
that it is not in any.

(76.) For each other and not in others. } So you have to say that
two words are of same logical type in the context of
certain ~~types~~ of sentences. } then you can't specify
the type of the sentences for the same reason so you must
list ~~them~~ many of them with an etc. at the end. }

Logical liaisons are among sentences also ~~because~~ in virtue of
words like "sister of" "to the north of" etc.

The Formal Functions of Words

Modern logicians have separated a group of words which have only formal, no descriptive nor denotative, functions. What is the function of these logical words--"all", "or", "if---then" etc.? They are arranged with non-specified variables in certain patterns in order to show in virtue of what ~~pattern~~ arrangements of them the truth of one sentence implies the truth of another. However interesting for logicians and those concerned with foundations of mathematics this may be, this listing of logical words and giving their truth functional interpretations is not an accurate representation of their usage in normal language--for instance, the truth functional interpretation of "if---then". Furthermore, there are many words other than those listed in virtue of which the truth of one sentence implies that of another. For example, "x is cousin of y" implies "y is cousin of x". The truth of "x is red" implies the truth of "x is coloured" or "x is extended" in a less simple way. But the significance of "x is red" implies the significance of "x is blue" and also the significance of various questions such as "What shape is x?", "Where is x?" "Is x beautiful?" The relation between the truth of one sentence implying the truth of another and the significance of one implying the significance of another

1a.

is interesting and probably important. I cannot understand it at the moment and have confused the two in this paper, but the paper is mostly about the implication of significance.

2.

are incompatibility, relevance, level difference etc.

The method of verification displays some of the logical distinctions in expressions having the same grammatical form--for instance between "red" and "brittle" . But this is too narrow because some meaningful statements are in principle unverifiable. But one would like to say that "It is evil to kill one's father" and "If Cleopatra's nose had been one inch longer Caesar would not have loved her" are of different logical types. One can, of course, narrow the problem to the formal relations among ~~and~~ indicative sentences, but this seems like the escapist practice of only asking questions to which one has the answer. Even then, ~~it~~ it is not clear what would count as a different type of verification process, because the laboratory directions, which on this theory would be the formal content of a sentence or expressions (opposed to which the sentence's prediction of the outcome would be the descriptive content) could be very different for expressions which you would like to say were of the same logical type--the temperature in this room and that inside the Sun. But they could say that although the equipment were different, the question could be settled by one observation of an appropriate instrument. This would be a way for distinguishing "What is

3.

the temperature?" from "Is John honest?" but it does not help to distinguish "What is the temperature?" from "What is the color?" Both could be determined by one appropriate observation, but their answers imply different sentences. "Red" implies "It is not yellow", and "60" implies "It is not 80." So you are pushed back to specifying different methods of observation. But when do you call them different? In fact, it seems more likely that different kinds of verification procedures are to be distinguished by the types of sentences they are about. In physics one frequently used the same equipment and same procedures (such as cyclotrons and looking at marks on photographic plates) to confirm hypotheses of very different levels. One can tell the level of the hypothesis by seeing its function within the theory and in relating that theory to others.

It seems more likely that one can tell the logical type of an expression by considering ^{sentences involving it} what ~~it~~ implies. But implication is only one of the many relations among sentences in virtue of the usage of the terms involved alone--also there are incompatibility, relevance, level difference etc. Two expressions are of the same logical type if the substitution of one for the other does not make nonsense of a statement

4.

which, with the first, was sensible (could be true or false). Since two expressions of the same logical type, when exchanged in a sentence leave the logical relations of that sentence unchanged while possibly changing its descriptive or assertive content, the distinction between the formal and descriptive functions of sentences should be sought in the criterion for being of the same logical type.

But this way of distinguishing the formal from the descriptive functions of expressions involves knowing how to tell nonsense from falsity---in all those cases when a does not apply to what it is intended to to separate those in which in some sense it could not apply. But this is very difficult, for what a person calls ~~is~~ nonsense and what false depends on what he would be inclined to doubt or consider (or to assert as informative) and what he would take for granted, and this again depends on his knowledge and on how habitual his thinking and acting in terms of that knowledge has become. For instance, if without any explanation while holding a bowl, I should say "If I let go of this heavy bowl, it will fly to the ceiling" an appropriate remark would be "What nonsense! Why should it?" Similarly an airplane pilot who said "If I lower the flaps, the plane will go down" would be corrected by someone in the habit of using the information by "Nonsense (or its colloquial equivalent) You know it will rise." But a student who had read her textbook too quickly would be told that it was false.

Calling an assertion nonsense implies that to some extent you understand it, (One would not call Chinese nonsense, nor indeed any series of mere sounds. "'Twas brillig and the slithy toves did gyre and gimbel in the wabe" is

2.

nonsense because its normal English grammatical form and the familiar sound of the words makes the hearer expect to understand it all, but that the normal ways of combining words of which the knowledge is involved in your understanding of the sentence have somehow been violated, or in the first and most questionable case of nonsense, that the conceptual framework which you assume in speaking and acting has been broken. This will perhaps gain clarity (or at least a familiar sound) through a consideration of a series of kinds of nonsense.

"What did you eat for lunch, dear?" "I ate a chair, mother." This is not impossible, but it sounds silly because "eating" raises certain expectations for the completion of any sentence involving it among which "chair" is not (except through a simultaneous change to French and cannibalism.) It is a mere prejudice that we eat what we do, but such a common one that it influences the objects that "eats" can sensibly take.

"In the middle of the night I heard a loud green patch." The logical impossibility of this comes about through the physical fact that we have eyes and ears. That is, if we did not have separate and independent organs of sense there would

7.

be no point in the distinction between visible and audible things. For an amoeba speaking English it would not be nonsense to say "I felt a green bang". But, being as we are, the implication "If I saw it, it was visible" is useful.

If I say "Number 3 is green", you will think, trying to understand, that I mean the mark on a door or the third object in a row. "Is green" is a description that can only describe certain types of things.

In fact, the mathematical analogue "x is a prime" well illustrates the difference between nonsense and falsity and also that between different degrees of nonsense. For the function implies what kind of variables it can sensibly take. Knowing how to use "prime" involves knowing that you could get a γ "Yes" or "No" answer to "Is x a prime" only when x is an integer. One does not usually answer is "^{1/3}1/13 a prime?" simply by saying "No" but by saying "Don't be silly. 1/13 couldn't be a prime. only integers can be primes."--by pointing out that its meaning is such that it wants completion only by integers and that it is inappropriate to ask ~~1/13~~ "Is it prime?" about other kinds of numbers. "My dog is a prime" is deeper nonsense which in no way could be said to be merely false--nor even to be inappropriate and pointless. One would not stoop to correct such a remark

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but only say "Funny sort of dog you must have." or $\times$ more seriously "Prime refers to numbers" (thus putting it into the group that was previously considered too wide). Any function (mathematical or not) restricts its variables to a certain group of things for which it is sensible to ask whether or no it holds; and most restrict them within several classes contained as concentric circles one within the other:

"A wolf is a bird with golden claws"

"A wolf is a three-legged table."

