

Culture of Publicity

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IN CONGRESS, JULY 4, 1776.

THE UNANIMOUS DECLARATION OF THE THIRTEEN UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

WHEN in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.—We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,—That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.—Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world.—He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good.—He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his Assent

should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them.—He has refused to pass other Laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless these people would relinquish the right of Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only.—He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their public Records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures.—For—He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people.—He has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected; whereby the Legislative powers, incapable of Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their exercise; the State remaining in the mean time exposed to all the dangers of invasion from without, and convulsions within.—He has endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither, and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.—He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary powers.—He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.—He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance.—He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislatures.—He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power.—He has combined with others to subject us to a Jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation:—For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us:—For protecting them, by a mock Trial, from punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States:—For cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world:—For imposing Taxes on us without our Consent:—For depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury:—For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences:—For abolishing the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province, establishing therein an Arbitrary government, and enlarging its Boundaries so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these Colonies:—For taking away our Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws, and altering fundamentally the Forms of our Governments: —For suspending our own Legislatures and declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever.—He has abdicated Government

here, by declaring us out of his Protection and waging War against us.—He has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people.—He is at this time transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty & perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized nation.—He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country, to become the executioners of their friends and Brethren, or to fall themselves by their Hands.—He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions. In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people. Nor have We been wanting in attentions to our Brittish brethren. We have warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends.—

WE, THEREFORE, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do.--And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.

Lecture VI

Pragmatism's Conception of Truth

When Clerk Maxwell was a child it is written that he had a mania for having everything explained to him, and that when people put him off with vague verbal accounts of any phenomenon he would interrupt them impatiently by saying, "Yes; but I want you to tell me the *particular* go of it!" Had his question been about truth, only a pragmatist could have told him the particular go of it. I believe that our contemporary pragmatists, especially Messrs. Schiller and Dewey, have given the only tenable account of this subject. It is a very ticklish subject, sending subtle rootlets into all kinds of cran-nies, and hard to treat in the sketchy way that alone befits a public lecture. But the Schiller-Dewey view of truth has been so ferociously attacked by rationalistic philosophers, and so abominably misunderstood, that here, if anywhere, is the point where a clear and simple statement should be made.

I fully expect to see the pragmatist view of truth run through the classic stages of a theory's career. First, you know, a new theory is attacked as absurd; then it is admitted to be true, but obvious and insignificant; finally it is seen to be so important that its adversaries claim that they themselves discovered it. Our doctrine of truth is at present in the first of these three stages, with symptoms of the second stage having begun in certain quarters. I wish that

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this lecture might help it beyond the first stage in the eyes of many of you.

Truth, as any dictionary will tell you, is a property of certain of our ideas. It means their 'agreement,' as falsity means their disagreement, with 'reality.' Pragmatists and intellectualists both accept this definition as a matter of course. They begin to quarrel only after the question is raised as to what may precisely be meant by the term 'agreement,' and what by the term 'reality,' when reality is taken as something for our ideas to agree with.

In answering these questions the pragmatists are more analytic and painstaking, the intellectualists more offhand and irreflective. The popular notion is that a true idea must copy its reality. Like other popular views, this one follows the analogy of the most usual experience. Our true ideas of sensible things do indeed copy them. Shut your eyes and think of yonder clock on the wall, and you get just such a true picture or copy of its dial. But your idea of its 'works' (unless you are a clock-maker) is much less of a copy, yet it passes muster, for it in no way clashes with the reality. Even tho it should shrink to the mere word 'works,' that word still serves you truly; and when you speak of the 'time-keeping function' of the clock, or of its spring's 'elasticity,' it is hard to see exactly what your ideas can copy.

You perceive that there is a problem here. Where our ideas cannot copy definitely their object, what does agreement with that object mean? Some idealists seem to say that they are true whenever they are what God means that we ought to think about that object. Others hold the copy-view all through, and speak as if our ideas possessed truth just in proportion as they approach to being copies of the Absolute's eternal way of thinking.

These views, you see, invite pragmatistic discussion. But the great assumption of the intellectualists is that truth means essentially an inert static relation. When you've got your true idea of anything, there's an end of the matter. You're in possession; you *know*; you have fulfilled your thinking destiny. You are where you ought to be mentally; you have obeyed your categorical imperative; and nothing more need follow on that climax of your rational destiny. Epistemologically you are in stable equilibrium.

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Pragmatism, on the other hand, asks its usual question. "Grant an idea or belief to be true," it says, "what concrete difference will its being true make in anyone's actual life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth's cash-value in experiential terms?"

The moment pragmatism asks this question, it sees the answer: True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot. That is the practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known-as.

This thesis is what I have to defend. The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth *happens* to an idea. It *becomes* true, is *made* true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its *verifi-cation*. Its validity is the process of its *valid-ation*..

But what do the words verification and validation themselves pragmatically mean? They again signify certain practical consequences of the verified and validated idea. It is hard to find any one phrase that characterizes these consequences better than the ordinary agreement-formula—just such consequences being what we have in mind whenever we say that our ideas 'agree' with reality. They lead us, namely, through the acts and other ideas which they instigate, into or up to, or towards, other parts of experience with which we feel all the while—such feeling being among our potentialities—that the original ideas remain in agreement. The connexions and transitions come to us from point to point as being progressive, harmonious, satisfactory. This function of agreeable leading is what we mean by an idea's verification. Such an account is vague and it sounds at first quite trivial, but it has results which it will take the rest of my hour to explain.

Let me begin by reminding you of the fact that the possession of true thoughts means everywhere the possession of invaluable instruments of action; and that our duty to gain truth, so far from being a blank command from out of the blue, or a 'stunt' self-imposed by our intellect, can account for itself by excellent practical reasons.

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The importance to human life of having true beliefs about matters of fact is a thing too notorious. We live in a world of realities that can be infinitely useful or infinitely harmful. Ideas that tell us which of them to expect count as the true ideas in all this primary sphere of verification, and the pursuit of such ideas is a primary human duty. The possession of truth, so far from being here an end in itself, is only a preliminary means towards other vital satisfactions. If I am lost in the woods and starved, and find what looks like a cow-path, it is of the utmost importance that I should think of a human habitation at the end of it, for if I do so and follow it, I save myself. The true thought is useful here because the house which is its object is useful. The practical value of true ideas is thus primarily derived from the practical importance of their objects to us. Their objects are, indeed, not important at all times. I may on another occasion have no use for the house; and then my idea of it, however verifiable, will be practically irrelevant, and had better remain latent. Yet since almost any object may some day become temporarily important, the advantage of having a general stock of *extra* truths, of ideas that shall be true of merely possible situations, is obvious. We store such extra truths away in our memories, and with the overflow we fill our books of reference. Whenever such an extra truth becomes practically relevant to one of our emergencies, it passes from cold-storage to do work in the world, and our belief in it grows active. You can say of it then either that 'it is useful because it is true' or that 'it is true because it is useful.' Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing, namely that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified. True is the name for whatever idea starts the verification-process, useful is the name for its completed function in experience. True ideas would never have been singled out as such, would never have acquired a class-name, least of all a name suggesting value, unless they had been useful from the outset in this way.

From this simple cue pragmatism gets her general notion of truth as something essentially bound up with the way in which one moment in our experience may lead us towards other moments which it will be worth while to have been led to. Primarily, and on the common-sense level, the truth of a state of mind means this function of *a leading that is worth while*. When a moment in our

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experience, of any kind whatever, inspires us with a thought that is true, that means that sooner or later we dip by that thought's guidance into the particulars of experience again and make advantageous connexion with them. This is a vague enough statement, but I beg you to retain it, for it is essential.

Our experience meanwhile is all shot through with regularities. One bit of it can warn us to get ready for another bit, can 'intend' or be 'significant of' that remoter object. The object's advent is the significance's verification. Truth, in these cases, meaning nothing but eventual verification, is manifestly incompatible with waywardness on our part. Woe to him whose beliefs play fast and loose with the order which realities follow in his experience: they will lead him nowhere or else make false connexions.

By 'realities' or 'objects' here, we mean either things of common sense, sensibly present, or else common-sense relations, such as dates, places, distances, kinds, activities. Following our mental image of a house along the cow-path, we actually come to see the house; we get the image's full verification. *Such simply and fully verified leadings are certainly the originals and prototypes of the truth-process.* Experience offers indeed other forms of truth-process, but they are all conceivable as being primary verifications arrested, multiplied or substituted one for another.

Take, for instance, yonder object on the wall. You and I consider it to be a 'clock,' altho no one of us has seen the hidden works that make it one. We let our notion pass for true without attempting to verify. If truths mean verification-process essentially, ought we then to call such unverified truths as this abortive? No, for they form the overwhelmingly large number of the truths we live by. Indirect as well as direct verifications pass muster. Where circumstantial evidence is sufficient, we can go without eye-witnessing. Just as we here assume Japan to exist without ever having been there, because it *works* to do so, everything we know conspiring with the belief, and nothing interfering, so we assume that thing to be a clock. We use it as a clock, regulating the length of our lecture by it. The verification of the assumption here means its leading to no frustration or contradiction. *Verifiability* of wheels and weights and pendulum is as good as verification. For one truth-

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process completed there are a million in our lives that function in this state of nascency. They turn us *towards* direct verification; lead us into the *surroundings* of the objects they envisage; and then, if everything runs on harmoniously, we are so sure that verification is possible that we omit it, and are usually justified by all that happens.

Truth lives, in fact, for the most part on a credit system. Our thoughts and beliefs 'pass,' so long as nothing challenges them, just as bank-notes pass so long as nobody refuses them. But this all points to direct face-to-face verifications somewhere, without which the fabric of truth collapses like a financial system with no cash-basis whatever. You accept my verification of one thing, I yours of another. We trade on each other's truth. But beliefs verified concretely by *somebody* are the posts of the whole superstructure.

Another great reason—beside economy of time—for waiving complete verification in the usual business of life is that all things exist in kinds and not singly. Our world is found once for all to have that peculiarity. So that when we have once directly verified our ideas about one specimen of a kind, we consider ourselves free to apply them to other specimens without verification. A mind that habitually discerns the kind of thing before it, and acts by the law of the kind immediately, without pausing to verify, will be a 'true' mind in ninety-nine out of a hundred emergencies, proved so by its conduct fitting everything it meets, and getting no refutation.

Indirectly or only potentially verifying processes may thus be true as well as full verification-processes. They work as true processes would work, give us the same advantages, and claim our recognition for the same reasons. All this on the common-sense level of matters of fact, which we are alone considering.

But matters of fact are not our only stock in trade. *Relations among purely mental ideas* form another sphere where true and false beliefs obtain, and here the beliefs are absolute, or unconditional. 'When they are true they bear the name either of definitions or of principles. It is either a principle or a definition that 1 and 1 make 2, that 2 and 1 make 3, and so on; that white differs less from gray than it does from black; that when the cause begins to act the

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effect also commences. Such propositions hold of all possible 'ones,' of all conceivable 'whites' and 'grays' and 'causes.' The objects here are mental objects. Their relations are perceptually obvious at a glance, and no sense-verification is necessary. Moreover, once true, always true, of those same mental objects. Truth here has an 'eternal' character. If you can find a concrete thing anywhere that is 'one' or 'white' or 'gray,' or an 'effect,' then your principles will everlastingly apply to it. It is but a case of ascertaining the kind, and then applying the law of its kind to the particular object. You are sure to get truth if you can but name the kind rightly, for your mental relations hold good of everything of that kind without exception. If you then, nevertheless, failed to get truth concretely, you would say that you had classed your real objects wrongly.

In this realm of mental relations, truth again is an affair of leading. We relate one abstract idea with another, framing in the end great systems of logical and mathematical truth, under the respective terms of which the sensible facts of experience eventually arrange themselves, so that our eternal truths hold good of realities also. This marriage of fact and theory is endlessly fertile. What we say is here already true in advance of special verification, *if we have subsumed our objects rightly*. Our ready-made ideal framework for all sorts of possible objects follows from the very structure of our thinking. We can no more play fast and loose with these abstract relations than we can do so with our sense-experiences. They coerce us; we must treat them consistently, whether or not we like the results. The rules of addition apply to our debts as rigorously as to our assets. The hundredth decimal of π , the ratio of the circumference to its diameter, is predetermined ideally now, tho no one may have computed it. If we should ever need the figure in our dealings with an actual circle we should need to have it given rightly, calculated by the usual rules; for it is the same kind of truth that those rules elsewhere calculate.

Between the coercions of the sensible order and those of the ideal order, our mind is thus wedged tightly. Our ideas must agree with realities, be such realities concrete, or abstract, be they facts or be they principles, under penalty of endless inconsistency and frustration.

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So far, intellectualists can raise no protest. They can only say that we have barely touched the skin of the matter.

Realities mean, then, either concrete facts, or abstract kinds of things and relations perceived intuitively between them. They furthermore and thirdly mean, as things that new ideas of ours must no less take account of, the whole body of other truths already in our possession. But what now does 'agreement' with such three-fold realities mean?—to use again the definition that is current.

Here it is that pragmatism and intellectualism begin to part company. Primarily, no doubt, to agree means to copy, but we saw that the mere word 'clock' would do instead of a mental picture of its works, and that of many realities our ideas can only be symbols and not copies. 'Past time,' 'power,' 'spontaneity'—how can our mind copy such realities?

To 'agree' in the widest sense with a reality, *can only mean to be guided either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put into such working touch with it as to handle either it or something connected with it better than if we disagreed.* Better either intellectually or practically! And often agreement will only mean the negative fact that nothing contradictory from the quarter of that reality comes to interfere with the way in which our ideas guide us elsewhere. To copy a reality is, indeed, one very important way of agreeing with it, but it is far from being essential. The essential thing is the process of being guided. Any idea that helps us to *deal*, whether practically or intellectually, with either the reality or its belongings, that doesn't entangle our progress in frustrations, that *fits*, in fact, and adapts our life to the reality's whole setting, will agree sufficiently to meet the requirement. It will hold true of that reality.

Thus, *names* are just as 'true' or 'false' as definite mental pictures are. They set up similar verification-processes, and lead to fully equivalent practical results.

All human thinking gets discursified; we exchange ideas; we lend and borrow verifications, get them from one another by means of social intercourse. All truth thus gets verbally built out, stored up, and made available for everyone. Hence, we must *talk* consistently just as we must *think* consistently: for both in talk and

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thought we deal with kinds. Names are arbitrary, but once understood they must be kept to. We mustn't now call Abel 'Cain' or Cain 'Abel.' If we do, we ungear ourselves from the whole book of Genesis, and from all its connexions with the universe of speech and fact down to the present time. We throw ourselves out of whatever truth that entire system of speech and fact may embody.

The overwhelming majority of our true ideas admit of no direct or face-to-face verification—those of past history, for example, as of Cain and Abel. The stream of time can be remounted only verbally, or verified indirectly by the present prolongations or effects of what the past harbored. Yet if they agree with these verbalities and effects, we can know that our ideas of the past are true. *As true as past time itself was*, so true was Julius Caesar, so true were antediluvian monsters, all in their proper dates and settings. That past time itself was is guaranteed by its coherence with everything that's present. True as the present is, the past was also.

Agreement thus turns out to be essentially an affair of leading—leading that is useful because it is into quarters that contain objects that are important. True ideas lead us into useful verbal and conceptual quarters as well as directly up to useful sensible termini. They lead to consistency, stability and flowing human intercourse. They lead away from excentricity and isolation, from foiled and barren thinking. The untrammelled flowing of the leading-process, its general freedom from clash and contradiction, passes for its indirect verification; but all roads lead to Rome, and in the end and eventually, all true processes must lead to the face of directly verifying sensible experiences somewhere, which somebody's ideas have copied.

Such is the large loose way in which the pragmatist interprets the word agreement. He treats it altogether practically. He lets it cover any process of conduction from a present idea to a future terminus, provided only it run prosperously. It is only thus that 'scientific' ideas, flying as they do beyond common sense, can be said to agree with their realities. It is, as I have already said, *as if* reality were made of ether, atoms or electrons, but we mustn't think so literally. The term 'energy' doesn't even pretend to stand for anything 'objective.' It is only a way of measuring the surface of phenomena so as to string their changes on a simple formula.

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Yet in the choice of these man-made formulas we cannot be capricious with impunity any more than we can be capricious on the common-sense practical level. We must find a theory that will *work*; and that means something extremely difficult; for our theory must mediate between all previous truths and certain new experiences. It must derange common sense and previous belief as little as possible, and it must lead to some sensible terminus or other that can be verified exactly. To 'work' means both these things; and the squeeze is so tight that there is little loose play for any hypothesis. Our theories are wedged and controlled as nothing else is. Yet sometimes alternative theoretic formulas are equally compatible with all the truths we know, and then we choose between them for subjective reasons. We choose the kind of theory to which we are already partial; we follow 'elegance' or 'economy.' Clerk Maxwell somewhere says it would be "poor scientific taste" to choose the more complicated of two equally well-evidenced conceptions; and you will all agree with him. Truth in science is what gives us the maximum possible sum of satisfactions, taste included, but consistency both with previous truth and with novel fact is always the most imperious claimant.

I have led you through a very sandy desert. But now, if I may be allowed so vulgar an expression, we begin to taste the milk in the cocoanut. Our rationalist critics here discharge their batteries upon us, and to reply to them will take us out from all this dryness into full sight of a momentous philosophical alternative.

Our account of truth is an account of truths in the plural, of processes of leading, realized *in rebus*, and having only this quality in common, that they *pay*. They pay by guiding us into or towards some part of a system that dips at numerous points into sense-percepts, which we may copy mentally or not, but with which at any rate we are now in the kind of commerce vaguely designated as verification. Truth for us is simply a collective name for verification-processes, just as health, wealth, strength, etc., are names for other processes connected with life, and also pursued because it pays to pursue them. Truth is made, just as health, wealth and strength are made, in the course of experience.

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Here rationalism is instantaneously up in arms against us. I can imagine a rationalist to talk as follows:

"Truth is not made," he will say; "it absolutely obtains, being a unique relation that does not wait upon any process, but shoots straight over the head of experience, and hits its reality every time. Our belief that yon thing on the wall is a clock is true already, altho no one in the whole history of the world should verify it. The bare quality of standing in that transcendent relation is what makes any thought true that possesses it, whether or not there be verification. You pragmatists put the cart before the horse in making truth's being reside in verification-processes. These are merely signs of its being, merely our lame ways of ascertaining after the fact, which of our ideas already has possessed the wondrous quality. The quality itself is timeless, like all essences and natures. Thoughts partake of it directly, as they partake of falsity or of irrelevancy. It can't be analyzed away into pragmatic consequences."

The whole plausibility of this rationalist tirade is due to the fact to which we have already paid so much attention. In our world, namely, abounding as it does in things of similar kinds and similarly associated, one verification serves for others of its kind, and one great use of knowing things is to be led not so much to them as to their associates, especially to human talk about them. The quality of truth, obtaining *ante rem*, pragmatically means, then, the fact that in such a world innumerable ideas work better by their indirect or possible than by their direct and actual verification. Truth *ante rem* means only verifiability, then; or else it is a case of the stock rationalist trick of treating the *name* of a concrete phenomenal reality as an independent prior entity, and placing it behind the reality as its explanation. Professor Mach quotes somewhere an epigram of Lessing's:

Sagt Hänschen Schlau zu Vetter Fritz,
"Wie kommt es, Vetter Fritzen,
Dass grad' die Reichsten in der Welt,
Das meiste Geld besitzen?"

Hänschen Schlau here treats the principle 'wealth' as something distinct from the facts denoted by the man's being rich. It antedates

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them; the facts become only a sort of secondary coincidence with the rich man's essential nature.

In the case of 'wealth' we all see the fallacy. We know that wealth is but a name for concrete processes that certain men's lives play a part in, and not a natural excellence found in Messrs. Rockefeller and Carnegie, but not in the rest of us.

Like wealth, health also lives in *rebus*. It is a name for processes, as digestion, circulation, sleep, etc., that go on happily, tho in this instance we are more inclined to think of it as a principle and to say the man digests and sleeps so well *because* he is so healthy.

With 'strength' we are, I think, more rationalistic still, and decidedly inclined to treat it as an excellence pre-existing in the man and explanatory of the herculean performances of his muscles.

With 'truth' most people go over the border entirely, and treat the rationalistic account as self-evident. But really all these words in *th* are exactly similar. Truth exists *ante rem* just as much and as little as the other things do.

The scholastics, following Aristotle, made much of the distinction between habit and act. Health in *actu* means, among other things, good sleeping and digesting. But a healthy man need not always be sleeping, or always digesting, any more than a wealthy man need be always handling money, or a strong man always lifting weights. All such qualities sink to the status of 'habits' between their times of exercise; and similarly truth becomes a habit of certain of our ideas and beliefs in their intervals of rest from their verifying activities. But those activities are the root of the whole matter, and the condition of there being any habit to exist in the intervals.

|| 'The true,' to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the whole of course; for what meets expediently all the experience in sight won't necessarily meet all farther experiences equally satisfactorily. Experience, as we know, has ways of *boiling over*, and making us correct our present formulas.

The 'absolutely' true, meaning what no farther experience will ever alter, is that ideal vanishing-point towards which we imagine

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that all our temporary truths will some day converge. It runs on all fours with the perfectly wise man, and with the absolutely complete experience; and, if these ideals are ever realized, they will all be realized together. Meanwhile we have to live to-day by what truth we can get to-day, and be ready to-morrow to call it falsehood. Ptolemaic astronomy, euclidean space, aristotelian logic, scholastic metaphysics, were expedient for centuries, but human experience has boiled over those limits, and we now call these things only relatively true, or true within those borders of experience. 'Absolutely' they are false; for we know that those limits were casual, and might have been transcended by past theorists just as they are by present thinkers.

When new experiences lead to retrospective judgments, using the past tense, what these judgments utter *was* true, even tho no past thinker had been led there. We live forwards, a Danish thinker has said, but we understand backwards. The present sheds a backward light on the world's previous processes. They may have been truth-processes for the actors in them. They are not so for one who knows the later revelations of the story.

This regulative notion of a potential better truth to be established later, possibly to be established some day absolutely, and having powers of retroactive legislation, turns its face, like all pragmatist notions, towards concreteness of fact, and towards the future. Like the half-truths, the absolute truth will have to be *made*, made as a relation incidental to the growth of a mass of verification-experience, to which the half-true ideas are all along contributing their quota.

I have already insisted on the fact that truth is made largely out of previous truths. Men's beliefs at any time are so much experience *funded*. But the beliefs are themselves parts of the sum total of the world's experience, and become matter, therefore, for the next day's funding operations. So far as reality means experienceable reality, both it and the truths men gain about it are everlastingly in process of mutation—mutation towards a definite goal, it may be—but still mutation.

Mathematicians can solve problems with two variables. On the Newtonian theory, for instance, acceleration varies with distance,

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but distance also varies with acceleration. In the realm of truth-processes facts come independently and determine our beliefs provisionally. But these beliefs make us act, and as fast as they do so, they bring into sight or into existence new facts which re-determine the beliefs accordingly. So the whole coil and ball of truth, as it rolls up, is the product of a double influence. Truths emerge from facts; but they dip forward into facts again and add to them; which facts again create or reveal new truth (the word is indifferent) and so on indefinitely. The 'facts' themselves meanwhile are not true. They simply are. Truth is the function of the beliefs that start and terminate among them.

The case is like a snowball's growth, due as it is to the distribution of the snow on the one hand, and to the successive pushes of the boys on the other, with these factors co-determining each other incessantly.

The most fateful point of difference between being a rationalist and being a pragmatist is now fully in sight. Experience is in mutation, and our psychological ascertainments of truth are in mutation—so much rationalism will allow; but never that either reality itself or truth itself is mutable. Reality stands complete and ready-made from all eternity, rationalism insists, and the agreement of our ideas with it is that unique unanalyzable virtue in them of which she has already told us. As that intrinsic excellence, their truth has nothing to do with our experiences. It adds nothing to the content of experience. It makes no difference to reality itself; it is supervenient, inert, static, a reflexion merely. It doesn't exist, it holds or obtains, it belongs to another dimension from that of either facts or fact-relations, belongs, in short, to the epistemological dimension—and with that big word rationalism closes the discussion.

Thus, just as pragmatism faces forward to the future, so does rationalism here again face backward to a past eternity. True to her inveterate habit, rationalism reverts to 'principles,' and thinks that when an abstraction once is named, we own an oracular solution.

The tremendous pregnancy in the way of consequences for life of this radical difference of outlook will only become apparent in

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my later lectures. I wish meanwhile to close this lecture by showing that rationalism's sublimity does not save it from inanity.

When, namely, you ask rationalists, instead of accusing pragmatism of desecrating the notion of truth, to define it themselves by saying exactly what *they* understand by it, the only positive attempts I can think of are these two:

1. "Truth is just the system of propositions which have an unconditional claim to be recognized as valid."¹

2. Truth is a name for all those judgments which we find ourselves under obligation to make by a kind of imperative duty.²

The first thing that strikes one in such definitions is their unutterable triviality. They are absolutely true, of course, but absolutely insignificant until you handle them pragmatically. What do you mean by 'claim' here, and what do you mean by 'duty'? As summary names for the concrete reasons why thinking in true ways is overwhelmingly expedient and good for mortal men, it is all right to talk of claims on reality's part to be agreed with, and of obligations on our part to agree. We feel both the claims and the obligations, and we feel them for just those reasons.

But the rationalists who talk of claim and obligation *expressly say that they have nothing to do with our practical interests or personal reasons*. Our reasons for agreeing are psychological facts, they say, relative to each thinker, and to the accidents of his life. They are his evidence merely, they are no part of the life of truth itself. That life transacts itself in a purely logical or epistemological, as distinguished from a psychological, dimension, and its claims antedate and exceed all personal motivations whatsoever. The neither man nor God should ever ascertain truth, the word would still have to be defined as that which *ought* to be ascertained and recognized.

There never was a more exquisite example of an idea abstracted from the concretes of experience and then used to oppose and negate what it was abstracted from.

¹ A. E. Taylor, *Philosophical Review*, vol. xiv, p. 288.

² H. Rickert, *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis*, chapter on 'Die Urtheilsmothwendigkeit.'

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Philosophy and common life abound in similar instances. The 'sentimentalist fallacy' is to shed tears over abstract justice and generosity, beauty, etc., and never to know these qualities when you meet them in the street, because there the circumstances make them vulgar. Thus I read in the privately printed biography of an eminently rationalistic mind: "It was strange that with such admiration for beauty in the abstract, my brother had no enthusiasm for fine architecture, for beautiful painting, or for flowers." And in almost the last philosophic work I have read, I find such passages as the following: "Justice is ideal, solely ideal. Reason conceives that it ought to exist, but experience shows that it cannot. . . . Truth, which ought to be, cannot be. . . . Reason is deformed by experience. As soon as reason enters experience, it becomes contrary to reason."

The rationalist's fallacy here is exactly like the sentimentalist's. Both extract a quality from the muddy particulars of experience, and find it so pure when extracted that they contrast it with each and all its muddy instances as an opposite and higher nature. All the while it is *their* nature. It is the nature of truths to be validated, verified. It pays for our ideas to be validated. Our obligation to seek truth is part of our general obligation to do what pays. The payments true ideas bring are the sole why of our duty to follow them.

Identical whys exist in the case of wealth and health. Truth makes no other kind of claim and imposes no other kind of ought than health and wealth do. All these claims are conditional; the concrete benefits we gain are what we mean by calling the pursuit a duty. In the case of truth, untrue beliefs work as perniciously in the long run as true beliefs work beneficially. Talking abstractly, the quality 'true' may thus be said to grow absolutely precious, and the quality 'untrue' absolutely damnable: the one may be called good, the other bad, unconditionally. We ought to think the true, we ought to shun the false, imperatively.

But if we treat all this abstraction literally and oppose it to its mother soil in experience, see what a preposterous position we work ourselves into.

We cannot then take a step forward in our actual thinking.

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When shall I acknowledge this truth and when that? Shall the acknowledgment be loud?—or silent? If sometimes loud, sometimes silent, which *now*? When may a truth go into cold-storage in the encyclopedia? and when shall it come out for battle? Must I constantly be repeating the truth 'twice two are four' because of its eternal claim on recognition? or is it sometimes irrelevant? Must my thoughts dwell night and day on my personal sins and blemishes, because I truly have them?—or may I sink and ignore them in order to be a decent social unit, and not a mass of morbid melancholy and apology?

It is quite evident that our obligation to acknowledge truth, so far from being unconditional, is tremendously conditioned. Truth with a big T, and in the singular, claims abstractly to be recognized, of course; but concrete truths in the plural need be recognized only when their recognition is expedient. A truth must always be preferred to a falsehood when both relate to the situation; but when neither does, truth is as little of a duty as falsehood. If you ask me what o'clock it is and I tell you that I live at 95 Irving Street, my answer may indeed be true, but you don't see why it is my duty to give it. A false address would be as much to the purpose.

With this admission that there are conditions that limit the application of the abstract imperative, *the pragmatistic treatment of truth sweeps back upon us in its fulness*. Our duty to agree with reality is seen to be grounded in a perfect jungle of concrete expediencies.

When Berkeley had explained what people meant by matter, people thought that he denied matter's existence. When Messrs. Schiller and Dewey now explain what people mean by truth, they are accused of denying *its* existence. These pragmatists destroy all objective standards, critics say, and put foolishness and wisdom on one level. A favorite formula for describing Mr. Schiller's doctrines and mine is that we are persons who think that by saying whatever you find it pleasant to say and calling it truth you fulfil every pragmatistic requirement.

I leave it to you to judge whether this be not an impudent slander. Pent in, as the pragmatist more than anyone else sees himself to be, between the whole body of funded truths squeezed from

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the past and the coercions of the world of sense about him, who so well as he feels the immense pressure of objective control under which our minds perform their operations? If anyone imagines that this law is lax, let him keep its commandment one day, says Emerson. We have heard much of late of the uses of the imagination in science. It is high time to urge the use of a little imagination in philosophy. The unwillingness of some of our critics to read any but the silliest of possible meanings into our statements is as discreditable to their imaginations as anything I know in recent philosophic history. Schiller says the true is that which 'works.' Thereupon he is treated as one who limits verification to the lowest material utilities. Dewey says truth is what gives 'satisfaction.' He is treated as one who believes in calling everything true which, if it were true, would be pleasant.

Our critics certainly need more imagination of realities. I have honestly tried to stretch my own imagination and to read the best possible meaning into the rationalist conception, but I have to confess that it still completely baffles me. The notion of a reality calling on us to 'agree' with it, and that for no reasons, but simply because its claim is 'unconditional' or 'transcendent,' is one that I can make neither head nor tail of. I try to imagine myself as the sole reality in the world, and then to imagine what more I would 'claim' if I were allowed to. If you suggest the possibility of my claiming that a mind should come into being from out of the void inane and stand and *copy* me, I can indeed imagine what the copying might mean, but I can conjure up no motive. What good it would do me to be copied, or what good it would do that mind to copy me, if farther consequences are expressly and in principle ruled out as motives for the claim (as they are by our rationalist authorities) I cannot fathom. When the Irishman's admirers ran him along to the place of banquet in a sedan chair with no bottom, he said, "Faith, if it wasn't for the honor of the thing, I might as well have come on foot." So here: but for the honor of the thing, I might as well have remained uncopied. Copying is one genuine mode of knowing (which for some strange reason our contemporary transcendentalists seem to be tumbling over each other to repudiate); but when we get beyond copying, and fall back on

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unnamed forms of agreeing that are expressly denied to be either copyings or leadings or fittings, or any other processes pragmatically definable, the *what* of the 'agreement' claimed becomes as unintelligible as the *why* of it. Neither content nor motive can be imagined for it. It is an absolutely meaningless abstraction.¹

Surely in this field of truth it is the pragmatists and not the rationalists who are the more genuine defenders of the universe's rationality.

¹ I am not forgetting that Professor Rickert long ago gave up the whole notion of truth being founded on agreement with reality. Reality, according to him, is whatever agrees with truth, and truth is founded solely on our primal duty. This fantastic flight, together with Mr. Joachim's candid confession of failure in his book *The Nature of Truth*, seems to me to mark the bankruptcy of rationalism when dealing with this subject. Rickert deals with part of the pragmatistic position under the head of what he calls 'Relativismus.' I cannot discuss his text here. Suffice it to say that his argumentation in that chapter is so feeble as to seem almost incredible in so generally able a writer.

We have a letter from a large machinery manufacturing concern in Cleveland which gives plenty of cause for thought. Here is the letter:

"It is our idea that a recognized body print a weekly newspaper, edited by a practical newspaper man, that shall be amusing, entertaining, and educational, and which shall be handed out with the pay envelopes of industrial concerns, or in bundles sent out to working people.

"Those of sober judgment on both sides of the labor question agree that harmonious conditions can come only with mutual education. It will be a slow process, but these differences can gradually be worn away by publicity.

"Understand, it isn't the idea that this newspaper shall be edited by either labor or capital, but turned over to a practical newspaper man who shall be left alone in his methods until it is learned that he is not bringing the result.

"In this way this newspaper, we think will be an 'emulsifying agency in gradually uniting two diverse elements.

"We propose issuing one nuber of such newspaper at our expense, so that employers and others interested can better see the method and purpose."

This concern—the Globe Machine and Stamping Company—publishes one of the most interesting house organs ever issued, called *The Silent Partner*, edited by David Gibson. In this house organ the labor problem has been dealt with in a very plain-hearted manner. In a recent issue the situation was summarized, and a remedy for the exiting ills suggested, as follows:

"The owners and managers of large industries employing labor may sit around, talk, write to one another, and attend secret meeting of secret employers' associations, but, what good will it do? The conslusions and benefits will never get beyond the general office's walls.

"There is nothing good in anything secret.

"Now if Ignorance is the root of all labor evils, if men of labor 'know not what they do,' let's get busy and guide them in the way they should go by a campaign of education.

"Let us forget ourselves for a time and consider the men in their ignorance.

"They are not at fault. It is the labor demagogues. The labor demagog is very willing that labor remain in ignorance. Ignorance is a very convenient method by which they can retain their control—just as the heads of certain religions foster ignorance among their young in order to retain the good graces of their parishioners.

"We can't undertake to reform things in a day—all we can do is to pursue an ascending scale.

"Unions that secure the real good of their members and the employers are the ones where

the individual intelligence of the men is highest—printers, locomotive engineers, and bricklayers for instance. These men never make trouble.

"Intelligence is not a thing to fear. It's the ignorant man that throws bricks.

"The medium by which men can be lifted out of the brick-throwing class is publicity.

"The remedy is for a recognized body of employers to print a weekly newspaper that will be handed out with the pay envelope. A publication that doesn't pretend anything, but is just what it is. A newspaper not got out by a trade journalist, but by a practical daily newspaper man that can size up a class and tell what they want to read.

"It should amuse, entertain, and instruct, and be written and edited on the principle that readers are divided into two classes: those who are too lazy to read and those who haven't time.

"Of course, such a scheme would be expensive in itself; but divided among a large number of industries the individual assessment would be small.

"Start out slowly at first—just worry along until it gets a hearing and the editors learn what the readers want. In this way the mistakes will be made while the circulation is small.

"If it succeeds at all it will support itself after the first year; for a valuable advertising medium will be created.

"A publication that starts out with other motives than merely carrying advertising is usually the most valuable for that purpose; the space is purchased voluntarily.

"Print this paper in some unique, harmonious, but cheap way, on manila paper with brown ink, make it the only real yellow newspaper. Have its type-architecture laid out by an artist in type. Of course, in a sense it would be a 'flash' newspaper, but an orchestra can play loud and still be harmonious and beautiful.

"Keep trade-journal-dry-bones-and-sawdust out of it.

"The members of an employers' association should not edit this paper, but turn it over to a practical newspaper man with good brain and good digestion. He must be allowed to run it until it is learned that he is not bringing the results."

"Understand, the regular editorial staff of such a publication would not be large, the matter for the most part would be purchased at good prices from free-lance newspaper writers.

"Of course this might not be the right scheme, but let us all think about it."

This is interesting. The experiment will be watched with great interest, by labor and employers of labor, and by the entire advertising fraternity. It will put to a practical test some of the theories respecting the powers and limits of publicity. It is applying the principles of advertising to a field in the industrial world that is the very foundation of that world, the relations of labor and capital. If it is successful it will prove at least two things—that the contentions of its originator are correct, and its editor is possessed of talent better than genius.

THE PUBLIC AND THE CROWD

1901

NOT ONLY does a crowd attract and exert an irresistible pull on the spectator, but its very name has a prestigious attraction for the contemporary reader, encouraging certain writers to use this ambiguous word to designate all sorts of human groupings. It is important to put an end to this confusion, and notably not to confuse the crowd with the *public*, a word in itself subject to various interpretations but which I shall attempt to define precisely. We speak of the public at a theater, the public at some assembly, and here public means crowd. But this is neither the sole nor even the primary meaning, and while the importance of this type of public has declined or remains static, the invention of printing has caused a very different type of public to appear, one which never ceases to grow and whose indefinite extension is one of the most clearly marked traits of our period. There is a psychology of crowds;* there remains to be developed a psychology of the public, understood in this other sense as a purely spiritual collectivity, a dispersion of individuals who are physically separated and whose cohesion is entirely mental. Where the public comes from, how it arises and develops; its varieties and relationships with those who are its directors; its relationships to the crowd, to corporations, to states; its strength for good or evil, and its ways of acting and feeling—this is what we plan to investigate in this study.

From *L'Opinion et la foule* (Paris: Alcan, 1922; originally published 1901), pt. 1, "Le Public et la foule," pp. 1-62, with elisions.

* "Psychologie des foules," which Tarde uses here, is usually rendered as mass or mob psychology; in keeping with Tarde's thought in this essay, we have given the more literal translation.—Ed.

In the lowest animal societies, associations are above all material aggregates. As one goes up the tree of life, social relations become more spiritual. But if the individual members separate to the point of no longer seeing each other or remain so separated beyond a certain short period of time, they cease to be associates. Now, in this respect the crowd has something animal about it, for is it not a collection of psychic connections produced essentially by physical contacts? However, not all communications from mind to mind, from soul to soul, are necessarily based on physical proximity. This condition is fulfilled less and less often in our civilized societies when *currents of opinion* take shape. It is not the meetings of men on the public street or in the public square that witness the birth and development of these kinds of social rivers,¹ these great impulses which are presently overwhelming the hardest hearts and the most resistant minds, and which are now being consecrated as laws or decrees enacted by governments and parliaments. The strange thing about it is that these men who are swept along in this way, who persuade each other, or rather who transmit to one another suggestions from above—these men do not come in contact, do not meet or hear each other; they are all sitting in their own homes scattered over a vast territory, reading the same newspaper. What then is the bond between them? This bond lies in their simultaneous conviction or passion and in their awareness of sharing at the same time an idea or a wish with a great number of other men. It suffices for a man to know this, even without seeing these others, to be influenced by them *en masse* and not just by the journalist, who is the common inspiration of them all and is himself all the more fascinating for being invisible and unknown....

Neither in Latin nor Greek is there any word which is the

¹ . We should note that these *hydraulic* comparisons naturally come to mind every time we speak of crowds as well as publics. For in this respect they resemble each other: a crowd in action on the evening of a public celebration circulates with a slowness and numerous eddies reminiscent of a river having no specific bed. A public is even less comparable to an organism than is a crowd. They are both rather like streams with a poorly defined channel.

equivalent of what we mean by public. There are words to designate the masses, the gathering of armed or unarmed citizens, the electoral body, and all types of crowds. But what writer of antiquity thought of talking about his public? None of them ever knew anything other than his *audience* in rooms rented for public readings, at which the poets contemporary to Pliny the Younger gathered a small sympathetic crowd. As for the few scattered readers of manuscripts copied by hand and existing in perhaps a dozen copies, they, unlike the present-day readers of a newspaper or even, sometimes, of a popular novel, were not aware of forming a social aggregate. Was there a public in the Middle Ages? No, but there were fairs, pilgrimages, tumultuous multitudes dominated by pious or belligerent emotions, angers or panics. The public could begin to arise only after the first great development in the invention of printing, in the sixteenth century. The transportation of force over distance is nothing compared to this transportation of thought across distance. Is not thought the social force *par excellence*?—think of Mr. Fouillée's *idées-forces*. Then appeared, as a profound innovation with incalculable effects, the daily and simultaneous reading of a single book, the Bible, produced for the first time in thousands of copies, and to the united mass of its readers this gave the sensation of forming a new social body, detached from the Church. But this nascent public itself was not yet anything more than a church apart, coinciding with that church, and it is the weakness of Protestantism to have been a public and a church at the same time, two aggregates ruled by different and irreconcilable principles. The public as such only began to assume a definite form under Louis XIV. But although at that time there were crowds as torrential as at present, and as sizable, at royal coronations, the great holidays, and the demonstrations provoked by periodic famine, the public was scarcely anything beyond a narrow elite of "gentlefolk" (*honnêtes gens*) reading their monthly gazette, reading books, a small number of books written for a small number of readers. And the majority of these readers were in Paris, if not at court.

In the eighteenth century, this public grew rapidly and became fragmented. I do not think that there was a philosophical public

distinct from the general literary public before Bayle, because I do not apply the term public to a group of scholars—united, it is true, despite their dispersion in various provinces or countries, by their preoccupation with similar investigations and the reading of the same writings, but so few in number that they can keep up an active correspondence and draw from these personal relationships the principal sustenance for their scientific communion. A special public does not take shape until that time—difficult to specify—when men given to the same study were too numerous to know each other personally and felt themselves bound only by impersonal communications of sufficient frequency and regularity. In the second half of the eighteenth century, a political public arose, grew, and soon overflowed and absorbed all the other publics—literary, philosophical, and scientific—just as a river absorbs its tributaries. Until the Revolution, however, the life of the public has little intensity of its own and only acquires importance through the life of the crowd, to which it is still connected, and through the very lively activity of the salons and cafés.

The true advent of journalism, hence that of the public, dates from the Revolution, which was one of the growing pains of the public. . . .

The revolutionary public was above all Parisian; outside Paris its influence was weak. Arthur Young, in his famous journey, was struck by seeing the public newspapers so little circulated even in the cities. Of course, this observation applies to the beginning of the Revolution; a little later it would be much less true. Until the end of the Revolution, however, the absence of rapid communication posed an insurmountable obstacle to the intensity and propagation of the life of the public. How could newspapers, arriving only two or three times a week and then a week after their publication in Paris, give readers in the south of France that feeling of immediacy and awareness of simultaneous unanimity without which the reading of a newspaper does not differ essentially from the reading of a book? It remained for our century, through its perfected means of locomotion and instantaneous transmission of thought from any distance, to give all publics the indefinite extension of which they are capable and which contrasts them so

sharply with crowds. The crowd is the social group of the past; after the family it is the oldest of all social groups. Whatever its form, standing or seated, immobile or on the march, it is incapable of extension beyond a limited area; when its leaders cease to keep it in hand, when the crowd no longer hears their voices, it breaks loose. The biggest audience ever seen was in the Coliseum, and even that did not exceed 100,000 persons. . . .

But the public can be extended indefinitely, and since its particular life becomes more intense as it extends, one cannot deny that it is the social group of the future. Thus three mutually auxiliary inventions—printing, the railroad, and the telegraph—combined to create the formidable power of the press, that prodigious telephone which has so inordinately enlarged the former audiences of orators and preachers. I therefore cannot agree with that vigorous writer, Dr. LeBon, that our age is the “era of crowds.” It is the era of the public or of publics, and that is a very different thing. . . .

Up to a certain point, a public is confused with what we call a *world*, “the literary world,” “the political world,” and so forth, except that this idea implies personal contact such as an exchange of visits or receptions among those who are part of this world; this contact need not exist among the members of the same public. From the crowd to the public is an enormous leap, as we have already seen, even though the public comes in part from a type of crowd, from the orators’ audience.

Between the two there are many other instructive differences which I have not yet pointed out. One can belong—and in fact one always does belong—simultaneously to several publics, as to several corporations or sects; one can only be part of one crowd at a time. From this follows the far greater intolerance of crowds, and consequently of nations dominated by the spirit of crowds, because one is completely taken over, irresistibly drawn along by a force with no counterbalance; hence the advantage of the gradual substitution of publics for crowds, a transformation which is always accompanied by progress in tolerance, if not in skepticism. Admittedly, it often happens, that an overexcited public produces fanatical crowds which run around in the streets crying “long live” or “death” to anything at all. In this sense the public

could be defined as a potential crowd. But this fall from public to crowd, though extremely dangerous, is fairly rare; and without questioning whether or not these crowds which have arisen from publics are a little less brutal, on the whole, than crowds preceding any public, it remains evident that the opposition of two publics, always ready to fuse along their indistinct boundaries, is a lesser danger to social peace than the encounter of two opposing crowds....

It has been contested, wrongly but not without a deceptive appearance of reason, that every crowd has a leader and that in fact it is often the crowd that leads its chief. But who will contest the fact that every public has someone who inspires it and is sometimes its creator? What Sainte-Beuve said of genius, that "genius is a king who creates his people," is especially true of the great journalist. How often one sees publicists create their own public!² For Edouard Drumont to resuscitate antisemitism it was necessary that his initial attempts at agitation respond to a certain state of mind among the population; but as long as no voice made itself heard, echoed and expressed this state of mind, it remained purely individual, with little intensity and even less contagion, unaware of itself. He who expressed it created it as a collective force, artificial perhaps, yet nonetheless real. I know of areas in France where the fact that no one has ever seen a single Jew does not prevent antisemitism from flowering, because people there read anti-semitic papers. Nor did the socialist state of mind or the anarchist state of mind amount to anything before a few famous publicists, Karl Marx, Kropotkin, and others, expressed them and put them into circulation. Accordingly it is quite understandable that the individual stamp of its promoter's genius is more marked on a public than the genius of its nationality, and that the opposite is true of the crowd....

It may be objected that a newspaper reader is much more in

² Will it be said that if every publicist creates his public every sizable public creates its publicist? This second proposition is much less true than the first; there are large groups which for many years do not succeed in bringing forward the writer adapted to their true orientation. Such is the case with the Catholic world at present.

control of his intellectual freedom than a lost individual swept up in a crowd. He can think about what he reads, in silence, and despite his ordinary passivity he may change newspapers until he finds the one that suits him or that he thinks will suit him. On the other hand, the journalist seeks to please him and to keep him. Statistics of circulation and subscriptions are excellent thermometers, which are often consulted and which warn the editors of the lines of behavior and thought to follow. An indication of this nature motivated the sudden about-face of a well-known paper in a famous affair, and such a recantation is not unusual. The public, then, sometimes reacts on the journalist, but he is continually acting on his public. After a few trial runs, the reader has chosen his paper, the paper has selected its readers, there has been mutual selection, hence mutual adaptation. The one has a paper which pleases him and flatters his prejudices and passions; the other has hold of a reader to his liking, docile and credulous, whom he can easily direct with a few concessions to his positions, analogous to the oratorical precautions of the ancient orators. The man of one book is to be feared, it has been said; but what is he beside the man of one newspaper! This man is each one of us at heart, or nearly so, and therein lies the danger of modern times. Therefore, far from preventing the action of the publicist from being finally decisive on his public, the double selection, the double adaptation, which makes the public a homogeneous group, pliable and well-known to the writer, enables him to act with more force and certainty. A crowd is, in general, much less homogeneous than a public; it always swells with many bystanders—simply curious or semi-involved—who are momentarily caught up and assimilated but succeed in making it difficult for the incoherent elements to achieve a common direction. . . .

As every supplier has two sorts of clientele, one fixed and the other floating, there are also two sorts of publics for newspapers and journals: a consolidated stable public and a floating, unstable public. The proportion of these two is very unequal from one newspaper to the next; for the older newspapers, organs of old parties, the second group does not count, or scarcely so, and I agree that here the action of the publicist is singularly hindered

by the intolerance of the organization he has entered and from which he will be driven by a manifest dissidence. On the other hand, when it does occur in such a situation, his action is extremely durable and penetrating. Note, finally, that faithful publics traditionally loyal to a paper tend to disappear, being increasingly replaced by more mobile publics on which the talented journalist often has a more effective, if not more lasting, hold. This evolution of journalism can rightly be lamented, because firm publics make for honest and convinced publicists, just as capricious publics make for light, versatile, unsettling publicists; but this evolution certainly seems irresistible at present and not easily reversible, and one can see the growing resources of social power it opens up for writers. It may be that this evolution results in increasing subservience of mediocre publicists to the whims of their public, but it certainly subjugates the public more and more to the despotism of important publicists. Far more than statesmen, even the most elevated, these men make opinion and lead the world. And when they have become indispensable, what a solid throne is theirs! . . .

Indeed, one has only to open one's eyes to see that the division of a society into publics, an entirely psychological division which corresponds to differences in states of mind, tends not to substitute itself for, but to superimpose itself more and more visibly and effectively on, divisions along economic, religious, aesthetic, political lines, and divisions into corporations, sects, professions, schools or parties. It is not uniquely the crowds of old, the audiences of orators and preachers, that are dominated or enlarged by their corresponding publics—the parliamentary and religious publics; there is not one sect that does not wish to have its own newspaper in order to surround itself with a public extending far beyond it, causing a sort of mobile atmosphere in which it will be bathed, a collective awareness by which it will be illuminated. And we cannot say of this awareness that it is a simple *epiphenomenon*, in itself inefficacious and inactive. Nor is there any profession, be it small or large, that does not want its own newspaper or review as well, as each corporation in the Middle Ages had its chaplain or its habitual preacher, and each class in ancient Greece its regular orator. Is not the first concern of a new literary or artistic

ously seen in them: they become capable of interpenetration and internationalization. They interpenetrate easily because, as we said above, each of us does or can belong to several publics at once. They become international because the winged words of the papers easily cross borders which were never crossed by the voice of the famous orator or party leader.³

Thus, whatever the nature of the groups into which a society is fragmented, be they religious, economic, political, or even national, the public is in some way their final state and, so to speak, their common denominator. Everything is reduced to this entirely psychological group of states of mind in the process of perpetual mutation. It is remarkable that the professional aggregate, based on the mutual exploitation and adaptation of desires and interests, has been affected most deeply by this civilizing transformation. In spite of all the dissimilarities that we have noted, the crowd and the public, those two extremes of social evolution,⁴ have in common the bond between the diverse individuals making them up, which consists not in *harmonizing* through their very diversities, through their mutually useful specialties, but rather in reflecting, fusing through their innate or acquired similarities into a simple and powerful *unison* (but with how much more force in the public than in the crowd!), in a communion of ideas and passions which, moreover, leaves free play to their individual differences. . . .

After having shown the birth and growth of the public, noted its characteristics, similar or not to those of a crowd, and indicated its genealogical relationship with the different social groups, we shall now delineate a classification of its varieties compared with those of a crowd.

³ Certain large newspapers, the *Times*, the *Figaro*, and certain journals have their public spread throughout the entire world. The religious, scientific, economic, and aesthetic *publics* are essentially and constantly international; religious, scientific, etc. crowds are so only rarely, in the form of a congress. And the congresses could only become international because they were preceded in this direction by their respective publics.

⁴ The family and the horde are the two points of departure of this evolution. But the horde, the gross, pillaging band, is only the crowd in notion.

Publics, like crowds, can be classified from different points of view. From that of sex, we see masculine and feminine publics as well as masculine and feminine crowds. But feminine publics made up of readers of popular novels or fashionable poetry, fashion magazines, feminist journals, and the like, scarcely resemble crowds of the same sex. They have quite a different numerical importance and a more inoffensive nature. I am not speaking of a female audience in church; but when women assemble in the streets, they are always appalling in their extraordinary excitability and ferocity.

From the point of view of age, juvenile crowds—processions or demonstrations by students or Paris *urchins*—have much greater importance than juvenile publics, even the literary ones, which have never exercised any serious influence. On the other hand, elderly publics conduct the world of business while elderly crowds have no effect. This unperceived *gerontocracy* establishes a counterbalance to the *epheboocracy* of electoral crowds, in which the dominant element is young and has not yet had time to become disgusted with the right to vote. Elderly crowds are, moreover, extremely rare. One could cite a few tumultuous councils of old bishops in the days of the early Church or a few stormy sessions of ancient and modern senates as examples of the excesses into which assembled old men may be drawn and of the collective juvenility which they sometimes manifest when they meet....

Crowds can be distinguished according to the temper of the times, the season, the latitude. . . . We have said why this distinction is inapplicable to publics. The action of physical agents on the formation and development of a public is almost nil, whereas it is supreme in the formation and behavior of crowds. The sun is a great tonic to crowds; summer crowds are much more feverish than winter ones. Perhaps if Charles X had waited until December or January to publish his famous ordinances,* the result would have been different. But the influence of race, taken in the national sense of the word, on the public as well as on the crowd is not negli-

* Of July 25, 1830, which, dissolving the Chamber of Deputies and modifying the Constitution, provoked the July Revolution.—Ed.

gible, and the "enthusiasms" characteristic of the French public bespeak the effects of the *furia francese*.*

In spite of everything, the most important distinction to make between various publics, as between various crowds, lies in the nature of their *goal* or their *faith*. Passers-by in the streets, each one going about his own business, peasants assembled at a fairground, people out walking, may form a dense mass, but they are merely a throng until they have a common faith or a common goal that moves them, and moves them as one group. As soon as a new spectacle demands their attention, an unforeseen danger or sudden indignation orients their hearts toward the same desire, they begin to aggregate docilely, and this first degree of the social aggregate is the crowd. A parallel statement can be made: so long as they read only notices and practical information relevant to their private affairs, even the habitual readers of a newspaper do not form a public; and if I could believe, as is sometimes claimed, that notices will grow at the expense of the news, I should hasten to erase all that I said above about the social transformations caused by journalism. But this is not true, even in America.⁵ It is from the moment when the readers of a newspaper are seized by the idea or the passion which provoked it that they truly become a public.

We must therefore classify crowds, as well as publics, before all else according to the nature of the goal or the faith which animates them. But first of all, let us distinguish them according to the extent to which the faith—the idea—or else the goal—the desire—dominates. There are believing crowds and desirous crowds,

* Expression used by the Italians after losing the battle of Fornova (1495) to characterize the impetuosity of the French in combat.—Ed.

⁵ In his fine work on the *Principles of Sociology*, the American, Giddings, speaks incidentally of the major role played by the newspapers in the Civil War. In this regard he goes against the popular opinion according to which "the papers have suppressed all individual influence under the daily deluge of their *impersonal* opinions. . . ." The press, he says, "produced its maximum impression on public opinion when it was the voice of a remarkable personality, a Garrison [*sic*] or a Greeley. Furthermore, the public is not really aware that in the newspaper offices, the idea-man, unknown to the public, is known by his co-workers and stamps his individuality on their minds and their work."

believing publics and desirous publics; or rather (since men assembled or united from afar rapidly push all thought and desire to extremes) there are crowds and publics which are convinced and fanatic and those which are impassioned and despotic. There is scarcely ever a choice of more than these two categories. Let us agree nonetheless that publics are less extremist than crowds, less despotic and dogmatic too, but that on the other hand their despotism or dogmatism is far more tenacious and chronic than that of crowds.

Believing or desiring, crowds differ according to the nature of the corporation or the sect with which they are connected; and the same distinction, as we know, applies to publics, which always come from organized social groups of which they are the *inorganic* transformation.⁶

Though more difficult to activate originally, rural crowds are more to be feared once they are roused; there is no Parisian riot with ravages comparable to those of a peasant uprising. Religious crowds are the most inoffensive of all; they do not become capable of crimes until a dissident or opposition crowd offends their intolerance, which is not greater than, but only equal to, that of any other crowd. Individuals can be liberal and tolerant when each is alone, but once assembled together they become authoritarian and tyrannical. This is because beliefs become heightened through mutual contact, and no strong convictions withstand contradiction. Hence, for example, the massacre of the Arians by the Catholics and that of the Catholics by the Arians, which bloodied the streets of Alexandria in the fourth century. Political crowds, mostly urban, are the most impassioned and the most furious; fortunately they are versatile, passing from execration to adoration, from excessive anger to excessive joy with extreme facility. Economic or industrial crowds, like rural ones, are much more homogeneous than the others, much more unanimous and persistent in their wishes, more massive and stronger, but all in all less inclined, when they become exasperated, to murder than to material destruction.

Aesthetic crowds (which along with religious crowds are the

⁶ This is a new proof that the organic bond and the social bond are different and that the progress of the latter in no way implies the progress of the former.

only crowds based on belief) have been neglected, why I do not know. I use this term for those crowds that are aroused by a new or old school of literature or art in favor of or against a drama or a musical work, for example. These crowds are perhaps the most intolerant, just because of the arbitrariness and subjectiveness of the judgment of taste that they proclaim. Their need to see the spread of their enthusiasm for such and such an artist, for Victor Hugo, Wagner, or Zola, or the opposite, their horror of Zola, Wagner, or Victor Hugo, is all the more imperative because this propagation of artistic faith is almost their only justification. Hence, when they find themselves face to face with an opposition which is itself forming ranks, their anger can at times become sanguinary. Did not blood run in the eighteenth century in the battles between the partisans and the adversaries of Italian music? . . .

Whether they are formed principally by a communion of beliefs or by one of wishes, crowds can show four stages of being, which mark the various degrees of their passivity or activity. They are either *expectant*, *attentive*, *demonstrating* or *active*. Publics show the same diversity.

Expectant crowds are those which, gathered in a theater before the curtain goes up or around a guillotine before the arrival of the condemned man, await the rise of the curtain or the arrival of the prisoner; or else those which, having run to meet a king, an imperial visitor, or a train carrying a popular leader, orator or victorious general, await the royal cortege of the train. The collective curiosity of such crowds attains unparalleled proportions without the slightest relation to the sometimes insignificant object of that curiosity. It is even more intense and exaggerated than among expectant publics, where it nonetheless runs so high when millions of readers, overexcited by a sensational affair, await a verdict, an arrest, or any new development. The least curious, the most serious of men, upon entering one of these feverish gatherings, asks himself what is keeping him there despite his urgent business, what strange need he, like all those around him, is now experiencing to see an emperor's carriages or a general's black horse. Note that expectant crowds are always much more patient than individuals in similar circumstances. During the Franco-Russian festivals, mul-

titudes of Parisians stationed themselves along the route that the Czar was to follow, three to four hours in advance, and remained immobile, pressed together, with no sign of discontent. From time to time some carriage was taken for the beginning of the cortege, but once the error was recognized, people returned to their waiting without the occurrence of those repeated illusions and disappointments that usually create exasperation. Well-known too is the indefinite amount of time spent in the rain, even at night, by curious crowds awaiting a big military review. Inversely, it often happens at the theater that the same public which calmly resigned to an excessive delay suddenly becomes exasperated and will not suffer another minute's delay. Why is a crowd thus always more patient or more impatient than an individual? The same psychological cause explains both cases: the mutual contagion of sentiments among the assembled individuals. So long as no manifestation of impatience, foot stamping, catcalling, sound of canes or of feet is produced in a group (and they never occur when it would do no good, such as before an execution or a review), each individual is impressed by the sight of his neighbors' resigned or cheerful attitude, and unconsciously reflects their gaiety or resignation. But if someone (when, as at the theater, it can help reduce the delay) takes the initiative and becomes impatient, he is soon imitated by degrees, and the impatience of each individual is redoubled by that of the others. Individuals in a crowd have achieved both the highest degree of mutual moral attraction and mutual physical repulsion (an antithesis which does not exist for publics). They elbow each other aside, but at the same time they visibly wish to express only those sentiments which are in agreement with those of their neighbors, and in the conversations which sometimes occur between them they seek to please each other without distinction for rank or class.

Attentive crowds are those who crowd around the pulpit of a preacher or lecturer, a lectern, a platform, or in front of the stage where a moving drama is being performed. Their attention—and also their inattention—is always stronger and more constant than would be that of each individual in the group if he were alone. On the subject of the crowds in question, a professor made a re-

mark to me that seemed accurate. He said that "an audience of young people at the Law Faculty or in any other faculty is always attentive and respectful when it is not large; but if instead of being 20 or 30, there are 100, 200, 300, they often cease to respect and listen to the professor, whereupon foot-tapping is frequent. Divide them into four groups of 25, and from these 100 rebellious and turbulent students you will get four audiences full of attention and respect." The arrogant sensation of their numbers intoxicates men when they are assembled and makes them scorn the isolated man who is speaking to them, unless he manages to dazzle or "charm" them. But it must be added that when a large audience is captured by a speaker, size makes it all the more respectful and attentive.

In a crowd of people fascinated by a spectacle or a speech, only a small number of spectators or listeners can hear very well, many only see or hear partially or almost not at all, and nonetheless, however poorly seated they may be, no matter how expensive their seat, they are satisfied and regret neither their time nor their money. Those people waited two hours for the Czar, who did finally pass by, but, crowded together behind several rows of people, they saw nothing; at most they could have heard the noise of the carriages—or sometimes only a deceptive noise. Yet when they went home they recounted the spectacle in all good faith as if they had been witnesses, for, in truth, they had seen it through the eyes of others. They would have been astonished had they been told that the man in the provinces, 200 leagues from Paris, looking at a picture of the imperial procession in his illustrated paper, was more truly a spectator than they. Why are they convinced of the contrary? Because the crowd itself on such occasions serves as its own spectacle. The crowd draws and admires the crowd.

Halfway between the more or less passive crowds of which we have just spoken and the active ones lie the demonstrating crowds. Whether they demonstrate with love or with hate, with joy or with sorrow, with conviction or with passion, it is always with their own particular excesses. Two somewhat feminine characteristics may be noted in them: a remarkably expressive symbolism related to a great poverty of imagination in inventing of these symbols, which,

are always the same, repeated to the point of satiety. Marching in procession carrying banners and flags, statues, relics, sometimes heads cut off and stuck on pikes, shouting *vivas* or slogans, hymns or songs: that is about all they have been able to invent to express their sentiments. But if they have few ideas, they hold on to them and do not tire of shouting the same slogans, starting again on the same march. Publics too, when brought to a certain point of excitement, can become demonstrative, not only indirectly through the crowds arising from them, but especially, and directly, through the contagious influence that they exert on the very people who stirred them up in the first place and who can no longer control them, through torrents of lyricism or imprecations, adulation or defamation, Utopian delirium or bloody fury called forth from the pens of their obedient publicists, the masters who have become slaves. Their manifestations are therefore more varied and more dangerous than those of crowds, and we must deplore the inventive genius expended on clever lies, specious fables, all continually contradicted, continually revived, for the simple pleasure of serving each public the dishes it desires, of expressing what they think to be true, or what they wish to be true.

We come now to active crowds. But what can crowds do? We see what they can undo, destroy—but what can they produce with their essential incoherence and the lack of coordination in their efforts? Corporations, sects, organized associations are productive as well as destructive. The *pontifical brothers* of the Middle Ages built bridges, the monks of the Occident cleared land and built villages; the Jesuits in Paraguay made the most interesting attempt at phalansteries that has ever been successfully undertaken; and groups of masons put up the majority of our cathedrals. But can we cite a single house built by a crowd, any land cleared and worked by a crowd, or any industry created by a crowd? For the few trees of liberty that they planted, how many forests have been burned, homes pillaged, chateaux demolished by them. . . .

The danger for new democracies is the growing difficulty for thoughtful men to escape the obsession and fascination of turmoil. It is difficult to descend in a diving bell into a very rough sea. The guiding individuals whom contemporary society brings into promi-

nence are more and more often writers living in continual contact with society; the powerful action that they exercise, though preferable to the blindness of leaderless crowds, is still a refutation of the theory of creative masses. But this is not enough, and since to spread average culture everywhere is not enough, and since we must carry high culture still higher, we could, like Summer Maine, already be concerned with what will be the lot of the last *intellectuals*, whose long-term services do not stand out. What keeps mountain populations from razing and transforming the mountains into workable land, vineyards, or grasslands is certainly not the gratitude for the services of these natural water-towers; it is simply the solidity of their peaks, the durability of their substance, which is too expensive to dynamite. What will preserve the intellectual and artistic summits of humanity from democratic leveling will not, I fear, be recognition of the good that the world owes them, the just esteem for their discoveries. What then? I should like to think that it will be their force of resistance. Let them beware if they should separate!

OPINION AND CONVERSATION

1898

Opinion

OPINION⁴ is to the modern public what the soul is to the body, and the study of one leads us naturally to the other. Might one object that public opinion has always existed whereas the public, as defined here, is fairly recent? This is certainly true, but we shall soon see how little this objection amounts to. What is opinion? How is it born? What are its various sources? While growing, how is it articulated, and by being articulated, how does it grow still further—a phenomenon illustrated by its contemporary modes of expression, universal suffrage and journalism? What is its productivity and its social significance? How is it transformed? And toward what common outlet, if there is one, do its multiple currents converge? It is to these questions that we shall essay a few answers.

Let us first say that in the word *opinion* two things are generally confused which are intermingled in practice, but which a careful analysis must distinguish: opinion proper, a totality of judgments; and the general will, a totality of desires. It is primarily but not exclusively opinion taken in the first sense that will concern us here.

However great the importance of opinion and despite its present excesses, its role must not be exaggerated. Let us try to circum-

From *L'Opinion et la foule* (Paris: Alcan, 1922), pp. 62–158, with elisions.
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scribe its domain. Opinion should not be confused with two other parts of the social mind, which both feed and limit it, and which are in perpetual border disputes with it. One is Tradition, a condensed and accumulated extract of what was the opinion of those now dead, a heritage of necessary and salutatory prejudices frequently onerous to the living. The other is what I take the liberty of calling by the collective and abbreviated name Reason. This I understand to be the relatively rational although often unreasonable personal judgments of an elite which isolates itself, reflects, and emerges from the popular stream of thought in order to dam it up or direct it. Originally priests, then philosophers, scholars, lawyers—councils, universities, law courts—are successively or simultaneously the incarnation of these resistant and directive judgments, which are clearly differentiated both from the passionate and sheeplike enthusiasms of the multitudes and from their own innermost motives or age-old principles. I should like to be able to add to this listing parliaments, whether assemblies or senates. Are not their members elected specifically to deliberate in perfect independence and to serve as a brake to the public train? But it is a long way from the ideal to reality. Well before an opinion is experienced as such, the individuals who comprise a nation are aware of possessing a common tradition and knowingly submit to the decisions of judgments deemed superior. Thus of the three branches of the public mind, Opinion is the last to develop but also the most apt to grow after a certain time; and it grows at the expense of the two others. No national institution can resist its intermittent assaults; there is not one individual judgment that does not tremble and stutter in the face of its threats or demands. Which of its two rivals does Opinion most impair? This depends on who is in control of Opinion. When those in control are part of the reasoning elite, they sometimes raise up Opinion like a battering ram to breach the ramparts of tradition, enlarging them through destruction, an act not without danger. But when the direction of the multitude is left to the firstcomers, it is easier for them, leaning on tradition, to rouse opinion against reason, which nevertheless triumphs in the end.

All would be for the best if opinion limited itself to popular

izing reason in order to consecrate it in tradition. Today's reason would thus become tomorrow's opinion and the day after tomorrow's tradition. But instead of serving as a link between its neighbors, Opinion likes to take part in their squabbles and sometimes, becoming intoxicated with new and fashionable doctrines, it pillages established ideas or institutions before it is able to replace them; sometimes, under the authority of Custom, it expulses or oppresses rational innovators, or forces them to don the hypocritical disguise of traditionalist livery.

These three forces differ as much in their causes and effects as in their natures. They work together, but very unequally and variably, to create the *value* of things; and value is very different according to whether it is primarily a question of custom, or of style, or of reasoning. Later we shall affirm that conversation at all times, and the press, which at present is the principal source of conversation, are the major factors in opinion, without counting, of course, tradition and reason, which never cease to have part in it and to leave their stamp on it. The factors¹ of tradition, besides opinion itself, are family education, professional apprenticeship, and academic instruction, at least on an elementary level. In all the judicial, philosophical, scientific, and even ecclesiastical coteries where it develops, reason has as its characteristic sources observation, experience, inquiry, or in any case reasoning, deduction based on subject matter.

The battles or the alliances of these three forces, their clashes, their reciprocal trespassing, their mutual action, their multiple and varied relations are one of the keen interests of history. Social life has nothing more intestine but also nothing more productive than this long travail of often bloody opposition and adaptation. Tradition, which is always national, is more restricted between fixed limits than Opinion, but infinitely more profound and stable, for opinion is something as light, as transitory, as expansive as the wind, and always striving to become international, like reason. It can be said, in

¹ This word *factor* (*facteur*) is ambiguous; it means *channel* or *source*. Here it means channel, because conversation and education only transmit the ideas which constitute opinion or tradition. *Sources* are always individual initiatives, small or great inventions.

general, that the cliffs of tradition are endlessly eroded by the flow of opinion's unebbing tide. Opinion is all the stronger because tradition is weaker, which is not to say that then reason too is weaker. In the Middle Ages reason, represented by the universities, the councils, and the courts of justice, had much more strength than today to resist and repress popular opinion; it had much less strength, it is true, to fight and reform tradition. The misfortune is that contemporary Opinion has become omnipotent not only against tradition (which is serious enough) but also against reason—judicial reason, scientific reason, legislative or political reason, as the opportunity occurs. If Opinion has not invaded the laboratories of scholars—the only inviolable asylum up to now—it overwhelms tribunes of the judiciary, it submerges parliaments, and there is nothing more alarming than this deluge, whose end is not in sight.

Now that we have delimited Opinion, let us essay a better definition.

Opinion, as we define it, is a momentary, more or less logical cluster of judgments which, responding to current problems, is reproduced many times over in people of the same country, at the same time, in the same society.

All these conditions are essential. It is also essential that each of these individuals be more or less aware of the similarity of his judgments with those of others; for if each one thought himself isolated in his evaluation, none of them would feel himself to be (and hence would not be) bound in close association with others like himself (unconsciously like himself). Now, in order for the consciousness of this similarity of ideas to exist among the members of a society, must not the cause of this similarity be the manifestations in words, in writing, or in the Press, of an idea that was individual at first, then gradually little by little generalized? The transformation of an individual opinion into a social opinion, into Opinion, is due to public discourse in classical times and in the Middle Ages, to the press of our own time, and at all times, most particularly, to those private conversations which we shall soon be discussing.

We say Opinion, but for every problem there are always two

opinions. One of the two, however, manages to eclipse the other fairly quickly by its more rapid and striking brilliance or else because, even though less widespread, it is the more clamorous of the two.²

Every age, even the most barbaric, has had an opinion, but it has differed profoundly from what we call by that name. In the clan, in the tribe, even in the classical or medieval city everyone knew everyone else personally, and when, in private discussion or the speeches of orators, a common idea was established, it did not appear like a stone fallen from heaven, of impersonal and hence so much more prestigious origin; for each person the idea was linked to the tone of voice, the face, of the person from whom it had come, a person who lent it a living visage. For the same reason it served as a link only between people who, seeing and speaking to each other every day, were never deceived about each other.

For as long as the state did not extend beyond the ramparts of the city or, at most, the borders of a small canton, opinion thus formed, original, and strong, strong sometimes against tradition itself but especially against individual judgments, played in men's government the preponderant role of the chorus in Greek tragedy, a role often assumed by modern opinion, which is of quite another origin, in our large states or in our immense and growing federations. But in the enormously long interval separating these two historical phases, the importance of opinion underwent an enormous depression, which can be explained by its disintegration into local opinions unaware of each other and without liaison.

In a feudal state, such as medieval England or France, each village, each town had its internal dissensions, its own politics. And the currents of ideas, or rather the eddies of ideas which whirled around inside these enclaves, were as different from one

² However widespread an opinion may be, it is never *manifest* if it is moderate; but however narrowly held a violent opinion may be, it is very *manifest*. Now the "manifestations," expressions which are at once all-inclusive and very clear, play an immense role in the fusion and interpenetration of opinions of various groups and in their propagation. It is the most violent opinions which, through manifestation, are soonest and most clearly aware of their coëxistence, and thus their expansion is strangely favored.

place to another as they were alien and indifferent to one another, at least in normal times. Not only were local politics absorbing in these places, but to the extent, the small extent, that there was interest in national politics, it was only among acquaintances, and there was only the vaguest notion of the way in which the same questions were resolved in neighboring villages. It was not Opinion that existed but thousands of separate opinions with no continuous link between them.

This link was not provided until the advent, first, of books, and then (and with greater efficacy) newspapers. The periodical press enabled these primary groups of similar individuals to form a secondary and far superior aggregate, whose units were closely bound without personal contact. From this situation arose important differences—among others, this one: in the primary groups the voices *ponderantur* rather than *numerantur*, while in the secondary and much larger group, adhered to blindly by individuals who cannot see one another, voices can only be counted and not weighed. Unconsciously the press thus worked to create the strength of numbers and to reduce that of character, if not of intelligence.

At the same time it suppressed the conditions which made possible the absolute power of the governing group. This power was greatly favored, in actuality, by the local splitting of opinion: even more, it found here its *raison d'être* and justification. What kind of a country is it whose various regions, cities, towns are not linked by a collective consciousness of their unity of views? Is it really a nation? Is it anything more than a geographical or, at most, political expression? Yes, it is a nation but only in the sense that political submission of these various factions of a realm to the same chief is already nationalism. In the France of Philip the Fair,* for example, with the exception of a few rare occasions when a common danger preoccupied all the cities and fiefs, there was no *public mind* (*esprit public*), there were only local minds aroused separately by their own fixed ideas or passions. But through his administrators the king was aware of these diverse states of mind; he assembled them in his person, as it were, and in

* 1268-1314, king of France who convoked the first Estates-General (1302).—Ed. ○

his own summary knowledge of them, which served as a basis for his plans, he thus unified them.

It was a fragile unification, an imperfect one, to be sure, which gave to the king only a vague awareness of what was general in local preoccupations. His person was the only area of their mutual penetration. When the Estates-General were convened, a new step was taken toward the nationalization of regional and local opinion. In the mind of each deputy these opinions met, and found themselves similar or dissimilar; and the entire country, its eyes on its deputies, interested to a small (infinitely smaller than today) degree in their work, then created the unusual (at that time) spectacle of a nation aware of itself. And this intermittent, exceptional consciousness was very vague, as well as slow and obscure. The meetings of the Estates-General were not public. In any case, for want of a press the discussions were not published, and, lacking even postal service, letters could not make up for this absence of newspapers. In short, it became known through sometimes distorted news passed from mouth to mouth, after weeks and months, from travelers on horseback and on foot, wandering monks and merchants, that the Estates-General had met, and that they had considered such and such a subject—and that was all.

Note that the members of these assemblies, during their short and infrequent meetings, themselves formed a local group, the site of an intense local opinion, born contagiously from meeting man to man, from personal relationships, from reciprocal influences. And it was owing to this superior, temporary, elective local group that the inferior, permanent hereditary local groups composed of relatives or traditional friends in the towns and fiefs felt themselves united in transitory alliance.

The development of the mails by multiplying first public then private correspondence, the development of highways by multiplying new contacts between people, the development of permanent armies by making soldiers from all the provinces fraternize with each other, and finally the development of courts by drawing the aristocratic elite from all corners of the earth to the monarchical center of the nation—all had the effect of gradually developing the

public mind (*l'esprit public*). But it remained for the printing press to extend this great work to the fullest. It was for the press, once it had reached the stage of newspaper, to make national, European, even cosmic, anything local which, despite its possible intrinsic interest, formerly would have remained unknown beyond a limited range. . . .

Let us try to be more precise. In a large society divided into nations, subdivided into provinces, fiefs, and cities, international opinion, arising every now and then, has always existed, even before the press: beneath international opinion are national opinions, still intermittent but already more frequent; beneath national opinions are the almost continuous regional and local opinions. These are the superimposed strata of the public mind. But the proportions of these diverse layers have varied considerably with regard to importance and depth, and it is easy to see how. The farther back one goes into the past, the more local opinion is predominant. The work of journalism has been to nationalize more and more, and even to internationalize, the public mind.

Journalism both sucks in and pumps out information, which, coming in from all corners of the earth in the morning, is directed, the same day, back out to all the corners of the earth, insofar as the journalist defines what is or appears to be interesting about it, given the goals he is pursuing and the party for which he speaks. His information is in reality a force which little by little becomes irresistible. Newspapers began by expressing opinion, first the completely local opinion of privileged groups, a court, a parliament, a capital, whose gossip, discussions, or debates they reproduced; they ended up directing opinion almost as they wished, modeling it, and imposing the majority of their daily topics upon conversation.

We shall never know and can never imagine to what degree newspapers have transformed, both enriched and leveled, *unified in space* and *diversified in time*, the conversations of individuals. even those who do not read papers but who, talking to those who do, are forced to follow the groove of their borrowed thoughts. One pen suffices to set off a million tongues.

Parliaments *before the press* differed so profoundly from those *after the press* that they seem only to have their name in common. They differ in their origins, the nature of their mandates, their functioning, the extent and the efficacy of their action. Before the press, the deputies to the Cortès, to the Diets, to the Estates-General could not express opinion, which did not yet exist; they only expressed local opinions of a very different nature, as we well know, or national traditions. . . .

The old parliaments were groups with heterogeneous mandates, each organized around distinct interests, rights, and principles; the new parliaments are groups with homogeneous mandates (even if contradictory ones), concerned with identical preoccupations and conscious of their identity. Besides, the dissimilarity of the old deputies was due to the peculiarities of their original modes of election, which were all based on the principle of the inequality and the electoral dissimilarity of various individuals, on the eminently personal nature of the right to vote. Strength of numbers was not yet known or recognized as legitimate; and for this very reason, in the deliberations of assemblies thus elected, no one considered a simple numerical majority as having the force of law. . . .

Universal suffrage and the omnipotence of parliamentary majorities were only made possible by the prolonged and accumulated action of the press, the sine qua non of a great leveling democracy (I am not speaking of a democracy limited to the ramparts of a Greek city or a Swiss canton).

The differences just indicated explain another, namely the sovereignty inherent in parliaments *after the press*, which those *before the press* never had thought of claiming. . . .

The monarchies before the press could and were supposed to be more or less absolute, intangible and sacred because they embodied national unity as a whole; after the press, they can no longer be so, because national unity is created outside them, and better than it was created by them. They can subsist, however, but they are as different from the old monarchies as present-day parliaments are from former ones. The monarch of old had the supreme merit of *constituting* the unity and the conscience of the nation;

the monarch of today can no longer have any justification except in expressing the unity created by the continuity of a national opinion conscious of itself, in conforming to this opinion and bending with it without submitting to it.

To complete our discussion of the social role of the press, is it not to the great progress of the periodical press that we owe the broader and clearer delimitation, the new and more prominent sentiment of nationality that is the political characteristic of our present period? Is it not the press that has caused the growth of our internationalism at the same time as that of our nationalism, which seems to be its opposite but may only be its complement? If growing nationalism has replaced decreasing loyalty to become the new form of patriotism, should we not credit this change to the same terrible and productive power? It is surprising to see that as nations intermingle and imitate one another, assimilate, and morally unite, the demarcation of nationalities becomes deeper, and their oppositions appear more irreconcilable. At first glance one cannot understand this contrast of the nationalistic nineteenth century with the cosmopolitanism of the previous century. But this result, however paradoxical, is actually very logical. While between neighboring or distant peoples the exchange of merchandise, ideas, all kinds of items multiplied, the exchange of ideas, in particular, between people speaking the same language progressed even more rapidly, thanks to newspapers. Therefore, even though the *absolute* difference between nations diminished, their relative and conscious differences grew. Note that geographic limits of nationalities tend at present to be confused more and more with those of the principal languages. There are countries in which the language battle and the nationality battle are one and the same. The reason for this is that national sentiment was revived by journalism and that the truly effective influence of newspapers stops at the frontiers of the language in which they are written.

The influence of books, which preceded that of newspapers and was dominant in both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, could not produce the same effects; for even if the book made

all who read it in the same language feel their philological identity, it was not concerned with questions both current and simultaneously exciting to everybody. National existence is well attested by literatures, but by their great daily fluctuations it is the newspapers that fire national *life*, stir up united movements of minds and wills. Instead of drawing its interest from the concrete facts it presents, as a newspaper does, a book seeks to interest the reader primarily by the *general* and abstract character of the ideas it contains. It is thus more apt to arouse a humanitarian current, like our literature of the eighteenth century, than a national or even international current.

Conversation

We have just cast a rapid first glance on our subject to give an idea of its complexity. After defining opinion we concentrated in particular on showing its relations to the press, but the press is only one of the sources of opinion, and one of the most recent. We studied it first because it is the most clearly visible. But now it is advisable to study in greater depth an unexplored domain, that factor of opinion that we have already recognized as the most continuous and the most universal, its invisible source, flowing everywhere and at all time in unequal waves: conversation. First, the conversation of an elite. In a letter of Diderot to Necker, in 1775, I find this very accurate definition: "Opinion, that motive (*mobile*) whose force for good or evil is well known to all of us, is originally no more than the effect of a small number of men who speak after having thought and who continuously form centers of instruction, in different parts of society, from which errors and well-reasoned truths flow by degrees until they reach the outer confines of the city, where they become established as articles of faith." If no one conversed, the newspapers would appear to no avail—in which case one cannot conceive of their publication—because they would exercise no profound influence on any minds. They would be like a string vibrating without a sounding board. On the other hand, without papers² or even speeches, if conversa-

tion did succeed in making progress without these nutriments—hard to believe—it would in the long run take over to a certain extent the social role of public oratory or the press as formers of opinion.

By conversation I mean any dialogue without direct and immediate utility, in which one talks primarily to talk, for pleasure, as a game, out of politeness. This definition excludes judicial inquiries, diplomatic or commercial negotiations or councils, and even scientific congresses, although the latter abound in superfluous chatter. It does not exclude flirtations or amorous exchanges generally, despite the frequent transparence of their goals, which does not keep them from being pleasing in themselves. It includes all nonessential discussions (*entretiens de luxe*), even among barbarians and savages. If I were only concerned with polite and cultivated conversation as a special art, I could not trace it back farther (at least since classical antiquity) than the fifteenth century in Italy, the sixteenth or seventeenth in France and then in England, and the eighteenth in Germany. But long before this aesthetic flower of civilizations began to bloom, its first buds appeared on the tree of languages; and although less fruitful in visible results than the discourse of an elite, the elementary discussions (*entretiens terre à terre*) between primitive people are not lacking in great social importance.

Never, except in a duel, does one observe an individual with all the force of one's attention unless one is talking with him, and that is the most constant, the most important, and the least observed effect of conversation. It marks the apogee of the *spontaneous attention* that men lend each other,³ by which they interpenetrate to a much greater depth than in any other social relationship. By making them confer, conversation makes them communicate via an action as irresistible as it is unconscious. It is, consequently, the strongest agent of imitation, of the propagation of sentiments, ideas, and modes of action. A captivating and much applauded discussion is often less suggestive because it avows the intention of

³ Mr. Ribot, in his clear and penetrating studies, has shown the importance of "spontaneous attention."

being so. Interlocutors act on each other from close at hand,⁴ not by language alone but by the tone of their voices, glances, physiognomy, magnetic gestures. It is rightly said of a good conversationalist that he is a *charmer* in the magical sense of the word. Telephone conversations, which lack the majority of these interesting elements, tend to be boring unless they are purely utilitarian.

Let us sketch as briefly as possible the psychology or rather the sociology of conversation: What are its varieties? What have been its successful stages, its history, its evolution? What are its causes and its effects? What are its relations to social peace, to love, to transformations of language, customs, and literatures? Each of these aspects of so vast a subject would require an entire volume, and we cannot claim to exhaust them here.

Conversations differ greatly according to the natures of those talking, their degree of culture, their social situation, their rural or urban origin, their professional habits, their religion. They differ in subjects treated, in tone, in ceremony, in rapidity of delivery, in length. The average speed of pedestrians in various world capitals has been measured, and the published statistics show quite great variation in these speeds, as well as the constancy of each one of them. I am convinced that, if it were judged relevant, the rapidity of speech in each city could be measured just as well and that it would be found to be very different from one town to another, as from one sex to another.

It seems that as people become more civilized, they walk and speak faster. In his *Voyage to Japan* Mr. Bellessort notes "the slowness of Japanese conversations, the shaking of the head, the immobile bodies kneeling around a brazier." All travelers have also noted

⁴ Despots are well aware of this. Hence they keep a close and wary eye on talk between their subjects and prevent them as much as possible from conversing. Authoritarian housekeepers do not like to see their servants talk with those from elsewhere, because they know that it is this way that they "get ideas into their heads." From the time of Cato the Elder the Roman ladies got together to gossip, and the fierce censor looked askance at these feminine circles, these *feminist* sprees of the salons. Cato himself advised his successor, saying that he should see to it that his wife "fear you, that she not care too much for luxury, that she see as little as possible of her neighbors or other women."

the slowness of speech of the Arabs and other primitive peoples. Does the future lie with the peoples who speak fast or with those who speak slowly? Probably with the former, but I think it would be well worth the effort to treat this aspect of our subject with numerical precision; for such a study would be amenable to a sort of social psycho-physics. At the moment, the elements for this are lacking.

Conversation takes on an entirely different tone, even a different rapidity between inferior and superior than between equals, between relatives or than between strangers, between persons of the same sex than between men and women. Conversations in small towns between citizens linked to one another by hereditary friendships are and must be quite different from conversations in large cities between educated people who hardly know each other. Both talk about what they know best and what they have in common in the realm of ideas. However, since the latter do not know each other personally, what they have in common with each other they also have in common with a great many other people—whence their penchant for general subjects, for discussing ideas of general interest. But small town citizens have no ideas more common and at the same time better known than the peculiarities of the lives and characters of the people they know—whence their propensity for gossip and slander. If there is less gossip in the cultivated circles of the capitals, it is not because there is less meanness or nastiness but because this meanness has more difficulty finding subject matter, unless it is exercised on prominent political personages or stage celebrities. These *public gossips* are no better than the private ones, which they replace, except insofar as they unfortunately interest a greater number of people.

Leaving aside many secondary distinctions, let us differentiate first of all between the conversation-battle (*conversation-lutte*) and the conversation-exchange (*conversation-échange*), between discussion and mutual informing. There is no doubt, as we shall see, that the second develops at the cost of the first. It is the same in the course of life for the individual who, inclined to argue as well as fight during his adolescence and youth, avoids contradiction and seeks accord among ideas as he grows older.

Let us also distinguish obligatory conversation—regulated and ritual ceremony—from voluntary (*facultatif*) conversation. The latter generally takes place only between equals, and the equality of men fosters its progress as much as it contributes to shrinking the domain of the first. Unless explained historically, there is nothing more grotesque than the obligation imposed on civil servants by decrees and on private individuals by social convention to make or receive periodic visits to and from one another during which, seated together, they are forced for a half hour or an entire hour to torture their minds in order to talk without saying anything or to say what they do not think and not say what they do think. The universal acceptance of such a constraint can only be understood if one goes back to its origins. The main purpose of the first visits made to the leaders and chiefs by their inferiors, to the suzerains by their vassals, was to bring presents, which at first were spontaneous and irregular presents and later became customary and regular, as has been abundantly demonstrated by Herbert Spencer. At the same time it was natural that they also be the occasion of a long or short conversation between the two, consisting of excessive compliments on the one hand and protective thanks on the other.⁵ Here conversation was only the accessory of the gift, and it is still understood in this way by many peasants in regions that are the most backward in their relations with people of the higher classes. Little by little, these two elements of the archaic visits became dissociated, the present becoming the tax and the conversation developing separately, but not without keeping, even between equals, something of its past ceremonial form—from which we derive the formulas and sacramental formalities with which all conversation starts and finishes. Despite their variations, all conversations agree

⁵ The customs of visits and gifts are tied together: it seems probable that the visit was only the necessary consequence of the gift. The visit is, in short, a relic: the gift was its original *raison d'être*, which the visit outlived. Nonetheless something of this remains and in many visits to the country, when one goes to see people who have children, it is still the custom in many countries to bring candy or treats. Compliments must once have been simple accompaniments of gifts in the same way as visits. And in the same way, after gifts became obsolete, the compliments continued, but little by little became more *mutual*, and in the form of *conversation*.

in evincing great interest in the precious existence of the one who is being talked to and an intense desire to see him again. These formulas and formalities, which are becoming briefer but which nonetheless remain the permanent frame for conversation, stamp it with the seal of a true social institution.

Another origin of obligatory conversation must have been the profound boredom that solitude creates for primitive peoples, and illiterate peoples in general, when they have leisure time. The social inferior then makes it a duty to go, even without a gift in hand, to keep his superior company, talking with him in order to relieve his boredom. This origin and the one above easily explain the ritual frame of obligatory conversations.

As for the source of voluntary conversations, it is to be found in human sociability, which at all times has been apparent in free discussions with peers or comrades.

. . . At all times people speak of what their priests or their teachers, their parents or their masters, their orators or the journalists have taught them. Thus the monologues pronounced by superiors feed the dialogues between equals. Let us add that between interlocutors it is rare that the roles are perfectly equal. Most often, one speaks much more than the other. . . .

. . . The greatest force governing modern conversation is books and newspapers. Before the deluge of these two, nothing varied more from one town to another, from one country to another, than conversational subjects, tone, and style, nor was anything more monotonous. At present the reverse is true. The press unifies and invigorates conversations, makes them uniform in space and diversified in time. Every morning the papers give their publics the conversations for the day. One can be almost certain at any moment of the subject of conversation between men talking at a club, in a smoking room, in a lobby. But this subject changes every day and every week, except in the case, fortunately very rare, of a national or international *obsession* with a fixed subject. This increasing similarity of simultaneous conversations in an ever more vast geographic domain is one of the most important characteristics of our time. . . .

Having spoken of the varieties of conversation, its transformations and causes, let us say something about its effects, a subject we have barely touched upon. In order not to omit any, we shall classify these effects according to the well-known broad categories of social relationships. From the linguistic point of view, conversation conserves and enriches languages as long as it does not extend their territorial domain. It stimulates literature, drama in particular. From the religious point of view, it is the most fruitful means of proselytizing, spreading dogmas and skepticism in turn. Religions are established or weakened not so much by preaching as by conversation. From the political point of view, conversation is, before the press, the only brake on governments, the unassailable fortress of liberty. It creates reputations and prestige, determines glory and therefore power. It tends to equate the speakers by assimilating them to one another and destroys hierarchies by expressing them. From the economic point of view, it standardizes judgments of the utility of various riches, creates and specifies the idea of value, and establishes a scale and system of values. Thus, superfluous chatter, a simple waste of time in the eyes of utilitarian economics, is actually the most indispensable of economic agents, since without it there would be no opinion, and without opinion there would be no value, which is in turn the fundamental notion of political economy and of many other social sciences.