"A wolf is that number which added to 17 makes $15 \frac{2}{3}$."

"A wolf is a not."

As the successive circles of restrictions are violated there are layers of nonsense passing from the surprising to grammatical mistakes with no significance at all. The third could be corrected by "What nonsense! A wolf is not a number but a material thing." "Nonsense" varies systematically depending on what it is to be contrasted with.

This sliding use of "nonsense" is illuminative of the amount of common knowledge that is absorbed into and assumed by everyday speech. So the $\times$ answers to some questions are already given by the use the words in them usually have in other fact-stating contexts, and the falsity of some assertions is likewise suggested by the normal use of their words in this world as it is by us as we are. Since different people are familiar with different

9.

contexts of usage, their words have different suggestive patterns, and what is nonsense to some, is simply false to others and questionable to those still less informed. For some people less is implied or suggested by the use of certain expressions and more is left to be found out. Nonsense is the violation of that which, in the context, is assumed.

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Arose from attempts to distinguish justification of statement from its vindication: vindication means fulfillment of future expectations. "I see a horse" like "I know there is a horse" implies there is a horse & future horse behavior. Doesn't help to say "I see something that looks like a horse" because something implies future material object behavior. "I see a horse" is justified in present if it looks sufficiently like a horse. ^{making} "It looks like a horse" basic implies logical precedence of "looking like a horse" or "seeming to see a horse" to seeing horses. Absurd.

If you don't confuse justification & vindication, then you are justified in seeing horses.

"Seeing" "hearing" "feeling" do not describe channels through which we learn about the world. We describe objects not ways of knowing. What do they do? They give a ~~proper~~ evidence-status place in the report. Seeing is better evidence for identifying than is touching, but touching is better for its being present. Or they could divide up objects in terms of different functions — seeing for chairs are to be sat in or seeing to be beautiful, — or aspects — auditory aspect of a quarrel, visual aspect of a quarrel. For "red" and "loud" & "stinky" we don't need to do this because (most) adjectives imply the ~~appropriate~~ appropriate "sense category". But nouns or substance words combine several "sense categories".

old facts prejudices, philosophy word not to be clearly understood.

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+ so statements about them need to be divided up as visual evidence, auditory evidence etc.

\$ My "senses" + "sensing" distinction is all right. Difference between "direct observation" and reports is here

covered by first + third person. "I saw or heard or smelled" + "he saw etc." Question about mat. obj. implies answer in one of these. + ^{does} not ~~disturb~~ distinguish between them, ^{suggests}

"I feel the pain here" implies ^{or strongly suggests} that "here" is part of my body (although it is merely a ^{prejudice} fact that it is must be connected with the rest of my body.

My coordinate lang. while giving good instructions to a painter, doesn't represent the ^{actual} vagueness of our seeing — You see the starry sky but can't tell how many stars.

Question 508

Strawson: Is "seeing" + "hearing" etc. in no way ^{or} descriptive of relations or events {must carefully distinguish events + processes} then what is their relation to describable processes like "I am looking carefully." "I am trying to see." "Seeing" etc. do not describe processes ^{of coming to grips} through different channels. ^{find} the difference is like that between learning + knowing.

For example The Truth About What Stalin Plans could have an ^{independent} effect on the environment of the newspaper reader, while the plans of Prince Myshkin could at most have a psychological effect on the reader and no independent effect on his surroundings.

"And then I said to myself "Here I am in Tibet.""

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some things in the actual or conversationally contextual/ vicinity of the speaker, while "the truth" indicates some ^{i.e. something that could possibly have consequences for him} causal or knowledge connection with the speaker often of something or some event not in his immediate neighborhood; as when someone is explaining something that has just occurred something that he has a business to know happened some time ago with a "The truth of the matter is" phrase. Thus the distinction between truth and fiction is that between events which have or could have ^{physical} effects on the speaker ^{even his environment} and about which he could know either directly or indirectly through someone who had known directly, and those which are not so connected with him.

This is perhaps why while "That's true" and "That's false" are parallel terms, ~~for agreeing and disagreeing~~ "truth" and "falsehood" or "falsity" are not so parallel: "She is always telling us falsehoods, but I want to get at the truth of the matter." Never "I want to get at (or avoid) the falsity of the matter." There could be no negative demonstration nor pointing away from the facts, but only your knowledge of the truth--of what has happened--could lead you to disagree or call incorrect somebody's statement. Making "falsity" completely parallel with "truth" in this demonstrative function perhaps lead Plato into puzzles about how

1. Nature of explanations ~~for~~ scientific laws.
2. Relations between experimental & metaphysical phil.
3. ~~Democritus~~ Relation between math & physics

Prin. of Sufficient Reasons

Infinitesimals

Relation between math & visual or tactile space.

5. Secondary & Primary qualities

Notion of matter - in physics, metaphysics, & ordinary speech

4. 1. Status of gravity
2. Action at a distance
3. Time & Space - 1st
6. Atoms & Vacuum

Matter

Dynamics

Conservation of vis viva.

Principle of inertia.

→ Kind of motion

Bodies considered as pure extension.

Mechanistic & Dynamical explanations.

What parts of the theories are definitions or tautologies.

4+2. Problems in Scientific method:

Natural 2nd & 4th axiom systems. e.g. $\mathcal{P}$ & $\mathcal{B}$
hyp.

6. Implications of 2nd & 4th axiom systems

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This subtlety of function obviously cannot be formulated in
an extensional logic.

Strawson: Truths

On metalinguistic interpretation can ask: what is the subject of "is true"? "What is 'is true' about?"

See. You say ~~is true~~ ^{ink} about a statement is true. Not a noise nor a blotch of paper. A statement is what you say — but if Fanchon says "I am hot"

Strawson is asked "What did she say?" he replies "she said that she was hot." Well, what Fanchon said &

what strawson said she said are different sounds, so statement is not sound but what you say. Same statements can be true ^{and} false. So don't say it is the sound used in the context where it is used that is true or false. The statement or what she said is a funny kind of entity & scarcely deserves to be called ~~the~~ subject.