From the point of view of ethics, conversation battles constantly and with frequent success against egoism, against the tendency of behavior to follow entirely individual ends. It traces and lays out the precise opposite of this individual teleology, an entirely social teleology whose salutary illusions or conventional conversations give credit to lies by means of appropriate praise and blame which spreads contagiously. By its mutual penetration of hearts and minds, conversation contributes to the germination and progress of a psychology which is not exactly individual, but primarily social and moral. From the aesthetic point of view, conversation engenders politeness first by unilateral, then by mutual flattery. It tends to bring judgments of taste into agreement, eventually succeeds in doing so, and thus elaborates a poetic art, an aesthetic code

which is sovereign and obeyed in each era and in each country. Conversation thus works powerfully for civilization, of which politeness and art are the primary conditions. . . .

There is a tight bond between the functioning of conversation and changes of opinion, and on this depend the vicissitudes of power. . . .

If a man of state, a Mirabeau or a Napoleon, could be *personally* known by all Frenchmen, he would have no need of conversation to establish his authority; the French might be mute, but the majority would still be fascinated by him. But since this cannot be, as soon as the extent of the state has exceeded the limits of a small town, it is necessary for men to talk among themselves to create the prestige which must rule them. After all, three-quarters of the time we obey a man because we see him obeyed by others. The first people who obeyed this man had, or thought they had, reasons for doing so: they had faith in his protective and guiding capabilities or his advanced age, high birth, his physical force, or his eloquence, or his genius. But this faith, which arose in them spontaneously, was communicated by their remarks to others who had faith in their turn. It is by talking of a man's acts that we make him notorious, celebrated, illustrious, or glorious; and once he has achieved power via glory, it is in discussions of his campaign plans or his decrees, his battles or his governmental actions, that we make his power grow or decrease.

In economic life especially, conversation has a fundamental importance that the economists do not seem to have noticed. Is not conversation, the exchange of ideas—or rather a reciprocal or unilateral gift of ideas—the preamble to the exchange of services? It is by words at first, by talking, that men of the same society communicate to each other their needs and desires concerning consumption or production. It is extremely rare that the desire to buy a new object arises simply by our seeing it, without its having been suggested in conversation. . . .

. . . The first mails began as a university and ecclesiastical privilege, or, to go back even farther, a royal privilege.

Of this important institution I shall say only a word to note

that its development conforms to the law of propagation of examples from *top to bottom*. First the kings and popes, then the princes and prelates, had their own mail, before the ordinary lords, then their vassals, then successively all the layers of the nation all the way down to the last also yielded to the temptation to write. . . .

[The number of letters] increased from two and one-half million in 1700 to ten million in 1777: it quadrupled. At present postal statistics enable us to measure the rapid and continuous increase in the number of letters in various countries,⁶ and to measure the unequal but still regular rise in the general need to which it responds. It is able to instruct us on the unequal degrees and the progress of sociability.

But this very statistic is also a good specimen of the fact that there are always qualities hidden beneath social quantities of which statistics in general are the approximate measure.⁷ In fact, from the outside there is nothing more similar than letters of one period and one country, and it would seem that the condition of homogeneous units necessary for the statisticians' calculations could not be better fulfilled. Letters have just about the same format, the same type of envelope and seal, the same type of address. They are now covered with identical stamps. Criminal and civil statistics are far from counting units as similar as these. But open the letters, and what characteristic differences, profound and substantial, you find, despite the constant element of the ritual formulas at the beginning and the end! Adding up such heterogeneous things is therefore not doing very much. We know their number, but not even their length. It would be interesting to find out, at least, if as they become more numerous they become shorter, which seems likely, and more prosaic as well. And if sta-

⁶ In France, for example, from 1830 to 1892 the number of letters grew regularly from year to year (except in 1848 and 1870) from 63 million to 773 million. From 1858 to 1892 the number of telegrams rose, in round numbers, from 32 to 463 million.

⁷ If this were the place, I would show the qualitative elements that are hidden beneath the physical quantities measured by scientific procedures, which are basically analogous to and no less specious than statistics even though they seem more solid.

tistics existed for conversations,⁸ which would be just as legitimate, one would wish, likewise, to know their length, which in our busy century could be in inverse relationship to their frequency. The cities in which it rains the most, in which the most water falls from the sky—please excuse the analogy—are quite often those where it rains the least often. It would be especially interesting to know the innermost substantive transformations of letters as well as of conversations, and here statistics give us no information at all.

In this regard, there is no doubt that the coming of journalism gave a decided stimulus to epistolary transformation. The press, which activated and nourished conversation with so many new stimulants and foods, exhausted, on the other hand, many of the sources of correspondence, which it used for its own benefit. . . .

Will it be said that the press, by liberating and freeing private correspondence from the burden of reporting the news, did epistolary literature the service of pushing it into its true path, narrow but deep, entirely psychological and cordial? I am afraid it would be a delusion to think so. Owing to the increasingly urban nature of our civilization and because the number of our friends and acquaintances does not cease to grow while their degree of intimacy decreases, what we have to say or write is addressed less and less to isolated individuals, and more and more to ever larger groups. Our real interlocuter, our real correspondent is, and more so each day, the Public.⁹ It is, therefore, not completely surprising that printed announcements,¹⁰ and advertisements in newspapers,

⁸ It would be possible if each of us regularly kept a diary analogous to that of the Goncourt brothers. Up to now the only types of conversations recorded are the numbers of meetings of Congress or of learned societies, and the statistics affirm a constant progression.

⁹ The need to speak to a public is fairly recent. Even the kings of the ancien régime never spoke to the public: they spoke to bodies, such as Parliament, the clergy, never to the nation taken *en masse*, and certainly not to particular individuals.

¹⁰ Printed announcements of marriages, births, and deaths deprived private correspondence of one of its most fruitful topics. In a volume of Voltaire's correspondence is a series of letters dedicated to announcing to the friends of Mme du Châtelet, with ingenious and laborious variations of style, the birth of the child she had just produced.

increase much more rapidly than private letters. Perhaps we even have the right to think it probable that these latter, the familiar, chatty letters, which must be distinguished from business letters, continue to diminish in number and still more in length, to judge by the extraordinary simplification and abbreviation even of love letters appearing in the "personal correspondence" section of certain newspapers.¹¹ The utilitarian terseness of telegrams and telephone conversations, which are trespassing on the domains of correspondence, has repercussions on the style of even the most intimate letters. Invaded by the press from one side, by the telegraph and the telephone from the other, preyed upon on both sides at once, if correspondence still lives and even, according to postal statistics, gives illusory signs of prosperity, it can only be because of the increase in business letters.

The personal letter, familiar and well developed, was killed by the newspaper. This is understandable, since the newspaper is the superior equivalent of the letter, or rather its extension and amplification, its universal dissemination. The newspaper does not have the same origins as the book. Books come from speeches, from monologues, and especially from poems and songs. The book of poetry preceded the book of prose; the sacred book preceded the profane. The origin of books is lyrical and religious. But the origin of the newspaper is secular and familiar. It comes from the private letter, which itself comes from conversation. Hence newspapers began as private letters addressed to individuals and copied a certain number of times. . . .

The newspaper, in short, is a public letter, a public conversation, which is derived from private letters and conversation and is becoming their great regulator and their most abundant nourishment, uniform for everyone in the whole world, changing pro-

¹¹ What is undeniably decreasing and becoming simplified in letters of all types is their ceremony. Compare "yours sincerely" of the present with the closing formalities of the sixteenth and seventeenth century. The change in ritual conversational formulas in this same direction is not to be doubted, but since they never left a durable trace it is easier to study this progression or regression in the correspondence of the past and the present.

foundly for everyone from one day to the next. It began as only a prolonged echo of chats and correspondences and ended up as their almost exclusive source. Correspondence still lives, more than ever, and especially in the most concentrated and modern of its forms, the telegram. A private telegram addressed to the editor-in-chief results in a sensational new story of intense immediacy, which will instantaneously arouse crowds in all the great cities of the continent; from these dispersed crowds, in intimate though distant contact through their consciousness of their simultaneity and their mutual action born of the action of the news story, the newspaper will create an immense, abstract, and sovereign crowd, which it will name opinion. The newspaper has thus finished the age-old work that conversation began, that correspondence extended, but that always remained in a state of a sparse and scattered outline—the fusion of personal opinions into local opinions, and this into national and *world* opinion, the grandiose unification of the public mind. I say the *public* mind, not the national or the traditional mind, which remain basically distinct despite the double invasion of this *rational*, serious internationalism, of which the national mind is often no more than the popular echo and repercussion. This is an enormous power, one that can only increase, because the need to agree with the public of which one is a part, to think and act in agreement with opinion, becomes all the more strong and irresistible as the public becomes more numerous, the opinion more imposing, and the need itself more often satisfied. One should thus not be surprised to see our contemporaries so pliant before the wind of passing opinion, nor should one conclude from this that characters have necessarily weakened. When poplars and oaks are brought down by a storm, it is not because they grew weaker but because the wind grew stronger.

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3. Show why, in exchange or diplomacy, the one who best dissembles his estimate of the thing he has and of the thing the other man has is likely to get the better of the bargain.
4. Account for the fact that the best way to get the offer of the coveted position is to affect an indifference to it.
5. Explain why, in coping with men, boldness is so often justified by the outcome. Is it so in coping with nature?
6. Why is it safer, on meeting a formidable animal, to stand than to run?
7. What is the point of the saying, "He doth protest too much"?
8. Justify by psychology the advice in "Joseph Vance" (p. 48): "When a chap thinks you know he believes in your solvency, don't deceive him by offering him cash. Then he'll know you think he believes you insolvent and never give you a brass farden o' credit."
9. Explain the good moral influence of certain teachers and the utter lack of influence of other teachers.
10. Does the succession of hero types in the development of the boy into the man correspond to the succession of folk heroes in the rise of a people from barbarism to civilization?

CHAPTER III

THE CROWD

THE strength of multiplied suggestion is at its maximum when the individual is in the midst of a throng, helpless to control his position or movements. The same pressure on the body that prevents voluntary movement conveys promptly to him all the electrifying swayings and tremors that betray the emotions of the mass. This squeeze of the crowd tends to depress the self-sense. Says James:¹ —

Individuality
and voluntary move-
ment

"In a sense, then, . . . the 'Self of selves,' when carefully examined, is found to consist mainly of the collection of these peculiar motions in the head and between the head and the throat. I do not for a moment say that this is all it consists of . . . but I feel quite sure that these cephalic motions are the portions of my innermost activity of which I am most distinctly aware. If the dim portions which I cannot yet define should prove to be like unto these distinct portions in me, and I like other men, it would follow that our entire feeling of spiritual activity, or what commonly passes by that name, is really a feeling of bodily activities, whose exact nature is by most men overlooked."

Sidis² goes further in declaring: "If anything gives us a strong sense of our individuality, it is surely our voluntary movements. We may say that the individual self

¹ "The Principles of Psychology," I, 301.

² "The Psychology of Suggestion," 299.

grows and expands with the increase of variety and intensity of its voluntary activity; and conversely, the life of the individual self sinks, shrinks with the decrease of variety and intensity of voluntary movements." Often a furious naughty child will suddenly become meek and obedient after being held a moment as in a vise. On the playground a saucy boy will abruptly surrender and "take it back" when held firmly on the ground without power to move hand or foot. The cause is not fear, but deflation of the ego.

Depression
of the self
sense in the
throng

Here, perhaps, is the reason why individuality is so wilted in a dense throng, and why persons of a highly developed but somewhat fragile personality have a horror of getting nipped in a crowd. It is said that in the French theatre of the old régime the standing portion of the audience (pit) was always more emotional and violent in its demonstrations than the sitting portion (parquet), and that the providing of seats for the pit spectators greatly quieted their demeanor. The experienced orator knows that a standing open-air crowd is very different in response from a seated indoor audience, and changes his style accordingly.

Fixation of
attention

Nevertheless, a holiday jam in a railroad station or at a race-course is no mob. A crowd self will not arise unless there is an orientation of attention, expectancy, a narrowing of the field of consciousness that excludes disturbing impressions. When a crowd is entering the critical state, we hear of "strained attention," "sea of upturned faces," "bated breath," "ominous hush," "a silence such that you can hear a fly buzz or a pin drop." The following newspaper account¹ of a Paderewski *matinée* shows the rôle of expectancy and inhibition:

¹ See Sldis, "The Psychology of Suggestion," 301.

"There is a chatter, a rustling of programmes, a waving of fans, a nodding of feathers, a general air of expectancy, and the lights are lowered. A hush. All eyes are turned to a small door leading on to the stage; it is opened. Paderewski enters. . . . A storm of applause greets him, . . . but after it comes a tremulous hush and a prolonged sigh, . . . created by the long, deep inhalation of upward of three thousand women. . . . Paderewski is at the piano. . . . Thousands of eyes watch every commonplace movement [of his] through opera-glasses with an intensity painful to observe. He the idol, they the idolaters. . . . Toward the end of the performance the most decorous women seem to abandon themselves to the influence. . . . There are sighs, sobs, the tight clenching of the palms, the bowing of the head. Fervid exclamations: 'He is my master!' are heard in the feminine mob."

An excited throng easily turns mob because excitement weakens the reasoning power and predisposes to suggestions in line with the master emotion. Thus, frightened persons are peculiarly susceptible to warnings, angry persons to denunciations, expectant persons to promises, anxious persons to rumors. An agitated gathering is tinder, and the throngs that form in times of public tension are very liable to become mobs.

Excitement

Although crowding, fixation of attention, and excitement exalt suggestibility, all members of the crowd do not experience this in the same degree. There are at least two descriptions of people who, in the give-and-take of the throng, are more likely to impose suggestions than to accept them. The *intelligent* are able to criticise and appraise the suggestions that impinge upon them. They are quick to react if a suggestion clashes with their in-

Elements in the crowd that profit by the heightened suggestibility

terests or their convictions, whereas the ignorant are at the mercy of the leader or the clique, and may be stampeded into a course of action quite at variance with their real desires. The *fanatical and impassioned* are little responsive to impressions from without, because of their inner tension. Being determined from within, they emit powerful suggestions, but are hard to influence. There is thus a tendency for the warped and inflamed members to impart their passion to the rest and to sweep along with them the neutral and indifferent. This is why, as the crowd comes under the hypnotic spell, the extremists gain the upper hand of the moderates.

Emotion-
alism of the
crowd

Feelings, having more means of vivid expression, run through the crowd more readily than ideas. Masked by their anonymity, people feel free to give rein to the expression of their feelings. To be heard, one does not speak; one shouts. To be seen, one does not simply show one's self; one gesticulates. Boisterous laughter, frenzied objurgations, frantic cheers, are needed to express the merriment or wrath or enthusiasm of the crowd. Such exaggerated signs of emotion cannot but produce in suggestible beholders exaggerated states of mind. The mental temperature rises, so that what seemed hot now seems lukewarm, what felt tepid now feels cold. The intensifying of the feelings in consequence of reciprocal suggestion will be most rapid when the crowd meets under agitating circumstances. In this case the unbridled manifestation of feeling prevails from the first, and the psychic fermentation proceeds at a great rate.

Arrest of
thought in
the crowd

To the degree that feeling is intensified, reason is paralyzed. In general, strong emotion inhibits the intellectual processes. In a sudden crisis we expect the sane act

from the man who is "cool," who has not "lost his head." Now, the very hurly-burly of the crowd tends to distraction. Then, the high pitch of feeling to which the crowd gradually works up checks thinking and results in a temporary imbecility. There is no question that, taken herdwise, people are less sane and sensible than they are dispersed.

In a real deliberative assembly there is a possibility that the best thought, the soundest opinion, the shrewdest plan advanced from any quarter will prevail. Where there is cool discussion and leisurely reflection, ideas struggle with one another, and the fittest are accepted by all. In the fugitive, structureless crowd, however, there can be no fruitful debate. Under a wise leader the crowd may act sagaciously. But there is no guarantee that the master of the crowd shall be wiser than his followers. The man of biggest voice or wildest language, the aggressive person who first leaps upon a table, raises aloft a symbol, or utters a catching phrase, is likely to become the bell-wether.

The crowd
leader

Under these conditions — heightened suggestibility and emotion, arrested thinking — three things will happen when an impulse, whether emanating from a spectacle, an event, or a leader, runs through the crowd.

The psychic
process in
the crowd

1. *Extension.* — By sheer contagion it extends to unsympathetic persons. Thus by-standing scoffers have been drawn into a revival maelstrom,¹ law-abiding persons

¹ Davenport tells of a young man who happened to be standing as a spectator on the fringe of a Southern camp-meeting of two thousand people. "He had had no religious experience and at that time did not wish any. The crowd was laboring under great religious excitement, and reflex phenomena were abundantly in evidence. Suddenly my friend found himself with his hands pressed against his lungs, shouting,

have been sucked into the vortex of a brutal lynching bee, hard-headed workingmen with dependent families have been stampeded into a sympathetic strike. In his story "On the City Wall," Kipling introduces a young native just back to Madras from Oxford. He is a typical product of Western culture, polished, sceptical, utterly aloof from his people, and contemptuous of the foolish religious riots between Hindu and Mohammedan fanatics. He shows us this same scoffer a few hours later fighting furiously in the thick of the riot on behalf of his Mohammedan coreligionists for whose faith he cares not a straw. Sidis¹ cites an incident of the riots of certain military colonists in Russia in 1831: "While Sokolov was fighting hard for his life, I saw a corporal lying on the piazza and crying bitterly. On my question, 'Why do you cry?' he pointed in the direction of the mob and exclaimed, 'Oh, they do not kill a commander, but a father!' I told him that instead of it he should rather go to Sokolov's aid. He rose at once and ran to the help of his commander. A little later when I came with a few soldiers to Sokolov's help, I found the same corporal striking Sokolov with a club. 'Wretch, what are you

'Hallelujah!' at the top of his voice." In a Southern congregation brought to the revival point by the preaching of Dr. Alexander, "the sympathetic wave spread from the centre to the circumference, and the whole audience was swayed like a forest in a mighty wind. Dr. Alexander himself is on record as having found it necessary to put forth a conscious effort of resistance in order to hold himself steady in the violence of the storm, and he testified that the old tobacco planters in the rear, who had not listened to one word of the sermon, displayed tremulous emotion in every muscle of their brawny faces, while the tears coursed down their wrinkled cheeks." — "Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals," 226, 227.

¹ "The Psychology of Suggestion," 305.

doing? Have you not told me he was to you like a father?' To which he answered, 'It is such a time, your honor; all the people strike him; why should I keep quiet?'" An English prison matron confesses that sometimes when she hears the women under her care "break out" and commence smashing and destroying everything they can get hold of, it is as much as she can do to restrain herself from joining in.

2. *Intensification*. — Each individual impressed feels more intensely the moment he perceives that so many others share his feeling. Hence, a secondary wave, a reverberation, runs through the crowd that is becoming aware of itself.

3. *Predisposition*. — The perceived unison begets a sympathy that makes like response easier the next time.

Since each fulfilled suggestion increases the emotion of the mob in volume and pitch, the passing of the crowd into the mob is more or less gradual. A mob is a *formation that takes time*. The revivalist expects little response during his first half-hour. No matter how brilliant his work in the earlier scenes, an actor will not elicit the wildest demonstrations from his audience until the closing acts. There are always several steps in the decline of an orderly crowd into a riotous mob. It is not a single blow, but a quick succession of shocks, that throws an army into a panic. In all these cases, with the growing fascination of the mass for the individual, his consciousness contracts to the pin-point of the immediate moment, and the volume of suggestion needed to start an impulse on its conquering career becomes less and less. He becomes automatic, in a way unconscious. The end is a tranced impressionable condition akin to hypnosis.

Time nec
for the en
gence of
crowd act

The Ken-
tucky
Revival

There is no assignable limit to the mastery of the crowd self over the selves of the members. McMaster¹ thus describes a famous Kentucky revival, 1799-1800. "One of the brothers was irresistibly impelled to speak. . . . The words which then fell from his lips roused the people before him 'to a pungent sense of sin.' Again and again the woman shouted, and would not be silent. He started to go to her. The crowd begged him to turn back. Something within him urged him on, and he went through the house shouting and exhorting and praising God. In a moment the floor, to use his own words, 'was covered with the slain.' Their cries for mercy were terrible to hear. Some found forgiveness, but many went away 'spiritually wounded' and suffering unutterable agony of soul. Nothing could allay the excitement. Every settlement along the Green River and the Cumberland was full of religious fervor. Men fitted their wagons with beds and provisions, and travelled fifty miles to camp upon the ground and hear him preach. The idea was new; hundreds adopted it, and camp-meetings began.

"At no time was the 'falling exercise' so prevalent as at night. Nothing was then wanting that could strike terror into minds weak, timid, and harassed. The red glare of the camp-fires reflected from hundreds of tents and wagons; the dense blackness of the flickering shadows, the darkness of the surrounding forest, made still more terrible by the groans and screams of the 'spiritually wounded,' who had fled to it for comfort; the entreaty of the preachers; the sobs and shrieks of the downcast still walking through the dark valley of the Shadow of Death; the shouts and songs of praise of the happy ones

¹ "History of the People of the United States," II, 578-582.

who had crossed the Delectable Mountains, had gone on through the fogs of the Enchanted Ground, and entered the Land of Beulah, were too much for those over whose minds and bodies lively imaginations held full sway. The heart swelled, the nerves gave way, the hands and feet grew cold, and, motionless and speechless, they fell headlong to the ground. In a moment crowds gathered about them to pray and shout. Some lay still as death. Some passed through frightful twitchings of face and limb. At Cabin Creek so many fell that, lest the multitude should tread on them, they were carried to the meeting-house and laid in rows on the floor. At Cane Ridge the number was three thousand."

"The excitement surpassed anything that had been known. Men who came to scoff remained to preach. All day and all night the crowd swarmed to and fro from preacher to preacher, singing, shouting, laughing, now rushing off to listen to some new exhorter who had climbed upon a stump, now gathering around some unfortunate who, in their peculiar language, was 'spiritually slain.' Soon men and women fell in such numbers that it became impossible to move about without trampling them, and they were hurried to the meeting-house. At no time was the floor less than half covered. Some lay quiet, unable to move or speak. Some talked, but could not move. Some beat the floor with their heels. Some, shrieking in agony, bounded about, it is said, like a live fish out of water. Many lay down and rolled over and over for hours at a time. Others rushed wildly over the stumps and benches, and then plunged, shouting Lost! Lost! into the forest.

"As the meetings grew more and more frequent, this

nervous excitement assumed new and more terrible forms. One was known as jerking; another, as the barking exercise; a third, as the Holy Laugh. 'The jerks' began in the head and spread rapidly to the feet. The head would be thrown from side to side so swiftly that the features would be blotted out and the hair made to snap. When the body was affected, the sufferer was hurled over hindrances that came in his way, and finally dashed on the ground to bounce about like a ball. At camp-meetings in the far South, saplings were cut off breast-high and left 'for the people to jerk by.' One who visited such a camp-ground declares that about the roots of from fifty to one hundred saplings the earth was kicked up 'as by a horse stamping flies.'"

"From the nerves and muscles the disorder passed to the mind. Men dreamed dreams and saw visions, nay, fancied themselves dogs, went down on all fours, and barked till they grew hoarse. It was no uncommon sight to behold numbers of them gathered about a tree, barking, yelping, 'treeing the devil.' Two years later, when much of the excitement of the great revival had gone down, falling and jerking gave way to hysterics. During the most earnest preaching and exhorting, even sincere professors of religion would, on a sudden, burst into loud laughter; others, unable to resist, would follow, and soon the assembled multitude would join in. This was the 'Holy Laugh,' and became, after 1803, a recognized part of worship."

Coe¹ thus accounts for the extraordinary phenomena often manifested in religious assemblies. "The striking psychic manifestations which reach their climax among

¹ "The Spiritual Life," 141-143, 146.

us in emotional revivals, camp-meetings, and negro services have a direct relation to certain states of an essentially hypnotic and hallucinatory kind. In various forms such states have appeared and reappeared throughout the history of religion. Examples of what is here referred to are found in the sacred frenzy of the Bacchantes, the trance of the Sibyls, the ecstasy of the Neo-Platonists, the enlightenment that came to Gautama Buddha under the sacred Bo-tree, the visions of the canonized saints, the absorption into God experienced by various mystics, and the religious epidemics of the Middle Ages, such as tarantism and St. Vitus's dance. All these and a multitude of similar phenomena were produced by processes easily recognized by any modern psychologist as automatic and suggestive. Similarly, the phenomenon in Methodist history known as the 'power' was induced by hypnotic processes now well understood, though hidden until long after the days of the Wesleys." "The explanation of the 'power' and similar outbreaks is simple. Under the pressure of religious excitement there occurs a sporadic case of hallucination, or of motor automatism, or of auto-hypnotism, taking the form of trance, visions, voices, or catalepsy. The onlookers naturally conceive a more or less distressing fear lest the mysterious power attack their own persons. Fear acts as a suggestion, and the more suggestible soon realize their expectation. In accordance with the law of suggestion, every new case adds power to the real cause and presently the conditions are right for an epidemic of such experiences." "Suggestion works in proportion as it secures a monopoly of attention. Let us ask what, according to this law, will happen to passably suggestible persons who submit them-

selves to certain well-known revival practices. Let us suppose that the notion of a striking transformation has been held before the subject's mind for days, weeks, or even years; let us suppose that the subject has finally been induced to go to the penitent form; here, we will suppose, prayers full of sympathy and emotional earnestness are offered for him, and that everything has been so arranged as to produce a climax in which he will finally believe that the connection between himself and God is now accomplished. 'The leader says to him: 'Do you now believe? 'Then you are saved.' Is it not evident that this whole process favors the production of a profound emotional transformation directly through suggestion?"

The crowd
cannot last

The crowd self is ephemeral. Not for long can it supersede the individual self. The straining of attention leads to fatigue, lessened power of response to further suggestions. Then, stimuli from within help to break the spell. Sensations of hunger, cold, and weariness become so insistent as to distract the attention. Presently the bond dissolves, and the crowd scatters. Mobs have been broken up by a downpour of rain or an alarm of fire. The little Corsican disperses a turbulent crowd with grape; the humane philosopher turns a fire hose on it. It is easy to tell whether a riot is a collective aberration or a work of intent by noticing whether the crowd returns the next day. If it does, there is more behind it than mass psychology.

The crowd
is unstable

Whether its members be saints or knaves, sages or hoodlums, the self of the crowd exhibits certain characteristics. It is *unstable*, as the word "mob" (*mobile*) indicates. Its hero one moment may be its victim the next. It may pass abruptly from reckless courage to

dastard fear. Little things turn its purpose. Taine¹ tells of a street mob bent on hanging a supposed monopolizer. By some words uttered on his behalf it was brought to embrace him, drink with him, and make him join them in a mad dance about a liberty pole. At the close of the Paris Commune, a crowd, irritated by the defiant air of one of the communist women, howls, "Death to her!" An old gentleman cries, "No cruelty, after all it is a woman!" In a moment the wrath of the crowd is turned on him. "He is a communist, an incendiary!" But in this critical moment the shrill voice of a gamin is heard, "Don't hurt him, she's his girl!" Thereupon a great burst of laughter about the old gentleman, and he is saved.²

The crowd self is *credulous*. The "holding-off" attitude is a kind of inhibition, for we tend to believe what we hear reiterated with fire. Now, in a psychological crowd, individuals are "out of themselves." For them the past does not exist. Rational analysis and test are out of the question. *The faculties we doubt with are asleep*. Again, the crowd self is *irrational*. It cannot dissect, weigh, and compare, cannot apply remembered teachings. Under the sway of vivid impressions through eye or ear the man in the crowd cannot relate his present problem to his previous experiences. His actions are near to reflexes. The crowd self shows *simplicity*. Like children and savages, it cannot embrace in a single judgment several factors and details. It sees only one aspect of a thing at a time.³ It may face about completely when

The crowd
is credulous,
irrational,
and simple-
minded

¹ "Révolution Française," II, 145.

² Tarde, "Essais et mélanges sociologiques," 22.

³ In Cincinnati, in 1884, a mob, outraged by the acquittal of a brutal murderer, burned the Court House when balked of their lynching purpose.

some other aspect is thrown into the focus of its attention. Unable to think things in their actual complexity, the crowd trusts to impressions or prejudices, if it is heterogeneous; to glittering generalities or abstract principles if it is a political or legislative assembly.

The crowd
lacks virtue

Finally, the crowd self is *immoral*. To be sure, it is capable of courage and generosity, even of honesty. The perpetrators of the September massacres in the French Revolution faithfully turned in the money and valuables found on their victims, while the mob that invaded the Tuileries in 1848 refrained from carrying away any of the priceless objects they saw. The crowd is emotional, and some of its emotions may be moral. On the whole, however, the virtues grow on an intellectual stalk. Right conduct is thought-out conduct. (Conscience is a way of thinking things.) Now, thronging paralyzes thought, and while the crowd may be sentimental and heroic, it will lack the virtues born of self-control—veracity, prudence, thrift, perseverance, respect for another's rights, obedience to law.

The crowd
is the lowest
form of
association

It is safe to conclude that amorphous, heterogeneous gatherings are morally and intellectually below the average of their members. This manner of coming together deteriorates. The crowd may generate moral fervor, but it never sheds light. If at times it has furthered progress, it is because the mob serves as a battering-ram to raze some mouldering, bat-infested institution and clean

Their idea was to rebuke tricky, dishonest lawyers by destroying a building which had become a den of corruption rather than a temple of justice. A moment's cool reflection would have shown them that by burning the records of a century regarding wills, marriages, property transfers, mortgages, etc., they would produce enough litigation to fatten the hated lawyers for a generation.

the ground for something better. This better will be the creation of gifted individuals or of deliberative bodies, never of anonymous crowds. It is easier for masses to agree on a Nay than on a Yea. Hence crowds destroy despotisms, but never build free states; abolish evils, but never found works of beneficence. Essentially atavistic and sterile, the crowd ranks as the lowest of the forms of human association.

Hearing,
mental in-
on

A free people is obliged to settle matters of common concern in a deliberative assembly. But the big assembly skirts ever the slippery incline that leads down to mob madness, and guard-rails in the form of fixed modes of procedure are necessary to save it a misstep. Its chief protection is the Parliamentary Rules of Order, wrought out in the venerable House of Commons and certainly not the least among England's gifts to the world. The rules requiring that a meeting shall have a chairman, that the chairman shall not take part in debate, that no one shall speak without recognition, that the speaker shall address the chair and not the assembly, that remarks shall pertain to a pending motion, that personalities shall be taboo, and that members shall not be referred to by name — what are they but so many devices to keep the honey-tongued or brazen-throated crowd leader from springing to the centre of the stage and weaving his baleful spells! The rules that the hearers be in order, that they remain seated, that they forbear to interrupt, that they patiently listen to all speakers regularly recognized, and that their signs of approval or disapproval be decorous — are not these so many guard-rails to help the assembly get safely by certain vertiginous moments?

How delib-
erative
assemblies
escape the
crowd vortex

It has long been recognized that the behavior of city populations under excitement shows the familiar characteristics of the mob, quite apart from any thronging. Here we get unanimity, impulsiveness, exaggeration of feeling, excessive credulity, fickleness, inability to reason, and sudden alternations of boldness and cowardice. Here, indeed, are the chief counts in the indictment which historians have drawn against the city democracies of old Greece and mediæval Italy.

The city
facilitates
inter-sug-
gestion

These faults are due in part to the nervous strain of great cities. The bombardment of the senses by innumerable impressions tends to produce neurasthenia, the peculiar affliction of the city dweller. Moreover, in the sheltered life of the city live many degenerates that would be unsparingly eliminated by the sterner conditions of existence in the country. In the main, however, the behavior of city dwellers under excitement can best be understood as the result of mental contacts made possible by easy communication. Even in the crowd, the main thing is the contact of minds. Let this be given and the three consequences above pointed out must follow. An expectant or excited man learns that thousands of his fellow-townsmen have been seized by a certain strong feeling and meets with their expression of this feeling. Each of these townsmen learns how many others are feeling as he does. Each stage in the subsequent growth of this feeling in extent and in intensity is perceived, and so fosters sympathy and a will to "go along." Will we not inevitably, by this series of interactions, get that "out"-look which characterizes the human atom in the mob?

Says Jones:¹ "Inasmuch as the prevailing economic

¹ "Economic Crises," 204-205.

system enforces intimate association in a sense in which no previous system ever did, this class of influences tending to vitiate the economic reasoning of those who are subject to market influences may well demand serious attention. Businesses are being increasingly concentrated in large cities, and especially are those who control them being closely compacted together in the business sections of great cities. It has been asserted that these conditions originate the influences which breed crises, and the case of Australia, where the population is unusually concentrated in cities, has been cited as evidence. 'A large city is characterized by an intensity of internal imitation in proportion to the density of population, and a multiform multiplicity of the relations of its inhabitants. Thus there is an epidemic and contagious character given not only to its diseases, but to its styles and views.' The so-called 'booms' of American towns illustrate in acute form the occasional economic effect of these influences. The power of mental contagion is increased by such facilities for assemblage and communication as the railway, telegraph, and telephone. It is obviously enhanced by the practice of transacting business in industrial assemblages such as stock and produce exchanges. Attention may be called to the fact that in periods of unusual business success or depression, this physical concentration of traders in large markets is greatly increased."

But the propinquity of city people may be more than counteracted by their mental and moral heterogeneity. Says Professor Giddings:¹ "The increasing density of

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¹ *Forum*, 35, pp. 251-252.

modern populations is seemingly favorable to popular tumult, which might easily become insurrection or revolution. In the literature of political science there is perhaps no more familiar assumption than the one which associates all the dangers of the mob spirit with the democratic organization of great cities." Yet "a systematic grouping of observations from many parts of the world would demonstrate that the phenomena of lawless popular action, as in insurrections, lynchings, and riotous outbreaks in connection with labor strikes, are, on the whole, phenomena of rural rather than of urban population. There have been scenes of wild violence in Paris and in London; there have been draft and other riots in New York City; but the collective violence in all the great cities of Europe and America for two hundred years would not make a great showing by comparison with the epidemics of emotion — accompanied by dancing and other manias — that surged through rural communities in connection with the great revival movements under the Wesleyans, the later revivals of 1837 and 1857, the insurrections like Shays's Rebellion and the Whiskey Rebellion, the Ku Klux Klan outrages, the Vigilance Committee activities, the conflicts between Gentiles and Mormons, the White Cap outrages, and the lynchings in our Western and Southern states.

"The reason for this curious fact is undoubtedly to be found in the restraining effect of ethnic and mental difference. The rural community is relatively homogeneous. The 'neighbors' for miles in every direction are nearly all of one blood. They are practically of one economic condition. For the most part they are of one religious confession or of two or three confessions not very unlike

Obstacles to
impulsive
coöperation
among city
dwellers

in creeds and practices. All are acquainted with one another. An exciting event or suggestion that moves one will, almost certainly, move the others. Emotion among them is highly contagious. They respond to like stimuli because they are alike. The city population is composite and differentiated. In a mixed crowd of hundreds that gathers on the street no one man of them all recognizes a dozen others. They are of all sorts and conditions, the well-to-do and the poor, and often of many nationalities. Danger arises only when discontent and inflammatory suggestion find homogeneous material to work upon in a quarter whose denizens are of one nationality and of the same economic condition, and among whom may be found, here and there, small gangs of toughs who are already disciplined in associating for lawless purposes. Only an extraordinary influence can combine the impulsive tendencies among unlike classes, differing nationalities, unacquainted neighborhoods, in one great outbreak. Such things have happened, and doubtless will happen again; but the normal influence of heterogeneity and differentiation in a population is unfavorable to collective action."

SUMMARY

In the dense throng individuality wits and droops.

A common orientation of attention and a state of excitement predispose to the mob mood.

The heightened suggestibility of people under such conditions exaggerates the influence of the fanatical and impassioned.

Crowd conditions facilitate the circulation of feelings, hinder the circulation of ideas.

Under these conditions the dominant emotional note reaches an extreme pitch.

In the crowd rational or accurate thinking is arrested.

Every impulse that traverses the crowd smooths the way for its successor. The merging of many individual selves into a single crowd self therefore takes time.

The crowd self is unstable, credulous, irrational, and immoral.

The Rules of Order save the deliberative assembly from degenerating into a crowd.

EXERCISE

Show that each of these arts of the popular orator finds its warrant in some psychological characteristic of the crowd. If possible read Le Bon's "The Crowd," Bk. I, ch. III; Bk. II, ch. II, sec. I, ch. III.

1. At the outset seem to agree with it.
2. Vigorously affirm and reiterate with fire and passion.
3. Make each imagine you address him. By eye, voice, attitude, and action rivet attention and keep the spell unbroken.
4. Cut out facts, statistics, valid proof, and evidence.
5. Never argue or follow out painstakingly the links of a logical chain.
6. Use demonstration, ocular evidence, histrionism.
7. Use figures of speech, metaphors, emblems (flag, group symbol, totem), and shibboleths ("family," "home," "the Church," "the Fathers," "Our Country," "our Cause," "the Right").
8. Address passions (including, of course, cupidity), but not rational interests.

CHAPTER IV

MOB MIND

PRESENCE is not essential to mass suggestion. Mental touch is no longer bound up with physical proximity. With the telegraph to collect and transmit the expressions and signs of the ruling mood, and the fast mail to hurry to the eager clutch of waiting thousands the still damp sheets of the morning daily, remote people are brought, as it were, into one another's presence. Through its organs the excited public is able to assail the individual with a mass of suggestion almost as vivid as if he actually stood in the midst of an immense crowd.

Mob mind
without the
crowd

Formerly, within a day, a shock might throw into a fever all within a hundred miles. The next day it might agitate the zone beyond, but meanwhile the first body of people would have cooled down and become ready to listen to reason. And so, while a wave of excitement passed slowly over the country, the entire folk was at no moment in a state of agitation. Now, however, our space-annihilating devices make a shock well-nigh simultaneous. A vast public shares the same rage, alarm, enthusiasm, or horror. Then, as each part of the mass becomes acquainted with the sentiment of all the rest, the feeling is generalized and intensified. In the end the public swallows up the individuality of the ordinary man in much the same way the crowd swallows up the individuality of its members.

The public

Differences
between
crowd and
public

Nevertheless, public and crowd are not identical in their characteristics. If by the aid of a telephonic news service — as in Budapest — people were brought into immediate touch, there would still be lacking certain conditions of the mob state. The hurly-burly, the press and heave of the crowd are avoided when contact is purely mental. As we have seen, in the throng the means of expressing feeling are much more effective than the facilities for expressing thought. But in a dispersed group feeling enjoys no such advantage. Both are confined to the same vehicle — the printed word — and so ideas and opinions run as rapidly through the public as emotions.

The psy-
chology of
the public
more nor-
mal

One is member of but one crowd at a time, but by reading a number of newspapers, one can belong to several publics with, perhaps, different planes of vibration. So far as these various unanimities cross and neutralize one another, the suction of the public will be weakened. The crowd may be stampeded into folly or crime by accidental leaders. The public can receive suggestions only through the columns of its journal, the editor of which is like the chairman of a mass-meeting, for no one can be heard without his recognition. For all these reasons the psychology of the public, though similar to that of the crowd, is more normal.

Ours is the
era of publics

Ours is not the era of hereditary rulers, oligarchies, hierarchies, or close corporations. But neither is it, as some insist, "the era of crowds." It is, in fact, *the era of publics*. Those who perceive that to-day under the influence of universal discussion the old fixed groupings which held their members so tenaciously — sects, parties, castes, and the like — are liquefying, that allegiances sit lightly, and that men are endlessly passing into new

combinations, seek to stigmatize these loose associations as "crowds." The true crowd is, however, in a declining rôle. Universal contact by means of print ushers in "the rule of public opinion," which is a totally different thing from "government by the mob."

The principal manifestations of mob mind / in vast bodies of dispersed individuals are the *craze* and the *fad*. These may be defined as *that irrational unanimity of interest, feeling, opinion, or deed in a body of communicating individuals, which results from suggestion and imitation*. In the chorus of execration over a sensational crime, in the clamor for the blood of an assassin, in waves of national feeling, in political "land-slides," in passionate "sympathetic" strikes, in cholera scares, in popular delusions, in religious crazes, in migration manias, in "booms" and panics, in agitations and insurrections, we witness contagion on a gigantic scale, favored in some cases by popular hysteria.

Craze and fad are symptoms of mob mind

As there must be in the typical mob a centre which radiates impulses by fascination till they have subdued enough people to continue their course by sheer intimidation, so for the *craze* there must be an excitant, overcoming so many people that these can affect the rest by mere volume of suggestion. This first orientation may be produced by some striking event or incident. The murder of a leader, an insult to an ambassador, the predictions of a crazy fanatic, the words of a "Messiah," a sensational proclamation, the arrest of an agitator, a *coup d'état*, the advent of a new railroad, the collapse of a prominent bank, a number of deaths by an epidemic, a series of mysterious murders, an inexplicable occurrence, such as a comet, an eclipse, a star shower, or an earthquake,—

Theory of the craze

each of these has been the starting-point of some fever, mania, crusade, uprising, boom, panic, delusion, or fright. The more expectant or overwrought the public mind, the easier it is to set up a great perturbation. After a series of public calamities, a train of startling events, a pestilence, an earthquake, or a war, the anchor of reason finds no holding ground, and minds are blown about by every gust of passion or sentiment.

Socio-psychic phenomena in the early church

The early years of Christianity were marked by extraordinary signs of exalted suggestibility. Harnack¹ cites the following phenomena — regarded as tokens "of the Spirit and of Power" — in the primitive Christian church.

"1. God speaks to the missionaries in visions, dreams, and ecstasy, revealing to them affairs of moment and also trifles, controlling their plans, and pointing out the roads on which they are to travel, the cities where they are to stay, and the persons whom they are to visit. Visions emerge especially after martyrdom, the dead martyr appearing to his friends during the weeks that immediately follow his death, as in the case of Potamiana, or of Cyprian, or of many others.

"2. At the missionary addresses of the apostles or evangelists, or at the services of the churches which they founded, sudden movements of rapture are experienced, many of them being simultaneous seizures; these are either full of terror and dismay, convulsing the whole spiritual life, or exultant outbursts of a joy that sees heaven opened to its eyes. The simple question, 'What must I do to be saved?' also bursts upon the mind with an elemental force."

¹ "Expansion of Christianity," I, 251-252.

² How like all this to certain modern experiences! Says Evans, speaking of the conclusive manifestations among the Shakers: "Sometimes, after sitting awhile in silent meditation, they were seized with a

"3. Some are inspired, who have power to clothe their experience in words — prophets to explain the past, to interpret and to fathom the present, and to foretell the future. Their prophecies relate to the general course of history, but also to the fortunes of individuals, to what individuals are to do or leave undone.

"4. Brethren are inspired with the impulse to improvise prayers and hymns and psalms.

"5. Others are so filled with the Spirit that they lose consciousness and break out in stammering speech and cries, in intelligible utterances which can be interpreted, however, by those who have the gift.

"6. Into the hands of others, again, the Spirit slips a pen, either in an ecstasy or in exalted moments of spiritual tension; they not merely speak, but write as they are bidden.

"7. Sick persons are brought to be healed by the missionaries, or by brethren who have been but recently awakened; wild paroxysms of terror in God's presence are also soothed, and in the name of Jesus demons are cast out.

"8. The Spirit impels men to an immense variety of extraordinary actions — to symbolic actions which are meant to reveal some mystery or to give some directions for life, as well as to deeds of heroism.

mighty trembling, under which they would often express the indignation of God against all sin, at other times, they were exercised with singing, shouting, and leaping for joy, at the near prospect of salvation. They were often exercised with great agitation of body and limbs, shaking, running, and walking the floor, with a variety of other operations and signs, swiftly passing and repassing each other, like clouds agitated with a mighty wind. These exercises, so strange in the eyes of the beholders, brought upon them the appellation of *Shakers*." — "Shakers," 21.

"9. Some perceive the presence of the Spirit with every sense; they see its brilliant light, they hear its voice, they smell the fragrance of immortality and taste its sweetness. Nay, more; they see celestial persons with their own eyes, see them and also hear them; they peer into what is hidden or distant or to come; they are even rapt into the world to come, into heaven itself, where they listen to 'words that cannot be uttered.'

"10. But although the Spirit manifests itself through marvels like these, it is no less effective in heightening the religious and the moral powers, which operate with such purity and power in certain individuals that they bear palpably the stamp of their divine origin."

Institution-
alizing kills
"the Spirit"

Evidently there are two main sources of these extraordinary mental phenomena — the subconscious and the social environment. It is only the latter that involves social psychology. Harnack significantly adds:¹ "It was in the primitive days of Christianity during the first sixty years of its course that their effects were most conspicuous, but they continued to exist all through the second century, although in diminished volume. . . . The Montanist movement certainly gave new life to 'the Spirit' which had begun to wane; but after the opening of the third century the phenomena dwindled rapidly and instead of being the hall-mark of the church at large, or of every individual community, they became merely the equipment of a few favored individuals."²

¹ "Expansion of Christianity," I, 254-256.

² Precisely this taming and institutionalizing of an elemental impulse is seen in the history of the Society of Friends. They obtained the name of *Quakers* from the violent trembling which overcame the worshippers in the early days, and which they regarded as manifestations of divine power in them. It is hard to see in the sedate and quiet Friend

The abnormal suggestibility of mediæval society revealed itself in the Crusades,¹ especially the crusades of children. About 1212 Stephen, a shepherd boy, preached among the pilgrims at St. Denys a crusade of children to recover the Holy Sepulchre. Presently everywhere there arose children of ten y^{ears}, and some even so young as eight, who claimed to be prophets also. They went about collecting followers and marching in solemn procession through towns and villages. Some noble youths joined these processions, and many girls. The efforts of parents to hold back their children were futile. "Bolts and bars would not hold the children. If shut up, they broke through doors and windows, and rushed, deaf to appeals of mothers and fathers, to take their places in the processions, which they saw passing by, whose crosses and banners, whose censers, songs, and shouts, and paraphernalia seemed, like the winds of torrid climates, to bear resistless infection. If the children were forcibly held and confined, so that escape was impossible, they wept and mourned, and at last pined, as if the receding sounds carried away their hearts and their strength. It was necessary to release them, and, forgetting to say farewell, . . . they ran to enlist in those deluded throngs that knew not whither they went."²

The Children's Crusade

In the neighborhood of Cologne, Nicholas, a boy of ten, gathered together not less than twenty thousand children. "Parents, friends, and pastors sought to restrain them by force or appeal, but they whose hearts were set upon the

of to-day the spiritual descendant of *exaltés* whose convulsions are said to have been so violent as to shake the house of meeting!

¹ See Von Sybel, "Geschichte des ersten Kreuzzuges," 185-203.

² Gray, "The Children's Crusade," 52.

enterprise mourned and pined so that we are told their lives were frequently endangered as by disease, and it was necessary to allow them to depart."¹ Ultimately nearly one hundred thousand children were drawn into the maelstrom, of whom at least a third never saw their homes again.

The child pilgrimages, the flagellant epidemic, the dancing mania, tarantism, the witchcraft delusion, and the anti-Jewish outbreaks down to the Russian *pogroms* of to-day all show the spirit of the hive. Of religious and moral epidemics America has had its full share. The Great Awakening in colonial days, the great revivals of 1800, 1830, and 1858, however fruitful in their results, were certainly extended by social suggestion. How else can we explain the wild-fire sweep of the movement after it had slowly won a certain headway and momentum?

In 1840 William Miller went about predicting the coming of the Lord and the end of all things somewhere between the equinoxes of 1843-1844. By upwards of three thousand addresses he was able to win about fifty thousand followers, and these by interstimulation wrought one another up to a high pitch of fanaticism. As the great day approached, they forsook their callings, gave away their goods, prepared their ascension robes, and repaired to the fields. When the appointed time rolled by, instead of losing confidence in their leader, as an individual would have done, the Millerites, as if to illustrate the abeyance of reason in all collectivities, clung to their delusion and accepted the new date of October 22, 1844. During the interval converts multiplied, and the fanaticism was, if anything, more intense than before. When proph-

¹ Gray, "The Children's Crusade," 66.

cey a second time failed, the growth of the sect was checked, although it survives to the present day.

The Women's Crusade¹ began in Hillsborough, Ohio, on Christmas morning, 1873. After a lecture by Dr. Dio Lewis on the Potency of Women's Prayer in the Grogshop, a meeting for prayer and organization was held, and thereupon the ladies, led by the wife of a distinguished general, sallied forth to the drug stores, hotels, and saloons. "The movement spread into adjacent towns, the women visiting saloons, singing, praying, and pleading with those engaged in the traffic to desist. In many places the ladies suffered severe privations, were oftentimes kept standing in the cold and rain, and were sometimes the subjects of severe remarks and direct persecution. The churches were crowded day and night, and touching incidents of recovery from ruin interested immense audiences." In spite of seeming success, the crusade soon died out and has never been repeated. Too much at variance with feminine nature to last, its sudden wide vogue can be explained only by mental contagion.

The Women's Crusade

In 1901 Mrs. Nation of Wichita, Kansas, went about Kansas towns destroying saloon furnishings with an axe. At once there was great agitation, and tens of thousands of women held prayer-meetings and meditated following her example. A number of imitators sprang up, but law and public opinion quickly intervened to check the spread of the movement.

Mrs. Nation's crusade

In modern times financial crazes are a close second to religious crazes. The tulip mania is perhaps the strangest. "About the year 1634 the Dutch became suddenly possessed with a mania for tulips. The ordinary industry

Financial crazes. The tulip mania

¹ See "Cyclopedia of Methodism."

of the country was neglected, and the population, even to its lowest dregs, embarked in the tulip trade. The tulip rose rapidly in value, and when the mania was in full swing some daring speculators invested as much as one hundred thousand florins in the purchase of forty roots. The bulbs were as precious as diamonds; they were sold by their weight in *perils*, a weight less than a grain." "Regular marts for the sale of roots were established in all the large towns of Holland — in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Haarlem, Leyden, Alkmaar. The stock jobbers dealt largely in tulips, and their profits were enormous. Many speculators grew suddenly rich. The epidemic of tulipomania raged with intense fury, the enthusiasm of speculation filled every heart, and confidence was at its height. A golden bait hung temptingly out before the people, and one after the other they rushed to the tulip marts like flies around a honey-pot. Every one imagined that the passion for tulips would last forever, and that the wealthy from every part of the world would send to Holland and pay whatever prices were asked for them. The riches of Europe would be concentrated on the shores of the Zuyder Zee. Nobles, citizens, farmers, mechanics, seamen, footmen, maid-servants, chimney-sweepers, and old-clothes women dabbled in tulips. Houses and lands were offered for sale at ruinously low prices, or assigned in payment of bargains made at the tulip market. So contagious was the epidemic that foreigners became smitten with the same frenzy, and money poured into Holland from all directions.

"This speculative mania did not last long; social suggestion began to work in the opposite direction, and a universal panic suddenly seized on the minds of the Dutch.

Instead of buying, every one was trying to sell. Tulips fell below their normal value. Thousands of merchants were utterly ruined, and a cry of lamentation rose in the land."¹

In the same class may be placed the Mississippi Bubble, the South Sea Bubble, and the railway manias, real estate booms, and financial panics so frequent in the last century. Often movements to fields of opportunity show something of the stampede. The "Ho for Texas!" movement, the California gold fever, the negro exodus of 1879, the Klondike Rush, and the frequent mass migrations at the rumor of a rich "strike" in the mining country, rational as they are at bottom, owe something to the contagion of example. When, in the spring, the first boat down the Yukon brings news of so many millions of gold dust washed out, a certain number resolve for the Klondike. When, now, the sceptic learns in quick succession that his partner, his brother, his grocer, his dentist, and his neighbor are off to seek their fortunes, he becomes restless. The "fever" is in his blood. Something is pulling him, and the pull becomes stronger with every new recruit he hears of. When at length he joins the army of gold seekers, his example helps break down the resistance of some one else; and so there is a rush.

The "Great Fear" in France in 1789 illustrates the craze. Says Stephens: "The months of July and August may be called the months of the 'great fear.' Men were afraid, both in town and country, of they knew not what. How this universal feeling of terror arose cannot be proved, but it was actually deemed necessary in some districts for a distinct denial to be published to the report

¹ Sidis, "The Psychology of Suggestion," 343-345.

² "History of the French Revolution," I, 178-179.

that the king had paid brigands to rob the people." "This 'great fear' was generally expressed in the words 'The brigands are coming.' Who the brigands were, whence they came, or whither they were going, nobody knew; but that the brigands were coming, nobody doubted." "It was in the towns that this strange terror was most keenly felt. In the town of Gueret, July 29, 1789, was known for years after as the day of the 'great fear.' Suddenly, at about five in the afternoon of that day, a rumor arose that the brigands were coming. The women rushed out of the town and hid themselves in the thickets and ditches; while the men assembled at the Hôtel de Ville, and hastily formed themselves into an armed force to assist the town militia. Several notables of the town took their seats with the municipal officers and formed a committee, which sent despatches to all the neighboring towns and villages for aid. . . . These allies, to the number of 8000 to 10,000, flocked into the town, and were regaled at its expense; and when it was found that the brigands did not come, they all went home again. At Château-Thierry news arrived, on July 28, that 2500 'carabots,' or brigands, were marching along the Soissons road; the tocsin rang, and the bourgeois marched out to meet them. On their way a miller told them that the brigands had just sacked Bouresches, which was in flames; but when the partisans of order arrived there, the flames were found to be only the reflection of the sun upon the roofs of the houses. Then the brigands were descried in the act of crossing the Marne at Essommes; but when the tired pursuers came up, they found that these new brigands were the women of Essommes, who had been scared at their appearance and who believed them to be the real brigands."

In the present agitated, overwrought state of the Russian people there are occurring, no doubt, among the ignorant, superstitious masses mob-mind phenomena that will stupefy us with amazement once the veil is withdrawn and the facts become known.

The tendency of the plane to extend and complete itself as the emotional temperature rises is seen in the sweeping of the war spirit over North and South after the firing on Fort Sumter. In the two sections psychic vortexes had gradually formed, rotating in opposite directions. With the sudden access of emotion after the shock of the first clash of arms, these vortexes rotated at a much higher speed and sucked into themselves many who hitherto had been indifferent or hostile. All but a vanishing remnant were affected with the emotion of their section. Say Nicolay and Hay:¹ "The guns of the Sumter bombardment woke the country from the political nightmare which had so long tormented and paralyzed it. The lion of the North was fully roused. Betrayed, insulted, outraged, the free States arose as with a cry of pain and vengeance. War sermons from pulpits; war speeches in every assemblage; tenders of troops; offers of money; military proclamations and orders in every newspaper; every city radiant with bunting; every village green a mustering ground; war appropriations in every legislature and in every city or town council; war preparations in every public or private workshop; gun casting in the great foundries; cartridge making in the principal towns; camps and drills in the fields; parades, drums, flags, and bayonets in the streets; knitting, bandage rolling, and lint scraping in nearly every household. Before the lapse of

The war
spirit of '61

¹ "Abraham Lincoln, A History," IV, 85-87.

forty-eight hours a Massachusetts regiment, armed and equipped, was on its way to Washington; within the space of a month the energy and intelligence of the country were almost completely turned from the industries of peace to the activities of war. The very children abandoned their old-time school games, and played only at soldiering." "Ten days ago we had two parties in this State; to-day we have but one, and that one is for the Constitution and the Union unconditionally," said Iowa. The war spirit rose above all anticipation, and the offer of volunteers went far beyond the call."

"In the Gulf States the revolutionary excitement rose to a similar height, but with contrary sentiment. All Union feeling and utterance vanished; and, overawed by a terrorism which now found its culmination, no one dared breathe a thought or scarcely entertain a hope for the old flag."

The laws of
crazes

The laws of crazes may be formulated as follows:—

1. *The Craze takes Time to develop to its Height.*—The panic of 1893 began in April and reached its height in August, but socio-psychic phenomena began to manifest themselves only in 1894 in the form of the great sympathetic railway strike, labor riots, and the departure for the national capital of ten bodies of penniless unemployed "commonwealers" to petition Congress for work. The susceptibility of the public continued through 1896, and was responsible for the strong emotional currents in the presidential campaign of that year.

2. *The More Extensive its Ravages, the Stronger the Type of Intellect that falls a Prey to It.*—In the acute stages of a boom or a revival, even the educated, experienced, and hard-headed succumb. Perhaps no better

instance can be cited than the progress of a Messianic craze among the Jews. In 1666 a Jew named Sabbathai Zevi declared himself publicly as the long-expected Messiah. A maniacal ecstasy took possession of the Jewish mind. Men, women, and children fell into fits of hysterics. Business men left their occupations, workmen their trades, and devoted themselves to prayer and penitence. The synagogues resounded with sighs, cries, and sobs for days and nights together. All the rabbis who opposed the mania had to flee for their lives. The fame of Sabbathai spread throughout the world. In Poland, in Germany, in Holland, and in England, the course of business was interrupted on the Exchange by the gravest Jews breaking off to discuss this wonderful event. In Amsterdam the Jews marched through the streets, carrying with them rolls of the Torah, singing, leaping, and dancing, as if possessed. Scenes still more turbulent and wild occurred in Hamburg, Venice, Leghorn, Avignon, and many other cities. Learned men began to give in their adhesion. Everywhere prophets and prophetesses appeared, thus realizing the Jewish belief in the inspired nature of Messianic times. Men and women, boys and girls, in hysterical convulsions screamed praises to the new Messiah. At last, from all sides rich men came to Sabbathai, putting their wealth at his disposal. Many sold all they possessed and set out for Palestine. Traffic in the greatest commercial centres came to a complete standstill; most of the Jewish merchants and bankers liquidated their affairs. The belief in the divine mission of Sabbathai was made into a religious dogma of equal rank with that of the unity of God.¹

¹ Sldia, "The Psychology of Suggestion," 327-329.

3. *The Greater its Height, the More Absurd the Propositions that will be believed or the Actions that will be done.* — At the zenith of the South Sea craze companies formed "to make deal boards out of sawdust," "for extracting silver from lead," "for a wheel of perpetual motion," "for furnishing funerals to any part of Great Britain," could sell stock. Finally one bold speculator started "a company for carrying on an undertaking of great advantage, but nobody to know what it is!"

4. *The Higher the Craze, the Sharper the Reaction from It.* — The prostration of a "busted boom" town is so extreme that its unboomed rivals forge ahead of it. The reaction from a purely emotional religious revival often leaves the cause of real religion worse off than it was at first. This perhaps is why experienced churches like the Roman Catholic have no use for revivals.

5. *One Craze is frequently succeeded by Another exciting Emotions of a Different Character.* — Says Jones:¹ "It is interesting to note that the emotions which have been generated by speculative excitement and intensified by panic depressions have been frequently transferred to religious subjects and have, in the United States at certain times, given rise to remarkable revivals of religion following close upon the heels of panics." "A contemporary account of the extraordinary revival movement of 1857 says: 'It was in October of this year (1857) that Mr. Lamphier, a missionary of the Dutch Reformed Church, thought, in his own heart, that an hour of daily prayer would bring consolation to afflicted business men.' In a few weeks those holding the meetings were astonished to find the crowds growing too large for the buildings. The Method-

¹ "Economic Crises," 209, 210.

ist Church on John Street and the Dutch Reformed Church on Fulton Street were opened daily. Next, Burton's Theatre was hired, and throughout the winter noonday prayer-meetings were held at numerous places in the city." "Even the firemen and policemen held their prayer-meetings, so that we may feel perfectly assured of the truth of what the writer says when he adds, 'It is doubtful whether under heaven was seen such a sight as went on in the city of New York in the winter and spring of the year 1857-1858.' 'From New York as a centre, the mysterious influence spread abroad till it penetrated all New England in the East, southward as far as Virginia, and even beyond, westward to Buffalo, Cincinnati, Chicago, St. Louis.'"

6. *A Dynamic Society is more Craze-ridden than One moving along the Ruts of Custom.* — In a dynamic society so many readjustments are necessary, such far-reaching transformations are experienced in half a lifetime, that the past is discredited. One forms a habit of breaking habits. Ancestral wisdom, the teachings of social experience are refuted and discarded at so many points that they lose their steadying power. The result is that instead of aping their forefathers, people ape the multitude.

It is a delusion to suppose that one who has broken the yoke of custom is emancipated. The lanes of custom are narrow, the hedge-rows are high, and view to right or left there is none. But there is as much freedom and self-direction in him who trudges along this lane as in the "emancipated" person, who finds himself in the open country free to pick a course of his own, but who, nevertheless, stampedes aimlessly with the herd. A dynamic society may, therefore, foster individuality no more than

a static society. But it *does* progress, and that, perhaps, ought to reconcile us to the mental epidemics that afflict us.

7. *Ethnic or Mental Homogeneity is Favorable to the Craze.* — The remarks of Giddings regarding like-mindedness and the crowd apply equally well here. Caste lines break the sweep of the craze. The English are proof against mob mind chiefly because they stand on such different levels. Americans are on a prairie. The English are on terraces. The gentleman, the shopkeeper, or the clerk looks with disdain upon an agitation spreading among workingmen, and instead of feeling drawn by the rush of numbers, is, in fact, repelled. Caste makes a society immune to craze, even if the remedy is worse than the disease.

Theory of
the fad

The *fad* originates in the surprise or interest excited by novelty. Roller skating, blue glass, the planchette, a forty days' fast, tiddledy-winks, faith healing, the "13-14-15" puzzle, baseball, telepathy, or the sexual novel attract those restless folk who are always running hither and thither after some new thing. This creates a swirl which rapidly sucks into its vortex the soft-headed and weak-minded, and at last, grown bigger, involves even the saner kind. As no department of life is safe from the invasion of novelty, we have all kinds of fads: philosophic fads, like pessimism or anarchism; literary fads, like the Impressionists or the Decadents; religious fads, like spiritualism or theosophy; hygienic fads, like water-cure or breakfast foods; medical fads, like lymph or tuberculin; personal fads, like pet lizards or face enamel. And of these orders of fads each has a *clientèle* of its own. In many cases we can explain vogue entirely in terms

of novelty fascination, and mass suggestion. But, even when the new thing can make its way by sheer merit, it does not escape becoming a fad. It still will have its penumbral ring of rapt imitators. So there is something of the fad even in bicycling, motoring, massage, anti-sepsis, and physical culture. Indeed, it is sometimes hard to distinguish faddism from the enthusiastic welcome and prompt acceptance accorded to a real improvement. For the undiscerning the only touchstone is time. Here, as elsewhere, "persistence in consciousness" is the test of reality. The mere novelty, soon ceasing to be novel, bores people, and must yield to a fresh sensation; a genuine improvement, on the other hand, meets a real need and therefore lasts.

Faddism
progress

Unlike the craze, the fad does not spread in a medium especially prepared for it by excitement. It cannot rely on the heightened suggestibility of people. Its conquests, therefore, imply something above mere volume of suggestion. They imply prestige. The fad owes half its power over minds to the prestige that in this age attaches to the new.

Why fads
flourish
nowadays

SUMMARY

With the new facilities for intercommunication the pressure of suggestion upon the mind of the individual may be greatly intensified.

From the interaction of innumerable minds results a *quasi-unit* known as "the public." The psychic plane into which the public draws its members is nearer their average than is the plane that forms in the crowd.

In the public the manifestations which most resemble those of the mob are the craze and the fad.

The craze takes time to develop its full power, is followed by a corresponding reaction, and frequently leaves minds susceptible to other types of craze.

Custom and caste are unfavorable to the craze.

The sad is the sudden brief focussing of general attention and interest upon the new. It occurs only in times or societies in which the new enjoys prestige.

EXERCISES

1. Trace the psychological history of a real estate "boom" in an infant but promising town.
2. Discriminate between open-mindedness and suggestibility.
3. May not a craze bring about a sympathy which may last after the craze has been forgotten? If so, is not the craze a socializing agent?
4. Which presents the greater obstacle to the social sweep of an idea or emotion — cultural difference (religion, education, etc.) or class difference? Why?
5. Why is it that a financial craze may bring in its train a religious craze, whereas the reverse is not true?
6. Compare in susceptibility to craze a hopeful, prosperous people with a hopeless, miserable people.
7. Show that the proverbial individualism of the farmer is not necessarily the same as individuality.

CHAPTER V

PROPHYLACTICS AGAINST MOB MIND

IN his "Ninety-Three" Victor Hugo describes a mounted cannon broken loose in the hold of a vessel on the high seas. With every lurch the huge gun rolls helplessly about, wrecking the interior, and threatening to send the ship to the bottom with a hole through her side. This pictures the situation of the society with a large number of mob folk in it, making a wild lunge, now here, now there, as events call up this feeling or that. In a community the prevalence of such a type leads to all manner of folly — Millerism, "holy rolling," vegetarianism, wonderworking shrines, divine healers, table-tipping séances, frenzied religious revivals, land booms, speculations and panics, the Belgian hare mania, and the walking craze, ending in people crowding to watch rival female pedestrians try to walk one thousand quarter miles in one thousand consecutive quarter hours! In a nation it leads to political "tidal waves" producing a dangerous rhythm in the conduct of public affairs, to a costly wavering in dealing with money or tariff, to a fickle sentimental foreign policy, and to war fevers tending, perhaps, to national humiliation and loss of prestige.

Mob folk
destroy
social sta-
bility

Since it is the concern of organized society to lessen its burden of mob folk, let us consider the various conditions that favor the growth of strong, robust individualities proof against mental contagion.

Education
for criticism

1. *Higher Education.* — Up to a certain point education fosters mob mind by opening the mind to novel ideas before the critical faculty has been strengthened. The power to value ideas lagging far behind the power to absorb them, the individual, left rudderless, is obliged to drift with the current. Now, a college education is not simply four more high-school years. It ought to equip the student with standards and tests of objective truth. It ought to require him to dig down past the walls of some science to the bed-rock it rests on, so that he may learn in what mortar and by what plumb-line the stones of that science have been laid. Once he has been obliged to lay one little stone in the top course of a single turret of his science, he will ever after appreciate the difference between science and humbug, truth and opinion, scholarship and quackery, saddism and progress. When there is, in every community, a handful of well-ballasted college men and women, how often will be stayed the sweep of the popular delusion — rain making, Second Coming, spiritualism, absent treatment, and the like!

How to be-
come crank
proof

2. *Sound Knowledge of Body, Mind, and Society.* — Hygiene, psychology, and sociology can ward off more folly than astronomy, physics, or geology. For body, mind, and society are the storm-centres of saddism, the breeding grounds of manias. To be folly-proof here is to be fortified against nine-tenths of the higher foolishness. The reason why cranks haunt these three topics is that they are of supreme human interest. The prizes that can be held out for the adoption of the Kneipp cure, theosophy, or some social Utopia are the most-desired things in the world — immunity from disease, from sin, and from poverty.

3. *Familiarity with that which is Classic.* — One ought to know the intellectual kings of the human race — Job, Solomon, Aischylus, Plato, Cervantes, Bacon, Montaigne, Shakespeare, Swift, Goethe, Burns. The first-rank minds that for centuries have been able to impress the generations with their universal appeal are all choice, sane spirits, able to rescue one from the sway of the sensational and ephemeral. Excellent are the winnowings of time. "Whenever I am urged to read a new book," says the sage, "I re-read an old one." Moreover, acquaintance with the very best in thought and literature helps one justly to rate the things that people run after, and to ignore the "Lo here!" "Lo there!" of the false prophets.

Steadying
influence of
the classic

4. *The Influence of Sane Teachers.* — A university is not, as some insist, "a collection of books." Books are of all dates and values, and hence indiscriminate, omnivorous reading is no furnisher of sound ideas. Guidance by the specialist is needful. President Garfield's ideal of a college, "Mark Hopkins on the other end of a log," recognizes the educative value of contact with a master-mind. The greatest teachers — Hopkins, Agassiz, McCosh, Jowett, Thomas Hill Green — are just those who, by throwing the student on his own resources, bring to ripeness his individuality. The genuine teacher wants fellows, not disciples, and his happiest hour is when he finds that the cub he has trained is now able to hold him at bay.

Ozone from
the penks

5. *Avoidance of the Sensational Newspaper.* — The howling dervishes of journalism propagate crazes and fads by distorting the significance of the moment. The valuable new is, in fact, but a slender fringe along the vast expanse of the valuable old. It is a hundred to one

Shun the
dithyramble
press

that the old classic is worth more than "the book of the month." Old wit, condensed into homely maxims about cleanliness, avoiding draughts, keeping the feet warm and the head cool, save a thousand lives where the new wrinkles in medicine or surgery — which make newspaper "copy" — save a dozen. Now, this static side of life is ignored by the yellow press. By exaggerating the *news* it presents things in a false perspective. It can capture the public's pennies by exploiting the unique, the startling, even the imaginary. Therefore, to keep readers on the tiptoe of expectation, it promises something extraordinary which is always just on the eve of happening, — but doesn't happen! The Czar is about to be blown up, the Kaiser is just going mad, a cure for consumption is ready to be given to humanity, the flying machine is soon to displace the bicycle, or the manufacture of weather is about to begin! So the jaded nerves are kept on the perpetual thrill, and, looking always for something wonderful to turn up, the deluded reader goes on and on like a donkey reaching for the sheaf of oats tied to the end of his wagon pole. Moreover, the constant flitting from topic to topic brings upon the confirmed newspaper reader what we may call *paragraphesis*, i.e., inability to hold the mind on a subject for any length of time. Reading so inimical to poise, self-control, and mental concentration as the sensational newspaper should be cut down to a minimum.

Sport trains
to inhibition

6. *Sports*. — Physical health in itself makes for intellectual self-possession. Frequently sickness heightens suggestibility, which may in part account for the "cures" at wonderworking shrines, and the successes of magnetic healers. The will made on a sick-bed lies under the just

suspicion of "undue influence," in case it favors those who had access to the testator at the time. There is a peculiar value, however, in participation in sports and athletic contests, for these produce moral as well as physical tone. The effort not to "break training," the overruling of the impulse to give up at moments of weariness or discouragement, the subordination of one's playing to the team work that gives another man the showy plays that win applause, the keeping of one's temper under hard knocks, modest self-restraint in victory, and, above all, the "game" spirit in defeat, *i.e.*, the mastery of the impulse to whine or cry "unfair," or show chagrin, — these triumphs of the will over impulse undoubtedly conduce to the triumph of the will over suggestion. If "the battle-fields of England are won on the football fields of Eton and Rugby," it is because the coolness of the British officer in a Dervish charge or an Afghan rush is the same imperturbability that the seasoned football player attains when, amid the cheers of excited thousands, he thinks quickly and decides unerringly what is to be done.

7. *Country Life.* — The city overwhelms the mind with a myriad of impressions which fray the nerves and weaken the power of concentration. } One comes at last not to hear the din or see the street signs but, nevertheless, the subconscious is noting them and the store of nervous energy is being depleted. City-bred populations are liable to be hysterical, and to be hysterical is to be suggestible. Well does Emerson¹ remark, "A sturdy lad from New Hampshire or Vermont, who in turn tries all the professions, who *teams it, farms it, peddles,* keeps a

Stability of
the country
bred

¹ Essay on Self-reliance.

school, preaches, edits a newspaper, goes to Congress, buys a township, and so forth in successive years, and always, like a cat, falls on his feet, is worth a hundred of these city dolls." In cities, with cuts and fills and asphalt, the human will visibly dominates the physical environment, and men come readily to the cardinal assumption of the mob, that nothing can stand against numbers. In the country painful contact with the unyielding laws of nature inspires reasonableness and caution. The mob's sense of invincibility can hardly spring up among people under the unremitting necessity of adapting their efforts to huge implacable forces. In the city some ways of living foster suggestibility, while others check it. It is bad for people to be crowded into barrack-like tenement-houses, for such massing inspires the cheese-mite consciousness, makes the self count for nothing. The best correctives for urban propinquity are broad streets, numerous parks, and the individual domicile with a little space about it; for these preserve the selfhood of the family group and of the individual.

realde or
'd

8. *Familism*. — Close relations to a few people — as in the well-knit family — joined to a vivid sense of obligation to the community, seem to be more favorable to stable character than the loose touch-and-go associations of general intercourse. The Northern peoples, obliged by climate to centre their lives in the circle about the fire-side, are more resistant to popular currents than the Southern peoples, passing their leisure in the buzz of the street, the *plaza*, and the *foyer*. Worshipers of the spirit of the hearth, they are more aloof from their fellows, slower therefore to merge with them or be swept from their moorings by them. It seems to be communion by

the fireside rather than communion in the public resort that gives individuality long bracing roots. The withdrawn social self, although it lacks breadth, gains in depth, and there is nothing to show that the talkative, sociable, impressionable Latin will sacrifice himself more readily for the public weal than the hedged, reserved Englishman.

9. *Ownership of Property.* — The protection and care of a piece of property makes for thoughtfulness and steadiness, individualizes. One recipe for building character in a boy is to give him a plot and let him keep what he can raise on it, give him a colt and let him have its growth in value. This property, so responsive to care or to neglect, is a standing challenge to his self-control. It admonishes him to look ahead, to plan, to sacrifice, to overrule his impulses to idle, procrastinate, or day-dream. The city parent, having nothing of this sort he can make over to his boy, is puzzled how he shall make a man of him.

A wide diffusion of land ownership has long been recognized as fostering a stable and conservative political habit. "The magic of property turns sand into gold," said Arthur Young. It also turns hinds into men. An industrial or mining population, unsteadied by ownership, is altogether more easily drawn into impulsive mass action than a proprietary farming population. The man owns his home, but in a sense his home owns him, checking his rash impulses, holding him out of the human whirlpool, ever saying inaudibly, "Heed me, care for me, or you lose me!" With the growth of great corporation-held properties in which the individual has only a fractional ownership, property ceases to contribute much to the individualizing of persons. Its rôle is probably on the wane.

Property is a
tether peg
hindering
stampede

voluntary
association
disciplines
the impulses

10. *Participation in Voluntary Association.* — The acknowledged political capacity of the English has been attributed to the experience of the masses in their popular religious organizations, i.e., the dissenting churches. Participation in the management of a society develops acquaintance with the rules of discussion, tolerance of opponents, love of order, and readiness to abide by the will of the majority. Above all, it teaches people to rate the windbag, the ranter, or the sophist at his true worth, and to value the less showy qualities of the man of judgment and reason. None have a greater contempt for mob mind and for the wild and whirling words of the stamper than those who have long worked in voluntary associations. Town-meetings, religious societies, fraternal organizations, labor-unions, granges, women's clubs, and similar societies, by diffusing the qualities for deliberative association, diminish the amount of inflammable material in the community.

let stability
be honored

11. *Intellectual Self-possession as an Ideal.* — The types of character held up to youth as models should be strong in point of self-control. Self-consistency, tranquillity, balance, robust independence, should be recognized as rare and precious qualities worthy of all honor and praise. Let fad and craze be made ridiculous. Honor virile will more than the commoner excellences of heart and head. Writers like Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman make intellectual individualism attractive by showing that "Bear ye one another's burdens" does not mean "Share ye one another's delusions."

Pride vs. love
as moral
main spring

12. *Prideful Morality.* — There are two bases of spontaneous right doing, neighbor love and self-respect. Right conduct prompted by the sense of self-respect and

honor seems to preserve selfhood more than if it springs from the sense of a common life with one's fellows. Powerful individualities are more apt to be inspired to goodness by self-respect than by brotherly affection. Haughty nobles develop among themselves a morality that has its mainspring in honor, and there is no question that the basis of morality in modern society is more akin to the pride of the mediæval castle than to the humility of the mediæval monastery.¹ Sympathy and fraternalism must, of course, constitute the emotional background to the moral life; but in the advance of individualization the true line is to awaken a sense of worth and dignity in the common man, and to hinge his social and civic duties on self-respect rather than on the spirit of the hive.

13. *Vital Religion*. — A religion for life and work is more individualizing than a contemplative devotional one, and a religion that means the domination of one's life by some principle of responsibility or some ideal of character braces the soul more than an emotional religion that charms the heart to goodness by appeals and examples. Introspective devotionalism is enervating. The remarks of Coe² help us realize that there is a yellow religion to contend with as well as a yellow journalism.

Also yellow religion

"To take feeling out of religion would be as absurd as to take parental or conjugal fondness out of the family. Yet it is not possible to maintain the family solely, or even chiefly, by reliance upon feelings. . . . Religion ought to rest upon and call into exercise all the faculties of the mind, and no superior sanctity should be ascribed to persons whose temperamental make-up is sentimental rather

¹ See Ross, "Social Control," 236-242

² "The Spiritual Life," 215-217.

than choleric. . . Preserve the equilibrium between sensibility and will. When this equilibrium is lost, in rushes a tide of religious vagaries. At a camp-meeting in western New York a number of years ago a brother testified somewhat as follows: 'Brethren, I feel — I feel — I feel — I feel that I feel — I can't tell you how I feel, but O I feel! I feel!'

"Says a prominent pastor: 'There are in my church two distinct classes of members. 'On the one hand, there is a group of substantial persons of high character and agreeable conduct who support the enterprises of the church with their money, but are rarely or never seen at prayer-meeting. One never sees them prostrated before God in earnest prayer. If a sinner should come weeping to the altar, they would not gather around to pray for him. If he should rise shouting, they would shake hands with him and tell him they were glad he had started, but that is all. On the other hand, there is a class of members who can be relied upon to be present at the prayer-meeting, who would rush to the altar to pray with the sinner, and who, if he should rise shouting, would scarcely know whether they were in the body or out of the body. Nevertheless, these persons are without influence in spite of their unction. They are flighty and changeable in their moods, lack organization, and their judgment is not to be trusted. If I were to go on a long journey, I would not choose them for companions, but rather persons of the former description. And if I were to go sailing in a small boat, I would not take one of these prayer-meeting members with me, lest he should have a spell of some sort and capsize the boat.'"

SUMMARY

No education is complete that fails to provide one with truth-filters.

Against the folly of craze and fad one is forearmed who possesses exact knowledge of the matter in question.

No work becomes an acknowledged classic which is not wholesome in tone and universal in appeal. The foundations of one's culture should therefore be laid in the classics.

By exaggerating everything in the foreground, the sensational newspaper predisposes the reader to craze and fad.

A reasonable participation in wholesome competitive sports involving team work strengthens self-control.

It is difficult to build a stable individuality in the city-bred.

Self-sufficing home-life, although it narrows the sympathies, favors depth of character.

The responsibilities of ownership are steady.

The appeal to self-respect and honor individualizes.

A purely emotional religion leads to flabbiness.

EXERCISES

1. Distinguish between suggestibility and sociality.
2. How does the experience of responsibility affect one's responsiveness to mental contagion? Why?
3. Compare manual training with literary studies as a developer of objectivity and self-control.
4. What are the reactions upon character of boys' clubs, playground self-government, the George Junior Republic, etc.?
5. Compare business with industry in its effect on one's power to resist suggestion.
6. What special reason is there why in the United States mental epidemic has shown itself more in the rural than in the urban population?
7. Study the religious currents of the Reformation epoch, and find by what means certain sects were able to escape the follies, fanaticisms, and crazes of the time and become the parents of the great Protestant denominations.

THE purpose of THE PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY is to contribute to the study of the nature and working of public opinion in the contemporary world. Editorial policy has no other goal. The cooperation of the editors rests only upon a common desire to support this scholarly purpose. The editors believe that they can best achieve what they have in view by an open-minded hospitality to contributions of many kinds—analyses by disinterested scholars of problems and situations, along with expositions and arguments, perhaps *ex parte*, by direct participants in problems and situations. In the case of each article attention is expressly called by an editorial foreword to the relation of the writer to the activity which he reports or evaluates. The editors hold varying opinions on public questions and they accept no responsibility for the views expressed by contributors. They do accept responsibility for selecting contributions which will in one way or another promote the study and understanding of public opinion and of adding these contributions to the store of data at the disposal of scholars and business and professional workers.

PUBLIC RELATIONS POLICIES OF THE BELL SYSTEM

By NORTON E. LONG

The author (Harvard A.B. '32, Ph.D. '37) is an Instructor in Government at Harvard. This article is one portion of a much longer report, embracing all aspects of the Bell System's public relations policies, which Dr. Long presents as "a case study in the politics of modern industry."

In the pursuit of those forces which underlie and condition the formal institutions of government, political science has pushed its inquiry beyond the once unheeded and still extra-constitutional party to the modern pressure group. Pushing the field of investigation a little further, the large corporation of modern times appears as an important factor in the political process.

The activities of business in connection with legislation and administration have, of late, received increasing attention. But, though recent studies have brought business activities within the scope of political inquiry, they have been, for the most part, confined to an examination of the activities of business bearing directly on the agencies of government. The broader implications of those corporate policies and actions designed to mold the basic political attitudes of the electorate have largely been neglected.¹ For a more comprehensive understanding of the rôle of modern industry in the political process, it seems necessary to go beyond the restricted field of "pressure politics" and to examine that complex of corporate activities which goes under the heading of public relations.

The relevance of public opinion to the conduct of business enterprise was forcibly revealed to the leaders of industry at least as far back as the 'eighties of the last century. With the Granger movement, the Populist Revolt and the long and still continuing ground swell of anti-big-business sentiment (typified in the anti-trust movement of the 1890's and 1900's) the position of large-scale industry in the political life of the country underwent a change.

For the day-to-day adjustment between business activities and the untoward restriction of the legal framework, the services of the politician and those with political influence proved, and in large measure still prove, adequate. But that old easygoing reliance on the professionals of politics to

¹ As an exception, see S. M. Rosen, *Political Process* (New York 1935), ch. vii.

temper the tides of popular unrest has become increasingly untrustworthy. For those businesses standing out in the public eye unscreened by a mass of competitors—especially those to whom the terms monopoly or trust could be applied, terms of opprobrium in the prevailing vocabulary of public opinion—the danger of political attack constituted a real menace. The dominant popular ideology, based as it has been on certain economic preconceptions and an agrarian egalitarianism, has become increasingly incompatible with the emerging character of modern industry. This incompatibility has offered a fertile field for the demagogue, the radical, and the crusading newspaper editor, a constant temptation to political blackmail, and a continuous threat to the profitable conduct of large-scale business enterprise. Can it be wondered, then, that the leaders of modern industry, no longer able safely to rely upon the politicians, have sought a further insurance against adverse political action in a persistent campaign to mold or remold the basic attitudes of the electorate?²

BUSINESS NEEDS POLITICAL STABILITY

From a strictly economic point of view, the character of modern large-scale industry requires a high degree of stability in the political and legal framework. Both the extent and the long-term nature of its commitments render it far more vulnerable to changes in the legal pattern of rights and obligations than the much more adaptable small business of the past. For example, the possible effect of labor legislation in increasing the degree of rigidity in the operating cost structure of many large enterprises can easily be conceived. In the case of public utilities, the existence of governmental bodies with power over their rates gives them a direct concern with the currents of politics. While the impact of legal change may be of varying importance to large-scale industries, depending on whether they are still in or have passed the expanding stage, it remains true that on the whole the larger modern industries are increasingly tied into a set of contractual relationships whose change would affect them severely. Again, the very scale of their operations gives changes in the political framework a quantitative impact on their

² For articles concerning the impact of public relations on the utilities see the post-war volumes of the *Electrical World*. An early appreciation of the importance of public opinion is shown in the 1911 annual report of the A. T. & T. under the heading "Public Relations." The *Proceedings of the National Electric Light Association* show the growth of concern with this factor. Some useful summaries are to be found in Jones and Bingham, *Principles of Public Utilities* (1931) and Mosher and Crawford, *Public Utility Regulation* (1933) under the heading "Public Relations." See also the Federal Trade Commission hearings on Public Utility Propaganda, *Sen. Doc. 92*, part 3.

business that they cannot fail to appreciate. Inextricably intertwined with the existing pattern of legal relationships, the large modern corporation must strive to maintain the *status quo*. While in times gone by its political objectives have been primarily directed toward the acquisition of political favors, its politics of today are principally motivated by the desire to maintain undisturbed that legal pattern upon the preservation of which the continuance of its operations depend. It is not strange, then, that the management of large-scale industry should be increasingly preoccupied with the ways and means of political stabilization—the more so because the absence of acute competitive conditions, the stability of its control, the magnitude of its operations, and the revenues at its command give it unique resources for the accomplishment of this task.

Though widely denounced as immoral, the attempt on the part of business management to insure itself against changes in the political framework—a framework which it must, to a large degree, be able to take for granted if it is to concentrate on its more orthodox economic tasks—seems as logical as insuring against fire or flood. The novelty that so distresses the political moralist is not so much that business should meddle in politics, or even propagandize the electorate on specific issues, but rather that with the emergence of stable management control in the larger corporations, a certain political rationality, combined with a long-run point of view and a conscious attempt at the continuous molding of more basic political attitudes, is manifested.

BELL POLICY A CLASSIC

The public relations policy of the Bell System, now regarded on all hands as classic, may serve as a fruitful point of departure for the study of this phenomenon in its evolutionary and in this particular case its fairly well developed stages. While it may seem doubtful that the policies of a single corporation can throw much light on the policies of the large corporation in general, there are certain indications that policies of the Bell System result from causes broadly prevalent in large-scale industry.

The choice of the Bell System for a study in the logic of public relations policy may seem somewhat arbitrary. In the first place, it is a public utility and so has an overt impact on the citizenry uncushioned by the indirect relationship with the ultimate consumer enjoyed, for example, by the American Aluminum Company. As opposed to other utilities, the Bell System has had a centralized management control permitting unified and coordinated

activities by its component companies in the public relations field. Needless to say, the National Electric Light Association, without the same power of command over its membership, was never able to approach this efficiency. The geographical distribution of Bell employees and plants in an almost even ratio to the centers of population and the relevant governmental jurisdictions has given it a resource unavailable to those large corporations, such as United States Steel, whose business is more localized with respect to employment.

In justification of the selection it can only be pleaded that the facts were more available and that because of the very peculiarities that set it apart, the Bell System has developed a more subtle, extensive, and well rationalized scheme of public relations than its less fortunately situated confrères. Perhaps on further examination, it will be found that the policies and methods arrived at over a long period of years by this particular corporate complex are not untypical of those utilized or about to be utilized by large-scale business in general, at least in so far as these policies and methods are not uniquely determined by opportunities available to the Bell System alone.

ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THE PATENT MONOPOLY

Historically the present Bell System originated in a private patent monopoly.³ Though the character of its business required the use of the public thoroughfare and thus necessitated franchises, the monopoly aspect of the business resulted from the Bell patents and not from any of the franchises secured. In the eyes of contemporary opinion, the monopoly was but a transitory one whose sway would be terminated with the expiration of its basic patents.

When the powerful Western Union had given a kind of commercial accolade to the business by infringing the Bell patents and entering into competition with the Bell licensees through its subsidiary, the Gold and Stock Corporation, a persistent legal battle was initiated which lasted well on toward the twentieth century. No sooner was the Western Union persuaded to withdraw, having exacted as its price a lucrative settlement, than others

³ For a more detailed account of the history of the telephone, cf. J. W. Stehman, *The Financial History of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company* (1925); H. N. Carson, *The History of the Telephone* (1916). This latter volume, though subsidized by the A. T. & T., has some value. Cf. also A. B. Paine, *Theodore N. Vail* (1939), a sympathetic account of the life of a major figure in Bell System history. Superseding in great measure all earlier financial and corporate histories of the telephone industry is the *Report on the Corporate and Financial History of the Bell System* by the Federal Communications Commission, Telephone Investigation, Special Investigation Docket No. 1.

sprang into the field to break, if possible, the legal barriers protecting the rich field of telephony.

With the passage of time and the growing popularity of the telephone as an instrument of communication, in fact with its approach to the category of what we now call a public utility, a certain restiveness on the part of the users and people demanding telephone service became manifest. Whether because of a certain arrogant unprogressiveness characteristic of those who have a sure market or because of inherent business limitations, the Bell licensees were unwilling or unable to satisfy a growing demand for telephone service. This caused considerable and widespread discontent. As the invalidation of the Bell patents seemed to offer a remedy, it was only natural that the current patent litigation should take on a political character.

Perhaps the most interesting case in which the political potentialities of patent litigation were brought out was that of the famous Pan Electric Company, formed in 1883 to utilize the inventions of J. Harris Rogers of Washington, D.C.⁴ As far as can be ascertained, the Rogers patents were of questionable validity and the company of a largely promotional nature. Nevertheless it secured the influence of certain prominent members of the House and Senate by the gift of stock. Senator Augustus H. Garland received one-tenth of the company's stock and was appointed attorney for the company. Although the Pan Electric attempted to come to an agreement with the Bell interests, this attempt was unavailing. A patent infringement suit loomed and the prospects were rather black.

With the election of Cleveland in 1885, however, the Pan Electric's political prospects brightened. Garland became U.S. Attorney-General and the other members of Congress with stock holdings became more important, as they were for the most part Democrats. After some maneuvering, a suit on the government's behalf to vacate the Bell patents was commenced. A certain justification was lent to these proceedings as the judicial proceedings which had previously upheld the Bell patents in sweeping form were somewhat tainted in the public mind. In Massachusetts, where two of the strongest decisions had been handed down, it was later discovered that the families of the judges who had made these decisions had large holdings of Bell securities. In other cases there was a strong suspicion that the companies against which the Bell interests had entered infringement suits were under Bell control. But this was largely offset when the news of the connection between

⁴ Cummings and McFarland, *Federal Justice* (1937), pp. 296 ff., for a summary description of the whole affair.

the Pan Electric and prominent government officials and members of Congress leaked out. A furor in the press and a congressional investigation ensued.⁵

Notwithstanding all this the suit in the government's behalf to vacate the Bell patents was continued. It went through a history of varying vicissitudes and was finally dropped in 1906, thirty years after its initiation. Throughout the period of the suit various Attorneys-General plaintively asked Congress for instructions as to its disposal. But "Congress was as fearful of the issue as the Attorney-General, and showed no inclination to assume the responsibility."⁶ Newspaper accounts of this suit seem to indicate that the public was as much interested in the dissolution of the Bell monopoly as in the validity of the patents in question. It seems doubtful if the suit would ever have been instituted, or, if instituted, continued so long without considerable popular support.

PUBLIC DEMANDS A COMPETITIVE SYSTEM

The public, impatient under the Bell monopoly and convinced that competition would mean lower prices, eagerly awaited the expiration of the Bell patents, due to lapse in 1894. Whether by accident or by design, a patent application of Emile Berliner of a broad and restrictive scope had been allowed to slumber in the patent office from 1877, and was taken out only in 1891. The furor at this prospective increase of the life of the Bell monopoly was considerable. The press, taxpayers' associations, and anti-monopoly leagues came down on Congress and the Attorney-General's office demanding relief from this attempted prolongation of the Bell domination. Though the government suit for the annulment of the Berliner patent was unsuccessful, a court construction of the patent so limited its scope that it failed of fulfilling the fears of those who saw in it a potent instrument for the continuation of monopoly.

While a few legislative attempts at regulation of rates had been made, these were in the main sporadic, and no great thought had been given to the problems of regulation.

In the main, almost up to 1910, the telephone was considered as an industrial rather than a public utility. Though the character of its business required a public franchise, its monopoly aspect was not considered as based

⁵ "Testimony on Charges against Certain Public Officers Relating to the Pan Electric Company," *House Misc. Doc.*, 375, 49 Cong., 1 Sess.

⁶ Cummings and McFarland, *Federal Justice* (1917), p. 312.

on this, but rather on its exclusive patent rights. Thus, in the public and even in the legislative mind its monopoly was considered as transitory; the vexing problems of rate and service regulation were postponed for solution by the cure-all of competition, supposedly impending on the proximate extinction of the Bell patents. A few there were, such as the editors of the *Electrical World*, who foresaw that the Bell System, strongly entrenched in the most lucrative centers of business, with extensive long-lines facilities and excellent financial resources, stood more than a fair chance of retaining its monopoly in the competitive war about to begin. But the generality paid no heed, and the costly if partially beneficial experiment with competition ensued.

The expansion of telephone use under the impact of competition seems to show that development in the field had been unduly restricted under the patent monopoly. It not only forced the Bell interests into activity and shook them out of a complacent lethargy, but also permitted the extension of the telephone into areas untouched by the Bell System and previously without telephony because of the impossibility of securing the patented instruments. "Farmer's" and "Mutual" lines sprang up in the West and in other unserved areas.

COMPETITIVE WARFARE ENSUES

Competitive warfare in some of the Bell territories became remarkably keen. Large speculative enterprises were set on foot to invade these fields. Low rates were promised in return for franchises, and the greatest optimism was shown in the anticipation of profits. Depreciation and maintenance charges were either underestimated or neglected altogether. In bidding for operating franchises, rates that were later to prove utterly inadequate were held out to the public, which readily believed that Bell licensee charges were based mostly on monopoly. Though the bait of low rates was certainly important in the granting of franchises, the accumulated ill will that had accrued to the Bell interests in certain of its territories was a considerable factor. It was the era of trust-busting and Populism in the West. Local pride, resentment of domination from afar, all contributed to make it almost a local duty to aid in setting up companies to compete with the "Bell Trust."

Hudson, who was president from 1889 to 1901, was the last of the old school to run the Bell System. According to Paine:

His attitude would seem to have been one of dignified independence—not indifference, perhaps, though certainly the "take it or leave it" policy was very generally

prevailing in towns throughout the West. No effort was made to conciliate the independent companies—to "take them into camp," after the later method. They were merely ignored and scorned, and in more than one instance where they were forced to the wall the Bell company acquired for a song their wires and their telephones, and in truly medieval fashion piled the instruments in the street and burned them, as a horrible example for the future. This was not the best way to promote good feeling, and in certain other towns where officers of the independent company had begun negotiations with Bell, the stockholders, incensed at what they had heard, threatened their officials with violence if they dared to surrender.⁷

After the first few years of the twentieth century, the era of fierce competition had about run its course. The entrenched strength of the Bell interests had withstood the shock. The promotional character of the new companies was becoming more apparent. Demands for upward revision of rates and violation of franchises were disillusioning to the protagonists of telephone competition. Inadequate maintenance and depreciation charges left investors with the unpleasant realization that in many cases dividends had been paid out of capital. While the competitive tactics of the Bell interests were not above criticism, it seems that the stock-jobbing interests of the promoters of the new companies were largely responsible for the inglorious liquidation or consolidation with the Bell companies that ensued.

The public, despite its deep-seated distrust of monopoly, its prejudice against big business, and its sentimental preference for local capital, found the benefits of competition scarcely worth the burden of two telephones. The local investor who patriotically went forth to slay the "Bell Octopus" was discouraged to learn that virtue, in many cases, was its own and only reward.

The Bell interests, however, learned a lesson. Though competition in many cases was potential rather than actual, its very possibility served to awaken them to public demands to which a secure patent-protected position had long rendered them deaf. The enthusiastic popular support in the promotion of competing companies, the bitter resentment against consolidation and absorption, and certain sporadic expressions in the form of "strike legislation" and "strike ordinances" apprised them of the fact that the state of public opinion could make itself felt in the profit and loss account.

NEW POLICY TOWARD INDEPENDENTS

As a result of this, a change came over the policies of management; under President Fish a far less vindictive policy was pursued with respect to the independents. A wholesale policy of expansion in the construction of long lines and renewal of equipment was inaugurated. Consolidation, or in

⁷ A. B. Paine, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

case this proved impossible, connection with the independents, instead of forcing their extinction by the old methods of competitive warfare, became the policy of the Bell management. To take the independents "into camp" instead of destroying them went far toward elimination of the hostility of a group whose economic stake guaranteed a persistent and determined enemy in the political field—an enemy dangerous less on account of its resources in the field of business competition than in its power to command the sympathy of a public deeply indoctrinated with the "curse of bigness" ideology. A group who had a continuous economic interest in parading as modern St. Georges slaying the Bell Dragon or who could exploit the strong home-rule sentiment, the intense localism and distrust of domination by distant capitalists residing in some far-off Boston or New York, were respectable antagonists, at least in the political arena. The wisdom of this policy bore fruit, not only in stilling, to a large measure, the politically dangerous clamor of the independents, but also in retaining a protective fringe of small business. The existence of a numerous though economically unimportant swarm of independents conciliated to, and in varying degrees dependent on, the Bell interests, has given the remote management of the A. T. & T. a conveniently harmonious mass base in many of the states. Since these independents believe themselves to have similar interests, they can be relied upon to do much of the legislative work, which, overtly falling on the shoulders of the Bell interests, would give rise to the cry of sinister and foreign domination.

It would be incorrect, however, to assume that peace descended on the competitive battleground all of a sudden. It was only over a considerable period that the ambitions of the independents came to assume that modest proportion compatible with the Bell scheme of things. The state and Federal anti-trust laws gave them a strategic position for legal attack. But in the main, though they had some successes in the state courts, they failed of any substantial achievement. They were doubtless to a considerable degree impeded by the courts' incapacity to set aside the corporate fiction and face the reality of the holding company. In the Federal field, the divorce between Western Union and the A. T. & T. was secured. The Bell interests, perhaps fearing the unfortunate results of a court trial, did this voluntarily at the request of the Attorney-General. The uncertain operation of the anti-trust laws was favorably stabilized, from the Bell point of view, by an agreement between Vice-President Kingsbury and Attorney-General Wickersham. This gentleman's agreement was in effect a promise on the part of the Attorney-

General to let bygones be bygones if, in return, the Bell interests would abandon any further attempts to increase the scope of their domination in the telephone field. The unstable situation created by the anti-trust laws in the telephone field was ended by the passage of an act in 1921 permitting the merger of telephone properties upon the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

A PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY

In another and perhaps more important respect, the Bell public relations policies suffered a change in this period. With the passing of Hudson and the old ways of the patent-monopoly period, the management turned to the improvement of the service, the personnel, and personnel attitudes. It was hoped that much of the public criticism which underlay the political difficulties could be remedied by a continuous campaign of efficiency, courteousness, and a readiness to attend to complaints. This marked a still further change from the complacent and arrogant attitude that so provoked the public during the preceding era. A general approbation of service and efficiency has had measurable value in distracting public attention from the more delicate question concerning rates.

This change in attitude toward the public is reflected in the 1903 Annual Report. It states, "An essential obligation on the part of this company and the operating companies with which it is associated is to use every effort to give their patrons the best possible service. To do this the apparatus must be of the best design and quality, and must be installed under the most favorable conditions." And here a new factor is introduced that was to prove over the course of time one of the most potent agents in effective public relations technique. "More than that," the report continues, "the working force, including not only the telephone operators who come in contact with the public, but all those upon whom is imposed the duty of keeping the apparatus in order and of arranging with the public for its use must be thoroughly trained, as well in the practical part of their work as in meeting and dealing properly with the public."

This report approximately dates the beginning of large-scale utilization of personnel for public relations purposes by the Bell management. Here at a still rudimentary stage is the conception of employees as a means and medium of public relations; in successive stages it has developed and expanded until it is now one of the most important resources in the hands of management. It has been found that a properly recruited, properly educated

staff whose loyalty has been adequately ensured will work not only eight or more hours a day keeping up the Bell System's public relations, but further, even in personal contacts and friendships, on company time and off, will serve as an efficient agent in spreading the Bell ideology and securing the sympathies and allegiance of groups and individuals to the Bell System.

While public relations were notably advanced under Fish, and means to their harmonious maintenance devised, it is on the whole fair to say that their present emphasis, scope, and importance awaited the vision and imagination of his successor, Theodore N. Vail. Vail had a remarkably good background for the presidency of the A. T. & T., to which he was called at the insistence of the bankers, alarmed at the condition of the company after the Fish expansion and aware of the impending financial crisis. In his early years Vail had been head of the railway mail in the Post Office Department; later he had seen the Bell company through its infancy; and now he was returning from successful operations in South America. He has claims to be ranked as one of the first leaders of American industry to appreciate the problems of public relations in a farsighted manner and to seek a basis for their long-term adjustment.

INSTABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE CONTROL

The situation that faced the Bell interests in the latter part of the first decade of the twentieth century was delicate. Competition, it was true, in so far as it seriously threatened the profits of the system, had been overcome. But with a public irritated, resentful, and suspicious of Bell policies, it remained a potential menace. Legislative regulation of rates, in fact the general legislative control, was highly unsatisfactory. As elective bodies, the legislatures were highly amenable to public pressure. Political blackmail and political campaigning on the question of rates were uncondusive to that degree of political stability most favorable to the conduct of the business. Though relations with state legislatures can be regularized, committees packed, spokesmen elected, opposition bought or browbeaten, that is an arduous task with the frequency of personnel turnover, and is open to all manner of surprises and difficulties. While the courts proved and still prove a haven of refuge from the sporadic attacks of the popular branch, their constant utilization might weaken their strength for extraordinary need, and, in any event, as a workaday method of adjustment, they were out of the question.

For these and perhaps other reasons, President Vail and the management of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company reversed the previous position of the Bell System on regulation.

It is contended [states the 1908 annual report] that if there is to be no competition, there should be public control. It is not believed that there is any serious objection to such control, provided it is independent, intelligent, considerate, thorough and just, recognizing, as does the Interstate Commerce Commission in its report recently issued, that capital is entitled to its fair return, and good management or enterprise to its reward.

In further annual reports President Vail and the Bell management sketch out the picture of the desired type of control:

Public control or regulation [says the 1911 report] of Public Service Corporations by permanent commissions, has come and come to stay. Control or regulation exercised through such a body has many advantages over that exercised through regular legislative bodies or committees. The permanent commission will be a quasi-judicial body. . . . Experience also has demonstrated that this "supervision" should stop at "control" and "regulation" and not "manage," "operate" nor dictate what the management or operation should be beyond the requirements of the greatest efficiency and economy. . . . Governmental control should protect the investor as well as the public. It should ensure to the public good service and fair rates. It should also ensure fair returns to the investor. A public utility giving good service at fair rates should not be subject to competition at unfair rates.

The reasons for this interest in the development of commission regulation are more fully elaborated in the 1912 report under the heading "Public Relations." The report states:

In our relations with permanent bodies of control and regulation during the past year, we have had so little in the way of difference or difficulty as to be almost negligible. . . . Wherever we have had serious difficulties with representative bodies of the public, it has almost always been because those representing the public or legislative bodies were of temporary nature. In all such cases we have presented our side with the same care as to the rights of ourselves and consideration for the public as in cases before permanent bodies. As a result our position and claims have been conceded and sustained, or if not and it has been necessary to resort to the courts, we have in most instances been satisfactorily vindicated.

The report goes on to conclude from the above that all regulation and control of public service corporations should be by permanent bodies judicial in attitude. For "temporary committees of bodies legislative in their functions, though trying to assume a judicial attitude, do act from an entirely legislative and sometimes political standpoint."

VAIL ACCEPTS REGULATION

President Vail and the management of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company were wise enough to see that their vision of a national

telephone monopoly could never be achieved in the face of a popular ideology which demanded competition as an insurance against extortion, without the counter proposition of regulation. The experience of the railroads with the Interstate Commerce Commission seemed not unattractive. At least President Vail indicates that must have been a consideration. The commissions would serve as a buffer between the Bell System and both the state legislatures and the public. As permanent bodies they would be both less amenable to the changing gusts of public opinion and more susceptible to a stable system of sympathetic contact. The Bell experience with the courts may have contributed to the desire that the commissions should be judicial in attitude, but there were perhaps other reasons.

It seems to have been hoped that through the device of commissions the utility issue might be measurably "depoliticized." But backing commission legislation of the desired variety, through the public utility section of the American Bar Association, in conjunction with other utilities, and pushing it in the state legislatures was not enough.⁸ The commissions, once established, had to be supported by public opinion if they were fearlessly to give the utilities their due. At the Bell System's 1913 annual conference, which seems to have been mostly concerned with public relations, President Vail, speaking on various aspects of educating the public, felt obliged to say:

One of the most important things in connection with this education—important enough to be dealt with alone—is to make a campaign for increased respect in the attitude of the public toward the public service commissions. The greater respect in which these bodies are held by the public, the abler will be the men who will serve, and the greater the benefit they can be to the public service corporations. . . . Until the time comes when the decision of these bodies can be fully accepted by all—even though they are not fully acceptable to all—they will fall short of the purpose of their being. It is for us, in cooperation with all others interested, to aid in bringing this about.

It is to be feared that the desired end has failed of achievement, for the campaign to support the commissions, at least to shield them from the untoward political effect of unpopular rate decisions, has apparently remained unceasing.⁹ The commissions have failed to attain, in the eyes of the populace, that reverent awe customarily yielded to the courts, nor have they

⁸ F. C. C., *Report on the Bell System, Outside Contacts of the Bell System*, Special Investigation, Docket No. 1, p. 35. Cf. also F. C. C., *Telephone Investigation*, Special Investigation Docket No. 1, Hearings, vol. xl, on the use of the Bar Association by the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company.

⁹ Cf. F. C. C., *Hearings, Special Investigation of Certain Telephone Companies*, Special Investigation Docket No. 1, vols. vi, vii, viii, xv, and xviii, which deal with Bell relations with public utility commissions.

remained insulated from the influence of the state legislatures, a fact lamented in the Bell annual reports.

TO EDUCATE THE PUBLIC

In the address above quoted, Mr. Vail further reveals his deep belief in the necessity of educating the public:

All industrials, particularly utilities, are face to face with problems, the solution of which will largely determine the future of the business; they are, in the last resort, subject to a control and regulation far stronger than that exercised by commissions or by legislators, that influence and power that makes and unmakes legislators and judges; the influence and power of public desire and public selfishness, which if not regulated or controlled will lead to chaos and disaster. The only regulation or control for this is that common sense which, directed by education and observation, and rightfully administered and regulated, will conserve the interests of all.

The reader may be tempted to regard these sentiments of President Vail as a case of business man's "spooks." At the time, of course, there was considerable alarm over agitation for the "postalization of the telephone." But perhaps the remarks were indicative of more lasting public relations policies than merely the wholesale anti-government-ownership campaign they preceded.

This feeling of the danger to the Bell interests of an uneducated or perhaps improperly educated public mind is more clearly expressed by Vice-President E. K. Hall of the A. T. & T. in a speech given by him in 1909 to the Telephone Society of New England at Boston: "From the public point of view, speaking generally, the public does not know us except as a corporation, and they know corporations as a species of business organizations which are generally unpopular and are quite generally considered to be in some way oppressing the general public." It is doubtful whether with the spread of the corporation form the term has the same negative value as in 1909, but the general antipathy to large-scale enterprise would seem to have persisted to the present time, though in a mitigated form.

"They know us as a monopoly," he continues, "and that creates hostility at once because the public does not like monopolies. They have no opportunity to see us or know us, and the two things that they do see of us—namely the telephone instrument and the pole lines—give them the wrong kind of impression of us. They think first that ours is a very easy, simple sort of a business and that facilities for telephoning ought to be furnished at very low prices and without any defects. . . ."

II. HUMANIZING A "SOULLESS CORPORATION"

In answer to the difficulties complained of by Mr. Hall in the above quotation, public relations techniques were evolved. The impersonal corporation of the trust-busting era—soulless, or if deemed to have a soul, an evil one—has been clothed with the radiant garment of a Bruce Barton service ideology. Irritation of the public with the impersonality of the corporate form has had the effect of forcing the presidents and officers of these companies to take on the difficult task of personifying and humanizing them in the public eye. And as a public relations expert will tell you, from his angle, the way a Gifford or a Sloan is viewed by the public is of calculable importance.¹⁰ Just as the politician in his speeches and acts must attempt to please the public, so the modern corporation executive must seek to act the part deemed best for public relations. This emerging consciousness of the semi-public capacity that clothes their work is as yet embryonic with the leaders of industry. However they may scoff at it privately, the demands of improved public relations are forcing at least its outward acceptance.

The public distrust of monopoly which Mr. Hall takes as axiomatic and which finds unmitigated expression even at this date in the speeches of Mr. Borah, the writings of Mr. Justice Brandeis, and those two epistles to the middle class and their labor brethren—the platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties"—has necessitated the manufacture of a counter ideology. The ruinous nature of competition has been a theme of Bell oratory from an early date. The magnetic and imaginative appeal of "Universal Service" has been sent forth to do battle with the slogans of the "Curse of Bigness." Who could resist the appeal that lies behind "When you lift the Bell receiver and ask for Western Union you are in contact with the world"?

¹⁰ "Walter Gifford at head of these enterprises [the Bell System] has also been publicized personally. The idea of service and public spirited enterprise was greatly aided by Mr. Gifford's acceptance of the post of director of unemployment relief during 1931." J. P. Jones (president of the Commercial News Corporation), *Public Relations—Public Policy and Commercial Publicity* (1933).

¹¹ A quotation from the 1936 platform of the Republican Party will, perhaps, serve to show how pervasive this ideology is believed to be by the politically initiate. "A private monopoly is indefensible and intolerable. It menaces and if continued will utterly destroy constitutional government and liberty of the citizen."

"We favor the vigorous enforcement of the criminal laws against monopolies and trusts and their officials and we demand the enactment of such additional legislation as is necessary to make it impossible for private monopoly to exist in the United States."

"We will employ the full powers of the government to the end that monopoly shall be eliminated and that free enterprise shall be fully restored and maintained." While the leaders of big business could confidently discount this pronouncement, they must reckon with the latent and widespread public hostility to which it gives representation.

INSPIRING AWE AND RESPECT

The pole lines have long ceased to be a factor of public annoyance. A glance, however, at any photograph of New York streets in the early years of this century will give one a sympathetic understanding of both the Bell and the public's problems. The more enduring problem of convincing the public of the complexity and difficulty, and hence the costliness of telephone operations, has enlisted many techniques in its solution. The public is astounded into acquiescence by the very sight of the complicated and ponderous maze to which it is treated in one of the many thousands of central-office visits to which it may be a party under the hospitable auspices of the Bell management and the guidance of an efficient public-relations man. The appeal of science has not been neglected. The newspaperman, the editor, the college professor, and the public utility commissioner are welcomed and sometimes brought to the Bell Laboratories and the Western Electric plants. Through countless lectures at clubs and societies ranging from Chambers of Commerce through library groups, even to American Legion posts, in subjects ranging from the story of Bell achievements, the future of television, to transoceanic telephony and the like, seeds of goodwill are sown and the public imagination is sympathetically enlisted in the cause of this great corporation that they have learned is doing so much to advance the outposts of science and benefit humanity in general and the American public in particular. In these days the use of the motion picture has been appreciated. After seeing one of the most brilliant pieces of modern photography, showing the intricate parts and delicacy of construction of the French phone, who but the most captious and suspicious would query the reasonableness of the extra charge for the hand set?

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY

But to return to Mr. Hall's summary of the Bell public relations difficulties, after pointing out the then unavoidable disfiguration of the streets, he continues:

So we start out in our dealings with the public under a heavy handicap; they do not know us, they misunderstand us, they mistrust us, and there is a continued tendency to believe that our intentions toward them are not fair. In other words, in spite of anything we do or can do the natural tendency of the public mind toward the company is one of hostility or antagonism—I might perhaps better say passive hostility or antagonism. This general attitude of the public mind is, as I believe, not only a serious danger to the property of the business but it is in my judgment the only serious danger confronting the company, because the natural tendency of such

hostility, founded as it is on misunderstanding, prejudice, and distrust is, under slight incentive, to crystallize at any time into adverse legislation. . . .

Perhaps Vice-President Hall has got to the bottom of the modern public relations problem at this point. For the telephone industry and many others, it is no longer primarily the old question of getting favors from the government. But rather, having carved out a relatively secure position in the economic field, these industries are increasingly sensitive to possible changes in the governmental framework. By the scope and extent of their operations they are so inextricably tied in with this framework that its change may mean, for them at least, acute dislocation. This latent hostility on the part of the public of which he speaks presents the very real danger of such change. The effect of all this is an increasing preoccupation of the management of large-scale industry with the maintenance of the *status quo* and an increasing diversion of attention from more orthodox economic tasks. The economic incidence of a rate reduction is clear even if the means of its avoidance lie without the strictly economic sphere.

In addition to the reasons cited above, the very resources in the hands of large-scale management are a standing temptation to seek a remedy for its political dangers and necessities. The mass of employees whose loyalty may be won and used, the interested army of security owners, the volume and influence of advertisements and the many other sources of support and influence are at least the permissive causes of modern public relations policies.

As the quotations of this paper have been for the most part from sources of an earlier date, it seems desirable to bring it to an end with one from recent times showing the continuity of Bell policy. The following is from a talk at a Bell System publicity conference by W. P. Banning, Assistant Vice-President in charge of public relations, on "The Service of Publicity":

It is because the higher strata of society are articulate that our publicity activity must take special cognizance of them. Everywhere there are thinking people who make and lead public opinion. Personal contact with them as individuals or in groups is all-important. Create occasions for reaching, or seize occasions when their attention can be focused on your institutional message as Mr. Gifford did at Dallas. [He refers to W. S. Gifford's 1927 address before the Convention of the National Association of Railway and Utilities Commissioners.] Be equally alert when an occasion arises that is capable of misconstruction or that seems unrelated to your objective. [It should be borne in mind that this address is to a gathering concerned with public relations.]

The Western Electric dividend of \$48,000,000 might have weakened the argument in our *Statement of Policy*¹² but it was used and interpreted so as to give this statement additional strength and clarity.

Mr. Banning is not unaware of the importance of the group structure in our political life:

Groups and individuals make mighty allies of telephone publicity when they are convinced. They are specific markets for specific ideas. Their cooperation is a result worthy of much striving to gain. The American Company's [A. T. & T.] effort to reach and convince the group mind is illustrated by its different magazine appeals that Mr. Cook will tell you about. It is also illustrated by the two quarterlies, and by the motion picture program which recognizes that there are many group tastes to be satisfied, and that they may be appealed to through this medium.

But after all these special appeals are secondary to the news in their impact on the public mind:

Yet it is in the form of news that the thought of the nation comes to the common mind first and usually last. It is upon the news and not upon information received at lectures, scientific demonstrations, or from class magazines, that public opinion is largely formed. The important thing to keep in mind is the necessity not only of reporting the facts reliably but of interpreting them reliably and usefully.

One last quotation from Mr. Banning bringing out the magnitude of the stake and the necessity for continuous endeavor:

Indeed, in the work of striving to overcome prejudice, skepticism, and mental inertia in the public mind or group mind alike there can be no stopping. Not without continuous effort can publicity serve as the destroyer of friction, *as insurance for a business structure already enormous in value and gaining at the rate of more than one million dollars a day.*¹³ What can judge when the public is conscious even of the outline of the story that we ourselves were so long in comprehending, with eight hours a day in which to absorb it? There can be no stopping, and this applies particularly to the publicity we pay to have published. A manufacturer having developed his public relations finds he cannot stop and hold his position. He must maintain his prestige even though he doesn't work to increase it. Thus his credit with the public is not frozen and he has some reserves to call up when he must stand battle with competition.

But it is no longer the battle of competition that the Bell System has to fear.

¹² Cf. W. S. Gilford, *A Statement of Policy of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company*, reprint of an address before the 1927 Convention of the National Association of Railway and Utilities Commissioners.

¹³ My italics. At a conservative estimate the properties under control of the A. T. & T. cannot be much under \$5,000,000,000.

WHAT LABOR IS THINKING

By JOHN L. LEWIS

The development, during the present critical period, of ways of thinking about the problems of industrial organization in the United States, especially the thinking of leaders of labor masses, bears on the future of the country and is of particular concern to students of public opinion. In this article Mr. Lewis, the initiator and president of the Committee on Industrial Organization, gives his views of labor's attitude.

The attitude and aspirations of organized labor, as represented by the C.I.O., are largely outgrowths of the post-depression experience of all groups of workers—whether by hand or brain.

In the first place, it has been keenly realized by labor in looking backward over the period 1923-29, when American industry reached its zenith in the way of technological advancement and productive accomplishment, that the advances made by the workers, or their participation in the productive gains of the so-called new industrial revolution, were relatively small. There were substantial reductions in living costs and an expansion in the opportunity for steady employment, but the actual rates of pay of organized labor as a whole did not rise more than 10 per cent during those years, in deplorable contrast with the unprecedented increases in profits and speculative values accruing to other groups of the population.

In the second place, it has been apparent that labor was made the residual sufferer of the depression which followed the industrial and financial collapse of the autumn of 1929. The blight of unemployment descended upon all groups. Through no fault of their own, the savings and property of those who had been thrifty disappeared. Large proportions of the ambitious, the industrious, and the energetic found, during the succeeding years, that it was possible to survive only through public relief.

Furthermore, during the depression period, 1930-33, it will be recalled that our industrial and financial institutions were subjected to a most critical and intensive examination by economists, engineers, and technologists of all descriptions. Through articles in popular magazines and the daily press they took the capitalistic system apart, pointed out its weaknesses and defects, and demonstrated to labor, and all other groups of our people, what changes or remedies were necessary if our economic system was to be put together again and made to function in the public interest. Even some of the most conserva-

PUBLIC RELATIONS.

In all times, in all lands, public opinion has had control at the last word—public opinion is but the concert of individual opinion, and is as much subject to change or to education.

It is based on information and belief. If it is wrong it is wrong because of wrong information, and consequent erroneous belief.

It is not only the right but the obligation of all individuals, or aggregations of individuals, who come before the public, to see that the public have full and correct information.

The Bell System gained 740,027 subscribers last year. Of the total number of subscribers over 1,000,000 were new during the year.

The American Telephone and Telegraph Company gained 4,558 shareholders last year. Of the total number of shareholders many more were new last year.

The excuse for setting forth at great length the policy, facts, beliefs and desires of the Bell System and those administering it, even to the extent of repeating much that has already been said and explaining some things familiar to many, is to inform the new public, the new subscribers, and the new shareholders.

Every fact that is stated is correct.

Every argument or reason is believed to be well founded and based on facts and is intended to be impartial.

The position of the Bell System is well known.

It is believed that the telephone system should be universal, interdependent and intercommunicating, affording opportunity for any subscriber of any ex-

change to communicate with any other subscriber of any other exchange within the limits of speaking distance, giving to every subscriber every possible additional facility for *annihilating time or distance by use of electrical transmission of intelligence or personal communication*. It is believed that some sort of a connection with the telephone system should be within reach of all. It is believed further, that this idea of universality can be broadened and applied to a *universal wire system for the electrical transmission of intelligence (written or personal communication)*, from every one in every place to every one in every other place, a system as universal and as extensive as the highway system of the country which extends from every man's door to every other man's door.

It is not believed that this can be accomplished by separately controlled or distinct systems nor that there can be competition in the accepted sense of competition.

It is believed that all this can be accomplished to the reasonable satisfaction of the public with its acquiescence, under such control and regulation as will afford the public much better service at less cost than any competition or government-owned monopoly could permanently afford and at the same time be self-sustaining.

The Bell System as at present constituted was evolved first through the local exchange.

In the beginning of the business it was impossible to get the necessary capital for development in any large amount. In the place of large capital, small capital and the optimism of individuals had to be utilized. Small capital, large hopes and individual effort brought about a development by limiting the size of the exchange territory given to each individual to his possibilities. In this way the country and smaller cities were largely developed before much

was done in the larger cities. The capital to develop New York was estimated at less than \$100,000, yet it was a long time before even that could be raised. Even if it had been possible to raise capital to exploit the whole country through one company, it would have been impossible to use it properly. The business was new. Those who constructed and operated it had to be educated. The policy of small units and individual effort, with concentration, application and resourcefulness brought a more rapid development and education than could have been had in any other way.

In this formative period, when the business was new, before distant speaking possibilities were shown, all communication was local. No two exchanges were either equipped or operated on the same lines or under the same methods, nor did they need to be; service, judged by present standards, was poor, but satisfied the local use; better service was not known. Later development of the toll line, of lines connecting exchanges, and of long-distance service made the deficiencies of the service glaring and the necessity of improvement imperative.

It will be remembered by many when the long-distance service was first introduced special connections had to be built for the users; now every telephone station or line can be equally well used for long-distance speaking.

With the extension of the speaking limits of the telephone over connecting lines came also the necessity for the extension of the territorial limits of the exchange systems, the necessity of standardization, uniformity of apparatus and operating methods, and an effective common control over all. The necessity for system was the beginning of the Bell System. The combination of the separate exchanges and lines into larger aggregations or organizations followed. It was necessary to have more effective organization with more effective administration and management,

and with resources sufficient to make the changes which experiment and experience had found necessary.

It is impossible to define the territorial limitations of a telephone system because from every exchange center communication is wanted up to the talking limits in every direction.

This process of combination will continue until all telephone exchanges and lines will be merged either into one company owning and operating the whole system, or until a number of companies with territories determined by political, business or geographical conditions, each performing all functions pertaining to local management and operation, will be closely associated under the control of one central organization exercising all the functions of centralized general administration. But whatever may be the form of the operating organization, there is bound to be for legal purposes and the holding of franchises, some sort of subordinate state organization which will bring the business and property in each locality under the jurisdiction of the state in which it is situated and operated.

The American Telephone and Telegraph Company, which is the owner of all or part of each company forming the Bell System, is not simply a holding company. It is not a combination that has eliminated competition between the companies controlled by it. There can be no rivalry or competition between local exchanges in adjacent territory. Those desiring the service of exchanges in adjacent territory in addition to their own can get it much better and cheaper through their local exchange. To give direct individual wires from one exchange territory into another would be impractical from the multiplication of lines and prohibitive on account of cost. The American Telephone and Telegraph Company is a centralized general administration for all the

companies. It does the financing for the extension of the business. It furnishes the engineering, operating and other experts. It maintains a productive and protective organization so far as patents are concerned. It defends all the companies against all infringements. It undertakes to bring about improvements by working out the ideas and suggestions of others, both in and out of the business. Its agents keep each company fully informed of all that is going on in the field. It avoids all duplication of efforts, of experiments, of trial of new methods, apparatus, etc. It looks after the public relations of the companies. In other words, it performs all that service which is common to all, leaving to the local companies the local management. The organization is not unlike that of the United States, each local company occupying its own territory and performing all local functions, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company binding them all together with its long-distance lines and looking after all the relations between the local companies and between local companies and other companies. To have developed the telephone industry to its present state of efficiency would have been beyond the ability of any one of the local companies.

All independent systems which have been started have more or less followed the same lines, but within restricted areas, whether built by one company or interest, or by several. First, the local exchange, then the toll line to outlying points, and then the long-distance line connecting with other independent exchanges, tying them together to form a system affording facilities for communication between the subscribers of one exchange and the subscribers of the other, but limited in scope, and without the community of interest necessary to a common system.

In other words we have the Bell System on the one side, developed on the lines of a universal, intercommunicating and interdependent service. We

have the opposition on the other side, segregated exchanges or limited systems without universality, incomplete and inefficient, neither interdependent nor intercommunicating, except to a limited extent.

CORPORATE ORGANIZATION AND COMBINATION.

There is nothing of greater common interest, nothing which is exciting more comment and discussion at the present moment, than the questions of state control of corporate organizations and of combinations, especially of those controlling public utilities.

Corporate organization and combination are the necessary and logical solution of the problem of caring for the wonderful development which has been going on all over the world, and particularly in this country, in the recent past.

Combination only can cope with that industrial development of the present time which is far beyond the scope of individual effort or capital. In those good old times, one man, with his own capital, could carry on even the largest operations. The margin of profits due to low wages and large selling prices enabled the owners of such individual establishments to live and enjoy the best to be had in those times, and amass fortunes—fortunes relatively as large as any of the present—from an amount of gross business, the profits from which today would not be sufficient to pay the wages of a shop superintendent.

The development of the arts, the necessity of extensive laboratories and experimental departments, with technical staffs competent to keep abreast of modern progress and find out how to utilize *all of everything*, the large gross production at small margin of profit, the large capital requirements necessary to conduct business on these lines; all these place modern industrial enterprises either beyond the financial ability of any one individual, or far beyond

the amount that any one individual wishes to have in any one venture.

Without attempting to discuss the history or evolution of "Company," "Corporation," or "Monopoly," and similar organizations or combinations of trade, it can be said that the first and oldest step towards corporate organization was partnership. Corporate combination is but a partnership wherein the partners are represented by shares held in various amounts by the various investors.

These corporate organizations and combinations have become a permanent part of our business machinery; the public would not, if it could, abolish them.

Who would ever consent, or would the requirements of business allow, that the railroads between the great sections of our country revert to the independent lines that once existed, with all the consequential delays, inconveniences and disadvantages to traffic and travel? Who would be content if the telegraph business should be carried on by the transfer of messages from one to another of the numerous companies, formerly independent, but now combined and giving direct transit over the whole country?

That there has been in large measure reason or cause for the existing unfavorable public opinion as to corporations, trusts and combinations, is beyond question, but it does not follow that there is reason or cause for the wholesale denunciation and condemnation of all corporations, trusts and combinations. Nor does it follow that all that is bad is centered in or confined to those prominent in the public eye.

Many of the practices most severely condemned are but the amplification or continuance of practices or customs common in the current affairs of business, practices or customs which were not wrong in themselves, but wrong in the abuse of them.

Public utility corporations and other combinations

have too frequently assumed that new laws and regulations were disastrous and ruinous without first giving them a fair trial, and legislators too often have displayed an ignorance or disregard of existing laws, spreading the idea that new legislation was a cure-all for any undesirable condition, while it was often only a political play, and the enforcement of the existing laws was utterly neglected. The results have been bad. While business will adjust itself to any condition if given time and opportunity, sudden change of conditions will result in disaster to some interest, but not as a rule to those at which the change was aimed.

There is too little consideration given to the fact, based on all experience, that no one interest can permanently prosper unless all other interests are in a prosperous condition, and to the fact that any sudden change in existing conditions will always be taken advantage of by some one interest to the detriment of other interests in general.

The proper use of corporate organization or combination under proper regulation or control cannot be objected to.

What is and should be condemned, prevented and punished, is the abuse made of corporate machinery to the detriment of public welfare and such abuse as has been and is being practised so extensively for purely speculative and oftentimes swindling enterprises.

It is largely this abuse by professional speculative promoters and swindling security vendors, mostly on a comparatively small scale, not in any way associated or connected with the general business organizations or systems, that has been the cause of most of the popular odium surrounding this necessary machinery of business. It does not seem possible that the only way of reaching such offenders is through penalties for "misuse of the mails," but however or by whom over the remedy is applied, he who does it should re-

ceive the heartiest thanks and appreciation of the community.

The large corporate combinations which often in popular opinion are supposed to be owned or wholly controlled by some one man or some few men, are, in fact, made up of thousands and tens of thousands of silent partners, the shareholders, who are the real owners. The existence of these real owners, these shareholders, is often obscured in the shadow of some one or more individuals who dominate these companies, not by large ownership, as popularly believed, but by administrative and operating aggressiveness and successful management. The shareholding owners are in the aggregate very numerous and, in any other country than America, would be frequently in evidence and heard from, would always take an active participation in all meetings, annual or special, and would in that way protect themselves and their holdings by associating the corporation or combination in the minds of the public with the particular and separate individual ownerships, or interests in them. In this way that same protection, recognition or consideration, to which all interests, whether individual or corporate, are alike entitled, would be assured.

PUBLIC UTILITIES.

THE "SERVED" AND THE "SERVERS."

Under the existing conditions the corporations or combinations represent the "servers." To the shareholders, dividends represent good management and desirable investment, but to many of the community, the community that is "served," profits which in individual enterprise would be considered reasonable are unreasonable and forced out of their pockets by unscrupulous management or illegal or dishonest practices.

The contest between the "served" and the

"servers," the "producer" and the "consumer," between "he-who-has" and "he-who-has-not," has been going on from the dawn of civilization, from the time when some one had more of some one thing than he wanted, while another had none, or less than he wanted.

From time immemorial efforts have been made in some way to control or restrict any accumulation, in the hands or in the uncontrolled possession of any individual or set of individuals, of those things which had become necessary to public wants, and to prevent necessities from in any way getting outside that control which natural competition, or the law of supply and demand under normal conditions exercises.

There has always been and will always be the laudable desire of the great public to be served rightly, and as cheaply as possible, which sometimes selfishly degenerates into a lack of consideration for the rights of those who are serving.

On the other hand there has always been the laudable desire of the "server," or the producer, to get a profit for his service or production, which sometimes degenerates into a selfish disregard or lack of consideration for those who are served.

This conflict, which originated with the first commercial transaction or exchange, has continued ever since and will continue to the end of time.

Until the state, or conditions under which society was organized, began to be complex there were very few things which were not and could not be regulated by the law of supply and demand, the law of substitution of one article for another in case of scarcity, or by the laws of competition. In the simple life, which was with the masses of the people until very recent years enforced, and is with all laudable, there were few articles which were in themselves necessities, and of these very few which did not have alternative articles of use, or substitutes, and, in fact, there was little that was not produced by the local

community or by the family. Those few things which, in the growth of civilization, and particularly by the increase of urban population, were of general use and necessity for all, those few things in which the masses of the public had an interest in receiving regularly and reasonably, soon became the object of control or regulation, and here was the beginning of and reason for state control and regulation or state ownership.

PUBLIC CONTROL.

Public control or regulation of Public Service Corporations by permanent commissions, has come and come to stay. Control or regulation exercised through such a body has many advantages over that exercised through regular legislative bodies or committees. The permanent commission will be a quasi-judicial body. It should be made up of members whose duty it will be, and who will have the desire, the time and the opportunity, to familiarize themselves with the questions coming before them. It should act only after thorough investigation and be governed by the equities of each case. It would in time establish a course of practice and precedent for the guidance of all concerned.

Experience also has demonstrated that this "supervision" should stop at "control" and "regulation" and not "manage," "operate" nor dictate what the management or operation should be beyond the requirements of the greatest efficiency and economy.

Management or operation requires intimate knowledge and experience which can only be gained by continuous, active and practical participation in actual working, while control or regulation can be intelligently exercised, after judicial hearing, by those who have not the knowledge or experience to operate.

State control or regulation should be of such character as to encourage the highest possible standard in plant, the utmost extension of facilities, the highest

efficiency in service, rigid economy in operation, and to that end should allow rates that will warrant the highest wages for the best service, some reward for high efficiency in administration, and such certainty of return on investment as will induce investors not only to retain their securities, but to supply at all times all the capital needed to meet the demands of the public.]

Such "control" and "regulation" can and should stop all abuses of capitalization, of extortion or of overcharges, of unreasonable division of profits.

If there is to be state control and regulation, there should also be state protection—protection to a corporation striving to serve the whole community (some part of whose service must necessarily be unprofitable), from aggressive competition which covers only that part which is profitable.

Governmental control should protect the investor as well as the public. It should ensure to the public good service and fair rates. It should also ensure fair returns to the investor.

A public utility giving good service at fair rates should not be subject to competition at unfair rates.

It is not that all competition should be suppressed, but that all competition should be regulated and controlled. That competition should be suppressed which arises out of the promotion of unnecessary duplication, which gives no additional facilities or service, which is in no sense either extension or improvement, which without initiative or enterprise tries to take advantage of the initiative and enterprise of others by sharing the profitable without assuming any of the burden of the unprofitable parts or which has only the selfishly speculative object of forcing a consolidation or purchase.

State control and regulation, to be effective at all, should be of such a character, that the results from the operation of any one enterprise would not warrant

the expenditure or investment necessary for mere duplication and straight competition. In other words, the profits should not be so large as to warrant duplication of capitalization in the competition for the same business.

When thoroughly understood it will be found that "control" will give more of the benefits and public advantages, which are expected to be obtained by state ownership, than could be obtained through such ownership, and will obtain them without the public burden of either the public office-holder or public debt or operating deficit. It is conceded that as a rule private management is better, more economical and more efficient than public management, and much more advanced and enterprising. The economical margin between public and private management has been shown by experience to be more than sufficient to secure the best private administration.

When through a wise and judicious state control and regulation all the advantages without any of the disadvantages of state ownership are secured, state ownership is doomed.

State control of public utilities should not prevent progress, should be sufficiently unrestricting to encourage the introduction and demonstration of the value of any new or novel enterprise, and should allow sufficient reward for the initiative, enterprise, risk and imagination of the adventurers behind such enterprises. It should discriminate between the useful adventurers or promoters, pioneers in fact, and those pirates or sharks who, on the strength of other successes, extravagantly capitalize undeveloped ideas, and exchange the worthless securities for the savings of deluded and credulous investors. Corporate control and restriction should always exist to a sufficient degree to prevent such speculative promoting, and such stock-jobbing schemes.

The regulation or control of any new or novel thing

which is a mere convenience and not a necessity can be left largely to the laws of trade; such a thing, if offered, must be offered at a price acceptable to the public, who are the customers, at a price which in the opinion of the purchaser leaves him a margin of profit either in convenience or enjoyment. Under such control private initiative can be depended upon for the introduction of everything believed to have possibilities.

The combination of the promoter, investor and capitalist, with their imagination, personality, optimism and desire, has been at the bottom of every development of every kind or nature which has benefitted the human race in the way of utilities, and still is the only way in which new utilities can be developed. Whenever any great works have been undertaken by governments they have been on lines of old development, based on experience of that which has been developed by the persistent genius and application of some individual or group of individuals.

State control or regulation, to be effective, should when exercised, be accepted and acquiesced in by the public. If all the decisions not in exact accord with the desire or contention of the public are condemned, if it is expected and required that all decisions be against the utilities controlled, if politics and political effect are to govern decisions, if decisions go for nothing with, and are not respected by the public, failure and disappointment are bound to follow, self-respecting men will refuse to act, the standard of appointments will fall and state control and regulation will become a disgrace, and the evils which it was intended to correct will multiply.

If any company gives good service, meets all the reasonable demands of the public, does not earn more than sufficient to provide for the maintenance of its plant up to the latest standard and for reconstruction of plant when worn out or obsolete, pays

only fair dividends to its shareholders—if a company is only doing this its rates and charges to the public cannot be unreasonable.

COMPETITION VS. CONTROL OR REGULATION.

Effective, aggressive competition, and regulation and control are inconsistent with each other, and cannot be had at the same time.

Control or regulation, to be effective, means publicity; it means semi-public discussion and consideration before action; it means deliberation, non-discrimination; it means everything which is the opposite of and inconsistent with effective competition.

Competition—aggressive, effective competition—means *strife*, industrial warfare; it means contention; it oftentimes means taking advantage of or resorting to any means that the conscience of the contestants or the degree of the enforcement of the laws will permit. To make competition effective great and uncontrolled latitude of action is necessary; action must be prompt and secret.

Aggressive competition means duplication of plant and investment. The ultimate object of such competition is the possession of the field wholly or partially; therefore it means either ultimate combination on such basis and with such prices as will cover past losses, or it means loss of return on investment, and eventual loss of capital. However it results, all costs of aggressive, uncontrolled competition are eventually borne, directly or indirectly, by the public.

Competition which is not aggressive, presupposes co-operative action, understandings, agreements, which result in general uniformity or harmony of action, which, in fact, is not competition but is combination, unstable but for the time effective.

COMPETING EXCHANGES.

Two local telephone exchanges in the same community are regarded as competing exchanges, and the public tolerates this dual service only in the fast disappearing idea that through competition in the telephone service some benefit may be obtained both as to rate and efficiency. Competition means that the same thing, or a satisfactory substitute, is offered. In this sense there can be no competing exchanges unless each exchange has substantially the same list of subscribers, which is in itself inconceivable.

It is not telephone service *per se* that an exchange affords; it is a particular, definite telephone connection between two people which can only be given between two parties connected with the same exchange or the same system. Each of the several independent exchanges in the same community offers you telephone service, but telephone service only with its particular list of subscribers.

Opposition exchanges compete in the same way as do two street railway lines, each starting in the center of the city, running a short distance through the same main street, and then branching off, each supplying an entirely different district of the city. Those traveling only from point to point on the main street can use either line, pay one fare; there is to this extent competition—there is a choice. Beyond that, to reach the other districts, there is no choice, there is no competition; one line or the other must be taken, depending on the particular district wished to be reached.

In the case of the street car service, payment is made only to the line used, when used.

To be in a position to obtain full telephone service where there are opposition exchanges, subscriptions to all are necessary.

In all other opposition utilities, to get the full service one or the other is paid—not both.

As before said, the purpose and object of an exchange is to afford a direct speaking circuit between parties at points distant from each other, to afford a highway for personal communication between any two. The exchange gives nothing but that connection, does nothing but provide that highway of communication, and place it at the service of the two parties desiring to communicate. The actual communicating is done by the parties themselves over this circuit placed at their exclusive service for the time being. To get this service, however, both parties must be connected with the same system; if not, the telephone circuit between the two parties cannot be made.

In two exchanges each having 2,000 subscribers, Messrs. A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N are connected with one, and Messrs. A, B, C, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, X, Y, Z, connected with the other. Messrs. A, B, and C can use either exchange to connect with each other, but to connect with each other one exchange with one subscription and with but one payment would be sufficient. This is not competition; this is duplication.

Messrs. A, B, C can connect with all the others on both exchanges only by two subscriptions and two payments. There is no choice; there is no competition.

Any competition between opposition exchanges is confined to obtaining new subscribers—to increasing their subscription lists. Neither the same thing nor what could possibly be called a substitute is offered. Each exchange affords that connection between the subscribers on its particular list and that is all—between Messrs. A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, etc., or between Messrs. A, B, C, O, P, Q, R, S, T, etc. A subscription to only one exchange is of no benefit when a connection with the other exchange is wanted, subscription to the other exchange is also necessary. This is not competition in any beneficial or any other sense.

When anyone decides to become a subscriber to an exchange he does not go to the one which offers any other inducement than the ability to connect with the people with whom it is the habit or necessity of the person subscribing to communicate. If it is his habit or necessity to communicate with some or all of those on both exchanges, subscriptions to both exchanges are necessary; in other words to get the advantage of complete local telephone service in a community, subscription to every local exchange in that community is necessary.

The fundamental idea of the Bell System is that the telephone service should be universal, intercommunicating and interdependent; that there are *certain people with whom one communicates frequently and regularly*; there are a *certain few with whom one communicates occasionally*, while there are *times when it is most necessary to get communication with some other one, who, until the particular necessity arose, might have been unknown and unthought of*. It is this necessity, impossible to predetermine, which makes the universal service the only perfect service.

On the assumption that a perfect telephone system must afford this direct highway of communication between any two desiring to converse, this system must reach everyone; must be universal, comprehensive. To the extent that any system does not reach everyone it is not perfect; to the extent that any system does not reach everyone, it is not in competition with the one that does; and to the extent that both systems reach everyone it is merely duplication; it is not competition.

Two exchanges may compete for subscribers, but not by offering the same list of subscribers; it would be impossible to keep the list of subscribers to any two opposition exchanges the same. One may offer a more desirable list of subscribers from your point of view than the other, therefore you will subscribe to that

one, but if both offer an equally desirable list of subscribers to you then you must choose between them, or you must subscribe to both exchanges.

One may call the carriage industry and the automobile industry competing. They are in a sense, or one is a substitute in a very general sense for the other. One might say the wholesale or retail flour merchant and the rice merchant are competing, as one is a substitute for the other, but two exchanges offering different lists of subscribers are not competing even in that sense, as neither is a substitute for the other, in that on one you may have communication with certain people, and on the other with certain other people; therefore they are not competing.

Two exchange systems in the same place offering identically the same list of subscribers, if such a thing can be imagined, are as useless as a duplicate system of highways or streets in a village not connecting with each other, but each reaching all the residents.

PHYSICAL CONNECTIONS.

Physical connection. What is meant by it? And what object is it intended to accomplish?

Where there are two or more so-called competing local telephone exchanges in the same territory, each offers a particular service; each offers a connection with its particular list of subscribers.

Physical connection would connect these separate exchanges by trunk lines the same as exchanges belonging to one system are connected.

This in itself would be an easy matter in many cases, and would allow the subscriber to one local exchange speaking connection with the subscribers to the other local exchanges. A fairly satisfactory service could be given if all of the exchanges had the same general style of equipment, uniform operating methods, and if harmony and concert of action between the

operators of entirely independent and rival exchanges could be assured.

But what has been accomplished? You have enabled any subscriber to any exchange to communicate with any subscriber to any other exchange. You have not avoided the objectionable duplication. You have not given service to all the exchanges for one subscription. This can only be done through merger or combination, not by physical connection. Physical connection implies separate and independent entities. For the privilege of this physical connection with the other exchanges the subscriber to any one of the exchanges must pay. This payment or toll must be more or less the equivalent of what the regular subscribers pay, otherwise there would be discrimination.

If the equipment and the operating methods of the opposition or independent exchanges physically connected are different, the service is bound to be unsatisfactory. No one of the exchanges can have any control over the operators of the other exchanges. There is bound to be strife and contention between the operators, resulting in delays and poor service. Each exchange must necessarily give preference and attention to its own service.

From the standpoint of local telephone exchange service, therefore, there can be nothing to gain from physical connection, either in economy or quality of service.

The most important matter to consider in connection with physical connection, the one that has the greatest bearing on the subject, is the character of such physical connection between telephone exchanges, and wherein it differs from regular exchange of service or physical connection between other public utility companies.

A telephone exchange does not furnish a commodity, does not transport goods, nor does it transmit messages.

What the telephone exchange does is to place at the disposition of any subscriber a telephone circuit, consisting of two wires, connecting such subscriber with another person at a distant point. This circuit enables them to carry on speaking communication with each other; it must be continuous and unbroken; it is for their exclusive use and while the circuit is at their service it cannot be used by any others desiring to communicate, or for any other telephone purpose. The employees of the exchange render no other service than selecting and connecting the wires together to form this circuit, and putting the parties in communication. To do this, and do it satisfactorily, the operators making up the circuit must have absolute control of the wires necessary for these circuits over the whole distance between the points of communication; that is, the operator at the starting point must have either control of or perfect working unity and harmony of action with all the operators of all the trunk lines and exchange lines necessary for this circuit.

These conditions can only exist where there is a strong, common interest or control.

Physical connection between independent or opposition exchanges means, therefore, the placing of the wires necessary to give it effect out of the control for the time being of the owning company and under the control of a competing, opposition company, to enable that competing, opposition company to give its subscribers the use of property, equipment, facilities, operating staff, other than its own, and for the time being depriving the owning company and its subscribers of the use of such facilities.

Physical connection demands the exclusive use of an integral part of the property and facilities and operating staff of one company for the customers of a competing company, no matter how urgent may be the owner's necessity for the immediate use of such property and facilities, nor how small the surplus facilities beyond the owner's requirements.

If the service consisted of carrying packages or transmitting messages along with other packages or other messages, or hauling cars to their destination, or accepting through tickets or transfers from connecting or cross lines of travel, it would be very different. In such cases the property, facilities and operation remain in the control of the owning company or its operating staff; no property intended for the benefit of the customers of one company is put to the exclusive use of another company; all that is done, is the same as is done with and for all comers. The package or passenger is carried, or the message transmitted, to its destination at the convenience of the company, along with other packages or messages.

So far we have considered only the local exchange. Physical connection between independent or opposition telephone systems or between an independent local exchange and a telephone system presents not only the same but many more complications, and is far more objectionable.

To better understand what is meant by physical connection and what it is meant to accomplish, a knowledge of the evolution and development and policy of the Bell System is necessary, and what that policy and belief is.

Repeating what has been said above, it believes that the telephone system should be universal, interdependent and intercommunicating, affording opportunity for any subscriber to any exchange to communicate with any other subscriber of any other exchange within the limits of speaking distance, giving to every subscriber every possible additional facility for annihilating time or distance by use of electrical transmission of intelligence or personal communication. It believes that some sort of a connection with the telephone system should be within reach of all.

This is what the Bell System aims to be—one system with common policy, common purpose and

common action; comprehensive, universal, interdependent, intercommunicating; like the highway system of the country, extending from every door to every other door; affording *electrical communication of every kind*, from every one at every place to every one at every other place.

To create this system has been the policy of the Bell interests from the beginning. It is the only way by which a satisfactory telephone service—satisfactory to the public or profitable to its owners—can be maintained.

The Bell System as established is as advanced and extended as the country as a whole will warrant. Its policy of extension carries it a little in advance of the public demands. In any effort to cover the whole country many unremunerative exchanges and toll lines have to be constructed and operated. Some of these will in time become remunerative; some never will, and those, for the benefit of the whole system, will have to be carried at the cost of the whole system.

Most of the opposition exchanges have been built up in a selected territory with capital obtained by the promise of, or in anticipation of large profits; as a rule capitalized far in excess of the plant value or construction cost. Subscribers have been obtained by promises of improved service at low rates. Many of such exchanges owe what success they have, where there is any success, to personal local influence or interest. Many, if not all, have been a disappointment. The day of local telephone exchanges or limited telephone systems has gone. This is recognized and fully appreciated by those who have exploited or are operating them.

The idea of physical connection is born of a desire to get for these local and isolated competing or opposition exchanges or these comparatively limited exchange systems, the advantage of the more extensive, comprehensive Bell System. To get for the subscrib-

ers of these so-called competing, opposition exchanges the connections which their own systems do not give them, to get for their subscribers all the advantages enjoyed by subscribers of the Bell exchanges by giving them the use of a part of the Bell System.

Physical connection would force the Bell System to place at the disposal of and under the control of any opposition company, Philadelphia for instance, for the time being, one of its circuits from Chicago to Philadelphia, to connect that Bell circuit with the circuits and system of the opposition company and disconnect it, for the time being, from the circuits of the Bell System.

This is not carrying packages or transmitting messages for the subscribers of the opposition Philadelphia exchange; it is turning over to that exchange for the use of its subscribers the property of the Bell System.

The fact that the opposition exchange could get such facilities would enhance its importance at the expense of the Bell System.

Physical connection would force the comprehensive Bell System, which has been built up with foresight and enterprise and is being maintained in its completeness at the cost of maintaining unremunerative exchanges and unremunerative lines, to turn over to, and put under control of, any opposition system for its use and benefit, for the time being, a physical part of the property of the Bell System and at the same time deprive the subscribers to the Bell System of the use of such property. Physical connection would oblige any system to construct and maintain surplus facilities and employ a surplus staff of operators for the benefit of any so-called competing or opposition—but less enterprising—company.

No possible compensation would be adequate for such service or such deprivation.

One of the arguments for physical connection is that

it will stop duplication. How? All agreements as to territory, rates or character of opposition; all arrangements which would come under the head of combination or pooling; all understandings or anything that would be equivalent to consolidation or combination, must be eliminated; this is not what is meant by and is not a part of, physical connection. Leaving all understandings out of consideration what effect would physical connection have on the local opposition exchanges? Neither exchange could stop competing for subscribers. The exchange that did would soon dwindle to a point of absolute undesirability; in other words, to a point where the subscription list would offer no inducements to others to join. Consequently activity must be maintained, each exchange making every effort not only to retain all on its list of subscribers but to add more. The same territory must be covered, the consequent duplication of conduits, pole lines, central and branch offices must continue; in fact the strife or competition would have to be more severe.

It is claimed that physical connection would bring about one system, where any one telephone subscriber could obtain connection with any other telephone subscriber within the limits of possible communication. With physical connection that would be the case, after a fashion, but what kind of a system would it be? It would be imperfect in that it would still be a dual system, with dual charges, made up of heterogeneous units of exchanges and lines, operated under independent managements with different operating methods and interests, with no common control over operators, without which service can not be satisfactory; in fact with all those imperfections that it has taken the Bell interests years to correct—imperfections which can be removed only by combination, agreement, understanding, which would be in effect consolidation.

Such demand as there may be for physical connection from opposition exchanges is a recognition of supe-

rior facilities and comes from a desire to get the benefits of those superior facilities.

So far as it comes from the public it is an expression of weariness with dual service or so-called competition.

Is there anything in practice, law or precedent that can compel one system, built upon a comprehensive basis, and trying to meet all the requirements of the public, to turn over its physical property for the use of so-called competitors—opposition exchanges built in selected territory with selfish views or motives? Is there anything to compel one to share the prosperity of a business created by enterprise and advanced policy with those who wish to appropriate the benefits of such work? Can any public utility company be compelled to divest itself of the operating control of its own property which was created for and may be needed at any time in the conduct of its own business? This is not the kind of interchange of business contemplated by the rules governing common carriers. It is not co-operation. It is pure and simple confiscation.

Selections from

James R. Mock and Cedric Larson,

*Words that Won the War:
The Story of the Committee on Public
Information*

(Princeton, 1939)

Culture of Publicity—Prof. Stuart Ewen

"It is given to every man either to eat his cake or to keep his cake, but it is given to no man to do both. A country can choose to be a great military power, and to remain in peace times constantly upon a military footing, subtracting from education and religion and progress all along the line the cost of it; or it can choose to be a great democracy of hope and peace and progress, and knowing well beforehand that if it chooses to be this latter, it must muddle and suffer infinitely in men and money when war is forced upon it. Each nation can choose one of these two things. Nobody can choose both."—Senator John Sharp Williams in a letter to George Creel, April 4, 1918.

Chapter 1

THE AMERICAN MIND IN WARTIME

WE had gone to war. We had decided to send our boys over to France to save democracy. But even as indignation against Germany had surged higher and higher in those last tense days before 3:12 a.m., April 6, 1917, no one could say just what the American people would do after their eloquent leader had urged them into war.

The great majority of Americans, it seemed, wanted to fight, but people wondered anxiously how large and how determined the minority might be. Minorities are dangerous when the fate of civilization is hanging in the balance. Who felt quite easy with Senator LaFollette and his "little group of wilful men" still in Congress? How could we count on the millions of Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, Poles, Russians and other "aliens in our midst"? Wasn't there something very disquieting in the widely quoted opinion of Dr. Aleš Hrdlicka that the Melting Pot had failed to melt? How many people still believed there was such a thing as being too proud to fight? How many remembered the President's statement that there was no essential difference in the expressed war aims of the belligerents? What of enemy spies, of whom there were said to be 100,000 or more at large, and their allies, the pacifists, Socialists, and labor agitators? What about the success of Wilson's campaign slogan, "He kept us out of war"? What about warnings against entanglement in Europe's quarrels which still echoed in countless homes?

And what, above all, about the unknown thousands of Americans who might not feel very strongly one way or the other but thought Europe was a long way off and might find it too much bother to make the sacrifices which a modern war demands of the entire population?

honor," but could we fulfill that pledge? When a peaceful nation, jealous of individual liberty and proud of its freedom from militarism, attempted to mobilize its men, money, resources, and emotions for one mighty effort, even a rather small minority could bring disaster. "Widespread cooperation" was not good enough when the nation's life was at stake. Nothing less than complete solidarity would do.

America was not unified when war was declared. The necessary reversal of opinion was too great to be achieved overnight. The agonizing question in official Washington, the question on which hung the fate of the country's entire wartime effort, was whether the inner lines at home would hold as effectively as the lines in France.

The Committee on Public Information was assigned the staggering task of "holding fast the inner lines." The story of how it fulfilled that mission is a dramatic record of vigor, effectiveness, and creative imagination. The Committee was America's "propaganda ministry" during the World War, charged with encouraging and then consolidating the revolution of opinion which changed the United States from anti-militaristic democracy to an organized war machine. This work touched the private life of virtually every man, woman, and child; it reflected the thoughts of the American people under the leadership of Woodrow Wilson; and it popularized what was for us a new idea of the individual's relation to the state.

President Wilson created the Committee on Public Information by executive order dated April 13, 1917, and appointed George Creel as civilian chairman, with the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy as the other members. Mr. Creel assembled as brilliant and talented a group of journalists, scholars, press agents, editors, artists, and other manipulators of the symbols of public opinion as America had ever seen united for a single purpose. It was a gargantuan advertising agency the like of which the country had never known, and the breathtaking scope of its activities was not to be equalled until the rise of totalitarian dictatorships after the war. George Creel, Carl

and their famous associates were literally public relations counsellors to the United States government, carrying first to the citizens of this country and then to those in distant lands the ideas which gave motive power to the stupendous undertaking of 1917-1918.

Whether or not one accepts the interpretation of Charles Bear¹, the Nye Committee, Walter Millis, or someone else, it is clear that *ideas*, for whatever reason they were held, took us into the war and kept alive the fiercely burning fires of industrial and military and naval activity. Without the driving force of those ideas there would have been no A.E.F. in France, no destroyer squadron at Queenstown, no sub-chasers in the Mediterranean, no "Bridge of Ships" spanning the Atlantic, no Liberty Bonds, no Draft Law, no food rationing, no coal shortage, no seizure of railroads and ammunition plants, no abridgment of free speech and free press.

And it was the Committee on Public Information that both mobilized and expressed the thoughts and emotions supporting these extraordinary dislocations of peaceful life. The story of its career holds a strategic place in the history of the war, and it presses for current attention as America anxiously considers what it will do in the current European War.

Through every known channel of communication the Committee carried straight to the people its message of Wilson's idealism, a war to end war, and America to the rescue of civilization. "Fireside chats" via radio did not in that day give national leaders the present easy avenue of approach to the family circle, but the Committee was nevertheless able to address itself directly to the minds and hearts of Americans, however isolated they might appear to be from the main stream of martial activity.

If they included misinformation in their complex of ideas about the war, at least it was misinformation shared with them by editors and college professors, the country's greatest intellectual and spiritual leaders, and by public figures in the shadow of the White House. History had not yet separated true and false,

and many things were believed in 1918 that scholars would deny today. But there was little expressed difference of opinion. It was illegal to express dissent of certain kinds, but for most people no law was necessary. The Committee on Public Information had done its work so well that there was a burning eagerness to believe, to conform, to feel the exaltation of joining in a great and selfless enterprise.

When facts were known or convictions held by any considerable number of the people they were common to all—to simple folk on the edge of the prairie, to department store clerks and subway guards in the metropolis, to lumbermen deep in the forests of the Northwest, and to maintenance men set down in squalid huts along a desert right-of-way. Americans stood close together in the comradeship of battle in 1917 and 1918, and it was largely the doing of the Committee on Public Information.

Consider the case of one mid-western family. They lived on a quarter-section of farmland a dozen miles from the railroad, telegraph, and postoffice. The nearest daily newspaper was published at the far end of the next county, seventy-five miles away. No through road passed near their farm, they had seen pavement only a few times in their lives, and they had no phone. Normally they paid scant attention to public affairs. Their only aim in life, so it seemed, was to bring in the golden harvest.

Yet when this simple, uneducated family, far from urban centers of information and five thousand miles across sea and land from the battlefields of France, sat down to a threshers' supper in the summer of 1918 they were more conscious of the World War than many more literate people had been of any war since fighting began.

And every item of war news they saw—in the county weekly, in magazines, or in the city daily picked up occasionally in the general store—was not merely officially approved information but precisely the same kind that millions of their fellow citizens were getting at the same moment. Every war story had been censored somewhere along the line—at the source, in transit, or

in the newspaper office in accordance with "voluntary" issued by the CPI. The same mimeograph machines furnished most of the Washington news, and the same cable censorship had passed all items from abroad.

Patriotic advertising in all of these papers had been prepared by the CPI, and even commercial announcements had a patriotic twist which had been suggested by someone in the Committee office. Cartoons were those inspired by the Committee staff. At the state fair the family viewed war exhibits under Committee sponsorship, and the movies at the county seat began with one of the Committee's patriotic films and paused briefly for oratory by one of the Committees Four-Minute Men, who had gained his ideas for the talk from the Committee's "suggestions."

At the township school the children saw war photographs issued by the Committee, recited war verse from a Committee brochure, learned current events from a Committee newspaper, studied war maps with a teacher who had acquired her knowledge of international politics through the Committee's pamphlets, and when they came home at night bore more literature for their parents.

The postoffice bulletin board was adorned with copies of the Committee's *Official Bulletin*, and posters in the general store and on telephone poles up and down the countryside were those designed by the Committee's artists, the same pictures appearing again and again with the persuasive insistence of modern cigarette advertising. Both the children and their mother read war stories suggested or actually briefed by the Committee. On Sunday the pastor thanked Providence for blessings that had been listed by one of the Committee's copywriters, and prayed for achievement of an objective glowingly described by another. When the Ladies' Aid held its monthly meeting, the program was that suggested by the Committee's division of women's war work, and the speaker came bearing credentials from the Committee's speakers' bureau. He delivered an address which he thought was his own but which actually paraphrased one of the Committee pamphlets, and his

months of 1917, there was a steady and progressively solidifying of opinion around the concepts which President Wilson was to present in their familiar aspect only as the country stood at the very brink of the abyss. These concepts of a "War to End War" and "Make the World Safe for Democracy" had taken form slowly at first, but as our actual entry neared there was a coagulation of opinion, and this process was hastened by many forces, such as economic interest, Anglo-American friendship, British propaganda, exposure of German plots in America, the uplifting sweep of President Wilson's eloquence, America's Big Brother complex, the hope of making a better world, and so on.

Many agencies were at work to bring more and ever more American citizens within the magnetic field of the war spirit. The National Security League, the American Defense Society, the Navy League, General Leonard Wood, many of the leaders of the League to Enforce Peace—all these and many more undertook deliberate campaigns for military preparedness. Most of them also favored war at least a year before our entry.

Almost from the invasion of Belgium in 1914, a growing number of Americans believed that France and England were fighting our battle. These people set about converting their fellow citizens. Friends of Germany, anglophobes, pacifists, and isolationists attempted to check this movement, but they lost ground steadily. More and more Americans came to believe that defeat of the Allies would mean eventual doom for democracy everywhere; many feared actual and immediate armed invasion or at least bombardment of North America. Special economic interests both nurtured and exploited these fears, and every sensational development in Germany's submarine warfare, in the occupation of Belgium, or in the inept German plotting in this country was used by all of the war groups—the idealists as well as the special interests—to gain

new supporters for their contention that German military might must be struck to earth.

Through it all rang the voice of Woodrow Wilson, a clear call to the American people, lifting them to heights of spiritual excitement from which they were not to descend until the back-to-normalcy days of President Harding.

When war was declared there was a sharp intensification of feeling, a speeding up in the process of unifying opinion, but there was not the sharp break with the past that we sometimes think of. From August 1914 to April 1917 a host of disparate groups had carried the burden of propaganda and education which the Committee on Public Information assumed under George Creel when war actually came.

The Committee performed an almost incredible task in the marshalling of opinion, in building strong walls of national solidarity. But it is important to realize that the Committee was no inner clique imposing unwanted views on the general public. Scarcely an idea may be found in all the work of the CPI that was not held by many Americans before war was declared. The Committee was representative of the articulate majority in American opinion.

What the Committee did do was to codify and standardize ideas already widely current, and to bring the powerful force of the emotions behind them. It is true that the whipping-in of stragglers through application of social pressure held a vitally important place in the work, but the greatest effort was directed toward vitalizing convictions already held and toward developing the will to fight for ideas already familiar.

The job was to keep the Wilson program before the people and to make it seem like something worth dying for.

With the CPI viewed in this light, George Creel's selection for the post of chairman was natural. He had been a Wilson man "before 1912"; for years he had expressed in the language of front-page journalism very much the same sort of thing that President Wilson expressed in the language of the library and the pulpit. Mr. Creel has given the authors his own report on the reasons for his selection:

"As editor of the *Rocky Mountain News* in Denver, I indicated Woodrow Wilson's nomination as early as 1911, and had correspondence with him throughout his first administration. Going to New York in 1913, I played a rather important part in the 1916 campaign, contributing syndicated articles to the press and also publishing *Wilson and the Issues*. After the election he asked me to come to Washington as a member of his official family, but my finances would not permit acceptance of the offer. When we entered the war on April 6, 1917, and the papers carried the news that some rigid form of censorship would be adopted, I wrote a letter of protest to the President in which I explained to him that the need was for expression not repression, and urged a campaign that would carry our war aims and peace terms not only to the United States, but to every neutral country, and also in England, France, and Italy. As for censorship, I insisted that all proper needs could be met by some voluntary methods. He sent for me and after approving my proposal, drafted me to act as active chairman. No other person was considered for the place."

Mr. Creel suggests here not only his political kinship with Wilson but also his determination to carry out the work of the CPI along Wilsonian lines—by bold appeal to the people.

Two methods of handling public opinion were available to the United States. An ironclad censorship could be established, with a great bureaucracy attempting to judge the "loyalty" of every item in every newspaper, every word in every conversation—to probe, in fact, into the innermost thoughts of every citizen. On the other hand, a policy could be adopted whereby the hand of censorship was held back but the channels of communication were literally choked with official, approved news and opinion, leaving little freeway for rumor or disloyal reports.

George Creel took the affirmative line.

Consistently to the end of the war, he placed his faith in a censorship which was at least technically voluntary. The newspapers accepted this censorship, though they also contributed in full measure the expected criticism of Mr. Creel

himself. He was one of the most disliked and traduced members of the national government while the war was in progress, and the 1918 caricature of him carries over to the present day. This picture is unfair, as the reader will discover, but Mr. Creel was in a sense hoist with his own petard. For he, more than any other one man aside from the President, helped to produce the 1917 temper in which the tossing about of symbols became a substitute for an intellectual transaction, and in which people thought together and thought in stereotypes.

Truth, George Creel knew, is the first casualty in war, but he shared with his chief and with millions of their fellow citizens the hope that "this war will be different." As the story of the CPI unfolds it will be clear in how many ways George Creel attempted to protect truth. But the emotional climate in which Ora Buffington, a Pennsylvania attorney, urged the CPI to import for public exhibition some of the Belgian children whose hands had been cut off was the very climate that Mr. Creel had to maintain for the support of President Wilson's most ennobling political ideals.

The CPI hoped that it could direct the nation's emotional energy into channels of constructive patriotism, not hysteria, but it was not always successful. Though only too well aware of how hysteria begins and grows, the Committee was forced to deal constantly with the material of panic, fear, and intolerance.

Preposterous or frightening evidences of "national jitters" were continually received.

Joseph P. Tumulty, the President's secretary, had been imprisoned as a German spy . . . he had been shot. . . .

Five Americans, former prisoners of war with their tongues cut out, were in a hospital ship lying in the Potomac. . . .

The assistant to the chairman of the U.S. Shipping Board protested against the cover of the *Hog Island News*, a ship-builder's house organ, which showed a huge porker carrying an American flag—he thought it might be used for German propaganda. . . .

Newspapers reported a TEUTON PLAN TO TOR
CAPTURED SAMMIES. . . .

U-boat captains were believed to have landed on the Atlantic Coast and then to have made their way inland, poisoning wells en route. . . .

Suspected pro-Germans were lynched. . . .

A report was syndicated that a man in a training camp near Chillicothe, Ohio, had never received any mail. Shortly after this publication, he received 1,200 letters, nineteen special-delivery messages, and fifty-four packages. . . . "As it happens," the tired postmaster reported to Washington, "— can neither read or write. He is not just right and was not accepted by the army but refuses to leave. . . ."

All of this was socially unwholesome. It was also dangerous. During the Spanish-American War, as at other times, civilian hysteria had forced the United States to change its disposition of forces and threatened strategical plans. But the CPI was caught in a dilemma. It was forced to return again and again to the methods of arousing opinion which brought the very atmosphere of hate and fear which might endanger national safety and was surely incompatible with the consecrated mission on which President Wilson was leading the country.

George Creel has been charged with being too eager, too impetuous and flamboyant. Each of these adjectives is properly applied to him. Evidence is abundant, however, that countless citizens wished public opinion to be whipped to higher and higher fury. The independent patriotic groups such as the National Security League, perhaps jealous of government interference with private enterprise, frequently charged the CPI with malingering. Even more sober observers feared public apathy and called ever and again for more dramatic action.

In August 1917, for instance, Grosvenor Clarkson, secretary (later director) of the Council of National Defense, wrote to a number of prominent men, calling attention to lack of war enthusiasm and asking their opinions. Clarkson sent copies of the replies to Creel.

DON'T TALK



THE WEB
IS SPUN
FOR YOU
WITH
INVISIBLE
THREADS

KEEP OUT OF IT
HELP TO DESTROY IT

STOP = THINK

ASK YOURSELF IF WHAT
YOU WERE ABOUT TO SAY
MIGHT HELP THE ENEMY

SPIES ARE LISTENING

INTELLIGENCE OFFICE BOSTON, SEPTEMBER 1945

"The Mood for Spy Hunts"

A Poster Displayed in Boston by a Military Intelligence Office

roy W. Howard of the Scripps papers and United Press, who had just returned from the Pacific Coast, concurred in Clarkson's judgment and said: "This weakness must be remedied before the nation will go to war with its heart as well as its hands and feet." Frederick Dixon, editor of the *Christian Science Monitor*: "The country is not awake . . . invaluable time is being wasted." Frank Cobb, editor of the *New York World*: "There are plenty of soap-boxes and some of them might well be occupied by men who believe in the United States and in the justice of its cause." R. J. Cuddihy, treasurer of Funk and Wagnalls: "The churches of the country should be courted on to reach the spiritual and emotional side of our people, and . . . this is the side that must be fully awakened."

Typical of many letters that came to Creel through all the months of the war was one from S. H. Church, president of Carnegie Institute of Technology. In January 1918 he wrote that the CPI must emphasize "in season and out of season, the fact that we are engaged in a bloody and remorseless war with the most pitiless and despicable nation that has ever attacked the peace and dignity of civilization, and that this high note of raging battle ought to be sounded throughout the world until we shall receive a definite assurance that peace is within our grasp and upon our own terms."

The "high note of raging battle," however, produced not only the will to fight Germany but also the mood for spy hunts. Spies there undoubtedly were, but their number was infinitesimal compared with the excitement they caused. After the war John Lord O'Brian, head of the War-Emergency Division of the Department of Justice, said that "No other one cause contributed so much to the oppression of innocent men as the systematic and indiscriminate agitation against what was claimed to be an all-pervasive system of German espionage." Captain Henry T. Hunt, head of the Military Intelligence counter-espionage section during the war, has told the authors that in addition to unfounded spy stories innocently

launched there were many started with the apparent object of removing or inconveniencing political, business, or social rivals. As an illustration of the complexity of charges and counter-charges, he reports that on one occasion two of his own men were taken into custody by the Department of Justice, while seeking to determine the loyalty of the headwaiter in a Washington hotel.

The nervousness illustrated by this incident was exploited and turned to devious uses. Professor S. H. Clark of the Department of Public Speaking at the University of Chicago, for instance, wrote to Creel: "Many public men and many of our prominent newspapers who have always bitterly fought socialism, the I.W.W.'s, and even labor unions, are taking advantage of the present crisis in an effort not purely patriotic to squelch all of these more or less radical organizations without regard to the effect upon the future of our country, to say nothing of the effect in the present war."

One man who emphatically agreed with this was the famous I.W.W. agitator, Big Bill Haywood, who wrote to Creel from Cook County Jail: "Perhaps some day when the pendulum swings back, when a war-mad world can assume something of a normal attitude of thought, when the ideas and ideals of a New Freedom will not be misinterpreted, I may ask you to do something for us. I still hate autoocracy and Russian Oligarchy from the bottom of my heart, but even more the Industrial Oligarchy so rapidly developing in this country—which must be fought after the World War if democracy is to endure."

From the very opposite end of the social and economic scale—from Thomas W. Lamont, the Morgan partner who had just purchased the *New York Evening Post*—Creel received yet another letter showing appreciation of what happens in wartime: "There is altogether too great a tendency to call people names just because they happen to talk intelligently on certain topics. I have heard people dubbed Socialists just because they happened to be students of sociology

and, looking forward, were convinced that in the future would have to have an even squarer deal than it has had in the past. I have heard other people called pro-Germans just because they expressed the hope that the war would not last forever. . . . I think we are apt, in time of war, to fall into a mood of more or less intolerance, if the other fellow doesn't agree with us."

But perhaps the most interesting of all the letters which came to George Creel on this subject was that from the wealthy but radical lawyer and publicist, Amos Pinchot, whose political position lay somewhere between Big Bill Haywood and Thomas Lamont. He wrote:

"Has Wilson changed? Is he going back on himself and on us? Has he seen a new vision of a world peace, founded on things un-American, based on old-world imperialist aggression, which he so lately condemned? Have we got to die tomorrow for principles that yesterday the President told us were wrong?"

"What has changed Wilson? Who has put it over on him?"

"We have got to remember that before we went into the war, the Administration, and the liberal press, the Scripps papers, the Cloverleaf syndicate, the N.E.A., and even much of the reactionary press, for two solid years carried on an anti-war propaganda. They were pro-Ally, but they said that we had no business in it. At the end of this period the President went to the country on the issue that he kept us out of war—and won. . . .

"Considering our approaches to the war, the President's own attitude, his distinct downright repudiation of the Allies' annexation policies, the anti-imperialist feeling in America, it seems fairly evident that even for Wilson the task of swinging the public into line for the present war aims of the Allies would be too big a task, even if it were a right and necessary course.

"If the President attempts it he will fail. He will fall as an American leader, and fall farther and harder than any modern liberal statesman."

There is no evidence of a reply from Creel, but from many other records we know what he would have said. He would

have granted the change in the President's attitude toward the war, granted the perils of entanglement in European politics, granted the dangers to democracy which militarism had brought to this country. But he would have said that we were fighting not for Europe's war aims but for Wilson's, and that the hope of a new world, of universal democracy, and of permanent peace made any temporary concessions richly justified.

Creel did not, however, push from his mind the knowledge of how "patriotism" was being turned to selfish uses, and how much work remained to be done for democracy at home. In March 1918 he wrote to Joseph E. Davis: "I shall support every necessary measure directed to the supreme end of defeating . . . the unholy combination of autocracy, militarism, and predatory capitalism which rules Germany and threatens liberty and self-government everywhere. . . . [But] I ask and expect only support of those who believe that for the sake of political liberty and social progress, America must win this war while it consolidates at home every position won from the forces of reaction and political bigotry."

George Creel, as Woodrow Wilson, faced the tragic dilemma of a war on behalf of democracy. In the record of the Committee on Public Information one may find evidence of their success or lack of success in meeting it. This book can present only part of the evidence, but the files of the CPI contain some of the most important material of American history. For it is not only George Creel that is to be judged but the entire national policy of a democracy at war. The problem boils down to this: Can any wartime compromise be "temporary"? Can modern war, a war of populations, be waged without permanent loss of some of the things for which America entered the World War in 1917?

Every observer will have his own answer to these questions, but no one can afford to evade them.

Chapter 2

THE COMING OF CENSORSHIP



AMERICA went under censorship during the World War without realizing it. Debate was energetic and inspiring while it lasted, but after the opponents of censorship had won a single major engagement in the campaign they thought the enemy had retired from the field. They were wrong. The enemy quietly occupied the abandoned positions and then, at a convenient opportunity, swarmed into defenseless territory behind the lines.

An account of these maneuvers is essential to an appreciation of the CPI, for though the Committee's chief function was to distribute affirmative propaganda it was likewise intimately concerned with the negative phases of public opinion management—with suppression of speech or publication inimical to the doctrines for which America believed it was fighting. The fact that the censorship power was employed with moderation does not detract from its significance in American history. If the Administration had wished, it might have imposed an almost complete censorship on the utterances and publications of all Americans during the war.

"If the Administration had wished" really means "if George Creel had wished," for in censorship as in affirmative propaganda he held the key. Knowledge of the political and emotional background of the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, thus sharpens understanding of the later work of the CPI.

As interpreted by the courts, the Espionage Act pressed hard against the limits of constitutionality set by the First Amendment. Minority critics asserted in 1918, as more will grant today, that in its final form the act violated the guaranty of free speech and free press established in the Bill of Rights, but

take over the mailing list and good will of the *Official Bulletin*, and for a considerable time the legend "Official Gov't News" appeared on the paper. (This formed the basis of one of the charges against Creel—that he had allowed Babson to take a government asset—but Mr. Creel was at the Peace Conference when all this happened.)

 <h1 style="margin: 0;">Official Bulletin</h1> <p style="font-size: small; margin: 0;">PUBLISHED DAILY UNDER ORDER OF THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION CAROL C. CREEL, CHAIRMAN</p>		
Vol. I.	WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, MAY 10, 1917	No. 1.
<p>PRESIDENT'S WELCOME TO STATES' DEFENSE COUNCIL</p> <p style="font-size: x-small;">The President in Executive and representative of State symbols of national</p>	<p>POST THE BULLETIN.</p> <p style="font-size: x-small;">Postmaster: Your particular attention is called to THE OFFICIAL BULLETIN which</p>	<p>TREASURY FORCE GIVING LIBERALLY TO RED CROSS</p> <p style="font-size: x-small;">There has been a general response to the call of the Secretary of the Treasury</p>

<div style="border: 1px dashed black; padding: 2px; font-size: x-small;">Official Gov't News</div>	<h1 style="margin: 0;">United States Bulletin</h1>	<div style="border: 1px dashed black; padding: 2px; font-size: x-small;">Policies Bills Orders</div>
CONTINUING the Work of THE OFFICIAL U. S. BULLETIN Established under an order of THE PRESIDENT of the UNITED STATES, MAY 10, 1917. AUTHENTICATIVE RECORD of all U. S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES. ISSUED EVERY MORNING.		
Vol. I. No. 17.	WASHINGTON, MONDAY, JULY 14, 1919.	\$10.00 A YEAR
<p>United States Owns Greatest Gold Stock In the World's History and Largest Favorable Trade Balance</p>	<p>FIXING OF RESALE PRICES BY MANUFACTURERS URGED BY U. S. TRADE COMMISSION</p>	

The "Official Bulletin" as Published under the Creel Committee and (below) in the Process of Becoming a Commercial News Letter under Roger W. Babson

Mr. Babson retained Mr. Rochester as editor, changed the title to *United States Bulletin*, moved to a twice-weekly and eventually to a weekly schedule, and boosted subscription rates to \$10 a year. He thus became one of the first in the now busy field of publishers of Washington news-letters. Commencing with the March 22, 1920, number, all issues were marked **CONFIDENTIAL**, and subscriptions for individuals were raised to \$52 a year. After a few months Mr. Rochester left the enterprise. In the spring of 1921 the *United States Bulletin*



DR. UNCLE SAM

is now in charge of our industrial troubles. He has prescribed a Victory Tonic called Co-operation. It will bring better feeling among our wage-earners and wage-payers and will cure strife.


Quack remedies, known as legislative ether, spirits of discontent and agitators acid, almost killed the patients. They are poisons, not remedies.

CO-OPERATION WILL WIN THE WAR!

**THE HAND
THAT
THREATENS**



**OUR
INDUSTRIAL
LIFE**



More than 32,000 American industrial plants have been placed at the disposal of the government to win this war.

Their effectiveness must not be hampered by enemy agitators who cause bad feeling between wage-earners and wage payers. Every community is interested in promoting industrial prosperity.



Robert Sobel

"Ideas and War: The CPI"

from: Robert Sobel, *The Manipulators: America in the Media Age* (Garden City, 1976)

The Culture of Publicity—Prof. Stuart Ewen

Ideas and War: *The CPI*

In the summer of 1908 Hamilton Holt, managing editor of the *Independent* decided to publish a series of articles on American universities. Given the popularity of collegian novels at the time, the rise of football as a spectator sport, and the growing prominence of college men and women in national life, he was certain such pieces would be well received.

As author of the proposed piece, Holt selected Edwin E. Slosson, a former professor who had recently turned to journalism and letters. The *Independent* would pay Slosson a generous advance, and then he would select the universities, on the basis of interest, importance, and reputation as well as geographic diversity. He would visit the schools during the 1908-9 academic year and write the articles in the autumn and early winter of 1909, after which they would be published in the magazine.

Slosson agreed, and in September 1908 he set out for Harvard. After a week there, he traveled to New Haven for a period at Yale, then on to Princeton and into the Midwest. Slosson was at Stanford in January, after which he started eastward again, winding up in Cornell in May and Columbia in June. He had visited fourteen universities, concentrating on the East and Midwest—the large private schools, the huge public complexes—and ignoring both

the Far West, with the exception of Stanford, and the South, traveling only so far as Baltimore to spend two weeks at Johns Hopkins. Still, he could defend his selections. In 1909, American higher education seemed typified by the old and prestigious eastern colleges and universities and the newer, brash state universities of the Midwest. Slosson's articles appeared in 1910 and were gathered into a book late in the year. Both the articles and book were successes; the latter became a minor best seller, and remained the definitive study in its field for years after.

Slosson was most impressed by the state colleges, and especially with the vitality of one. "It is impossible to ascertain the size or location of the University of Wisconsin," he wrote. "The most that one can say is that the headquarters of the institution is at the city of Madison and that the campus has an area of about 56,000 square miles."¹ Like so many others who came to Madison, he was struck by the degree to which the university had infiltrated the daily life of the state, how its influence could be found in all parts of Wisconsin. No one seemed to know how many students were taking courses in various units and subunits of the system, or even how many different locations it controlled. "The laboratories are wherever there is machinery in action, industrial or social, with which the students care to experiment. If we go into a local electric light and power plant in any part of the State, we may happen upon a group of advanced students making an investigation of it," and the same was true of farms and factories.

The main campus was within walking distance of the capital buildings, and Slosson quickly learned that leading professors spent as much time in politics as in academic work. Professor Balthasar H. Meyer, an economist, served as the first chairman of the state Railroad Commission and then left for a post on the Interstate Commerce Commission in Washington. Political Scientist Thomas S. Adams was a member of the Tax Commission, as were William D. Pence, John G. D. Mack, and Halsten J. Thorkelson, all of the University of Wisconsin College of Engineering, and all on the Railroad Commission as well. Geologist William O. Hotchkiss would soon go to the new Highway Commission. Lincoln Steffens, who arrived in Wisconsin weeks after Slosson left, said that forty-one professors were serving in sixty-six state offices and that President Charles R. Van Hise was on five different boards and commissions.² The University and the state

government appeared to be completely entwined one with the other.

This same kind of situation existed at other state colleges and universities throughout the nation. Under the terms of federal legislation assisting the schools, they were required to become involved in various public services, especially those relating to agriculture. Furthermore, the university could scarcely have expected aid from the state unless it could demonstrate, clearly and directly, that it was serving the interests of its taxpayers and educating its children in worthwhile pursuits. The concept was articulated more clearly and forcefully at Madison than anywhere else, however. Robert LaFollette, who had served as governor from 1901 to 1906, was himself a graduate, and keenly interested in mobilizing the university's resources in the service of the state. He found willing allies in such eminent social scientists as John Commons, Richard Ely, Paul Reinsch, Edward Ross, and others. The politicians required the knowledge of experts, and the latter were eager to put their theories into practice, to have a "social laboratory" at their disposal. It was a fine mating.

While LaFollette spoke of the need for the university to serve all of Wisconsin's citizens, Commons wrote of "utilitarian idealism." "I do not see why there is not as much idealism in breeding a perfect animal or a Wisconsin No. 7 ear of corn, or in devising an absolutely exact instrument for measuring a thousand cubic feet of gas, or for measuring exactly the amount of butter or casein in milk, as there is in chipping out a Venus de Milo or erecting a Parthenon." On accepting the presidency of the school in 1904, Van Hise said: "I am not willing to admit that a state university under a democracy shall be of lower grade than a state university under a monarchy." To become a quality school, Wisconsin would have to select its areas of interest with care, with an eye out to the requirements of the state. Consistently Van Hise spoke of his belief that appropriations for the university were "investments which have been returned manyfold and will continue to be returned in the future in even larger measure," and he promised that the school would be "at the service of the state." To this LaFollette echoed, "We believe that the purpose of the university is to serve the people and every effort is made . . . to make every resident of the state under the broadening and inspiring influence of a faculty of trained men."³

It seemed so simple and so right. The state would invest funds in its university, and in return see its children educated, its farms and factories benefited by practical knowledge developed at the schools, and its administration assisted by experts on loan from their labors in class and laboratory. The faculty would benefit, both in terms of increased experience and status, and the students would have a better faculty for it. Slosson—the former professor turned journalist—applauded what he saw. “The line that used to be drawn sharply between the scholar and the man of affairs, between those who knew a great deal and could not do anything and those who had to do everything and did not know much about it, is being wiped out in Wisconsin.”