When you can say of statement "That's correct" you can also say "True" or "Indeed he did," then "correct" is not used in same sense as when used to a foreigner about his grammar. Borderline cases "Well-described" "Well-spoken." But "is true" is more like a repetition than it is like a comment on his speech. ^{then it is like meaning in the} strictly semantical sense where "P" means ^{metalinguage} Q.

In the "is true if & only if" which is equivalent to "means" ^{metalinguage}, "true" has a different — a metalinguistic function — different from the function of "is true" in ordinary conversation. Why should this be puzzling?

Should not say "Truth" has demonstrative function
 because a demonstrative ^{single out} points out something in the
 environment _{from the rest.}

But you can't single out the whole world from something
 which is not the world. Can only point out from each
 other things of the same logical type. Since truth &
 fiction are not of same logical type, it is not false
 but nonsense that their "causal series" should
 intersect. Something + Truth is told in a different tone of
 voice from fiction

→ So it is no criteria for distinguishing them

so.
 How do you define the response appropriate to certain occasion.

Fan: What is normally said under similar circumstances —
 normally being ambiguous with changes in social status, age,
 period of the century, ^{character:} frame of mind of speaker etc.

truth

It is perhaps slightly surprising that most articles on "truth" concern themselves solely with the analysis of "is true" to the exclusion of "truth". But this too is a word that is commonly used: "Truth is stranger than fiction." "The truth of the matter is that the butler $\neq$ is a murderer." "Truth will out." "Science is the search for truth." In all of these "truth" can be paraphrased by "the fact" or "the facts". This suggests that "truth" like "fact" (Hart's lectures) has, not a descriptive, but a demonstrative function. It fastens our assertions onto the world like a gesture. (One can even imagine a dramatic context in which "WHAT IS THE TRUTH?" could be answered by a sweeping gesture of the arm towards cities and mountains). But this is much too vague, for "the truth" indicates, not just the world in general, but ~~the appropriate; that~~ that part or aspect of the world appropriate to the context. In "Science is the search for truth." and "The truth of the matter is that the butler is the murderer" "the truth" indicates respectively all abstract regularities observable in ~~the~~^{non-human} world (or something similar), and the occurrences in the vicinity of the manor house on the fatal night. So "the truth" is appropriately ambiguous. But "the truth" functions differently from "this" or "here". For "this" is only used for objects, situations or

2.

some things in the actual or conversationally contextual ("And then I said to myself 'Here I am in Tibet'") vicinity of the speaker, while "the truth" indicates something that could have a physical effect on the speaker or his environment and could be directly known by him. For example The Truth About What

Stalin Plans could have a very independent effect on the environment and life of the newspaper reader, while the plans of Prince Myshkin could at most have a psychological effect upon the reader and no independent effect on his surroundings. Thus the distinction between truth and fiction is that between events which do or could have physical effects on the speaker or his environment and about which he could know either directly or indirectly through someone who had known directly (by seeing it happen, being present at the accident etc) and those which ^{could be} ~~are~~ not so connected with him.

This is perhaps why while "That's true" and "That's false" are parallel terms, "truth" and "falsehood" or "falsity" are not so parallel: "She is always telling us falsehoods, but I want to get at the truth of the matter." Never "I want to get at (or avoid) the falsity of the matter." There could be no negative demonstration nor pointing away from the facts, but only your knowledge of the truth--of what has happened--could lead you to disagree or call incorrect somebody's statement. Making "falsity" completely parallel with "truth" in this demonstrative function perhaps lead Plato into puzzles about how

we can know what is not. More recently the mistaking of the demonstrative for a descriptive function of "the truth" has raised more metaphysical puzzles when questions appropriate only for describing words have been asked about it: "What entities does truth relate?" "Is ~~it~~ relating them when nobody is asserting or considering the propositions?" "What must language have in common with the world in order to picture it truthfully?"

I hope that the following will not lead down this garden path. Roughly speaking, Strawson's classification of metalinguistic expressions seems too rough, for it does not distinguish between expressions about sentences considered as things in themselves such as: "is ungrammatical" or "is written in blue ink" (these two are very different but their difference is irrelevant here) from those which are concerned with the relation between sentences or utterances and some kind of non-verbal experience (or one only essentially verbal), for example, "means". or "designates".

The membership of "is true" in the latter class is all that could reasonably be questioned. Unfortunately a reconsideration of the job of "is true" leads ~~to~~ (at least me) to the puzzling question of the relation between a sentence written or spoken or thought and the fact or experience it is about. You do not indicate or name a fact--point it out--you indicate things, and

so pointing can be a way of giving the meaning or showing the relation between words and objects, but not between sentences and facts, experiences or states of affairs. Nor ~~does a sentence~~ ^{do you} describe a fact, say what it was like---you describe an event or the appearance of a person or the emotional quality of a reaction. You state a fact. (It is true, sentences describe people, but only selectively. They do not picture or describe them completely like cameras. So it is convenient to say "fact!") "Fact" here does not denote a separate entity about which you can ask such questions as "Where is it?" This would be obviously wrong, because you cannot state an entity or a substance word. But it is used to say that a sentence is concerned with the state of affairs or a possible state of affairs--for an indicative gesture toward the world--and also to say that sentences are selective and in no way organizedly about everything going on in the world. ~~You use "fact" on the linguistic occasion of doubting or questioning. etc.~~ Stating a fact (uttering a sentence) is the response ~~at~~ (not simply in the sense of saying it happened after it did happen, but of predicting, denying, suggesting, entertaining) appropriate to some non-linguistic (or accidentally linguistic) occasion such as the collapse of a chair and another kind of non-linguistic occasion such as the emotional

upheaval

5.

of the speaker. Certain types of sentences are among the appropriate responses of people in certain frames of mind to certain types of occurrences (The actual occurrences in all detail which would lead you to say: "There is a cow in the next room" are numerous---the next room might be far or near, large or small, a barn or a bedroom, the cow might be brown or black or stuffed, the speaker might be drunk or having hallucinations or making a bad joke.) Maybe this is why you

also say of remarks "that's correct," i.e. that it is the right or one of the right things to say under the circumstances.

But for anything that happens there is not just one appropriate thing to say about it, nor is any remark exhaustive of it, nor is there only one state of affairs which is the proper occasion for the utterance of a given remark. "That's true" is far

more normally replaced by "That's right" or (in America)

"Correct," than by "Yes" or by an artificial ditto language.

In fact, in negative statements "That's true" can not

idiomatically be replaced by "Yes": If you say "That isn't

the way one would normally speak in English", and I, instead of

saying "That's true. It isn't," say "Yes! It isn't", you will

have a new occasion to repeat your remark. One generally says

"That's true" when he means "That's the sort of thing I would

6.

say under the circumstances," "I would have done likewise if I had spoken first", which of course leads to or, if you like, implies "I second it," but not without the previous language-considering moves. "That's true" does then indicate that you have employed the conventional correlation between happenings and utterances correctly---you've said the right thing. (Note) Of course, in saying "That's true" you are asserting something about the occurrence which the sentence says happened or confirming that it did happen, but you are also saying that another happening---the utterance of the sentence---occurred in accordance with the conventions for the use of language or was right. ~~That's~~ "That's true" is uttered on appropriate

(Note 1.)
The distinction between occasions for ~~uttering/certain~~ making certain statements and what those statements are about seems *it used not in the normal loose sense but if given philosophic rigour,* rather ~~very~~ cloudy and likely to lead to misunderstanding.

If you say that a sentence is about a fact or a thing, then you think ~~considering~~ of it as describing the fact and ask what is the picturing relation or the representing relation between language and the world. This is bad. Instead of asking what a sentence is about, you could ask "On what occasions would I say this?" ~~This is a~~

6a Note can't

Saying that / the utterance of "is true" is an activity demanding a linguistic occasion seems like a specialization of Ryle's stratification of activities on the basis of the performance of some of them involving the thought of the performance of others. But the "about" "occasion" distinction here fades out, for the occasion of the higher level activity of saying "Ah, I have solved this anagram!" is the solution of the anagram under consideration, but it would not normally seem odd to say that it is about the solution of the anagram.

Note 2 Concerning the idiomatic evidence:

In "It's true that Queen Anne is dead" "that" as a possible device for indirect quotation can mislead one into taking "Queen Anne is dead" as an unquoted direct statement of fact instead of ^{indirectly} aquoted sentence. It seems more like "He said that Queen Anne is dead " than "It is sad that Queen Anne is dead."

But language is notoriously ambiguous so I suppose which you choose to compare it to depends partly on your philosophic prejudice.

Other paraphrases of "That's true" give support to opposite philosophic interpretations. The American idioms (slightly vulgar) "That's a fact," and "You ain't kidding(lying)" lend their support respectively to the confirmation and metalinguistic interpretations.

Criticism of Strawson:

Untranslated ~~phrases~~ fragments/are in obj. lang. where sub & sent. is translated

"Means" is metalinguistic. Well, is ~~a~~ very different from "ungrammatical" because is between two statements + not statement + its truth conditions,

Distinction between "means" + "means that."

Is "says" metalinguistic?

Strawson: How are occasion & about to be distinguished. Not incompatible. I say, "What a beautiful painting!" on ~~the~~ certain occasions but it is about the painting too.
Fardon: Solve Zeno's paradox by analysis. Or what a true (true-to-life, realistic) painting!
Strawson: Truth, canvas-picture & about it. Parke & says they are similar.
"That painting is correct representation."

You could look at a portrait of your friend & say "No" or "That's false." if it didn't look like her. A novel or autobiography could be called true.

Change in emphasis from symbol to state of affairs it represents. But the assertion "is true" asserts similarity between them, depending on whether the symbol is of more or less interest in itself. Of a theory "that's true" or "that's false" concerns mostly its predictions because we are interested in these.

To be used at conclusion: To carry the exaggeration a bit farther, consider the case when "is true" is more or less idiomatically applied to non-linguistic symbols - like paintings with no implication that the proposition pictures the fact, but I can't resist the temptation to see difference between relation of "true" & "truth", "is true" & "false" are parallel; are "truth" & "falsity".

General remark on linguistic analysis: same utterance may have several functions. Analogies toward extremes help separate these functions.

For Searle in some way that Parke, Truth & Falsity are one of

134. Compare meaning & Truth: Is the meaning the truth condition?

^{more generalized}
Instrawson: Ryle's levels of activities in which one activity is on higher level than another if it involves the thought of the other's performance. Not only substituted levels of activities concerned with each other for propositions about each other. I.E. has substituted utterances for substituting props. which is a classifying thing to do. But reflection of metalanguages & here is one activity being occasioned by another

~~Is appropriate~~ Is appropriate even without linguistic occasions.
"Truth" is paraphrased by "Fact" & does not function descriptively but demonstratively. ~~It~~ Fastens or ties our assertions onto the world — like a gesture. I.E. "truth" does not describe property or relation of props, or between props ~~to~~ ^{appropriate} ~~world~~ but it indicates — the world or the context.

^{so is ambiguous.}
Since it does not do a describing job metaphysical puzzles arise when you ask descriptively questions about it — What is it about or what ^{entities} things does it relate. is it relating them when no one is asserting the props.

Science is the search for truth → Science is investigation of ~~the~~ the world (with wide gesture) qua scientific. Truth is used even on non-linguistic occasions "What is the truth behind Stalin's refusal to meet Truman?"
→ the fact ^{the thing} that (account for it) what has been going on (that has caused)

Say "The truth of the matter is — ^{usually} what you are about to give an explanation

From the world of our knowledge



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Thomson: Truth:

Philosophical relevance of Tarski's semantic definition of truth.

Semantic definition of truth is such that to assert that

a sentence is ~~that~~ true is logically equivalent to asserting that sentence.

"London is a city" is true $\equiv$ London is a city. ^{Called a T-sentence}

Examplifies correct use of "true". This sentence is itself true.

Black objects that this can't be generalized to a definition of "is true."

What we do understand from

(x)(y)(z) (if x is a sentence & y designates x and if z is got by writing first y and then "is true", then x & z are materially equivalents)

Is not definition of "is true" because "is true" is mentioned & not used. And because materially equivalent is defined in terms of "true".

Tarski's definition ~~in terms~~ of true in terms of logical equivalence is false.

logical equivalence is for example

$43 \in \text{Prime} \equiv \text{any number that divides } 43 \text{ is } 43 \text{ or } 1$

because "43" is mentioned on left side & right but "prime" only on left.

So sentence is consequence of a definition of "prime".

But T-sentences don't repeat 43's analogue on left & right because on left it is only a name & on right is a sentence.

3. "London is a city" is true $\equiv$ London is a city. Tacit & necessary assumption that $\vdash$ is same sentence as $\vdash$. But assertion of

I can't tell us this. Must say this in meta-meta language.

Can't eliminate "true" by definition in ~~no~~ terms of other words in metalanguage because it doesn't occur in metalanguage as equivalent of other expressions but as predicate of sentences in obj. lang.

There can be no general definition of truth because for each T-sentence you need meta-meta language statements that "P" is name of P, i.e. because every T-sentence exemplifies but does not make explicit a rule of designation.