But there was a danger, one that Slosson recognized although thought minor. “The offices held by members of the faculty are mostly those classed as non-political positions; that is, they carry with them little money, prestige, or party power.”⁴ In the narrow, late-nineteenth-century definition of the term, this was doubtless correct, although some might question the prestige aspect. On the other hand, as experts in political life gained power and influence, the academicians would have the best of both worlds—the respect of the academy, the power of the state house. Might not a governor—or a President—call upon the universities to provide him with able, trained experts to help him work his political will? Could not the system as developed in Wisconsin and elsewhere be utilized to impose upon the general population the tyranny of an elitist society? At what point did the expert become a policymaker, thus assuming powers given to elected officials? The academics and reform leaders of the Progressive period did not ask such questions, at least openly. Instead, the difficulties of power without responsibility would be debated by their grandchildren.

POLITICS AND ACADEMIA—THE WILSON YEARS

Slosson admired Wisconsin, which he felt combined the best qualities of liberal arts with professionalism, in such a fashion as to serve the people of the state. But he found Princeton “the most interesting of American universities to study just now,” even though it was quite different from Wisconsin. “What I like about Princeton,” he wrote, “is that it has an ideal of education and is

working it out. It is not exactly my ideal, but that does not matter to anyone but me."

The ideal was Woodrow Wilson's, and at the time of Slosson's visit, Wilson was the university president best known to educated Americans. Through his books, magazine articles, and speeches—and his penchant for publicity—Wilson had become a national figure, who even then was being mentioned as a potential presidential nominee.

Wilson had arrived in academia just in time to benefit from the fresh crosscurrents in the field. He had graduated from Princeton in 1879, when the school had been dominated by the collegians, and although academically inclined, he had belonged to the glee club and took a keen interest in football. Subsequently a graduate of the University of Virginia Law School, he practiced law for a while, but in 1882 entered Johns Hopkins to study political science and history on the graduate level. His first book, *Congressional Government*, was published in 1885, and its success brought job offers from several major institutions. Abandoning law, Wilson went to Bryn Mawr in September of that year, received his Ph.D. in 1886, accepted a chair in history and political science at Wesleyan in 1888, continued to publish widely, and in 1890 took the chair of jurisprudence and political science at Princeton.

Wilson was a popular teacher at Princeton, and also a prolific writer and popular public speaker. In addition, he helped coach the football team—he had served as coach at Wesleyan—and occasionally sang with the glee club. And he spoke of his educational philosophy with members of the faculty. Princeton was a small university in 1890—it had forty-five faculty members and a total student enrollment of 768—and so continuous debate and discussion was possible, and indeed unavoidable.

Under the presidencies of James McCosh and his successor, Francis L. Patton, Princeton had expanded and altered its curriculum. Greater stress was being placed upon the pure sciences, while the administration attempted to raise funds for several graduate and professional schools, which would truly transform Princeton from a small college into a major university, with a national constituency. In 1890, more than three quarters of the undergraduates had come from Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey, while the endowment was only \$1.5 million. Princeton was a small, local college, with a long but rather undistinguished his-

tory. Patton and the trustees thought that a new stress upon graduate and professional education would change this. As for the undergraduates, their education would remain pretty much as it had been before—they would continue to be collegians. Professor of Latin Andrew F. West, who had graduated from Princeton the year before Wilson had entered as a freshman, was committed to Patton's plan. "The college lies very close to the people," West wrote in 1899. "Distinctions of caste may manifest themselves occasionally, and yet the college is stoutly and we believe permanently democratic." In 1900, West was named dean of the proposed graduate college. Two years later, after having turned down the presidencies of several large universities, Wilson was selected to succeed Patton at Princeton.

Wilson's inaugural address, "Princeton for the Nation's Service," was widely reprinted and discussed, for his idea of the meaning of college and university education differed greatly from that of the professionals and the collegians. He strongly favored the liberal arts, not for their utility, but for their own sake. While extracurricular activities were fine, the stress should be on the classroom, not the football stadium. "In planning for Princeton . . . we are planning for the country. The service of institutions of learning is not private, but public. It is plain what the nation needs as its affairs grow more and more complex and its interests begin to touch the ends of the earth. It needs efficient and enlightened men. The universities of the country must take part in supplying them."

This was quite different from the viewpoints of LaFollette, Commons, and Van Hise at Wisconsin, or even West's conception of undergraduate education. "The college is not for the majority who carry forward the common labor of the world, nor even for those who work at . . . skilled handicrafts," said Wilson. "It is for the minority who plan, who conceive, who superintend, who mediate between group and group and must see the wide stage as a whole. Democratic nations must be served in this wise no less than those whose leaders are chosen by birth and privilege."⁸

Wilson believed all should be subordinated to the goal of turning out undergraduates with excellent educations—such that could rival those of graduate students in depth and superior to that which the collegians received in breadth. He strongly supported graduate schools, but wanted them to revolve around the

undergraduate college, in hope that the graduate students would form a fellowship with the undergraduates and so help instruct them. Wilson instituted a preceptorial program, bringing in young faculty to meet regularly with students and assist them in their studies. He opposed Princeton's eating clubs, not so much because he thought them undemocratic, but based on his conviction that they distracted students from their main tasks in the classrooms and libraries. "College life in our day, has become so absorbing a thing and so interesting a thing, that college work has fallen into the background," he complained. "The sideshows were swallowing up the circus." Speaking before the University Club in Chicago in 1908, he explained:

After all, gentlemen, a University has as its only legitimate object intellectual attainment. I do not mean that there should not go along with that a great deal that is delightful in the way of comradeship; but I am sure that men never thoroughly enjoy each other if they merely touch superficially. I do not believe men ever know or enjoy each other until they lay their minds alongside each other and make real test of their quality.⁶

Wilson hoped to apply professional standards to undergraduate liberal arts education, and if some of the trustees were dubious about the necessity of learning for its own sake, they could appreciate the value of professionalism and higher standards. "The fact is, that for some time, a considerable portion of the undergraduate body has looked upon Princeton University as simply an academic and artistic background for the club life that is now such a prominent feature of the place," wrote trustee David B. Jones in 1907. "The clubs will therefore strangle the university unless some radical modification is devised and applied. . . ." And so it was. Wilson strove to eliminate the eating clubs, place the new graduate schools close by the undergraduate institution, and stress basic liberal arts education. He rejected the extremes of Eliot's elective system and the utilitarianism practiced at the University of Wisconsin. Wilson believed America was in a new era, in which expertise would become increasingly important and the nation assume a major world role. He hoped the colleges would educate an elite that was capable of leading the nation, of directing the new experts—a cadre of intelligent, perceptive men who could provide insights for the masses and assume power by virtue

of their wisdom and learning. As one whose words and exploits had received wide press coverage, Wilson also respected the powers of publicity. Those who graduated from Princeton in the future would benefit from the insights obtained there, and then bring the message to the world. "Princeton is no longer a thing for Princeton men to please themselves with," he told the University Club. "Princeton is a thing with which Princeton men must satisfy the country."

In the end, Wilson lost many of his battles.⁷ But he also managed to create a different kind of school at Princeton. President Lowell of Harvard conceded that Wilson "certainly did raise Princeton very much in grade among the institutions of higher learning in the country. He was also the first, so far as I am aware, who strove to raise the respect for scholarship among the undergraduate body."

Wilson resigned as Princeton's president in 1910, to accept the Democratic nomination for the governorship of New Jersey. But even before then, he had lost several famous battles, and was no longer as effective as he had been at the beginning of his tour there. In 1910, however, Princeton had an endowment of \$5.1 million, a student body of 1,444, and a faculty of 174. It had also emerged as the leader of a different kind of college and university from that represented by Wisconsin.

And what of the man? After resigning, Wilson told a friend that his Princeton experience had been a fine preparation for his future career. "I'll confide in you, as I have already confided to others—that, as compared with the college politician, the real article seems like an amateur." By this, he was referring to dealings with the Democratic party's professionals. He felt equipped to lead the masses, but lacked experience and knowledge of the lives and desires of common people. More important, Wilson felt they needed a leader, a person to shape their actions, to help formulate their ideas.

In 1905 Robert LaFollette had asked the Wisconsin state legislature to vote an additional increment to the university's budget. The appropriations was necessary, he said, to provide new buildings for the College of Engineering and the College of Agriculture. Quoting a Board of Regents report, LaFollette explained, "A great institution of learning demands a great and growing income." He recognized the need for economy and prudence, but

"the State will not have discharged its duty to the University, nor the University fulfilled its mission to the people, until adequate means have been furnished to every young man and woman in the State to acquire an education at home in every department of learning. . . ."

Wilson had hoped to educate an elite in the liberal arts and have them lead the nation. LaFollette wanted to train and educate the masses in subjects of their own choosing, and in the hope that through additional knowledge they would not only prosper but also become better citizens, more capable of running their own affairs. Both men were leaders, and each considered himself a true democrat, but the difference between them was vast. Wilson was a Princeton graduate, and while the college's leader he often indicated he cared little about expansion. As far as he was concerned, the school could become smaller if that meant its students would be better educated. LaFollette, a Wisconsin graduate, yearned to see his university the largest in the nation. Each man had a philosophy of education that was close to the roots of their beings: In 1912, both offered themselves to the nation as presidential candidates.

Wilson would win.

Although his duties at Princeton had been onerous, they did not interfere with Wilson's speaking tours. These continued, for if anything, the demand for Wilson was growing in 1905-6. In November of 1905 he spoke in Orange, New Jersey, on Princeton's future, and then swept through New York and New England giving talks, sometime at the rate of three a week, on educational, historical, and political topics. On December 16, Wilson was in New York to offer a lecture on politics, in which he said that "governments should supply an equilibrium, not a disturbing force." The remarks were carried in the newspapers and were discussed in columns for several weeks. Then Wilson turned south, speaking in Philadelphia in early January and at Charleston, South Carolina, on January 18. J. C. Hemphill, editor of the *News & Courier*, initiated a correspondence with Wilson soon after. "The whole town is still talking about your lecture as the best delivered in this place for many years." Later that year, Hemphill wrote and published

an editorial, "Wanted: a Leader," in which he called Wilson "the most promising of Southern candidates" for the presidency.

In early February, Wilson was in New York again, this time to attend a dinner in his honor at the Lotus Club. George Harvey, the former editor of the *New York World* and a leading Pulitzer protégé, was there to deliver a talk. At the time, Harvey was president of the publishing house of Harper & Brothers and editor of *Harper's Weekly*. He had met Wilson in 1902 and had worked with him on several projects. Harvey quickly became a Wilson enthusiast. In his speech, he all but nominated him for the presidency. Wilson's face was on the cover of the March 12 issue of *Harper's Weekly*, and the full text of the Harvey speech was reprinted inside. With this, a minor Wilson boom was started, led by Harvey, with Hemphill's aid in the South. The *Milwaukee Sentinel* thought the nomination "would be a good thing for the country," and the *Trenton True American* believed Wilson could unite the nation. The influential Henry Watterson of the *Louisville Courier-Journal* thought Wilson would be "ideal," while Adolph Ochs of the *New York Times* read the Harvey speech and thought the Wilson boom a "splendid suggestion." The *New York Sun* noted that a Wilson campaign in 1908 was viewed as "certain" in Washington, while others thought Wilson would be better served to seek the governorship of New Jersey, or a Senate seat from that state, before making a presidential bid in 1912 or 1916. Wilson began receiving letters from all parts of the country urging him to enter politics on the presidential level. Academia and journalism had united to create a national political figure, who had not yet run for public office."

In 1908, Wilson was seriously considered for the vice presidential nomination, but withdrew before any boom could be started. William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic nominee, lost badly to Republican William Howard Taft, who thus succeeded Theodore Roosevelt. The defeat crushed the "radical" wing of the party and opened the way for a moderate candidate in 1912. Even before announcing for the New Jersey gubernatorial race in 1910, Wilson was listed as a Democratic presidential possibility for 1912.

As governor, Wilson received support from Democratic editors and publishers, and his efforts in New Jersey were reported

throughout the country. His relations with the Trenton news corps were correct and somewhat stiff, however; some of the older reporters felt he was lecturing them on the arts and science of government on occasion, and they resented it. Generally speaking, the farther reporters were from Wilson—the more they could be influenced by his words rather than his personality—the more impressed they were by the man.

When he won the Democratic presidential nomination in 1912, Wilson received endorsements from the Democratic press as well, including Hearst. The candidate campaigned vigorously, despite his rather fragile health, and delivered some of the most articulate and thoughtful speeches Americans had heard since the Civil War. With the Republican party split between Taft's regulars and Roosevelt's Progressives, there was little doubt from that start that Wilson would win. So he did, with 435 electoral votes, more than any other President had received to that time. But Wilson received only 6,293,019 votes in sweeping the country in 1912, fewer than Bryan had obtained in 1908—6,393,182. Wilson's constituency was mixed—it included regular Democrats, moderate reformers, conservative Republicans hoping to defeat Roosevelt, along with some who admired the coming of the "scholar in politics." How important the last group was cannot be determined; there was no academic voting bloc in 1912, however, and no unity on candidacies or issues on the nation's campuses. The heritage of the Civil War was at least as important as the ties of academia that year. Nevertheless, flawed and uncertain though his mandate was, Wilson became President in 1913.

Wilson had good relations with the press, but such was the norm in this period. William McKinley had been popular with reporters, and his private secretary had been a former editor. Secretary of State John Hay had been a newspaperman, and Postmaster General Charles E. Smith was the former editor of the Philadelphia Press. Theodore Roosevelt genuinely liked reporters, had wide experience with editors prior to entering politics, and provided "good copy." He also constructed the first press room in the White House. William Howard Taft had come from a newspaper family; his brother was publisher of the Cincinnati *Times-Star*. He appreciated the power of the press, and inaugurated regular press conferences, which he said were more enjoyable than Cabi-

net meetings. Wilson inherited this foundation and tradition. He instituted semiweekly press conferences, took reporters into his confidence, and met often with influential editors and publishers.

But there were problems. For one thing, Wilson tended to prepare for his meetings with reporters as he might for a university lecture; he provided information, but answered few questions. Some of the older reporters felt he was preaching to them. When McKinley, Roosevelt, and Taft were misquoted or misrepresented, the result had been anger and irritation. Even when editors took anti-Taft stands, the President remained on good terms with the reporters. All three had what might be called "the common touch." It was otherwise with Wilson, who regarded errors in facts as a sign that the reporter was either professionally incompetent or a dissembler. There was a striking difference between the well-educated President and the self-taught journalists—the last generation of that group of Washington reporters who had come up from the print shop.⁸ It was a replay of the Trenton situation; the farther reporters were from Wilson, the more they admired him.

GEORGE CREEL: MASTER MANIPULATOR

In 1896 George Creel, then twenty years old and late of Independence, Missouri, took a position as reporter for the *Kansas City Star*. After serving his apprenticeship there he traveled to New York, where he sought, unsuccessfully, to become a freelance journalist. Then in 1899 he returned to Kansas City to help found the *Independent*, which in time became a leading midwestern newspaper. Creel began writing articles on corruption in Kansas City, which won him a national audience, and in time his pieces began appearing in the muckraking magazines of the day. Along with Ida Tarbell, Lincoln Steffens, and Upton Sinclair, he was considered a major force in the progressive reform movement.

Like Woodrow Wilson, Creel had come to his commitment to reform through a distrust of northern power. As a boy he had sat on the courthouse steps in Independence, listening to tales of the lost cause recited by veterans. Later he looked upon the trusts as an attempt on the part of northern interests to control every as-

pect of national life. To him, reform was not only humane and progressive, it was also revenge for all the humiliations that had followed Appomattox.

Creel had definite ideas regarding journalism and education, many of which had been inspired by Charles Ferguson, a local pastor. Ferguson was convinced that the nation was on the brink of a major upheaval and that its leaders would come from pure-minded individuals educated at new universities in the Midwest. He wanted to establish one, and as a start, organized the National Fellowship of the University Militant. His new school would be "free from the greeds of private initiative and the raids of the freebooting money-maker." From it would be graduated an elite, which would lead the country into correct thoughts and actions. As for the general public, it would be educated through the newspapers, which Ferguson believed were destined to become the dominant force in national life. He gathered around him a group of young Kansas City leaders, Creel among them, and at one point half convinced the publisher to turn the *Independent* into a new kind of newspaper that would serve the cause.

Creel rejected the idea, but did promise to found "a different kind of journal," to be called *The Newsbook*, which would be "the first link in a projected chain of weekly newspapers localized in the chief cities of the country." It would not be controlled by the "plutocrats," but rather by reporters and editors. *The Newsbook* would be operated as a co-operative venture by the reporters, who would share risks and rewards.

Ferguson contacted his friends in New York, asking them to join in the venture, if only to submit articles. Many indicated an interest. Such leading reform figures as Brand Whitlock, Edwin Markham, Elbert Hubbard, and Ida Tarbell—even Ray Standard Baker—met in New York with Ferguson and Creel to plan the new journal. According to Ferguson, its aim would be to:

win and hold the balance of power in American communities, for an institution—the municipal university or university of the people—that shall subordinate all sects, parties, and special interests to the paramount interest of civilization, to wit, the raising of the general standard of living through the practical advancement of science and the humanities. We believe that such an institution is the predestined crown and complement of our national system of free schools.

It was a harebrained scheme, ill-planned and poorly executed. But an issue of *The Newsbook* did appear, on March 7, 1908. It was a monumental flop. Creel and Ferguson had a falling out. Disgusted, Creel gave the *Independent* to two ladies who owned the local job printing shop, and went off to Mexico to recover and forget.¹⁰ He was back in America a few months later, however, and headed to Denver, where he helped lead the reform movement in that city as editor for the *Rocky Mountain News*. Now Creel emerged as one of the nation's most powerful journalists. According to a colleague who met him at this time, Creel was a "humorous, vigorous, laughing human being, pungent, racy, robust, servidly temperamental in a way that pleased and amused, one of the best story tellers of his day."¹¹

Creel had a sketchy education and was not at all certain about the functions of college. He showed contempt for the collegian type, however, and was half convinced they did nothing but sing and play football for four years. On the other hand, he had respect for learning, and stood in awe of professors. "The ideal arrangement, as I have come to see it, is this: after high school a year or so of work so as to give some idea of what is wanted out of further schooling. That is what I had in mind for myself, but somehow I could never find either the time or the money."

While in Kansas City, Creel had attended a lecture Wilson gave for a high school audience. The subject was "the meaning of democracy." As was the case with so many who heard Wilson speak, Creel quickly admired the man. "This admiration grew as I read his books and watched him perform as governor of New Jersey." Creel believed then, and later on, that his ideas regarding education were similar to Wilson's. "As Woodrow Wilson complained, most of the colleges and universities fail to relate their courses to life." To be sure, this was an almost total misreading of Wilson's philosophy of education. On the other hand, there was a striking similarity between the ideas of Wilson and those of Charles Ferguson, and as Creel had followed Ferguson in 1907, so he came to admire Wilson.

In 1911, as the governor prepared for the Democratic convention the following year, Creel wrote an editorial in the *Rocky Mountain News* which called for Wilson's nomination. The following year Creel organized a Wilson Club in Denver, and convinced his newspaper's owner, former Senator Thomas M. Patter-

son, to support Wilson both in print and at the convention. When the candidate arrived in Denver to deliver a campaign speech, Creel was on the committee that greeted him. The two men formed a friendship.

Creel left Denver for New York shortly after the election. While there he wrote free-lance pieces for magazines and was on call as a presidential adviser. The ties between the two men grew, and Creel became one of the army of young reformers who would consider themselves Wilsonians for the rest of their lives.

Creel played a significant role in the 1916 election. He wrote a series of articles outlining the President's stands on major controversies, which were gathered into a small book, *Wilson and the Issues*, and used effectively in the campaign. More important, however, were his organizing activities. In previous presidential elections, journalists, authors, and intellectuals had supported one candidate or another, but unless they joined the official party organization, that was the limit of their efforts. By 1916 Creel knew most of the major journalists in the nation and their politics. With Wilson's blessings, he brought them together in an informal group, and asked them to volunteer to write statements and pamphlets for the cause. Many agreed to do so, and under Creel's direction, such individuals as Tarbell, Steffens, Baker, Irvin Cobb, Samuel Hopkins Adams, Fannie Hurst, Edgar Lee Masters, and Kathleen Norris made significant contributions to the campaign. With the financial backing of several Democratic millionaires, most notably Bernard Baruch and Thomas Chadbourne, Creel was able to run full-page advertisements in major newspapers, attacking Republican candidate Charles Evans Hughes' positions and defending Wilson.

Robert Wooley, who was in charge of publicity for the Democratic National Committee, welcomed this help at first, but then realized that Creel and his group were assuming his role. The two men clashed, with Wilson stepping in as moderator on occasion. Most of the time, however, the President sided with Creel, especially after arguing with Wooley over the use of the slogan "He Kept Us out of War," which Wilson believed deceiving. By the end of the campaign, Wooley was almost powerless, while Creel was invited to come to Washington in an official capacity, but more important, as an unofficial adviser.

Every President has had a kitchen Cabinet of one kind or an-

other. Creel was to become a member of Wilson's in the second Administration; although Creel rejected the offer at first, he changed his mind in 1917, when it appeared that the United States was about to enter the war.

In late March, several newspapers carried stories concerned with the effects of an American declaration of war upon the national life, in which was raised the question of freedom of the press. Most realized that the yellow press had been responsible in part for the Spanish-American War—"Mr. Hearst's War." It had been a short contest, and the matter of censorship had not been seriously considered. But the experience had left a bad taste in government, especially in the War and Navy departments, which felt that full freedom could not be permitted should the United States fight in Europe. The French and Germans had practiced rigid censorship during the Franco-Prussian War, and the British had done the same in the Boer War. All nations involved in World War I were restraining their newspapers. It appeared likely that the United States would follow their leads when and if it became a belligerent.

The Wilson war message was delivered on April 6, and the next day the newspapers indicated that the President favored censorship of one kind or another. Creel learned of this and responded with a brief in which he argued that such a policy would be unwise and counterproductive, as well as of dubious constitutionality. America should not have censorship, he wrote, but rather the press should be asked to accept a series of self-imposed restrictions on the publication of news of troop movements and concentrations in preparations for attacks and withdrawals. The Administration should explain its needs to the nation's publishers and editors, and assuming they were reasonable, all would respond; to do otherwise would be to invite not only the disapproval of their peers but also retaliation from readers who would consider the publication of secret information harmful to the cause.

Creel went on to say that "*expression, not suppression, was the real need.*" Wilson should organize the nation's opinionmakers and molders to help in the war effort. It would be "a plain publicity proposal, a vast enterprise in salesmanship, the world's greatest adventure in advertising." Just as the President was mobilizing industry, agriculture, and consumers, as well as the military

and naval forces, so should he do the same in the area of propaganda. "What I proposed," wrote Creel thirty years after, "was the creation of an agency that would make the fight for what Wilson himself had called 'the verdict of mankind.'" In the innocent rhetoric of a past age, Creel spoke of the need for a massive propaganda apparatus, which would blanket the nation with official interpretations of events and spread the word to the rest of the globe. Creel wanted a government agency "that would not only reach into every American community, clearing away confusions, but at the same time seek the friendship of neutral nations and break through the barrage of lies that kept the Germans in darkness and delusion."¹²

Wilson was considering just such an organization. Congress had passed the Espionage Act in June, and even before that, several Cabinet members had urged the creation of a propaganda apparatus. Grosvenor Clarkson, head of the Council of National Defense, asked leading publishers and editors for suggestions on the censorship issue, and they agreed that such an organization would be in the national good. The only remaining question was that of control. The publishers wanted to make certain that propaganda was in the hands of people like themselves. Frederick Roy Martin, head of the Associated Press, wrote in *Editor and Publisher* that censorship should be administered by "trained newspapermen and not by retired Army and Navy officers, who may suffer from physical or mental gout and antagonize the press at every turn." As he saw it, "Newspapermen cannot command battleships, and military staff officers cannot conduct newspapers."

The Cabinet disagreed. Secretary of State Robert Lansing and Secretary of War Newton D. Baker expected that propaganda and censorship would be in the hands of the military, while all relations with foreign governments—including the release of information—would continue to come under the control of the State Department. Baker was on record as wanting retired officers "to act as censors at the various places where such services may be required," while Lansing had warned Wilson of "grave difficulties" if any outside agency competed with the State Department in releases to foreign governments. For a year the War Department had conducted an "educational service" known as the Bureau of Information, which was in charge of press relations. At its head was an ambitious young officer with a talent for public relations,

Major Douglas MacArthur. Lansing and Baker, together with Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, hoped MacArthur's operation would be expanded, and in time have control over the nation's press and propaganda.

Wilson thought otherwise. After some urging from reformist journalists and intellectuals—among them A. A. Berle, Oswald Garrison Villard, and Norman Thomas (who had also been in Wilson's classes in Princeton)—he offered Creel the position of head of the new Committee on Public Information (CPI), with the other members being Lansing, Baker, and Daniels. As for MacArthur, he would serve as Creel's aide before being transferred to a combat outfit on its way to France.

The battle over leadership of the propaganda apparatus was one of the most crucial that occurred during that first month of American participation in World War I. Given the confusion of the period and the fact that Wilson was calling upon many civilians to take leadership roles in the war effort, the Creel selection appeared part of a general plan, interesting but not worthy of special attention. And yet it was. For the first time in its history, the nation was to have an official propaganda arm. In the past, Greeley, Bennett, Raymond, and other editor-publishers had debated the issues of the Civil War; Lincoln had established no bureau of public information. Hearst and Pulitzer, together with their reporters and editors, had helped lead America into the Spanish-American War, and men like them—not William McKinley—molded public opinion during the conflict. It would be different, however, in World War I. The Wilson administration would not only determine political and military policies, but also possess a stronger instrument of public opinion than that of any publisher or editor.

Creel was in a unique position. The country had had its share of influential editors and publishers, and some had served in Cabinets. One, Horace Greeley, had even been nominated for the presidency. During the muckraking era before the war, journalists like Tarbell, Sinclair, and Steffens had achieved national reputations. Never before, however, had a working newspaperman possessed so much official political power—and with a constituency of one: President Wilson. In an age of information the journalist, not the politician, bureaucrat, or military officer was taking command, and would do so with impressive and effective allies.

Creel had no difficulties in working with Secretary Baker. The two men had met when Baker was mayor of Cleveland, and while Creel admired Baker's progressive programs, the Secretary understood the power of the press and respected it. As for Daniels, he had been publisher of the *Rocky Mount Reporter* and a printer before entering government service. Later on, Daniels had purchased the *Raleigh News and Observer* and had served as a publicity director during the Bryan and Wilson campaigns. He was a shrewd politician who understood men like Creel and had no difficulty in working with them.

Secretary of State Lansing was another matter. A prominent lawyer and unsuccessful politician, Lansing had served in a variety of government posts before assuming his Cabinet position on the resignation of William Jennings Bryan in 1915. An aristocrat by breeding and a conservative by inclination, Lansing had little use for Creel, whom he considered a dangerous radical with "socialist tendencies." Along with other politicians and bureaucrats, Lansing clashed often with Creel, with Wilson usually siding with the former newspaperman. After each confrontation, Creel's power seemed to grow. Lansing believed Creel's views "caused distrust and apprehension among many officials of the Administration." But, Lansing said, Wilson didn't seem to mind; the President "viewed with toleration, if not with a degree of approval, certain socialistic ideas which he termed 'progressive,' although they were utterly hostile to the fundamental principles of his party." In Lansing's view, "Jeffersonian Democracy and Wilsonian Democracy were and will continue to be quite different."¹²

Perhaps it might have been anticipated that Wilson would select a person like Creel to head the CPI. For despite their differences in training, education, and politics, both were individuals who had made their ways through life by developing and expounding ideas.¹⁴ Each man, in his own way, was at home with people who thought, spoke, and wrote for their livings. The CPI that a Creel would establish and manage would be quite different from one headed by a Douglas MacArthur, Robert Lansing, or Newton Baker. Furthermore, its approach, style, and impact were also strikingly different from anything that had gone before or might have developed in the 1917-19 period under a less Jeffersonian variety of President.¹⁵

The Executive Division of the CPI was headed by Creel and

consisted of him and three associate chairmen. Edgar Sisson, the most important of these, had been city editor of the *Chicago Tribune*, managing editor of *Collier's*, and editor of *Cosmopolitan*. Sisson was sent to Europe after the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, eventually winding up in Moscow, where he was supposed to work against the Soviets. He became director of the CPI's Foreign Section, which distributed domestic releases to European newspapers and governments and created books, pamphlets, and articles for use throughout the world. While Sisson was gone, Harvey J. O'Higgins, an author and playwright, gained power at the committee. O'Higgins was available to assign and write articles that answered specific charges against Wilson and the Administration. Carl Byoir, the third associate chairman, had been circulation manager of *Cosmopolitan* before the war and was considered a brilliant public-relations and advertising man. Among his other tasks, Byoir was charged with maintaining good relations with other agencies of government and the publishers. Next to Creel, he was the most visible member of the Executive Division, and his work there proved a springboard for his postwar activities, which included the establishment of Carl Byoir and Associates, the nation's leading public-relations firm. ¹

Under Creel's direction and with the assistance of Byoir, O'Higgins, and Sisson, the CPI established a division of news, a foreign-language newspaper section, a civic and educational branch, a film division, a bureau of war expositions, a bureau of state fair exhibits, an industrial relations sector, the alliance for labor and democracy, a speaking division, an advertising section, and even a bureau of cartoons.¹² New sections, divisions, branches, and offices appeared daily in 1917, to the point that even Wilson did not understand or comprehend the scope of the organization or its activities. Certainly Creel was afforded a great deal of leeway, with at least as much freedom in organizing propaganda as Bernard Baruch was permitted in mobilizing production. For most of the war Creel functioned on his own, without executive or legislative restraints.

Although most Americans seemed to approve of the declaration of war, there was still a large amount of antiwar sentiment, and even pro-German activity. After all, Wilson himself had campaigned in 1916 on an antiwar platform. LaFollette and others, too, had voted against the declaration. America had large num-

bers of German and Irish immigrants and children of immigrants, and in 1917, there was some question as to their loyalties. Whether justified or not, Wilson, Creel, and others in government believed a massive propaganda effort in favor of the war was required. To some, it appeared an official version of what Hearst and Pulitzer had done in 1897-98 in respect to the Cuban situation. But it was far more than that. Utilizing his position to the fullest, Creel mobilized a large segment of the nation's intellectuals, writers, artists, and journalists, had them manufacture "products" under his supervision, distributed them and suppressed alternate views. It was the closest America had ever come to control of expression, and given the technology of the period, constituted its greatest effort in that direction. Creel was proud of his accomplishments. In April of 1918, he wrote to the editor of the *Birmingham News* of the scope of his activities:

Three thousand historians are at our call in the preparation of pamphlet matter; virtually every writer of prominence is giving time to the work of the Committee; the Division of Advertising enlists the energies of every great advertising expert in the United States; there are close to fifty thousand speakers in the Four Minute Men; the war conferences of the states are under our supervision; men and women of all nationalities go from coast to coast at our bidding; the famous artists of the United States are banded together for the production of our posters; the motion-picture industry has been mobilized and is giving us ungrudging support without thought of financial return; and in every capital in the world there are men and women serving with courage and distinction.¹⁷

Creel was particularly proud of the work done by college professors, a breed he knew little of prior to the war. Given the opportunity to speak before a larger audience than they had ever known, the professoriat responded eagerly. To be sure, academics from some midwestern universities and land-grant institutions in the East had worked with state commissions, but now these academics were listened to as patriotic and influential leaders; for the first time, they tasted the heady wine of power and influence. Hundreds of professors served as Four Minute Men—people prepared to speak for that period of time on topics relating to the war. In the CPI's "Red, White, and Blue Series," Wallace Note-

stein and Elmer Stoll of the University of Minnesota wrote *Conquest and Kultur*, an anti-German tract, of which more than 1,200,000 copies were printed and distributed. Professors Dana Munro of Princeton, George Sellery of the University of Wisconsin, and August Krey of the University of Minnesota wrote *German War Practices* (1,500,000 copies); E. E. Sperry of Syracuse University and W. M. West of the University of Minnesota edited *German Plots and Intrigues* (127,000 copies); while the *War Cyclopedia* (200,000 copies) was produced by Frederic L. Paxton of the University of Wisconsin, Edward Corwin of Princeton, and Samuel Harding of Indiana University. In the "War Information Series," William Stearns Davis of the University of Minnesota produced *The War Message and the Facts Behind It* (2,000,000 copies); Professor Charles Hazen of Columbia wrote *The Government of Germany* (1,800,000 copies); Carl Becker of Cornell was the author of *America's War Aims and Peace Terms* (719,000 copies); and Andrew McLaughlin of the University of Chicago wrote *The Great War: From Spectator to Participant* (1,580,000 copies). These scholars, some of them among the leading academic figures in the nation, became, in effect, part-time propagandists for the government. No longer were they the "dear old prof" and "the absent-minded professor." For the duration of the war, at least, they felt themselves to be men of affairs, experts whose knowledge was not as esoteric as previously thought, but instead of great utility—as important to the war effort as guns and ships. For a few years, historians and political scientists were in positions to help sway the entire nation, not merely their college classes and the readers of journals in their fields. They worked under the guidance of a scholar-president; the world was their campus.

It was a heady experience for these men, and some would never recover from it. For the rest of their lives, they would try to function as participants in the nonacademic world. But there would be little call for their talents in the peacetime administrations of Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover, or in the business world of the 1920s. In addition, their CPI books and pamphlets, written with such zeal in 1917 and 1918, would seem blatantly propagandistic, hardly respectable history and political science in the cold eye of the postwar period. By the mid-1920s, many professors would come to fear that they had been used,

their talents prostituted. Such individuals continued to want a public forum, complete with power, but on their own terms—or as close to them as they could get. In effect, they maintained their loyalties to the Wilsonian dream, but were disillusioned by the practices made necessary in service to the cause. They craved the forms, perquisites, and status that had come with power, but recoiled from the practices necessary to obtain all three. The returning soldiers and sailors of 1910–20 weren't the only ones to have problems of postwar blues during the 1920s. Perhaps instinctively, Creel had discovered that these men had their prices, and he paid them with the coin of status, receiving services and goods in return. Afterward, the professors would wonder whether they had done the right thing.

Creel had a different experience with the newspapermen. Unlike the professors, publishers and editors had known power and at least local influence before the war. They could not be seduced by talk of patriotic duty from a man who, after all, was only one of them, and no plaster saint at that. Hopewell Rogers, head of the American Newspaper Publishers' Association, attacked Creel as "incompetent and disloyal," and other publishers resented Creel's often crude attempts at distorting the news. Creel responded that men like Rogers spoke only for the business end of journalism. "That body of the press which deals with the news itself is without national organization," Creel noted, implying that the reporters would do well to confront their disloyal publishers and their editor lackeys. Reckless journalism, said Creel, "is a positive menace when the nation is at war," adding, "In this day of high emotionalism and mental confusion, the printed word has immeasurable power, and the term traitor is not too harsh in application to the publisher, editor, or writer who wields this power without full and solemn recognition of responsibilities." Later on, Creel claimed he had been talking about information regarding the disposition of troops, convoys, and the like. But at the time he urged those in journalism who had "any doubts" about the propriety of their articles to submit them for approval. Hearst, who was both antiwar and anti-Wilson, was able to withstand Creel's attacks on his patriotism, although on occasion even he bowed to government regulations by killing stories. Lesser editors and reporters simply wrote and published pieces they knew would be in conformity with Creel's desires.¹⁰

And it was easy to do so. The CPI's News Division, directed by J. W. McConaughy, formerly editorial writer for *Munsey's Magazine* and staffed by experienced editors and writers, was the largest news-gathering and writing press association in the nation, producing some twenty thousand items a week, all of which were available to editors and reporters. It was a simple matter for a reporter to rewrite a CPI release, hand it in, see it published, and then go on to do other things. By the war's end, the "press release," unknown before 1917, had become institutionalized. The practice was continued by government in the 1920s and after, and picked up by businesses, many of which hired public-relations firms—such as Byoir's—to develop and write pieces for release and, hopefully, publication in newspapers and magazines. To be sure, press agency had its origins before the war, but the CPI experience helped cement the alliances between the new creators in the public-relations rooms of industry and government and the reporters and editors at newspapers throughout the nation. In fact, the two positions often were interchangeable, with talented reporters taking government and business posts, and public-relations men finding employment on newspapers.

During the muckraking period, an independent and powerful press criticized and probed government on all levels. The two came together under Wilson and Creel, and although they separated after the war, the ties were never fully broken. In the years that followed, reformers would criticize the "Lords of the Press," and there would be cries for more independent journalism among other things, for newspapers controlled by reporters and editors and not by publishers. This demand missed the point of the wartime experience. As much as any other group in the nation, reporters had been enlisted into government service, albeit indirectly, by the CPI. For the next generation at least, the nexus would remain intact.

Creel had hoped to mold the American people through propaganda, and certainly his efforts in that direction were impressive. He also worked to sell the Wilsonian dream overseas, and a good deal of the President's popularity can be traced to Creel's vision and prose—spread by the CPI to every corner of the globe. "Creel's enterprise became mainly one of 'building up' Wilson, causing Wilson's ideas to dominate the mind of the world, including Germany, including even the minds of Germany's armies in

the field," wrote newspaperman Mark Sullivan. "He, with Wilson; Wilson as forger of verbal thunderbolts, Creel as propagandeer of them; Wilson as Napoleon of ideas; Creel as Marshal Ney of dissemination—the two would conquer the world."¹⁰

Was this really so? We can trace Creel's efforts through the professors, count the number of pamphlets and articles distributed, note his influence with the press. We can see Creel threatening publishers who printed pro-German books, planting propaganda in textbooks of his own design, helping publish a school newspaper that went to every classroom in the land, and translating Wilson's speeches into all languages. Through Creel's efforts, Wilson did become the best-known, most popular American in history. All of this could rightfully be claimed. The words had been written and distributed. But had they been read? By whom? And what were their effects?

Wilson had been an elitist in education, and Creel a reformer. Yet the congresses of the prewar period had been largely conservative. Americans had elected McKinley with a landslide in 1900; Roosevelt became President after his assassination, and then was elected in his own right only after obtaining the support of a large segment of the business community. Wilson was a minority President. To whom did he speak, and who was listening? In 1918 *Shavings*, a maudlin novel by Joseph C. Lincoln, was a best seller. Gertrude Atherton, Ernest Poole, Irving Bacheller, Mary Johnston—writers of escapist fiction—had fine sales with their novels that year. The first parts of *Ulysses* by James Joyce were banned from the mails in 1918, while *Lightnin'* began a record run on Broadway, and then sent stock companies to the provinces, where *Uncle Tom's Cabin* and minstrel shows were still popular, though not as much as the circus. In all probability more Americans read of Boston Red Sox pitcher Babe Ruth and his World Series exploits than they did the collected—or uncollected—speeches of Woodrow Wilson. What did these Americans think of the propaganda effort, originated and executed by intellectuals and their allies?

The CPI had established a division of labor publications, headed by Robert Maisel, a former labor organizer. It also sponsored the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy, with Samuel Compers of the American Federation of Labor as its titular chief. Maisel was charged with producing and distributing litera-

ture to workers, while the Alliance was supposed to maintain peace and harmony at the unions. In addition, Roger W. Babson, the statistician and economic analyst, headed a division of industrial relations, which provided ideas and assistance for the other two groups. Experts from other sections were brought in to help mobilize the workers. Professor Commons of Wisconsin wrote *Why Workingmen Support the War*, in which he said, "This is an American workingmen's war, conducted for American workingmen, by American workingmen. Never before has democracy for wage earners made so great progress as it has in the six months that we have been at war." Commons predicted that "if this continues" the worker would gain an eight-hour day and higher wages than ever before. "Capitalists are being controlled in their profits and in the wages and hours of laborers by leaders whom the workingmen themselves put on the various war boards."

While the Wilson administration had supported legislation controlling profits, businessmen were, nevertheless, making large profits during the war. In addition, Commons had exaggerated the workers' benefits, both in terms of hours and wages. The CPI urged workers to "enlist in the war effort for the duration." Posters showing workers and soldiers arm in arm were plastered over walls in factories throughout the nation. Firms with high production ratings received awards and publicity. Yet the number of work stoppages increased during the war. There had been 1,593 strikes in 1915, 3,789 in 1916, and 4,450 in 1917. In 1918, with the CPI urging greater productivity, there were 3,353 strikes, and in 1919, 3,630, and the majority were caused by grievances in regard to wages and hours.

What was the reason for this? Some manufacturers blamed "socialistic propaganda" and others spoke darkly of "German plots." "The thing has gone so far that it is going to be a big job to sway the attitude by any educational system," said L. J. Monahan, president of the Universal Motor Company. T. S. Graselli, head of the large Graselli Chemical Company, thought legislation "making it criminal for a man to be idle when any government work has to be done in any community" would be helpful. Economist Chester Wright, who took charge of the division of labor publications in 1918, reported that workers were complaining about excessive overtime and poor wages. "An attempt to proceed with loyalty work without an adjudication of industrial

conditions would be pure waste of time," he told Creel. Another commentator wrote that "My two sons in France get \$33 apiece per month: Why should Stone, and Armour, and Vanderlip *et al.* be paid more? . . . Unless we conscript wealth to the justifiable limit, all appeals whether by the Four-Minute Men or a letter from the President, to save, to give blood or money, to compose differences, to subscribe for bonds, to stand behind the President—all appeals will fall eventually on deaf ears; and we shall have a sullen, scowling, half-hearted cooperation, instead of a whole-hearted, inspiring to-the-last-ditch united democracy."

Creel was at a loss as how best to proceed. He would not conscript labor, his pleas were unavailing, and no amount of propaganda seemed to do the job. Were the workers simply unpatriotic? After all, a good many of them were foreign-born, and perhaps their sympathies were with the Central Powers, not the Allies. Was the American labor force more radical than had been believed? These were the questions asked, but Creel seemed incapable of coming up with the answers. The attempts to mobilize unskilled and semiskilled labor generally failed; in contrast, Creel's greatest successes had come in his work with intellectuals.

In 1918, H. R. Wade of the Diamond Forging and Manufacturing Company wrote to Creel of labor discontent at his plant. "One of our laborers called my attention to a paragraph in a Polish paper that an individual named Frankfurter, of some college, had been appointed by President Wilson to a position in the Labor Department, and requested enlightenment as to how such a man could use any influence with common labor."²² In other words, Wilson and Creel might be able to mobilize men like Felix Frankfurter, but they lacked the ability to communicate with manual workers—the nonintellectuals.

We see the war, now, through the eyes of the press, public speakers, officials, and writers—the vision of intellectuals. And it appears a fairly popular crusade, with Wilson capturing the hearts and minds of the nation and then of the world. But was this really so? Given an understanding and appreciation of the Creel effort at the CPI, was this view a truthful one? The histories of the war were written by Wilsonians, often men who worked at the CPI. A generation of American historians were trained in government, and they remained Wilsonians for the rest of their lives.

What did the rest of the country think of the war and of the

Wilsonians? Just how strong was the antiwar movement? There is no way of answering these questions satisfactorily, but there are bits and pieces of information and evidence to consider, such as the number of strikes. Furthermore, antiwar congressmen did not suffer unduly in the 1918 election. Eugene V. Debs and his Socialist party were antiwar. In 1912 Debs received 900,000 votes for the presidency. In 1916, Socialist A. L. Benson ran in Debs' place and obtained 585,000 votes. Four years later, in 1920, Debs was in jail for his opposition to the war and won 919,000 votes. That year Harding—supported by antiwar forces, among others—received 16.1 million votes, while James Cox, with Wilson's blessings, had only 9.1 million.

Then there was Robert LaFollette, who had opposed entry into the war, and spoke for moderation from 1917 to 1919. LaFollette was sharply critical of Creel's propaganda efforts, especially when war resisters were branded as traitors. The CPI issued a series of advertisements urging Americans to "report the man who spreads pessimistic stories. Report him to the Department of Justice." LaFollette branded such activities thought control, and in a Senate speech in late 1917 he urged repeal of the sedition laws. Clearly referring to the CPI, he said, "It appears to be the purpose of those conducting their campaign to throw the country into a state of terror, to coerce public opinion, to stifle criticism, and suppress discussion of the great issues involved in this war." A person of his stature, prominence—and courage as well—could say such things in the superpatriotic atmosphere fostered by the CPI. Other, lesser men remained silent, while a handful in the House and Senate attacked Creel indirectly by attempting to cut appropriations for the CPI. Creel responded by charging them with partisanship, and since most of his opponents were Republicans, there may have been substance to this. Then he would plant stories about the effective work of his committee so as to put pressure on the legislators. When Edgar Sisson returned from Russia with documents purporting to prove that the Germans had encouraged the Soviet Revolution, the news caused a sensation and resulted both in a resurgence of patriotic zeal for the war and new appropriations for the CPI.

By the mid-1920s, the whole nation appeared disillusioned with the war—or at least this seemed the verdict of journalists and other writers. A new generation of them had appeared, one that

had not participated in the war effort or had not made moral, professional, and spiritual commitments to the Great Crusade. These men and women criticized those who had involved the nation in the struggle. Their chosen villains were businessmen and foreigners. (Wilson, however, was still praised as a man of vision who even then was taking a place in the pantheon of American saints.) The antforeign crusade of 1919 that culminated in the Red Raids of 1920 were blamed upon Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, not Wilson or Creel. The CPI had done much to create the atmosphere of fear and hate, and even though Creel was repelled by the superpatriots and spoke out against them, he was unwilling or unable to control their work. Later on, in writing his surprisingly candid memoirs, he still failed to discern any significant connection among the anti-German propaganda from 1918-19, the curtailment of civil liberties by superpatriots, and the Red Raids.

Wilson and LaFollette had been leaders of the American reform movement prior to World War I. Despite some surface similarities, they had enunciated differing beliefs and opinions on a variety of issues, from education to the functions of leadership in a democracy. LaFollette trusted the instincts of the common man in most things; he thought Americans could take care of their own interests. Wilson loved humanity in the abstract, but had doubts about the abilities of individuals to select wise and proper courses of action. An elite would be required for this task, a cadre that would create ideas and programs for the rest of the society. These would have to be disseminated among the masses, in a form and a fashion the common people would understand and appreciate. He believed he had found the man for the task in George Creel, the agency in the CPI.

Newspapermen and academics found a perfect conduit into the area of public service in Creel. As chairman, he helped alter the direction of American journalism. Although Creel did not dominate the stage as had Greeley or Pulitzer, he operated on a far wider arena, and for a brief time with greater power than even Hearst. And in the process Creel trained a generation of newspapermen and academics in public service, and fashioned links between journalism and government stronger than any that had existed since the early nineteenth century.

The muckrakers had criticized government from the outside;

Tarbell, Steffens, Sinclair, and others of their group had had no hope of political office; if they had been offered bribes, they were in the form of cash, not power. This changed with the war. From that time on, journalists would attack and defend government with an eye to power—often official power at that. Government and the press would each try to use the other, with often curious results for each.

Most of the professors who worked for and with the CPI and other government agencies returned to the universities and colleges after the war. But the dear old prof, who may have worked for his state or municipal government in one capacity or another prior to 1917, now had had his taste of national, even international status and power. He had mingled with the movers and shakers, and often found the experience heady and to his liking. This would not be forgotten, or the lessons lost on those who took their places in academic affairs and government in the next generation. For example, there was Guy Stanton Ford, professor of European history and dean of the University of Minnesota in 1917, who had become director of the CPI Division of Civic and Educational Co-operation and helped recruit dozens of leading historians and political scientists for Creel, including Andrew C. McLaughlin of the University of Chicago and Carl Becker of Cornell. After the war, Ford returned to Minnesota, soon to become president of the university. Ford, McLaughlin, and Becker all would serve as presidents of the American Historical Association; a majority of those who would hold that position in the 1920s and 1930s had had direct or indirect connection with the Wilson administration.

Men such as these would continue to present the Wilsonian view of the war and defend it. In the past, most historians had liked to think of themselves as impartial observers, standing above the conflict, watching the actors with a cool eye. But the histories of this war would be written by men who had had an emotional, intellectual, moral, and often personal stake in the conflict and its resolution. They may have been better informed than their predecessors for their experiences, but they could now hardly be considered impartial. Wilson may have lost the battle for the League of Nations, but he had long before been victorious in the conflict for the affections of the nation's academic elite.²¹

Some intellectuals spent the 1920s in Europe, where they came

to be known as the "Lost Generation." Those who used the term were convinced that America, not the writers and artists in Paris and London, was truly lost, primarily because the nation did not utilize their talents, giving them positions of power and prestige. Those who remained at home railed against those who had succeeded them in government and sneered at the new middle-class culture that emerged after the war. The new people didn't seem to mind, and in fact they appeared somewhat amused by critiques of their ways of enjoying themselves, much to the chagrin and disgust of the attackers. In any case, newspapers and elite colleges were not prime areas of interest for the nation's middle class. Rather, the dominant culture found expression through different instruments, which the intellectuals and reporters initially ignored. The Wilsonians retired to the background—to some newspapers and universities—after the Great War. For a decade it appeared that the age of the mass intellectual had dawned, that if a reform temperament survived it would be that of LaFollette, not Wilson. In 1924 an old, tired, and ill LaFollette ran for the presidency on a third-party ticket, with little publicity or newspaper support. Yet he received 4.8 million votes, an impressive showing under the circumstances. But this was not the age of men like LaFollette or Wilson. Rather, it was best symbolized by the victor in 1924, Calvin Coolidge, and the man he had succeeded, Warren Harding. The differences between them and LaFollette were far greater in most respects than those between the universities at Madison and Princeton.

Films from Form to Content

Guy Stanton Ford attended the University of Wisconsin from 1892 to 1896, when the school was becoming deeply involved in the management of the state. He registered for courses with two leaders of the Wisconsin Idea, Paul Reinsch and Richard Ely, but most of his work was with historian Frederick Jackson Turner. After graduation, Ford accepted a teaching position in a local school in order to save money for graduate work, and in 1898 he began to take courses toward a Ph.D. in European history. The following year he went to Berlin to conduct research for his thesis, and in 1901 Ford returned to America, to teach at Yale and complete his doctorate at Columbia. His thesis, finished in 1903, was entitled "Hanover and Prussia, 1795-1803." The work, which dealt with the different traditions within the German Empire, was rather dull and pedantic. As Ford saw it, Prussia was able to dominate the German states because of its abilities at organization, while the other states refused to arm in the face of potential aggression. Ford received his Ph.D. and, after publishing a few articles, was offered a professorship at the University of Illinois, which he accepted. In 1913, he was named dean of the graduate school at Minnesota.

George Creel

Chairman of the U.S. Committee on Public Information

"Public Opinion in War Time"*

**Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, lxxviii, July 1918, pp 185-193.

PUBLIC OPINION IN WAR TIME

BY GEORGE CREEL,

Chairman, Committee on Public Information, Washington, D. C.

Now more than at any other time in history the importance of public opinion has come to be recognized. The fight for it is a part of the military program of every country, for every belligerent nation has brought psychology to the aid of science. Not only has Germany spent millions of dollars on its propaganda, but it has been very vigorous in protecting its soldiers and civilians from counter-propaganda. We are highly honored by having both Austria and Germany establish a death penalty for every representative of the Committee on Public Information, and imprisonment and execution are visited on everyone who is found in possession of the literature that we drop from airplanes or that we shoot across the line from mortars, or that we smuggle into the countries by various means.

Any discussion of public opinion must necessarily be prefaced by some slight attempt at definition. Just what do we mean by it? A great many people think that public opinion is a state of mind, formed and changed by the events of the day or by the events of the hour; that it is sort of a combination of kaleidoscope and weather-cock. I disagree with this theory entirely. I do not believe that public opinion has its rise in the emotions, or that it is tipped from one extreme to the other by every passing rumor, by every gust of passion, or by every storm of anger. I feel that public opinion has its source in the minds of people, that it has its base in reason, and that it expresses slow-formed convictions rather than any temporary excitement or any passing passion of the moment. I may be wrong, but since mine is the responsibility, mine is the decision, and it is upon that decision that every policy of the committee has been based. We have never preached any message of hate. We have never made any appeal to the emotions, but we have always by every means in our power tried to drive home to the people the causes behind this war, the great fundamental necessities that compelled

a peace-loving nation to take up arms to protect free institutions and preserve our liberties.

We had to establish new approaches in a great many respects to drive home these truths. We believed in the justice of our cause. We believed passionately in the purity of our motives. We believed in the nobility and the disinterestedness of our aims, and we felt that in order to win unity, in order to gain the verdict of mankind, all we had to do was to give facts in the interest of full understanding. It may be said that there was no great necessity for this—that this war was going on for three years before America entered it—but I cannot but feel that on April 6, 1917, there was very little intelligent understanding of fundamentals, for those three years had been years of controversy and years of passion—two things that are absolutely opposed to intelligent public opinion. You had your pro-Allies, you had your pro-Germans, you had your people who thought war was a horrible thing and who shrank from it without grasping the great significances involved; and so on the day we entered war we had a frazzled emotionalism, with people whose sensibilities had grown numb by very violence. We had to approach people to try to drive home to them some great truths.

Now, the press did not lend itself to our purposes in any large degree, because the press by its very constitution is not an interpretive or educational factor. The press chronicles the events of the day—it dies with the day that gives it birth—and so as far as historical record is concerned, so far as interpretation is concerned, so far as educational needs are concerned, we had to establish a new medium. So we called together three thousand historians of the country for pamphlet production, to set down causes in black and white, to put it so simply that a child could grasp just what we meant by democracy, just what we meant by freedom of the seas, and just what we meant by international law; so that people can read it and understand, and instead of being filled with a cheap and poisoning hate, they may be filled with a tremendous resolve, a great determination, that will last, not for a day, not for a week and not for a year, but until such time as a settlement is won as will forever safeguard our liberties and our aspirations.

There was also the spoken word that had to be organized. We had to try to substitute for the passions of the curbstone the logic and the reason of the platform, and so we formed the Four

Minute Men campaign, so that today 50,000 of them are receiving budgets of material and going out through moving picture houses all over the land preaching the gospel of America's Justice. We organized the speaking of the country, trying to bring some order out of oratorical chaos. We have brought men of every nationality from the trenches to speak to the people, and we have sent men from coast to coast, so that people might be brought face to face with the truth, not by controversialists, but by those who had seen, by those who actually knew what war meant, those who knew what defeat meant, and those who knew the necessity of victory. These were the fundamentals of the case, of which we tried to build foundations upon which to erect our house of truth.

Then there was the necessity also of giving people information. There has been nothing so distressing to me as this absurd assumption on the part of a large number of people that the Committee on Public Information is a censorship and interested in suppression rather than expression. We do not touch censorship at any point, because censorship in the United States is a voluntary agreement managed and enforced by the press itself. The desires of the government with respect to the concealment of its plans, its policies, the movement of troops, the departure of troops, and so on, go to the press upon a simple card that bears this paragraph: "These requests go to the press without larger authority than the necessity of the war-making branches. Their enforcement is a matter for the press itself." I am very glad and very proud to be able to say that this voluntary censorship has a greater force than could ever have been obtained by any law.

At every point we have tried to stimulate discussion, even to organize discussion. Aside from the disclosure of military secrets of importance, aside from any protest that is liable to weaken the will of the country to continue this war, or that may interfere with the prosecution of this war, we stand for the freest discussion that any people in the world ever had. I can conceive of no greater tragedy than that, out of stupid rages, out of the elevation of the mob spirit above reason, discussion should be stifled.

Just as we assembled historians to prepare pamphlets, trained speakers to form the Four Minute Men, so did we gather together the artists of the country to draw posters, and under the leadership of Charles Dana Gibson, the billboards of the country are filling

with posters as beautiful as they are effective. We mobilized the advertising experts of the nation, and today every great advertising man in the United States is working for the Committee on Public Information, preparing the matter that goes into periodicals and on the billboards, and contributing millions in free space to the national service.

We have realized the necessity for specialized service. It was soon seen that we had to devise departments that would prepare matter for the rural press, for the religious press, for the labor press, for the magazines, and so on. We had to gather together the essayists and the brilliant novelists of the land—it was a proposition of touching up the high lights—to lay before the people the truth. Today 50,000 men and women are giving their time without money, without thought of reward, to the service of the government. Whenever the Committee on Public Information is attacked I think of these thousands of volunteers who are giving so freely of their service, and any slur at them is a blow in the back, a cowardly assault upon those who are serving behind the lines with as much devotion as the soldiers in the trenches.

Aside from the English speaking people of the United States, we have had to pay attention to the foreign language groups. Somebody once said that people do not live by bread alone; they live mostly by catch phrases. For long we have had the theory in this country that we could dismiss our responsibilities to the foreigner by glib references to the melting pot, but every man of intelligence knows that the melting pot has not melted for years. Foreigners came to this country with their eyes upturned to the flag, with the hope that they were coming to a land of promise, and we let them land at the dock without an outstretched hand to meet them. In one month that I remember, twenty thousand agricultural workers drifted into sweatshops in industrial centres near the seaboard, while all the rich acreage of the west called to them. No aid was given to them whereby they could buy railroad tickets to help bring them in touch with opportunity. They were simply dumped into the Ghettos of the big cities. We let sharks prey on them, we let poverty swamp them, we did not teach them English, and we forced them to establish their own foreign language church and their own foreign language institutions, and today when we need them and call upon them, we find we are called upon to pay for the utter neglect of the last twenty-five years.

We lost Russia. Why? Because thousands of people went back from the Ghetto of New York to Russia, and all they ever knew of America was the wretchedness and sordidness of the East Side, and they told them in Russia that America was a lie, a fake democracy, that there was no truth in us. They described America as they saw it, never having had a chance to come in touch with the bright promise of the land.

It was our task to repair the blunders of the past. We went into every foreign language group—among Hungarians, among the Greeks, among the Poles, among the Jugo-Slavs, the Czecho-Slovaks, and a score of other nationalities that were seldom heard of before until this war came.

We organized loyalty leagues in these groups. We had to get speakers in their own language. We had to go into the factories and hold noon meetings. We had slips put in their pay envelopes, and in a hundred other ways we had to drive home the meaning and purposes of democracy. We have pointed out that democracy was not an automatic device but the struggle everlasting; that there is no evil in our national life that cannot be cured at the polling place; that the ballot was their sword, their remedy for every injustice; that all they needed to bring about the 100 per cent perfection for which we struggle was intelligence and education; and that if there were failures it was just as much their fault as it was the fault of the American born. The remedy for everything lies in a better and finer appreciation of the duties of the citizen. While we are driving home the truths of the war, this great Americanization work that we are carrying on is building foundations under the union. That is the thing to do—bring them into closer touch with American life.

What we are doing in this country we are doing in practically every other country on the globe. We are trying to "sell" America to the world. We have been the most provincial people that ever lived, the most self-satisfied people; we have always been sufficient unto ourselves, and the very fact that other people did not speak our language was accepted at once as a proof of inferiority. We had little touch with other countries, knew very little of them, and they knew less of us. All Europe ever knew about us was our earthquakes and our cyclones and the fact that we lynched darkies in the south—that we were a race of dollar grabbers, a race of money

makers. So we had to begin to develop communication with them to get in closer touch with them.

Our work has been educational and informative. Much has been said in praise of German propaganda, but from the first our policy has been to find out what the Germans were doing, and the not to do it. Rottenness and corruption and deceit and trickery may win for awhile, but in the long run it always brings about its own inevitable reaction. What we are doing in foreign countries is being done openly. What we are trying to do is to bring home to them the meaning of American life, the purposes of America, our hopes and our ambitions.

We go in first with our news service. I found that the wireless here was not being used to any large extent and immediately began sending a thousand words a day of American news. We send out from Tuckerton to the Eiffel Tower, and from France it is sent to Switzerland, to Rome, to Madrid and to Lisbon. We send it to London and from London to Russia, to Holland and to the Scandinavian countries. From Darien it is flashed to the countries of South America. It goes from New York by telegraph to San Diego and from San Diego by wireless to Cavite; from Cavite to Shanghai; from Shanghai to Tokio. So we cover the whole world today with our American news. That is the best propaganda possible because it tells them what we are doing and what we are thinking.

We have sent to all these countries great motion picture campaigns, putting them out through the established theatres, or hiring our own theatres. These motion pictures set forth the industrial and social progress of the United States, our schools, conditions of labor among women and children, the houses where our working people live, our sanitariums, the way we take care of the sick, our schools, and women voting in enlightened states like Colorado. We show them our war progress, how a democracy prepares for battle, all its thousands of youngsters coming from their homes clean-eyed, straight-limbed, walking into training camps, and the splendid democracy of it. We show them our factories, our great fleet, our destroyers and submarines, and we send those pictures over the world.

We have our representatives trying to find out what the people are most interested in in America, and then we send people from America to these countries to make speaking tours. We find

what pamphlets will appeal to them and then we send those pamphlets from house to house, and we use airplanes in dropping messages in enemy countries. We had three printing plants in Russia at one time getting out material in all dialects of Austria-Hungary and sent it across by planes and by messengers to all the oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary.

So that the work that is carried on by the Committee on Public Information is not a censorship and never has been a censorship. It is a medium of expression. It is the medium through which the government is trying to bring home to all the people of the world what America means and what we fight for.

We do not want a public opinion that is based on the happenings of the moment. We want a public opinion that springs from the heart and soul—that has its root in the rich soil of truth. And this fight is going to win because it is a fight for truth, because we have nothing to be ashamed of. The other day, when asked the question, I said I had no sympathy with the conscientious objector, because I thought this war was holy enough to enlist the devotion of every man, whatever his religion. We waited three years, going to the very ultimate of humility, to prove our devotion to peace, and we drew the sword only when the seas were filled with our dead, when international law was set aside, when torch and bomb were applied to our industries, and when it was seen that the German government was dead to honor and decency. Having drawn the sword, being confident of the high motives for which we stand, we will never sheathe it until the heights of our determination are gained.

We are perfectly willing to have peace discussed. We are never going to shut our ears to peace, but there cannot be mention of any peace that savors of compromise. You can compromise questions of territory, questions of commerce and economic disputes, but you cannot compromise eternal principles. President Wilson's motive for entering this war was to establish certain solemn rights of ours for which every man of us must be willing to die and should be ready to die. This fight we are making all over the world today, this fight for public opinion, is a fight that is not going to be won until every man, woman and child in the United States here at home is made to realize that they are called to the colors as much as the sailor and soldier.

This is an irritating time in American life; it is the hour of preparation. We have not known the glory of the firing line yet to any extent. All we have known is the sweat and drudgery of getting ready. There have been failures and discomforts and inconveniences, but there is this to remember; we are here safe at home. While thousands of boys, our best and bravest, are going to France to offer their lives on the altar of liberty, the worst any of us can know is irritation.

When people complain about the annoyance of wheatless days and the fuel situation, and how intolerable it is to have to give up this or that, and how the trains are not running on time, how everything is going wrong, and all like pettinesses, let them remember Belgium and Serbia, and realize that unless we stand together shoulder to shoulder, heart to heart, in one tremendous brotherhood, big enough to look over every little, rotten thing, big enough to rise over peevishness and meanness, we are going to know the same fate as Belgium and Serbia. What we want in this country today is not the careless indifference that will overlook defects, for criticism is the most wholesome corrective in the world. But let care be taken that the criticism is constructive and that it is not put forward to conceal partisanship and other unutterable meannesses.

As for the censorship on free speech, it is not imposed by Washington, but by the intolerances and bigotries of individual communities. The government is not responsible for mobs that hang innocent men, that paint houses yellow and that run up and down the country trying to crush honest discussion. Norman Angell and E. K. Radcliffe, two of the brightest minds of all England, have been here all winter telling truths about England from the extreme radical viewpoint, and yet you do not find those men figuring on the front pages. The censorship that stops them is not of the government but proceeds from the prejudices of the press.

It is very easy to talk about the absurdities of censorship. In our voluntary agreement with the press of America, we asked that the arrival and departure of ships be not announced, because as far as able we want to try to protect them from the submarine. That may be a foolish way, but we are going to stick at it until we get a better way. Not even for the satisfaction of a news item are we going to endanger American lives. We ask also that they shall not mention the arrival of foreign missions and their train movements

while in this country, in order to protect our guests as far as possible. The German government does *not* know how many men we have in France. It is all very well to say "the enemy knows, anyway," but there is no use in putting information on his breakfast table. We may be stupid about these things, but where lives of men are concerned we are not going to put news items above those lives, the lives of those men over in France. Certain items have been stopped by the able censorship from going abroad. And there will be others stopped, because while it is one thing to let the people of this country have all the information it is another thing to give aid and comfort to the enemy. When they say that our war preparations have broken down, let the facts be stated and debated here at home; but we do not want that sort of talk to get into Germany. When any man declares that "the war progress of the United States has stopped; everything is a failure, and we cannot come to the aid of the Allies in any degree, and everything that has been done is futile;" and such statements are put in the papers of Germany it is worth a million men to them, and they are not going to obtain them if we can help it. I am in favor of having all possible condemnation heaped on failures—but do not let us use every failure to tear down the whole structure of accomplishment.

If we have had failures we have also had our splendid victories. Nobody ever says one word about the fact that in less than a month after the declaration of war we overturned the policy of one hundred and forty-one years by the enactment of the selective service law; nobody says a word about our enrolling 10,000,000 men without friction, or a word about the wonderful record of the exemption boards; nobody says a word about the completion of the cantonments within 90 days after the driving of the first nail; nobody says anything about there being no scandal with regard to the food furnished our soldiers; nobody says a word about our medical service—how we gathered 12,000 doctors that give these men finer care than they ever received as individuals; no, nobody says a word about all this—just the failures are talked about. Nobody says a word about the difficulties that had to be overcome when we began sending our men over to France; how after they arrived, there was not a dock to give them and not a train to use.

That is no criticism of France or England. Their own tasks absorbed every energy and resource. Our men had to build their

own docks; they had to build hundreds of miles of railroads; and they had to go into the virgin forests and cut down trees in order to make their barracks. They had to mobilize engineers, foresters, railroad men and construction men as well as soldiers—all this tremendous machinery of industry had to be created over there so as not to interrupt the war preparations of France or England; and the stream of men going across the Atlantic today exceeds the expectations of England and France and is a source of amazement to them.

People will tell about our failure to produce guns here in America at once, but they do not say anything about the fact that we selected the best foreign models, and gave contracts for their production in English and French factories so that we could give them money and give them work, and how we went to work in the meantime and produced the best machine gun in the world today—the Browning. They do not say a word about these tremendous accomplishments—how a nation is straining every energy to help in a great way and to the very best of our ability, but they take the aeroplane situation, where certain inefficiencies were shown, and they harp on it in order to throw doubt and confusion upon every other war preparation. Let us go after the failure, let us remedy it, let us have criticism, but let us not tear down the whole structure of achievement when we have to replace a defective brick.

FREEDOM OF DISCUSSION IN WAR TIME

By NORMAN ANGELL,
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I propose to deal with one phase only of the problem of the mobilization of the public mind. It is this: "What degree of freedom of public discussion will best fit a democracy to wage war effectively?"

It is not merely, or perhaps mainly, a governmental question, but one which confronts newspapers and bodies like universities and churches; one of its most important aspects is that of personal relationships. I shall not enter into the discussion of any proposed legislation, nor touch in any way on the attitude of the government.

CHAPTER I

IMPULSE AND INSTINCT IN POLITICS

WHOEVER sets himself to base his political thinking on a re-examination of the working of human nature, must begin by trying to overcome his own tendency to exaggerate the intellectuality of mankind.

We are apt to assume that every human action is the result of an intellectual process, by which a man first thinks of some end which he desires, and then calculates the means by which that end can be attained. An investor, for instance, desires good security combined with five per cent. interest. He spends an hour in studying with an open mind the price-list of stocks, and finally infers that the purchase of Brewery Debentures will enable him most completely to realize his desire. Given the original desire for good security, his act in purchasing the Debentures appears to be the inevitable result of his inference. The desire for good security itself may further appear to be merely an intellectual inference as to the means of satisfying some more general desire, shared by all mankind, for "happiness," our own "interest," or the like. The satisfaction of this general desire can then be treated as the supreme "end" of life, from which all our acts and impulses, great and small, are derived by the same intellectual process as that by

which the conclusion is derived from the premises of an argument.

This way of thinking is sometimes called "common sense." A good example of its application to politics may be found in a sentence from Macaulay's celebrated attack on the Utilitarian followers of Bentham in the *Edinburgh Review* of March 1829. This extreme instance of the foundation of politics upon dogmatic psychology is, curiously enough, part of an argument intended to show that "it is utterly impossible to deduce the science of government from the principles of human nature." "What proposition," Macaulay asks, "is there respecting human nature which is absolutely and universally true? We know of only one: and that is not only true, but identical; that men always act from self-interest. . . . *When we see the actions of a man, we know with certainty what he thinks his interest to be.*"¹ Macaulay believes himself to be opposing Benthamism root and branch, but is unconsciously adopting and exaggerating the assumption which Bentham shared with most of the other eighteenth and early nineteenth century philosophers—that all motives result from the idea of some preconceived end.

If he had been pressed, Macaulay would probably have admitted that there are cases in which human acts and impulses to act occur independently of any idea of an end to be gained by them. If I have a piece of grit in my eye, and ask some one to take it out with the

¹ *Edinburgh Review*, March 1829, p. 105. (The italics are mine.)

corner of his handkerchief, I generally close the eye as soon as the handkerchief comes near, and always feel a strong impulse to do so. Nobody supposes that I close my eye because, after due consideration, I think it my interest to do so. Nor do most men choose to run away in battle, to fall in love, or to talk about the weather in order to satisfy their desire for a preconceived end. If, indeed, a man were followed through one ordinary day, without his knowing it, by a cinematographic camera and a phonograph, and if all his acts and sayings were reproduced before him next day, he would be astonished to find how few of them were the result of a deliberate search for the means of attaining ends. He would, of course, see that much of his activities consisted in the half-conscious repetition, under the influence of habit, of movements which were originally more fully conscious. But even if all cases of habit were excluded he would find that only a small proportion of the residue could be explained as being directly produced by an intellectual calculation. If a record were also kept of those of his impulses and emotions which did not result in action, it would be seen that they were of the same kind as those which did, and that very few of them were preceded by that process which Macaulay takes for granted.

If Macaulay had been pressed still further, he would probably have admitted that even when an act is preceded by a calculation of ends and means, it is not the inevitable result of that calculation. Even when we know what a man thinks it his interest to do, we do

not know for certain that he will do it. The man who studies the Stock Exchange list does not buy his Debentures, unless, apart from his intellectual inference on the subject, he has an impulse to write to his stockbroker sufficiently strong to overcome another impulse to put the whole thing off till the next day.

Macaulay might even further have admitted that the mental act of calculation itself results from, or is accompanied by, an impulse to calculate, which impulse may have nothing to do with any anterior consideration of means and ends, and may vary from the half-conscious yielding to a train of reverie up to the obstinate driving of a tired brain into the difficult task of exact thought.

The text-books of psychology now warn every student against the "intellectualist" fallacy which is illustrated by my quotation from Macaulay. Impulse, it is now agreed, has an evolutionary history of its own earlier than the history of those intellectual processes by which it is often directed and modified. Our inherited organization inclines us to re-act in certain ways to certain stimuli because such reactions have been useful in the past in preserving our species. Some of the reactions are what we call specifically "instincts," that is to say, impulses towards definite acts or series of acts, independent of any conscious anticipation of their probable effects.¹ Those instincts are sometimes unconscious and

¹ "Instinct is usually defined as the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends without foresight of the ends and without previous

involuntary; and sometimes, in the case of ourselves and apparently of other higher animals, they are conscious and voluntary. But the connection between means and ends which they exhibit is the result not of any contrivance by the actor, but of the survival, in the past, of the "fittest" of many varying tendencies to act. Indeed the instinct persists when it is obviously useless, as in the case of a dog who turns round to flatten the grass before lying down on a carpet; and even when it is known to be dangerous, as when a man recovering from typhoid hungers for solid food.

The fact that impulse is not always the result of conscious foresight is most clearly seen in the case of children. The first impulses of a baby to suck, or to grasp, are obviously "instinctive." But even when the unconscious or unremembered condition of infancy has been succeeded by the connected consciousness of childhood, the child will fly to his mother and hide his face in her skirts when he sees a harmless stranger. Later on he will torture small beasts and run away from big beasts, or steal fruit, or climb trees, though no one has suggested such actions to him, and though he may expect disagreeable results from them.

We generally think of "instinct" as consisting of a number of such separate tendencies, each towards some distinct act or series of acts. But there is no reason to suppose that the whole body of inherited impulse even

among non-human animals has ever been divisible in that way. The evolutionary history of impulses must have been very complicated. An impulse which survived because it produced one result may have persisted with modifications because it produced another result; and side by side with impulses towards specific acts we can detect in all animals vague and generalized tendencies, often overlapping and contradictory, like curiosity and shyness, sympathy and cruelty, imitation and restless activity. It is possible, therefore, to avoid the ingenious dilemma by which Mr. Balfour argues that we must either demonstrate that the desire, e.g., for scientific truth, is lineally descended from some one of the specific instincts which teach us "to fight, to eat, and to bring up children," or must admit the supernatural authority of the Shorter Catechism.¹

The prerational character of many of our impulses is, however, disguised by the fact that during the lifetime of each individual they are increasingly modified by memory and habit and thought. Even the non-human animals are able to adapt and modify their inherited impulses either by imitation or by habits founded on individual experience. When telegraph wires, for instance, were first put up many birds flew against them and were killed. But although the number of those that

¹ *Reflections suggested by the New Theory of Matter*, 1904, p. 21. "So far as natural science can tell us, every quality of sense or intellect which does not help us to fight, to eat, and to bring up children, is but a by-product of the qualities which do."

were killed was obviously insufficient to produce a change in the biological inheritance of the species, very few birds fly against the wires now. The young birds must have imitated their elders, who had learnt to avoid the wires; just as the young of many hunting animals are said to learn devices and precautions which are the result of their parents' experience, and later to make and hand down by imitation inventions of their own.

Many of the directly inherited impulses, again, appear, both in men and other animals, at a certain point in the growth of the individual, and then, if they are checked, die away, or, if they are unchecked, form habits; and impulses, which were originally strong and useful, may no longer help in preserving life, and may, like the whale's legs or our teeth and hair, be weakened by biological degeneration. Such temporary or weakened impulses are especially liable to be transferred to new objects, or to be modified by experience and thought.

With all these complicated facts the schoolmaster has to deal. In Macaulay's time he used to be guided by his "common-sense," and to intellectualize the whole process. The unfortunate boys who acted upon an ancient impulse to fidget, to play truant, to chase cats, or to mimic their teacher, were asked, with repeated threats of punishment, "why" they had done so. They, being ignorant of their own evolutionary history, were forced to invent some far-fetched lie, and were punished for that as well. The trained schoolmaster of today

takes the existence of such impulses as a normal fact; and decides how far, in each case, he shall check them by relying on that half-conscious imitation which makes the greater part of class-room discipline, and how far by stimulating a conscious recognition of the connection, ethical or penal, between acts and their consequences. In any case his power of controlling instinctive impulse is due to his recognition of its non-intellectual origin. He may even be able to extend this recognition to his own impulses, and to overcome the conviction that his irritability during afternoon school in July is the result of an intellectual conclusion as to the need of special severity in dealing with a set of unprecedentedly wicked boys.

The politician, however, is still apt to intellectualize impulse as completely as the schoolmaster did fifty years ago. He has two excuses, that he deals entirely with adults, whose impulses are more deeply modified by experience and thought than those of children, and that it is very difficult for any one who thinks about politics not to confine his consideration to those political actions and impulses which are accompanied by the greatest amount of conscious thought, and which therefore come first into his mind. (But the politician thinks about men in large communities, and it is in the forecasting of the action of large communities that the intellectualist fallacy is most misleading.) The results of experience and thought are often confined to individuals or small groups, and when they differ may

cancel each other as political forces. The original human impulses are, with personal variations, common to the whole race, and increase in their importance with an increase in the number of those influenced by them.

It may be worth while, therefore, to attempt a description of some of the more obvious or more important political impulses, remembering always that in politics we are dealing not with such clear-cut separate instincts as we may find in children and animals, but with tendencies often weakened by the course of human evolution, still more often transferred to new uses, and acting not simply but in combination or counteraction.

Aristotle, for instance, says that it is "affection" (or "friendship," for the meaning of *φιλία* stands halfway between the two words) which "makes political union possible," and "which law-givers consider more important than justice." It is, he says, a hereditary instinct among animals of the same race, and particularly among men. If we look for this political affection in its simplest form, we see it in our impulse to feel "kindly" towards any other human being of whose existence and personality we become vividly aware. This impulse can be checked and overlaid by others, but any one can test its existence and its prerationality in his own case by going, for instance, to the British Museum

¹ *Ethics*, Bk. viii. chap. 1. Φύσει τ' ἐκυπάρχειν τοῖσι . . . αὐτὸς μόνος ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θρίσι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζώων, καὶ τοῖς ἐμοσι πρὸς ἀλλήλα, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις . . . τοῖσι δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις συνέχειν ἡ φιλία, καὶ οἱ νομοθέται μάλλον περὶ αὐτὴν σπουδάζειν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην.

and watching the effect on his feelings of the discovery that a little Egyptian girl baby who died four thousand years ago rubbed the toes of her shoes by crawling upon the floor.

The tactics of an election consist largely of contrivances by which this immediate emotion of personal affection may be set up. The candidate is advised to "show himself" continually, to give away prizes, to "say a few words" at the end of other people's speeches—all under circumstances which offer little or no opportunity for the formation of a reasoned opinion of his merits, but many opportunities for the rise of a purely instinctive affection among those present. His portrait is periodically distributed, and is more effective if it is a good, that is to say, a distinctive, than if it is a flattering likeness. Best of all is a photograph which brings his ordinary existence sharply forward by representing him in his garden smoking a pipe or reading a newspaper.

A simple-minded supporter whose affection has been so worked up will probably try to give an intellectual explanation of it. He will say that the man, of whom he may know really nothing except that he was photographed in a Panama hat with a fox-terrier, is "the kind of man we want," and that therefore he has decided to support him; just as a child will say that he loves his mother because she is the best mother in the world,¹ or a man in love will give an elaborate explanation of his

¹ A rather unusually reflective little girl of my acquaintance, felt, one

perfectly normal feelings, which he describes as an intellectual inference from alleged abnormal excellences in his beloved. The candidate naturally intellectualizes in the same way. One of the most perfectly modest men I know once told me that he was "going round" a good deal among his future constituents "to let them see what a good fellow I am." Unless, indeed, the process can be intellectualized, it is for many men unintelligible.

A monarch is a life-long candidate, and there exists a singularly elaborate traditional art of producing personal affection for him. It is more important that he should be seen than that he should speak or act. His portrait appears on every coin and stamp, and apart from any question of personal beauty, produces most effect when it is a good likeness. Any one, for instance, who can clearly recall his own emotions during the later years of Queen Victoria's reign, will remember a measurable increase of his affection for her, when, in 1897, a thoroughly life-like portrait took the place on the coins of the conventional head of 1837-1887, and the awkward compromise of the first Jubilee year. In the case of monarchy one can also watch the intellectualization of the whole process by the newspapers, the official biographers, the courtiers, and possibly the

day, while looking at her mother, a strong impulse of affection. She first gave the usual intellectual explanation of her feeling, "Mummy, I do think you are the most beautiful Mummy in the whole world," and then, after a moment's thought, corrected herself by saying, "But there, they do say love is blind."

monarch himself. The daily bulletin of details as to his walks and drives is, in reality, the more likely to create a vivid impression of his personality, and therefore to produce this particular kind of emotion, the more ordinary the events described are in themselves. But since an emotion arising out of ordinary events is difficult to explain on a purely intellectual basis, these events are written about as revealing a life of extraordinary regularity and industry. When the affection is formed it is even sometimes described as an inevitable reasoned conclusion arising from reflection upon a reign during which there have been an unusual number of good harvests or great inventions.

Sometimes ~~the impulse of affection~~ is excited to a point at which ~~its non-rational character~~ becomes obvious. George the Third was beloved by the English people because they realized intensely that, like themselves, he had been born in England, and because the published facts of his daily life came home to them. Fanny Burney describes, therefore, how when, during an attack of madness, he was to be taken in a coach to Kew, the doctors who were to accompany him were seriously afraid that the inhabitants of any village who saw that the King was under restraint would attack them.¹ The kindred emotion of personal and dynastic loyalty (whose origin is possibly to be found in the fact

¹ *Diary of Madame D'Arbly*, ed. 1905, vol. iv, p. 184, "If they even attempted force, they had not a doubt but his smallest resistance would call up the whole country to his fancied rescue."

that the loosely organized companies of our pre-human ancestors could not defend themselves from their carnivorous enemies until the general instinct of affection was specialized into a vehement impulse to follow and protect their leader), has again and again produced destructive and utterly useless civil wars.

Fear often accompanies and, in politics, is confused with affection. A man, whose life's dream it has been to get sight and speech of his King, is accidentally brought face to face with him. He is "rooted to the spot," becomes pale, and is unable to speak, because a movement might have betrayed his ancestors to a lion or a bear, or earlier still, to a hungry cuttlefish. It would be an interesting experiment if some professor of experimental psychology would arrange his class in the laboratory with sphygmographs on their wrists ready to record those pulse movements which accompany the sensation of "thrill," and would then introduce into the room without notice, and in chance order, a bishop, a well-known general, the greatest living man of letters, and a minor member of the royal family. The resulting records of immediate pulse disturbances would be of real scientific importance, and it might even be possible to continue the record in each case say, for a quarter of a minute, and to trace the secondary effects of variations in political opinions, education, or the sense of humour among the students. At present almost the only really scientific observation on the subject from its political side is contained in Lord Palmerston's

protest against a purely intellectual account of aristocracy: "there is no damned nonsense about merit," he said, "in the case of the Garter." Masters of new aristocracies are still, however, apt to intellectualize. The French government, for instance, have created an order, "Pour le Mérite Agricole," which ought, on the basis of mere logic, to be very successful; but one is told that the green ribbon of that order produces in France no thrill whatever.

The impulse to laugh is comparatively unimportant in politics, but it affords a good instance of the way in which a practical politician has to allow for pre-rational impulse. It is apparently an immediate effect of the recognition of the incongruous, just as trembling is of the recognition of danger. It may have been evolved because an animal which suffered a slight spasm in the presence of the unexpected was more likely to be on its guard against enemies, or it may have been the merely accidental result of some fact in our nervous organization which was otherwise useful. Incongruity is, however, so much a matter of habit and association and individual variation, that it is extraordinarily difficult to forecast whether any particular act will seem ridiculous to any particular class, or how long the sense of incongruity will in any case persist. Acts, for instance, which aim at producing exalted emotional effect among ordinary slow-witted people—Burke's dagger, Louis Napoleon's tame eagle, the German Kaiser's telegrams about Huns and mailed

sists—may do so, and therefore be in the end politically successful, although they produce spontaneous laughter in men whose conception of good political manners is based upon the idea of self-restraint.

Again, almost the whole of the economic question between socialism and individualism turns on the nature and limitations of the desire for property. There seem to be good grounds for supposing that this is a true specific instinct, and not merely the result of habit or of the intellectual choice of means for satisfying the desire of power. Children, for instance, quarrel furiously at a very early age over apparently worthless things, and collect and hide them long before they can have any clear notion of the advantages to be derived from individual possession. Those children who in certain charity schools are brought up entirely without personal property, even in their clothes or pocket-handkerchiefs, show every sign of the bad effect on health and character which results from complete inability to satisfy a strong inherited instinct. The evolutionary origin of the desire for property is indicated also by many of the habits of dogs or squirrels or magpies. Some economist ought therefore to give us a treatise in which this property instinct is carefully and quantitatively examined. Is it, like the hunting instinct, an impulse which dies away if it is not indulged? How far can it be eliminated or modified by education? Is it satisfied by a leasehold or a life-interest, or by such an arrangement of corporate property as is offered by

a collegiate foundation or by the provision of a public park? Does it require for its satisfaction material and visible things such as land or houses, or is the holding, say, of colonial railway shares sufficient? Is the absence of unlimited proprietary rights felt more strongly in the case of personal chattels (such as furniture and ornaments) than in the case of land or machinery? Does the degree and direction of the instinct markedly differ among different individuals or races, or between the two sexes?

Pending such an inquiry my own provisional opinion is that, like a good many instincts of very early evolutionary origin, it can be satisfied by an avowed pretence; just as a kitten which is fed regularly on milk can be kept in good health if it is allowed to indulge its hunting instinct by playing with a bobbin, and a peaceful civil servant satisfies his instinct of combat and adventure at golf. If this is so, and if it is considered for other reasons undesirable to satisfy the property instinct by the possession, say, of slaves or of freehold land, one supposes that a good deal of the feeling of property may in the future be enjoyed, even by persons in whom the instinct is abnormally strong, through the collection of shells or of picture postcards.

The property instinct is, it happens, one of two instances in which the classical economists deserted their usual habit of treating all desires as the result of a calculation of the means of obtaining "utility" or "wealth." The satisfaction of the instinct of absolute

property by peasant proprietorship turned, they said, "sand to gold," although it required a larger expenditure of labour for every unit of income than was the case in salaried employment. The other instance was the instinct of family affection. This also still needs a special treatise on its stimulus, variation, and limitations. But the classical economists treated it as absolute and unvarying. The "economic man," who had no more concern than a lone wolf with the rest of the human species, was treated as possessing a perfect and permanent solidarity of feeling with his "family." The family was apparently assumed as consisting of those persons for whose support a man in Western Europe is legally responsible, and no attempt was made to estimate whether the instinct extended in any degree to cousins or great-uncles.

A treatise on political impulses which aimed at completeness would further include at least the fighting instinct (with the part which it plays, together with affection and loyalty, in the formation of parties), and the instincts of suspicion, curiosity, and the desire to excel.

All these primary impulses are greatly increased in immediate effectiveness when they are "pure," that is to say, unaccompanied by competing or opposing impulses; and this is the main reason why art, which aims at producing one emotion at a time, acts on most men so much more easily than does the more varied appeal of real life. I once sat in a suburban theatre

among a number of colonial troopers who had come over from South Africa for the King's Coronation. The play was "Our Boys," and between the acts my next neighbour gave me, without any sign of emotion, a hideous account of the scene at Tweefontein after De Wet had rushed the British camp on the Christmas morning of 1901—the militiamen slaughtered while drunk, and the Kaffir drivers tied to the blazing waggons. The curtain rose again, and, five minutes later, I saw that he was weeping in sympathy with the stage misfortunes of two able-bodied young men who had to eat "inferior Dorset" butter. My sympathy with the militiamen and the Kaffirs was "pure," whereas his was overlaid with remembered race-hatred, battle-fury, and contempt for British incompetence. His sympathy, on the other hand, with the stage characters was not accompanied, as mine was, by critical feelings about theatrical conventions, indifferent acting, and middle-Victorian sentiment.

It is this greater immediate effect of pure and artificial as compared with mixed and concrete emotion which explains the traditional maxim of political agents that it is better that a candidate should not live in his constituency. It is an advantage that he should be able to represent himself as a "local candidate," but his local character should be ad hoc, and should consist in the hiring of a large house each year in which he lives a life of carefully dramatized hospitality. Things in no way blameworthy in themselves—his choice of

tradesmen, his childrens' hats and measles, his difficulties with his relations—will be, if he is a permanent resident, "out of the picture," and may confuse the impression which he produces. If one could, by the help of a time-machine, see for a moment in the flesh the little Egyptian girl who wore out her shoes, one might find her behaving so charmingly that one's pity for her death would be increased. But it is more probable that, even if she was, in fact, a very nice little girl, one would not.

This greater immediate facility of the emotions set up by artistic presentment, as compared with those resulting from concrete observation, has, however, to be studied in its relation to another fact—that impulses vary, in their driving force and in the depth of the nervous disturbance which they cause, in proportion, not to their importance in our present life, but to the point at which they appeared in our evolutionary past. We are quite unable to resist the impulse of mere vascular and nervous reaction, the watering of the mouth, the jerk of the limb, the closing of the eye, which we share with some of the simplest vertebrates. We can only with difficulty resist the instincts of sex and food, of anger and fear, which we share with the higher animals. It is, on the other hand, difficult for us to obey consistently the impulses which attend on the mental images formed by inference and association. A man may be convinced by a long train of cogent reasoning that he will go to hell if he visits a certain

house; and yet he will do so in satisfaction of a half-conscious craving whose existence he is ashamed to recognize. It may be that when a preacher makes hell real to him by physical images of fire and torment his conviction will acquire coercive force. But that force may soon die away as his memory fades, and even the most vivid description has little effect as compared with a touch of actual pain. At the theatre, because pure emotion is facile, three-quarters of the audience may cry, but because second-hand emotion is shallow, very few of them will be unable to sleep when they get home, or will even lose their appetite for a late supper. My South African trooper probably recovered from his tears over "Our Boys" as soon as they were shed. The transient and pleasurable quality of the tragic emotions produced by novel reading is well known. A man may weep over a novel which he will forget in two or three hours, although the same man may be made insane, or may have his character changed for life, by actual experiences which are far less terrible than those of which he reads, experiences which at the moment may produce neither tears nor any other obvious nervous effect.

Both these facts are of first-rate political importance in those great modern communities in which all the events which stimulate political action reach the voters through newspapers. The emotional appeal of journalism, even more than that of the stage, is facile because it is pure, and transitory because it is second-hand. Battles and famines, murders and the evidence of

inquiries into destitution, all are presented by the journalist in literary form, with a careful selection of 'telling' detail. Their effect is therefore produced at once, in the half-hour that follows the middle-class breakfast, or in the longer interval on the Sunday morning when the workman reads his weekly paper. But when the paper has been read the emotional effect fades rapidly away. *

Any candidate at an election feels for this reason the strangeness of the conditions under which what Professor James calls the "pungent sense of effective reality,"¹ reaches or fails to reach, mankind, in a civilization based upon newspapers. I was walking along the street during my last election, thinking of the actual issues involved, and comparing them with the vague fog of journalistic phrases, and the half-conscious impulses of old habit and new suspicion which make up the atmosphere of electioneering. I came round a street corner upon a boy of about fifteen returning from work, whose whole face lit up with genuine and lively interest as soon as he saw me. I stopped, and he said: "I know you, Mr. Wallas, you put the medals on me." All that day political principles and arguments had refused to become real to my constituents, but the emotion excited by the bodily fact that I had at a school ceremony pinned a medal for good

¹ "The moral tragedy of human life comes almost wholly from the fact that the link is ruptured which normally should hold between vision of the truth and action, and that this pungent sense of effective reality will not attach to certain ideas." W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. II. p. 547.

attendance on a boy's coat, had all the pungency of a first-hand experience.