Strawson: Truth:

Bring out features which lead to regarding "true" as metalinguistic.

Comparison of "true" with "yes". Normal use of "yes" is to answer a question or to agree. "Was Jones there?" "Yes" ^{But answering it, same as saying} "Yes" is not talking about sentence "Jones was".

"Yes" demands linguistic occasion.

"That's true" functions same way. Is way of saying Jones was there only after someone else has already said this.

This fact about use of "true" together with prejudice that indicative sentences must be about something which makes people think "That's true" is about a sentence.

Paradox of ^{what I say now is false} ~~the liar~~. There is no linguistic occasion for the utterance of this. It is a pointless remark. Not a statement but a linguistic performance for which there must be an occasion. Indicative clause of which grammatical predicate is "is true" does not ~~make~~ make any statement except to make implicit meta-statement but then "is true" does not play a part in this. "Is true" never has

statement making role. ^{existential} meta statement — "What I am saying now is false." — "I have just made a statement."

"What the policeman said is true." —> "The policeman made a statement." What more than this is involved in this. Additional performance is like repetition of policeman's statement, i.e. confirmation.

To confirm is not to say something additional about his story but must be after his story. "That's true" is device for confirming without repeating. Analysis of "What the policeman said is true" —> "Policeman said something" ^{metastatement}.

"I confirm it" — not descriptive but performatory.

Further, saying
evidence is saying
which is false.

"Is true" does not make a statement in the sense in which for any statement you can ask ~~about~~ "What is it about?" "What does it describe?" "What property does it assert to hold between what entities?" Is prejudice that "is true" should be descriptive that leads to saying it describes sentences.

If you persist in saying it describes something while denying that it is about sentences, ^{it is about} ask metaphysical questions about nature of ^{you} tests for truth etc.

Better not ask "what is criterion of truth?" but "what are grounds for agreement?" — Not less varied than subjects about which agreement can be reached. "True" & "False" signify agreement or disagreement.

Normal uses of "true".

~~"True"~~ "True" is like performative utterance "I confirm it," ^{seems to describe an activity but actually is that activity.}
 "It's true that but" paraphrased by "Although" or
 "I concede that but." Concessive

To show that you have belief

Why the entanglement of "true" with "certain" has arisen.

Above all when doubt has been raised that we use words like "true" "certain", "prove" — Search for truth is search that will set doubts at rest. Philosophical search for general characteristics of truth is search for what is general sets doubts at rest → Absolute
 → Atomic Facts

Spencer: Truth of Empirical Statements

Criticize metalinguistic theory of truth: "True" is not used in non-technical sense in way of semantic definition.

Two theses:

I. Any sentence beginning with "It is true that" does not change its assertive meaning when "It is true that" is omitted.

II. To say that statement is true is to make a statement about a ^{sentence} statement in a ^{specific} ordinary language. Metalinguistic statement ascribing property "true" to object language.

I. is right in saying that to say sentence is true is not to say anything different, but wrong in saying it that it is same as asserting the sentence. II. Right in saying that saying "It is true" is doing something different.

I & II. Are incompatible. For to talk about ^{an} English sentence about maths is different from talking about maths.

Compare "is true" with Real metalinguistic statements, "Il pleuve" is incorrect French, "badly expressed", "means", "ungrammatical", "misfelt".

I & II. If these were translated they would contain the talked about sentences quoted & untranslated. Sentence with "is true" does not contain quoted passage to which "is true" applied because "is true" doesn't apply to anything. Truth is not a property.

Example: Sentential system — rules in metalanguage so that rules determine truth condition for every sentence in obj. lang.
 > or meaning

"Truth conditions" & "Meaning" used synonymously so there is ~~some~~ "true" & only "is" at least should be about sentences.

1. "The monarch is deceased," means in English ^{that} the king is dead.
Contingent metastatement about English usage. In translating would leave quoted passage untranslated.
2. "The monarch is deceased," is true ^{in English} if & only if the king is dead.
3. "The monarch is deceased" means in Eng. that the monarch is deceased.
"is true" "if & only if"

Are these 3 & 4 true contingent metastatements?

yes because they do indicate quoted sentence has some meaning in English or translation into French would yield.

No, because what contingent matter do they state — "means that" form is misleading. Call these degenerate cases.

Similarity of these to defining formulae

"The monarch is ~~decease~~ if & only if the king is dead."
gives no contingent information although statement that it was necessary would, ... i.e. about Eng. usage. Analogy to this defining use was temptation to regard 2 as definition of ~~decease~~ contained part.

"London is a city" is true if & only if London is a city. Is degenerate case of contingent metastatement like 2 & uses "is true if & only if" as synonym for "means that."
That separates "is true" from the context that confers metalinguistic ^{force} on it.

The semantic definition borrows its plausibility from thesis I but is a muddle.

While "true" + "false" seem to be parallel terms for agreeing + disagreeing, "truth" + "falsity or falsehood" are not parallel?
 "Propaganda is the ~~spreading~~ of falsity as if it were truth."
 "You told a falsehood."

"She is always telling us falsehoods, but I want to get at the truth of the matter."
 "That ~~metal~~ ring is a false metal." "False friend."

i.e. "falsehood" is ~~some~~ a particular kind of sentence which doesn't tell the truth i.e. what really happened.

or of a method
 leads you to expect that he will do things which he doesn't.
 i.e. that it is unreliable. But this is only a descriptive word ~~and does not influence~~ by analogy or metaphorical the same sound as logical word.

If I am right about the demonstrative function of "truth" it is not surprising that there is no parallel job of falsity or falsehood.
 There could be no negative ~~or~~ demonstration of pointing away from facts. ... but only that your knowledge of ~~the~~ the truth - what has happened - leads you to disagree with somebody's statement.

You don't say "The falseness or falsity of the matter is"
 but you can say, "The falseness of the matter lay in her ~~misleadingness~~ claim to self-righteousness."

Could possibly paraphrase by "The deluding appearance" - very uncommon.



146. Examine truth conditions & meaning. Truth conditions/sentence as equivalent to its indicative meaning. Now is meaning a metalinguistic concept: "P" means "Q" or "P" means P?

So "falsity" demands a more a linguistic occasion than does "truth".

Difference between function of "truth" and of "this".

"This" ~~is~~ spatial-temporal proximity with speaker.

"Truth" for causal or knowledge connection with speaker, usually not in his immediate vicinity. — i.e. when perhaps speaker is explaining something that has just happened by something he has a business to know happened some time before.....

This distinction between truth and fiction is that between happenings which have causal & knowledge connections with speaker about which he could know either directly or indirectly through someone who had known directly.