Throughout the contest the candidate is made aware, at every point, of the enormously greater solidity for most men of the work-a-day world which they see for themselves, as compared with the world of inference and secondary ideas which they see through the newspapers. A London County Councillor, for instance, as his election comes near, and he begins to withdraw from the daily business of administrative committees into the cloud of the electoral campaign, finds that the officials whom he leaves behind, with their daily stint of work, and their hopes and fears about their salaries, seem to him much more real than himself. The old woman at her door in a mean street who refuses to believe that he is not being paid for canvassing, the prosperous and good-natured tradesman who says quite simply, "I expect you find politics rather an expensive amusement," all seem to stand with their feet upon the ground. However often he assures himself that the great realities are on his side, and that the busy people round him are concerned only with fleeting appearances, yet the feeling constantly recurs to him that it is he himself who is living in a world of shadows.

This feeling is increased by the fact that a candidate has constantly to repeat the same arguments, and to stimulate in himself the same emotions, and that mere repetition produces a distressing sense of unreality. The preachers who have to repeat every Sunday the same

gospel, find also that "dry times" alternate with times of exaltation. Even among the voters the repetition of the same political thoughts is apt to produce weariness. The main cause of the recurring swing of the electoral pendulum seems to be that opinions which have been held with enthusiasm become after a year or two stale and flat, and that the new opinions seem fresh and vivid.

A treatise is indeed required from some trained psychologist on the conditions under which our nervous system shows itself intolerant of repeated sensations and emotions. The fact is obviously connected with the purely physiological causes which produce giddiness, tickling, sea-sickness, etc. But many things that are "natural," that is to say, which we have constantly experienced during any considerable part of the ages during which our nervous organization was being developed, apparently do not so affect us. Our heart-beats, the taste of water, the rising and setting of the sun, or, in the case of a child, milk, or the presence of its mother, or of its brothers, do not seem to become, in sound health, distressingly monotonous. But "artificial" things, however pleasant at first—a tune on the piano, the pattern of a garment, the greeting of an acquaintance—are likely to become unbearable if often exactly repeated. A newspaper is an artificial thing in this sense, and one of the arts of the newspaper-writer consists in presenting his views with that kind of repetition which, like the phrases of a fugue, constantly approaches, but never oversteps the limit of monotony.

Advertisers again are now discovering that it pays to vary the monotony with which a poster appeals to the eye by printing in different colours those copies which are to hang near each other, or still better, by representing varied incidents in the career of "Sunny Jim" or "Sunlight Sue."

A candidate is also an artificial thing. If he lives and works in his constituency, the daily vision of an otherwise admirable business man seated in a first-class carriage on the 8.47 A. M. train in the same attitude and reading the same newspaper may produce a slight and unrecognized feeling of discomfort among his constituents, although it would cause no such feeling in the wife whose relation to him is "natural." For the same reason when his election comes on, although he may declare himself to be the "old member standing on the old platform," he should be careful to avoid monotony by slightly varying his portrait, the form of his address, and the details of his declaration of political faith.

* Another fact, closely connected with our intolerance of repeated emotional adjustment, is the desire for privacy, sufficiently marked to approach the character of a specific instinct, and balanced by a corresponding and opposing dread of loneliness. Our ancestors in the ages during which our present nervous system became fixed, lived, apparently, in loosely organized family groups, associated for certain occasional purposes into larger, but still more loosely organized, tribal groups.

No one slept alone, for the more or less monogamic family assembled nightly in a cave or "lean to" shelter. The hunt for food which filled the day was carried on, one supposes, neither in complete solitude nor in constant intercourse. Even if the female were left at home with the young, the male exchanged some dozen times a day rough greetings with acquaintances, or joined in a common task. Occasionally, even before the full development of language, excited palavers attended by some hundreds would take place, or opposing tribes would gather for a fight.

It is still extremely difficult for the normal man to endure either much less or much more than this amount of intercourse with his fellows. However safe they may know themselves to be, most men find it difficult to sleep in an empty house, and would be distressed by anything beyond three days of absolute solitude. Even habit cannot do much in this respect. A man required to submit to gradually increasing periods of solitary confinement would probably go mad as soon as he had been kept for a year without a break. A settler, though he may be the son of a settler, and may have known no other way of living, can hardly endure existence unless his daily intercourse with his family is supplemented by a weekly chat with a neighbour or a stranger; and he will go long and dangerous journeys in order once a year to enjoy the noise and bustle of a crowd.

But, on the other hand, the nervous system of most men will not tolerate the frequent repetition of that

adjustment of the mind and sympathies to new acquaintanceship, a certain amount of which is so refreshing and so necessary. One can therefore watch in great modern cities men half consciously striving to preserve the same proportion between privacy and intercourse which prevailed among their ancestors in the woods, and one can watch also the constant appearance of proposals or experiments which altogether ignore the primary facts of human nature in this respect. The habitual intellectualism of the writers of political Utopias prevents them from seeing any "reason" why men should not find happiness as well as economy in a sort of huge extension of family life. The writer himself at his moments of greatest imaginative exaltation does not perhaps realize the need of privacy at all. His affections are in a state of expansion which, without sanctificalness, one may refer back to the emotional atmosphere prevalent in the screaming assemblies of his pre-human ancestors; and he is ready, so long as this condition lasts, to take the whole world almost literally to his bosom. What he does not realize is that neither he nor any one else can keep himself permanently at this level. In William Morris's "News from Nowhere" the customs of family life extend to the streets, and the tired student from the British Museum talks with easy intimacy to the thirsty dustman. I remember reading an article written about 1850 by one of the early Christian Socialists. He said that he had just been riding down Oxford Street in

an omnibus, and that he had noticed that when the omnibus passed over a section of the street in which macadam had been substituted for paving, all the passengers turned and spoke to each other. "Some day," he said, "all Oxford street will be macadamized, and then, because men will be able to hear each other's voices, the omnibus will become a delightful informal club." Now nearly all London is paved with wood, and people as they sit in chairs on the top of omnibuses can hear each other whispering: but no event short of a fatal accident is held to justify a passenger who speaks to his neighbour.

Clubs were established in London, not so much for the sake of the cheapness and convenience of common sitting-rooms and kitchens, as to bring together bodies of men, each of whom should meet all the rest on terms of unrestrained social intercourse. One can see in Thackeray's "Book of Snobs," and in the stories of Thackeray's own club quarrels, the difficulties produced by this plan. Nowadays clubs are successful exactly because it is an unwritten law in almost every one of them that no member must speak to any other who is not one of his own personal acquaintances. The innumerable communistic experiments of Fournier, Robert Owen, and others, all broke up essentially because of the want of privacy. The associates got on each other's nerves. In those confused pages of the "Politics," in which Aristotle criticizes from the point

of view of experience the communism of Plato, the same point stands out: "It is difficult to live together in community," communistic colonists have always "disputed with each other about the most ordinary matters"; we most often disagree with those slaves who are brought into daily contact with us."¹

The Charity Schools of 1700 to 1850 were experiments in the result of a complete refusal of scope, not only for the instinct of property, but for the entirely distinct instinct of privacy, and part of their disastrous nervous and moral effect must be put down to that. The boys in the contemporary public boarding-schools secured a little privacy by the adoption of strange and sometimes cruel social customs, and more has been done since then by systems of "studies" and "houses." Experience seems, however, to show that during childhood a day school with its alternation of home, class-room, and playing field, is better suited than a boarding-school to the facts of normal human nature.

This instinctive need of privacy is again a subject which would repay special and detailed study. It varies very greatly among different races, and one supposes that the much greater desire for privacy which is found among Northern, as compared to Southern Europeans, may be due to the fact that races who had to spend much or little of the year under cover, adjusted themselves biologically to a different standard in this respect. It is clear, also, that it is our emotional nature,

¹ *Politics*, Book II. ch. v.

and not the intellectual or muscular organs of talking, which is most easily fatigued. Light chatter, even among strangers, in which neither party "gives himself away," is very much less fatiguing than an intimacy which makes some call upon the emotions. An actor who accepts the second alternative of Diderot's paradox, and *feels* his part, is much more likely to break down from overstrain, than one who only simulates feeling and keeps his own emotional life to himself.

It is in democratic politics, however, that privacy is most neglected, most difficult, and most necessary. In America all observers are agreed as to the danger which results from looking on a politician as an abstract personification of the will of the people, to whom all citizens have an equal and inalienable right of access, and from whom every one ought to receive an equally warm and sincere welcome. In England our comparatively aristocratic tradition as to the relation between a representative and his constituents has done something to preserve customs corresponding more closely to the actual nature of man. A tired English statesman at a big reception is still allowed to spend his time rather in chaffing with a few friends in a distant corner of the room than in shaking hands and exchanging effusive commonplaces with innumerable unknown guests. But there is a real danger lest this tradition of privacy may be abolished in English democracy, simply because of its connection with aristocratic manners. A young labour politician is expected to live in more than

American conditions of intimate publicity. Having, perhaps, just lost the working bench, and having to adjust his nerves and his bodily health to the difficult requirements of mental work, he is expected to receive every caller at any hour of the day or night with the same hearty good will, and to be always ready to share or excite the enthusiasm of his followers. After a year or two, in the case of a man of sensitive organization, the task is found to be impossible. The signs of nervous fatigue are at first accepted by him and his friends as proofs of his sincerity. He begins to suffer from the curate's disease, the bright-eyed, hysterical condition in which a man talks all day long to a succession of sympathetic hearers about his own overwork, and drifts into actual ill-health, though he is not making an hour's continuous exertion in the day. I knew a young agitator in that state who thought that he could not make a propagandist speech unless the deeply admiring pitman, in whose cottage he was staying, played the Marseillaise on a harmonium before he started. Often such a man takes to drink. In any case he is liable, as the East End clergymen who try to live the same life are liable, to the most pitiable forms of moral collapse.

Such men, however, are those who being unfit for a life without privacy, do not survive. Greater political danger comes perhaps from those who are comparatively fit. Anyone who has been in America, who has stood among the crowd in a Philadelphia law-court during the trial of a political case, or has seen the thousands of

cartoons in a contest in which Tammany is concerned, will find that he has a picture in his mind of one type at least of those who do survive. Powerfully built, with the big jaw and loose mouth of the dominant talker, practised by years of sitting behind saloon bars, they have learnt the way of "selling cheap that which should be most dear." But even they generally look as if they drank, and as if they would not live to old age.

Other and less dreadful types of politicians without privacy come into one's mind, the orator who night after night repeats the theatrical success of his own personality, and, like the actor, keeps his recurring fits of weary disgust to himself; the busy organizing talkative man to whom it is a mere delight to take the chair at four smoking concerts a week. But there is no one of them who would not be the better, both in health and working power, if he were compelled to retire for six months from the public view, and to produce something with his own hand and brain, or even to sit alone in his own house and think.

These facts, in so far as they represent the nervous disturbance produced by certain conditions of life in political communities, are again closely connected with the one point in the special psychology of politics which has as yet received any extensive consideration—the so-called "Psychology of the Crowd," on which the late M. Tarde, M. Le Bon, and others have written. In the case of human beings, as in the case of many other

social and semi-social animals, the simpler impulses—especially those of fear and anger—when they are consciously shared by many physically associated individuals, may become enormously exalted, and may give rise to violent nervous disturbances. One may suppose that this fact, like the existence of laughter, was originally an accidental and undesirable result of the mechanism of nervous reaction, and that it persisted because when a common danger was realized (a forest fire, for instance, or an attack by beasts of prey), a general stampede, although it might be fatal to the weaker members of the herd, was the best chance of safety for the majority.

My own observation of English politics suggests that in a modern national state, this panic effect of the combination of nervous excitement with physical contact is not of great importance. London in the twentieth century is very unlike Paris in the eighteenth century, or Florence in the fourteenth, if only because it is very difficult for any considerable proportion of the citizens to be gathered under circumstances likely to produce the special "Psychology of the Crowd." I have watched two hundred thousand men assembled in Hyde Park for a Labour Demonstration. The scattered platforms, the fresh air, the wide grassy space, seemed to be an unsuitable environment for the production of purely instinctive excitement, and the attitude of such an assembly in London is good-tempered and lethargic. A crowd in a narrow street is more likely to get "out of

hand," and one may see a few thousand men in a large hall reach a state approaching genuine pathological exaltation on an exciting occasion, and when they are in the hands of a practised speaker. But as they go out of the hall they drop into the cool ocean of London, and their mood is dissipated in a moment. The mob that took the Bastille would not seem or feel an overwhelming force in one of the business streets of Manchester. Yet such facts vary greatly among different races, and the exaggeration which one seems to notice when reading the French sociologists on this point may be due to their observations having been made among a Latin and not a Northern race.

So far I have dealt with the impulses illustrated by the internal politics of a modern state. But perhaps the most important section in the whole psychology of political impulse is that which is concerned not with the emotional effect of the citizens of any state upon each other, but with those racial feelings which reveal themselves in international politics. The future peace of the world largely turns on the question whether we have, as is sometimes said and often assumed, an instinctive affection for those human beings whose features and colour are like our own, combined with an instinctive hatred for those who are unlike us. On this point, pending a careful examination of the evidence by the psychologists, it is difficult to dogmatize. But I am inclined to think that those strong and apparently simple cases of racial hatred and affection which can

certainly be found, are not instances of a specific and universal instinct, but the result of several distinct and comparatively weak instincts combined and heightened by habit and association. I have already argued that the instinct of political affection is stimulated by the vivid realization of its object. Since therefore it is easier, at least for uneducated men, to realize the existence of beings like than of beings unlike themselves, affection for one's like would appear to have a natural basis, but one likely to be modified as our powers of realization are stimulated by education.

Again, since most men live, especially in childhood, among persons belonging to the same race as themselves, any markedly unusual face or dress may excite the instinct of fear of that which is unknown. A child's fear, however, of a strangely shaped or coloured face is more easily obliterated by familiarity than it would be if it were the result of a specific instinct of race-hatred. White or Chinese children show, one is told, no permanent aversion for Chinese or white or Hindoo or negro nurses and attendants. Sex love, again, even when opposed by social tradition, springs up freely between very different human types; and widely separated races have been thereby amalgamated. Between some of the non-human species (horses and camels, for instance) instinctive mutual hatred, as distinguished from fear, does seem to exist, but nowhere, as far as I know, is it found between varieties so nearly related to each other and so readily interbreeding as the various human races.

Anglo-Indian officials sometimes explain, as a case of specific instinct, the fact that a man who goes out with an enthusiastic interest in the native races often finds himself, after a few years, unwillingly yielding to a hatred of the Hindoo racial type. But the account which they give of their sensations seems to me more like the nervous disgust which I described as arising from a constantly repeated mental and emotional adjustment to inharmonious surroundings. At the age when an English official reaches India most of his emotional habits are already set, and he makes, as a rule, no systematic attempt to modify them. Therefore, just as the unfamiliarity of French cookery or German beds, which at the beginning of a continental visit is a delightful change, may become after a month or two an intolerable *gêne*, so the servility and untruthfulness, and even the patience and cleverness of those natives with whom he is brought into official contact, get after a few years on the nerves of an Anglo-Indian. Intimate and uninterrupted contact during a long period, after his social habits have been formed, with people of his own race but of a different social tradition would produce the same effect.

Perhaps, however, intellectual association is a larger factor than instinct in the causation of racial affection and hatred. An American working man associates, for instance, the Far Eastern physical type with that lowering of the standard wage which overshadows as a dreadful possibility every trade in the industrial world.

Fifty years ago the middle class readers to whom *Punch* appeals associated the same type with stories of tortured missionaries and envoys. After the battle of the Sea of Japan they associated it with that kind of heroism which, owing to our geographical position, we most admire; and drawings of the unmistakably Asiatic features of Admiral Togo, which would have excited genuine and apparently instinctive disgust in 1859, produced a thrill of affection in 1906.

But at this point we approach that discussion of the objects, sensible or imaginary, of political impulse (as distinguished from the impulses themselves), which must be reserved for my next chapter.

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL ENTITIES

MAN's impulses and thoughts and acts result from the relation between his nature and the environment into which he is born. The last chapter approached that relation (in so far as it affects politics) from the side of man's nature. This chapter will approach the same relation from the side of man's political environment.

The two lines of approach have this important difference, that the nature with which man is born is looked on by the politician as fixed, while the environment into which man is born is rapidly and indefinitely changing. It is not to changes in our nature, but to changes in our environment only—using the word to include the traditions and expedients which we acquire after birth as well as our material surroundings—that all our political development from the tribal organization of the Stone Ages to the modern nation has apparently been due.

The biologist looks on human nature itself as changing, but to him the period of a few thousands or tens of thousands of years which constitute the past of politics is quite insignificant. Important changes in biological types may perhaps have occurred in the his-

SOCIOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HERD INSTINCT

IT was shown in the previous essay that the gregarious mental character is evident in man's behaviour, not only in crowds and other circumstances of actual association, but also in his behaviour as an individual, however isolated. The conclusions were arrived at that man's suggestibility is not the abnormal casual phenomenon it is often supposed to be, but a normal instinct present in every individual, and that the apparent inconstancy of its action is due to the common failure to recognize the extent of the field over which suggestion acts; that the only medium in which man's mind can function satisfactorily is the herd, which therefore is not only the source of his opinions, his credulities, his disbeliefs, and his weaknesses, but of his altruism, his charity, his enthusiasms, and his power.

The subject of the psychological effects of herd instinct is so wide that the discussion of it in the former essay covered only a comparatively small part of the field, and that in a very cursory way. Such as it was, however, it cannot be further amplified here, where an attempt will rather be made to sketch some of the practical corollaries of such generalizations as were laid down there.

In the first place, it must be stated with emphasis that deductive speculation of this sort finds its principal value in opening up new possibilities for

the application of a more exact method. Science is measurement, but the deductive method may indicate those things which can be most profitably measured.

When the overwhelming importance of the suggestibility of man is recognized our first effort should be to obtain exact numerical expressions of it. This is not the place to attempt any exposition of the directions in which experiment should proceed ; but it may be stated that what we want to know is, how much suggestion can do in the way of inducing belief, and it may be guessed that we shall ultimately be able to express the force of suggestion in terms of the number of undifferentiated units of the herd it represents. In the work that has already been done, chiefly by Binet and by Sidis, the suggestive force experimented with was relatively feeble, and the effects consequently were rendered liable to great disturbance from the spontaneous action of other forces of suggestion already in the mind. Sidis, for example, found that his subjects often yielded to his suggestions out of " politeness " ; this source of difficulty was obviously due to his use of pure individual suggestion, a variety which theory shows to be weak or even directly resisted.

The next feature of practical interest is connected with the hypothesis, which we attempted in the former article to demonstrate, that irrational belief forms a large bulk of the furniture of the mind, and is indistinguishable by the subject from rational verifiable knowledge. It is obviously of cardinal importance to be able to effect this distinction, for it is the failure to do so which, while it is not the cause of the slowness of advance in knowledge, is the mechanism by which this delay is brought about. Is there, then, we may ask, any discoverable touchstone by which non-rational opinion may be distinguished from rational? Non-rational judgments, being the product of suggestion, will have

the quality of instinctive opinion, or, as we may call it, of belief in the strict sense. The essence of this quality is obviousness; the truth held in this way is one of James's "*a priori* syntheses of the most perfect sort"; to question it is to the believer to carry scepticism to an insane degree, and will be met by contempt, disapproval, or condemnation, according to the nature of the belief in question. When, therefore, we find ourselves entertaining an opinion about the basis of which there is a quality of feeling which tells us that to inquire into it would be absurd, obviously unnecessary, unprofitable, undesirable, bad form, or wicked, we may know that that opinion is a non-rational one, and probably, therefore, founded upon inadequate evidence.

Opinions, on the other hand, which are acquired as the result of experience alone do not possess this quality of primary certitude. They are true in the sense of being verifiable, but they are unaccompanied by that profound feeling of truth which belief possesses, and, therefore, we have no sense of reluctance in admitting inquiry into them. That heavy bodies tend to fall to the earth and that fire burns fingers are truths verifiable and verified every day, but we do not hold them with impassioned certitude, and we do not resent or resist inquiry into their basis; whereas in such a question as that of the survival of death by human personality we hold the favourable or the adverse view with a quality of feeling entirely different, and of such a kind that inquiry into the matter is looked upon as disreputable by orthodox science and as wicked by orthodox religion. In relation to this subject, it may be remarked, we often see it very interestingly shown that the holders of two diametrically opposed opinions, one of which is certainly right, may both show by their attitude that the belief is held

instinctively and non-rationally, as, for example, when an atheist and a Christian unite in repudiating inquiry into the existence of the soul.

A third practical corollary of a recognition of the true gregariousness of man is the very obvious one that it is not by any means necessary that suggestion should always act on the side of unreason. The despair of the reformer has always been the irrationality of man, and latterly some have come to regard the future as hopeless until we can breed a rational species. Now, the trouble is not irrationality, not a definite preference for unreason, but suggestibility—that is, a capacity for accepting reason or unreason if it comes from the proper source.

This quality we have seen to be a direct consequence of the social habit, of a single definite instinct, that of gregariousness, the same instinct which makes social life at all possible and altruism a reality.

It does not seem to have been fully understood that if you attack suggestibility by selection—and that is what you do if you breed for rationality—you are attacking gregariousness, for there is at present no adequate evidence that the gregarious instinct is other than a simple character and one which cannot be split up by the breeder. If, then, such an effort in breeding were successful, we should exchange the manageable unreason of man for the inhuman rationality of the tiger.

The solution would seem rather to lie in seeing to it that suggestion always acts on the side of reason; if rationality were once to become really respectable, if we feared the entertaining of an unverifiable opinion with the warmth with which we fear using the wrong implement at the dinner table, if the thought of holding a prejudice disgusted us as does a foul disease, then the dangers of man's suggestibility would be turned into advantages. We

have seen that suggestion already has begun to act on the side of reason in some small part of the life of the student of science, and it is possible that a highly sanguine prophetic imagination might detect here a germ of future changes.

Again, a fourth corollary of gregariousness in man is the fact expounded many years ago by Pearson that human altruism is a natural instinctive product. The obvious dependence of the evolution of altruism upon increase in knowledge and inter-communication has led to its being regarded as a late and a conscious development—as something in the nature of a judgment by the individual that it pays him to be unselfish. This is an interesting rationalization of the facts because in the sense in which "pay" is meant it is so obviously false. Altruism does not at present, and cannot, pay the individual in anything but feeling, as theory declares it must. It is clear, of course, that as long as altruism is regarded as in the nature of a judgment, the fact is overlooked that necessarily its only reward can be in feeling. Man is altruistic because he must be, not because reason recommends it, for herd suggestion opposes any advance in altruism, and when it can the herd executes the altruist, not of course as such but as an innovator. This is a remarkable instance of the protean character of the gregarious instinct and the complexity it introduces into human affairs, for we see one instinct producing manifestations directly hostile to each other—prompting to ever advancing developments of altruism, while it necessarily leads to any new product of advance being attacked. It shows, moreover, as will be pointed out again later, that a gregarious species rapidly developing a complex society can be saved from inextricable confusion only by the appearance of reason and the application of it to life.

When we remember the fearful repressing force which society has always exercised on new forms of altruism and how constantly the dungeon, the scaffold, and the cross have been the reward of the altruist, we are able to get some conception of the force of the instinctive impulse which has triumphantly defied these terrors, and to appreciate in some slight degree how irresistible an enthusiasm it might become if it were encouraged by the unanimous voice of the herd.

In conclusion we have to deal with one more consequence of the social habit in man, a consequence the discussion of which involves some speculation of a necessarily quite tentative kind.

If we look in a broad, general way at the four instincts which bulk largely in man's life, namely, those of self-preservation, nutrition, sex, and the herd, we shall see at once that there is a striking difference between the mode of action of the first three and that of the last. The first three, which we may, for convenience and without prejudice, call the primitive instincts, have in common the characteristic of attaining their maximal activities only over short periods and in special sets of circumstances, and of being fundamentally pleasant to yield to. They do not remain in action concurrently, but when the circumstances are appropriate for the yielding to one, the others automatically fall into the background, and the governing impulse is absolute master. Thus these instincts cannot be supposed at all frequently to conflict amongst themselves, and the animal possessing them alone, however highly developed his consciousness might be, would lead a life emotionally quite simple, for at any given moment he would necessarily be doing what he most wanted to do. We may, therefore, imagine him to be endowed with the feelings of free-will and reality to a superb degree, wholly unperplexed by doubt and wholly secure in his unity of purpose.

The appearance of the fourth instinct, however, introduces a profound change, for this instinct has the characteristic that it exercises a controlling power upon the individual from without. In the case of the solitary animal yielding to instinct the act itself is pleasant, and the whole creature, as it were body and soul, pours itself out in one smooth concurrence of reaction. With the social animal controlled by herd instinct it is not the actual deed which is instinctively done, but the order to do it, which is instinctively obeyed. The deed, being ordained from without, may actually be unpleasant, and so be resisted from the individual side and yet be forced instinctively into execution. The instinctive act seems to have been too much associated in current thought with the idea of yielding to an impulse irresistibly pleasant to the body, yet it is very obvious that herd instinct at once introduces a mechanism by which the sanctions of instinct are conferred upon acts by no means necessarily acceptable to the body or mind. This, of course, involves an enormous increase of the range through which instinct can be made use of. Its appearance marks the beginning of the multifarious activities of man and of his stupendous success as a species; but a spectator watching the process at its outset, had he been interested in the destiny of the race, might have felt a pang of apprehension when he realized how momentous was the divorce which had been accomplished between instinct and individual desire. Instinctive acts are still done because they are based on "*a priori* syntheses of the most perfect sort," but they are no longer necessarily pleasant. Duty has first appeared in the world, and with it the age-long conflict which is described in the memorable words of Paul: "I delight in the law of God after the inward man; but I see another law in my members

warring against the law of my mind and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members."

Into the features and consequences of this conflict it is now necessary for us to probe a little farther.

The element of conflict in the normal life of all inhabitants of a civilized state is so familiar that no formal demonstration of its existence is necessary. In childhood the process has begun. The child receives from the herd the doctrines, let us say, that truthfulness is the most valuable of all the virtues, that honesty is the best policy, that to the religious man death has no terrors, and that there is in store a future life of perfect happiness and delight. And yet experience tells him with persistence that truthfulness as often as not brings him punishment, that his dishonest playfellow has as good if not a better time than he, that the religious man shrinks from death with as great a terror as the unbeliever, is as broken-hearted by bereavement, and as determined to continue his hold upon this imperfect life rather than trust himself to what he declares to be the certainty of future bliss. To the child, of course, experience has but little suggestive force, and he is easily consoled by the perfunctory rationalizations offered him as explanations by his elders. Yet who of us is there who cannot remember the vague feeling of dissatisfaction, the obscure and elusive sense of something being wrong, which is left by these and similar conflicts?

When the world begins to open out before us and experience to flow in with rapidly increasing volume, the state of affairs necessarily becomes more obvious. The mental unrest which we, with a certain cynicism, regard as normal to adolescence is evidence of the heavy handicap we lay upon the developing mind in forcing it to attempt to assimilate with

experience the dicta of herd suggestion. Moreover, let us remember, to the adolescent experience is no longer the shadowy and easily manipulable series of dreams which it usually is to the child. It has become touched with the warmth and reality of instinctive feeling. The primitive instincts are now fully developed and finding themselves balked at every turn by herd suggestion; indeed, even products of the latter are in conflict among themselves. Not only sex, self-preservation, and nutrition are at war with the pronouncements of the herd, but altruism, the ideal of rationality, the desire for power, the yearning for protection, and other feelings which have acquired instinctive force from group suggestion.

The sufferings entailed by this condition are commonplace knowledge, and there is scarcely a novelist who has not dealt with them. It is around matters of sex and of religion that the conflict is most severe, and while it is no part of our purpose to make any detailed survey of the condition, it may be of interest to point out some of the more obvious significances of this localization.

Religion has always been to man an intensely serious matter, and when we realize its biological significance we can see that this is due to a deeply ingrained need of his mind. The individual of a gregarious species can never be truly independent and self-sufficient. Natural selection has ensured that as an individual he must have an abiding sense of incompleteness, which, as thought develops in complexity, will come to be more and more abstractly expressed. This is the psychological germ which expresses itself in the religious feelings, in the desire for completion, for mystical union, for incorporation with the infinite, which are all provided for in Christianity and in all the successful sub-varieties of Christianity which modern times have

seen develop. This need seems with the increasing complexity of society to become more and more imperious, or rather to be satisfiable only by more and more elaborately rationalized expressions. The following is a representative passage from a recent very popular book of mystical religion: "The great central fact in human life, in your life and in mine, is the coming into a conscious vital realization of our oneness with the Infinite Life and the opening of ourselves fully to this divine inflow." It is very interestingly shown here to what lengths of rationalization may be forced the consequences of that yearning in us which is identical with the mechanism that binds the wolf to the pack, the sheep to the flock, and to the dog makes the company of his master like walking with God in the cool of the evening.

Did an opportunity offer, it would be interesting to inquire into the relation of the same instinctive impulse to the genesis of philosophy. Such an attempt would, however, involve too great a digression from the argument of this essay.

That sex should be a chief field for the conflicts we are discussing is comprehensible not only from the immense strength of the impulse and the fact that it is a mode of man's activity which herd suggestion has always tried to regulate, but also because there is reason to believe that the sex impulse becomes secondarily associated with another instinctive feeling of great strength, namely, altruism. We have seen already that altruism is largely antagonized by herd tradition, and it is plausible to suppose that the overwhelming rush of this feeling which is usually associated with sex feelings is not altogether sexual in quality, but secondarily associated therewith as being the only outlet through which it is allowed by the herd to indulge manifestations of really passionate intensity.

If this were so it would clearly be of great practical importance should the rational method ever come to be applied to the solution of the problems for the sociologist and statesman which surround the relations of the sexes.

The conflicts which we are discussing are of course by no means limited to the periods of childhood and adolescence, but are frequently carried over into adult life. To understand how the apparent calm of normal adult life is attained, it is necessary to consider the effects upon the mind of these processes of contention.

Let us consider the case of a person caught in one of those dilemmas which society presents so abundantly to its members—a man seized with a passion for some individual forbidden to him by the herd, or a man whose eyes have been opened to the vision of the cruelty which everywhere lies close below the surface of life, and yet has deeply ingrained in him the doctrine of the herd that things, on the whole, are fundamentally right, that the universe is congruous with his moral feelings, that the seeming cruelty is mercy and the apparent indifference long-suffering. Now, what are the possible developments in such a tormented soul?

The conflict may end through the subsidence of either antagonist. Years, other instincts, or grosser passions may moderate the intensity of ungratified love or take away the sharpness from the sight of incomprehensible pain.

Again, scepticism may detect the nature of the herd suggestion and deprive it of its compelling force.

Thirdly, the problem may be shirked by the easy mechanism of rationalization. The man may take his forbidden pleasure and endow a chapel, persuading himself that his is a special case, that at any rate he is not as bad as X, or Y, or Z, who

committed such and such enormities, that after all there is Divine mercy, and he never beat his wife, and was always regular with his subscriptions to missions and the hospitals. Or, if his difficulty is the ethical one, he will come to see how right the herd view really is ; that it is a very narrow mind which cannot see the intrinsic excellence of suffering ; that the sheep and cattle we breed for eating, the calf we bleed to death that its meat may be white, the one baby out of four we kill in the first year of life, that cancer, consumption, and insanity and the growing river of blood which bathes the feet of advancing mankind, all have their part in the Increasing Purpose which is leading the race ever upwards and onwards to a Divine consummation of joy. Thus the conflict ceases, and the man is content to watch the blood and the Purpose go on increasing together and to put on flesh unperplexed by the shallow and querulous scruples of his youth.

Of these three solutions that of scepticism is unquestionably the least common, though the impression that this is not the case is created by the frequency of apparent scepticism, which, in fact, merely masks the continuation of conflict in the deeper strata of the mind. A man the subject of such submerged conflict, though he may appear to others, and, of course, to himself, to have reached a secure and uncontested basis of stability, may, after a period of apparently frictionless mental life, betray by unmistakable evidence the fact that conflict has continued disastrously below the surface.

The solutions by indifference and by rationalization or by a mixture of these two processes are characteristic of the great class of normal, sensible, reliable middle age, with its definite views, its resiliency to the depressing influence of facts, and its gift for forming the backbone of the State. In

them herd suggestion shows its capacity to triumph over experience, to delay the evolution of altruism, and to obscure the existence and falsify the results of the contest between personal and social desires. That it is able to do so has the advantage of establishing existing society with great firmness, but it has also the consequence of entrusting the conduct of the State and the attitude of it towards life to a class which their very stability shows to possess a certain relative incapacity to take experience seriously, a certain relative insensibility to the value of feeling and to suffering, and a decided preference for herd tradition over all other sources of conduct.

Early in history the bulk of mankind must have been of this type, because experience, being still relatively simple, would have but little suggestive force, and would therefore readily be suppressed by herd suggestion. There would be little or no mental conflict, and such as there was would be readily stilled by comparatively simple rationalizations. The average man would then be happy, active, and possessed of an inexhaustible fund of motive and energy, capable of intense patriotism and even of self-immolation for the herd. The nation consequently, in an appropriate environment, would be an expanding one and rendered ruthless and formidable by an intense, unshakable conviction of its divine mission. Its blindness towards the new in experience would keep its patriots narrow and fierce, its priests bigoted and bloodthirsty, its rulers arrogant, reactionary, and over-confident. Should chance ordain that there arose no great environmental change rendering necessary great modifications, such a nation would have a brilliant career of conquest as has been so often demonstrated by history.

Amongst the first-class Powers to-day the mentally stable are still the directing class, and their char-

acteristic tone is discernible in national attitudes towards experience, in national ideals and religions, and in national morality. It is this possession of the power of directing national opinion by a class which is in essence relatively insensitive towards new combinations of experience; this persistence of a mental type which may have been adequate in the simpler past, into a world where environments are daily becoming more complex—it is this survival, so to say, of the waggoner upon the footplate of the express engine, which has made the modern history of nations a series of such breathless adventures and hairbreadth escapes. To those who are able to view national affairs from an objective standpoint, it is obvious that each of these escapes might very easily have been a disaster, and that sooner or later one of them must be such.

Thus far we have seen that the conflict between herd suggestion and experience is associated with the appearance of the great mental type which is commonly called normal. Whether or not it is in fact to be regarded as such is comparatively unimportant and obviously a question of statistics; what is, however, of an importance impossible to exaggerate is the fact that in this type of mind personal satisfactoriness or adequacy, or, as we may call it, mental comfort, is attained at the cost of an attitude towards experience which greatly affects the value to the species of the activities of minds of this type. This mental stability, then, is to be regarded as, in certain important directions, a loss; and the nature of the loss resides in a limitation of outlook, a relative intolerance of the new in thought, and a consequent narrowing of the range of facts over which satisfactory intellectual activity is possible. We may, therefore, for convenience, refer to this type as the resistive, a name which serves as a reminder of the exceedingly important fact that,

however, "normal" the type may be, it is one which falls far short of the possibilities of the human mind.

If we now turn to a consideration of the mental characteristics of the constituents of society other than those of the resistive type, we shall find a common quality traceable, and another great type capable of broad definition. We must at once, however, guard ourselves against being misled by the name "normal" as applied to the resistant into the supposition that this type is in a numerical majority in society. Intellectually unquestionably of inferior value, there is good reason to suppose that in mere numbers it has already passed its zenith, as may be gathered from the note of panic which what is called the increase of degeneracy is beginning to excite.

Outside the comfortable and possibly diminishing ranks of the "normal," society is everywhere penetrated by a steadily increasing degree of what we may call in the broadest possible way mental instability. All observers of society, even the most optimistic, are agreed that the prevalence of this mental quality is increasing, while those who are competent to trace its less obtrusive manifestations find it to be very widespread.

When the twenty years just past come to be looked back upon from the distant future, it is probable that their chief claim to interest will be that they saw the birth of the science of abnormal psychology. That science, inconspicuous as has been its development, has already given us a few generalizations of the first importance. Amongst such, perhaps the most valuable is that which has taught us that certain mental and physical manifestations which have usually been regarded as disease in the ordinary sense are due to the effects upon the mind of the failure to assimilate the

experience presented to it into a harmonious unitary personality. We have seen that the stable-minded deal with an unsatisfactory piece of experience by rejecting its significance. In certain minds such successful exclusion does not occur, and the unwelcome experience persists as an irritant, so to say, capable neither of assimilation nor rejection. Abnormal psychology discloses the fact that such minds are apt to develop the supposed diseases we have just referred to, and the fact that these and other manifestations of what we have called mental instability are the consequences of mental conflict.

Now, we have already seen that a gregarious animal, unless his society is perfectly organized, must be subject to lasting and fierce conflict between experience and herd suggestion.¹ It is natural, therefore, to assume that the manifestations of mental instability are not diseases of the individual in the ordinary sense at all, but inevitable consequences of man's biological history and exact measures of the stage now reached of his assimilation into the gregarious life. The manifestations of mental instability and disintegration were at first supposed to be of comparatively rare occurrence and limited to certain well-known "diseases," but they are coming to be recognized over a larger and larger field, and in a great variety of phenomena.

Conditions which at first sight give rise to no suspicion of being acquired injuries to the mind, when they are looked at in the light of the facts we have been considering, reveal themselves as being scars inflicted by conflict as certainly as are some

¹ The word "experience" is used here in a special sense that perhaps renders necessary a word or two of definition. The experience meant is everything that comes to the individual, not only his experience of events in the external world, but also his experience of the instinctive and often egoistic impulses at work within his own personality. 1915.

forms of insanity. Characteristics which pass as vices, eccentricities, defects of temper, peculiarities of disposition, come when critically examined to be explicable as minor grades of defective mental stability, although, on account of their great frequency, they have been looked upon as normal, or at any rate in the natural order of things.

Few examples could be found to illustrate better such conditions than alcoholism. Almost universally regarded as either, on the one hand, a sin or vice, or on the other hand, as a disease, there can be little doubt that in fact it is essentially a response to a psychological necessity. In the tragic conflict between what he has been taught to desire and what he is allowed to get, man has found in alcohol, as he has found in certain other drugs, a sinister but effective peacemaker, a means of securing, for however short a time, some way out of the prison house of reality back to the Golden Age. There can be equally little doubt that it is but a comparatively small proportion of the victims of conflict who find a solace in alcohol, and the prevalence of alcoholism and the punishments entailed by the use of that dreadful remedy cannot fail to impress upon us how great must be the number of those whose need was just as great, but who were too ignorant, too cowardly, or perhaps too brave to find a release there.

We have seen that mental instability must be regarded as a condition extremely common, and produced by the mental conflict forced upon man by his sensitiveness to herd suggestion on the one hand and to experience on the other. It remains for us to estimate, in some rough way the characteristics of the unstable, in order that we may be able to judge of their value or otherwise to the State and the species. Such an estimate must necessarily be exaggerated, over-sharp in its outlines, omitting

much, and therefore in many respects false. The most prominent characteristic in which the mentally unstable contrast with the "normal" is what we may vaguely call motive. They tend to be weak in energy, and especially in persistence of energy. Such weakness may translate itself into a vague scepticism as to the value of things in general, or into a definite defect of what is popularly called will power, or into many other forms, but it is always of the same fundamental significance, for it is always the result of the thwarting of the primary impulses to action resident in herd suggestion by the influence of an experience which cannot be disregarded. Such minds cannot be stimulated for long by objects adequate to normal ambition; they are apt to be sceptical in such matters as patriotism, religion, politics, social success, but the scepticism is incomplete, so that they are readily won to new causes, new religions, new quacks, and as readily fall away therefrom.

We saw that the resistive gain in motive what they lose in adaptability; we may add that in a sense the unstable gain in adaptability what they lose in motive. Thus we see society cleft by the instinctive qualities of its members into two great classes, each to a great extent possessing what the other lacks, and each falling below the possibilities of human personality. The effect of the gradual increase of the unstable in society can be seen to a certain extent in history. We can watch it through the careers of the Jews and of the Romans. At first, when the bulk of the citizens were of the stable type, the nation was enterprising, energetic, indomitable, but hard, inelastic, and fanatically convinced of its Divine mission. The inevitable effect of the expansion of experience which followed success was that development of the unstable and sceptical which ultimately allowed the nation, no longer

believing in itself or its gods, to become the almost passive prey of more stable peoples.

In regard to the question of the fundamental significance of the two great mental types found in society, a tempting field for speculation at once opens up, and many questions immediately arise for discussion. Is, for example, the stable normal type naturally in some special degree insensitive to experience, and if so, is such a quality inborn or acquired? Again, may the characteristics of the members of this class be the result of an experience relatively easily dealt with by rationalization and exclusion? Then again, are the unstable naturally hypersensitive to experience, or have they met with an experience relatively difficult to assimilate? Into the discussion of such questions we shall here make no attempt to enter, but shall limit ourselves to reiterating that these two types divide society between them, that they both must be regarded as seriously defective and as evidence that civilization has not yet provided a medium in which the average human mind can grow undeformed and to its full stature.

GREGARIOUSNESS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN.

Thus far we have attempted to apply biological conceptions to man and society as they actually exist at present. We may now, very shortly, inquire whether or not the same method can yield some hint as to the course which human development will take in the future.

As we have already seen reason to believe, in the course of organic development when the limits of size and efficiency in the unicellular organism were reached, the only possible access of advantage to the competing organism was gained by the appearance of combination. In the scale of the metazoa

we see the advantages of combination and division of labour being more and more made use of, until the individual cells lose completely the power of separate existence, and their functions come to be useful only in the most indirect way and through the organisms of which the cells are constituents. This complete submergence of the cell in the organism indicates the attainment of the maximum advantages to be obtained from this particular access in complexity, and it indicates to us the direction in which development must proceed within the limits which are produced by that other access of complexity—gregariousness.

The success and extent of such development clearly depend on the relation of two series of activities in the individual which may in the most general way be described as the capacity for varied reaction and the capacity for communication. The process going on in the satisfactorily developing gregarious animal is the moulding of the varied reactions of the individual into functions beneficial to him only indirectly through the welfare of the new unit—the herd. This moulding process is a consequence of the power of intercommunication amongst the individual constituents of the new unit. Intercommunication is thus seen to be of cardinal importance to the gregarious, just as was the nervous system to the multicellular.

Moreover, in a given gregarious species the existence of a highly developed power of reaction in the individual with a proportionately less developed capacity for communication will mean that the species is not deriving the advantages it might from the possession of gregariousness, while the full advantages of the type will be attained only when the two sets of activities are correspondingly strong.

Here we may see perhaps the explanation of the astounding success and completeness of gregarious-

ness in bees and ants. Their cycle of development was early complete because the possibilities of reaction of the individual were so small, and consequently, the capacity for intercommunication of the individual was relatively soon able to attain a corresponding grade. The individual has become as completely merged in the hive as the single cell in the multicellular animal, and consequently, the whole of her activities is available for the uses of the State. It is interesting to notice that, considered from this aspect, the wonderful society of the bee, with its perfect organization and its wonderful adaptability and elasticity, owes its early attainment of success to the smallness of the brain power of the individual.

For the mammals with their greater powers of varied reaction the path to the consummation of their possibilities must be longer, more painful, and more dangerous, and this applies in an altogether special degree to man.

The enormous power of varied reaction possessed by man must render necessary, for his attainment of the full advantages of the gregarious habit a power of intercommunication of absolutely unprecedented fineness. It is clear that scarcely a hint of such power has yet appeared, and it is equally obvious that it is this defect which gives to society the characteristics which are the contempt of the man of science and the disgust of the humanitarian.

We are now in a position to understand how momentous is the question as to what society does with the raw material of its minds to encourage in them the potential capacity for intercommunication which they undoubtedly by nature possess. To that question there is but one answer. By providing its members with a herd tradition which is constantly at war with feeling and with experience,

society drives them inevitably into resistiveness on the one hand, or into mental instability on the other, conditions which have this in common, that they tend to exaggerate that isolation of the individual which is shown us by the intellect to be unnatural and by the heart to be cruel.

Another urgent question for the future is provided by the steady increase, relative and absolute, of the mentally unstable. The danger to the State constituted by a large unstable class is already generally recognized, but unfortunately realization has so far only instigated a yet heavier blow at the species. It is assumed that instability is a primary quality, and therefore only to be dealt with by breeding it out. With that indifference to the mental side of life which is characteristic of the mentally resistant class, the question as to the real meaning of instability has been begged by the invention of the disastrous word "degenerate." The simplicity of the idea has charmed modern speculation, and the only difficulty in the whole problem has come to be the decision as to the most expeditious way of getting rid of this troublesome flaw in an otherwise satisfactory world.

The conception that the natural environment of man must be modified if the body is to survive has long been recognized, but the fact that the mind is incomparably more delicate than the body has scarcely been noticed at all. We assume that the disorderly environment with which we surround the mind has no effect, and are ingenuously surprised when mental instability arises apparently from nowhere; but although we know nothing of its origin our temerity in applying the cure is in no sense daunted.

It has already been pointed out how dangerous it would be to breed man for reason—that is, against suggestibility. The idea is a fit companion for the

device of breeding against "degeneracy." The "degenerate"—that is, the mentally unstable—have demonstrated by the mere fact of instability that they possess the quality of sensitiveness to feeling and to experience, for it is this which has prevented them from applying the remedy of rationalization or exclusion when they have met with experience conflicting with herd suggestion. There can be no doubt as to the value to the State of such sensitiveness were it developed in a congruous environment. The "degeneracy," therefore, which we see developed as a secondary quality in these sensitive minds is no evidence against the degenerate, but an indictment of the disorderly environment which has ruined them, just as the catchword associating insanity and genius tells us nothing about genius but a great deal about the situation into which it has had the misfortune to be born.

Sensitiveness to feeling and experience is undoubtedly the necessary antecedent of any high grade of that power of intercommunication which we have seen to be necessary to the satisfactory development of man. Such sensitiveness, however, in society as it now is, inevitably leads merely to mental instability. That such sensitiveness increases with civilization is shown by the close association between civilization and mental instability. There is no lack, therefore, of the mental quality of all others most necessary to the gregarious animal. The pressing problem which in fact faces man in the immediate future is how to readjust the mental environment in such a way that sensitiveness may develop and confer on man the enormous advantages which it holds for him, without being transformed from a blessing into the curse and menace of instability. To the biologist it is quite clear that this can be effected only by an extension of the rational method to the whole field of experience, a

process of the greatest difficulty, but one which must be the next great variation in man's development if that development is to continue to be an evolution.

Outside this possibility the imagination can see nothing but grounds for pessimism. It needs but little effort of foresight to realize that without some totally revolutionary change in man's attitude towards the mind, even his very tenure of the earth may come to be threatened. Recent developments in the study of disease have shown us how blind and fumbling have been our efforts against the attacks of our immemorial enemies the unicellular organisms. When we remember their capacities for variation and our fixity, we can see that for the race effectually and permanently to guard itself against even this one danger are necessary that fineness and complexity of organization, that rendering available of the utmost capacity of its members, against which the face of society seems at present to be so steadily set. We see man to-day, instead of the frank and courageous recognition of his status, the docile attention to his biological history, the determination to let nothing stand in the way of the security and permanence of his future, which alone can establish the safety and happiness of the race, substituting blind confidence in his destiny, unclouded faith in the essentially respectful attitude of the universe towards his moral code, and a belief no less firm that his traditions and laws and institutions necessarily contain permanent qualities of reality. Living as he does in a world where outside his race no allowances are made for infirmity, and where figments however beautiful never become facts, it needs but little imagination to see how great are the probabilities that after all man will prove but one more of Nature's failures, ignominiously to be swept from her work-table to make way for another venture of her tireless curiosity and patience.

country, has shown itself to be directed by the higher powers of the intellect, and nowhere has the continued action of clear, temperate, vigorous, and comprehensive thought made itself manifest, because even the utmost urgency, of warfare failed to dislodge the stable-minded type from its monopoly of prestige and power. What the necessities of war could not do there is certainly no magic in peace to bring about. Society, therefore, is setting out upon what is generally regarded as a new era of hope without the defect that made the war possible having in any degree been corrected. Certain supposedly immutable principles such as democracy and national self-determination are regarded by some as being mankind's guarantees against disaster. To the psychologist such principles represent mere vague and fluctuating drifts of feeling, arising out of deep instinctive needs, but not fully and powerfully, embodying such; as automatic safeguards of society, their claims are altogether bogus, and cannot be ranked as perceptibly higher than those of the ordinary run of political nostrums and doctrinaire specifics. Society can never be safe until the direction of it is entrusted only, to those who possess high capacity rigorously trained and acute sensitiveness to experience and to feeling.

Statecraft, after all, is a difficult art, and it seems unreasonable to leave the choice of those who practise it to accident, to heredity, or to the possession of the wholly irrelevant gifts that take the fancy of the crowd. The result of such methods of selection is not even a mere random choice from the whole population, but shows a steady drift towards the establishment in power of a type in certain ways almost characteristically unfitted for the tasks of government. The fact that man has always shirked the heavy intellectual and moral

labour of founding a scientific and truly expert statecraft may contain a germ of hope for the future, in that it shows where effort may be usefully expended. But it cannot but justify uneasiness as to the immediate future of society. The essential factor in society is the subordination of the individual will to social needs. Our statecraft is still ignorant of how this can be made a fair and honest bargain to the individual and to the state, and recent events have convinced a very large proportion of mankind that accepted methods of establishing this social cohesion have proved to them at any rate the worst of bargains.

THE INSTABILITY OF CIVILIZATION.

The foregoing considerations are enough, perhaps, to make one wonder whether, after all, Western civilization may not be about to follow its unnumbered predecessors into decay and dissolution. There can be no doubt that such a suspicion is oppressing many thoughtful minds at the present time. It is not likely to be dispelled by the contemplation of history or by the nature of recent events. Indeed, the view can be maintained very plausibly that all civilizations must tend ultimately to break down, that they reach sooner or later a period when their original vigour is worn out, and then collapse through internal disruption or outside pressure. It is even believed by some that Western civilization already shows the evidences of decline which in its predecessors have been the forerunners of destruction. When we remember that our very short period of recorded history includes the dissolution of civilizations so elaborate as those of the Chaldeans, the Assyrians, the Egyptians, and of the Incas, that a social structure so complex as that but lately disclosed in Crete could leave no trace in human

memory, but a faint and dubious whisper of tradition, and that the dawn of history finds civilization already old, we can scarcely resist the conclusion that social life has, more often than one can bear to contemplate, swung laboriously up to a meaningless apogee and then lapsed again into darkness. We know enough of man to be aware that each of these unnumbered upward movements must have been infinitely painful, must have been at least as fruitful of torture, oppression, and anguish as the ones of which we know the history, and yet each was no more than the swing of a pendulum and a mere fruitless oscillation landing man once more at his starting point, impoverished and broken, with perhaps more often than not no transmissible vestige of his greatness.

If we limit our view to the historical scale of time and the exclusively human outlook, we seem almost forced to accept the dreadful hypothesis that in the very structure and substance of all human constructive social efforts there is embodied a principle of death, that there is no progressive impulse but must become fatigued, that the intellect can provide no permanent defence against a vigorous barbarism, that social complexity is necessarily weaker than social simplicity, and that fineness of moral fibre must in the long run succumb to the primitive and coarse.

Let us consider, however, what comments may be made on this hypothesis in view of the biological conceptions of man which have been put forward in this book. At the same time an opportunity is afforded to put in a more continuous form the view of society that has necessarily been touched on so far in an interrupted and incidental way.

Whatever may be one's view as to the larger pretensions that are put forward as to the significance and destiny of man, there can be no doubt

that it is indispensable to recognize the full implications of his status as an animal completely indigenous in the zoological series. The whole of his physical and mental structure is congruous with that of other living beings, and is constantly giving evidence of the complicated network of relationships by which he is bound to them.

The accumulation of knowledge is steadily amplifying the range over which this congruity with the natural order can be demonstrated, and is showing more and more fully, that practical understanding and foresight of man's behaviour are attained in proportion as this hypothesis of the complete "naturalness" of man is adhered to.

The endowment of instinct that man possesses is in every detail cognate with that of other animals, provides no element that is not fully represented elsewhere, and above all—however little the individual man may be inclined to admit it—is in no degree less vigorous and intense or less important in relation to feeling and activity than it is in related animals. This supremely important side of mental life, then, will be capable of continuous illustration and illumination by biological methods. It is on the intellectual side of mental life that man's congruity with other animals is least obvious at first sight. The departure from type, however, is probably a matter of degree only, and not of quality. Put in the most general terms, the work of the intellect is to cause delay between stimulus and response, and under circumstances to modify the direction of the latter. We may suppose all stimulation to necessitate response, and that such response must ultimately occur with undiminished total energy. The intellect, however, is capable of delaying such response, and within limits of directing its path so that it may superficially show no relation to the stimulus of which it is the discharge. If we extend

the word stimulation to include the impulses arising from instinct, and grant that the delaying and deflecting influence of the intellect may be indefinitely enlarged, we have an animal in which instinct is as vigorous as in any of its primitive ancestors, but which is superficially, scarcely an instinctive animal at all. Such is the case of man. His instinctive impulses are so greatly masked by the variety of response that his intellect opens to him that he has been commonly regarded until quite recent times as a practically non-instinctive creature, capable of determining by reason his conduct and even his desires. Such a conception made it almost impossible to gain any help in human psychology from the study of other animals, and scarcely less difficult to evolve a psychology which would be of the least use in foreseeing and controlling the behaviour of man.

No understanding of the causes of stability and instability in human society is possible until the undiminished vigour of instinct in man is fully recognized.

The significance of this rich instinctive endowment lies in the fact that mental health depends upon instinct finding a balanced but vigorous expression in functional activity. The response to instinct may be infinitely varied, and may even, under certain circumstances, be not more than symbolic without harm to the individual as a social unit, but there are limits beyond which the restriction of it to indirect and symbolic modes of expression cannot be carried without serious effects on personality. The individual in whom direct instinctive expression is unduly limited acquires a spiritual meagreness which makes him the worst possible social material.

All recorded history shows that society developing under the conditions that have obtained up

to the present time—developing, that is to say, spontaneously, under the random influences of an uncontrolled environment of the individual—does not permit to the average man that balanced instinctive expression which is indispensable for the formation of a rich, vigorous, and functionally active personality. It has been one of my chief efforts in this book to show that the social instinct, while in itself the very foundation of society, takes, when its action is undirected and uncontrolled, a principal part in restricting the completeness and efficacy of the social impulse. (This instinct is doubly responsible for the defects which have always inhered in society, through the personal impoverishment of its individual constituents. In the first place, it is the great agent by which the egoistic instincts are driven into dwarfed, distorted, and symbolic modes of expression without any regard for the objective social necessity of such oppressive regulation. In the second place, it is an instinct which, while it embodies one of the deepest and potentially most invigorating passions of the soul, tends automatically to fall out of vigorous and constant activity with the expansion of societies. It is the common character of large societies to suffer heavily from the restrictive effect on personality of the social instinct, and at the same time to suffer in the highest degree from the debilitation of the common social impulse. Only in the smallest groups, such as perhaps was early republican Rome, can the common impulse inform and invigorate the whole society. As the group expands and ceases to feel the constant pressure of an environment it no longer has to fear, the common impulse droops, and the society becomes segregated into classes, each of which a lesser herd within the main body, and under the reciprocated pressure of its fellows, now yields to its members the social feeling which the main body

can no longer provide. The passage of the small, vigorous, homogeneous and fiercely patriotic group into the large, lax, segregated and ultimately decadent group is a commonplace of history. In highly segregated peoples the restrictive effect of the social instinct upon personality has usually been to some extent relaxed, and a relatively rich personal development has been possible. Such an amplification has always, however, been limited to privileged classes, has always been accompanied by a weakening of the national bond, and a tendency of the privileged class to the sincere conviction that its interests are identical with those of the nation. No nation has ever succeeded in liberating the personality of its citizens from the restrictive action of the social instinct and at the same time in maintaining national homogeneity and common impulse. In a small community intercommunication among its individual members is free enough to keep common feeling intense and vigorous. As the community increases in size the general intercommunication becomes attenuated, and with this common feeling is correspondingly weakened. If there were no other mechanism capable of inducing common action than the faint social stimulus coming from the nation at large, a segregated society would be incapable of national enterprise. There is, however, another mechanism which we may call leadership, using the word in a certain special sense. All social groups are more or less capable of being led, and it is manifest that the leadership of individuals, or perhaps more usually of classes, has been a dominant influence in the expansion and enterprise of all civilizations of which we have any knowledge. It is only in the small communities that we can detect evidence of a true common impulse shared alike by all the members acting as the cause of expansion. In larger groups, auto-

cracies and dynasties, Pharaohs and Nebuchadnezzars have imposed the impulse of expansion upon the people, and by virtue of human susceptibility to leadership have secured a virtual, though only, a secondary, common purpose.

Now leadership, potent as it undoubtedly is in calling forth the energy of the social instinct, is essentially a limited and therefore an exhaustible force. It depends for continued vigour upon successful enterprise. While it is succeeding there are only wide limits to the moral power it can set free and command, but in the face of misfortune and disaster its limitations become obvious, and its power inevitably declines. On the other hand, the moral power yielded by a true community, of feeling, and not imposed by leadership, is enormously more resistant and even indestructible by failure and defeat. History gives many examples of the encounters of communities of these two types—the led society and the homogeneous society—and in spite of the invariably greater size and physical power of the former, frequently records the astoundingly successful resistance its greater moral vigour has given to the latter. This is perhaps why Carthage beat in vain against little Rome, and certainly, why Austria failed to subdue Switzerland.

All large societies that have had their day and have fallen from their zenith by internal dissolution or outward attack have been given their impulse to expansion by leadership and have depended on it for their moral power. If society is to continue to depend for its enterprise and expansion upon leadership, and can find no more satisfactory source of moral power, it is, to say the least, highly probable that civilizations will continue to rise and fall in a dreadful sameness of alternating aspiration and despair until perhaps some lucky accident of

confusion finds for humanity in extinction the rest it could never win for itself in life.

There is, however, reason to suppose that susceptibility to leadership is a characteristic of relatively primitive social types, and tends to diminish with increasing social complexity. I have already called attention to and attempted to define the apparently specific psychological differences between Germany and England before and during the war. These differences I attributed to variations in the type of reaction to herd instinct shown by the two peoples. The aggressive social type represented by Germany and analogous with that characteristic of the predaceous social animals I regarded as being relatively primitive and simple. The socialized type represented by England and presenting analogies with that characteristic of many social insects I regarded as being, though imperfect as are all the human examples available for study up to the present time, more complex and less primitive, and representing at any rate a tendency towards a satisfactory solution of the problems with which man as a gregarious animal is surrounded. Now, it is a very obvious fact that the susceptibility to leadership shown by Germany and by England before the war was remarkably different. The common citizen of Germany was strikingly open to and dependent upon discipline and leadership, and seemed to have a positive satisfaction in leaving to his masters the management of his social problems and accepting with alacrity the solutions that were imposed upon him. The nation consequently presented a close knit uniformity of purpose, a singleness of national consciousness and effort that gave it an aspect of moral power of the most formidable kind. In England a very different state of affairs prevailed. The common citizen was apt to meet with indifference or resentment all efforts to change the social

structure, and it had long been a political axiom that "reform" should always await an irresistible demand for it. Instances will be within every one's memory of politicians who met with crushing rebuffs through regarding the supposed desirability of a reform as a justification for imposing it. This almost sullen indifference to great projects and ideals, this unwillingness to take thought in the interests of the nation and the empire in spite of the apostolic zeal of the most eloquent political prophets, was generally regarded as evidence of a weakness and slackness in the body politic that could not but threaten disaster. And yet in the trials of the war the moral stability of England showed itself to be superior to that of Germany, which, in those rough waters, it jostled as mercilessly and as effectually as did the brass pot the earthen crock in the fable.

During the war itself the submission to leadership that England showed was characteristic of the socialized type. It was to a great extent spontaneous, voluntary, and undisciplined, and gave repeated evidence that the passage of inspiration was essentially from the common people to its leaders rather than from the leaders to the common people. When the current of inspiration sets persistently in this direction, as it unquestionably did in England, it is very plain that the primitive type of leadership that has led so many civilizations to disaster is no longer in unmodified action.

Germany has provided the most complete example of a culture of leadership that has ever been recorded, and has gone through the phases of her evolution with a precision which should make her case an illustration classical for all history. With a people showing strongly the characteristics of the aggressive social type, and a social structure deeply and rigidly segregated, the nation was ideally

susceptible to discipline and leadership, and a leading class was available which possessed an almost superhuman prestige. The opportunity given to leadership was exploited with great energy and thoroughness and with an intelligence that by its intensity almost made up for being nowhere really profound. With all these advantages and the full uses of the huge resources science has made available to intelligently concerted effort, an extremely formidable power was created. The peoples of the socialized type towards whom from the first its hostility was scarcely veiled were under obvious disadvantages in rivalry with it. Their social type made it impossible for them to combine and organize themselves against what was to them no more than a vaguely hypothetical danger. Against peaceful conquest by Germany in the industrial sphere England was therefore practically helpless, and to it would probably in time have succumbed. Paradox as it may seem, there can be no doubt that it was in war only that England could contend with Germany on equal terms. Paradoxically again, it was war for which England was reluctant and Germany was eager.

War brought Germany into contact with the, to her, inexplicable ferocity of peoples of the socialized type under attack, and it was by this disappointment that the first blow to her morale was struck. The wastage of modern warfare must very soon have begun to impair the isolation and prestige of the officer class through increasingly free importation from without the pale. With this necessarily began to be sapped the absolute and rigid segregation on which leadership of the type we are considering so largely depends. At the same time, the general tendency of the increasing pressure of war is to wear down class segregation over the whole social field. This tendency, which intensified

and invigorated the morale of her enemies would work steadily against the leadership morale of Germany. These factors must no doubt be added to the moral need for aggression, the exhaustion consequent upon forced offensives, and the specific intolerance of failure and retreat that combined to bring down the strongest example of the pre-daceous led society, that history records.

SOME CHARACTERS OF A RATIONAL STATECRAFT.

If the foregoing discussion has been sound, we may attribute the impermanence of all civilizations of which we have knowledge to the failure of society to preserve with increasing magnitude of its communities a true homogeneity, and a progressive integration of its elements.* We have seen that there is a type of society—distinguished here as the socialized type—in which a trace of this integrative tendency can be detected at work. Under the threat of war this tendency is accelerated in its action, and can attain a moderate, though very far indeed from a complete, degree of development. In the absence of such a powerful stimulus to homogeneity, however, segregation reasserts itself, and the society, necessarily deprived by its type of the advantages of leadership, becomes confused, disunited, and threatened with disruption. It seems probable, indeed, that the integrative tendency unaided and uncontrolled is too weak to surmount the obstacles with which it has to contend, and to anticipate disruption by welding the elements of society into a common life and common purpose. It has already been repeatedly suggested that these difficulties, due as they are to the human power of various reaction, can be met only by the interposition of the intellect as an active factor in the problem of the direction of society. In other words, the progressive evolution of society has reached a point where the con-

Reaching Out to Touch Someone

From early in this century, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) was one of the first major corporations to pursue an aggressive public relations policy. As a private corporation trying to establish a monopoly over an important public utility, it was necessary to wage public warfare against anti-monopolists, local independent telephone companies, and against those calling for government ownership. Under the brilliant leadership of President Theodore Vail, AT&T was an innovator in corporate media strategy, cultivating advantageous press relations, placing stories in newspapers throughout the country, and maintaining—by whatever means necessary—that one big, privately owned system was best for America.

According to Vail, it was necessary to "educate the public that a monopoly does not necessarily mean public disadvantage." In measured, informational tones, AT&T worked to ensure that education. "Before we can accomplish our plans for a universal...system," Vail announced to his executives in 1913, the public mind must be thoroughly imbued with its economies and advantages."

By the early twenties, however, this strategy of rational argumentation had begun to give way to more modern, psychological approaches to persuasion. In synch with Walter Lippmann's description of the power of symbols upon people's emotional lives, AT&T's tactics began to take on a more modern flavor.

In this speech, delivered to the Publicity Department of the Bell System in 1923, William P. Banning (Assistant Publicity Manager for AT&T) sermonizes on a corporate decision to shift from institutional advertising strategies which rely on logical argument, toward approaches aimed at appealing to the sentiments of the public. Of particular interest is Banning's emphasis on the particular utility of visual elements (illustrations, typography, layout) within such emotion-oriented appeals.

This speech represents the genesis of an AT&T advertising strategy—depicting corporate innovations in relation to the experiences and aspirations of consumers, and presenting the company as the old friend that permits you to *Reach Out And Touch Someone*—that persists into the present.

—Stuart Ewen

...I am narrowing down my subject to the main advertising strategy for a telephone company,—real institutional advertising,—but not the kind like that evidently handled by the manufacturer personally, who prints a picture of his factory with the slogan "Established 1846," thinking that he has written a good piece of copy....

Institutional advertising for a telephone company in its broadest sense means advertising that will make the company liked, appreciated and respected. ...[I]n the last analysis those reactions are all that accompany a reasonably expect from advertising, and they are certainly a whole lot to get.... Nevertheless, every company in the Bell System can get them, if it is willing to advertise institutionally....

Coming back to my double-jointed subject, "Advertising Technique and Copy Appeal," I will quote the dictionary definition of technique, which is "the method or style of performance in any art." The question involved in our topic, therefore, reduced to its lowest term is "what methods might a telephone company adopt for a campaign of institutional advertising?" The answer to this question, it seems to me, lies in truly understanding the public as a mass, in knowing what will interest and appeal to it, and then in applying common sense.

Thus the advertiser must have the proper mental attitude to start with. He must take the public as it is, not as he would like it to be. He must have a composite picture of that public always in his mind's eye. Having that picture, he can then think of the public as an individual. He is getting somewhere when he has that visualization, for then, perhaps, he can master the temptation to put out stuff that he himself likes and is interested in, without thinking very much of the likes and dislikes of his fellow men. He may decide that it is wiser to think of

what the public will read, instead of what he would like to write. If he keeps the homely saying in mind that molasses is better than vinegar, if he will remember that an appeal to the heart, to the sentiments, is more resultful than one based on logic, he has the beginnings of a good technique.

Have you ever heard anyone say "I like that man; he seems so friendly, so pleasant, so accommodating, so modest." Good institutional advertising will result in the public saying "I like that company; it seems so friendly, so pleasant, so accommodating, so modest." My emphasis is on the word "seems." The man you like, or the company the public likes, will enjoy the reputation and the benefits of having these rugged virtues, as long as they seem to have them,—in other words, until some word or act spoils the impression.

Institutional advertising will succeed if it merely creates impressions, that is, good impressions. The telephone business is an engineered business, and that betokens accuracy in everything. It tends to make telephone men literal men. It is a business involving infinite detail for proper functioning. It needs public considerateness, and intelligent use of telephone facilities, as a help toward its successful functioning. That leads to a wish to teach the public, so as to increase the public's knowledge and considerateness. Thus much telephone advertising is educational, obviously so, sometimes strenuously so, and much of it is not attractive to the individual typifying the composite public, who is a bromidic though good-natured person, with too many troubles of his own to bother with those of a monopoly, who would rather be amused than instructed. It is natural for a telephone company to assume that facts should be the basis of its advertising appeal. So it would be, for a public composed of electrical engineers, but our composite public probably would be more interested in something less mechanical, or mathematical, or statistical....It's just as easy to make an advertisement seem to say "I'm interesting," as it is to plan it so it will really say "Pass me up, I'm hard to read."...

A telephone company should have...consideration for impressions when planning the physical presentment of each advertisement. This includes border, typeface, illustration or decoration, white space, signature and seal....

A writer of books on advertising once said: "The public does not care a hang about you, your house, or your product, except as these hold a special, personal interest for the individual reader. You might almost take as a basic rule that an advertisement should always begin with 'you' and never with 'I' 'we,' 'ours.'"

This statement applies to a very great degree to your own proposition. Of course, the public wants telephone service; it wants the best service at the lowest price that it can get. Anything you can tell them about their service is going to get an audience, but just as far as you try to tell them about your service, your problems and your difficulties, just so surely will your audience tend toward the vanishing point.

...[I]f advertising experience has any value whatever, you may be sure that you can secure an audience, and a receptive audience, when you relate your messages to the pleasures, problems, hobbies, prides of your public. Some of the advertising of the operating companies of the Bell System truly looks as though it might have been written by an engineer and set up in type by a country printer. The idea that every bit of that advertising is expected to sell good-will seems to have escaped notice in a number of cases. You have talked about facts and figures, problems and projects of paramount interest to you, as though you expected every newspaper reader who saw one of your advertisements to jump at it and gain its valuable information for his very own, with the same degree of enthusiasm you display in connection with your official study of these situations....

Then when some of your friends and associates tell you "that was a great

advertisement you had in the paper" you take it for granted that the paper sold out its edition as a result of the compelling interest of your message. Such is not the case. This dealing with subjects subjectively will never get your dear public to compose hymns of praise to the telephone company.

The job of the Publicity Directors of the Bell System is to make the people understand and love the company. Not merely be consciously dependent upon it—not merely regard it as a necessity—not merely take it for granted, but to love it—hold real affection for it—make it an honored personal member of their business force, an admired intimate member of the family.

This cannot be done through the presentment of statistical data clothed in formal language. Don't be afraid of the people losing their respect for the telephone. Whatever we love we respect. A friendly familiarity based on confidence, backed up by constant association, is as valuable an asset for the telephone as it is for a motor car, a breakfast food or fountain pen....

Think of your whole advertisement as a picture, and I believe you will find the problem of securing an attractive result will be simplified. Consider the border of your advertisement as its frame, consider the illustration as the cottage, or the group of trees, or the lovers, or the other human or animal centers of interest which appear on most canvases.

Then consider your type matter as the foreground of the picture, which gives the proper setting to the illustration. Your headline will gain attention either through its explanation as the title of the picture or through curiosity by the nature of its appeal. The picture and the caption together must entice the reader into the text or he will never get there; and the text must carry him through to the signature if you want him to get the whole story. Though the value of an advertisement is by no means lost if the picture and the headline are of sufficient

attractive value to stop the reader for a moment, for while the text may be slighted, each person who hesitates through interest generated by illustration and heading will at least want to know their source and will glance at the signature. You don't care if the text is neglected if the rest of the advertisement gave the right impression.

This situation obviously puts a burden upon illustration and caption—a burden that is not by any means confined to their nature, but is also very dependent upon their quality.

To make your advertising picture a pleasing whole it is evidently necessary to consider the relationship of each part to all the other parts. There must be harmony between border, illustration, text and signature. There must be harmony as to the quality and quantity of each, as to their arrangement and as to the contrast of values of black and white, so that the eye must first be attracted, then pleased and almost instantly enticed into reading....

My personal feelings about text are known to you by this time. I would sum them up by saying, be light without being flippant. Be humorous without being cheap. Be friendly without being fresh. Remember that a laugh will accomplish more than much logic; that entertainment is far more appreciated than instruction; that the average human animal will only receive logic or instruction when it is clothed in entertainment, or some form of human interest. That is what makes the motion picture so invaluable.

And I suggest that this is the time to take the offensive. There is no question but that your needs are greater now than ever before. In actual operation, the telephone to-day averages a service equal to that of pre-war days, but you well know that your public is not convinced that this is true. Enthuse your officials and associates with what you want to do. Make them see the great opportunity that exists right now for the gaining of real public support by institutional

advertising. Tell them the truth. Tell them that advertising is not to be used as a plaster to soothe a sore spot, but as a great energizing force, capable of arousing an interest which will insure the backing of any undertaking your company has in mind.

And, gentlemen, all that I have said or endeavored to say will be of no material value if only half heartedly put into practice, or if accepted by only a few and ignored by the others. We are the Bell System. Splendid isolation offers us nothing but danger. We stand or fall together. And we must stand.

CHAPTER V

AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF PUBLIC MOTIVATION IS NECESSARY TO THE WORK OF THE PUBLIC RELATIONS COUNSEL

BEFORE defining the fundamental motivations of society, let me mention those outward signs on which psychologists base their study of conditions.

Psychological habits, or as Mr. Lippmann calls them, "stereotypes," are shorthand by which human effort is minimized. They are so clearly and commonly understood that every one will immediately respond to the mention of a stereotype within his personal experience. The words "capitalist" or "boy scout" bring out definite images to the hearer. These images are more comprehensible than detailed descriptions. Chorus girl, woman lawyer, politician, detective, financier are clean-cut concepts and capable of definition. We all have stereotypes which minimize not only our thinking habits but also the ordinary routine of life.

Mr. Lippmann finds that the stereotypes at the

center of the code by which various sections of the public live "largely determine what group of facts we shall see and in what light we shall see them." That is why, he says, "with the best will in the world, the news policy of a journal tends to support its editorial policy, why a capitalist sees one set of facts and certain aspects of human nature—literally sees them; his socialist opponent another set and other aspects, and why each regards the other as unreasonable or perverse, when the real difference between them is a difference of perception. That difference is imposed by the difference between the capitalist and socialist pattern of stereotypes. 'There are no classes in America,' writes an American editor. 'The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles,' says the Communist Manifesto. If you have the editor's pattern in your mind, you will see vividly the facts that confirm it, vaguely and ineffectively those that contradict. If you have the communist pattern, you will not only look for different things, but you will see with a totally different emphasis what you and the editor happen to see in common."

The stereotype is the basis of a large part of the work of the public relations counsel. Let us try to inquire where the stereotype originates—why it is so influential and why from a practical standpoint it is so tremendously difficult to

affect or change stereotypes or to attempt to substitute one set of stereotypes for another.

Mr. Martin attempts to answer questions such as these in his volume on "The Behavior of Crowds." By "crowds" Mr. Martin does not mean merely a physical aggregation of a number of persons. To Mr. Martin the crowd is rather a state of mind, "the peculiar mental condition which sometimes occurs when people think and act together, either immediately where the members of the group are present and in close contact, or remotely, as when they affect one another in a certain way through the medium of an organization, a party or sect, the press, etc."

Motives of social behavior are based on individual instincts. Individual instincts, on the other hand, must yield to group needs. Mr. Martin pictures society as an aggregation of people who have sacrificed individual freedom in order to remain within the group. This sacrifice of freedom on the part of individuals in the groups leads its members to resist all efforts at fundamental changes in the group code. Because all have made certain sacrifices, reasons are developed why such sacrifices must be insisted upon at all times. The "logic-proof" compartment is the result of this unwillingness to accept changes.

"What has been so painstakingly built up is not to be lightly destroyed. Each group, there-

fore, within itself, considers its own standards ultimate and indisputable, and tends to dismiss all contrary or different standards as indefensible.

"Even an honest, critical understanding of the demands of the opposing crowd is discouraged, possibly because it is rightly felt that the critical habit of mind is as destructive of one crowd-complex as the other, and the old crowd prefers to remain intact and die in the last ditch rather than risk dissolution, even with the promise of averting a revolution. Hence the Romans were willing to believe that the Christians worshiped the head of an ass. The medieval Catholics, even at Leo's court, failed to grasp the meaning of the outbreak in North Germany. Thousands saw in the reformation only the alleged fact that the monk Luther wanted to marry a wife. . . ." ¹

The main satisfaction, Mr. Martin thinks, which the individual derives from his group association is the satisfaction of his vanity through the creation of an enlarged self-importance.

The Freudian theories upon which Mr. Martin relies very largely for his argument lead to the conclusion that what Mr. Henry Watterson has said of the suppression of news applies equally to the suppression of individual desire. Neither will suppress. With the normal person,

¹ "The Behavior of Crowds" (page 199).

the result of this social suppression is to produce an individual who conforms with sufficient closeness to the standards of his group to enable him to remain comfortably within it.

The tendency, however, of the instincts and desires which are thus ruled out of conduct is somehow or other, when the conditions are favorable, to seek some avenue of release and satisfaction. To the individual most of these avenues of release are closed. He cannot, for example, indulge his instinct of pugnacity without running foul of the law. The only release which the individual can have is one which commands, however briefly, the approval of his fellows. That is why Mr. Martin calls crowd psychology and crowd activity "the result of forces hidden in a personal and unconscious psyche of the members of the crowd, forces which are merely released by social gatherings of a certain sort." The crowd enables the individual to express himself according to his desire and without restraint.

He says further, "Every crowd 'boosts for' itself, gives itself airs, speaks with oracular finality, regards itself as morally superior, and will, so far as it has the power, lord it over every one. Notice how each group and section in society, so far as it permits itself to think as crowd, claims to be 'the people.'"

As an illustration of the boosting principle Mr.

Martin points out the readiness of most groups to enter upon conflict of one kind or another with opposing groups. "Nothing so easily catches general attention and grips a crowd as a contest of any kind," he says. "The crowd unconsciously identifies its members with one or the other competitor. Success enables the winning crowd to 'crow over' the losers. Such an action becomes symbolical, and is utilized by the ego to enhance its feeling of importance. In society this egoism tends to take the form of the desire for dominance." According to Mr. Martin, that is why ". . . whenever any attempt is being made to secure recruits for a movement or a point of view the leaders intuitively assume and reiterate the certainty of ultimate victory."

Two points which Mr. Martin makes seem to me most important. In the first place, Mr. Martin points out with absolute justice that the crowd-mind is by no means limited to the ignorant. "Any class," he says, "may behave and think as a crowd—in fact, it usually does so in so far as its class interests are concerned." Neither is the crowd mind to be found only when there is a physical agglomeration of people. This fact is important to an understanding of the problems of the public relations counsel, because he must bear in mind always that the readers of advertisements, the recipients of letters,

the solitary listener at a radio speech, the reader of the morning newspapers are mysteriously part of the crowd-mind.

When Bergson came to America about a decade ago, men and women flocked to his classes, both the French and the English sessions. It was obvious to the observer that numbers of disciples who conscientiously attended the full course of lectures understood almost nothing of what was being said. Their behavior was an instance of the crowd-mind.

Everybody read "Main Street." Each reader in his own study tried to react as a crowd-mind. They felt as they thought they ought to.

Initiation scandals, where the crowd-mind has created a brutality not possible to individuals, take place not only in brotherhoods among what Mr. Martin calls "the lower classes," but also among well-bred college youths and the fraternal orders of successful business and professional men. A more specific instance is the football game, with its manifestations of the crowd-mind among a selected group of individuals. The Ku Klux Klan has numbered among its violent supporters some of the "best" families of the affected localities.

The crowd is a state of mind which permeates society and its individuals at almost all times. What becomes articulate in times of stress under

great excitement is present in the mind of the individual at most times and explains in part why popular opinion is so positive and so intolerant of contrary points of view. The college professor in his study on a peaceful summer day is just as likely to be reacting as a unit of a crowd-mind, as any member of a lynching party in Texas or Georgia.

Mr. Trotter in his book, "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War,"¹ gives us further material for study. He discusses the underlying causes and results of "herd" tendencies, stressing the herd's cohesiveness.

The tendency the group has to standardize the habits of individuals and to assign logical reasons for them is an important factor in the work of the public relations counsel. The predominant point of view, according to Mr. Trotter, which translates a rationalized point of view into an axiomatic truth, arises and derives its strength from the fact that it enlists herd support for the point of view of the individual. This explains why it is so easy to popularize many ideas.

"The cardinal quality of the herd is homogeneity."² The biological significance of homo-

¹ W. Trotter, "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War."

² It should be explained at the very outset that Mr. Trotter does not use the term "herd" in any derogatory sense. He approaches the entire subject from the point of view of the biologist and compares the gregarious instinct in man to the same instinct in lower forms of life.

geneity lies in its survival value. The wolf pack is many times as strong as the combined strength of each of its individual members. These results of homogeneity have created the "herd" point of view.

One of the psychological results of homogeneity is the fact that physical loneliness is a real terror to the gregarious animal, and that association with the herd causes a feeling of security. In man this fear of loneliness creates a desire for identification with the herd in matters of opinion. It is here, says Mr. Trotter,¹ that we find "the ineradicable impulse mankind has always displayed towards segregation into classes. Each one of us in his opinions and his conduct, in matters of amusement, religion, and politics, is compelled to obtain the support of a class, of a herd within the herd."

Says Mr. Trotter:² "The effect of it will clearly be to make acceptable those suggestions which come from the herd, and those only. It is of especial importance to note that this suggestibility is not general, and it is only herd suggestions which are rendered acceptable by the action of instinct, and man is, for example, notoriously insensitive to the suggestions of experience. The history of what is rather grandiosely called hu-

¹ "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War" (page 32).

² *Ibid.*

man progress everywhere illustrates this. If we look back upon the developments of some such thing as the steam engine, we cannot fail to be struck by the extreme obviousness of each advance, and how obstinately it was refused assimilation until the machine almost invented itself."

The workings of the gregarious instinct in man result frequently in conduct of the most remarkable complexity, but it is characterized by all of the qualities of instinctive action. Such conduct is usually rationalized, but this does not conceal its real character.

We may sincerely think that we vote the Republican ticket because we have thought out the issues of the political campaign and reached our decision in the cold-blooded exercise of judgment. The fact remains that it is just as likely that we voted the Republican ticket because we did so the year before or because the Republican platform contains a declaration of principle, no matter how vague, which awakens profound emotional response in us, or because our neighbor whom we do not like happens to be a Democrat.

Mr. Lippmann remarks:¹ "For the most part we do not first see and then define, we define first and then see. In the great booming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out of the clutter what is already defined for us, and we

¹ "Public Opinion" (page 81).

tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture."

Mr. Trotter cites as a few of the examples of rationalization the mechanism which "enables the European lady who wears rings in her ears to smile at the barbarism of the colored lady who wears her rings in her nose"¹ and the process which enables the Englishman "who is amused by the African chieftain's regard for the top hat as an essential piece of the furniture of state to ignore the identity of his own behavior when he goes to church beneath the same tremendous ensign."

The gregarious tendency in man, according to Mr. Trotter, results in five characteristics which he displays in common with all gregarious animals.

1. *"He is intolerant and fearful of solitude, physical or mental."*² The same urge which drives the buffalo into the herd and man into the city requires on the part of the latter a sense of spiritual identification with the herd. Man is never so much at home as when on the band wagon.

2. *"He is more sensitive to the voice of the herd than to any other influence."* Mr. Trotter illustrates this characteristic in a paragraph which

¹ "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War" (page 38).

² *Ibid.* (page 112 et seq.). Italics mine.

is worth quoting in its entirety. He says: "It (the voice of the herd) can inhibit or stimulate his thought and conduct. It is the source of his moral codes, of the sanctions of his ethics and philosophy. It can endow him with energy, courage, and endurance, and can as easily take these away. It can make him acquiesce in his own punishment and embrace his executioner, submit to poverty, bow to tyranny, and sink without complaint under starvation. Not merely can it make him accept hardship and suffering unresistingly, but it can make him accept as truth the explanation that his perfectly preventable afflictions are sublimely just and gentle. It is this acme of the power of herd suggestion that is perhaps the most absolutely incontestable proof of the profoundly gregarious nature of man."

3. *"He is subject to the passions of the pack in his mob violence and the passions of the herd in his panics."*

4. *"He is remarkably susceptible to leadership."* Mr. Trotter points out that the need for leadership is often satisfied by leadership of a quality which cannot stand analysis, and which must therefore satisfy some impulse rather than the demands of reason.

5. *"His relations with his fellows are dependent upon the recognition of him as a member of the herd."*

CHAPTER I

ORGANIZING CHAOS

THE conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country.

We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of. This is a logical result of the way in which our democratic society is organized. Vast numbers of human beings must coöperate in this manner if they are to live together as a smoothly functioning society.

Our invisible governors are, in many cases, unaware of the identity of their fellow members in the inner cabinet.

They govern us by their qualities of natural leadership, their ability to supply needed ideas and by their key position in the social structure. Whatever attitude one chooses to take toward this condition, it remains a fact that in almost every act of our daily lives, whether in the sphere of politics or business, in our social conduct or our ethical thinking, we are

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dominated by the relatively small number of persons—a trifling fraction of our hundred and twenty million—who understand the mental processes and social patterns of the masses. It is they who pull the wires which control the public mind, who harness old social forces and contrive new ways to bind and guide the world.

It is not usually realized how necessary these invisible governors are to the orderly functioning of our group life. In theory, every citizen may vote for whom he pleases. Our Constitution does not envisage political parties as part of the mechanism of government, and its framers seem not to have pictured to themselves the existence in our national politics of anything like the modern political machine. But the American voters soon found that without organization and direction their individual votes, cast, perhaps, for dozens or hundreds of candidates, would produce nothing but confusion. Invisible government, in the shape of rudimentary political parties, arose almost overnight. Ever since then we have agreed, for the sake of simplicity and practicality, that party machines should narrow down the field of choice to two candidates, or at most three or four.

In theory, every citizen makes up his mind on public questions and matters of private conduct. In practice, if all men had to study for themselves the abstruse economic, political, and ethical data involved

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in every question, they would find it impossible to come to a conclusion about anything. We have voluntarily agreed to let an invisible government sift the data and high-spot the outstanding issues so that our field of choice shall be narrowed to practical proportions. From our leaders and the media they use to reach the public, we accept the evidence and the demarcation of issues bearing upon public questions; from some ethical teacher, be it a minister, a favorite essayist, or merely prevailing opinion, we accept a standardized code of social conduct to which we conform most of the time.

In theory, everybody buys the best and cheapest commodities offered him on the market. In practice, if every one went around pricing, and chemically testing before purchasing, the dozens of soaps or fabrics or brands of bread which are for sale, economic life would become hopelessly jammed. To avoid such confusion, society consents to have its choice narrowed to ideas and objects brought to its attention through propaganda of all kinds. [There is consequently a vast and continuous effort going on to capture our minds in the interest of some policy or commodity or idea.]

It might be better to have, instead of propaganda and special pleading, committees of wise men who would choose our rulers, dictate our conduct, private and public, and decide upon the best types of clothes for us to wear and the best kinds of food for us to

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eat. But we have chosen the opposite method, that of open competition. We must find a way to make free competition function with reasonable smoothness. To achieve this society has consented to permit free competition to be organized by leadership and propaganda.

Some of the phenomena of this process are criticized—the manipulation of news, the inflation of personality, and the general ballyhoo by which politicians and commercial products and social ideas are brought to the consciousness of the masses. The instruments by which public opinion is organized and focused may be misused. But such organization and focusing are necessary to orderly life.

As civilization has become more complex, and as the need for invisible government has been increasingly demonstrated, the technical means have been invented and developed by which opinion may be regimented.

[With the printing press and the newspaper, the railroad, the telephone, telegraph, radio and airplanes, ideas can be spread rapidly and even instantaneously over the whole of America.]

H. G. Wells senses the vast potentialities of these inventions when he writes in the *New York Times*:

“Modern means of communication—the power afforded by print, telephone, wireless and so forth, of rapidly putting through directive strategic or technical conceptions to a great number of coöperating

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centers, of getting quick replies and effective discussion—have opened up a new world of political processes. Ideas and phrases can now be given an effectiveness greater than the effectiveness of any personality and stronger than any sectional interest. The common design can be documented and sustained against perversion and betrayal. It can be elaborated and developed steadily and widely without personal, local and sectional misunderstanding.”

What Mr. Wells says of political processes is equally true of commercial and social processes and all manifestations of mass activity. The groupings and affiliations of society to-day are no longer subject to “local and sectional” limitations. When the Constitution was adopted, the unit of organization was the village community, which produced the greater part of its own necessary commodities and generated its group ideas and opinions by personal contact and discussion directly among its citizens. [But to-day, because ideas can be instantaneously transmitted to any distance and to any number of people, this geographical integration has been supplemented by many other kinds of grouping, so that persons having the same ideas and interests may be associated and regimented for common action even though they live thousands of miles apart.]

It is extremely difficult to realize how many and diverse are these cleavages in our society. They may be social, political, economic, racial, religious or eth-

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ical, with hundreds of subdivisions of each. In the World Almanac, for example, the following groups are listed under the A's:

The League to Abolish Capital Punishment; Association to Abolish War; American Institute of Accountants; Actors' Equity Association; Actuarial Association of America; International Advertising Association; National Aeronautic Association; Albany Institute of History and Art; Amen Corner; American Academy in Rome; American Antiquarian Society; League for American Citizenship; American Federation of Labor; Amore (Rosicrucian Order); Andiron Club; American-Irish Historical Association; Anti-Cigarette League; Anti-Profanity League; Archeological Association of America; National Archery Association; Arion Singing Society; American Astronomical Association; Ayrshire Breeders' Association; Aztec Club of 1847. There are many more under the "A" section of this very limited list.

The American Newspaper Annual and Directory for 1928 lists 22,128 periodical publications in America. I have selected at random the N's published in Chicago. They are:

Narod (Bohemian daily newspaper); Narod-Polski (Polish monthly); N.A.R.D. (pharmaceutical); National Corporation Reporter; National Culinary Progress (for hotel chefs); National Dog Journal; National Drug Clerk; National Engineer; National

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Grocer; National Hotel Reporter; National Income Tax Magazine; National Jeweler; National Journal of Chiropractic; National Live Stock Producer; National Miller; National Nut News; National Poultry, Butter and Egg Bulletin; National Provisioner (for meat packers); National Real Estate Journal; National Retail Clothier; National Retail Lumber Dealer; National Safety News; National Spiritualist; National Underwriter; The Nation's Health; Naujienos (Lithuanian daily newspaper); New Comer (Republican weekly for Italians); Daily News; The New World (Catholic weekly); North American Banker; North American Veterinarian.

The circulation of some of these publications is astonishing. The National Live Stock Producer has a sworn circulation of 155,978; The National Engineer, of 20,328; The New World, an estimated circulation of 67,000. The greater number of the periodicals listed—chosen at random from among 22,128—have a circulation in excess of 10,000.

The diversity of these publications is evident at a glance. Yet they can only faintly suggest the multitude of cleavages which exist in our society, and along which flow information and opinion carrying authority to the individual groups.

Here are the conventions scheduled for Cleveland, Ohio, recorded in a single recent issue of "World

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Convention Dates"—a fraction of the 5,500 conventions and rallies scheduled.

The Employing Photo-Engravers' Association of America; The Outdoor Writers' Association; the Knights of St. John; the Walther League; The National Knitted Outerwear Association; The Knights of St. Joseph; The Royal Order of Sphinx; The Mortgage Bankers' Association; The International Association of Public Employment Officials; The Kiwanis Clubs of Ohio; The American Photo-Engravers' Association; The Cleveland Auto Manufacturers Show; The American Society of Heating and Ventilating Engineers.

Other conventions to be held in 1928 were those of:

The Association of Limb Manufacturers' Associations; The National Circus Fans' Association of America; The American Naturopathic Association; The American Trap Shooting Association; The Texas Folklore Association; The Hotel Greeters; The Fox Breeders' Association; The Insecticide and Disinfectant Association; The National Association of Egg Case and Egg Case Filler Manufacturers; The American Bottlers of Carbonated Beverages; and The National Pickle Packers' Association, not to mention the Terrapin Derby—most of them with banquets and orations attached.

If all these thousands of formal organizations and institutions could be listed (and no complete list has

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ever been made), they would still represent but a part of those existing less formally but leading vigorous lives. Ideas are sifted and opinions stereotyped in the neighborhood bridge club. Leaders assert their authority through community drives and amateur theatricals. Thousands of women may unconsciously belong to a sorority which follows the fashions set by a single society leader.

"Life" satirically expresses this idea in the reply which it represents an American as giving to the Britisher who praises this country for having no upper and lower classes or castes:

"Yeah, all we have is the Four Hundred, the White-Collar Men, Bootleggers, Wall Street Barons, Criminals, the D.A.R., the K.K.K., the Colonial Dames, the Masons, Kiwanis and Rotarians, the K. of C., the Elks, the Censors, the Cognoscenti, the Morons, Heroes like Lindy, the W.C.T.U., Politicians, Menckenites, the Booboisie, Immigrants, Broadcasters, and—the Rich and Poor."

Yet it must be remembered that these thousands of groups interlace. John Jones, besides being a Rotarian, is member of a church, of a fraternal order, of a political party, of a charitable organization, of a professional association, of a local chamber of commerce, of a league for or against prohibition or of a society for or against lowering the tariff, and of a golf club. The opinions which he receives as a

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Rotarian, he will tend to disseminate in the other groups in which he may have influence.

4 [This invisible, intertwining structure of groupings and associations is the mechanism by which democracy has organized its group mind and simplified its mass thinking.] To deplore the existence of such a mechanism is to ask for a society such as never was and never will be. To admit that it exists, but expect that it shall not be used, is unreasonable.

Emil Ludwig represents Napoleon as "ever on the watch for indications of public opinion; always listening to the voice of the people, a voice which defies calculation. 'Do you know,' he said in those days, 'what amazes me more than all else? The impotence of force to organize anything.'"

It is the purpose of this book to explain the structure of the mechanism which controls the public mind, and to tell how it is manipulated by the special pleader who seeks to create public acceptance for a particular idea or commodity. It will attempt at the same time to find the due place in the modern democratic scheme for this new propaganda and to suggest its gradually evolving code of ethics and practice.

CHAPTER II

THE NEW PROPAGANDA

IN the days when kings were kings, Louis XIV made his modest remark, "L'Etat c'est moi." He was nearly right.

But times have changed. The steam engine, the multiple press, and the public school, that trio of the industrial revolution, have taken the power away from kings and given it to the people. The people actually gained power which the king lost. For economic power tends to draw after it political power; and the history of the industrial revolution shows how that power passed from the king and the aristocracy to the bourgeoisie. Universal suffrage and universal schooling reënforced this tendency, and at last even the bourgeoisie stood in fear of the common people. For the masses promised to become king.

To-day, however, a reaction has set in. The minority has discovered a powerful help in influencing majorities. It has been found possible so to mold the mind of the masses that they will throw their newly gained strength in the desired direction. In the present structure of society, this practice is inevitable. Whatever of social importance is done

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to-day, whether in politics, finance, manufacture, agriculture, charity, education, or other fields, must be done with the help of propaganda. Propaganda is the executive arm of the invisible government.

Universal literacy was supposed to educate the common man to control his environment. Once he could read and write he would have a mind fit to rule. So ran the democratic doctrine. But instead of a mind, universal literacy has given him rubber stamps, rubber stamps inked with advertising slogans, with editorials, with published scientific data, with the trivialities of the tabloids and the platitudes of history, but quite innocent of original thought. Each man's rubber stamps are the duplicates of millions of others, so that when those millions are exposed to the same stimuli, all receive identical imprints. It may seem an exaggeration to say that the American public gets most of its ideas in this wholesale fashion. The mechanism by which ideas are disseminated on a large scale is propaganda, in the broad sense of an organized effort to spread a particular belief or doctrine.

I am aware that the word "propaganda" carries to many minds an unpleasant connotation. Yet whether, in any instance, propaganda is good or bad depends upon the merit of the cause urged, and the correctness of the information published.

In itself, the word "propaganda" has certain technical meanings which, like most things in this world,

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are "neither good nor bad but custom makes them so." I find the word defined in Funk and Wagnalls' Dictionary in four ways:

"1. A society of cardinals, the overseers of foreign missions; also the College of the Propaganda at Rome founded by Pope Urban VIII in 1627 for the education of missionary priests; Sacred College *de Propaganda Fide*.

"2. Hence, any institution or scheme for propagating a doctrine or system.

"3. Effort directed systematically toward the gaining of public support for an opinion or a course of action.

"4. The principles advanced by a propaganda."

The *Scientific American*, in a recent issue, pleads for the restoration to respectable usage of that "fine old word 'propaganda.'"

"There is no word in the English language," it says, "whose meaning has been so sadly distorted as the word 'propaganda.' The change took place mainly during the late war when the term took on a decidedly sinister complexion.

"If you turn to the Standard Dictionary, you will find that the word was applied to a congregation or society of cardinals for the care and oversight of foreign missions which was instituted at Rome in the year 1627. It was applied also to the College of the Propaganda at Rome that was founded by Pope Urban VIII, for the education of the missionary

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5 priests. Hence, in later years the word came to be applied to any institution or scheme for propagating a doctrine or system.

6 "Judged by this definition, we can see that in its true sense propaganda is a perfectly legitimate form of human activity. Any society, whether it be social, religious or political, which is possessed of certain beliefs, and sets out to make them known, either by the spoken or written words, is practicing propaganda.

17 "Truth is mighty and must prevail, and if any body of men believe that they have discovered a valuable truth, it is not merely their privilege but their duty to disseminate that truth. If they realize, as they quickly must, that this spreading of the truth can be done upon a large scale and effectively only by organized effort, they will make use of the press and the platform as the best means to give it wide circulation. [Propaganda becomes vicious and reprehensive only when its authors consciously and deliberately disseminate what they know to be lies, or when they aim at effects which they know to be prejudicial to the common good.]

"'Propaganda' in its proper meaning is a perfectly wholesome word, of honest parentage, and with an honorable history. The fact that it should to-day be carrying a sinister meaning merely shows how much of the child remains in the average adult. A group of citizens writes and talks in favor of a certain

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course of action in some debatable question, believing that it is promoting the best interest of the community. Propaganda? Not a bit of it. Just a plain forceful statement of truth. But let another group of citizens express opposing views, and they are promptly labeled with the sinister name of propaganda. . . .

"'What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander,' says a wise old proverb. Let us make haste to put this fine old word back where it belongs, and restore its dignified significance for the use of our children and our children's children."

The extent to which propaganda shapes the progress of affairs about us may surprise even well informed persons. Nevertheless, it is only necessary to look under the surface of the newspaper for a hint as to propaganda's authority over public opinion. Page one of the *New York Times* on the day these paragraphs are written contains eight important news stories. Four of them, or one-half, are propaganda. } — 8
The casual reader accepts them as accounts of spontaneous happenings. But are they? Here are the headlines which announce them: "TWELVE NATIONS WARN CHINA REAL REFORM MUST COME BEFORE THEY GIVE RELIEF," "PRITCHETT REPORTS ZIONISM WILL FAIL," "REALTY MEN DEMAND A TRANSIT INQUIRY," and "OUR LIVING STANDARD HIGHEST IN HISTORY, SAYS HOOVER REPORT."

Take them in order: the article on China explains

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the joint report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China, presenting an exposition of the Powers' stand in the Chinese muddle. What it says is less important than what it is. It was "made public by the State Department to-day" with the purpose of presenting to the American public a picture of the State Department's position. Its source gives it authority, and the American public tends to accept and support the State Department view.

The report of Dr. Pritchett, a trustee of the Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, is an attempt to find the facts about this Jewish colony in the midst of a restless Arab world. When Dr. Pritchett's survey convinced him that in the long run Zionism would "bring more bitterness and more unhappiness both for the Jew and for the Arab," this point of view was broadcast with all the authority of the Carnegie Foundation, so that the public would hear and believe. The statement by the president of the Real Estate Board of New York, and Secretary Hoover's report, are similar attempts to influence the public toward an opinion.

These examples are not given to create the impression that there is anything sinister about propaganda. They are set down rather to illustrate how conscious direction is given to events, and how the men behind these events influence public opinion. As such they are examples of modern propaganda. At this point we may attempt to define propaganda.

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Modern propaganda is a consistent, enduring effort to create or shape events to influence the relations of the public to an enterprise, idea or group.

This practice of creating circumstances and of creating pictures in the minds of millions of persons is very common. Virtually no important undertaking is now carried on without it, whether that enterprise be building a cathedral, endowing a university, marketing a moving picture, floating a large bond issue, or electing a president. Sometimes the effect on the public is created by a professional propagandist, sometimes by an amateur deputed for the job. The important thing is that it is universal and continuous; and in its sum total it is regimenting the public mind every bit as much as an army regiments the bodies of its soldiers.

So vast are the numbers of minds which can be regimented, and so tenacious are they when regimented, that a group at times offers an irresistible pressure before which legislators, editors, and teachers are helpless. The group will cling to its stereotype, as Walter Lippmann calls it, making of those supposedly powerful beings, the leaders of public opinion, mere bits of driftwood in the surf. When an Imperial Wizard, sensing what is perhaps hunger for an ideal, offers a picture of a nation all Nordic and nationalistic, the common man of the older American stock, feeling himself elbowed out of his rightful position and prosperity by the newer immi-

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grant stocks, grasps the picture which fits in so neatly with his prejudices, and makes it his own. He buys the sheet and pillow-case costume, and bands with his fellows by the thousand into a huge group powerful enough to swing state elections and to throw a ponderous monkey wrench into a national convention.

In our present social organization approval of the public is essential to any large undertaking. Hence a laudable movement may be lost unless it impresses itself on the public mind. Charity, as well as business, and politics and literature, for that matter, have had to adopt propaganda, for the public must be regimented into giving money just as it must be regimented into tuberculosis prophylaxis. The Near East Relief, the Association for the Improvement of the Condition of the Poor of New York, and all the rest, have to work on public opinion just as though they had tubes of tooth paste to sell. We are proud of our diminishing infant death rate—and that too is the work of propaganda.

Propaganda does exist on all sides of us, and it does change our mental pictures of the world. Even if this be unduly pessimistic—and that remains to be proved—the opinion reflects a tendency that is undoubtedly real. In fact, its use is growing as its efficiency in gaining public support is recognized.

This then, evidently indicates the fact that any one with sufficient influence can lead sections of the

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public at least for a time and for a given purpose. Formerly the rulers were the leaders. They laid out the course of history, by the simple process of doing what they wanted. And if nowadays the successors of the rulers, those whose position or ability gives them power, can no longer do what they want without the approval of the masses, they find in propaganda a tool which is increasingly powerful in gaining that approval. Therefore, propaganda is here to stay.

It was, of course, the astounding success of propaganda during the war that opened the eyes of the intelligent few in all departments of life to the possibilities of regimenting the public mind. The American government and numerous patriotic agencies developed a technique which, to most persons accustomed to bidding for public acceptance, was new. They not only appealed to the individual by means of every approach—visual, graphic, and auditory—to support the national endeavor, but they also secured the coöperation of the key men in every group—persons whose mere word carried authority to hundreds or thousands or hundreds of thousands of followers. They thus automatically gained the support of fraternal, religious, commercial, patriotic, social and local groups whose members took their opinions from their accustomed leaders and spokesmen, or from the periodical publications which they were accustomed to read and believe. At the same

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time, the manipulators of patriotic opinion made use of the mental clichés and the emotional habits of the public to produce mass reactions against the alleged atrocities, the terror and the tyranny of the enemy. It was only natural, after the war ended, that intelligent persons should ask themselves whether it was not possible to apply a similar technique to the problems of peace.

As a matter of fact, the practice of propaganda since the war has assumed very different forms from those prevalent twenty years ago. This new technique may fairly be called the new propaganda.

It takes account not merely of the individual, nor even of the mass mind alone, but also and especially of the anatomy of society, with its interlocking group formations and loyalties. It sees the individual not only as a cell in the social organism but as a cell organized into the social unit. Touch a nerve at a sensitive spot and you get an automatic response from certain specific members of the organism.

Business offers graphic examples of the effect that may be produced upon the public by interested groups, such as textile manufacturers losing their markets. This problem arose, not long ago, when the velvet manufacturers were facing ruin because their product had long been out of fashion. Analysis showed that it was impossible to revive a velvet fashion within America. Anatomical hunt for the vital spot! Paris! Obviously! But yes and no. Paris is

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the home of fashion. Lyons is the home of silk. The attack had to be made at the source. It was determined to substitute purpose for chance and to utilize the regular sources for fashion distribution and to influence the public from these sources. A velvet fashion service, openly supported by the manufacturers, was organized. Its first function was to establish contact with the Lyons manufactories and the Paris couturiers to discover what they were doing, to encourage them to act on behalf of velvet, and to help in the proper exploitation of their wares. An intelligent Parisian was enlisted in the work. He visited Lanvin and Worth, Agnès and Patou, and others and induced them to use velvet in their gowns and hats. It was he who arranged for the distinguished Countess This or Duchess That to wear the hat or the gown. And as for the presentation of the idea to the public, the American buyer or the American woman of fashion was simply shown the velvet creations in the atelier of the dressmaker or the milliner. She bought the velvet because she liked it and because it was in fashion.

The editors of the American magazines and fashion reporters of the American newspapers, likewise subjected to the actual (although created) circumstance, reflected it in their news, which, in turn, subjected the buyer and the consumer here to the same influences. The result was that what was at first a trickle of velvet became a flood. A demand

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was slowly, but deliberately, created in Paris and America. A big department store, aiming to be a style leader, advertised velvet gowns and hats on the authority of the French couturiers, and quoted original cables received from them. The echo of the new style note was heard from hundreds of department stores throughout the country which wanted to be style leaders too. Bulletins followed despatches. The mail followed the cables. And the American woman traveler appeared before the ship news photographers in velvet gown and hat.

The created circumstances had their effect. "Fickle fashion has veered to velvet," was one newspaper comment. And the industry in the United States again kept thousands busy.

The new propaganda, having regard to the constitution of society as a whole, not infrequently serves to focus and realize the desires of the masses. A desire for a specific reform, however widespread, cannot be translated into action until it is made articulate, and until it has exerted sufficient pressure upon the proper law-making bodies. Millions of housewives may feel that manufactured foods deleterious to health should be prohibited. But there is little chance that their individual desires will be translated into effective legal form unless their half-expressed demand can be organized, made vocal, and concentrated upon the state legislature or upon the Federal Congress in some mode which will pro-

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duce the results they desire. Whether they realize it or not, they call upon propaganda to organize and effectuate their demand.

But clearly it is the intelligent minorities which need to make use of propaganda continuously and systematically. In the active proselytizing minorities in whom selfish interests and public interests coincide lie the progress and development of America. Only through the active energy of the intelligent few can the public at large become aware of and act upon new ideas.

Small groups of persons can, and do, make the rest of us think what they please about a given subject. But there are usually proponents and opponents of every propaganda, both of whom are equally eager to convince the majority.

CHAPTER III

THE NEW PROPAGANDISTS

Who are the men who, without our realizing it, give us our ideas, tell us whom to admire and whom to despise, what to believe about the ownership of public utilities, about the tariff, about the price of rubber, about the Dawes Plan, about immigration; who tell us how our houses should be designed, what furniture we should put into them, what menus we should serve on our table, what kind of shirts we must wear, what sports we should indulge in, what plays we should see, what charities we should support, what pictures we should admire, what slang we should affect, what jokes we should laugh at?

If we set out to make a list of the men and women who, because of their position in public life, might fairly be called the molders of public opinion, we could quickly arrive at an extended list of persons mentioned in "Who's Who." It would obviously include, the President of the United States and the members of his Cabinet; the Senators and Representatives in Congress; the Governors of our forty-eight states; the presidents of the chambers of commerce in our hundred largest cities, the chairmen of the boards of directors of our hundred or more

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largest industrial corporations, the president of many of the labor unions affiliated in the American Federation of Labor, the national president of each of the national professional and fraternal organizations, the president of each of the racial or language societies in the country, the hundred leading newspaper and magazine editors, the fifty most popular authors, the presidents of the fifty leading charitable organizations, the twenty leading theatrical or cinema producers, the hundred recognized leaders of fashion, the most popular and influential clergymen in the hundred leading cities, the presidents of our colleges and universities and the foremost members of their faculties, the most powerful financiers in Wall Street, the most noted amateurs of sport, and so on.

Such a list would comprise several thousand persons. But it is well known that many of these leaders are themselves led, sometimes by persons, whose names are known to few. Many a congressman, in framing his platform, follows the suggestions of a district boss whom few persons outside the political machine have ever heard of. Eloquent divines may have great influence in their communities, but often take their doctrines from a higher ecclesiastical authority. The presidents of chambers of commerce mold the thought of local business men concerning public issues, but the opinions which they promulgate are usually derived from some national authority. A presidential candidate may be

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"drafted" in response to "overwhelming popular demand," but it is well known that his name may be decided upon by half a dozen men sitting around a table in a hotel room.

In some instances the power of invisible wire-pullers is flagrant. The power of the invisible cabinet which deliberated at the poker table in a certain little green house in Washington has become a national legend. There was a period in which the major policies of the national government were dictated by a single man, Mark Hanna. A Simmons may, for a few years, succeed in marshaling millions of men on a platform of intolerance and violence.

Such persons typify in the public mind the type of ruler associated with the phrase invisible government. But we do not often stop to think that there are dictators in other fields whose influence is just as decisive as that of the politicians I have mentioned. An Irene Castle can establish the fashion of short hair which dominates nine-tenths of the women who make any pretense to being fashionable. Paris fashion leaders set the mode of the short skirt, for wearing which, twenty years ago, any woman would simply have been arrested and thrown into jail by the New York police, and the entire women's clothing industry, capitalized at hundreds of millions of dollars, must be reorganized to conform to their dictum.

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There are invisible rulers who control the destinies of millions. It is not generally realized to what extent the words and actions of our most influential public men are dictated by shrewd persons operating behind the scenes.

Nor, what is still more important, the extent to which our thoughts and habits are modified by authorities.

In some departments of our daily life, in which we imagine ourselves free agents, we are ruled by dictators exercising great power. A man buying a suit of clothes imagines that he is choosing, according to his taste and his personality, the kind of garment which he prefers. In reality, he may be obeying the orders of an anonymous gentleman tailor in London. This personage is the silent partner in a modest tailoring establishment, which is patronized by gentlemen of fashion and princes of the blood. He suggests to British noblemen and others a blue cloth instead of gray, two buttons instead of three, or sleeves a quarter of an inch narrower than last season. The distinguished customer approves of the idea.

But how does this fact affect John Smith of Topeka?

The gentleman tailor is under contract with a certain large American firm, which manufactures men's suits, to send them instantly the designs of the suits chosen by the leaders of London fashion.

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Upon receiving the designs, with specifications as to color, weight and texture, the firm immediately places an order with the cloth makers for several hundred thousand dollars' worth of cloth. The suits made up according to the specifications are then advertised as the latest fashion. The fashionable men in New York, Chicago, Boston and Philadelphia wear them. And the Topeka man, recognizing this leadership, does the same.

Women are just as subject to the commands of invisible government as are men. A silk manufacturer, seeking a new market for its product, suggested to a large manufacturer of shoes that women's shoes should be covered with silk to match their dresses. The idea was adopted and systematically propagandized. A popular actress was persuaded to wear the shoes. The fashion spread. The shoe firm was ready with the supply to meet the created demand. And the silk company was ready with the silk for more shoes.

The man who injected this idea into the shoe industry was ruling women in one department of their social lives. Different men rule us in the various departments of our lives. There may be one power behind the throne in politics, another in the manipulation of the Federal discount rate, and still another in the dictation of next season's dances. If there were a national invisible cabinet ruling our destinies (a thing which is not impossible to conceive of) it

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would work through certain group leaders on Tuesday for one purpose, and through an entirely different set on Wednesday for another. The idea of invisible government is relative. There may be a handful of men who control the educational methods of the great majority of our schools. Yet from another standpoint, every parent is a group leader with authority over his or her children.

The invisible government tends to be concentrated in the hands of the few because of the expense of manipulating the social machinery which controls the opinions and habits of the masses. To advertise on a scale which will reach fifty million persons is expensive. To reach and persuade the group leaders who dictate the public's thoughts and actions is likewise expensive.

For this reason there is an increasing tendency to concentrate the functions of propaganda in the hands of the propaganda specialist. This specialist is more and more assuming a distinct place and function in our national life.

New activities call for new nomenclature. The propagandist who specializes in interpreting enterprises and ideas to the public, and in interpreting the public to promulgators of new enterprises and ideas, has come to be known by the name of "public relations counsel."

The new profession of public relations has grown up because of the increasing complexity of modern

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life and the consequent necessity for making the actions of one part of the public understandable to other sectors of the public. It is due, too, to the increasing dependence of organized power of all sorts upon public opinion. Governments, whether they are monarchical, constitutional, democratic or communist, depend upon acquiescent public opinion for the success of their efforts and, in fact, government is only government by virtue of public acquiescence. Industries, public utilities, educational movements, indeed all groups representing any concept or product, whether they are majority or minority ideas, succeed only because of approving public opinion. Public opinion is the unacknowledged partner in all broad efforts.

The public relations counsel, then, is the agent who, working with modern media of communication and the group formations of society, brings an idea to the consciousness of the public. But he is a great deal more than that. He is concerned with courses of action, doctrines, systems and opinions, and the securing of public support for them. He is also concerned with tangible things such as manufactured and raw products. He is concerned with public utilities, with large trade groups and associations representing entire industries.

He functions primarily as an adviser to his client, very much as a lawyer does. A lawyer concentrates on the legal aspects of his client's business. A coun-

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sel on public relations concentrates on the public contacts of his client's business. Every phase of his client's ideas, products or activities which may affect the public or in which the public may have an interest is part of his function.

For instance, in the specific problems of the manufacturer he examines the product, the markets, the way in which the public reacts to the product, the attitude of the employees to the public and towards the product, and the coöperation of the distribution agencies.

The counsel on public relations, after he has examined all these and other factors, endeavors to shape the actions of his client so that they will gain the interest, the approval and the acceptance of the public.

The means by which the public is apprised of the actions of his client are as varied as the means of communication themselves, such as conversation, letters, the stage, the motion picture, the radio, the lecture platform, the magazine, the daily newspaper. (The counsel on public relations is not an advertising man but he advocates advertising where that is indicated.) Very often he is called in by an advertising agency to supplement its work on behalf of a client. His work and that of the advertising agency do not conflict with or duplicate each other.

His first efforts are, naturally, devoted to analyzing his client's problems and making sure that what

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He has to offer the public is something which the public accepts or can be brought to accept. It is futile to attempt to sell an idea or to prepare the ground for a product that is basically unsound.

For example, an orphan asylum is worried by a falling off in contributions and a puzzling attitude of indifference or hostility on the part of the public. The counsel on public relations may discover upon analysis that the public, alive to modern sociological trends, subconsciously criticizes the institution because it is not organized on the new "cottage plan." He will advise modification of the client in this respect. Or a railroad may be urged to put on a fast train for the sake of the prestige which it will lend to the road's name, and hence to its stocks and bonds. If the corset makers, for instance, wished to bring their product into fashion again, he would unquestionably advise that the plan was impossible, since women have definitely emancipated themselves from the old-style corset. Yet his fashion advisers might report that women might be persuaded to adopt a certain type of girdle which eliminated the unhealthful features of the corset.

His next effort is to analyze his public. He studies the groups which must be reached, and the leaders through whom he may approach these groups. Social groups, economic groups, geographical groups, age groups, doctrinal groups, language groups, cultural groups, all these represent the divisions through

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which, on behalf of his client, he may talk to the public.

Only after this double analysis has been made and the results collated, has the time come for the next step, the formulation of policies governing the general practice, procedure and habits of the client in all those aspects in which he comes in contact with the public. And only when these policies have been agreed upon is it time for the fourth step.

The first recognition of the distinct functions of the public relations counsel arose, perhaps, in the early years of the present century as a result of the insurance scandals coincident with the muck-raking of corporate finance in the popular magazines. The interests thus attacked suddenly realized that they were completely out of touch with the public they were professing to serve, and required expert advice to show them how they could understand the public and interpret themselves to it.

The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, prompted by the most fundamental self-interest, initiated a conscious, directed effort to change the attitude of the public toward insurance companies in general, and toward itself in particular, to its profit and the public's benefit.

It tried to make a majority movement of itself by getting the public to buy its policies. It reached the public at every point of its corporate and separate existences. To communities it gave health surveys

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and expert counsel. To individuals it gave health creeds and advice. Even the building in which the corporation was located was made a picturesque landmark to see and remember, in other words to carry on the associative process. And so this company came to have a broad general acceptance. The number and amount of its policies grew constantly, as its broad contacts with society increased.

Within a decade, many large corporations were employing public relations counsel under one title or another, for they had come to recognize that they depended upon public good will for their continued prosperity. It was no longer true that it was "none of the public's business" how the affairs of a corporation were managed. They were obliged to convince the public that they were conforming to its demands as to honesty and fairness. Thus a corporation might discover that its labor policy was causing public resentment, and might introduce a more enlightened policy solely for the sake of general good will. Or a department store, hunting for the cause of diminishing sales, might discover that its clerks had a reputation for bad manners, and initiate formal instruction in courtesy and tact.

The public relations expert may be known as public relations director or counsel. Often he is called secretary or vice-president or director. Sometimes he is known as cabinet officer or commissioner. By whatever title he may be called, his function is well

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defined and his advice has definite bearing on the conduct of the group or individual with whom he is working.

Many persons still believe that the public relations counsel is a propagandist and nothing else. But, on the contrary, the stage at which many suppose he starts his activities may actually be the stage at which he ends them. After the public and the client are thoroughly analyzed and policies have been formulated, his work may be finished. In other cases the work of the public relations counsel must be continuous to be effective. For in many instances only by a careful system of constant, thorough and frank information will the public understand and appreciate the value of what a merchant, educator or statesman is doing. The counsel on public relations must maintain constant vigilance, because inadequate information, or false information from unknown sources, may have results of enormous importance. A single false rumor at a critical moment may drive down the price of a corporation's stock, causing a loss of millions to stockholders. An air of secrecy or mystery about a corporation's financial dealings may breed a general suspicion capable of acting as an invisible drag on the company's whole dealings with the public. The counsel on public relations must be in a position to deal effectively with rumors and suspicions, attempting to stop them at their source, counteracting them promptly with correct or more

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complete information through channels which will be most effective, or best of all establishing such relations of confidence in the concern's integrity that rumors and suspicions will have no opportunity to take root.

His function may include the discovery of new markets, the existence of which had been unsuspected.

If we accept public relations as a profession, we must also expect it to have both ideals and ethics. The ideal of the profession is a pragmatic one. It is to make the producer, whether that producer be a legislature making laws or a manufacturer making a commercial product, understand what the public wants and to make the public understand the objectives of the producer. In relation to industry, the ideal of the profession is to eliminate the waste and the friction that result when industry does things or makes things which its public does not want, or when the public does not understand what is being offered it. For example, the telephone companies maintain extensive public relations departments to explain what they are doing, so that energy may not be burned up in the friction of misunderstanding. A detailed description, for example, of the immense and scientific care which the company takes to choose clearly understandable and distinguishable exchange names, helps the public to appreciate the effort that is being made to give good service, and stimulates it to

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coöperate by enunciating clearly. It aims to bring about an understanding between educators and educated, between government and people, between charitable institutions and contributors, between nation and nation.

The profession of public relations counsel is developing for itself an ethical code which compares favorably with that governing the legal and medical professions. In part, this code is forced upon the public relations counsel by the very conditions of his work. While recognizing, just as the lawyer does, that every one has the right to present his case in its best light, he nevertheless refuses a client whom he believes to be dishonest, a product which he believes to be fraudulent, or a cause which he believes to be antisocial. One reason for this is that, even though a special pleader, he is not dissociated from the client in the public's mind. Another reason is that while he is pleading before the court—the court of public opinion—he is at the same time trying to affect that court's judgments and actions. In law, the judge and jury hold the deciding balance of power. In public opinion, the public relations counsel is judge and jury, because through his pleading of a case the public may accede to his opinion and judgment.

He does not accept a client whose interests conflict with those of another client. He does not accept

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a client whose case he believes to be hopeless or whose product he believes to be unmarketable.

He should be candid in his dealings. It must be repeated that his business is not to fool or hoodwink the public. If he were to get such a reputation, his usefulness in his profession would be at an end. When he is sending out propaganda material, it is clearly labeled as to source. The editor knows from whom it comes and what its purpose is, and accepts or rejects it on its merits as news.

CHAPTER IV

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PUBLIC RELATIONS

THE systematic study of mass psychology revealed to students the potentialities of invisible government of society by manipulation of the motives which actuate man in the group. Trotter and Le Bon, who approached the subject in a scientific manner, and Graham Wallas, Walter Lippmann and others who continued with searching studies of the group mind, established that the group has mental characteristics distinct from those of the individual, and is motivated by impulses and emotions which cannot be explained on the basis of what we know of individual psychology. So the question naturally arose: If we understand the mechanism and motives of the group mind, is it not possible to control and regiment the masses according to our will without their knowing it?

The recent practice of propaganda has proved that it is possible, at least up to a certain point and within certain limits. Mass psychology is as yet far from being an exact science and the mysteries of human motivation are by no means all revealed. But at least theory and practice have combined with sufficient success to permit us to know that in certain

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cases we can effect some change in public opinion with a fair degree of accuracy by operating a certain mechanism, just as the motorist can regulate the speed of his car by manipulating the flow of gasoline. Propaganda is not a science in the laboratory sense, but it is no longer entirely the empirical affair that it was before the advent of the study of mass psychology. It is now scientific in the sense that it seeks to base its operations upon definite knowledge drawn from direct observation of the group mind, and upon the application of principles which have been demonstrated to be consistent and relatively constant.

The modern propagandist studies systematically and objectively the material with which he is working in the spirit of the laboratory. If the matter in hand is a nation-wide sales campaign, he studies the field by means of a clipping service, or of a corps of scouts, or by personal study at a crucial spot. He determines, for example, which features of a product are losing their public appeal, and in what new direction the public taste is veering. He will not fail to investigate to what extent it is the wife who has the final word in the choice of her husband's car, or of his suits and shirts.

Scientific accuracy of results is not to be expected, because many of the elements of the situation must always be beyond his control. He may know with a fair degree of certainty that under favorable cir-

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cumstances an international flight will produce a spirit of good will, making possible even the consummation of political programs. But he cannot be sure that some unexpected event will not overshadow this flight in the public interest, or that some other aviator may not do something more spectacular the day before. Even in his restricted field of public psychology there must always be a wide margin of error. Propaganda, like economics and sociology, can never be an exact science for the reason that its subject-matter, like theirs, deals with human beings.

If you can influence the leaders, either with or without their conscious coöperation, you automatically influence the group which they sway. But men do not need to be actually gathered together in a public meeting or in a street riot, to be subject to the influences of mass psychology. Because man is by nature gregarious he feels himself to be member of a herd, even when he is alone in his room with the curtains drawn. His mind retains the patterns which have been stamped on it by the group influences. —

A man sits in his office deciding what stocks to buy. He imagines, no doubt, that he is planning his purchases according to his own judgment. In actual fact his judgment is a mélange of impressions stamped on his mind by outside influences which unconsciously control his thought. He buys a certain railroad stock because it was in the headlines yesterday and hence is the one which comes most promi-

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nently to his mind; because he has a pleasant recollection of a good dinner on one of its fast trains; because it has a liberal labor policy, a reputation for honesty; because he has been told that J. P. Morgan owns some of its shares.'

Trotter and Le Bon concluded that the [group mind does not *think* in the strict sense of the word. In place of thoughts it has impulses, habits and emotions. In making up [its] mind its first impulse is usually to follow the example of a trusted leader. This is one of the most firmly established principles of mass psychology. It operates in establishing the rising or diminishing prestige of a summer resort, in causing a run on a bank, or a panic on the stock exchange, in creating a best seller, or a box-office success.

But when the example of the leader is not at hand and the herd must think for itself, it does so by means of clichés, pat words or images which stand for a whole group of ideas or experiences. Not many years ago, it was only necessary to tag a political candidate with the word interests to stampede millions of people into voting against him, because anything associated with "the interests" seemed necessarily corrupt. Recently the word Bolshevik has performed a similar service for persons who wished to frighten the public away from a line of action.

By playing upon an old cliché, or manipulating a

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new one, the propagandist can sometimes swing a whole mass of group emotions. In Great Britain, during the war, the evacuation hospitals came in for a considerable amount of criticism because of the summary way in which they handled their wounded. It was assumed by the public that a hospital gives prolonged and conscientious attention to its patients. When the name was changed to evacuation posts the critical reaction vanished. No one expected more than an adequate emergency treatment from an institution so named. The cliché hospital was indelibly associated in the public mind with a certain picture. To persuade the public to discriminate between one type of hospital and another, to dissociate the cliché from the picture it evoked, would have been an impossible task. Instead, a new cliché automatically conditioned the public emotion toward these hospitals.

Men are rarely aware of the real reasons which motivate their actions. A man may believe that he buys a motor car because, after careful study of the technical features of all makes on the market, he has concluded that this is the best. He is almost certainly fooling himself. He bought it, perhaps, because a friend whose financial acumen he respects bought one last week; or because his neighbors believed he was not able to afford a car of that class; or because its colors are those of his college fraternity.

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It is chiefly the psychologists of the school of Freud who have pointed out that many of man's thoughts and actions are compensatory substitutes for desires which he has been obliged to suppress. A thing may be desired not for its intrinsic worth or usefulness, but because he has unconsciously come to see in it a symbol of something else, the desire for which he is ashamed to admit to himself. A man buying a car may think he wants it for purposes of locomotion, whereas the fact may be that he would really prefer not to be burdened with it, and would rather walk for the sake of his health. He may really want it because it is a symbol of social position, an evidence of his success in business, or a means of pleasing his wife.

This general principle, that men are very largely actuated by motives which they conceal from themselves, is as true of mass as of individual psychology. It is evident that the successful propagandist must understand the true motives and not be content to accept the reasons which men give for what they do.

It is not sufficient to understand only the mechanical structure of society, the groupings and cleavages and loyalties. An engineer may know all about the cylinders and pistons of a locomotive, but unless he knows how steam behaves under pressure he cannot make his engine run. Human desires are the steam which makes the social machine work. Only by understanding them can the propagandist

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control that vast, loose-jointed mechanism which is modern society.

The old propagandist based his work on the mechanistic reaction psychology then in vogue in our colleges. This assumed that the human mind was merely an individual machine, a system of nerves and nerve centers, reacting with mechanical regularity to stimuli, like a helpless, will-less automaton. It was the special pleader's function to provide the stimulus which would cause the desired reaction in the individual purchaser.

It was one of the doctrines of the reaction psychology that a certain stimulus often repeated would create a habit, or that the mere reiteration of an idea would create a conviction. Suppose the old type of salesmanship, acting for a meat packer, was seeking to increase the sale of bacon. It would reiterate innumerable times in full-page advertisements: "Eat more bacon. Eat bacon because it is cheap, because it is good, because it gives you reserve energy."

The newer salesmanship, understanding the group structure of society and the principles of mass psychology, would first ask: "Who is it that influences the eating habits of the public?" The answer, obviously, is: "The physicians." The new salesman will then suggest to physicians to say publicly that it is wholesome to eat bacon. He knows as a mathematical certainty, that large numbers of persons will follow the advice of their doctors, because he under-

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stands the psychological relation of dependence of men upon their physicians.

The old-fashioned propagandist, using almost exclusively the appeal of the printed word, tried to persuade the individual reader to buy a definite article, immediately. This approach is exemplified in a type of advertisement which used to be considered ideal from the point of view of directness and effectiveness:

"YOU (perhaps with a finger pointing at the reader) *buy O'Leary's rubber heels—NOW.*"

The advertiser sought by means of reiteration and emphasis directed upon the individual, to break down or penetrate sales resistance. Although the appeal was aimed at fifty million persons, it was aimed at each as an individual.

The new salesmanship has found it possible, by dealing with men in the mass through their group formations, to set up psychological and emotional currents which will work for him. Instead of assaulting sales resistance by direct attack, he is interested in removing sales resistance. He creates circumstances which will swing emotional currents so as to make for purchaser demand.

If, for instance, I want to sell pianos, it is not sufficient to blanket the country with a direct appeal, such as:

"YOU *buy a Mozart piano now. It is cheap. The best artists use it. It will last for years.*"

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The claims may all be true, but they are in direct conflict with the claims of other piano manufacturers, and in indirect competition with the claims of a radio or a motor car, each competing for the consumer's dollar.

What are the true reasons why the purchaser is planning to spend his money on a new car instead of on a new piano? Because he has decided that he wants the commodity called locomotion more than he wants the commodity called music? Not altogether. He buys a car, because it is at the moment the group custom to buy cars.

The modern propagandist therefore sets to work to create circumstances which will modify that custom. He appeals perhaps to the home instinct which is fundamental. He will endeavor to develop public acceptance of the idea of a music room in the home. This he may do, for example, by organizing an exhibition of period music rooms designed by well known decorators who themselves exert an influence on the buying groups. He enhances the effectiveness and prestige of these rooms by putting in them rare and valuable tapestries. Then, in order to create dramatic interest in the exhibit, he stages an event or ceremony. To this ceremony key people, persons known to influence the buying habits of the public, such as a famous violinist, a popular artist, and a society leader, are invited. These key persons affect other groups, lifting the idea of the music room to a

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place in the public consciousness which it did not have before.] The juxtaposition of these leaders, and the idea which they are dramatizing, are then projected to the wider public through various publicity channels. Meanwhile, influential architects have been persuaded to make the music room an integral architectural part of their plans with perhaps a specially charming niche in one corner for the piano. Less influential architects will as a matter of course imitate what is done by the men whom they consider masters of their profession. They in turn will implant the idea of the music room in the mind of the general public.

The music room will be accepted because it has been made the thing. And the man or woman who has a music room, or has arranged a corner of the parlor as a musical corner, will naturally think of buying a piano. It will come to him as his own idea.

Under the old salesmanship the manufacturer said to the prospective purchaser, "Please buy a piano." The new salesmanship has reversed the process and caused the prospective purchaser to say to the manufacturer, "Please sell me a piano."

The value of the associative processes in propaganda is shown in connection with a large real estate development. To emphasize that Jackson Heights was socially desirable every attempt was made to produce this associative process. A benefit perform-

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ance of the Jitney Players was staged for the benefit of earthquake victims of Japan, under the auspices of Mrs. Astor and others. The social advantages of the place were projected—a golf course was laid out and a clubhouse planned. When the post office was opened, the public relations counsel attempted to use it as a focus for national interest and discovered that its opening fell coincident with a date important in the annals of the American Postal Service. This was then made the basis of the opening.

When an attempt was made to show the public the beauty of the apartments, a competition was held among interior decorators for the best furnished apartment in Jackson Heights. An important committee of judges decided. This competition drew the approval of well known authorities, as well as the interest of millions, who were made cognizant of it through newspaper and magazine and other publicity, with the effect of building up definitely the prestige of the development.

One of the most effective methods is the utilization of the group formation of modern society in order to spread ideas. An example of this is the nationwide competitions for sculpture in Ivory soap, open to school children in certain age groups as well as professional sculptors. A sculptor of national reputation found Ivory soap an excellent medium for sculpture.

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The Procter and Gamble Company offered a series of prizes for the best sculpture in white soap. The contest was held under the auspices of the Art Center in New York City, an organization of high standing in the art world.

School superintendents and teachers throughout the country were glad to encourage the movement as an educational aid for schools. Practice among school children as part of their art courses was stimulated. Contests were held between schools, between school districts and between cities.

Ivory soap was adaptable for sculpturing in the homes because mothers saved the shavings and the imperfect efforts for laundry purposes. The work itself was clean.

The best pieces are selected from the local competitions for entry in the national contest. This is held annually at an important art gallery in New York, whose prestige with that of the distinguished judges, establishes the contest as a serious art event.

In the first of these national competitions about 500 pieces of sculpture were entered. In the third, 2,500. And in the fourth, more than 4,000. If the carefully selected pieces were so numerous, it is evident that a vast number were sculptured during the year, and that a much greater number must have been made for practice purposes. The good will was greatly enhanced by the fact that this soap had become not merely the concern of the

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housewife but also a matter of personal and intimate interest to her children.

A number of familiar psychological motives were set in motion in the carrying out of this campaign. The esthetic, the competitive, the gregarious (much of the sculpturing was done in school groups), the snobbish (the impulse to follow the example of a recognized leader), the exhibitionist, and—last but by no means least—the maternal.

All these motives and group habits were put in concerted motion by the simple machinery of group leadership and authority. As if actuated by the pressure of a button, people began working for the client for the sake of the gratification obtained in the sculpture work itself.

This point is most important in successful propaganda work. The leaders who lend their authority to any propaganda campaign will do so only if it can be made to touch their own interests. There must be a disinterested aspect of the propagandist's activities. In other words, it is one of the functions of the public relations counsel to discover at what points his client's interests coincide with those of other individuals or groups.

In the case of the soap sculpture competition, the distinguished artists and educators who sponsored the idea were glad to lend their services and their names because the competitions really promoted an interest which they had at heart—the cultivation of

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the esthetic impulse among the younger generation.

Such coincidence and overlapping of interests is as infinite as the interlacing of group formations themselves. For example, a railway wishes to develop its business. The counsel on public relations makes a survey to discover at what points its interests coincide with those of its prospective customers. The company then establishes relations with chambers of commerce along its right of way and assists them in developing their communities. It helps them to secure new plants and industries for the town. It facilitates business through the dissemination of technical information. It is not merely a case of bestowing favors in the hope of receiving favors; these activities of the railroad, besides creating good will, actually promote growth on its right of way. The interests of the railroad and the communities through which it passes mutually interact and feed one another.

In the same way, a bank institutes an investment service for the benefit of its customers in order that the latter may have more money to deposit with the bank. Or a jewelry concern develops an insurance department to insure the jewels it sells, in order to make the purchaser feel greater security in buying jewels. Or a baking company establishes an information service suggesting recipes for bread to encourage new uses for bread in the home.

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The ideas of the new propaganda are predicated on sound psychology based on enlightened self-interest.

I have tried, in these chapters, to explain the place of propaganda in modern American life and something of the methods by which it operates—to tell the why, the what, the who and the how of the invisible government which dictates our thoughts, directs our feelings and controls our actions. In the following chapters I shall try to show how propaganda functions in specific departments of group activity, to suggest some of the further ways in which it may operate.

CHAPTER V

BUSINESS AND THE PUBLIC

THE relationship between business and the public has become closer in the past few decades. Business to-day is taking the public into partnership. A number of causes, some economic, others due to the growing public understanding of business and the public interest in business, have produced this situation. Business realizes that its relationship to the public is not confined to the manufacture and sale of a given product, but includes at the same time the selling of itself and of all those things for which it stands in the public mind.

Twenty or twenty-five years ago, business sought to run its own affairs regardless of the public. The reaction was the muck-raking period, in which a multitude of sins were, justly and unjustly, laid to the charge of the interests. In the face of an aroused public conscience the large corporations were obliged to renounce their contention that their affairs were nobody's business. If to-day big business were to seek to throttle the public, a new reaction similar to that of twenty years ago would take place and the public would rise and try to throttle big business with restrictive laws. Business is conscious

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of the public's conscience] This consciousness has led to a healthy coöperation!

Another cause for the increasing relationship is undoubtedly to be found in the various phenomena growing out of mass production. Mass production is only profitable if its rhythm can be maintained—that is, if it can continue to sell its product in steady or increasing quantity. The result is that while, under the handicraft or small-unit system of production that was typical a century ago, demand created the supply, to-day supply must actively seek to create its corresponding demand. A single factory, potentially capable of supplying a whole continent with its particular product, cannot afford to wait until the public asks for its product; it must maintain constant touch, through advertising and propaganda, with the vast public in order to assure itself the continuous demand which alone will make its costly plant profitable. This entails a vastly more complex system of distribution than formerly. To make customers is the new problem. One must understand not only his own business—the manufacture of a particular product—but also the structure, the personality, the prejudices, of a potentially universal public.

Still another reason is to be found in the improvements in the technique of advertising—as regards both the size of the public which can be reached by the printed word, and the methods of appeal. The growth of newspapers and magazines having a

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circulation of millions of copies, and the art of the modern advertising expert in making the printed message attractive and persuasive, have placed the business man in a personal relation with a vast and diversified public.

Another modern phenomenon, which influences the general policy of big business, is the new competition between certain firms and the remainder of the industry, to which they belong. Another kind of competition is between whole industries, in their struggle for a share of the consumer's dollar. When, for example, a soap manufacturer claims that his product will preserve youth, he is obviously attempting to change the public's mode of thinking about soap in general—a thing of grave importance to the whole industry. Or when the metal furniture industry seeks to convince the public that it is more desirable to spend its money for metal furniture than for wood furniture, it is clearly seeking to alter the taste and standards of a whole generation. In either case, business is seeking to inject itself into the lives and customs of millions of persons.

Even in a basic sense, business is becoming dependent on public opinion. With the increasing volume and wider diffusion of wealth in America, thousands of persons now invest in industrial stocks. New stock or bond flotations, upon which an expanding business must depend for its success, can be effected only if the concern has understood how to gain the confi-

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dence and good will of the general public. Business must express itself and its entire corporate existence so that the public will understand and accept it. It must dramatize its personality and interpret its objectives in every particular in which it comes into contact with the community (or the nation) of which it is a part.

An oil corporation which truly understands its many-sided relation to the public, will offer that public not only good oil but a sound labor policy. A bank will seek to show not only that its management is sound and conservative, but also that its officers are honorable both in their public and in their private life. A store specializing in fashionable men's clothing will express in its architecture the authenticity of the goods it offers. A bakery will seek to impress the public with the hygienic care observed in its manufacturing process, not only by wrapping its loaves in dust-proof paper and throwing its factory open to public inspection, but also by the cleanliness and attractiveness of its delivery wagons. A construction firm will take care that the public knows not only that its buildings are durable and safe, but also that its employees, when injured at work, are compensated. At whatever point a business enterprise impinges on the public consciousness, it must seek to give its public relations the particular character which will conform to the objectives which it is pursuing.

Just as the production manager must be familiar

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with every element and detail concerning the materials with which he is working, so the man in charge of a firm's public relations must be familiar with the structure, the prejudices, and the whims of the general public, and must handle his problems with the utmost care. The public has its own standards and demands and habits. You may modify them, but you dare not run counter to them. You cannot persuade a whole generation of women to wear long skirts, but you may, by working through leaders of fashion, persuade them to wear evening dresses which are long in back. The public is not an amorphous mass which can be molded at will, or dictated to. Both business and the public have their own personalities which must somehow be brought into friendly agreement. Conflict and suspicion are injurious to both. Modern business must study on what terms the partnership can be made amicable and mutually beneficial. It must explain itself, its aims, its objectives, to the public in terms which the public can understand and is willing to accept.

Business does not willingly accept dictation from the public. It should not expect that it can dictate to the public. While the public should appreciate the great economic benefits which business offers, thanks to mass production and scientific marketing, business should also appreciate that the public is becoming increasingly discriminative in its standards and should seek to understand its demands and meet

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them. The relationship between business and the public can be healthy only if it is the relationship of give and take.

It is this condition and necessity which has created the need for a specialized field of public relations. Business now calls in the public relations counsel to advise it, to interpret its purpose to the public, and to suggest those modifications which may make it conform to the public demand.

The modifications then recommended to make the business conform to its objectives and to the public demand, may concern the broadest matters of policy or the apparently most trivial details of execution. It might in one case be necessary to transform entirely the lines of goods sold to conform to changing public demands. In another case the trouble may be found to lie in such small matters as the dress of the clerks. A jewelry store may complain that its patronage is shrinking upwards because of its reputation for carrying high-priced goods; in this case the public relations counsel might suggest the featuring of medium-priced goods, even at a loss, not because the firm desires a large medium-price trade as such, but because out of a hundred medium-price customers acquired to-day a certain percentage will be well-to-do ten years from now. A department storé which is seeking to gather in the high-class trade may be urged to employ college graduates as clerks or to engage well known modern artists to design show-windows

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or special exhibits. A bank may be urged to open a Fifth Avenue branch, not because the actual business done on Fifth Avenue warrants the expense, but because a beautiful Fifth Avenue office correctly expresses the kind of appeal which it wishes to make to future depositors; and, viewed in this way, it may be as important that the doorman be polite, or that the floors be kept clean, as that the branch manager be an able financier. Yet the beneficial effect of this branch may be canceled, if the wife of the president is involved in a scandal.

Big business studies every move which may express its true personality. It seeks to tell the public, in all appropriate ways,—by the direct advertising message and by the subtlest esthetic suggestion—the quality of the goods or services which it has to offer. A store which seeks a large sales volume in cheap goods will preach prices day in and day out, concentrating its whole appeal on the ways in which it can save money for its clients. But a store seeking a high margin of profit on individual sales would try to associate itself with the distinguished and the elegant, whether by an exhibition of old masters or through the social activities of the owner's wife.

The public relations activities of a business cannot be a protective coloring to hide its real aims. It is bad business as well as bad morals to feature exclusively a few high-class articles, when the main stock is of medium grade or cheap, for the general im-

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pression given is a false one. A sound public relations policy will not attempt to stampede the public with exaggerated claims and false pretenses, but to interpret the individual business vividly and truly through every avenue that leads to public opinion. The New York Central Railroad has for decades sought to appeal to the public not only on the basis of the speed and safety of its trains, but also on the basis of their elegance and comfort. It is appropriate that the corporation should have been personified to the general public in the person of so suave and ingratiating a gentleman as Chauncey M. Depew—an ideal window dressing for such an enterprise.

While the concrete recommendations of the public relations counsel may vary infinitely according to individual circumstances, his general plan of work may be reduced to two types, which I might term continuous interpretation and dramatization by high-spotting. The two may be alternative or may be pursued concurrently.

Continuous interpretation is achieved by trying to control every approach to the public mind in such a manner that the public receives the desired impression, often without being conscious of it. High-spotting, on the other hand, vividly seizes the attention of the public and fixes it upon some detail or aspect which is typical of the entire enterprise. When a real estate corporation which is erecting a tall office building

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makes it ten feet taller than the highest sky-scraper in existence, that is dramatization.

Which method is indicated, or whether both be indicated concurrently, can be determined only after a full study of objectives and specific possibilities.

Another interesting case of focusing public attention on the virtues of a product was shown in the case of gelatine. Its advantages in increasing the digestibility and nutritional value of milk were proven in the Mellon Institute of Industrial Research. The suggestion was made and carried out that to further this knowledge, gelatine be used by certain hospitals and school systems, to be tested out there. The favorable results of such tests were then projected to other leaders in the field with the result that they followed that group leadership and utilized gelatine for the scientific purposes which had been proven to be sound at the research institution. The idea carried momentum.

[The tendency of big business is to get bigger.]
Through mergers and monopolies it is constantly increasing the number of persons with whom it is in direct contact. All this has intensified and multiplied the public relationships of business.

The responsibilities are of many kinds. There is a responsibility to the stockholders—numbering perhaps five persons or five hundred thousand—who have entrusted their money to the concern and have the right to know how the money is being used. A

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concern which is fully aware of its responsibility toward its stockholders, will furnish them with frequent letters urging them to use the product in which their money is invested, and use their influence to promote its sale. It has a responsibility toward the dealer which it may express by inviting him, at its expense, to visit the home factory. It has a responsibility toward the industry as a whole which should restrain it from making exaggerated and unfair selling claims. It has a responsibility toward the retailer, and will see to it that its salesmen express the quality of the product which they have to sell. There is a responsibility toward the consumer, who is impressed by a clean and well managed factory, open to his inspection. And the general public, apart from its function as potential consumer, is influenced in its attitude toward the concern by what it knows of that concern's financial dealings, its labor policy, even by the livableness of the houses in which its employees dwell. There is no detail too trivial to influence the public in a favorable or unfavorable sense. The personality of the president may be a matter of importance, for he perhaps dramatizes the whole concern to the public mind. It may be very important to what charities he contributes, in what civic societies he holds office. If he is a leader in his industry, the public may demand that he be a leader in his community.

The business man has become a responsible member

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of the social group. It is not a question of ballyhoo, of creating a picturesque fiction for public consumption. It is merely a question of finding the appropriate modes of expressing the personality that is to be dramatized. Some business men can be their own best public relations counsel. But in the majority of cases knowledge of the public mind and of the ways in which it will react to an appeal, is a specialized function which must be undertaken by the professional expert.

Big business, I believe, is realizing this more and more. It is increasingly availing itself of the services of the specialist in public relations (whatever may be the title accorded him). And it is my conviction that as big business becomes bigger the need for expert manipulation of its innumerable contacts with the public will become greater.

One reason why the public relations of a business are frequently placed in the hands of an outside expert, instead of being confided to an officer of the company, is the fact that the correct approach to a problem may be indirect. For example, when the luggage industry attempted to solve some of its problems by a public relations policy, it was realized that the attitude of railroads, of steamship companies, and of foreign government-owned railroads was an important factor in the handling of luggage.

If a railroad and a baggage man, for their own interest, can be educated to handle baggage with more

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facility and promptness, with less damage to the baggage, and less inconvenience to the passenger; if the steamship company lets down, in its own interests, its restrictions on luggage; if the foreign government eases up on its baggage costs and transportation in order to further tourist travel; then the luggage manufacturers will profit.

The problem then, to increase the sale of their luggage, was to have these and other forces come over to their point of view. Hence the public relations campaign was directed not to the public, who were the ultimate consumers, but to these other elements.

Also, if the luggage manufacturer can educate the general public on what to wear on trips and when to wear it, he may be increasing the sale of men's and women's clothing, but he will, at the same time, be increasing the sale of his luggage.

Propaganda, since it goes to basic causes, can very often be most effective through the manner of its introduction. A campaign against unhealthy cosmetics might be waged by fighting for a return to the wash-cloth and soap—a fight that very logically might be taken up by health officials all over the country, who would urge the return to the salutary and helpful wash-cloth and soap, instead of cosmetics.

The development of public opinion for a cause or line of socially constructive action may very often

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be the result of a desire on the part of the propagandist to meet successfully his own problem which the socially constructive cause would further. And by doing so he is actually fulfilling a social purpose in the broadest sense.

The soundness of a public relations policy was likewise shown in the case of a shoe manufacturer who made service shoes for patrolmen, firemen, letter carriers, and men in similar occupations. He realized that if he could make acceptable the idea that men in such work ought to be well-shod, he would sell more shoes and at the same time further the efficiency of the men.

He organized, as part of his business, a foot protection bureau. This bureau disseminated scientifically accurate information on the proper care of the feet, principles which the manufacturer had incorporated in the construction of the shoes. The result was that civic bodies, police chiefs, fire chiefs, and others interested in the welfare and comfort of their men, furthered the ideas his product stood for and the product itself, with the consequent effect that more of his shoes were sold more easily.

The application of this principle of a common denominator of interest between the object that is sold and the public good will can be carried to infinite degrees.

“It matters not how much capital you may have, how fair the rates may be, how favorable the condi-

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tions of service, if you haven't behind you a sympathetic public opinion, you are bound to fail." This is the opinion of Samuel Insull, one the foremost traction magnates of the country. And the late Judge Gary, of the United States Steel Corporation, expressed the same idea when he said: "Once you have the good will of the general public, you can go ahead in the work of constructive expansion. Too often many try to discount this vague and intangible element. That way lies destruction."

Public opinion is no longer inclined to be unfavorable to the large business merger. It resents the censorship of business by the Federal Trade Commission. It has broken down the anti-trust laws where it thinks they hinder economic development. It backs great trusts and mergers which it excoriated a decade ago. The government now permits large aggregations of producing and distributing units, as evidenced by mergers among railroads and other public utilities, because representative government reflects public opinion. Public opinion itself fosters the growth of mammoth industrial enterprises. In the opinion of millions of small investors, mergers and trusts are friendly giants and not ogres, because of the economies, mainly due to quantity production, which they have effected, and can pass on to the consumer.

This result has been, to a great extent, obtained by a deliberate use of propaganda in its broadest

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sense. It was obtained not only by modifying the opinion of the public, as the governments modified and marshaled the opinion of their publics during the war, but often by modifying the business concern itself. A cement company may work with road commissions gratuitously to maintain testing laboratories in order to insure the best-quality roads to the public. A gas company maintains a free school of cookery.

But it would be rash and unreasonable to take it for granted that because public opinion has come over to the side of big business, it will always remain there. Only recently, Prof. W. Z. Ripley of Harvard University, one of the foremost national authorities on business organization and practice, exposed certain aspects of big business which tended to undermine public confidence in large corporations. He pointed out that the stockholders' supposed voting power is often illusory; that annual financial statements are sometimes so brief and summary that to the man in the street they are downright misleading; that the extension of the system of non-voting shares often places the effective control of corporations and their finances in the hands of a small clique of stockholders; and that some corporations refuse to give out sufficient information to permit the public to know the true condition of the concern.

Furthermore, no matter how favorably disposed the public may be toward big business in general, the utilities are always fair game for public discontent

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and need to maintain good will with the greatest care and watchfulness. These and other corporations of a semi-public character will always have to face a demand for government or municipal ownership if such attacks as those of Professor Ripley are continued and are, in the public's opinion, justified, unless conditions are changed and care is taken to maintain the contact with the public at all points of their corporate existence.

The public relations counsel should anticipate such trends of public opinion and advise on how to avert them, either by convincing the public that its fears or prejudices are unjustified, or in certain cases by modifying the action of the client to the extent necessary to remove the cause of complaint. In such a case public opinion might be surveyed and the points of irreducible opposition discovered. [The aspects of the situation which are susceptible of logical explanation; to what extent the criticism or prejudice is a habitual emotional reaction and what factors are dominated by accepted clichés, might be disclosed. In each instance he would advise some action or modification of policy calculated to make the readjustment.

While government ownership is in most instances only varyingly a remote possibility, public ownership of big business through the increasing popular investment in stocks and bonds, is becoming more and more a fact. The importance of public relations

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from this standpoint is to be judged by the fact that practically all prosperous corporations expect at some time to enlarge operations, and will need to float new stock or bond issues. The success of such issues depends upon the general record of the concern in the business world, and also upon the good will which it has been able to create in the general public. When the Victor Talking Machine Company was recently offered to the public, millions of dollars' worth of stock were sold overnight. On the other hand, there are certain companies which, although they are financially sound and commercially prosperous, would be unable to float a large stock issue, because public opinion is not conscious of them, or has some unanalyzed prejudice against them.

To such an extent is the successful floating of stocks and bonds dependent upon the public favor that the success of a new merger may stand or fall upon the public acceptance which is created for it. A merger may bring into existence huge new resources, and these resources, perhaps amounting to millions of dollars in a single operation, can often fairly be said to have been created by the expert manipulation of public opinion. It must be repeated that I am not speaking of artificial value given to a stock by dishonest propaganda or stock manipulation, but of the real economic values which are created when genuine public acceptance is gained for an industrial enterprise and becomes a real partner in it.

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The growth of big business is so rapid that in some lines ownership is more international than national. It is necessary to reach ever larger groups of people if modern industry and commerce are to be financed. Americans have purchased billions of dollars of foreign industrial securities since the war, and Europeans own, it is estimated, between one and two billion dollars' worth of ours. In each case public acceptance must be obtained for the issue and the enterprise behind it.

Public loans, state or municipal, to foreign countries depend upon the good will which those countries have been able to create for themselves here. An attempted issue by an east European country is now faring badly largely because of unfavorable public reaction to the behavior of members of its ruling family. But other countries have no difficulty in placing any issue because the public is already convinced of the prosperity of these nations and the stability of their governments.

The new technique of public relations counsel is serving a very useful purpose in business by acting as a complement to legitimate advertisers and advertising in helping to break down unfair competitive exaggerated and overemphatic advertising by reaching the public with the truth through other channels than advertising. Where two competitors in a field are fighting each other with this type of advertising, they are undermining that particular industry to a

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point where the public may lose confidence in the whole industry. The only way to combat such unethical methods, is for ethical members of the industry to use the weapon of propaganda in order to bring out the basic truths of the situation.

Take the case of tooth paste, for instance. Here is a highly competitive field in which the preponderance of public acceptance of one product over another can very legitimately rest in inherent values. However, what has happened in this field?

One or two of the large manufacturers have asserted advantages for their tooth pastes which no single tooth paste discovered up to the present time can possibly have. The competing manufacturer is put in the position either of overemphasizing an already exaggerated emphasis or of letting the overemphasis of his competitor take away his market. He turns to the weapon of propaganda which can effectively, through various channels of approach to the public—the dental clinics, the schools, the women's clubs, the medical colleges, the dental press and even the daily press—bring to the public the truth of what a tooth paste can do. This will, of course, have its effect in making the honestly advertised tooth paste get to its real public.

Propaganda is potent in meeting unethical or unfair advertising. Effective advertising has become more costly than ever before. Years ago, when the country was smaller and there was no tremendous

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advertising machinery, it was comparatively easy to get country-wide recognition for a product. A corps of traveling salesmen might persuade the retailers, with a few cigars and a repertory of funny stories, to display and recommend their article on a nation-wide scale. To-day, a small industry is swamped unless it can find appropriate and relatively inexpensive means of making known the special virtues of its product, while larger industries have sought to overcome the difficulty by coöperative advertising, in which associations of industries compete with other associations.

Mass advertising has produced new kinds of competition. Competition between rival products in the same line is, of course, as old as economic life itself. In recent years much has been said of the new competition, we have discussed it in a previous chapter, between one group of products and another. Stone competes against wood for building; linoleum against carpets; oranges against apples; tin against asbestos for roofing.

This type of competition has been humorously illustrated by Mr. O. H. Cheney, Vice-President of the American Exchange and Irving Trust Company of New York, in a speech before the Chicago Business Secretaries Forum.

"Do you represent the millinery trades?" said Mr. Cheney. "The man at your side may serve the fur industry, and by promoting the style of big fur col-

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lars on women's coats he is ruining the hat business by forcing women to wear small and inexpensive hats. You may be interested in the ankles of the fair sex—I mean, you may represent the silk hosiery industry. You have two brave rivals who are ready to fight to the death—to spend millions in the fight—for the glory of those ankles—the leather industry, which has suffered from the low-shoe vogue, and the fabrics manufacturers, who yearn for the good old days when skirts were skirts.

“If you represent the plumbing and heating business, you are the mortal enemy of the textile industry, because warmer homes mean lighter clothes. If you represent the printers, how can you shake hands with the radio equipment man? . . .

“These are really only obvious forms of what I have called the new competition. The old competition was that between the members of each trade organization. One phase of the new competition is that between the trade associations themselves—between you gentlemen who represent those industries. Inter-commodity competition is the new competition between products used alternatively for the same purpose. Inter-industrial competition is the new competition between apparently unrelated industries which affect each other or between such industries as compete for the consumer's dollar—and that means practically all industries. . . .

“Inter-commodity competition is, of course, the

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most spectacular of all. It is the one which seems most of all to have caught the business imagination of the country. More and more business men are beginning to appreciate what inter-commodity competition means to them. More and more they are calling upon their trade associations to help them—because inter-commodity competition cannot be fought single-handed.

“Take the great war on the dining-room table, for instance. Three times a day practically every dining-room table in the country is the scene of a fierce battle in the new competition. Shall we have prunes for breakfast? No, cry the embattled orange-growers and the massed legions of pineapple canners. Shall we eat sauerkraut? Why not eat green olives? is the answer of the Spaniards. Eat macaroni as a change from potatoes, says one advertiser—and will the potato growers take this challenge lying down?

“The doctors and dietitians tell us that a normal hard-working man needs only about two or three thousand calories of food a day. A banker, I suppose, needs a little less. But what am I to do? The fruit growers, the wheat raisers, the meat packers, the milk producers, the fishermen—all want me to eat more of their products—and are spending millions of dollars a year to convince me. Am I to eat to the point of exhaustion, or am I to obey the doctor and let the farmer and the food packer and the retailer go broke! Am I to balance my diet in pro-

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portion to the advertising appropriations of the various producers? Or am I to balance my diet scientifically and let those who overproduce go bankrupt? The new competition is probably keenest in the food industries because there we have a very real limitation on what we can consume—in spite of higher incomes and higher living standards, we cannot eat more than we can eat.”

I believe that competition in the future will not be only an advertising competition between individual products or between big associations, but that it will in addition be a competition of propaganda. The business man and advertising man is realizing that he must not discard entirely the methods of Barnum in reaching the public. An example in the annals of George Harrison Phelps, of the successful utilization of this type of appeal was the nation-wide hook-up which announced the launching of the Dodge Victory Six car.

Millions of people, it is estimated, listened in to this program broadcast over 47 stations. The expense was more than \$60,000. The arrangements involved an additional telephonic hook-up of 20,000 miles of wire, and included transmission from Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit, New Orleans, and New York. Al Jolson did his bit from New Orleans, Will Rogers from Beverly Hills, Fred and Dorothy Stone from Chicago, and Paul Whiteman from New York, at an aggregate artists' fee of \$25,000. And

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there was included a four-minute address by the president of Dodge Brothers announcing the new car, which gave him access in four minutes to an estimated audience of thirty million Americans, the largest number, unquestionably, ever to concentrate their attention on a given commercial product at a given moment. It was a sugar-coated sales message.

Modern sales technicians will object: "What you say of this method of appeal is true. But it increases the cost of getting the manufacturer's message across. The modern tendency has been to reduce this cost (for example, the elimination of premiums) and concentrate on getting full efficiency from the advertising expenditure. If you hire a Galli-Curci to sing for bacon you increase the cost of the bacon by the amount of her very large fee. Her voice adds nothing to the product but it adds to its cost."

Undoubtedly. But all modes of sales appeal require the spending of money to make the appeal attractive. The advertiser in print adds to the cost of his message by the use of pictures or by the cost of getting distinguished endorsements.

There is another kind of difficulty, created in the process of big business getting bigger, which calls for new modes of establishing contact with the public. Quantity production offers a standardized product the cost of which tends to diminish with the quantity sold. If low price is the only basis of competition with rival products, similarly produced, there ensues

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a cut-throat competition which can end only by taking all the profit and incentive out of the industry.

The logical way out of this dilemma is for the manufacturer to develop some sales appeal other than mere cheapness, to give the product, in the public mind, some other attraction, some idea that will modify the product slightly, some element of originality that will distinguish it from products in the same line. Thus, a manufacturer of typewriters paints his machines in cheerful hues. These special types of appeal can be popularized by the manipulation of the principles familiar to the propagandist—the principles of gregariousness, obedience to authority, emulation, and the like. A minor element can be made to assume economic importance by being established in the public mind as a matter of style. Mass production can be split up. Big business will still leave room for small business. Next to a huge department store there may be located a tiny specialty shop which makes a very good living.

The problem of bringing large hats back into fashion was undertaken by a propagandist. The millinery industry two years ago was menaced by the prevalence of the simple felt hat which was crowding out the manufacture of all other kinds of hats and hat ornaments. It was found that hats could roughly be classified in six types. It was found too that four groups might help to change hat fashions: the society leader, the style expert, the fashion editor and writer,

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the artist who might give artistic approval to the styles, and beautiful mannequins. The problem, then, was to bring these groups together before an audience of hat buyers.

A committee of prominent artists was organized to choose the most beautiful girls in New York to wear, in a series of tableaux, the most beautiful hats in the style classifications, at a fashion fête at a leading hotel.

A committee was formed of distinguished American women who, on the basis of their interest in the development of an American industry, were willing to add the authority of their names to the idea. A style committee was formed of editors of fashion magazines and other prominent fashion authorities who were willing to support the idea. The girls in their lovely hats and costumes paraded on the running-board before an audience of the entire trade.

The news of the event affected the buying habits not only of the onlookers, but also of the women throughout the country. The story of the event was flashed to the consumer by her newspaper as well as by the advertisements of her favorite store. Broad-sides went to the millinery buyer from the manufacturer. One manufacturer stated that whereas before the show he had not sold any large trimmed hats, after it he had sold thousands.

Often the public relations counsel is called in to handle an emergency situation. A false rumor, for

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instance, may occasion an enormous loss in prestige and money if not handled promptly and effectively.

An incident such as the one described in the *New York American* of Friday, May 21, 1926, shows what the lack of proper technical handling of public relations might result in.

\$1,000,000 LOST BY FALSE RUMOR ON HUDSON STOCK

Hudson Motor Company stock fluctuated widely around noon yesterday and losses estimated at \$500,000 to \$1,000,000 were suffered as a result of the widespread flotation of false news regarding dividend action.

The directors met in Detroit at 12:30, New York time, to act on a dividend. Almost immediately a false report that only the regular dividend had been declared was circulated.

At 12:46 the Dow, Jones & Co. ticker service received the report from the Stock Exchange firm and its publication resulted in further drop in the stock.

Shortly after 1 o'clock the ticker services received official news that the dividend had been increased and a 20 per cent stock distribution authorized. They rushed the correct news out on their tickers and Hudson stock immediately jumped more than 6 points.

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A clipping from the *Journal of Commerce* of April 4, 1925, is reproduced here as an interesting example of a method to counteract a false rumor:

BEECH-NUT HEAD HOME TOWN GUEST

Bartlett Arkell Signally Honored by Communities of Mohawk Valley

(Special to The Journal of Commerce)

CANAJOHARIE, N. Y., April 3.—To-day was 'Beech-Nut Day' in this town; in fact, for the whole Mohawk Valley. Business men and practically the whole community of this region joined in a personal testimonial to Bartlett Arkell of New York City, president of the Beech-Nut Packing Company of this city, in honor of his firm refusal to consider selling his company to other financial interests to move elsewhere.

When Mr. Arkell publicly denied recent rumors that he was to sell his company to the Postum Cereal Company for \$17,000,000, which would have resulted in taking the industry from its birthplace, he did so in terms conspicuously loyal to his boyhood home, which he has built up into a prosperous industrial community through thirty years' management of his Beech-Nut Company.

He absolutely controls the business and flatly

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stated that he would never sell it during his lifetime 'to any one at any price,' since it would be disloyal to his friends and fellow workers. And the whole Mohawk Valley spontaneously decided that such spirit deserved public recognition. Hence, to-day's festivities.

More than 3,000 people participated, headed by a committee comprising W. J. Roser, chairman; B. F. Spraker, H. V. Bush, B. F. Diefendorf and J. H. Cook. They were backed by the Canajoharie and the Mohawk Valley Chambers of Business Men's Associations.

Of course, every one realized after this that there was no truth in the rumor that the Beech-Nut Company was in the market. A denial would not have carried as much conviction.

Amusement, too, is a business—one of the largest in America. It was the amusement business—first the circus and the medicine show, then the theater—which taught the rudiments of advertising to industry and commerce. The latter adopted the ballyhoo of the show business. But under the stress of practical experience it adapted and refined these crude advertising methods to the precise ends it sought to obtain. The theater has, in its turn, learned from business, and has refined its publicity methods to the point where the old stentorian methods are in the discard.

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The modern publicity director of a theater syndicate or a motion picture trust is a business man, responsible for the security of tens or hundreds of millions of dollars of invested capital. He cannot afford to be a stunt artist or a free-lance adventurer in publicity. He must know his public accurately and modify its thoughts and actions by means of the methods which the amusement world has learned from its old pupil, big business. As public knowledge increases and public taste improves, business must be ready to meet them halfway.

Modern business must have its finger continuously on the public pulse. It must understand the changes in the public mind and be prepared to interpret itself fairly and eloquently to changing opinion.

CHAPTER XI

THE MECHANICS OF PROPAGANDA

THE media by which special pleaders transmit their messages to the public through propaganda include all the means by which people to-day transmit their ideas to one another. There is no means of human communication which may not also be a means of deliberate propaganda, because propaganda is simply the establishing of reciprocal understanding between an individual and a group.

The important point to the propagandist is that the relative value of the various instruments of propaganda, and their relation to the masses, are constantly changing. If he is to get full reach for his message he must take advantage of these shifts of value the instant they occur. Fifty years ago, the public meeting was a propaganda instrument par excellence. To-day it is difficult to get more than a handful of people to attend a public meeting unless extraordinary attractions are part of the program. The automobile takes them away from home, the radio keeps them in the home, the successive daily editions of the newspaper bring information to them in office or subway, and also they are sick of the ballyhoo of the rally.

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Instead there are numerous other media of communication, some new, others old but so transformed that they have become virtually new. The newspaper, of course, remains always a primary medium for the transmission of opinions and ideas—in other words, for propaganda.

It was not many years ago that newspaper editors resented what they called "the use of the news columns for propaganda purposes." Some editors would even kill a good story if they imagined its publication might benefit any one. This point of view is now largely abandoned. To-day the leading editorial offices take the view that the real criterion governing the publication or non-publication of matter which comes to the desk is its news value. The newspaper cannot assume, nor is it its function to assume, the responsibility of guaranteeing that what it publishes will not work out to somebody's interest. There is hardly a single item in any daily paper, the publication of which does not, or might not, profit or injure somebody. That is the nature of news. What the newspaper does strive for is that the news which it publishes shall be accurate, and (since it must select from the mass of news material available) that it shall be of interest and importance to large groups of its readers.

In its editorial columns the newspaper is a personality, commenting upon things and events from its individual point of view. But in its news columns

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the typical modern American newspaper attempts to reproduce, with due regard to news interest, the outstanding events and opinions of the day.

It does not ask whether a given item is propaganda or not. What is important is that it be news. And in the selection of news the editor is usually entirely independent. In the *New York Times*—to take an outstanding example—news is printed because of its news value and for no other reason. The *Times* editors determine with complete independence what is and what is not news. They brook no censorship. They are not influenced by any external pressure nor swayed by any values of expediency or opportunism. The conscientious editor on every newspaper realizes that his obligation to the public is news. The fact of its accomplishment makes it news.

If the public relations counsel can breathe the breath of life into an idea and make it take its place among other ideas and events, it will receive the public attention it merits. There can be no question of his "contaminating news at its source." He creates some of the day's events, which must compete in the editorial office with other events. Often the events which he creates may be specially acceptable to a newspaper's public and he may create them with that public in mind.

If important things of life to-day consist of transatlantic radiophone talks arranged by commercial telephone companies; if they consist of inventions

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that will be commercially advantageous to the men who market them; if they consist of Henry Fords with epoch-making cars—then all this is news. The so-called flow of propaganda into the newspaper offices of the country may, simply at the editor's discretion, find its way to the waste basket.

The source of the news offered to the editor should always be clearly stated and the facts accurately presented.

The situation of the magazines at the present moment, from the propagandist's point of view, is different from that of the daily newspapers. The average magazine assumes no obligation, as the newspaper does, to reflect the current news. It selects its material deliberately, in accordance with a continuous policy. It is not, like the newspaper, an organ of public opinion, but tends rather to become a propagandist organ, propagandizing for a particular idea, whether it be good housekeeping, or smart apparel, or beauty in home decoration, or debunking public opinion, or general enlightenment or liberalism or amusement. One magazine may aim to sell health; another, English gardens; another, fashionable men's wear; another, Nietzschean philosophy.

In all departments in which the various magazines specialize, the public relations counsel may play an important part. For he may, because of his client's interest, assist them to create the events which

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further their propaganda. A bank, in order to emphasize the importance of its women's department, may arrange to supply a leading women's magazine with a series of articles and advice on investments written by the woman expert in charge of this department. The women's magazine in turn will utilize this new feature as a means of building additional prestige and circulation.

The lecture, once a powerful means of influencing public opinion, has changed its value. The lecture itself may be only a symbol, a ceremony; its importance, for propaganda purposes, lies in the fact that it was delivered. Professor So-and-So, expounding an epoch-making invention, may speak to five hundred persons, or only fifty. His lecture, if it is important, will be broadcast; reports of it will appear in the newspapers; discussion will be stimulated. The real value of the lecture, from the propaganda point of view, is in its repercussion to the general public.

The radio is at present one of the most important tools of the propagandist. Its future development is uncertain.

It may compete with the newspaper as an advertising medium. Its ability to reach millions of persons simultaneously naturally appeals to the advertiser. And since the average advertiser has a limited appropriation for advertising, money spent on the

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radio will tend to be withdrawn from the newspaper.

To what extent is the publisher alive to this new phenomenon? It is bound to come close to American journalism and publishing. Newspapers have recognized the advertising potentialities of the companies that manufacture radio apparatus, and of radio stores, large and small; and newspapers have accorded to the radio in their news and feature columns an importance relative to the increasing attention given by the public to radio. At the same time, certain newspapers have bought radio stations and linked them up with their news and entertainment distribution facilities, supplying these two features over the air to the public.

It is possible that newspaper chains will sell schedules of advertising space on the air and on paper. Newspaper chains will possibly contract with advertisers for circulation on paper and over the air. There are, at present, publishers who sell space in the air and in their columns, but they regard the two as separate ventures.

Large groups, political, racial, sectarian, economic or professional, are tending to control stations to propagandize their points of view. Or is it conceivable that America may adopt the English licensing system under which the listener, instead of the advertiser, pays?

Whether the present system is changed, the ad-

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vertiser—and propagandist—must necessarily adapt himself to it. Whether, in the future, air space will be sold openly as such, or whether the message will reach the public in the form of straight entertainment and news, or as special programs for particular groups, the propagandist must be prepared to meet the conditions and utilize them.

The American motion picture is the greatest unconscious carrier of propaganda in the world to-day. It is a great distributor for ideas and opinions.

The motion picture can standardize the ideas and habits of a nation. Because pictures are made to meet market demands, they reflect, emphasize and even exaggerate broad popular tendencies, rather than stimulate new ideas and opinions. The motion picture avails itself only of ideas and facts which are in vogue. As the newspaper seeks to purvey news, it seeks to purvey entertainment.

Another instrument of propaganda is the personality. Has the device of the exploited personality been pushed too far? President Coolidge photographed on his vacation in full Indian regalia in company with full-blooded chiefs, was the climax of a greatly over-reported vacation. Obviously a public personality can be made absurd by misuse of the very mechanism which helped create it.

Yet the vivid dramatization of personality will always remain one of the functions of the public relations counsel. The public instinctively demands

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a personality to typify a conspicuous corporation or enterprise.

There is a story that a great financier discharged a partner because he had divorced his wife.

"But what," asked the partner, "have my private affairs to do with the banking business?"

"If you are not capable of managing your own wife," was the reply, "the people will certainly believe that you are not capable of managing their money."

The propagandist must treat personality as he would treat any other objective fact within his province.

A personality may create circumstances, as Lindbergh created good will between the United States and Mexico. Events may create a personality, as the Cuban War created the political figure of Roosevelt. It is often difficult to say which creates the other. Once a public figure has decided what ends he wishes to achieve, he must regard himself objectively and present an outward picture of himself which is consistent with his real character and his aims.

There are a multitude of other avenues of approach to the public mind, some old, some new as television. No attempt will be made to discuss each one separately. The school may disseminate information concerning scientific facts. The fact that a commercial concern may eventually profit from a

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understanding of its activities because of this does not condemn the dissemination of such information, provided that the subject merits study on the part of the students. If a baking corporation contributes pictures and charts to a school to show how bread is made, these propaganda activities, if they are accurate and candid, are in no way reprehensible, provided the school authorities accept or reject such offers carefully on their educational merits.

It may be that a new product will be announced to the public by means of a motion picture of a parade taking place a thousand miles away. Or the manufacturer of a new jitney airplane may personally appear and speak in a million homes through radio and television. The man who would most effectively transmit his message to the public must be alert to make use of all the means of propaganda.

Undoubtedly the public is becoming aware of the methods which are being used to mold its opinions and habits. If the public is better informed about the processes of its own life, it will be so much the more receptive to reasonable appeals to its own interests. No matter how sophisticated, how cynical the public may become about publicity methods, it must respond to the basic appeals, because it will always need food, crave amusement, long for beauty, respond to leadership.

If the public becomes more intelligent in its commercial demands, commercial firms will meet the

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new standards. If it becomes weary of the old methods used to persuade it to accept a given idea or commodity, its leaders will present their appeals more intelligently.

Propaganda will never die out. Intelligent men must realize that propaganda is the modern instrument by which they can fight for productive ends and help to bring order out of chaos.

THE END

Spencer H. Heller

W. H. H. Heller

C. W. Heller

W. H. Heller

1922

Walter Lippman

CHAPTER III

AGENTS AND BYSTANDERS

I

WHEN a citizen has qualified as a voter he finds himself one of the theoretical rulers of a great going concern. He has not made the complicated machine with its five hundred thousand federal officers and its uncounted local offices. He has not seen much of it. He is bound by contracts, by debts, by treaties, by laws, made before he was aware of them. He does not from day to day decide who shall do what in the business of government. Only some small fraction of it comes intermittently to his notice. And in those episodic moments when he stands in the polling booth he is a highly intelligent and public-spirited voter indeed who can discover two real alternatives and enlist his influence

for a party which promises something he can understand.

The actual governing is made up of a multitude of arrangements on specific questions by particular individuals. These rarely become visible to the private citizen. Government, in the long intervals between elections, is carried on by politicians, officeholders and influential men who make settlements with other politicians, officeholders and influential men. The mass of people see these settlements; judge them, and affect them only now and then. They are altogether too numerous, too complicated, too obscure in their effects to become the subject of any continuing exercise of public opinion.

Nor in any exact and literal sense are those who conduct the daily business of government accountable after the fact to the great mass of the voters. They are accountable only, except in spectacular cases, to the other politicians, officeholders and influential men directly interested in the particular act.

Modern society is not visible to anybody, nor intelligible continuously and as a whole. One section is visible to another section, one series of acts is intelligible to this group and another to that.

Even this degree of responsible understanding is attainable only by the development of fact-finding agencies of great scope and complexity.¹ These agencies give only a remote and incidental assistance to the general public. Their findings are too intricate for the casual reader. They are also almost always much too uninteresting. Indeed the popular boredom and contempt for the expert and for statistical measurement are such that the organization of intelligence to administer modern affairs would probably be entirely neglected were it not that departments of government, corporations, trade unions and trade associations are being compelled by their own internal necessities of administration, and by compulsion of other corporate groups, to

¹ Cf. my *Public Opinion*, Chapters XXV and XXVI.

record their own acts, measure them, publish them and stand accountable for them.

The need in the Great Society not only for publicity but for uninterrupted publicity is indisputable. But we shall misunderstand the need seriously if we imagine that the purpose of the publication can possibly be the informing of every voter. We live at the mere beginnings of public accounting. Yet the facts far exceed our curiosity. The railroads, for example, make an accounting. Do we read the results? Hardly. A few executives here and there, some bankers, some regulating officials, some representatives of shippers and the like read them. The rest of us ignore them for the good and sufficient reason that we have other things to do.

For the man does not live who can read all the reports that drift across his doorstep or all the dispatches in his newspaper. And if by some development of the radio every man could see and hear all that was happening everywhere, if publicity, in other words, be-

came absolute, how much time could or would he spend watching the Sinking Fund Commission and the Geological Survey? He would probably tune in on the Prince of Wales, or, in desperation, throw off the switch and seek peace in ignorance. It is bad enough today—with morning newspapers published in the evening and evening newspapers in the morning, with October magazines in September, with the movies and the radio—to be condemned to live under a barrage of eclectic information, to have one's mind made the receptacle for a hullabaloo of speeches, arguments and unrelated episodes. General information for the informing of public opinion is altogether too general for intellectual decency. And life is too short for the pursuit of omniscience by the counting in a state of nervous excitement of all the leaves on all the trees.

2

If all men had to conceive the whole process of government all the time the world's work

would obviously never be carried on. Men make no attempt to consider society as a whole. The farmer decides whether to plant wheat or corn, the mechanic whether to take the job offered at the Pennsylvania or the Erie shops, whether to buy a Ford or a piano, and, if a Ford, whether to buy it from the garage on Elm Street or from the dealer who sent him a circular. These decisions are among fairly narrow choices offered to him; he can no more choose among all the jobs in the world than he can consider marrying any woman in the world. These choices in detail are in their cumulative mass the government of society. They may rest on ignorant or enlightened opinions, but, whether he comes to them by accident or scientific instruction, they are specific and particular among at best a few concrete alternatives and they lead to a definite, visible result.

But men are supposed also to hold public opinions about the general conduct of society. The mechanic is supposed not only to choose

between working for the Pennsylvania or the Erie but to decide how in the interests of the nation all the railroads of the country shall be regulated. The two kinds of opinion merge insensibly one into the other; men have general notions which influence their individual decisions and their direct experiences unconsciously govern their general notions. Yet it is useful to distinguish between the two kinds of opinion, the specific and direct, the general and the indirect.

Specific opinions give rise to immediate executive acts; to take a job, to do a particular piece of work, to hire or fire, to buy or sell, to stay here or go there, to accept or refuse, to command or obey. General opinions give rise to delegated, indirect, symbolic, intangible results: to a vote, to a resolution, to applause, to criticism, to praise or dispraise, to audiences, circulations, followings, contentment or discontent. The specific opinion may lead to a decision to act within the area where a man has personal jurisdiction;

that is, within the limits set by law and custom, his personal power and his personal desire. But general opinions lead only to some sort of expression, such as voting, and do not result in executive acts except in coöperation with the general opinions of large numbers of other persons.

Since the general opinions of large numbers of persons are almost certain to be a vague and confusing medley, action cannot be taken until these opinions have been factored down, canalized, compressed and made uniform. The making of one general will out of a multitude of general wishes is not an Hegelian mystery, as so many social philosophers have imagined, but an art well known to leaders, politicians and steering committees.² It consists essentially in the use of symbols which assemble emotions after they have been detached from their ideas. Because feelings are much less specific than ideas, and yet more poignant, the leader is able to make a

² Cf. my *Public Opinion*, Chapters XIII and XIV.

homogeneous will out of a heterogeneous mass of desires. The process, therefore, by which general opinions are brought to co-operation consists of an intensification of feeling and a degradation of significance. Before a mass of general opinions can eventuate in executive action, the choice is narrowed down to a few alternatives. The victorious alternative is executed not by the mass but by individuals in control of its energy.

A private opinion may be quite complicated, and may issue in quite complicated actions, in a whole train of subsidiary opinions, as when a man decides to build a house and then makes a hundred judgments as to how it shall be built. But a public opinion has no such immediate responsibility or continuous result. It leads in politics to the making of a pencil mark on a piece of paper, and then to a period of waiting and watching as to whether one or two years hence the mark shall be made in the same column or in the adjoining

one. The decision to make the mark may be for reasons a^1 , a^2 , a^3 . . . a^n : the result, whether an idiot or genius has voted, is A.

For great masses of people, though each of them may have more or less distinct views, must when they act converge to an identical result. And the more complex the collection of men the more ambiguous must be the unity and the simpler the common ideas.

3

In English-speaking countries during the last century the contrast between the action of men individually and in the mass has been much emphasized, and yet greatly misunderstood. Macaulay, for example, speaking on the Reform Bill of 1832, drew the conventional distinction between private enterprise and public action:

“In all those things which depend on the intelligence, the knowledge, the industry, the energy of individuals, this country stands preëminent among all countries of the world

ancient and modern. But in those things which it belongs to the state to direct we have no such claim to superiority . . . can there be a stronger contrast than that which exists between the beauty, the completeness, the speed, the precision with which every process is performed in our factories, and the awkwardness, the crudeness, the slowness, the uncertainty of the apparatus by which offenses are punished and rights vindicated? . . . Surely we see the barbarism of the Thirteenth Century and the highest civilization of the Nineteenth Century side by side, and we see that the barbarism belongs to the government, and the civilization to the people."⁸

Macaulay was, of course, thinking of the contrast between factory production and government as it existed in England under Queen Victoria's uncles and the hard-drinking, hard-riding squirearchy. But the Prussian bureaucracy amply demonstrated that

⁸ Speech on the Reform Bill of 1832, quoted in the *Times* (London), July 12, 1923.

there is no such necessary contrast between governmental and private action. There is a contrast between action by and through great masses of people and action that moves without them.

The fundamental contrast is not between public and private enterprises, between "crowd" psychology and individual, but between men doing specific things and men attempting to command general results. The work of the world is carried on by men in their executive capacity, by an infinite number of concrete acts, plowing and planting and reaping, building and destroying, fitting this to that, going from here to there, transforming A into B and moving B from X to Y. The relationships between the individuals doing these specific things are balanced by a most intricate mechanism of exchange, of contract, of custom and of implied promises. Where men are performing their work they must learn to understand the process and the substance of these obligations if they are to do

it at all. But in governing the work of other men by votes or by the expression of opinion they can only reward or punish a result, accept or reject alternatives presented to them. They can say yes or no to something which has been done, yes or no to a proposal, but they cannot create, administer and actually perform the act they have in mind. Persons uttering public opinions may now and then be able to define the acts of men, but their opinions do not execute these acts.