Historical note: Making "falsity" completely parallel with "truth" in this demonstrative ~~sem~~ function ~~and~~ perhaps lead Plato into puzzles about "how can you know what is not?"

"Tell it with
you sweetly"

at 10:00 S. of 134000, day is 10:00 S. of 134000

$$T + \frac{1}{T} = \frac{1}{T_0}$$

2.

1st. If separate

... of ...
... "is true" ... designation + ...

... used between two ...
... "is" ... is also really between two
quoted sentences but ... means "that" ...

... such as he said that
... accurate to ...

What does ... mean ...
... is

... darker and deeper than any sea ...
... with a gesture ...

... do you ...
... that ... is the

... U.S. ...
... saying ...

... is going to happen in five ...
... if ...

... don't ...
... is essential ...

... of the ...
... relation ...

... state of ...
... is ...

... is these ...
... is ...

... What is ...
... answer ...

... nation ...
... is ...

... is ...
... is ...

... side ...
... is ...

... is ...
... is ...

$\sigma_1 + \text{H}_2\text{O} + \text{H}^+ = \text{H}_2\text{SiO}_4$

non-terminating f is true ~~the same~~
 its true, so f is true

$\frac{1}{2} \frac{d}{dt} \left(\frac{1}{2} \dot{\theta}^2 + \frac{1}{2} \dot{\phi}^2 \right) = \frac{1}{2} \frac{d}{dt} \left(\frac{1}{2} \dot{\theta}^2 + \frac{1}{2} \dot{\phi}^2 \right)$

at 100 ft. or more

A new street was built, named "Lafayette" + it is still there.

10. do I use "last" here -- not a verb with infinitive, adverb.

which you can ask "Where is it?" Obviously not in a sense
of a point in time. But with a certain

to the fact that the state of affairs is not the same as it was in 1914.

$\frac{d}{dt} \left(\frac{1}{r^2} \right) = -\frac{2}{r^3} \frac{dr}{dt}$

Criticism of Strawson: "is true" is obviously not about a sentence considered as a thing by itself like "is ~~written~~ ^{made of} written in blue ink" or "is ~~isogrammatical~~ ^{to}" but like "means" is about relation between sentences or utterances & some kind of non-verbal experience (or only accidentally verbal) (151)

#2.

Use "fact" on linguistic occasion of doubting or questioning, like "true". Can even paraphrase "That's true" by "That's a fact." - (more commonly done in Am. than in England.) So what do you do when you state a fact (or when you state as a fact something that is not)? -> Stating of a fact is ^{appropriate} response to a non-linguistic occasion ^{not in sense of saying it happened after it did but of denying, predicting, suggesting etc.} > also appropriate to feelings of person speaking which is another kind of non-linguistic occasion which combines with the collapse of chairs or whatever - is the "physical" occasion for speaking. Certain types of sentences are the appropriate response of people in certain frames of mind to certain types of occurrences (The ^{actual particular} ^{states of affairs} occurrences which would justify you in saying "There is a cow in the next room" are numerous - next room might be far or near, large or small, a barn or a bedroom, the cow might be brown or black or stuffed, speaker might be drunk, or having hallucinations or making a bad joke & Maybe this is why you can also say of ~~such~~ remarks that's correct. Meaning it's the right or appropriate thing to say under the circumstances. But for ~~some~~ anything that happens there is not just one appropriate thing to say about it - nor is ~~any~~ any remark exhaustive of it - nor is there only one state of affairs which is the proper occasion for the

None of this should be taken too seriously. When I say ^{state of affairs} response I am not using it in any technical or unusual sense, I hope. If I am, I am subject to philological, but not philosophical correction.

Much more natural to paraphrase "That's true" with "that's right." etc.
Artificial ditto language.

(152)

Stoneman say don't ask with conditions but I say don't ask grounds for agreement (society) but on what occasions is it proper to say this.

utterance of a given remark. Grounds for agreement: right, correct, appropriate

So when you say "That's true" you mean "that's the thing ^{or of the end} I would say under the circumstances." ~~But~~ "True" does then indicate that you have employed the conventional correlation between happenings & utterances correctly. You've said the right thing and so "true" is uttered itself on proper occasions i.e. on appropriate usage occasions. ^{i.e. your utterance of the sentence} "That's true" is as much about your sentence as "There is a cow in the next room" is about a cow — i.e. on certain linguistic occasions — on certain factual occasions. This is, of course, an exaggeration — to balance an exaggeration which was to balance another exaggeration. i.e. semantic theory — which... i.e. coherence theory. Only difference in emphasis that ~~on~~ confirmation function of "that's true" is indirect & through reference to correct usage & language.

What is difference between "occasion" & "about"? Sentences about facts or things — describes them — then what is the describing picturing relation between them etc. Bad. Ask on what ^{factual, a. chival, circumstantial} occasions would I say this?

i.e. in saying "that's true" you are asserting something about the occurrence which the sentence says happened but also are saying that another happening... that is, the utterance of the sentence ~~has~~ occurred in accordance with conventions for use of language or was right or correct.

It's true that Queen Anne is dead. — that as device for indirect quotation can mislead into taking Queen Anne is dead as the unquoted ^{fact} instead of sentence. Is more like He says that Queen Anne is dead, or then "It is sad that Queen Anne is dead" which you choose depends actually on your philosophic prejudice.

I would have done likewise. I had spoken first. I say don't ask with conditions but I say don't ask grounds for agreement (society) but on what occasions is it proper to say this. I say don't ask with conditions but I say don't ask grounds for agreement (society) but on what occasions is it proper to say this. I say don't ask with conditions but I say don't ask grounds for agreement (society) but on what occasions is it proper to say this.

The first part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the
 various methods which have been proposed for the determination of
 the rate of reaction between a radical and a molecule. The most
 common of these is the method of initial rates, in which the
 initial concentration of the radical is varied and the initial rate
 of reaction is measured.

In the case of a reaction between a radical and a molecule, the
 rate of reaction is proportional to the concentration of the radical
 and the concentration of the molecule. The method of initial rates
 is therefore a very simple and convenient method for the
 determination of the rate of reaction. However, it is not always
 possible to vary the initial concentration of the radical without
 varying the initial concentration of the molecule. In such cases,
 the method of initial rates is not applicable. The method of
 half-lives, on the other hand, is applicable to all reactions.
 In this method, the half-life of the radical is determined by
 measuring the time required for the concentration of the radical to
 fall to one-half of its initial value. The half-life is then used to
 calculate the rate of reaction.

The method of half-lives is a very simple and convenient method
 for the determination of the rate of reaction. It is applicable to
 all reactions.