4

To the realm of executive acts, each of us, as a member of the public, remains always external. Our public opinions are always and forever, by their very nature, an attempt to control the actions of others from the outside. If we can grasp the full significance of that conclusion we shall, I think, have found a way of fixing the rôle of public opinion in its true perspective; we shall know how to account for the disenchantment of democ-

racy, and we shall begin to see the outline of an ideal of public opinion which, unlike that accepted in the dogma of democracy, may be really attainable.

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CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM OF VIVIDNESS

Let the reader try to recall the smell of a peach. He will no doubt find it a little vague. Let him try, now, to recall its taste. Still vague; but perhaps less so. Now let him try to recall what a peach looks like. Not vague at all. The image of the peach leaps to the mind.

Most of us are visual minded. This means that anything that can be presented to the eye has a far greater chance of being retained and recalled than something which is presented only to the organs of taste and smell.

To put an idea into visual form, then, is to increase its power. For the power of an idea depends upon two things: (1) the swiftness and clarity with which it is received: (2) the ease with which it is recalled.

We have all suffered under the colorless speaker (note the visual condemnation in the word colorless). We have all groaned under too great abstractness of presentation. We have all had the baffling experience of trying to recall what a certain chapter was about. And we have all gratefully had the opposite experience, of a speaker who gave us a vivid sense of the reality of what he was talking about; of a writer who so "pointed up" his material with visual illustration that he left us with a clear sense of his essential meanings.

Picturizing With Words

Note the picture value of the following advertisement:¹

A \$12,000 Advertisement

It was only a small advertisement; but some freak of fortune brought it into the hands of a Chinese firm in Hongkong.

A few weeks later a Cleveland concern received an order from Hongkong, for \$12,000 worth of merchandise.

It was a sizeable order. They needed it badly. Yet they could find no credit data relating to the new customer.

They 'phoned to the Foreign Department of this organization. Within ninety minutes, they had four closely typewritten pages concerning their customer and his financial status.

Yet this is only a sample of the service at the command . . .

The power of that advertisement lies in the picture-phrases of which it is so largely made up: "Only a small advertisement;" "some freak of fortune brought it into the hands;" "Chinese firm in Hongkong;" "a Cleveland concern;" "an order from Hongkong;" "\$12,000 worth of merchandise;" "they needed it badly;" "they 'phoned the Foreign Department;" "within ninety minutes;" "four closely typewritten pages."

Let us reconstruct that advertisement along the lines of abstract dignity:

Credit Information

The Foreign Department of the Union Trust Company is prepared to give reliable credit information at short notice concerning business houses throughout the world.

¹The Fine Art of Picturizing; by Arthur T. Corbett. *Advertising and Selling Fortnightly*, Nov. 19, 1924, p. 18.

No pictures whatever there, except, perhaps, a whiff of one in the phrase "at short notice!" "Throughout the world" is far less arresting than "Hongkong," because it is too general, too diffused to form a picture. "Credit information" is an understandable phrase; but it leaves us cold beside the vivid picture of an actual instance, in a specific place, of credit confirmation.

Notice the picture value of the following names: Camp Fire Girls; Boy Scouts; Pioneer Youth; Children's Bureau; International Community Center; Day Nursery; The Road of Anthracite; New York Central. Suppose the Camp Fire Girls had been called: Association for the Promotion of Friendship and Outdoor Life Among Girls!

Notice the fuzzy abstractness of the following names: The Joint Committee on Methods of Preventing Juvenile Delinquency; The American Public Health Association; New York State Committee on Mental Hygiene; New York, Westchester and Boston Railway.¹

Be Creators of Images

Most of us, as we have said, are naturally "visual minded;" but comparatively few of us are "visual worded." There is no need, therefore, that we train ourselves in the power to receive visual images; there is every need, however, that we make some deliberate effort to train ourselves in the power to create and transmit visual images.

¹ I have just tested the recall value of the latter name by looking it up in the telephone directory. First, I discovered I could not recall the order of the three localities. So I started with Boston;—Boston, New York, Westchester; Boston, Westchester, New York; no luck! Then Westchester, Boston, New York; Westchester, New York, Boston; no luck again! Then New York, Boston, Westchester. Finally, after ten minutes or so of irritated turning of pages, the absurd combination!

We can do this, first, by taking passages from the great writers—men like Tolstoy; Anatole France; Shaw; Huxley; Emerson; Carlyle—noting the picture words used. To build up a fairly adequate vocabulary of such words is itself of value. Of greater value, however, is the habit which thereby develops of being aware of the power which such words give to the writing. As we begin to note the presence of visual words in the great writers, we note, the more easily, their absence from our own efforts. Another excellent procedure is to examine writing which is obviously dull and ineffective and note in how far the weakness of the writing arises out of the poverty of picture-building words. The same procedure may be followed in the case of effective speakers and dull speakers.

Then we shall be ready to take ourselves severely and successfully in hand. We can stand over our own dull paragraphs, or keep an ear upon our own colorless speeches, and point them up by substituting "eye" words for the commonplace, foggy symbols which help to hold us within the ranks of mediocrity.

The Anti-Picturizers

We now go a step further, and as writers or speakers put our material into visual form by the use of pictures. There is, among many so-called intellectuals, an instant and ominous "thumbs down." Pictures are lowbrow. No really intelligent person is supposed to look at pictures—unless they are framed and hung in a gallery!

This is a curious attitude, since a picture, very often, is obviously the clearest and simplest means for transmitting ideas. Take, for example, a printed verbal description of

a house or a landscape. We all know how difficult it is to follow the verbal process. Is there any particular advantage in having to grope through a wordy description, achieving, at the end, only a vague and inaccurate visual image, when a picture would give us instantly all the characteristic details? Or take a description of how to swing one's golf club properly, or how to do a crawl stroke? The objection to the use of pictures seems to be a curious left-over from the ascetic philosophy that life must be made as difficult as possible, never as easy. Pictures make things too easy for us.

There is, of course, a degree of truth in this. A generation brought up exclusively on pictures would doubtless become lazy and passive-minded (unless the pictures were stimulative of ideas). But no one in his senses, surely, would advocate such a wholesale use of pictures, particularly of pictures which in no wise roused the mind to active response.

In life we apply tools to the material of our environment. One kind of tool is applied to physical things. Now it would be a curious carpenter who would insist that it was demoralizing to use a modern set of steel tools on the ground that it made carpentering too easy. It is true that a stone hammer would cause the carpenter far more trouble; would tax his patience and his ingenuity to the utmost. But would that additional effort be worthwhile? Even at the best, he could never accomplish with his ascetic stone hammer what he could easily coax out of a full kit of modern tools.

The point is that the modern "easier" tools do not make the carpenter lazy; do not weaken his craftsman ability.

They simply release his energies for work impossible with the cruder tool.

Now words and pictures are tools. They are tools for communicating ideas, stimulating interests, arousing feelings and emotions. The sole question we have to ask about these tools is, which of them does the tool-work most effectively?

When we state the issue in this way there can be no doubt about the answer. "A picture, with a few words of explanation, will make it possible to get over an idea in one minute that would require two minutes without the picture." If that is true, then the picture is the more effective tool of communication. We need not worry about the fact that the receiving mind has, in this case, worked less hard (a minute less) in getting the idea by picture than by word. That simply means that it has more time left to get other ideas.

And therein, after all, lies the secret of what we, as human beings, are after. We make our life increasingly successful as we are able to minimize the time spent upon certain tasks, in order that our energies may be released for other worthwhile tasks and opportunities.

The Imitative Picture

There are two types of pictures which are of interest to us in this connection: (1) the imitative; (2) the selective. Obviously, the imitative picture serves many time-saving, idea-clarifying purposes. A photograph, or photographic drawing, of a dress, or gun, or bicycle, or building is so far more effective than a verbal description that business

men have long since abandoned the letter, save as supplementary to the picturization. The eye grasps instantly a hundred details, gets the "wholeness" of a thing in picture form, where it would crawl along slowly from word to word of a description and in the end have no clear image. Books on anatomy, physiology, biology, botany, horticulture, agriculture, etc., are largely effective in proportion to the clear and precise illustrations contained in their text. That pictures are not more generously used in such texts is due to the relatively large cost of their reproduction:

The Selective Picture: Diagrams, Graphs, Curves

The most significant type of picture, however, is the selective picture. At the farthest remove from imitative representation are those skeleton-like picturizings which we call diagrams, graphs, curves. "When large groups of figures are to be presented it is often useful to employ diagrams which enable the eye to grasp at once the series as a whole. There are many varieties. Popular discussions of comparative populations, wealth, navies, and so on often represent the various figures by lines or surfaces which are so juxtaposed as to show at once to the eye the relations of the several quantities. . . . Or we might employ rectangles with equal bases, or points on a curve."¹

Often skeleton maps with shaded areas show most effectively diminutions or increases in numbers.

Such selective picturizing is a comparatively recent device. It is a form of "conceptual shorthand" which very greatly increases the clarity and the power of the ideas.

It is significant that the making of such selective pictures

¹ Jones, A. L.; *Logic*; p. 226. Holt, New York.

is only slowly being introduced into the schools. Here verbal technique is still in the ascendant, although verbal technique is, in these cases, immeasurably inferior. But so, likewise, students are still required solemnly to add and subtract, multiply and divide, extract roots, etc. (long after they have attained skill in these), despite the adding machine and the slide rule!

The Cartoon

Is there a more effective, idea-clarifying and emotion-arousing device than the modern cartoon? The cartoon is in a preëminent way a form of selective picture which conveys an idea. Through conveying an idea with simple clarity, it often arouses powerful emotion. It frequently does what words cannot do. It crowds the salient details of a situation into a few square inches of space; places them there with such selective clarity that the eye and the mind catch them instantly.

The power of the cartoon is the power of all art, the power of selective emphasis. The cartoonist knows that most of us go about with only a hazy kind of attention. We see people indeed; but we recognize them only by a few conventional marks. The cartoonist wants us to see the vulgarity in that fat woman's face; or the pathos in that girl's thin arms. A bit of accentuation; and the trick is done. We now *see*. He has extended our human insight. He has given a new direction to our thought and feelings.

Or he wants us to be aware of the danger in a certain political situation. A few accentuated characters thrown together within his small area; and the whole story is told!

The cartoon is still one of the step-children of the arts. Some day it will be lifted to the place of honor which is its due. An artist who has genuine ideas about human life, genuine insight into human situations, might well be proud of the power to sweep his thoughts and feelings into the swift compass of pictures that grip us with their clear pertinence.

Here, again, we are the victims of our own early conditioning. Practically none of us, in our childhood days, were taught to "say it with pictures." And as for the pictures that we were taught to admire, they were the paintings on gallery walls.

But why should our children not be taught to "say it with pictures?" Why should we confine our children to copying leaves and plaster casts—a wholly imitative, idealess enterprise; when they ought, from their youngest years, to be learning how to give graphic expression to their ideas? When we find Thackeray, Clarence Day, Hugh Lofting, Willem Van Loon and others, telling their stories in pictures, we exclaim with delight. We seldom think that this is what all of us ought to be able to do; that it is a power which our word-dominated education has failed to develop in us, but which ought to become part of our everyday human equipment.

The Gallery Picture

Nor do we mean by this to detract in any degree from the high form of art which hangs on our gallery walls. The trouble with our gallery walls is—that they are gallery walls. The pictures on them are seldom seen; and when seen, they are looked upon as something rare and quite

apart from ourselves. Usually, we do not even know how to look at them. We drag through wearily, giving a glance here at a mother slicing bread for her children or there at a *generallissimo* on a snorting horse.

What do these pictures on our gallery walls really intend to convey? What good do they do? What use are they to our human enterprise?

The usual thought is that artists are queer folk who like to paint. Sometimes the pictures tickle our fancy; and we stand for a moment and look at them. Then we pass on.

But, of course, there is much more to it than this. A picture, if it is worth anything, is a more or less powerful means of communication. The artist has seen something. You and I have been in the same place, perhaps; have looked at the same object; but we have not seen just that peculiar, rare thing which the artist sees. Why? Because, as we said above, we usually see only the ordinary, conventional marks whereby we identify the objects and creatures of our world. But in this particular commonplace object—say it is a tree—the artist sees something which we have passed over. He sees a sturdiness, a stubbornness in the windswept branches. When he paints his picture, it is sturdiness, stubbornness that he paints into his canvas. He accentuates. He brings these out so that even our attention-dulled eyes can see.

What a picture does, then, is to fasten our attention upon aspects of our own world which ordinarily escape us. It is for that reason that galleries are usually psychological monstrosities. No one of us can have our attention whipped alive a hundred times in every few hundred feet; a thousand, several thousand times in the course of an hour. Every picture that is worth seeing is a stimulus to an un-

usual act of attention on our part. Each picture must, therefore, be given its full opportunity. We should hardly expect a person to listen with a peculiar joy to a single musical note, if a hundred discordant whistles were blowing. No more can we expect these selective bits of experience which we call pictures to arouse us to their peculiar new way of seeing things, if a hundred of them are claiming our distracted attention.

In one of our women's colleges there is a wise art director. One room is set apart; and in that room is hung one picture—usually for an entire week. Also in front of that one picture, at a great enough distance, is a bench with a back. The director knows that if we are to incorporate the new and rare experience, we must be given time; and that if we take time, the rest of our bodily organism must not be crying out for attention. He knows that we ordinarily see galleries not with our eyes but with our protesting feet.

Pictures seen in a real way add new feelings, new insights to our life. Architecture and sculpture also influence human behavior by picturization of ideas and feelings. There can be little doubt that to the Athenian the Parthenon was a very important, though doubtless quite unconscious, influence. There it reposed, a white jewel of beauty, on the top of the Acropolis. No hundred other "objects of art" to compete with it. The Athenian passed it scores of times; could look up at it from any part of the city. Suppose that instead of the gleaming white Parthenon, there had been a huge illuminated sign, with dancing silly-billies, advertising *Woggly's Chewing Gum: It Sticks!*

The Parthenon was a work of art, not only because it was beautiful, but because it was selective. It accentuated

beauty of line in the human body; beauty of movement; beauty of proportion. We could easily imagine a gargoyle temple crowded with hooded figures. Such a temple would be selective of other features of experience and would have had an influence notably different from that of the Parthenon. The Parthenon taught the Greeks to see human life in one of its major aspects; it influenced them unconsciously towards the development of a taste for beauty of line, movement and proportion.

Two Necessary Projects

There are two things which, apparently, we must learn to do if the full value of picturizing is to be realized in our modern civilization. First, we must unlearn most of our habits of thought about art. We must learn what pictures, sculptures, and works of architecture really have to say. Once we see that what they communicate is something selective; something taken out of the vague and helter-skelter mass of our experience and made to stand out as beautiful and worthy of our attention—once we see this, every picture or other work of art becomes for us a means to arouse our attention to something unique, something ordinarily unnoticed. A work of art, then, becomes for us a key to unlock a rarity. It is not simply something to look at and exclaim: "Why it's an exact copy!"; something to give the date of and the author; something to hunt up in a catalogue. It becomes in itself a new, enlightening experience.

But, in the second place, we must ourselves learn to speak the language of pictures. We must begin by noting the unusual, the rare. We must begin by trying somehow,

even though with the greatest awkwardness, to set down our own experience of what most people do not see. Technique can follow in due course after the artist eye is opened.

And so, if we are adults and have not yet learned to speak the language of pictures, our best plan will be not to copy plaster casts but simply to try to note what is characteristic about the objects around us—the saucy tilt of a nose; the expressive solemnity of huge ears; the pathos of knuckled fingers; the self-reliant stubbornness of a small dog's tail; the lordly droop of a chrysanthemum. We can try, in our awkward ways, to set down in simple black lines these things we see. We may never become skilled technicians; our drawings may be ridiculously crude; but one thing, we may be assured, they will not be—if they are drawn out of our actual seeing of what is rare and characteristic, they will never be dull. And they will do this for us: they will enable us to respond with a more instant sensitiveness to what the master artists are trying to convey.

But, of course, all this training ought to be begun early in life. It is a pity that our children spend years in learning the art of speaking with words, but, for the most part, no time at all in learning the art of speaking with visual images. There are signs, however, that a new understanding of the value of this art is being reached. In the more progressive schools, children begin to draw freely from the kindergarten on. They are never asked to copy anything—in the pedantic way demanded of old. They are given generous spaces of paper, a goodly equipment of paints and brushes and allowed to go ahead as they wish. And the wise teacher does not say: "Ah, Jennie, but don't you see that human arms don't hang that way? Let me show you how." No, she lets the arms hang in whatever way

they wish to hang, being fully assured that the spirit is more than arms and legs, and that while arms and legs will eventually find their proper placing, the spirit must blow where it listeth.

It is not in order that children may paint that we do this, or that they may bring home their pictures to fond papa and mamma. It is that they may learn to see and to express what they see. It is, in short, that their eyes may learn a sensitiveness to the rarer aspects of experience, instead of becoming dulled to all except the most conventional utilitarian marks whereby we identify the objects around us.

There is much loveliness in our world which quite escapes us. Looking out upon a landscape, let the reader bend down until his head is horizontal instead of perpendicular and let him look at the landscape from that angle. A subtle change comes over the scene. Colors not before detected now stand out, contours hitherto unnoticed are now in sharp relief. By a slight change in the angle of our perception, we have brought out new qualities in the scene before us. Art does that for us—when we really see art. All the more reason, then, that we should all, in some degree, become artists.

Thus we enrich our own experience. And thus, if we can really learn the art of selective expression, we enrich the experience of others. A civilization is drab, Main-Streetish, when it sees only the utilitarian values. It escapes drabness, it beautifies its Main Streets, when it develops in its members new and more subtle sensitiveness of vision.

The effort to picturize, in brief, is valuable in many different ways. If we can cast aside the colorless, abstract words of ordinary currency, and substitute words which suggest images; if we can create what people shall see—

whether we be writers, or advertisers, or teachers, or artists—we add not only to the clarity of our thought, but also to the power of our influence over human behavior.

Inducing an Imagined Experience

Picturization, then, lends a vividness such as is not usually experienced through the imaginative use of the other senses. To see with the eye of the mind concretely, is to apprehend more of the object, and more vividly, than to hear with the ears abstractly.

But there is something more effective even than seeing with the imaginative eye. It is the condition in which we imaginatively feel a situation with more or less of our whole personalities.

Let us suppose that I wish to interest some one in the starving children of Russia. I can tell the person that it is his duty to help these children in distress. Such admonition will probably not move him very greatly. Or I can ask him whether he will be so good as to help these poor, suffering children. He may be slightly moved by my appeal to his pity; more particularly, perhaps, by my flattery of his humanity; and he may give me a contribution. Suppose, however, I could take him over with me to Russia and let him see starving children; talk with them; help them individually. I should no longer have to argue or to plead. He himself, of his own free will, out of the intensity of his own feeling, would give the maximum of his help.

Obviously, the best technique we can ever use is to put the person completely into the situation. But in most cases in life this rather expensive technique can hardly be

applied. Hence we are called upon to use a second-best, namely, the technique of putting a person *imaginatively* into the situation.

We sometimes call this the power of suggestion. That word, however, has so mysterious a sound; it has become so associated with curious psychological procedures like hypnotism, auto-suggestion, etc., and with erotic "suggestiveness," that I prefer not to use it, but to use a phrase which quite clearly indicates precisely what we do.

We induce an imagined experience. Not all of us, of course do. When we do not, our speech or our writing is abstract, unarousing, "pale." We talk "about it and about." When, however, we do successfully induce an imagined experience, we have a power which, for effectively influencing human behavior, is almost, if not quite, the greatest that a writer or speaker can have.

Let me illustrate. The power of a person like Billy Sunday lies in the effective use of this technique. We may not be particularly interested in the kind of imagined experience which the Reverend Billy induces. As psychologists, however, it is important that we note the source of his power. *The New York Times* recently reported one of the characteristic feats of the preacher. "BILLY SUNDAY TALK ENDS LONG LOOTING." "WOMAN MOVED BY SERMON ON THE 'WAGES OF SIN,' REVEALS ALL TO THE ELMIRA POLICE." "Before an audience of 7,000 in the Sunday Tabernacle, the famous evangelist declared that 'no person in whose heart reposes guilty knowledge need expect to make peace with God until confession is first made,' and the statement struck terror to one woman's heart, for she had been concealing the knowledge of extensive robberies for nearly ten years and yet devoutly wished to make her

peace with her Creator. Leaving the tabernacle she sought the seclusion of her room and remained upon her knees in agonized prayer until the first flush of dawn, when her decision was made." Here was a case of inducing an imagined experience, that of standing before God with a guilty secret in one's heart. The preacher doubtless portrayed the situation with such vividness that the guilty woman was terror-stricken.

The colored minister often has this power. The following amusing yet psychologically most significant story is told by Professor F. M. Davenport (quoted by Allport, *Social Psychology*, p. 247):

"In a little town between Cleveland, Tennessee, and Chattanooga, it was the purpose to give a donation to the colored minister. One of the brethren in the church volunteered to make a collection from the various homes, and an old woman loaned this brother her cart and a pair of steers for the purpose. After he had been throughout the neighborhood and had secured a load of provisions and clothing, he drove off to Chattanooga and sold everything, including the cart and the steers, pocketed the proceeds and departed on a visit to Atlanta. Consternation and indignation reigned in the community when the affair became known. After some time the culprit drifted back in deep contrition, but having seen the indignation were more due to a white heat, and it was determined to give him a church trial at once. The meeting was crowded; and the preacher, after stating the charges, announced that the accused would be given a chance to be heard. He went forward and took the place of the preacher on the platform.

"'I ain't got nuffin to say fo' myse'f,' he began in a penitent voice, 'I'se a po' mis'able sinner. But, bredren, so is we all mis'able sinners. An' de good book says we must fergib. How many times, bredren? Till seven times? No, till seventy times seven. An' I ain't sinned no seventy times seven, and I'm jes' go' to sugges' dat

66 INFLUENCING HUMAN BEHAVIOR

peace with her Creator. Leaving the tabernacle she sought the seclusion of her room and remained upon her knees in agonized prayer until the first flush of dawn, when her decision was made." Here was a case of inducing an imagined experience, that of standing before God with a guilty secret in one's heart. The preacher doubtless portrayed the situation with such vividness that the guilty woman was terror-stricken.

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back, in deep contrition, but having spent it all. Indignation once more arose to a white heat, and

we turn dis into a fergibness meetin', and eberybody in dis great comp'ny dat is willin' to fergib me, come up now, while we sing one of our deah ole h'yms, and shake ma hand.'

"He started one of the powerful revival tunes, and they began to come, first those who hadn't given anything to the donation and were not much interested in the matter, then those who hadn't lost much, and then the others. Finally all had passed before him except one, and she stuck to her seat. 'Dar's one po' mis'able sinner lef',' said he, 'dat won't fergib.' (She was the old lady who had lost the steers.) 'Now I sugges' dat we hab a season ob prayer, an' gib dis po' ole sinner one mo' chance.' And after they had prayed and sung a hymn, the old lady came up, too!"

Imagining It Does It

Note the difference in effect between the following two statements made to a person: "I would advise you to have a regular examination by a physician;" and "By Jove, man, you're looking positively ill. You ought to have a doctor look you over!" In the one case we present a perfectly impeccable bit of abstract statement, with the result that nothing happens! In the second case, we "*induce an imagined experience.*" *The friend sees himself looking sick; he feels himself getting sicker.* And because it is he who does the feeling, no argument is needed. He goes to the doctor!

Amusing and yet instructive psychological experiments have been made along this line. A number of young men are subjects. They are told that experiments are to be made upon them to try out the effect of stimulating and of depressing drugs upon their heart-beat. They are accordingly given a few pills, which, they are told, contain strychnine; and it is explained to them that strychnine has the

case, we "induce an imagined experience." The friend sees himself looking sick;

effect of whipping up the heart to more rapid action. After a certain lapse of time, the heart beats are counted; and in the majority of cases the beat is faster. The pills, however, as the reader may have guessed, were only milk sugar pills! And so with the other experiments.¹

In these cases, "inducing an imagined experience" actually succeeds in so enlisting the entire organism that even movements ordinarily beyond conscious control are noticeably affected!

The "Forward Looking" Mind

There is at present in America, among forward looking minds, a large amount of dissatisfaction with reactionary tendencies. This dissatisfaction takes itself out in bitter negative argumentation. The American public are roundly scolded for taking no interest in the European situation; for being smugly concerned only with their own affairs; for being intolerant of liberals; for curbing free speech. Apparently, nothing very noticeable comes of all this. The American public go on their way supremely indifferent, because they do not even read or hear these scoldings! And even if they did, they would doubtless only be annoyed into a more stubborn pursuit of their ways.

The failure, one may suppose, lies in the fact that no glowing, imagined experience is portrayed for the American people. Suppose that the critics should face about, should accept the idea of 100 per cent Americanism but go it one better. Suppose they should build up, in every possible way, the picture of America the pioneer, America the adventurous, the red-blooded, the unafraid; America always on

¹ Dearborn, G. V.; *Influence of Joy*; p. 90. Little Brown & Co., Boston.

the firing-line of social and political advance. Suppose they could make the average citizen feel that kind of America, feel the thrill of pride in belonging to such a country. I doubt whether the indifference and reactionism would remain quite unaffected. As a matter of fact, "100 per cent American" is a powerful slogan, precisely because it does induce an imagined experience; does give a thrill of proud feeling.

Instead of arguing *against* keeping political refugees out, the more successful way, apparently, would be to build up the picture of America as the Haven of the Persecuted. Instead of arguing *against* standpattism, the more effective way would doubtless be to build up the picture of America as open minded, as indeed the very America it is, because of its eagerness for new ideas. Instead of inveighing against the timid reactionaries who are constantly harking back to the signers of the Constitution, the really powerful thing to do would be to build up the picture of America as forward looking.

Each of these phrases we have used, it will be noted, is a picture phrase, a phrase which puts one into a situation, and which consequently arouses the feeling of being in that situation.

The secret of all true persuasion is to induce the person to persuade himself. The chief task of the persuader, therefore is to induce the experience. The rest will take care of itself.

For the Reader

The reader will find it a most valuable undertaking to examine the extent to which the technique of inducing-an-

imagined-experience is used in various forms of print and speech. Advertising is a rich field of research. Almost every really effective advertisement gives one a sense of actually experiencing the delightful situation: travel advertisements, food, sport, clothing, health advertisements. He will soon be able to detect the difference between an advertisement which makes one's mouth water, so to speak, and the type of advertisement, which, couched only in abstract terms, leaves one cold.

He will find that the power of a great novel is that it is able to induce in one the feeling of the actual experiences through which the characters pass; whereas a mediocre novel keeps one always in the condition of looking on.) So, too, he will find that the speaker who moves people, achieves this through his power to make his audience experience what he is portraying. Enthusiasm is contagious to the extent and only to the extent that it does this. If it is unable to induce the imagined experience, it only seems rather silly.

He will find that the really successful parent is not the one who preaches or advises or explains or commands, but the one who can induce in his children vivid imagined experiences.

The secret of it all, of course, is that a person is led to *do* what he overwhelmingly *feels*. Practice in getting people to feel themselves in situations is therefore the surest road to persuasiveness.

CHAPTER IV

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EFFECTIVE SPEAKING

We proceed now, in this and the following chapter, to the two techniques of speech and writing. Speech, when it has an object, is always an effort to arrest the attention and in some measure to affect the behavior of other human beings. To be sure, there is the kind of aimless speech of conversation which seems to have no particular end in view save to keep going. But even in the speech of conversation there is the effort to say things in such a way that the other party listens. No conversationalist delights in seeing his respondent fall asleep before his eyes. Where, however, speech has a more definite object—as in an admonition to a child, an exposition of a point, the discussion of a motion in a committee meeting,—the object is quite clearly that of influencing the listener to some kind of behavior. It may be simply the intra-organic behavior of mental assent; or it may be the extra-organic behavior of doing something. In any event, speech is used as a means of getting some kind of favorable response.

The problem of effective speaking, therefore, is essentially psychological. A good deal of training in public speaking seems to miss this point. It is a training rather in the literary, logical and physical mechanics of speaking—the arrangement of ideas, sentence structure, beginning, middle and end, gestures, enunciation. All these, of course, are

The Work of Art

in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction

"Our fine arts were developed, their types and uses were established, in times very different from the present, by men whose power of action upon things was insignificant in comparison with ours. But the amazing growth of our techniques, the adaptability and precision they have attained, the ideas and habits they are creating, make it a certainty that profound changes are impending in the ancient craft of the Beautiful. In all the arts there is a physical component which can no longer be considered or treated as it used to be, which cannot remain unaffected by our modern knowledge and power. For the last twenty years neither matter nor space nor time has been what it was from time immemorial. We must expect great innovations to transform the entire technique of the arts, thereby affecting artistic invention itself and perhaps even bringing about an amazing change in our very notion of art." °

—Paul Valéry, *PIÈCES SUR L'ART*,
"La Conquête de l'ubiquité," Paris.

PREFACE

When Marx undertook his critique of the capitalistic mode of production, this mode was in its infancy. Marx directed his efforts in such a way as to give them prognostic value. He went back to the basic conditions underlying capitalistic production and through his presentation showed what could be expected of capitalism in the future. The result was that one could expect it not only to exploit the proletariat with increasing intensity, but ultimately to create conditions which would make it possible to abolish capitalism itself.

The transformation of the superstructure, which takes place

* Quoted from Paul Valéry, *Aesthetics*, "The Conquest of Ubiquity," translated by Ralph Manheim, p. 225. Pantheon Books, Bollingen Series, New York, 1964.

far more slowly than that of the substructure, has taken more than half a century to manifest in all areas of culture the change in the conditions of production. Only today can it be indicated what form this has taken. Certain prognostic requirements should be met by these statements. However, theses about the art of the proletariat after its assumption of power or about the art of a classless society would have less bearing on these demands than theses about the developmental tendencies of art under present conditions of production. Their dialectic is no less noticeable in the superstructure than in the economy. It would therefore be wrong to underestimate the value of such theses as a weapon. They brush aside a number of outmoded concepts, such as creativity and genius, eternal value and mystery—concepts whose uncontrolled (and at present almost uncontrollable) application would lead to a processing of data in the Fascist sense. The concepts which are introduced into the theory of art in what follows differ from the more familiar terms in that they are completely useless for the purposes of Fascism. They are, on the other hand, useful for the formulation of revolutionary demands in the politics of art.

I

In principle a work of art has always been reproducible. Man-made artifacts could always be imitated by men. Replicas were made by pupils in practice of their craft, by masters for diffusing their works, and, finally, by third parties in the pursuit of gain. Mechanical reproduction of a work of art, however, represents something new. Historically, it advanced intermittently and in leaps at long intervals, but with accelerated intensity. The Greeks knew only two procedures of technically reproducing works of art: founding and stamping. Bronzes, terra cottas, and coins were the only art works which they could produce in quantity. All others were unique and could not be mechanically reproduced. With the woodcut graphic art became mechanically reproducible for the first time, long before script became 'reproducible by print. The enormous changes which printing, the mechanical

reproduction of writing, has brought about in literature are a familiar story. However, within the phenomenon which we are here examining from the perspective of world history, print is merely a special, though particularly important, case. During the Middle Ages engraving and etching were added to the woodcut; at the beginning of the nineteenth century lithography made its appearance.

With lithography the technique of reproduction reached an essentially new stage. This much more direct process was distinguished by the tracing of the design on a stone rather than its incision on a block of wood or its etching on a copperplate and permitted graphic art for the first time to put its products on the market, not only in large numbers as hitherto, but also in daily changing forms. Lithography enabled graphic art to illustrate everyday life, and it began to keep pace with printing. But only a few decades after its invention, lithography was surpassed by photography. For the first time in the process of pictorial reproduction, photography freed the hand of the most important artistic functions which henceforth devolved only upon the eye looking into a lens. Since the eye perceives more swiftly than the hand can draw, the process of pictorial reproduction was accelerated so enormously that it could keep pace with speech. A film operator shooting a scene in the studio captures the images at the speed of an actor's speech. Just as lithography virtually implied the illustrated newspaper, so did photography foreshadow the sound film. The technical reproduction of sound was tackled at the end of the last century. These convergent endeavors made predictable a situation which Paul Valéry pointed up in this sentence: "Just as water, gas, and electricity are brought into our houses from far off to satisfy our needs in response to a minimal effort, so we shall be supplied with visual or auditory images, which will appear and disappear at a simple movement of the hand, hardly more than a sign" (*op. cit.*, p. 226). Around 1900 technical reproduction had reached a standard that not only permitted it to reproduce all transmitted works of art and thus to cause the most profound change in their impact upon the public; it also had captured a place of its own among the artistic proc-

esses. For the study of this standard nothing is more revealing than the nature of the repercussions that these two different manifestations—the reproduction of works of art and the art of the film—have had on art in its traditional form.

II

Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be: This unique existence of the work of art determined the history to which it was subject throughout the time of its existence. This includes the changes which it may have suffered in physical condition over the years as well as the various changes in its ownership.¹ The traces of the first can be revealed only by chemical or physical analyses which it is impossible to perform on a reproduction; changes of ownership are subject to a tradition which must be traced from the situation of the original.

The presence of the original is the prerequisite to the concept of authenticity. Chemical analyses of the patina of a bronze can help to establish this, as does the proof that a given manuscript of the Middle Ages stems from an archive of the fifteenth century. The whole sphere of authenticity is outside technical—and, of course, not only technical—reproducibility.² Confronted with its manual reproduction, which was usually branded as a forgery, the original preserved all its authority; not so *vis à vis* technical reproduction. The reason is twofold. First, process reproduction is more independent of the original than manual reproduction. For example, in photography, process reproduction can bring out those aspects of the original that are unattainable to the naked eye yet accessible to the lens, which is adjustable and chooses its angle at will. And photographic reproduction, with the aid of certain processes, such as enlargement or slow motion, can capture images which escape natural vision. Secondly, technical reproduction can put the copy of the original into situations which would be out of reach for the original itself. Above all, it enables the original to meet the beholder halfway,

be it in the form of a photograph or a phonograph record. The cathedral leaves its locale to be received in the studio of a lover of art; the choral production, performed in an auditorium or in the open air, resounds in the drawing room.

The situations into which the product of mechanical reproduction can be brought may not touch the actual work of art, yet the quality of its presence is always depreciated. This holds not only for the art work but also, for instance, for a landscape which passes in review before the spectator in a movie. In the case of the art object, a most sensitive nucleus—namely, its authenticity—is interfered with whereas no natural object is vulnerable on that score. The authenticity of a thing is the essence of all that is transmissible from its beginning, ranging from its substantive duration to its testimony to the history which it has experienced. Since the historical testimony rests on the authenticity, the former, too, is jeopardized by reproduction when substantive duration ceases to matter. And what is really jeopardized when the historical testimony is affected is the authority of the object.⁸

One might subsume the eliminated element in the term "aura" and go on to say: that which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art. This is a symptomatic process whose significance points beyond the realm of art. One might generalize by saying: the technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition. By making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence. And in permitting the reproduction to meet the beholder or listener in his own particular situation, it reactivates the object reproduced. These two processes lead to a tremendous shattering of tradition which is the obverse of the contemporary crisis and renewal of mankind. Both processes are intimately connected with the contemporary mass movements. Their most powerful agent is the film. Its social significance, particularly in its most positive form, is inconceivable without its destructive, cathartic aspect, that is, the liquidation of the traditional value of the cultural heritage. This phenomenon is most palpable in the great historical films. It extends to ever new positions. In 1927 Abel Gance exclaimed enthusiastically: "Shake-

speare, Rembrandt, Beethoven will make films . . . all legends, all mythologies and all myths, all founders of religion, and the very religions . . . await their exposed resurrection, and the heroes crowd each other at the gate." * Presumably without intending it, he issued an invitation to a far-reaching liquidation.

III

During long periods of history, the mode of human sense perception changes with humanity's entire mode of existence. The manner in which human sense perception is organized, the medium in which it is accomplished, is determined not only by nature but by historical circumstances as well. The fifth century, with its great shifts of population, saw the birth of the late Roman art industry and the Vienna Genesis, and there developed not only an art different from that of antiquity but also a new kind of perception. The scholars of the Viennese school, Riegl and Wickhoff, who resisted the weight of classical tradition under which these later art forms had been buried, were the first to draw conclusions from them concerning the organization of perception at the time. However far-reaching their insight, these scholars limited themselves to showing the significant, formal hallmark which characterized perception in late Roman times. They did not attempt—and, perhaps, saw no way—to show the social transformations expressed by these changes of perception. The conditions for an analogous insight are more favorable in the present. And if changes in the medium of contemporary perception can be comprehended as decay of the aura, it is possible to show its social causes.

The concept of aura which was proposed above with reference to historical objects may usefully be illustrated with reference to the aura of natural ones. We define the aura of the latter as the unique phenomenon of a distance, however close it may be. If, while resting on a summer afternoon, you follow with

* Abel Gance, "Le Temps de l'image est venu," *L'Art cinématographique*, Vol. 2, pp. 94 f, Paris, 1927.

your eyes a mountain range on the horizon or a branch which casts its shadow over you, you experience the aura of those mountains, of that branch. This image makes it easy to comprehend the social bases of the contemporary decay of the aura. It rests on two circumstances, both of which are related to the increasing significance of the masses in contemporary life. Namely, the desire of contemporary masses to bring things "closer" spatially and humanly, which is just as ardent as their bent toward overcoming the uniqueness of every reality by accepting its reproduction.⁴ Every day the urge grows stronger to get hold of an object at very close range by way of its likeness, its reproduction. Unmistakably, reproduction as offered by picture magazines and newsreels differs from the image seen by the unarmed eye. Uniqueness and permanence are as closely linked in the latter as are transitoriness and reproducibility in the former. To pry an object from its shell, to destroy its aura, is the mark of a perception whose "sense of the universal equality of things" has increased to such a degree that it extracts it even from a unique object by means of reproduction. Thus is manifested in the field of perception what in the theoretical sphere is noticeable in the increasing importance of statistics. The adjustment of reality to the masses and of the masses to reality is a process of unlimited scope, as much for thinking as for perception.

IV

The uniqueness of a work of art is inseparable from its being imbedded in the fabric of tradition. This tradition itself is thoroughly alive and extremely changeable. An ancient statue of Venus, for example, stood in a different traditional context with the Greeks, who made it an object of veneration, than with the clerics of the Middle Ages, who viewed it as an ominous idol. Both of them, however, were equally confronted with its uniqueness, that is, its aura. Originally the contextual integration of art in tradition found its expression in the cult. We know that the earliest art works originated in the service of a ritual—first the magical, then the religious kind. It is significant that the existence

of the work of art with reference to its aura is never entirely separated from its ritual function.⁵ In other words, the unique value of the "authentic" work of art has its basis in ritual, the location of its original use value. This ritualistic basis, however remote, is still recognizable as secularized ritual even in the most profane forms of the cult of beauty.⁶ The secular cult of beauty, developed during the Renaissance and prevailing for three centuries, clearly showed that ritualistic basis in its decline and the first deep crisis which befell it. With the advent of the first truly revolutionary means of reproduction, photography, simultaneously with the rise of socialism, art sensed the approaching crisis which has become evident a century later. At the time, art reacted with the doctrine of *Part pour Part*, that is, with a theology of art. This gave rise to what might be called a negative theology in the form of the idea of "pure" art, which not only denied any social function of art but also any categorizing by subject matter. (In poetry, Mallarmé was the first to take this position.)

An analysis of art in the age of mechanical reproduction must do justice to these relationships, for they lead us to an all-important insight: for the first time in world history, mechanical reproduction emancipates the work of art from its parasitical dependence on ritual. To an ever greater degree the work of art reproduced becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility.⁷ From a photographic negative, for example, one can make any number of prints; to ask for the "authentic" print makes no sense. But the instant the criterion of authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic production, the total function of art is reversed. Instead of being based on ritual, it begins to be based on another practice—politics.

v

Works of art are received and valued on different planes. Two polar types stand out: with one, the accent is on the cult value; with the other, on the exhibition value of the work.⁸ Artistic production begins with ceremonial objects destined to serve in a cult. One may assume that what mattered was their

existence, not their being on view. The elk portrayed by the man of the Stone Age on the walls of his cave was an instrument of magic. He did expose it to his fellow men, but in the main it was meant for the spirits. Today the cult value would seem to demand that the work of art remain hidden. Certain statues of gods are accessible only to the priest in the cella; certain Madonnas remain covered nearly all year round; certain sculptures on medieval cathedrals are invisible to the spectator on ground level. With the emancipation of the various art practices from ritual go increasing opportunities for the exhibition of their products. It is easier to exhibit a portrait bust that can be sent here and there than to exhibit the statue of a divinity that has its fixed place in the interior of a temple. The same holds for the painting as against the mosaic or fresco that preceded it. And even though the public presentability of a mass originally may have been just as great as that of a symphony, the latter originated at the moment when its public presentability promised to surpass that of the mass.

With the different methods of technical reproduction of a work of art, its fitness for exhibition increased to such an extent that the quantitative shift between its two poles turned into a qualitative transformation of its nature. This is comparable to the situation of the work of art in prehistoric times when, by the absolute emphasis on its cult value, it was, first and foremost, an instrument of magic. Only later did it come to be recognized as a work of art. In the same way today, by the absolute emphasis on its exhibition value the work of art becomes a creation with entirely new functions, among which the one we are conscious of, the artistic function, later may be recognized as incidental.⁹ This much is certain: today photography and the film are the most serviceable exemplifications of this new function.

V I

In photography, exhibition value begins to displace cult value all along the line. But cult value does not give way without resistance. It retires into an ultimate retrenchment: the human

countenance. It is no accident that the portrait was the focal point of early photography. The cult of remembrance of loved ones, absent or dead, offers a last refuge for the cult value of the picture. For the last time the aura emanates from the early photographs in the fleeting expression of a human face. This is what constitutes their melancholy, incomparable beauty. But as man withdraws from the photographic image, the exhibition value for the first time shows its superiority to the ritual value. To have pinpointed this new stage constitutes the incomparable significance of Atget, who, around 1900, took photographs of deserted Paris streets. It has quite justly been said of him that he photographed them like scenes of crime. The scene of a crime, too, is deserted; it is photographed for the purpose of establishing evidence. With Atget, photographs become standard evidence for historical occurrences, and acquire a hidden political significance. They demand a specific kind of approach; free-floating contemplation is not appropriate to them. They stir the viewer; he feels challenged by them in a new way. At the same time picture magazines begin to put up signposts for him, right ones or wrong ones, no matter. For the first time, captions have become obligatory. And it is clear that they have an altogether different character than the title of a painting. The directives which the captions give to those looking at pictures in illustrated magazines soon become even more explicit and more imperative in the film where the meaning of each single picture appears to be prescribed by the sequence of all preceding ones.

VII

The nineteenth-century dispute as to the artistic value of painting versus photography today seems devious and confused. This does not diminish its importance, however; if anything, it underlines it. The dispute was in fact the symptom of a historical transformation the universal impact of which was not realized by either of the rivals. When the age of mechanical reproduction separated art from its basis in cult, the semblance of its autonomy disappeared forever. The resulting change in the func-

tion of art transcended the perspective of the century; for a long time it even escaped that of the twentieth century, which experienced the development of the film.

Earlier much futile thought had been devoted to the question of whether photography is an art. The primary question—whether the very invention of photography had not transformed the entire nature of art—was not raised. Soon the film theoreticians asked the same ill-considered question with regard to the film. But the difficulties which photography caused traditional aesthetics were mere child's play as compared to those raised by the film. Whence the insensitive and forced character of early theories of the film. Abel Gance, for instance, compares the film with hieroglyphs: "Here, by a remarkable regression, we have come back to the level of expression of the Egyptians. . . . Pictorial language has not yet matured because our eyes have not yet adjusted to it. There is as yet insufficient respect for, insufficient cult of, what it expresses." * Or, in the words of Séverin-Mars: "What art has been granted a dream more poetical and more real at the same time! Approached in this fashion the film might represent an incomparable means of expression. Only the most high-minded persons, in the most perfect and mysterious moments of their lives, should be allowed to enter its ambience." † Alexandre Arnoux concludes his fantasy about the silent film with the question: "Do not all the bold descriptions we have given amount to the definition of prayer?" ‡ It is instructive to note how their desire to class the film among the "arts" forces these theoreticians to read ritual elements into it—with a striking lack of discretion. Yet when these speculations were published, films like *L'Opinion publique* and *The Gold Rush* had already appeared. This, however, did not keep Abel Gance from adducing hieroglyphs for purposes of comparison, nor Séverin-Mars from speaking of the film as one might speak of paintings by Fra Angelico. Characteristically, even today ultrareactionary authors give the film a similar contextual significance—if not an

* Abel Gance, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-1.

† Séverin-Mars, quoted by Abel Gance, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

‡ Alexandre Arnoux, *Cinéma pris*, 1929, p. 28.

outright sacred one, then at least a supernatural one. Commenting on Max Reinhardt's film version of *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Werfel states that undoubtedly it was the sterile copying of the exterior world with its streets, interiors, railroad stations, restaurants, motorcars, and beaches which until now had obstructed the elevation of the film to the realm of art. "The film has not yet realized its true meaning, its real possibilities . . . these consist in its unique faculty to express by natural means and with incomparable persuasiveness all that is fairylike, marvelous, supernatural." *

VIII

The artistic performance of a stage actor is definitely presented to the public by the actor in person; that of the screen actor, however, is presented by a camera, with a twofold consequence. The camera that presents the performance of the film actor to the public need not respect the performance as an integral whole. Guided by the cameraman, the camera continually changes its position with respect to the performance. The sequence of positional views which the editor composes from the material supplied him constitutes the completed film. It comprises certain factors of movement which are in reality those of the camera, not to mention special camera angles, close-ups, etc. Hence, the performance of the actor is subjected to a series of optical tests. This is the first consequence of the fact that the actor's performance is presented by means of a camera. Also, the film actor lacks the opportunity of the stage actor to adjust to the audience during his performance, since he does not present his performance to the audience in person. This permits the audience to take the position of a critic, without experiencing any personal contact with the actor. The audience's identification with the actor is really an identification with the camera. Consequently the audience takes the position of the camera; its ap-

* Franz Werfel, "Ein Sommernachtstraum, Ein Film von Shakespeare und Reinhardt," *Neues Wiener Journal*, cited in *Lu* 15, November, 1935.

proach is that of testing.¹⁰ This is not the approach to which cult values may be exposed.

IX

For the film, what matters primarily is that the actor represents himself to the public before the camera, rather than representing someone else. One of the first to sense the actor's metamorphosis by this form of testing was Pirandello. Though his remarks on the subject in his novel *Si Gira* were limited to the negative aspects of the question and to the silent film only, this hardly impairs their validity. For in this respect, the sound film did not change anything essential. What matters is that the part is acted not for an audience but for a mechanical contrivance—in the case of the sound film, for two of them. "The film actor," wrote Pirandello, "feels as if in exile—exiled not only from the stage but also from himself. With a vague sense of discomfort he feels inexplicable emptiness: his body loses its corporeality, it evaporates, it is deprived of reality, life, voice, and the noises caused by his moving about, in order to be changed into a mute image, flickering an instant on the screen, then vanishing into silence. . . . The projector will play with his shadow before the public, and he himself must be content to play before the camera." ^o This situation might also be characterized as follows: for the first time—and this is the effect of the film—man has to operate with his whole living person, yet forgoing its aura. For aura is tied to his presence; there can be no replica of it. The aura which, on the stage, emanates from Macbeth, cannot be separated for the spectators from that of the actor. However, the singularity of the shot in the studio is that the camera is substituted for the public. Consequently, the aura that envelops the actor vanishes, and with it the aura of the figure he portrays.

It is not surprising that it should be a dramatist such as Pirandello who, in characterizing the film, inadvertently touches on the very crisis in which we see the theater. Any thorough study

^o Luigi Pirandello, *Si Gira*, quoted by Léon Pierre-Quint, "Signification du cinéma," *L'Art cinématographique*, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

proves that there is indeed no greater contrast than that of the stage play to a work of art that is completely subject to or, like the film, founded in, mechanical reproduction. Experts have long recognized that in the film "the greatest effects are almost always obtained by 'acting' as little as possible. . . ." In 1932 Rudolf Arnheim saw "the latest trend . . . in treating the actor as a stage prop chosen for its characteristics and . . . inserted at the proper place."¹¹ With this idea something else is closely connected. The stage actor identifies himself with the character of his role. The film actor very often is denied this opportunity. His creation is by no means all of a piece; it is composed of many separate performances. Besides certain fortuitous considerations, such as cost of studio, availability of fellow players, décor, etc., there are elementary necessities of equipment that split the actor's work into a series of mountable episodes. In particular, lighting and its installation require the presentation of an event that, on the screen, unfolds as a rapid and unified scene, in a sequence of separate shootings which may take hours at the studio; not to mention more obvious montage. Thus a jump from the window can be shot in the studio as a jump from a scaffold, and the ensuing flight, if need be, can be shot weeks later when outdoor scenes are taken. Far more paradoxical cases can easily be construed. Let us assume that an actor is supposed to be startled by a knock at the door. If his reaction is not satisfactory, the director can resort to an expedient: when the actor happens to be at the studio again he has a shot fired behind him without his being forewarned of it. The frightened reaction can be shot now and be cut into the screen version. Nothing more strikingly shows that art has left the realm of the "beautiful semblance" which, so far, had been taken to be the only sphere where art could thrive.

x

The feeling of strangeness that overcomes the actor before the camera, as Pirandello describes it, is basically of the same kind as the estrangement felt before one's own image in the mirror.

But now the reflected image has become separable, transportable. And where is it transported? Before the public.¹² Never for a moment does the screen actor cease to be conscious of this fact. While facing the camera he knows that ultimately he will face the public, the consumers who constitute the market. This market, where he offers not only his labor but also his whole self, his heart and soul, is beyond his reach. During the shooting he has as little contact with it as any article made in a factory. This may contribute to that oppression, that new anxiety which, according to Pirandello, grips the actor before the camera. The film responds to the shriveling of the aura with an artificial build-up of the "personality" outside the studio. The cult of the movie star, fostered by the money of the film industry, preserves not the unique aura of the person but the "spell of the personality," the phony spell of a commodity. So long as the movie-makers' capital sets the fashion, as a rule no other revolutionary merit can be accredited to today's film than the promotion of a revolutionary criticism of traditional concepts of art. We do not deny that in some cases today's films can also promote revolutionary criticism of social conditions, even of the distribution of property. However, our present study is no more specifically concerned with this than is the film production of Western Europe.

It is inherent in the technique of the film as well as that of sports that everybody who witnesses its accomplishments is somewhat of an expert. This is obvious to anyone listening to a group of newspaper boys leaning on their bicycles and discussing the outcome of a bicycle race. It is not for nothing that newspaper publishers arrange races for their delivery boys. These arouse great interest among the participants, for the victor has an opportunity to rise from delivery boy to professional racer. Similarly, the newsreel offers everyone the opportunity to rise from passer-by to movie extra. In this way any man might even find himself part of a work of art, as witness Vertoff's *Three Songs About Lenin* or Ivens' *Borinage*. Any man today can lay claim to being filmed. This claim can best be elucidated by a comparative look at the historical situation of contemporary literature.

For centuries a small number of writers were confronted by

many thousands of readers. This changed toward the end of the last century. With the increasing extension of the press, which kept placing new political, religious, scientific, professional, and local organs before the readers, an increasing number of readers became writers—at first, occasional ones. It began with the daily press opening to its readers space for "letters to the editor." And today there is hardly a gainfully employed European who could not, in principle, find an opportunity to publish somewhere or other comments on his work, grievances, documentary reports, or that sort of thing. Thus, the distinction between author and public is about to lose its basic character. The difference becomes merely functional; it may vary from case to case. At any moment the reader is ready to turn into a writer. As expert, which he had to become willy-nilly in an extremely specialized work process, even if only in some minor respect, the reader gains access to authorship. In the Soviet Union work itself is given a voice. To present it verbally is part of a man's ability to perform the work. Literary license is now founded on polytechnic rather than specialized training and thus becomes common property.¹⁸

All this can easily be applied to the film, where transitions that in literature took centuries have come about in a decade. In cinematic practice, particularly in Russia, this change-over has partially become established reality. Some of the players whom we meet in Russian films are not actors in our sense but people who portray *themselves*—and primarily in their own work process. In Western Europe the capitalistic exploitation of the film denies consideration to modern man's legitimate claim to being reproduced. Under these circumstances the film industry is trying hard to spur the interest of the masses through illusion-promoting spectacles and dubious speculations.

XI

The shooting of a film, especially of a sound film, affords a spectacle unimaginable anywhere at any time before this. It presents a process in which it is impossible to assign to a spectator a viewpoint which would exclude from the actual scene such

extraneous accessories as camera equipment, lighting machinery, staff assistants, etc.—unless his eye were on a line parallel with the lens. This circumstance, more than any other, renders superficial and insignificant any possible similarity between a scene in the studio and one on the stage. In the theater one is well aware of the place from which the play cannot immediately be detected as illusionary. There is no such place for the movie scene that is being shot. Its illusionary nature is that of the second degree, the result of cutting. That is to say, in the studio the mechanical equipment has penetrated so deeply into reality that its pure aspect freed from the foreign substance of equipment is the result of a special procedure, namely, the shooting by the specially adjusted camera and the mounting of the shot together with other similar ones. The equipment-free aspect of reality here has become the height of artifice; the sight of immediate reality has become an orchid in the land of technology.

Even more revealing is the comparison of these circumstances, which differ so much from those of the theater, with the situation in painting. Here the question is: How does the cameraman compare with the painter? To answer this we take recourse to an analogy with a surgical operation. The surgeon represents the polar opposite of the magician. The magician heals a sick person by the laying on of hands; the surgeon cuts into the patient's body. The magician maintains the natural distance between the patient and himself; though he reduces it very slightly by the laying on of hands, he greatly increases it by virtue of his authority. The surgeon does exactly the reverse; he greatly diminishes the distance between himself and the patient by penetrating into the patient's body, and increases it but little by the caution with which his hand moves among the organs. In short, in contrast to the magician—who is still hidden in the medical practitioner—the surgeon at the decisive moment abstains from facing the patient man to man; rather, it is through the operation that he penetrates into him.

Magician and surgeon compare to painter and cameraman. The painter maintains in his work a natural distance from reality, the cameraman penetrates deeply into its web.¹⁴ There is a tre-

mendous difference between the pictures they obtain. That of the painter is a total one, that of the cameraman consists of multiple fragments which are assembled under a new law. Thus, for contemporary man the representation of reality by the film is incomparably more significant than that of the painter, since it offers, precisely because of the thoroughgoing permeation of reality with mechanical equipment, an aspect of reality which is free of all equipment. And that is what one is entitled to ask from a work of art.

XII

Mechanical reproduction of art changes the reaction of the masses toward art. The reactionary attitude toward a Picasso painting changes into the progressive reaction toward a Chaplin movie. The progressive reaction is characterized by the direct, intimate fusion of visual and emotional enjoyment with the orientation of the expert. Such fusion is of great social significance. The greater the decrease in the social significance of an art form, the sharper the distinction between criticism and enjoyment by the public. The conventional is uncritically enjoyed, and the truly new is criticized with aversion. With regard to the screen, the critical and the receptive attitudes of the public coincide. The decisive reason for this is that individual reactions are predetermined by the mass audience response they are about to produce, and this is nowhere more pronounced than in the film. The moment these responses become manifest they control each other. Again, the comparison with painting is fruitful. A painting has always had an excellent chance to be viewed by one person or by a few. The simultaneous contemplation of paintings by a large public, such as developed in the nineteenth century, is an early symptom of the crisis of painting, a crisis which was by no means occasioned exclusively by photography but rather in a relatively independent manner by the appeal of art works to the masses.

Painting simply is in no position to present an object for simultaneous collective experience, as it was possible for architec-

ture at all times, for the epic poem in the past, and for the movie today. Although this circumstance in itself should not lead one to conclusions about the social role of painting, it does constitute a serious threat as soon as painting, under special conditions and, as it were, against its nature, is confronted directly by the masses. In the churches and monasteries of the Middle Ages and at the princely courts up to the end of the eighteenth century, a collective reception of paintings did not occur simultaneously, but by graduated and hierarchized mediation. The change that has come about is an expression of the particular conflict in which painting was implicated by the mechanical reproducibility of paintings. Although paintings began to be publicly exhibited in galleries and salons, there was no way for the masses to organize and control themselves in their reception.¹⁵ Thus the same public which responds in a progressive manner toward a grotesque film is bound to respond in a reactionary manner to surrealism.

XIII

The characteristics of the film lie not only in the manner in which man presents himself to mechanical equipment but also in the manner in which, by means of this apparatus, man can represent his environment. A glance at occupational psychology illustrates the testing capacity of the equipment. Psychoanalysis illustrates it in a different perspective. The film has enriched our field of perception with methods which can be illustrated by those of Freudian theory. Fifty years ago, a slip of the tongue passed more or less unnoticed. Only exceptionally may such a slip have revealed dimensions of depth in a conversation which had seemed to be taking its course on the surface. Since the *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* things have changed. This book isolated and made analyzable things which had heretofore floated along unnoticed in the broad stream of perception. For the entire spectrum of optical, and now also acoustical, perception the film has brought about a similar deepening of apperception. It is only an obverse of this fact that behavior items shown in a movie can be analyzed much more precisely and from more

points of view than those presented on paintings or on the stage. As compared with painting, filmed behavior lends itself more readily to analysis because of its incomparably more precise statements of the situation. In comparison with the stage scene, the filmed behavior item lends itself more readily to analysis because it can be isolated more easily. This circumstance derives its chief importance from its tendency to promote the mutual penetration of art and science. Actually, of a screened behavior item which is neatly brought out in a certain situation, like a muscle of a body, it is difficult to say which is more fascinating, its artistic value or its value for science. To demonstrate the identity of the artistic and scientific uses of photography which heretofore usually were separated will be one of the revolutionary functions of the film.¹⁶

By close-ups of the things around us, by focusing on hidden details of familiar objects, by exploring commonplace milieus under the ingenious guidance of the camera, the film, on the one hand, extends our comprehension of the necessities which rule our lives; on the other hand, it manages to assure us of an immense and unexpected field of action. Our taverns and our metropolitan streets, our offices and furnished rooms, our railroad stations and our factories appeared to have us locked up hopelessly. Then came the film and burst this prison-world asunder by the dynamite of the tenth of a second, so that now, in the midst of its far-flung ruins and debris, we calmly and adventurously go traveling. With the close-up, space expands; with slow motion, movement is extended. The enlargement of a snapshot does not simply render more precise what in any case was visible, though unclear: it reveals entirely new structural formations of the subject. So, too, slow motion not only presents familiar qualities of movement but reveals in them entirely unknown ones "which, far from looking like retarded rapid movements, give the effect of singularly gliding, floating, supernatural motions." * Evidently a different nature opens itself to the camera than opens to the naked eye—if only because an unconsciously penetrated space is substituted for a space consciously explored

* Rudolf Arnheim, *loc. cit.*, p. 138.

by man. Even if one has a general knowledge of the way people walk, one knows nothing of a person's posture during the fractional second of a stride. The act of reaching for a lighter or a spoon is familiar routine, yet we hardly know what really goes on between hand and metal, not to mention how this fluctuates with our moods. Here the camera intervenes with the resources of its lowerings and liftings, its interruptions and isolations, its extensions and accelerations, its enlargements and reductions. The camera introduces us to unconscious optics as does psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses.

XIV

One of the foremost tasks of art has always been the creation of a demand which could be fully satisfied only later.¹⁷ The history of every art form shows critical epochs in which a certain art form aspires to effects which could be fully obtained only with a changed technical standard, that is to say, in a new art form. The extravagances and crudities of art which thus appear, particularly in the so-called decadent epochs, actually arise from the nucleus of its richest historical energies. In recent years, such barbarisms were abundant in Dadaism. It is only now that its impulse becomes discernible: Dadaism attempted to create by pictorial—and literary—means the effects which the public today seeks in the film.

Every fundamentally new, pioneering creation of demands will carry beyond its goal. Dadaism did so to the extent that it sacrificed the market values which are so characteristic of the film in favor of higher ambitions—though of course it was not conscious of such intentions as here described. The Dadaists attached much less importance to the sales value of their work than to its uselessness for contemplative immersion. The studied degradation of their material was not the least of their means to achieve this uselessness. Their poems are "word salad" containing obscenities and every imaginable waste product of language. The same is true of their paintings, on which they mounted buttons and tickets. What they intended and achieved was a relentless

destruction of the aura of their creations, which they branded as reproductions with the very means of production. Before a painting of Arp's or a poem by August Stramm it is impossible to take time for contemplation and evaluation as one would before a canvas of Derain's or a poem by Rilke. In the decline of middle-class society, contemplation became a school for asocial behavior; it was countered by distraction as a variant of social conduct.¹⁸ Dadaistic activities actually assured a rather vehement distraction by making works of art the center of scandal. One requirement was foremost: to outrage the public.

From an alluring appearance or persuasive structure of sound the work of art of the Dadaists became an instrument of balistics. It hit the spectator like a bullet, it happened to him, thus acquiring a tactile quality. It promoted a demand for the film, the distracting element of which is also primarily tactile, being based on changes of place and focus which periodically assail the spectator. Let us compare the screen on which a film unfolds with the canvas of a painting. The painting invites the spectator to contemplation; before it the spectator can abandon himself to his associations. Before the movie frame he cannot do so. No sooner has his eye grasped a scene than it is already changed. It cannot be arrested. Duhamel, who detests the film and knows nothing of its significance, though something of its structure, notes this circumstance as follows: "I can no longer think what I want to think. My thoughts have been replaced by moving images." ° The spectator's process of association in view of these images is indeed interrupted by their constant, sudden change. This constitutes the shock effect of the film, which, like all shocks, should be cushioned by heightened presence of mind.¹⁹ By means of its technical structure, the film has taken the physical shock effect out of the wrappers in which Dadaism had, as it were, kept it inside the moral shock effect.²⁰

* Georges Duhamel, *Scènes de la vie future*, Paris, 1930, p. 52.

xv

The mass is a matrix from which all traditional behavior toward works of art issues today in a new form. Quantity has been transmuted into quality. The greatly increased mass of participants has produced a change in the mode of participation. The fact that the new mode of participation first appeared in a disreputable form must not confuse the spectator. Yet some people have launched spirited attacks against precisely this superficial aspect. Among these, Duhamel has expressed himself in the most radical manner. What he objects to most is the kind of participation which the movie elicits from the masses. Duhamel calls the movie "a pastime for helots, a diversion for uneducated, wretched, worn-out creatures who are consumed by their worries . . . , a spectacle which requires no concentration and presupposes no intelligence . . . , which kindles no light in the heart and awakens no hope other than the ridiculous one of someday becoming a 'star' in Los Angeles." ° Clearly, this is at bottom the same ancient lament that the masses seek distraction whereas art demands concentration from the spectator. That is a commonplace. The question remains whether it provides a platform for the analysis of the film. A closer look is needed here. Distraction and concentration form polar opposites which may be stated as follows: A man who concentrates before a work of art is absorbed by it. He enters into this work of art the way legend tells of the Chinese painter when he viewed his finished painting. In contrast, the distracted mass absorbs the work of art. This is most obvious with regard to buildings. Architecture has always represented the prototype of a work of art the reception of which is consummated by a collectivity in a state of distraction. The laws of its reception are most instructive.

Buildings have been man's companions since primeval times. Many art forms have developed and perished. Tragedy begins with the Greeks, is extinguished with them, and after centuries its "rules" only are revived. The epic poem, which had its origin

° Duhamel, *op. cit.*, p/ 58.

in the youth of nations, expires in Europe at the end of the Renaissance. Panel painting is a creation of the Middle Ages, and nothing guarantees its uninterrupted existence. But the human need for shelter is lasting. Architecture has never been idle. Its history is more ancient than that of any other art, and its claim to being a living force has significance in every attempt to comprehend the relationship of the masses to art. Buildings are appropriated in a twofold manner: by use and by perception—or rather, by touch and sight. Such appropriation cannot be understood in terms of the attentive concentration of a tourist before a famous building. On the tactile side there is no counterpart to contemplation on the optical side. Tactile appropriation is accomplished not so much by attention as by habit. As regards architecture, habit determines to a large extent even optical reception. The latter, too, occurs much less through rapt attention than by noticing the object in incidental fashion. This mode of appropriation, developed with reference to architecture, in certain circumstances acquires canonical value. For the tasks which face the human apparatus of perception at the turning points of history cannot be solved by optical means, that is, by contemplation, alone. They are mastered gradually by habit, under the guidance of tactile appropriation.

The distracted person, too, can form habits. More, the ability to master certain tasks in a state of distraction proves that their solution has become a matter of habit. Distraction as provided by art presents a covert control of the extent to which new tasks have become soluble by apperception. Since, moreover, individuals are tempted to avoid such tasks, art will tackle the most difficult and most important ones where it is able to mobilize the masses. Today it does so in the film. Reception in a state of distraction, which is increasing noticeably in all fields of art and is symptomatic of profound changes in apperception, finds in the film its true means of exercise. The film with its shock effect meets this mode of reception halfway. The film makes the cult value recede into the background not only by putting the public in the position of the critic, but also by the fact that at the movies

this position requires no attention. The public is an examiner, but an absent-minded one.

EPILOGUE

The growing proletarianization of modern man and the increasing formation of masses are two aspects of the same process. Fascism attempts to organize the newly created proletarian masses without affecting the property structure which the masses strive to eliminate. Fascism sees its salvation in giving these masses not their right, but instead a chance to express themselves.²¹ The masses have a right to change property relations; Fascism seeks to give them an expression while preserving property. The logical result of Fascism is the introduction of aesthetics into political life. The violation of the masses, whom Fascism, with its *Führer* cult, forces to their knees, has its counterpart in the violation of an apparatus which is pressed into the production of ritual values.

All efforts to render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing: war. War and war only can set a goal for mass movements on the largest scale while respecting the traditional property system. This is the political formula for the situation. The technological formula may be stated as follows: Only war makes it possible to mobilize all of today's technical resources while maintaining the property system. It goes without saying that the Fascist apotheosis of war does not employ such arguments. Still, Marinetti says in his manifesto on the Ethiopian colonial war: "For twenty-seven years we Futurists have rebelled against the branding of war as antiaesthetic. . . . Accordingly we state: . . . War is beautiful because it establishes man's dominion over the subjugated machinery by means of gas masks, terrifying megaphones, flame throwers, and small tanks. War is beautiful because it initiates the dreamt-of metalization of the human body. War is beautiful because it enriches a flowering meadow with the fiery orchids of machine guns. War is beautiful because it combines the gunfire, the cannonades, the cease-fire, the scents, and the stench of putrefaction into a symphony. War is beautiful because it creates

new architecture, like that of the big tanks, the geometrical formation flights, the smoke spirals from burning villages, and many others. . . . Poets and artists of Futurism! . . . remember these principles of an aesthetics of war so that your struggle for a new literature and a new graphic art . . . may be illumined by them!"

This manifesto has the virtue of clarity. Its formulations deserve to be accepted by dialecticians. To the latter, the aesthetics of today's war appears as follows: If the natural utilization of productive forces is impeded by the property system, the increase in technical devices, in speed, and in the sources of energy will press for an unnatural utilization, and this is found in war. The destructiveness of war furnishes proof that society has not been mature enough to incorporate technology as its organ, that technology has not been sufficiently developed to cope with the elemental forces of society. The horrible features of imperialistic warfare are attributable to the discrepancy between the tremendous means of production and their inadequate utilization in the process of production—in other words, to unemployment and the lack of markets. Imperialistic war is a rebellion of technology which collects, in the form of "human material," the claims to which society has denied its natural material. Instead of draining rivers, society directs a human stream into a bed of trenches; instead of dropping seeds from airplanes, it drops incendiary bombs over cities; and through gas warfare the aura is abolished in a new way.

"*Fiat ars—pereat mundus*," says Fascism, and, as Marinetti admits, expects war to supply the artistic gratification of a sense perception that has been changed by technology. This is evidently the consummation of "*Part pour Part*." Mankind, which in Homer's time was an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order. This is the situation of politics which Fascism is rendering aesthetic. Communism responds by politicizing art.

Notes

1. Of course, the history of a work of art encompasses more than this. The history of the "Mona Lisa," for instance, encompasses the kind and number of its copies made in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries.

2. Precisely because authenticity is not reproducible, the intensive penetration of certain (mechanical) processes of reproduction was instrumental in differentiating and grading authenticity. To develop such differentiations was an important function of the trade in works of art. The invention of the woodcut may be said to have struck at the root of the quality of authenticity even before its late flowering. To be sure, at the time of its origin a medieval picture of the Madonna could not yet be said to be "authentic." It became "authentic" only during the succeeding centuries and perhaps most strikingly so during the last one.

3. The poorest provincial staging of *Faust* is superior to a *Faust* film in that, ideally, it competes with the first performance at Weimar. Before the screen it is unprofitable to remember traditional contents which might come to mind before the stage—for instance, that Goethe's friend Johann Heinrich Merck is hidden in Mephisto, and the like.

4. To satisfy the human interest of the masses may mean to have one's social function removed from the field of vision. Nothing guarantees that a portraitist of today, when painting a famous surgeon at the breakfast table in the midst of his family, depicts his social function more precisely than a painter of the 17th century who portrayed his medical doctors as representing this profession, like Rembrandt in his "Anatomy Lesson."

5. The definition of the aura as a "unique phenomenon of a distance however close it may be" represents nothing but the formulation of the cult value of the work of art in categories of space and time perception. Distance is the opposite of closeness. The essentially distant object is the unapproachable one. Unapproachability is indeed a major quality of the cult image. True to its nature, it remains "distant, however close it may be." The closeness which one may gain from its subject matter does not impair the distance which it retains in its appearance. /

6. To the extent to which the cult value of the painting is secularized the ideas of its fundamental uniqueness lose distinctness. In the imagination of the beholder the uniqueness of the phenomena which hold sway in the cult image is more and more displaced by the empirical uniqueness of the creator or of his creative achievement. To be sure, never completely so; the concept of authenticity always transcends mere genuineness. (This is particularly apparent in the collector who always retains some traces of the fetishist and who, by owning the work of art, shares in its ritual power.) Nevertheless, the function of the concept of authenticity remains determinate in the evaluation of art; with the secularization of art, authenticity displaces the cult value of the work.

7. In the case of films, mechanical reproduction is not, as with literature and painting, an external condition for mass distribution. Mechanical reproduction is inherent in the very technique of film production. This technique not only permits in the most direct way but virtually causes mass distribution. It enforces distribution because the production of a film is so expensive that an individual who, for instance, might afford to buy a painting no longer can afford to buy a film. In 1927 it was calculated that a major film, in order to pay its way, had to reach an audience of nine million. With the sound film, to be sure, a setback in its international distribution occurred at first: audiences became limited by language barriers. This coincided with the Fascist emphasis on national interests. It is more important to focus on this connection with Fascism than on this setback, which was soon minimized by synchronization. The simultaneity of both phenomena is attributable to the depression. The same disturbances which, on a larger scale, led to an attempt to maintain the existing property structure by sheer force led the endangered film capital to speed up the development of the sound film. The introduction of the sound film brought about a temporary relief, not only because it again brought the masses into the theaters but also because it merged new capital from the electrical industry with that of the film industry. Thus, viewed from the outside, the sound film promoted national interests, but seen from the inside it helped to internationalize film production even more than previously.

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within the limits of Idealism. We quote from his *Philosophy of History*:

"Images were known of old. Piety at an early time required them for worship, but it could do without *beautiful* images. These might even be disturbing. In every beautiful painting there is also something nonspiritual, merely external, but its spirit speaks to man through its beauty. Worshipping, conversely, is concerned with the work as an object, for it is but a spiritless stupor of the soul. . . . Fine art has arisen . . . in the church . . . , although it has already gone beyond its principle as art."

Likewise, the following passage from *The Philosophy of Fine Art* indicates that Hegel sensed a problem here.

"We are beyond the stage of reverence for works of art as divine and objects deserving our worship. The impression they produce is one of a more reflective kind, and the emotions they arouse require a higher test. . . ."—G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Fine Art*, trans., with notes, by F. P. B. Osmaston, Vol. 1, p. 12, London, 1920.

The transition from the first kind of artistic reception to the second characterizes the history of artistic reception in general. Apart from that, a certain oscillation between these two polar modes of reception can be demonstrated for each work of art. Take the Sistine Madonna. Since Hubert Grimme's research it has been known that the Madonna originally was painted for the purpose of exhibition. Grimme's research was inspired by the question: What is the purpose of the molding in the foreground of the painting which the two cupids lean upon? How, Grimme asked further, did Raphael come to furnish the sky with two draperies? Research proved that the Madonna had been commissioned for the public lying-in-state of Pope Sixtus. The Popes lay in state in a certain side chapel of St. Peter's. On that occasion Raphael's picture had been fastened in a nichelike background of the chapel, supported by the coffin. In this picture Raphael portrays the Madonna approaching the papal coffin in clouds from the background of the niche, which was demarcated by green drapes. At the obsequies of Sixtus a pre-eminent exhibition value of Raphael's picture was taken advantage of. Some time later it was placed on the high altar in the church of the Black Friars at Piacenza. The reason for this exile is to be found in the Roman rites which forbid the use of paintings exhibited at obsequies as cult objects on the high altar. This regulation devalued Raphael's picture to

some degree. In order to obtain an adequate price nevertheless, the Papal See resolved to add to the bargain the tacit toleration of the picture above the high altar. To avoid attention the picture was given to the monks of the far-off provincial town.

9. Bertolt Brecht, on a different level, engaged in analogous reflections: "If the concept of 'work of art' can no longer be applied to the thing that emerges once the work is transformed into a commodity, we have to eliminate this concept with cautious care but without fear, lest we liquidate the function of the very thing as well. For it has to go through this phase without mental reservation, and not as noncommittal deviation from the straight path; rather, what happens here with the work of art will change it fundamentally and erase its past to such an extent that should the old concept be taken up again—and it will, why not?—it will no longer stir any memory of the thing it once designated."

10. "The film . . . provides—or could provide—useful insight into the details of human actions. . . . Character is never used as a source of motivation; the inner life of the persons never supplies the principal cause of the plot and seldom is its main result." (Bertolt Brecht, *Versuche*, "Der Dreigroschenprozess," p. 268.) The expansion of the field of the testable which mechanical equipment brings about for the actor corresponds to the extraordinary expansion of the field of the testable brought about for the individual through economic conditions. Thus, vocational aptitude tests become constantly more important. What matters in these tests are segmental performances of the individual. The film shot and the vocational aptitude test are taken before a committee of experts. The camera director in the studio occupies a place identical with that of the examiner during aptitude tests.

11. Rudolf Arnheim, *Film als Kunst*, Berlin, 1932, pp. 176 f. In this context certain seemingly unimportant details in which the film director deviates from stage practices gain in interest. Such is the attempt to let the actor play without make-up, as made among others by Dreyer in his *Jeanne d'Arc*. Dreyer spent months seeking the forty actors who constitute the Inquisitors' tribunal. The search for these actors resembled that for stage properties that are hard to come by. Dreyer made every effort to avoid resemblances of age, build, and physiognomy. If the actor thus becomes a stage property, this latter, on the other hand, frequently functions as actor. At least it is not unusual for the film to assign a role to the stage property.

Instead of choosing at random from a great wealth of examples, let us concentrate on a particularly convincing one. A clock that is working will always be a disturbance on the stage. There it cannot be permitted its function of measuring time. Even in a naturalistic play, astronomical time would clash with theatrical time. Under these circumstances it is highly revealing that the film can, whenever appropriate, use time as measured by a clock. From this more than from many other touches it may clearly be recognized that under certain circumstances each and every prop in a film may assume important functions. From here it is but one step to Pudovkin's statement that "the playing of an actor which is connected with an object and is built around it . . . is always one of the strongest methods of cinematic construction." (W. Pudovkin, *Filmregie und Filmmanuskript*, Berlin, 1928, p. 126.) The film is the first art form capable of demonstrating how matter plays tricks on man. Hence, films can be an excellent means of materialistic representation.

12. The change noted here in the method of exhibition caused by mechanical reproduction applies to politics as well. The present crisis of the bourgeois democracies comprises a crisis of the conditions which determine the public presentation of the rulers. Democracies exhibit a member of government directly and personally before the nation's representatives. Parliament is his public. Since the innovations of camera and recording equipment make it possible for the orator to become audible and visible to an unlimited number of persons, the presentation of the man of politics before camera and recording equipment becomes paramount. Parliaments, as much as theaters, are deserted. Radio and film not only affect the function of the professional actor but likewise the function of those who also exhibit themselves before this mechanical equipment, those who govern. Though their tasks may be different, the change affects equally the actor and the ruler. The trend is toward establishing controllable and transferrable skills under certain social conditions. This results in a new selection, a selection before the equipment from which the star and the dictator emerge victorious.

13. The privileged character of the respective techniques is lost. Aldous Huxley writes:

"Advances in technology have led . . . to vulgarity. . . . Process reproduction and the rotary press have made possible the indefinite multiplication of writing and pictures. Universal education and relatively high wages have created an enormous public who

know how to read and can afford to buy reading and pictorial matter. A great industry has been called into existence in order to supply these commodities. Now, artistic talent is a very rare phenomenon; whence it follows . . . that, at every epoch and in all countries, most art has been bad. But the proportion of trash in the total artistic output is greater now than at any other period. That it must be so is a matter of simple arithmetic. The population of Western Europe has a little more than doubled during the last century. But the amount of reading—and seeing—matter has increased, I should imagine, at least twenty and possibly fifty or even a hundred times. If there were n men of talent in a population of x millions, there will presumably be $2n$ men of talent among $2x$ millions. The situation may be summed up thus. For every page of print and pictures published a century ago, twenty or perhaps even a hundred pages are published today. But for every man of talent then living, there are now only two men of talent. It may be of course that, thanks to universal education, many potential talents which in the past would have been still-born are now enabled to realize themselves. Let us assume, then, that there are now three or even four men of talent to every one of earlier times. It still remains true to say that the consumption of reading—and seeing—matter has far outstripped the natural production of gifted writers and draughtsmen. It is the same with hearing-matter. Prosperity, the gramophone and the radio have created an audience of hearers who consume an amount of hearing-matter that has increased out of all proportion to the increase of population and the consequent natural increase of talented musicians. It follows from all this that in all the arts the output of trash is both absolutely and relatively greater than it was in the past; and that it must remain greater for just so long as the world continues to consume the present inordinate quantities of reading-matter, seeing-matter, and hearing-matter.”—Aldous Huxley, *Beyond the Mexique Bay. A Traveller's Journal*, London, 1949, pp. 274 ff. First published in 1934.

This mode of observation is obviously not progressive.

14. The boldness of the cameraman is indeed comparable to that of the surgeon. Luc Durtain lists among specific technical sleights of hand those “which are required in surgery in the case of certain difficult operations. I choose as an example a case from oto-rhino-laryngology; . . . the so-called endonasal perspective procedure; or

I refer to the acrobatic tricks of larynx surgery which have to be performed following the reversed picture in the laryngoscope. I might also speak of ear surgery which suggests the precision work of watchmakers. What range of the most subtle muscular acrobatics is required from the man who wants to repair or save the human body! We have only to think of the couching of a cataract where there is virtually a debate of steel with nearly fluid tissue, or of the major abdominal operations (laparotomy).”—Luc Durtain, *op. cit.*

15. This mode of observation may seem crude, but as the great theoretician Leonardo has shown, crude modes of observation may at times be usefully adduced. Leonardo compares painting and music as follows: "Painting is superior to music because, unlike unfortunate music, it does not have to die as soon as it is born. . . . Music which is consumed in the very act of its birth is inferior to painting which the use of varnish has rendered eternal." (*Trattato I*, 29.)

16. Renaissance painting offers a revealing analogy to this situation. The incomparable development of this art and its significance rested not least on the integration of a number of new sciences, or at least of new scientific data. Renaissance painting made use of anatomy and perspective, of mathematics, meteorology, and chromatology. Valéry writes: "What could be further from us than the strange claim of a Leonardo to whom painting was a supreme goal and the ultimate demonstration of knowledge? Leonardo was convinced that painting demanded universal knowledge, and he did not even shrink from a theoretical analysis which to us is stunning because of its very depth and precision. . . ."—Paul Valéry, *Pièces sur l'art*, "Autour de Corot," Paris, p. 191.

17. "The work of art," says André Breton, "is valuable only in so far as it is vibrated by the reflexes of the future." Indeed, every developed art form intersects three lines of development. Technology works toward a certain form of art. Before the advent of the film there were photo booklets with pictures which flitted by the onlooker upon pressure of the thumb, thus portraying a boxing bout or a tennis match. Then there were the slot machines in bazaars; their picture sequences were produced by the turning of a crank.

Secondly, the traditional art forms in certain phases of their development strenuously work toward effects which later are effortlessly attained by the new ones. Before the rise of the movie the

Dadaists' performances tried to create an audience reaction which Chaplin later evoked in a more natural way.

Thirdly, unspectacular social changes often promote a change in receptivity which will benefit the new art form. Before the movie had begun to create its public, pictures that were no longer immobile captivated an assembled audience in the so-called *Kaiserpanorama*. Here the public assembled before a screen into which stereoscopes were mounted, one to each beholder. By a mechanical process individual pictures appeared briefly before the stereoscopes, then made way for others. Edison still had to use similar devices in presenting the first movie strip before the film screen and projection were known. This strip was presented to a small public which stared into the apparatus in which the succession of pictures was reeling off. Incidentally, the institution of the *Kaiserpanorama* shows very clearly a dialectic of the development. Shortly before the movie turned the reception of pictures into a collective one, the individual viewing of pictures in these swiftly outmoded establishments came into play once more with an intensity comparable to that of the ancient priest beholding the statue of a divinity in the cella.

18. The theological archetype of this contemplation is the awareness of being alone with one's God. Such awareness, in the heyday of the bourgeoisie, went to strengthen the freedom to shake off clerical tutelage. During the decline of the bourgeoisie this awareness had to take into account the hidden tendency to withdraw from public affairs those forces which the individual draws upon in his communion with God.

19. The film is the art form that is in keeping with the increased threat to his life which modern man has to face. Man's need to expose himself to shock effects is his adjustment to the dangers threatening him. The film corresponds to profound changes in the apperceptive apparatus—changes that are experienced on an individual scale by the man in the street in big-city traffic, on a historical scale by every present-day citizen.

20. As for Dadaism, insights important for Cubism and Futurism are to be gained from the movie. Both appear as deficient attempts of art to accommodate the pervasion of reality by the apparatus. In contrast to the film, these schools did not try to use the apparatus as such for the artistic presentation of reality, but aimed at some sort of alloy in the joint presentation of reality and apparatus. In Cubism,

the premonition that this apparatus will be structurally based on optics plays a dominant part; in Futurism, it is the premonition of the effects of this apparatus which are brought out by the rapid sequence of the film strip.

21. One technical feature is significant here, especially with regard to newsreels, the propagandist importance of which can hardly be overestimated. Mass reproduction is aided especially by the reproduction of masses. In big parades and monster rallies, in sports events, and in war, all of which nowadays are captured by camera and sound recording, the masses are brought face to face with themselves. This process, whose significance need not be stressed, is intimately connected with the development of the techniques of reproduction and photography. Mass movements are usually discerned more clearly by a camera than by the naked eye. A bird's-eye view best captures gatherings of hundreds of thousands. And even though such a view may be as accessible to the human eye as it is to the camera, the image received by the eye cannot be enlarged the way a negative is enlarged. This means that mass movements, including war, constitute a form of human behavior which particularly favors mechanical equipment.

"A fellow will remember things you wouldn't think he'd remember. You take me. One day back in 1896 I was crossing over to Jersey on the ferry, and as we pulled out there was another ferry pulling in. And on it there was a girl waiting to get off. A white dress she had on, and she was carrying a white parasol. And I only saw her face for one second. She didn't see me at all. But I'll bet a month hasn't gone by since, that I haven't thought of that girl."

—Mr. Bernstein, recalling his youth,
in Orson Welles' film, "Citizen Kane."

Stuart Ewen

The Public Eye: On Barneys' Advertising¹

One of the most unusual print advertising campaigns of the past several months has been launched by Barney's New York; fashioned by BNY Advertising, the pricey clothing store's in-house agency. Each ad in the series is dominated by a powerful, black and white photograph, juxtaposed with a terse piece of copy (usually in white typeface against a black background). The striking photos—most from the late 1950s and early 60s—illustrate the craft of some of our most celebrated naturalistic photographers, sensitive chroniclers of everyday life: Elliott Erwitt, Garry Winogrand, Roy de Carava, Rene Burri, William Claxton, Willy Ronis, Dennis Stock. No merchandise is featured, or referred to, in any of the ads. While these ads arrest the eye, they are—at the same time—confusing as advertising. Despite their allure, their sales appeal is uncertain.

The persuasive power of these ads lies in the phenomenon of photography itself. Photographs today are such a prominent part of our field of vision, that we take them for granted. In the process we ignore their power. When first introduced in the late 1830s, however, photography captivated the "wondering gaze" of humanity.

¹ From Stuart Ewen, "The Public Eye: Barneys' Ads." ARTFORUM, November 1990, pp 24-25.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., an avid amateur photographer, wrote of photography as a "mirror with a memory." With it, he observed, one could fix "the most fleeting of our illusions, that which the apostle and the philosopher and the poet have alike used as the type of instability and unreality."

In its ability to entrap the evanescent moment—defying the passage of time itself—photography also eluded customary notions of mortality. Photographs had the capacity to grab transient gestures, to enshrine the commonplace, the incidental, to hold onto things that previously survived only as faint if potent glimmers of memory.

Sigmund Freud wrote extensively of the powers that such ephemeral impressions exerted in the economy of the psyche. Forgotten, apparently incidental moments of life, he maintained, stood at the heart of character development, providing elemental keys to our desires and discontents. Within each of us, these mementoes lie concealed, asserting their influence, awaiting rediscovery. This insight of psychoanalysis may stand at the center of photography's magnetism; its ability to replicate the immeasurable power of the moment in the frame of human experience. The photograph, as nothing before it, could preserve the girl in the white dress, the impassioned glance from a ferry boat. In its pregnant stillness, it could stroke the depths of longing.

It is little wonder, then, that in advertising—particularly fashion advertising—photography is the prime medium of communication. In the carefully constructed pho-

tograph, a piece of off-the-rack clothing can be evocatively wedded to a sublime moment, an erotic shimmer, an epicurean gesture. Discreetly distanced from real experience, the fashion photograph becomes a commercial embodiment of unfulfilled desires, primal appetites. Within a charmed garment, the wearer incorporates what Roland Barthes termed, the "absolute state of the flesh."

Given the ubiquity of fashion photography today, however, each ad campaign is faced with a serious stumbling block. How does one create the moment that will arrest the eye, and make the sale, amid thousands of other skillfully pre-fabricated moments, each created with a similar intent?

The Barney's campaign represents an innovative approach to the problem. Riding itself of fashion, and of merchandise altogether, these advertisements ride on the power of the photograph, its ability to capture and elevate the significance of the moment. Each photograph in the series is an eloquent testimony to the medium's capacity for making the incidental special. In each scene an ordinary, everyday occurrence is rendered extraordinary, enigmatic and consummate. The concise accompanying texts only accentuate this.

Garry Winogrand's grainy, chiaroscuro portrait of five young toughs at a diner—hunched in private conversation, sipping coffee—bears the simple legend, "a conspiracy of taste." A casual meeting of youth, anywhere, is transformed by the photograph into an archetypal cabal.

A Roy De Carava photo of a bare, dimly lit Harlem dance floor occupied by two, solo silhouetted dancers, each mesmerized by the rhythms in the air, is captioned "a style all our own." The transported reveries of regular, friday-night people, soar to become an exalted monument to the music of the individual human soul.

Elliott Erwitt's prairie landscape with two farm houses, being moved on platforms, rolling by, provides an optic poem, pondering the unsettling affinity of continuity and impermanence.

Dennis Stock's granular photograph of a desponding James Dean, sitting atop a worn wooden desk in an old, empty Fairmont, Indiana schoolroom contemplates the question of "roots" that haunts and elevates the experience of celebrity.

Most advertising relies on the psychic mechanism of free association in making its appeal; the ability for people, in their minds, to make connections between unrelated phenomena: popularity and the purchase of a certain brand of soap; adventure and the purchase of a certain automobile; ecstasy and the wearing of a certain perfume; happiness and the use of a laxative.

While none of the photographs in the Barney's series bear a recognizable relation to what we normally think of as "fashion," each implicitly fulfills the promise that most fashion advertising can only make. Free association stands at the heart of the campaign. Insofar as fashion is habitually sold on the promise that, with it, the

wearer will jump out of the drear of the ordinary, that the banality of everyday life will take on an eye-arresting quality, these photos—none of them fashion photographs—incorporate the experience that is usually promised in fashion ads. In each picture, the everyday has been elevated into art, the ordinary has been rendered, at once, significant and enigmatic. Seen in the "mirror with a memory," ordinary existence is rendered remarkable, singular. There is no need to show merchandise. The photographic medium, itself, provides the perfect metaphor for fashion. Each photo provides an opportunity to actually experience the transformation of the mundane into the transcendent. Shopping at Barney's, the ads imply, will do the same.

While his contemporaries in the Photo-Secession wrestled with questions of "art," Lewis Hine explored the possibilities of photography with another intention in mind: to show or "document" conditions of life among America's working classes. After a brief career as a teacher in the school of the Ethical Cultural Society in New York (where Paul Strand was among his students), Hine became a full-time working photographer. Caught up in the atmosphere of social reform in the Progressive Era, he associated with reform groups devoted to improving housing and working conditions in American cities and factories. His earliest pictures date from about 1905, when he began to photograph immigrants at Ellis Island. For the reform journal *The Survey*, he photographed slums in Washington, D.C., and in 1907 contributed photographs of steel workers, their places of work, their homes and neighborhoods, for the *Pittsburgh Survey* — a pioneering multivolume study of a typical industrial city. But his best known and most effective pictures of these years were of child laborers in many industries across the country. As staff photographer for the National Child Labor Committee, Hine traveled tens of thousands of miles, gathering visual evidence of violations of child labor laws, often under trying circumstances. In the 1920s Hine focused chiefly on adult industrial workers, emphasizing the skill and courage of industrial "men at work," including the "skyjacks" who built the Empire State Building. In the 1930s he worked for several government agencies, notably the Tennessee Valley Authority and the National Research Project of the Works Progress Administration.