The rate of reaction between a radical and a molecule is a function
 of the concentration of the radical and the concentration of the
 molecule. The rate of reaction is therefore a function of the
 concentration of the radical and the concentration of the molecule.



1. The first part of the report is a general introduction to the subject.

2. The second part is a detailed description of the methods used in the study.

3. The third part is a discussion of the results of the study, which are compared with those of other studies.

4. The fourth part is a conclusion, which summarizes the main findings of the study.

5. The fifth part is a list of references, which includes all the sources used in the study.

6. The sixth part is a list of figures and tables, which are included in the report.

7. The seventh part is a list of appendices, which include additional information related to the study.

8. The eighth part is a list of abbreviations, which are used throughout the report.

9. The ninth part is a list of symbols, which are used in the report.

10. The tenth part is a list of footnotes, which provide additional information on certain points.

11. The eleventh part is a list of references, which are included in the report.

12. The twelfth part is a list of figures and tables, which are included in the report.

β

Phil. Professors - Vincent W. - no. - presented.

$\times A_1 = y \cdot A$

no explanation

$\times A_1 \equiv \cup (x \in y)$
 $\times A_2 \equiv \cup \cdot \text{II}$
 $E \equiv \dots$

... ..

... ..

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Things that are...
 ...of the ... of the ... of the ...
 ... of the ... of the ... of the ...

... to the ... of the ... of the ...
 ... of the ... of the ... of the ...

... of the ... of the ... of the ...

... of the ... of the ... of the ...

Notes
 ... of the ... of the ... of the ...
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 ... of the ... of the ... of the ...

... of the ... of the ... of the ...

... of the ... of the ... of the ...
 ... of the ... of the ... of the ...
 ... of the ... of the ... of the ...

To Supr. Seating - 1st class - 1st class - 1st class
 1st class - 1st class - 1st class - 1st class

Sidley: Antrobus - 1st class - 1st class - 1st class
 - 1st class - 1st class - 1st class - 1st class
 - 1st class - 1st class - 1st class - 1st class

at 22.

$$f(x) = \frac{1}{x^2} = x^{-2} \Rightarrow f'(x) = -2x^{-3} = -\frac{2}{x^3}$$

$\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$

est pour l'usage personnel de la personne à qui il est remis.

Trust

$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & i \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$

$$S^2 = \frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \bar{x})^2$$

4-1-2



Weissmann February 12,

Intuitionist restriction of existence to cases when you can construct it.

To test 91 is not a prime. At same time & by same operation test its truth & falsehood.

But for Fermat's theorem different procedures for falsifying & verifying. May have neither constructed a counterexample nor proved.

Brouwer does not assert third value for props. which are neither true nor false.

Without law of excluded middle cannot order ^{ordinal} real numbers.

Smart Feb. 20.

~~Physics~~ Math. rigor is inapplicable but also useless to physics — in physics don't have to assume mathematical continuity.

Technical Terms:

Do logic of technical terms: Collingwood: Phil. Method 208.
"technical terms are necessary because we get new concepts which we must talk about in new ways."

~~Phil~~ actyle — ~~refile~~ to which these bones belonged — as you learn more about from other sources you could say that some of the bones did not belong to.
Is ~~is~~ used more like a word such a 'cow' or 'rhinoceros' —
Is name for addition to your experience.

Real technical term

Waismann: January 28:

Brouwer:

Indirect proof of existence: Assume ~~contradictory~~ ^{of the} negation,
derive contradiction $\therefore$ prove theorem

Unproved Mathematical Theorems:

Fermat's Theorem:

$x^2 + y^2 = z^2$ $\frac{0}{0}$ infinite number of integers satisfy this

$x^3 + y^3 = z^3$

$x^n + y^n = z^n$

Proved that it is

Impossible to solve this for $n > 2$. ②

Given even number, it is always possible to represent ②③④⑤
it as sum of two primes.

If you could prove that Fermat's theorem leads to contradiction,
then $\exists x, y, z$ such $x^n + y^n = z^n$.
Intuitionists deny the existence of these } proved
until actual construction is given.

If you haven't proved nor refuted it can't say
law of excluded applies. May be completely
unsolvable.

Number theory:

Any real number is always either ≤ 0 , or > 0 . Are numbers
which are neither.

Limits of sequence

$$1 - a_n < \varepsilon \text{ if } n > N \quad \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{n}{n+1} = 1$$

Sequence goes on increasing

1. Ferm. is right

2. If Fermat's theorem is wrong, $(\exists v) \nexists$ such v is smallest number for which it doesn't hold.

$$\left(-\frac{1}{2}\right)^{a_1} + \left(-\frac{1}{2}\right)^{a_2} + \left(-\frac{1}{2}\right)^{a_3} \dots a_1, a_2, a_3 \text{ are integers which don't violate Fermat's theorem.}$$


$$-\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} - \frac{1}{8}$$

Sequence tends toward 0 in both directions

If sequence ends i.e. $(\exists v)$ sequence will end at v , & v will be limit of sequence & all follow'g numbers $\left(-\frac{1}{2}\right)^{2v}$

You don't know what this sequence does

Can construct pt. $P(x, y)$ such that you can't say it lies inside, on ~~the~~ circumference or outside of the square.



Can construct st. line so that you can't say it lies on, || or intersects given line.

Brouwer is not advocating three valued logic

If Goldbach's theorem were assumed as an axiom then could bifurcate arithmetic if you could show consistency of arithmetic & Goldbach's theorem.

Would not say that a particular problem was undecidable or ~~undecidable~~ ^{undecidable}. If we knew ^{new} undecidable then could ^{new} axiom system & it, then it would be true.
 (if it were independent from other axioms, ^{is undecidable on those axioms})
 Then if you considered undecidability as truth or falsehood, could say G's theorem was true.

January 23.

Horrible Example: 171.



Smart: Theories: why from limited number of observations can
logical problem of induction ^{go to generalities.} occur at common sense
level — in people being surprised. If there were
not uniformities people couldn't be surprised.

At scientific stage) $v \propto t^2$ law
sort of law is it? → Galileo did not pay attention
to the color of balls dropped, ... i.e. already knew
something about regularities.

Bacon was talking about common sense.

Kant " " " science.

Primary sort of experiment: Relation between
two fundamental magnitudes. Law is not just
description of facts but predicts for any values of S & T .
Experimental results don't come out exactly in neat
equations. Simple law predicts better because:

because of distinction between empirical (too many constants)
& ordinary laws. If you found regularity didn't
hold you $\rightarrow$ 1. disturbing circumstances, 2. ^{Antecedent reason to expect simple relation between space & time}
law which is only a ~~generalization~~ description — only
which summarizes positions of planets. No antecedent
reason to suppose that there should be simple relations.
Sociological or philological "laws" are accidental in
this sense.

Distinction between fundamental & derived laws.

Measurement:

"Measuring is having look at pointer readers." ^{Seem} All the same. No, they are very different. Logic of measurement. When measure with ruler, could make your own ruler without making first other ^{measuring} instruments. Thermometer would require first a ruler. Is on higher level. Don't find laws by measuring & appropriate equipment but invent instruments & laws.

Length: ^{serial} has order $(x)(y) (x \leq y)$.

(Can't put shapes in an order.

"longer than" transitive asymmetrical.

"Scratches" ^{has} order

"Metricalness" systems equal $\rightarrow$ (capable of ^{like putting end to end pieces of wood.} addition so as to form $\neq$ not equal) Logical

grammar of arithmetic addition is like that of wood being put end to end. ^{unless pieces of wood were magnetic.}

$$A + B = B + A$$

$$(A, B) (\exists C) \neq A + B = C$$

Status of these: analytic concepts but wouldn't be true if you ~~are~~ certain things about the world were not true,

Weismann January 21.

Intuitionism:

Brouwer
~~Brouwer~~ & Heyl Weyl

$$f(x) = x^n + a_1 x^{n-1} + a_{n-1} x + a_n.$$

Is called reducible if it can be factored.

Definition is void until it can be decided without there is for given equation a method of reduction.

Real number series: for any a & b $a \leq b$.

Criticism such definition is meaningless of deciding which.

Calculus: a $\overline{b}$

for any interval ^{from} is pt. of accumlq. Arbitrary range in which it lies contains infinitely many pts of the set.

Proof: logical existence of sequence of concentric ^{nest} series series. But no means of deciding.

Assumption: can always find out looking at interval whether it has infinite no. of members of series in it.

Makes irrational number non-existent.

Definition must carry means of constructing its object.

Law of excluded-middle does not apply in infinite cases.

"Intuitionism" borrowed from Bergson.

Relation between math. & math. language.

~~Math~~ Math. is independent of language — rests on activity of constructing, (1)
^{from} Only language used for communication of real math. thought is logic the regulator. Math. fact is independent of its expression in logic or algebra — are but language into ~~to~~ one translates math. thought.

Math. logic has to do with the language in which you write math but not math itself. So

~~Law of~~ Don't have to admit logical prin. of excluded middles (2)

Criticisms of the Way + the Truth!

I. ~~There is not a lot of~~ From usage you can partly see logical relations among concepts but also will be lead to think these are logical relations which are of empirical origin i.e. when you don't have a particular ~~kind~~ kind of idiom because the appropriate situation doesn't turn up frequently enough in this world.

Must guard against this

II. Emphasis on occasions of utterance, makes tautologies, statements that are always true, seem unimportant.

Flaw Personal Identity Jan. 29

Puzzle case: when you know normal meaning ~~of~~ use of
term, in an unusual case don't know whether it is
applicable. Question of meaning. Don't have enough
facts but *L v O. Co. v.*

Solution should tell why question raised by puzzle case is pseudo case. Or invent a ^{look} test ^{condition} that will unambiguously ^{decide whether to call it same person or not,} apply. Puzzle cases not relevant as facts but only in proper way to describe them if they did occur. _{only applied to,}

Locke: "Same" is ambiguous. Not unity of substance
Special problems about "same" as applied to people.

Locke: "Same person" x at T_2 is $\frac{2}{3}$ $G \neq y$ at T_1 , $\frac{1}{3}$
 x can be $\frac{1}{3}$ T_2 $\frac{2}{3}$ y at time 11

Locke was wrong about meaning of "person":
thinking, intelligent being can consider itself as
the same in different places.

Use of "person" — do not have to be intelligent or introspective. → Only meet people so people are necessarily of ~~the~~ of human size.

1. Person cannot be descriptively defined because its use is taught by ostensive definition.
 Some things — (given by " " " ")
 is language is to be about world.

Usage of "people": people are what you meet.

Objection: has substituted "people" for persons.

2. Lockian definition / allow people to "inhabit" human bodies. People are what we meet.
We don't meet their containers.
3. In ordinary use it is a necessary truth that people have human bodies.
4. People are not necessarily reasonable & reflective. "Disembodiment" is not something that happens to people. Like being hornier.

January 27

"Disembodied person" is ungrammatical because self-contradictory. Paradoxical to bring out meaning. But you suggest different tests or activities - different line of ^{investigation} ~~activity~~ than when you say "person". "Disembodied Person" is not a sort of person like cultured person. Usage is so different that ^{they} it doesn't have same logical lessons. Language can grow & get new uses & applications naturally - not just by deliberate introducing of new terms.

Try to give descriptive analyses.

Should tell what you mean by "person" by ostensive definition.

Source of Locke's confusion ^{distinction} of "same man" & "same person".

1. Person - psychological Man - physical ^{only a} ~~substance~~ ^{substance}.

Points:

1. Same person is "equivocal".
Does admit of "more or less".
Doesn't as "..."
- Is the man who committed the crime the same person as the butcher?
Does he have the same personality?

Grice: January 23

Meaning:

Pierre:

If x represents y it is because x has some feature of y + is to somebody.

Theories about meaning:

Causal theory: meaning in terms of a tendency to produce some response. Russell, Behavioristic — i.e. tendency on appearance v. certain sign to salivate.

Intention of user?

Communication

Capacity to give rules for use of sign in question

Word has meaning for you if you can give possible substitutes for it.

Newell-Smith:

Evidence means more body of propositions — can be direct evidence. If you formalize everything you get meanings only a propositions — coherent theory

Thinking in presence: — describing something that

is in front of you. How do you describe something

is in front of you?

Whenever you substitute an image for thing you have

another symbol & haven't applied symbolic knowledge. But of a different sort — they symbolize by

Images have ^{space} of their own. Because compare

each other.

2. 190.

Feb Jan 27

Point of saying "He is quite a different person" is when
you know he is ^{sense} same person.

Double usage of "pain"
Does it make sense to say "I feel it" I don't say "I know a pain" or "that I have one."
"Pain" also used for something beyond the feeling as a
diagnosis - rheumatism!

"We must be aware of universals" - then gives reason
"must mean its logical
"aware" makes it psychological.
Logical argument for proving empirical conclusion.

Rule goes too far in ~~the~~ the desire to say there are not
the processes of trying & solving to say that there
is no process of inferring. We can say how long it took
us to infer something.

Peter Walter Barry Bantay A.C.

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B:43 Mond.