Although Hine followed in the steps of Jacob Riis, the crusading newspaper reporter who made shocking photographs of slum conditions in New York in the 1890s, he developed a style and an approach to photography quite distinct from that of Riis. Hine's aim was not so much to shock a passive audience into fear and indignation; instead, he wished to show working people in their environments in a more detached and objective manner. Social photography was for him an educational process; a picture was a piece of evidence, a record of social injustice, but also of individual human beings surviving with dignity in intolerable conditions. More than anyone else in his generation, Hine shaped a style for engaged, sympathetic social documentary photography, and thus provided a model for the famous Farm Security Administration project of the 1930s.

For a moment, now, let us suppose that we as a body were working, against bitter opposition, for better conditions in the street trades of a certain state. In the heat of the conflict we have enlisted the services of a sympathetic photographer.

He has recorded some typical and appealing scenes in the life of the newsboy and his co-workers.

They show little chaps six years old selling until late at night; little girls exposed to public life with its temptations and dangers; school children starting out at 5 a.m. to peddle and going again after school and all day Saturday and Sunday; evening scenes where the little fellows work late in and out of the saloons, learning the best way to get extra money from the drunks, and where they vary the monotony between hard-luck stories by pitching pennies, far into the night hours.

We might not agree as to their exact use, but surely we would not stand in the way if it were proposed that we launch them into every possible channel of publicity in our appeal for public sympathy.

Long ago the business man settled, in the affirmative, the question, "Does Advertising Pay?" and the present status was well expressed in Collier's Weekly not long ago: "To the range of advertising there is no limit, and where all are tooting the loud bazoo, the problem of any one making himself heard is no slight one. Advertising is art; it is literature; it is invention. Failure is its one cardinal sin." Now, the social worker, with the most human, living material as his stock in trade, is still going through the old steps of doubt and conviction. But they must end one way, for the public will know what its servants are doing, and it is for these Servants of the Common Good to educate and direct public opinion. We are only beginning to realize the innumerable methods of reaching this great public.

I wonder, sometimes, what an enterprising manufacturer would do if his wares, instead of being inanimate things, were the problems and activities of life itself, with all their possibilities of human appeal. Would he not grasp eagerly at such opportunities to play upon the sympathies of his customers as are afforded by the camera.

Take the photograph of a tiny spinner in a Carolina cotton mill. As it is, it makes an appeal. Reinforce it with one of those

social pictures of Buga's in which he says, "The ideal of oppression was realized by this dismal servitude. When they find themselves in such condition at the dawn of existence — so young, so feeble, struggling among men — what passes in these souls fresh from God? But while they are children they escape because they are little. The smallest hole saves them. When they are men, the millstone of our social system comes in contact with them and grinds them."

With a picture thus sympathetically interpreted, what a lever we have for the social uplift.

The photograph of an adolescent, a weed-like youth, who has been doffing for eight years in another mill, carries its own lesson.

Now, let us take a glance under Brooklyn Bridge at 3 a.m. on a cold, snowy night. While these boys we see there wait, huddled, yet alert, for a customer, we might pause to ask where lies the power in a picture. Whether it be a painting or a photograph, the picture is a symbol that brings one immediately into close touch with reality. It speaks a language learned early in the race and in the individual — witness the ancient picture writers and the child of today absorbed in his picture book. For us older children, the picture continues to tell a story packed into the most condensed and vital form. In fact, it is often more effective than the reality would have been, because, in the picture, the non-essential and conflicting interests have been eliminated. The picture is the language of all nationalities and all ages. The increase, during recent years, of illustrations in newspapers, books, exhibits and the like gives ample evidence of this.

The photograph has an added realism of its own; it has an inherent attraction not found in other forms of illustration. For this reason the average person believes implicitly that the photograph cannot falsify. Of course, you and I know that this unbounded faith in the integrity of the photograph is often rudely shaken, for, while photographs may not lie, liars may photograph. It becomes necessary, then, in our revelation of the truth, to see to it that the camera we depend upon contracts no bad habits.

Not long ago, a leader in social work, who had previously told me that photographs had been faked so much they were of no

use to the work, assured Editor Kellogg that the photographs of child labor in the Carolinas would stand as evidence in any court of law.

Moral: Despise not the camera, even though yellow-photography does exist.

With several hundred photos like those which I have shown, backed with records of observations, conversations, names and addresses, are we not better able to refute those who, either optimistically or hypocritically, spread the news that there is no child labor in New England?

Perhaps you are weary of child labor pictures. Well, so are the rest of us, but we propose to make you and the whole country so sick and tired of the whole business that when the time for action comes, child-labor pictures will be records of the past.

The artist, Burne-Jones, once said he should never be able to paint again if he saw much of those hopeless lives that have no remedy. What a selfish, cowardly attitude!

How different is the stand taken by Hugo, that the great social peril is darkness and ignorance. "What then," he says, "is required? Light! Light in floods!"

The dictum, then, of the social worker is "Let there be light;" and in this campaign for light we have for our advance agent the light writer — the photographer.

This is the era of the specialist. Curtis, Burton Holmes, Stoddard and others have done much along special lines of social photography. The greatest advance in social work is to be made by the popularizing of camera work, so these records may be made by those who are in the thick of the battle. It is not a difficult proposition. In every group of workers there is sure to be one at least who is interested in the camera. If you can decide that photography would be a good thing for you, get a camera, set aside a small appropriation and some definite time for the staff photographer, go after the matter with a sympathetic enthusiasm (for camera work without enthusiasm is like a picnic in the rain). The local photographer (unless he is a rare one) cannot do much for you. Fight it out yourself, for better little technique and much sympathy than the reverse. Returns? Of course they will follow. Ask Mrs. Rogers, of Indianapolis, whose plea for bath suits (on the screen) was a real factor in procuring them. Ask Mr. Weller, of Pittsburgh, one of the pioneers in social photography.

At the _____ of the Round Table which follows this talk, I shall be glad to meet those of you who are interested in the question of enlarging your scope in camera work. If a camera club could be, the outcome, so much the better.

Apart from the charitable or pathological phases of social work, what a field for photographic art lies untouched in the industrial world.

There is urgent need for the intelligent interpretation of the world's workers, not only for the people of today, but for future ages.

Years ago, George Eliot suggested the need for the social photographer in these words:

"All honor and reverence to the divine beauty of form," says George Eliot (Adam Bede). "Let us cultivate it to the utmost in men, women and children, in our gardens, in our houses; but let us love that other beauty, too, which lies in no secret of proportion, but in the secret of deep human sympathy.

"Paint us an angel, if you can, with floating violet robe and a face paled by the celestial light; paint us a Madonna turning her mild face upward, and opening her arms to welcome the divine glory, but do not impose on us any esthetic rules which shall banish from the reign of art those old women with work-worn hands scraping carrots, those heavy clowns taking holiday in a dingy pothouse, those rounded backs and weather-beaten faces that have bent over the spade and done the rough work of the world, those homes with their tin pans, their brown pitchers, their rough curs and their clusters of onions.

"It is needful we should remember their existence, else we may happen to leave them out of our religion and philosophy, and frame lofty theories which only fit a world of extremes. Therefore, let art always remind us of them; therefore, let us always have men ready to give the loving pains of life to the faithful representing of commonplace things, men who see beauty in the commonplace things, and delight in showing how kindly the light of heaven falls on them."

When the New York World's Fair of 1939 was first plotted few persons realized that a trend in our national life would carry this exposition far beyond the scope of anything like it attempted before. It is true, of course, that those who first dreamed of this fair envisioned something done on a grand scale; but it would not have been achieved had not the New York World's Fair offered an ideal opportunity for business to seek a way out of the dire straits into which it has been precipitated in the last few years. Other fairs have been chiefly concerned with selling products; this one will be chiefly concerned with selling ideas.

When plans for the New York fair were first laid, most people had the Chicago Century of Progress in their minds, and to industry, the backbone of any fair, the New York exposition was viewed in terms of exhibits and budgets akin to those of the Century of Progress.

Soon it became apparent, however, that this New York fair would offer a great and timely opportunity for business men to deal in the commodity of good will. Business and industry, therefore, were sold the idea that beginning April 30, 1939, an opportunity would present itself to give the public a chance to see and hear what an indispensable contribution industry is making to social and economic existence.

And because of this, and because of the character of what is to be enacted at Flushing Meadow, the New York World's Fair of 1939 is going to be the greatest single public relations program in industrial history.

It may be assumed that World's Fair exhibitors, who will spend more than a hundred million dollars to tell their story, will take a lesson from modern-day propaganda achievements. Just as the government is making use of such

means as Pare Lorenz's *The River* on the screen, and the Living Newspaper on the New York stage to get across a message in an entertaining way, so exhibitors at the New York Fair may be counted upon to stress the entertainment angle in presenting their story.

Grover A. Whalen, president of the Fair, struck the keynote of this opportunity to mould public opinion through the Fair when he said in a recent radio address:

"It is evident that the large corporations know that when they exhibit at a Fair they are vividly depicting the vital role played by them in the nation's life. They realize that we have gathered the genius and imagination of our century to build in New York City a miniature of world civilization; and they know that this affords the opportunity to portray their part in this civilization. Their recognition of this is evidenced by the fact that our ground space is already over-subscribed."

"These large corporations also know," he continued, "that during these days of economic trials, the weight of public opinion is all-important—that the consuming public is becoming more and more educated to values. Only those corporations which have heeded this fundamental business fact have weathered the fluctuations of the business cycle and emerged safe and sound. That is why, today, we find in most successful firms a special department devoted to public relations."

And good will is the main thing that exhibitors at the New York World's Fair stand to win. Therefore, the effort that already is under way: first, by the World's Fair itself in its determination to bring fifty million visitors to Flushing Meadow in the 189 days beginning April 30, 1939; and second, by individual exhibitors who are determined to attract the attention and interest of as large a percentage as possible of these fifty million.

In discussing the manner in which the World's Fair itself is going about its publicity and promotion program, one of the officials of the Fair analyzes the

difference in perspective between this and recent American expositions as follows:

"Were the New York World's Fair to be nothing but a huge and strident collection of idle amusements, the entire subject might be exploited by the methods that have been used to promote recent fairs and expositions. They are only a slight improvement of the sideshow ballyhoo long employed by county fairs. The exploitation of nudists, fan dancers, and bathing beauties is not difficult to understand. For a time it is effective, but it certainly is a confession of weakness...-

"It was therefore logical that the first major item in the Fair's vast schedule of promotion should have been a long-planned and carefully considered release—one which reached the far corners of the world—dealing completely with the thematic content of the Fair and introducing for the first time the exposition's basic idea: 'Building the World of Tomorrow.' It is not that the exposition is offering to the world a new panacea. The attraction of an idea which has as its objective a feasible and logical plan for harmony and peace was a renewing and a compelling cause for hope. It is this theme which is which is constantly kept before the world public through every available vehicle of communication."...

Many exhibitors will provide in their buildings or at their exhibits comfortable and inviting quarters for the working press...In these press quarters employees of the exhibitors will have stories and pictures galore for the help of the reporter or photographer who is too busy or too disinclined to dig up the story himself. In a sense this Fair will be a newspaperman's holiday, for there will be entertainment and refreshments galore.

So, the Fair itself has publicity and promotion agencies to bring people to

Flushing Meadow; the exhibitors have or will have similar agencies to vie for the limited attention of the people who pay for admission to the Fair.

But those are not all the factors which will play a part in making the people World's Fair conscious. All of the newspapers and magazines and press associations and radio companies and newsreels and syndicates and news-picture agencies are doing a World's Fair job on their own hook....

It is a great parade of news, publicity propaganda! And what will be the result of it?

The New York World's Fair of 1939 will be the medium through which industry—large business and small—is determined to tell its story and to present its case to the public. If that story is told simply, clearly, entertainingly, and in good humor, industry will have done more to justify itself as a factor in this civilization than it ever has done before. And this justification can result in a tremendous wave of good will. That is why the New York Fair seems destined to become the greatest single public relations program in all history.

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April 25, 1940

Proposal for
EXHIBITION OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MANUFACTURERS

NEW YORK WORLD'S FAIR 1940

By

WALTER DORWIN TEAGUE

The objective of this exhibit should be to prove to the public the desirability of the American system of free individual enterprise, and the democratic way of life. It should do this by demonstrating how American invention, scientific research and technological progress, made fruitful by American industry, have benefited the American people by:

1. Increasing employment, both in variety and quantity;
2. Increasing the number, kinds and quality of goods and services available to the people;
3. Improving working conditions;
4. Creating our national wealth in the form of our individual incomes;
5. Shortening working hours;
6. Contributing to health and longevity;
7. Eliminating child labor;
8. Providing financial support for education, the government, the church and social services;
9. Providing new and better forms of entertainment and recreation, with the opportunity to enjoy these;

A World's Fair exhibit must, first of all, be interesting.

It must also be planned from the viewpoint of the visitor's interests, instead of reflecting only the exhibitor's viewpoint. In the keen competition for public attention at the World's Fair the most commendable and educational exhibit will fail completely of its purpose unless it is presented in such a dramatic form that the people are interested, entertained; if possible, fascinated and delighted as they view it. The exhibit should be such that people will crowd to see it, give it their attention and go away to disseminate enthusiastic reports of it.

This being the case, all limitations should be removed so that the objective can be attained in whatever manner shall prove most effective.

There is already available a great deal of material which bears upon the above objective, namely, the models and patents collection, the "Fashions Out of Test Tubes" Show, certain movie shorts, etc. This material is available and can be drawn upon in planning.

But unquestionably the most successful means of attracting and holding the public interest is not by means of a collection of exhibits assembled from existing sources and only loosely related by the presentation of different phases of the same story. The exhibit should be designed as a unit - a single impressive show which can be seen in not more than twelve or fifteen minutes, built around the single theme stated above, and driving it home with the maximum of impact.

Without having had time to make a complete study of the subject I see this show as a series of vivid episodes or exhibits

which might be presented simultaneously or successively. I believe these episodes or exhibits should deal with the primary and basic interests of the visitors. These might be listed as follows:

1. Food
2. Shelter
3. Clothing
4. Health
5. Education
6. Transportation
7. Communications
8. Recreation

This list might be expanded or differently arranged on further study.

In each classification we would tell the story of American progress in that field, building the story as far as possible around well-known historical personalities and stressing its application to the daily life of the individual visitor. We might use the original models of basic inventions in each field, use the great inventors or leaders in each field (acted perhaps by flesh-and blood actors) and show dramatically the increase of employment, wealth and well-being that have come to the nation as a result of this free individual effort. We would show how American Industry has developed the products of the nation's creative genius, making available to all men the conveniences and luxuries which kings could not obtain 200 years ago.

For instance, the public might see Eli Whitney perfecting his invention of the cotton gin. Then in the course of a brief episode there might be revealed to Whitney (and through him to the visitors) the many consequences that flowed from his invention, and the great series of technological developments in the textile field which followed him in time. Thus we could dramatically present the advance from laboriously woven homespun wool, cotton

and linen to modern machine-made natural fabrics and to rayon, celanese, nylon and the host of other textiles for which chemical research, fostered by American Industry, has been responsible.

Similarly Robert Fulton would see his steam boat as the first step toward the modern age of power locomotion, and the public would see his invention followed by the building of the railroads, the multiplication of steam-driven ships, invention of the automobile, the invention of flying, and the swift popularization of all these means of transportation for men and goods.

Throughout all these stories the theme of private enterprise, individual initiative and free speech would be stressed.

In conclusion the show would end on a high note of confidence in the American system which has made all these achievements possible. It would send the visitors forth with renewed pride in their country and renewed confidence that this is still a land of opportunity, a land where a man's fortunes are still largely in his own keeping.

Naturally, I have not yet fully worked out in my own mind the mechanics of this presentation. I do not, however, see it as an historical pageant. I see it as a series of related exhibits which the visitor will review one after another until he arrives at a climax. The budget which is presented herewith is obviously tentative but it is one within which I am sure the show can be successfully produced.

Obviously it is impossible to prepare an exhibit of this kind in time for the opening of the Fair on May 11. Instead, the opening date of June 15 should be adopted. This will eliminate only that portion of the season which is lightest in attendance.

If an admission of 10¢ is charged, an attendance of 1,500,000 may be expected. If no admission is charged an attendance in excess of 3,000,000 may be expected. Both these estimates are based, of course, on the assumption that the show will be one of great interest and drawing power, and will be vigorously publicized.

April 25, 1940

Walter Dorwin Teague

T. F. Joyce (General Manager, Radio-Phonograph-Television Department, RCA Victor Division, Radio Corporation of America), "Television and Postwar Distribution." Presentation before the Boston Conference on Distribution. October 17, 1944. (edited)

Full postwar employment is the favorite theme of those who write and speak on postwar problems.

"Full postwar employment." That is the phrase that, today, is on the lips of every economist, business man, labor leader and politician. It is the subject uppermost in the hearts and in the minds of the people.

The country wants assurance that there will be useful and productive jobs after the war, not only for the ten or twelve million men in the Armed Services, but for the "surplus" millions of men and women in war production who face possible unemployment when the guns cease firing—or before.

"Full postwar employment." It is a subject of vital interest to every individual attending the Boston Conference on Distribution—for full employment is essential if we are to have the widest possible distribution and consumption of goods and services....

If our conception of "static wealth" is the gold and silver which we buried in the ground or the paper money and securities which we have in our bank vaults, then we do not have a true picture of what constitutes the real wealth of the nation. For the real wealth of our country consists not only of its material resources; it consists also of the character and ability of our people and their unremitting desire for constructive accomplishment.

We need to arouse the spirit of the people and *their will to do* if we are to generate more wealth in the form of goods and services. Television is one of the most powerful forces on the horizon for setting into motion this kind of static wealth.

A nationwide television system is the medium which can arouse the spirit and the will of the people. Through the skillful use of a nationwide television

system, American political, business, labor, religious and social leadership can create in the hearts and in the minds of America's 134,000,000 people the desire to bring about the peace, security and plenty that is the dream of every citizen. But translating dreams into realities, as business men well know, requires a constant, never-failing faith—and a persistence of action that can be best characterized by Churchill's phrase—"Blood, Sweat and Tears." The fulfillment of our dreams is not a matter of wishing—it is a matter of doing.

The Importance of Consumer Demand

A strong, nationwide consumer demand is necessary to full production. Too many people minimize its importance.

The significance of a strong consumer desire as a stimulus to production was clearly demonstrated, recently, by a little known story concerning our government's planned economic follow-up of the invasion of North Africa. Some bright individual in one of the departments at Washington thought that we could get greater cooperation from the Arabs if we had goods, instead of gold, to give them in exchange for our services. On this theory, the Government ordered 50,000 portable phonographs to be distributed to the Arabs. ...The individual who planned this program probably reasoned that since there is a tremendous demand for portable phonographs in the United States, the Arabs, too, must want them.

The phonographs, however, were never shipped. Presumably, the agency which ordered them came to the conclusion that no one had created in the minds and hearts of the Arabs a desire for recorded music, and that the portable phonographs would go begging in the desert. Now, I am not familiar with the musical habits of Arabs, or whether they go for portable phonographs. But I do know something about the habits of my countrymen, and was therefore not surprised that the phonographs destined for North Africa found a ready market in the United States where a known demand for them exists—a demand creat-

ed by the advertising, promotion and salesmanship of American phonograph and record manufacturers, and their enterprising distributors and dealers. The Lazarus Department Store in Columbus, Ohio, with sixteen hundred lines of newspaper advertising, sold more than twenty-four hundred of the phonographs that the Arabs didn't get! Consumer demand—that's the life blood of the American economic system.

How Television Will Contribute to Healthy Economic Life

It is because consumer demand is the life blood of the American economic system that television promises to be such a powerful factor in the postwar economic world. The immediate postwar development of television can, and will, contribute forcefully to a healthy economic and business life in two ways:

First, in the added employment and added purchasing power which television as a business will bring to the radio industry, of which it is a part.

The peak employment of the radio industry in the year 1941 was 308,000 people, engaged in manufacturing, distribution and broadcast station operation. This figure may be exceeded for a full production year postwar, even without television. But by the end of the second full postwar production year, we have every reason to believe that radio employment will be substantially less than the peak of 1941. Why? Because the industry production for 1941 was 13,500,000 receivers as contrasted with the average annual production for the years from 1935 to 1939 inclusive—which was 7,500,000 receivers. Probably 30% to 40% of the 1941 production represented speculative buying by wholesalers and dealers—merchandise which was not sold until 1942 or 1943. With the greatly increased Radio industry manufacturing capacity, by the end of two years, the abnormal replacement market created by the war will probably have been largely satisfied.

Now, let us suppose that television comes into the picture right after the war.

It is estimated that in 1955, there will be over 40,000,000 consumer units in the United States. If television is given the "go-ahead" now and, assuming that television production gets underway in 1945, we can confidently predict that three-fourths of these consumer units will become owners of television receiving sets by the end of 1955. Assuming the average price of the television receiver to be \$200.00, this would represent a ten year market for over six billion dollars worth of television receivers at retail. It is my conviction that at the end of the third full production year, industry employment will approach 600,000—as compared with the 308,000 prewar peak.

The second way in which television can contribute to a healthy economic and business life is even more important than the first. It is television's potential power to stimulate the consumption of *all* consumer products, through the use of the most effective demand-creating and selling force the world has ever known.

In order to provide full employment during the postwar period without the use of extensive "made" work projects, the production of consumer goods must be increased a minimum of 50% over the prewar peak. There is no question about our ability to product the merchandise. Our farms and factories have a productive capacity that has astonished the world....

Obviously, our postwar problem is not one of production—either farm production or industrial production. It is one of demand and distribution. Only as consumers buy goods and services are people put to work growing farm products, turning out manufactured products and rendering personal services. Television has the power to create consumer demand and buying of goods and services beyond anything that we have heretofore known.

This means jobs.

How Jobs Are Made

A reference to what happened during the depression years shows clearly

that—in a free enterprise economy—jobs are made when people decide to buy goods or services.

The individual savings of the American people reached a low point in 1933, with approximately \$22,000,000,000 in savings banks and postal savings. In addition, more than two billion dollars were being hoarded in homes. Every year after 1933, the amount of money in savings banks, postal savings and the newly developed U.S. Savings Bonds increased substantially. By 1937, it reached \$25,265,000,000. Yet, in 1937, the average unemployment was estimated at 6,400,000 people.

People valued their money, all through that period, more than they did merchandise. It is only when people value merchandise more than money that they are willing to exchange money for merchandise. Television, properly used, has the power to make people want merchandise more than money, thus creating the necessary turnover of goods and services which alone can sustain continuing and useful jobs.

Advertising and personal salesmanship are the two most important consumer demand-creating forces. Television for the first time in history, will forge these two dynamic forces into the *one most powerful influence we have ever known for stimulating demand and inducing people to buy*. Thus will television put people to work.

The Miracle of Sight Added to Sound

So far, broadcasting has sold the nation's wares "sight unseen." By eliminating the "unseen", in the advertising message of radio, television becomes an unrivalled servant of the people. No other medium so completely fulfills all the requirements of good advertising. Television appeals at once both to the ear and to the eye. In visual appeal it surpasses printed advertisements, which can carry pictures as well as words, by showing the pictures *in motion*. It reprodu-

ces lifelike images that move and breathe instead of more static pictures which may have color and form, but show no signs of life.

By such a process, it is possible, therefore, to intensify the effect of a sales message upon the observer, to clarify its purpose and to make its story so complete and so precise that the purchaser knows exactly what is offered. He "sees" the thing advertised—vividly and in action. No other medium can do the job so well.

Now, as if by a miracle, sight is to be added to the sound of broadcasting. This addition is as important as giving sight to a blind man. The ability to see by television, as well as to hear by radio, should become a reality to more than one hundred million Americans in the first decade of television's existence as a full fledged industry.

To merchandise the products of our farms, factories and personal service industries, American business has invested several billion dollars in the show windows and showrooms of 1,770,000 retail establishments. The annual operating expense of these facilities runs to hundreds of millions of dollars. Their purpose is to enable millions of prospective buyers to see the products in the flesh and to provide the background against which millions of retail salesmen, personally, demonstrate and sell the products.

Thirty Million Show Rooms

If we have thirty million television-equipped homes by the end of 1955, American farmers, manufacturers and service industries will have thirty million showrooms where personal, dramatized demonstrations can be made, simultaneously, and under the most favorable conditions.

What national distributor of merchandise before the war could put his product on display in thirty million showrooms? None. For thirty million showrooms did not exist!

What national distributor knew that his products were simultaneously on

display in one-hundredth of thirty million showrooms, or three hundred thousand? None; for while they did exist, no one distributor could use them.

What sales manager for farm or industrial products or personal services before the war wouldn't have given his right eye to obtain simultaneous demonstrations of his merchandise in one-one thousandth of thirty million showrooms, or thirty thousand showrooms?

Or to bring it right down here to Boston, what value will Boston retailers place on being able to demonstrate their merchandise, simultaneously, in the seven hundred and sixty eight thousand television-equipped homes that will eventually be in the Boston market? One Boston department store answered that question when it applied for a television broadcasting license—Filene's. Other department stores in other parts of the country have taken or are planning to take similar action.

When we think of thirty million showrooms...we begin to see the future power of television and to realize its ability as an advertising and sales medium, to get people to buy goods and thus put people to work....

The Old versus the New

Now, by way of contrast, let's examine, for a moment, the kind of salesmanship that has been employed in the past to demonstrate and sell our products on the showroom floors.

In discussing "the kind of salesmanship" we must consider the billions of man hours and billions of dollars that have been used to build and operate the 1,770,000 retail salesrooms and the hundreds of millions of dollars, and millions of man hours, invested in all forms of advertising and promotion to induce people to go into the 1,770,000 showrooms and thus expose themselves to the products of our farms and factories. Television will not replace these salesmen on show rooms, but it will make them many times more effective and efficient by

pre conditioning and pre selling the customers.

Let's recall what happened when Mrs. Prospect, before the war, walked into one of these showrooms.

It has been the dream of every sales manager to be able to handle such a sales prospect under the most favorable atmosphere in which to induce the buying impulse. But, in the past, that dream has come true in probably not more than one in a thousand sales situations. In too many cases the product is not in good operating condition for demonstrating. In too many cases, the shopper's attention was distracted by irrelevant interests.

With television, the sales manager's dream can come true in every sales situation... [The product] can be demonstrated exactly as he wants it demonstrated. The "expert salesman's" actions and words can be delivered exactly as he wants them delivered. Every impression that this sales manager wants to make on the mind of a prospective buyer can be delivered by television—except one. Television cannot put an order form in the customer's hands. But—with the addition of facsimile to television—electronics promises, some day, to overcome even this handicap.

Let's compare the pre-war process of making a sale of an electric refrigerator, with the "television method." First, the refrigerator manufacturers spent millions of dollars in advertising to arouse the interest of prospects in owning a refrigerator so as to back up the retail refrigerator salesman and prepare the way for him. Then the salesman called door to door. If he was fortunate, he got one prospect out of ten to listen to him.

Then the "horse and buggy selling age" salesman induced the woman to come down to the showroom floor where she could actually see the refrigerator. If he did a good demonstrating job, he had her convinced. But all too often she said: "I must talk it over with my husband." Then, the salesman went to see the man of the house—which is not always an easy thing to do, for some people

don't like to see salesmen. When he succeeded in reaching the man of the house, the salesman had another selling job to do—another demonstration to arrange—and another strategy to plan to get the name on the dotted line.

The Television Selling Age

Now, let's see how this will be done in the television selling age. The psychologically-planned sales presentation is put right into the home where Dad and Mother, and the children, can all see it and hear it at once; where they are at leisure and can deliberate and discuss the family purchase. Just let your imagination roam for a moment to that advantage of television!

Had the refrigeration industry been built with the aid of the "television selling method," it would have been far less costly and the energy and effort expended would have been far more effective. Greatly reduced unit costs would have created millions of additional sales in a comparatively short period of time.

Our new postwar industries can have the advantage of the "television sales method." The war has produced or perfected thousands of inventions which peace will make available for civilian use. But they will mean little to the average citizen, or to the average household, until they have been produced on such a scale as to assure a price within the range of the average consumer. To assure the large scale production and distribution of these new postwar products, the dynamic force of television to create consumer demand is as essential as the dynamo to the powerhouse....

How can you prepare yourself for the coming of television? I recommend that you begin to study its use right now by examining the methods employed by the motion pictures to convey ideas. The motion picture producers are experts in the art of audio-visual selling. This doesn't mean that we can always borrow movie techniques ready-made, or that television hasn't a lot to learn in the way of programming and commercial presentation. There is a whole new art to be

developed. It follows that those organizations which get the most practice, which do the most experimenting, while television is young, will reap the greatest benefits when national television begins. So look for opportunities that *you* can use to become familiar with television techniques....

Freedom of speech and its democratic corollary, a free press, have tacitly expanded our Bill of Rights to include the right of persuasion. This development was the inevitable result of the expansion of the media of free speech and persuasion.... All these media provide open doors to the public mind. Any one of us through these media may influence the attitudes and actions of our fellow citizens.

The tremendous expansion of communications in the United States has given this Nation the world's most penetrating and effective apparatus for the transmission of ideas. Every resident is constantly exposed to the impact of our vast network of communications which reach every corner of the country, no matter how remote or isolated. Words hammer continually at the eyes and ears of America. The United States has become a small room in which a single whisper is magnified thousands of times.

Knowledge of how to use this enormous amplifying system becomes a matter of primary concern to those who are interested in socially constructive action.

There are two main divisions of this communications system which maintain social cohesion. On the first level there are the commercial media. Almost 1,800 daily newspapers in the United States have a combined circulation of around 44,000,000. There are approximately 10,000 weekly newspapers and almost 6,000 magazines. Approximately 2,000 radio stations of various types broadcast to the Nation's 60,000,000 receiving sets. Approximately 16,500 motion picture houses have a capacity of almost 10,500,000. A deluge of books and pamphlets is published annually. The country is blanketed with billboards, handbills, throwaways, and direct mail advertising. Round tables, panels, and forums, classrooms and legislative assemblies, and public platforms, any and all media, day after day, spread the word, someone's word.

On the second level there are the specialized media owned and operated by the many organized groups in this country. Almost all such groups...have their own communications systems. They disseminate ideas not only by means of the formal written word in labor papers, house organs, special bulletins, and the like, but also through lectures, meetings, discussions, and rank-and-file conversations.

Leadership Through Communication

This web of communications, sometimes duplicating, crisscrossing, and overlapping, is a condition of fact, not theory. We must recognize the significance of modern communications not only as a highly organized mechanical web but as a potent force for social good or possible evil. We can determine whether this network shall be employed to its greatest extent for sound social ends.

For only by mastering the techniques of communication can leadership be exercised fruitfully in the vast complex that is modern democracy in the United States. In an earlier age, in a society that was small geographically and with a more homogeneous population, a leader was usually known to his followers personally; there was a visual relationship between them. Communication was accomplished principally by personal announcement to an audience or through a relatively primitive printing press. Books, pamphlets, and newspapers reached a very small literate segment of the public.

We are tired of hearing repeated the threadbare cliché "The world has grown smaller"; but this so-called truism is not actually true, by any means. The world has grown both smaller and very much larger. Its physical frontiers have been expanded. Today's leaders have become more remote physically from the public; yet, at the same time, the public has much greater familiarity with these leaders through the system of modern communications. Leaders are just as pot-

ent today as ever.

In turn, by use of this system, which has constantly expanded as a result of technological improvement, leaders have been able to overcome the problems of geographical distance and social stratification to reach their publics. Underlying much of this expansion, and largely the reason for its existence in its present form, has been widespread and enormously rapid diffusion of literacy.

Leaders may be the spokesmen for many different points of view. They may direct the activities of major organized groups such as industry, labor, or units of government. They may compete with one another in battles for public good will; or they may, representing divisions within the larger units, compete among themselves. Such leaders, with the aid of technicians in the field who have specialized in utilizing the channels of communication, have been able to accomplish purposefully and scientifically what we have termed "the engineering of consent."

The Engineering Approach

This phrase quite simply means the use of an engineering approach—that is, action based only on thorough knowledge of the situation and on the application of scientific principles and tried practices to the task of getting people to support ideas and programs. Any person or organization depends ultimately on public approval, and is therefore faced with the problem of engineering the public's *consent* to a program or goal. We expect our elected government officials to try to engineer our consent—through the network of communications open to them—for the measures they propose. We reject government authoritarianism or regimentation, but we are willing to take action suggested to us by the written or spoken word. The engineering of consent is the very essence of the democratic process, the freedom to persuade and suggest. The freedoms of speech, press, petition, and assembly, the freedoms which make the engineering of consent possible, are among the most cherished guarantees of the Constitution

of the United States.

The engineering of consent should be based theoretically and practically on the complete understanding of those whom it attempts to win over. But it is sometimes impossible to reach joint decisions based on an understanding of facts by all the people. The average American adult has only six years of schooling behind him. With pressing crises and decisions to be faced, a leader frequently cannot wait for the people to arrive at even general understanding. In certain cases, democratic leaders must play their part in leading the public through the engineering of consent to socially constructive goals and values. This role naturally imposes upon them the obligation to use the educational processes, as well as other available techniques, to bring about as complete an understanding as possible.

Under no circumstances should the engineering of consent supersede or displace the functions of the educational system, either formal or informal, in bringing about understanding by the people as a basis for their action. The engineering of consent often does supplement the educational process. If higher general educational standards were to prevail in this country and the general level of public knowledge and understanding were raised as a result, this approach would still retain its value.

Even in a society of a perfectionist educational standard, equal progress would not be achieved in every field. There would always be time lags, blind spots, and points of weakness; and the engineering of consent would still be essential. The engineering of consent will always be needed as an adjunct to, or a partner of, the educational process.

Importance of Engineering Consent

Today it is impossible to overestimate the importance of engineering consent; it affects almost every aspect of our daily lives. When used for social pur-

poses, it is among our most valuable contributions to the efficient functioning of modern society. The techniques can be subverted; demagogues can utilize the techniques for antidemocratic purposes with as much success as can those who employ them for socially desirable ends. The responsible leader, to accomplish social objectives, must therefore be constantly aware of the possibilities of subversion. He must apply his energies to mastering the operational know-how of consent engineering, and to out-maneuvering his opponents in the public interest.

It is clear that a leader in a democracy need not always possess the personal qualities of a Daniel Webster or a Henry Clay. He need not be visible or even audible to his audiences. He may lead indirectly, simply by effectively using today's means of making contact with the eyes and ears of those audiences. Even the direct or what might be called the old fashioned method of speaking to an audience is for the most part once removed; for usually public speech is transmitted mechanically, through the mass media of radio, motion pictures, and television.

During World War I, the famous Committee on Public Information, organized by George Creel, dramatized in the public's consciousness the effectiveness of the war of words. The Committee helped to build the morale of our own people, to win over the neutrals, and to disrupt the enemy. It helped to win that war....

As this approach came to be recognized as the key factor in influencing public thought, thousands of experts in many related fields came to the fore—such specialists as editors, publishers, advertising men, heads of pressure groups and political parties, educators, and publicists. During World War I and the immediate postwar years a new profession developed in response to the demand for trained, skilled specialists to advise others on the technique of engineering public consent, a profession providing counsel on public relations.

The Professional Viewpoint

In 1923 I defined this profession in my book, *Crystallizing Public Opinion*, and in the same year, at New York University, gave the first course on the subject. In the almost quarter-century that has elapsed since then, the profession has become a recognized one in this country and has spread to other democratic countries where free communication and competition of ideas in the market place are permitted. The profession has its literature, its training courses, an increasing number of practitioners, and a growing recognition of social responsibility.

In the United States, the profession deals specifically with the problems of relationship between a group and its public. Its chief function is to analyze objectively and realistically the position of its client vis-à-vis a public and to advise as to the necessary corrections in its client's attitudes toward and approaches to that public. It is thus an instrument for achieving adjustment if any maladjustment in relationships exists. It must be remembered of course that good will, the basis of lasting adjustment, can be preserved in the long run only by those whose actions warrant it. But this does not prevent those who do not deserve good will from winning it and holding onto it long enough to do a lot of damage.

The public relations counsel has a professional responsibility to push only those ideas he can respect, and not to promote causes or accept assignments for clients he considers antisocial.

Planning a Campaign

Just as the civil engineer must analyze every element of the situation before he builds a bridge, so the engineer of consent, in order to achieve a worthwhile social objective, must operate from a foundation of soundly planned action. Let us assume that he is engaged in a specific task. His plans must be based on four prerequisites:

1. Calculation of resources, both human and physical; i.e., the manpower, the money, and the time available for the purpose;
2. As thorough knowledge of the subject as possible;
3. Determination of objectives, subject to possible change after research: specifically, what is to be accomplished, with whom and through whom;
4. Research of the public to learn why and how it acts, both individually and as a group.

Only after this preliminary groundwork has been firmly laid is it possible to know whether the objectives are realistically attainable. Only then can the engineer of consent utilize his resources of manpower, money, and time, and the media available. Strategy, organization, and activities will be geared to the realities of the situation.

The task must first be related to the budget available for manpower and mechanics. In terms of human assets, the consent engineer has certain talents—creative, administrative, executive—and he must know what these are. He should also have a clear knowledge of his limitations. The human assets need to be implemented by work space and office equipment. All material needs must be provided by budget.

Above all else, once the budget has been established, and before a first step is taken, the field of knowledge dealing with the subject should be thoroughly explored. This is primarily a matter of collecting and codifying a store of information so that it will be available for practical, efficient use. This preliminary work may be tedious and exacting, but it cannot be by-passed; for the engineer of consent should be powerfully equipped with facts, with truths, with evidence, before he begins to show himself before a public.

The consent engineer should provide himself with the standard reference books on public relations, publicity, public opinion: *N. W. Ayer & Son's Directory of Newspapers and Periodicals*, the *Editor and Publisher Year Book*, the *Radio Daily Annual*, the *Congressional Directory*, the *Chicago Daily News Almanac*,

the *World Almanac*—and, of course the telephone book. (The *World Almanac*, for example, contains lists of many of the thousands of associations in the United States—a cross section of the country.) These and other volumes provide a basic library necessary to effective planning.

At this point in the preparatory work, the engineer of consent should consider the objectives of his activity. He should have clearly in mind at all times precisely where he is going and what he wishes to accomplish. He may intensify already existing favorable attitudes; he may induce those holding favorable attitudes to take constructive action; he may convert disbelievers; he may disrupt certain antagonistic points of view.

Goals should be defined exactly. In a Red Cross drive, for example, a time limit and the amount of money to be raised are set from the start. Much better results are obtained in a relief drive when the appeal is made for aid to the people of a specific country or locality rather than of a general area such as Europe or Asia.

Studying the Public

The objective must at all times be related to the public whose consent is to be obtained. That public is people, but what do they know? What are their present attitudes toward the situation with which the consent engineer is concerned? What are the impulses which govern these attitudes? What ideas are the people ready to absorb? What are they ready to do, given an effective stimulant? Do they get their ideas from bartenders, letter carriers, waitresses, Little Orphan Annie, or the editorial page of the *New York Times*? What group leaders or opinion molders effectively influence the thought process of what followers? What is the flow of ideas—from whom to whom? To what extent do authority, factual evidence, precision, reason, tradition, and emotion play a part in the acceptance of these ideas?

The public's attitudes, assumptions, ideas, or prejudices result from definite influences. One must try to find out what they are in any situation in which one is working.

If the engineer of consent is to plan effectively, he must also know the group formations with which he is to deal, for democratic society is actually only a loose aggregate of constituent groups. Certain individuals with common social and/or professional interests form voluntary groups. These include such great professional organizations as those of doctors, lawyers, nurses, and the like; the trade associations; the farm associations and labor unions; the women's clubs; the religious groups; and the thousands of clubs and fraternal associations. Formal groups, such as political units, may range from organized minorities to the large amorphous political bodies that are our two major parties. There is today even another category of the public group which must be kept in mind by the engineer of consent. The readers of the *New Republic* or the listeners to Raymond Swing's program are as much voluntary groups, although unorganized, as are the members of a trade union or a Rotary Club.

To function well, almost all organized elect or select leaders who usually remain in a controlling position for stated intervals of time. These leaders reflect their followers' wishes and work to promote their interests. In a democratic society, they can only lead them as far as, and in the direction in which, they want to go. To influence the public, the engineer of consent works with and through group leaders and opinion molders on every level.

Value and Techniques of Research

To achieve accurate working knowledge of the receptivity of the public mind to an idea or ideas, it is necessary to engage in painstaking research. Such research should aim to establish a common denominator between the researcher and the public. It should disclose the realities of the objective situation in which

the engineer of consent has to work. Completed, it provides a blueprint of action and clarifies the question of who does what, where, when, and why. It will indicate the over-all strategy to be employed, the themes to be stressed, the organization needed, the use of media, and the day-to-day tactics. It should further indicate how long it will take to win the public and what are the short- and long-term trends of public thinking. It will disclose subconscious and conscious motivations in public thought, and the actions, words, and pictures that effect these motivations. It will reveal public awareness, the low or high visibility of ideas in the public mind.

Research may indicate the necessity to modify original objectives, to enlarge or contract the planned goal, or to change actions and methods. In short, it furnishes the equivalent of the mariner's chart, the architect's blueprint, the traveler's road map.

Public opinion research may be conducted by questionnaires, by personal interviews, or by polls. Contact can be made with business leaders, heads of trade associations, trade union officials, and educational leaders, all of whom may be willing to aid the engineer of consent. The heads of professional groups in the communities—the medical association, the architects, the engineers—all should be queried. So should social service executives, officials of women's clubs, and religious leaders. Editors, publishers, and radio station and motion picture people can be persuaded to discuss with the consent engineer his objectives and the appeals and angles that affect these leaders and their audiences. The local unions or associations of barbers, railwaymen, clothing workers, and taxicab drivers may be willing to co-operate in the undertaking. Grass-roots leaders are important.

Such a survey has a double barreled effect. The engineer of consent learns what group leaders know and do not know, the extent to which they will cooperate with him, the media that reach them, appeals that may be valid, and the prejudices, the legends, or the facts by which they live. He is able simultaneously to

determine whether or not they will conduct informational campaigns in their own right, and thus supplement his activities.

Themes Strategy, and Organization

Now that the preliminary work has been done, it will be possible to proceed to actual planning. From the survey of opinion will emerge the major themes of strategy. These themes contain the ideas to be conveyed; they channel the lines of approach to the public; and they must be expressed through whatever media are used. The themes are ever present but intangible—comparable to what in fiction is called the “story line.”

To be successful, the themes must appeal to the motives of the public. Motives are the activation of both conscious and subconscious pressures created by the force of desires. Psychologists have isolated a number of compelling appeals, the validity of which has been repeatedly proved in practical application.

Once the themes are established, in what kind of a campaign are they to be used? The situation may call for a blitzkrieg or a continuing battle, a combination of both, or some other strategy. It may be necessary to develop a plan of action for an election that will be over in a few weeks or months, or for a campaign that may take years.... Planning for mass persuasion is governed by many factors that call upon all one's powers of training, experience, skill, and judgment. Planning should be flexible and provide for changed conditions.

When the plan has been perfected, organization of resources follows, and it must be undertaken in advance to provide the necessary manpower, money, and physical equipment. Organization also correlates the activities of any specialists who may be called upon from time to time, such as opinion researchers, fund raisers, publicity men, radio and motion picture experts, specialists for women's clubs and foreign language groups, and the like.

The Tactics

At this point it will be possible to plan the tactics of the program, i.e., to decide how the themes are to be disseminated over the idea carriers, the networks of communication.

Do not think of tactics in terms of segmental approaches. The problem is not to get articles into a newspaper or obtain radio time or arrange a motion picture newsreel; it is rather to set in motion a broad activity, the success of which depends on interlocking all phases and elements of the proposed strategy, implemented by tactics that are timed to the moment of maximum effectiveness. An action held over but one day may fall completely flat. Skilled and imaginative timing has determined the success of many mass movements and campaigns, the familiar phenomena so typical of the American people's behavior pattern.

Emphasis of the consent engineer's activities will be on the written and spoken word, geared to the media and designed for the audiences he is addressing. He must be sure that his material fits his public. He must prepare copy written in simple language and sixteen-word sentences for the average school-age public. Some copy will be aimed at the understanding of people who have had seventeen years of schooling. He must familiarize himself with all media and know how to supply them with material suitable in quantity and quality.

Primarily, however, the engineer of consent must create news. News is not an inanimate thing. It is the overt act that makes news, and news in turn shapes the attitudes and actions of people. A good criterion as to whether something is or is not news is whether the event juts out of the pattern of routine. The developing of events and circumstances that are not routine is one of the basic functions of the engineer of consent. Events so planned can be projected over the communication systems to infinitely more people than those actually participating, and such events vividly dramatize ideas for those who do not witness the events.

The imaginatively managed event can compete successfully with other events for attention. Newsworthy events, involving people, usually do not happen by accident. They are planned deliberately to accomplish a purpose, to influence our ideas and actions.

Events may also be set up in chain reaction. By harnessing the energies of group leaders, the engineer of consent can stimulate them to set in motion activities of their own. They will organize additional, specialized, subsidiary [sic] events, all of which will further dramatize the basic theme.

Conclusion

Communication is the key to engineering consent for social action. But it is not enough to get out leaflets and bulletins on the mimeograph machines, to place releases in the newspapers, or to fill the air waves with radio talks. Words, sounds, and pictures accomplish little unless they are the tools of a soundly thought-out plan and carefully organized methods. If the plans are well formulated and the proper use is made of them, the ideas conveyed by the words will become part and parcel of the people themselves.

When the public is convinced of the soundness of an idea, it will proceed to action. People translate an idea into action suggested by the idea itself, whether it is ideological, political, or social. They may adopt a philosophy that stresses racial and religious tolerance; they may vote a New Deal into office; or they may organize a consumers' buying strike. But such results do not just happen. In a democracy they can be accomplished principally by the engineering of consent.

TO SEE AND NOT SEE

What happens when an adult who has been blind since childhood suddenly has his vision restored? The experience of Virgil, a fifty-year-old Oklahoman who regained his sight after forty-five years, raises questions about perception that have haunted philosophers and scientists for centuries.

BY OLIVER SACKS

EARLY in October of 1991, I got a phone call from a retired minister in the Midwest, who told me about his daughter's fiancé, a fifty-year-old man named Virgil, who had been virtually blind since early childhood. He had thick cataracts, and was also said to have retinitis pigmentosa, a hereditary condition that slowly but implacably eats away at the retinas. But his fiancée, Amy, who required regular eye checks herself, because of diabetes, had recently taken him to see her own ophthalmologist, Dr. Scott Hamlin, and he had given them new hope. Dr. Hamlin, listening carefully to the history, was not so sure that Virgil had retinitis pigmentosa. It was difficult to be certain at this stage, because the retinas could no longer be seen beneath the thick cataracts, but Virgil could still see light and dark, the direction from which light came, and the shadow of a hand moving in front of his eyes, so obviously there was not a total destruction of the retina. And cataract extraction was a relatively simple procedure, done under local anesthesia, with very little surgical risk. There was nothing to lose—and there might be much to gain. Amy and Virgil would be getting married soon—wouldn't it be fantastic if he could see? If, after nearly a lifetime of blindness, his first vision could be his bride, the wedding, the minister, the church!

Dr. Hamlin had agreed to operate, and the cataract on Virgil's right eye had been removed a fortnight earlier, Amy's father informed me. And, miraculously, the operation had worked. Amy, who began keeping a journal the day after the operation—the day the bandages were removed—wrote in her initial entry: "Virgil can SEE!!". Entire office in tears, first time Virgil has sight for forty years. Virgil's family so excited, cry-


ing, can't believe it! . . . Miracle of sight restored incredible! But the following day she remarked problems: "Trying to adjust to being sighted, tough to go from blindness to sighted. Has to think faster, not able to trust vision yet. . . . Like baby just learning to see, everything new, exciting, scary, unsure of what seeing means."

A neurologist's life is not systematic, like a scientist's, but it provides him with novel and unexpected situations, which can become windows, peepholes, into the

writes the ophthalmologist Alberto Valvo, in "Sight Restoration after Long-Term Blindness" (1971), "the number of cases of this kind over the last ten centuries known to us is not more than twenty."

What would vision be like in such a patient? Would it be "normal" from the moment vision was restored? This is what one might think at first. This is the commonsensical notion—that the eyes will be opened, the scales will fall from them, and (in the words of the New Testament) the blind man will "receive" sight.

But could it be that simple? Was not *experience* necessary to see? Did one not have to learn to see? I was not well acquainted with the literature on the subject, though I had read with fascination the great case history published in the *Quarterly Journal of Psychology* in 1963 by the psychologist Richard Gregory (with Jean G. Wallace), and I knew that such cases, hypothetical or real, had riveted the attention of philosophers and psychologists for hundreds of years. (There is a hint of it even in the Bible, in Mark's description of the miracle at Bethsaida; for here, at first, the blind man saw "men as trees, walking," and only subsequently was his eyesight fully restored.) The seventeenth-century philosopher William Molyneux, whose wife was blind, posed the following question to his friend John Locke: "Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere [be] made to see: [could he now] by his sight, before he touched them . . . distinguish and tell which was the globe and which the cube?" Locke considers this in his "Essay Concerning Human Understanding" (1690) and decides that the answer is no. In 1709, examining the problem in more detail, and the whole relation be-



intricacy of nature—an intricacy that one might not anticipate from the ordinary course of life. "Nature is nowhere accustomed more openly to display her secret mysteries," wrote Thomas Willis, in the seventeenth century, "than in cases where she shows traces of her workings apart from the beaten path." Certainly this phone call—about the restoration of vision in adulthood to a patient blind from early childhood—hinted of such a case. "In fact,"

tween sight and touch, in "A New Theory of Vision," George Berkeley concluded that there was no necessary connection between a tactile world and a sight world—that a connection between them could be established only on the basis of experience.

Barely twenty years elapsed before these considerations were put to the test—when, in 1728, an English surgeon named William Cheselden removed the cataracts from the eyes of a thirteen-year-old boy born blind. Despite his high intelligence and youth, the boy encountered profound difficulties with the simplest visual perceptions. He had no idea of distance. He had no idea of space or size. And he was bizarrely confused by drawings and paintings, by the *idea* of a two-dimensional representation of reality. As Berkeley had anticipated, he was able to make sense of what he saw only gradually, and insofar as he was able to connect visual experiences with tactile ones. It had been similar with many other patients in the two hundred and fifty years since Cheselden's operation: nearly all had experienced the most profound, Lockean confusion and bewilderment.

And yet, I was informed, as soon as the bandages were removed from Virgil's eye he saw his doctor and his fiancée, and laughed. Doubtless he saw *something*—but what did he see? What did "seeing" for this previously not-seeing man mean? What sort of world had he been launched into?

VIRGIL (nearly all the names in this account have been changed, and some identifying details have been disguised) was born on a small farm in Kentucky soon after the outbreak of the Second World War. He seemed normal enough as a baby, but (his mother thought) had poor eyesight even as a toddler, sometimes bumped into things, seemed not to see them. At the age of three, he became gravely ill with a triple illness—a meningitis or meningoencephalitis (inflammation of the brain and its membranes), polio, and cat-scratch fever. During this acute illness, he had convulsions, became virtually blind, paralyzed in the legs, partly paralyzed in his breathing, and, after ten days, fell into a coma. He remained in a coma for two weeks. When he emerged from it, he seemed, according to his mother, "a different person" and "sort of dull inside"; he showed

THE FRIENDLY CITY

Unless you put it away
he can never play with it again,
the marimba, and you know what that means.

Our city bemoans us, or does it
only seem to? Showers that come in shifts,
light poles guarded in air,
the dry cackle of trees in the Botanical Gardens?

Was it for this suburban marketplace
you wrote, and are writing still
in that wire-bound notebook of yours?
Things like: "Man cannot stand what he has become
but he loves to lap up his own vomit?"

In that case the city will probably stay around
for most of the day. It likes your sleeping sound,
not the bad silence of the others
who are even now clogging its approaches,
giving the place a bad name.

Oh if it was a name he wanted
why didn't somebody say something?
We could have found him one so easily,
like "Elector of Brandenburg,"
and the city could have seen its reflection
finally, a ducal palace, upended.

—JOHN ASHBERRY

ity, seemed nothing at all like the spunky, mischievous boy he had been.

The strength in his legs came back over the next year, and his chest grew stronger, though never, perhaps, entirely normal. His vision also recovered significantly—but his retinas were now gravely damaged. Whether the retinal damage was caused wholly by his acute illness or perhaps partly by a congenital retinal degeneration was never clear.

In Virgil's sixth year, cataracts began to develop in both eyes, and it was evident that he was becoming functionally blind. That same year, he was sent to a school for the blind, and there he eventually learned to read Braille and to become adept with the use of a cane. But he was not a star pupil; he was not as adventurous or aggressively independent as some blind people are. There was a striking passivity all through his time at school—as, indeed, there had been since his illness.

Yet Virgil graduated from the school and, when he was twenty, decided to leave Kentucky to seek training work

and a life of his own in a city in Oklahoma. He trained as a massage therapist, and soon found employment at a Y.M.C.A. He was obviously good at his job, and highly esteemed, and the Y was happy to keep him on its permanent staff and to provide a small house for him across the road, where he lived with a friend, also employed at the Y. Virgil had many clients—it is fascinating to hear the tactile detail with which he can describe them—and seemed to take a real pleasure and pride in his job. Thus, in his modest way, Virgil made a life: had a steady job and an identity, was self-supporting, had friends, read Braille papers and books (though less, with the years, as Talking Books came in). He had a passion for sports, especially baseball, and loved to listen to games on the radio. He had an encyclopedic knowledge of baseball games, players, scores, statistics. On a couple of occasions, he became involved with girlfriends, and would cross the city on public transport to meet them. He maintained a close tie with

home, and particularly with his mother—he would get hampers of food regularly from the farm, and send hampers of laundry back and forth. Life was limited, but stable in its way.

Then, in 1991, he met Amy—or, rather, they met again, for they had known each other well twenty or more years before. Amy's background was different from Virgil's: she came from a cultivated middle-class family, had gone to college in New Hampshire, and had a degree in botany. She had worked at another Y in town, as a swimming coach, and had met Virgil at a cat show in 1968. They dated a bit—she was in her early twenties, he was a few years older—but then Amy decided to go back to graduate school in Arkansas, where she met her first husband, and she and Virgil fell out of contact. She ran her own plant nursery for a while, specializing in orchids, but had to give this up when she developed severe asthma. She and her first husband divorced after a few years, and she returned to Oklahoma. In 1988, out of the blue, Virgil called her, and, after three years of long phone calls between them, they finally met again, in 1991. "All of a sudden it was like twenty years were never there," Amy said.

Meeting again, at this point in their lives, both felt a certain desire for companionship. With Amy, perhaps, this took a more active form. She saw Virgil stuck (as she perceived it) in a vegetative, dull life: going over to the Y, doing his massages; going back home, where, increasingly, he listened to ballgames on the radio; going out and meeting people less and less each year. Restoring his sight, she must have felt, would, like marriage, stir him from his indolent bachelor existence and provide them both with a new life.

But Virgil was passive here as in so much else. He had been sent to half a dozen specialists over the years, and they had been unanimous in declining to operate, feeling that in all probability he had no useful retinal function; and Virgil seemed to accept this with equanimity. But Amy disagreed. With Virgil being blind already, she said, there was nothing to lose, and there was a real possibility, remote but almost too exciting to contemplate, that he might actually get reasonable sight back and, after forty-five years, see again. And so Amy pushed for the surgery. Virgil's mother, fearing disturbance, was strongly against it. ("He is



"Which came first, Mom, the Chicken McNugget or the Egg McMuffin?"

fine as he is," she said.) Virgil himself showed no preference in the matter; he seemed happy to go along with whatever they decided.

Finally, in mid-September, the day of surgery came. Virgil's right eye had its cataract removed, and a new lens implant was inserted; then the eye was bandaged, as is customary, for twenty-four hours of recovery. The following day, the bandage was removed, and Virgil's eye was finally exposed, without cover, to the world. The moment of truth had finally come.

Or had it? The truth of the matter (as I pieced it together later), if less "miraculous" than Amy's journal suggested, was infinitely stranger. The dramatic moment stayed vacant, grew longer, sagged. No cry ("I can see!") burst from Virgil's lips. He seemed to be staring blankly, bewildered, without focussing, at the surgeon, who stood before him, still holding the bandages. Only when the surgeon spoke—saying "Well?"—did a look of recognition cross Virgil's face.

Virgil told me later that in this first moment he had no idea what he was seeing. There was light, there was movement, there was color, all mixed up, all meaningless, a blur. Then out of the blur came a voice that said, "Well?" Then, and only then, he said, did he finally realize that this chaos of light and shadow was a face—and, indeed, the face of his surgeon.

His experience was virtually identical to that of Gregory's patient, S.B.:

When the bandages were removed . . . he heard a voice coming from in front of him and to one side: he turned to the source of the sound, and saw a "blur." He realized that this must be a face. . . . He seemed to think that he would not have known that this was a face if he had not previously heard the voice and known that voices came from faces.

The rest of us, born sighted, can scarcely imagine such confusion. For we, born with a full complement of senses, and correlating these, one with the other, create a sight world from the start, a world of visual objects and concepts and meanings. When we open our eyes each morning, it is upon a world we have spent a lifetime learning to see. We are not given the world: we make our world through incessant experience, categorization, memory, reconnection. But when Virgil opened his eye, after being blind for forty-five years—having had little more than an infant's visual experience, and this long forgotten—there were no visual memories to support a perception, there was no world of experience and meaning awaiting him. He saw, but what he saw had no coherence. His retina and optic nerve were active, transmitting impulses, but his brain could make no sense of them; he was, as neurologists say, agnostic.

Everyone, Virgil included, expected something much simpler. A man opens

AUTOMATED -TELLER-



Victoria
Roberts

his eyes, light enters, and falls on the retina: he sees. It is as simple as that, we imagine. And the surgeon's own experience, like that of most ophthalmologists, had been with the removal of cataracts from patients who had almost always lost their sight late in life—and such patients do indeed, if the surgery is successful, have a virtually immediate recovery of normal vision, for they have in no sense lost their ability to see. And so, though there had been a careful surgical discussion of the operation and of possible postsurgical complications, there was little discussion or preparation for the neurological and psychological difficulties that Virgil might encounter.

WITH the cataract out, Virgil was able to see colors and movements, to see (but not identify) large objects and shapes, and, astonishingly, to read some letters on the third line of the standard Snellen eye chart—the line corresponding to a visual acuity of about 20/100, or a little better. But though his best vision was a respectable 20/80, he lacked a coherent visual field, because his central vision was poor, and it was almost impossible for the eye to fixate on targets; it kept losing them, making random searching movements, finding them, then losing them again. It was evident that the central, or macular, part of the retina, which is specialized for high acuity and fixation, was scarcely functioning, and that it was only the surrounding *paramacular* area which was making possible such vision as he had. The retina itself presented a moth-eaten or piebald appearance, with areas of increased and decreased pigmentation—islets of intact or relatively intact retina alternating with areas of atrophy. The macula was degenerated and pale, and the blood vessels of the entire retina appeared narrowed.

Examination, I was told, suggested the scars or residues of old disease but no current or active disease process; and, this being so, Virgil's vision, such as it was, could be stable for the rest of his life. It could be hoped, moreover (since the worse eye had been operated on first), that the left eye, which was to be operated upon in a few weeks' time, might have considerably more functional retina than the right.

I HAD not been able to go to Oklahoma straightaway—my impulse was to take the next plane after that ini-

tial phone call—but had kept myself informed of Virgil's progress over the ensuing weeks by speaking with Amy, with Virgil's mother, and, of course, with Virgil himself. I also spoke at length with Dr. Hamlin and with Richard Gregory, in England—to discuss what sort of test materials I should bring, for I myself had never seen such a case, nor did I know anyone (apart from Gregory) who had. I gathered together some materials—solid objects, pictures, cartoons, illusions, videotapes, and special perceptual tests designed by a physiologist colleague, Ralph Siegel; I phoned an ophthalmologist friend, Robert Wasserman (we had previously worked together on the case of a color-blind painter), and we started to plan a visit. It was important, we felt, not just to test Virgil but to see how he managed in real life, inside his house, outside, in natural settings and social situations; crucial, too, that we see him as a person, bringing his own life history—his particular dispositions and needs and expectations—to this critical passage; that we meet his fiancée, who had so urged the operation, and with whom his life was now so intimately mingled; that we look not merely at his eyes and perceptual powers but at the whole tenor and pattern of his life.

VIRGIL and Amy—now newlyweds—greeted us at the exit barrier in the airport. He was of medium height, but exceedingly fat; he moved slowly and tended to cough and puff with the slightest exertion. He was not, it was evident, an entirely well man. His eyes roved to and fro, in searching movements, and when Amy introduced Bob and me he did not seem to see us straightaway—he looked toward us but not quite at us. I had the impression, momentary but strong, that Virgil did not really look at our faces, though he smiled and laughed and listened minutely.

I was reminded of what Gregory had observed of his patient S.B.—that “he did not find faces ‘easy’ objects,” and that “he did not look at a speaker's face, and made nothing of facial expressions.” Virgil's behavior was certainly not that of a sighted man, but it wasn't that of a blind man, either. It was, rather, the behavior of one *mentally* blind, or agnostic—able to see but not to decipher what he was seeing. He reminded me of an agnostic patient of mine, Dr. P. (the man who mistook his wife for a hat), who, in-

stead of looking at me, taking me in, in the normal way, made sudden strange fixations—on my nose, on my right ear, down to my chin, up to my right eye—not seeing my face as a whole.

We walked out through the crowded airport. Amy holding Virgil's arm, guiding him, and out to the lot where they had parked their car. Virgil was fond of cars, and one of his first pleasures after surgery (as with S.B.) had been to watch them through the window of his house, to enjoy their motions, and spot their colors and shapes—their colors, especially. He was sometimes bewildered by shapes. "What cars do you see?" I asked him as we walked through the lot. He pointed to all the cars we passed. "That's a blue one, that's red—wow, that's a big one!" Some of the shapes he found very surprising. "Look at that one!" he exclaimed once. "I have to look down!" And, bending, he felt it—it was a slinky, streamlined V-12 Jaguar—and confirmed its low profile. But it was only the colors and general profiles he was getting; he would have walked past his own car had Amy not been with him. And Bob and I were struck by the fact that Virgil would look, would attend visually, only if one asked him to or pointed something out—not spontaneously. His sight might be largely restored, but seeing, looking, it was clear, was far from natural to him: he still had many of the habits, the behaviors, of a blind man.

The drive from the airport to their house was a long one; it took us through the heart of town, and it gave us an opportunity to talk to Virgil and Amy, and to observe Virgil's reactions to his new vision. He clearly enjoyed movement, watching the ever-changing spectacle through the car windows, and the movement of other cars on the road. He spotted a speeder coming up very fast behind us, and identified cars, buses (he especially loved the bright-yellow school buses), eighteen-wheelers, and, once, on a side road, a slow, noisy tractor. He seemed very sensitive to, and intrigued by, large neon signs and advertisements, and liked picking out their letters as we passed. He had difficulty reading entire words, though he often guessed them correctly from one or two letters, or from the style of the signs. Other signs he saw but could not read. He was able to see and identify the changing colors of the traffic lights as we got into town.

he had seen since his operation, and of some of the unexpected confusions that could occur. He had seen the moon; it was larger than he expected. On one occasion, he was puzzled by seeing "a fat airplane" in the sky—"stuck, not moving." It turned out to be a blimp. Occasionally, he had seen birds; they made him jump, sometimes, if they came too close. (Of course, they did *not* come that close, Amy explained. Virgil simply had no idea of distance.)

Much of their time recently had been spent shopping—there had been the wedding to prepare for, and Amy wanted to show Virgil off, tell his story to the clerks and shopkeepers they knew, let them see a transformed Virgil for themselves. It was fun; the local television station had aired a story about Virgil's operation, and people would recognize him and come up to shake his hand. But supermarkets and other stores were also dense visual spectacles of objects of all kinds, often in bright packaging, and provided good "exercise" for Virgil's new sight. Among the first objects he had recognized, just the day after his bandages came off, were rolls of toilet paper on display. He had picked up a package, and given it to Amy, to prove he could see. Three days after surgery, they had gone to an I.G.A., and Virgil had seen shelves, fruit, cans, people, aisles, carts—so much that he got scared. "Everything ran together," he said. He needed to get out of the store and close his eyes for a bit.

He enjoyed uncluttered views, he said, of green hills and grass—especially after the over-full, over-rich visual spectacles of shops—though it was difficult for him. Amy indicated, to connect the visual shapes of hills with the tangible hills he had walked up; and he had no idea of perspective. But the first month of seeing had been predominantly positive: "Every day seems like a great adventure, seeing more for the first time each day," Amy had written, summarizing it, in her journal.

WHEN we arrived at the house, Virgil, caneless, walked by himself up the path to the front door, pulled out his key, grasped the doorknob, unlocked the door, and opened it. This was impressive—he could never have done it at first, he said—and was something he

surgery. It was his showpiece. But he said that in general he found walking "scary" and "confusing" without touch, without his cane, with his uncertain, unstable judgment of space and distance. Sometimes surfaces or objects would seem to loom, to be on top of him, when they were still quite a distance away; sometimes he would get confused by his own shadow—the whole concept of shadows, of objects blocking light, was puzzling to him—and would come to a stop, or trip, or try to step over it. Steps, in particular, posed a special hazard, because all he could see was a confusion, a flat surface, of parallel and crisscrossing lines; he could not see them (although he knew them) as solid objects going up or coming down in three-dimensional space. Now, five weeks after surgery, he often felt more disabled than he had felt when he was blind, and he had lost the confidence, the ease of moving, that he had possessed then. But he hoped all this would sort itself out with time.

I was not so sure; every patient described in the literature had faced great difficulties after surgery in the apprehension of space and distance—for months, even years. This was the case even in Valvo's highly intelligent patient H.S., who had been normally sighted until, at fifteen, he was corneally scarred by a chemical explosion, and had regained his vision twenty-two years later. He encountered grave difficulties of every kind, which he recorded, minutely, on tape:

During these first weeks [after surgery] I had no appreciation of depth or distance; street lights were luminous stains stuck to the window panes, and the corridors of the hospital were black holes. When I crossed the road the traffic terrified me, even when I was accompanied. I am very insecure while walking; indeed I am more afraid now than before the operation.

WE gathered in the kitchen at the back of the house, which had a large white deal table. Bob and I laid out all our test objects—color charts, letter charts, pictures, illusions—on it, and we set up a video camera to record the testing. As we settled down, Virgil's cat and dog bounded in to greet and check us—and Virgil, we noted, had some difficulty telling which was which. This comic and embarrassing problem had persisted since he returned home from surgery: both animals, as it happened, were black.



them—to their annoyance—unless he could touch them, too. Sometimes, Amy said, she would see him examining the cat carefully, looking at its head, its ears, its paws, its tail, and touching each part gently as he did so. I observed this myself the next day—Virgil feeling and looking at Tibbles with extraordinary intentness, correlating the cat. He would keep doing this, Amy remarked (“You’d think once was enough”), but the new ideas, the visual recognitions, kept slipping from his mind.

Cheselden described a strikingly similar scene with his young patient in the seventeen-twenties:

One particular only, though it might appear trifling, I will relate: Having often forgot which was the cat, and which the dog, he was ashamed to ask; but catching the cat, which he knew by feeling, he was observed to look at her steadfastly, and then, setting her down, said, So, puss, I shall know you another time. . . . Upon being told what things were . . . he would carefully observe that he might know them again; and (as he said) at first learned to know, and again forgot, a thousand things in a day.

Virgil’s first formal recognitions when the bandages were taken off had been of letters on the ophthalmologist’s eye chart, and we decided to test him, first, on letter recognition. He could not see ordinary newsprint clearly—his acuity

was still only about 20/80—but he readily perceived letters that were more than a third of an inch high. Here he did rather well, for the most part, and recognized all the commoner letters (at least, capital letters) easily—as he had been able to do from the moment the bandages were removed. How was it that he had so much difficulty recognizing faces, or the cat, and so much difficulty with shapes generally, and with size and distance, and yet had little—or at least much less—difficulty recognizing letters? When I asked Virgil about it, he told me that he had learned the alphabet by touch at school, where they had used letter blocks, or cutout letters, for teaching the blind. I was much struck by this. Moreover, as Gregory relates of S.B., “much to our surprise, he could even tell the time by means of a large clock on the wall. We were so surprised at this that we did not at first believe that he could have been in any sense blind before the operation.” But in his blind days S.B. had used a large hunter watch with no glass, telling the time by touching the hands, and had apparently made an instant “cross-modal” transfer, to use Gregory’s term, from touch to vision.

But while Virgil could recognize individual letters easily, he could not string


them together—could not read, or even see words. I found this puzzling, for he said that they used not only Braille but English, in raised or inscribed letters, at school—and that he had learned to read fairly fluently. Indeed, he could still easily read the inscriptions on war memorials and tombstones by touch. But his eyes seemed to fix on particular letters, and to be incapable of the easy movement, the scanning, that is needed to read. This was also the case with the literate H.S.:

My first attempts at reading were painful. I could make out single letters, but it was impossible for me to make out whole words; I managed to do so only after weeks of exhausting attempts. In fact, it was impossible for me to remember all the letters together, after having read them one by one. Nor was it possible for me, during the first weeks, to count my own five fingers: I had the feeling that they were all there, but . . . it was not possible for me to pass from one to the other while counting.

Further problems became apparent as we spent the day with Virgil. He would pick up details incessantly—an angle, an edge, a color, a movement—but would not be able to synthesize them, to form a complex perception at a glance. This was one reason the cat, visually, was so puzzling: he would see a paw, the nose, the tail, an ear, but could not see all of them together, see the cat as a whole.

Amy had commented in her journal on how even the most “obvious” connections—visually and logically obvious—had to be learned. Thus, Amy told us, a few days after the operation “he said that trees didn’t look like anything on earth,” but in her entry for October 21st, a month after the operation, she noted, “Virgil finally put a tree together—he now knows that the trunk and leaves go together to form a complete unit.” And, on another occasion: “Skyscrapers strange, cannot understand how they stay up without collapsing.”

Many—or perhaps all—patients in Virgil’s situation had had similar difficulties. One such patient (described by Eduard Raehlmann, in 1891), though she had had a little vision preoperatively and had frequently handled dogs, “had no idea of how the head, legs, and ears were connected to the animal.” Of such difficulties, which may seem almost incomprehensible, or absurd, to the rest of us, Valvo remarks, “The real difficulty here is that simultaneous perception of objects is an unaccustomed way to those used to sequential perception through touch.” We,



"May I remind you that until quite recently it wasn't called the Lyle Lovett look. It was called the Eraserhead look."

with a full complement of senses, live in space and time, the blind live in a world of time alone. For the blind build their worlds from sequences of impressions (tactile, auditory, olfactory), and are not capable, as sighted people are, of a simultaneous visual perception, the making of an instantaneous visual scene. Indeed, if one can no longer see in space then the *idea* of space becomes incomprehensible—and this even for highly intelligent people blinded relatively late in life. This is powerfully conveyed by John Hull in his remarkable autobiography, "Touching the Rock," when he speaks of himself, of the blind, as "living in time" almost exclusively. With the blind, he writes,

this sense of being in a place is less pronounced. . . . Space is reduced to one's own body, and the position of the body is known not by what objects have been passed but by how long it has been in motion. Position is thus measured by time. . . . For the blind, people are not there unless they speak. . . . People are in motion, they are temporal, they come and they go. They come out of nothing; they disappear.

ALTHOUGH Virgil could recognize letters and numbers, and could write them, too, he mixed up some rather similar ones ("A" and "H," for example) and, on occasion, wrote some backward. (Hull describes how, after only five years of blindness in his forties, his own visual memories had become so uncertain that he was not sure which way around a "3" went, and had to trace it in the air with his fingers.) Still, Virgil's performance was an impressive one for a man who had not seen for forty-five years. But the world does not consist of letters and numbers. How would he do with objects and pictures? How would he do outside, in the real world?

His first impressions when the bandages were removed were especially of color, and it seemed to be color, which has no analogue in the world of touch, that excited and delighted him—this was very clear from the way he spoke, and from Amy's journal. (The recognition of colors and movement seems to be innate.) It was colors to which Virgil continually alluded, the chromatic unexpectedness of new sights. He had had Greek salad and spaghetti the night before, he told us, and the spaghetti startled him: "White round strings, like fishing line," he said. "I thought it'd be brown."

Seeing light and shape and movements, seeing colors above all, had been completely unexpected, and had had a

physical and emotional impact almost shocking, explosive. ("I felt the violence of these sensations," wrote Valvo's patient H.S., "like a blow on the head. The violence of the emotion . . . was akin to the very strong emotion I felt on seeing my wife for the first time, and when out in a car, I saw the huge monuments of Rome.")

We found that Virgil easily distinguished a great array of colors, and matched them without difficulty. But, confusingly, or confusedly, he sometimes gave colors the wrong names: yellow, for example, he called pink, but he knew that it was the same color as a banana. We wondered at first whether he could have a color agnosia or color anomia—defects of color association and color naming that are due to damage in specific areas of the brain. But these difficulties, it seemed to us, came from lack of learning—from the fact that early and long blindness had sometimes prevented his associating colors with their names or had caused him to forget some of the associations he had made. Such associations and the neural connections which underlay them, feeble in the first place, had become disestablished in his brain, not through any damage or disease but simply from disuse.

Although Virgil believed that he had visual memories, including color memories, from the remote past—on our drive from the airport he had spoken of growing up on the farm in Kentucky ("I see the creek running down the middle," "birds on the fences," "the big old white house")—I could not decide whether these were genuine memories, visual images in his mind, or mere verbal descriptions without images (like Helen Keller's).

How was he with shapes? Here matters were more complicated, because in the weeks since his surgery Virgil had been practicing shapes, correlating their look and their feel. No such practice had been required with colors. He had at first been unable to recognize any shapes visually—even shapes as simple as a square or a circle, which he recognized instantly by touch. To him, a touch square in no sense corresponded to a sight square. This was his answer to the Molyneux question. For this reason, Amy had bought, among other things, a child's wooden pegboard, with large, simple blocks—square, triangle, circle, and rect-

angle—to be fitted into corresponding holes, and had got Virgil to practice with it every day. Virgil found the task impossible at first, but quite easy now, after practicing for a month. He still tended to feel the holes and shapes before matching them, but when we forbade this he fitted them together quite fluently by sight alone.

Solid objects, it was evident, presented much more difficulty, because their appearance was so variable; and much of the past five weeks had been devoted to the exploration of objects, their unexpected vicissitudes of appearance as they were seen from near or far, or half concealed, or from different places and angles.

On the day he returned home after the bandages were removed, his house and its contents were unintelligible to him, and he had to be led up the garden path, led through the house, led into each room, and introduced to each chair. Within a week, with Amy's help, he had established a canonical line—a particular line up the path, through the sitting room to the kitchen, with further lines, as necessary, to the bathroom and the bedroom. It was only from this line, at first, that he could recognize anything—though this took a great deal of interpretation and inference; thus, he learned, for example, that "a whiteness to the right," to be seen as he came obliquely through the front door, was in fact the dining table in the next room, although at this point neither "table" nor "dining room" was a clear visual concept. If he deviated from the line, he would be totally disoriented. Then, carefully, with Amy's help, he started to use the line as a home base, making short sallies and excursions to either side of it, so that he could see the room, feel its walls and contents from different angles, and build up a sense of space, of solidity, of perspective.

As Virgil explored the rooms of his house, investigating, so to speak, the visual construction of the world, I was reminded of an infant moving his hand to and fro before his eyes, wagging his head, turning it this way and that, in his primal construction of the world. Most of us have no sense of the immensity of this construction, for we perform it seamlessly, unconsciously, thousands of times every day, at a glance. But this is not so



for a baby, it was not so for Virgil, and it is not so for, say, an artist who wants to experience his perceptions individually and anew. Cézanne wrote to his son, "The same subject seen from a different angle gives a subject for study of the highest interest and so varied that I think I could be occupied for months without changing my place, simply bending more to the right or left."

We achieve perceptual constancy—the correlation of all the different appearances, the transforms of objects—very early, in the first months of life. It constitutes a huge learning task, yet is achieved so swiftly and automatically that its enormous complexity is scarcely realized (though it is an achievement that even the largest supercomputers cannot begin to match). But for Virgil, with half a century of forgetting whatever visual engrams he had constructed, the learning, or relearning, of these transforms required hours of conscious and systematic exploration each day. This first month, then, saw a systematic exploration, by sight and touch, of all the smaller things in the house: fruit, vegetables, bottles, cans, cutlery, flowers, the knickknacks on the mantelpiece—turning them round and round, holding them close to him, then at arm's length, trying to synthesize their varying appearances into a sense of unitary objecthood.

Despite all the vexations that trying to see could entail, Virgil had stuck with this gamely, and he had learned steadily. He had little difficulty recognizing the fruit, the bottles, the cans in the kitchen, the different flowers in the living room, and other common objects in the house.

Unfamiliar objects were much more difficult. When I took a blood-pressure cuff from my medical bag, he was completely flummoxed and could make nothing of it, but he recognized it immediately when I allowed him to touch it. Moving objects presented a special problem, for their appearance changed constantly. Even his dog, he told me, looked so different at different times that he wondered if it was the same dog. He was utterly lost when it came to the rapid changes in others' physiognomies. Such difficulties are almost universal among the early blinded restored to sight. Gregory's patient S.B. could not recognize individual faces, or their expressions, a year after his eyes had been operated on, de-

spite perfectly normal elementary vision.

What about pictures? Here I had been given conflicting reports about Virgil. He was said to love television, to follow everything on it—and, indeed, a huge new TV stood in the living room, an emblem of Virgil's new life as a seeing person. We tried him first on still pictures, pictures in magazines, and with those he had no success at all. He could not see people, could not see objects—did not comprehend the idea of representation. It was similar with Cheselden's young patient:

We thought he soon knew what pictures represented . . . but we found afterwards we were mistaken; for about two months after he was couched, he discovered at once they represented solid bodies, when to that time he considered them only as party-coloured planes, or surfaces diversified with variety of paint; but even then he was no less surprised, expecting the pictures would feel like the things they represented. . . . and asked which was the lying sense, feeling or seeing?

Nor were things any better with moving pictures on a TV screen. Mindful of Virgil's passion for listening to baseball games, we found a channel with a game in progress. It seemed at first as if he were following it visually, because he could describe who was batting, what was going on. But as soon as we turned off the sound he was lost. It became evident that he himself perceived little beyond streaks of light and colors and motions, and that all the rest (what he *seemed* to see) was interpretation, performed swiftly, and perhaps unconsciously, in consonance with the sound. How it would be with a real game we were far from sure—it seemed possible to us that he might see and enjoy a good deal—but in the representation of reality, pictorial or televisual, he was at this point completely at sea.

Virgil had now had two hours of testing, and was beginning to get tired—both visually and cognitively tired, as he had tended to do since the operation—and when he got tired he could see less and less, and had more and more difficulty making sense of what he could see.

Indeed, we were getting restless ourselves, and wanted to get out after a morning of testing. We asked him, as a final task before going for a drive, if he felt up to some drawing. We suggested first that he draw a hammer. (A hammer was the first object S.B. drew.) Virgil agreed, and, rather shakily, began to draw. He tended to guide the pencil's

movement with his free hand. ("He only does that because he's tired now," said Amy.) Then he drew a car (very high and old-fashioned); a plane (with the tail missing: it would have been hard put to fly); and a house (flat and crude, like a three-year-old's drawing).

WHEN we finally got out, it was a brilliant October morning, and Virgil was blinded for a minute, until he put on a pair of dark-green sunglasses. Even ordinary daylight, he said, seemed far too bright for him, too glary; he felt that he saw best in quite subdued light. We asked him where he would like to go, and after thinking for a little he said, "The zoo." He had never been to a zoo, he said, and he was curious to know how the different animals looked. He had loved animals ever since his childhood days on the farm.

Very striking, as soon as we got to the zoo, was Virgil's sensitivity to motion. He was startled, first, by an odd strutting movement; it made him smile—he had never seen anything like it. "What is it?" he asked.

"An emu."

He wasn't quite sure what an emu was, so we asked him to describe it to us. He had difficulty, and could say only that it was about the same size as Amy—she and the emu were standing side by side at that point—but that its movements were quite different from hers. He wanted to touch it, to feel it all over. If he did that, he thought, he would then see it better. But touching, sadly, was not allowed.

His eye was caught next by a leaping motion nearby, and he immediately realized—or, rather, surmised—that it must be a kangaroo. His eye followed its motions closely, but he could not describe it, he said, unless he could feel it. We were wondering by now exactly what he could see—and what, indeed, he meant by "seeing."

In general, it seemed to us, if Virgil could identify an animal it would be either by its motion or by virtue of a single feature—thus, he might identify a kangaroo because it leaped, a giraffe by its height, or a zebra by its stripes—but he could not form any over-all impression of the animal. It was also necessary that the animal be sharply defined against a background; he could not identify the elephants, despite their trunks, because they were at a considerable distance and stood against a slate-colored background.

Finally, we went to the great-ape en-



closure; Virgil was curious to see the gorilla. He could not see it at all when it was half hidden among some trees, and when it finally came into the open he thought that, though it moved differently, it looked just like a large man. Fortunately, there was a life-size bronze statue of a gorilla in the enclosure, and we told Virgil, who had been longing to touch all the animals, that he could, if nothing else, at least examine the statue. Exploring it swiftly and minutely with his hands, he had an air of assurance that he had never shown when examining anything by sight. It came to me—perhaps it came to all of us at this moment—how skillful and self-sufficient he had been as a blind man, how naturally and easily he had experienced his world with his hands, and how much we were now, so to speak, pushing him against the grain: demanding that he renounce all that came easily to him, that he sense the world in a way incredibly difficult for him, and alien.

His face seemed to light up with comprehension as he felt the statue. "It's not like a man at all," he murmured. The statue examined, he opened his eyes, and turned around to the real gorilla standing before him in the enclosure. And now, in a way that would have been impossible before, he described the ape's posture, the way the knuckles touched the ground, the little bandy legs, the great canines, the huge ridge on the head, pointing to each feature as he did so. Gregory writes of a wonderful episode with his patient S.B., who had a long-standing interest in tools and machinery. Gregory took him to the Science Museum in London to see its grand collection:

The most interesting episode was his reaction to the fine Maudesley screw cutting lathe which is housed in a special glass case. . . . We led him to the glass case, which was closed, and asked him to tell us what was in it. He was quite unable to say anything about it, except that he thought the nearest part was a handle. . . . We then asked a museum attendant (as previously arranged) for the case to be opened, and S.B. was allowed to touch the lathe. The result was startling. . . . He ran his hands eagerly over the lathe, with his eyes tight shut. Then he stood back a little and opened his eyes and said: "Now that I've felt it I can see."

So it was with Virgil and the gorilla. This spectacular example of how touching could make seeing possible explained something else that had puzzled me. Since the operation, Virgil had begun to buy toy soldiers, toy cars, toy animals,

miniatures of famous buildings—an entire Lilliputian world—and to spend hours with them. It was not mere childishness or playfulness that had driven him to such pastimes. Through touching these at the same time he looked at them, he could forge a crucial correlation; he could prepare himself to see the real world by learning first to see this toy world. The disparity of scale did not matter, any more than it mattered to S.B., who was instantly able to tell the time on a large wall clock because he could correlate it with what he knew by touch from his pocket watch.

For lunch, we repaired to a local fish restaurant, and as we ate I stole glances, from time to time, at Virgil. He started eating, I observed, in the normal sighted fashion, accurately spearing segments of tomato in his salad. Then, as he continued, his aim grew worse: his fork started to miss its targets, and to hover, uncertainly, in the air. Finally, unable to "see," or make sense of, what was on his plate, he gave up the effort and started to use his hands, to eat as he used to, as a blind person eats. Amy had already told me about such relapses, and described them in her journal. There had been similar reversions, for example, with his shaving, where he would start with a mirror, shaving by sight, with tense concentration. Then the strokes of the razor would become slower, and he would start to peer uncertainly at his face in the mirror, or try to confirm what he half saw by touch. Finally, he would turn away from the mirror, or close his eyes, or turn the light off, and finish the job by feel.

That Virgil should have periods of acute visual fatigue following sustained visual effort or use was scarcely surprising; all of us have them if too much is demanded of our vision. Something happens to my own visual system if, for instance, I look at EEGs non-stop for three hours: I start missing things on the traces, and seeing dazzling afterimages of the squiggles wherever I look—the walls, the ceiling, all over the visual field—and at this point I need to stop and do something else, or, even better, close my eyes

for an hour. And Virgil's visual system, by comparison with the normal one, must have been at this stage labile in the extreme.

Less easy to understand, and alarming, perhaps ominous, were long periods of "blurriness"—impaired vision or gnosis—lasting hours, or even days, coming on spontaneously, without obvious reason. Bob Wasserman was very much puzzled by Virgil's and Amy's descriptions of these fluctuations; he had been practicing ophthalmology for some twenty-five years, and removed many cataracts, but he had never encountered fluctuations of this sort.

After lunch, we all went to Dr. Hamlin's office. Dr. Hamlin had taken detailed photographs of the retina right after surgery, and Bob, examining the eye now (with both direct and indirect ophthalmoscopy) and comparing it with the photographs, could see no evidence of any postoperative complications. (A special test—fluorescein angiography—had shown a small degree of cystoid macular edema, but this would not have caused the rapid fluctuations that were so striking.) Because there seemed to be no adequate local or ocular cause for these fluctuations, Bob wondered whether they could be a consequence of some underlying medical condition—we had been struck by how unwell Virgil looked as soon as we met him—or whether they could represent a *neural* reaction of the brain's visual system to conditions of sensory or cognitive overload. It is no effort for the normally sighted to construct shapes, boundaries, objects, and scenes from purely visual sensations; they have been making such visual constructs, a visual world, from the moment of birth, and have developed a vast, effortless cognitive apparatus for doing so. (Ordinarily, a half of the cerebral cortex is given over to visual processing.) But in Virgil these cognitive powers, undeveloped, were rudimentary; the visual-cognitive parts of his brain might easily have been overwhelmed.

Brain systems in all animals may respond to overwhelming stimulation, or stimulation past a critical point, with a sudden shutdown. Such reactions have nothing to do with the individual or his motives. They are purely local and physiological, and can occur even in isolated slices of cerebral cortex: they are a biological defense against neural overload.

Still, perceptual-cognitive processes,




while physiological, are also personal—it is not a world which one perceives or constructs but *one's own* world—and they lead to, are linked to, a perceptual self, with a will, an orientation, and a style of its own. This perceptual self may also collapse with the collapse of perceptual systems, and alter the orientation and the very identity of the individual. If this occurs, an individual not only becomes blind but ceases to behave as a visual being, yet offers no report of any change in inner state, is completely oblivious of his own visuality or lack of it. Such a condition, of total psychic blindness (known as Anton's syndrome), may occur if there is massive damage, as from a stroke, to the visual parts of the brain. But it also seemed to occur, on occasion, with Virgil. At such times, indeed, he might talk of "seeing" while in fact appearing blind and showing no visual behavior whatever. One had to wonder whether the whole basis of visual perception and identity in Virgil was as yet so feeble that under conditions of overload or exhaustion he might go in and out of not merely physical blindness but a total Anton-like psychic blindness.

A QUITE different sort of visual shut-down—a withdrawal—seems to be associated with situations of great emotional stress or conflict. And for Virgil this period was indeed as stressful a time as he had ever known: he had just had surgery, he had just been married; the even tenor of his blind, bachelor life had been shattered: he was under a tremendous pressure of expectation; and seeing itself was confusing, exhausting. These pressures had increased as his wedding day approached, especially with the convergence of his own family in town: his family had not only opposed the surgery in the first place but now insisted that he was in fact still blind. All this was documented by Amy in her journal:

October 9: Went to church to decorate for wedding. Virgil's vision quite blurry. Not able to distinguish much. It is as though sight has taken a nosedive. Virgil acting "blind" again. . . . Having me lead him around.

October 11: Virgil's family arrives today. His sight seems to have gone on vacation. . . . It is as though he has gone back to being blind! Family arrived. Couldn't believe he could see. Every time he said he could see something they would say, "Ah, you're just guessing." They treated him as though he was totally blind—leading him around, giving him anything he wanted. . . . I am very nervous, and Virgil's sight has dis-



"I can't cook, but I can pay."

appeared. . . . Want to be sure we are doing the right thing.

October 12: Wedding day. Virgil very calm . . . vision little clearer, but still blurry. . . . Could see me coming down aisle, but was very blurry. . . . Wedding beautiful. Party at Mom's. Virgil surrounded by family. They still cannot accept his sight, he could not see much. Said goodbye to his family tonight. Sight began clearing up right after they left.

Thus there seemed to be two distinct forms of "blind behavior" or "acting blind"—one a collapse of visual identity on a neurological basis, the other a massive withdrawal or regression on a strategic basis, in the face of overwhelming emotional stress.

Then again, given the extreme physiological instability of his vision, who was to know exactly what was going on? When a specific organic weakness exists, emotional stress can easily press toward a physical (or psychosomatic) form; thus, asthmatics get asthma under stress, parkinsonians become more parkinsonian, and someone like Virgil, with borderline vision, may get pushed over the border and become (temporarily) blind. It was, therefore, exceedingly difficult at times to distinguish between what was physiological and what was psychological in him—what was "motivated behavior" and what was physiological weakness.

Marius von Senden, reviewing every published case over a three-hundred-year period in his classic book "Space and Sight" (1932), concluded that every

newly sighted adult sooner or later comes to a "motivation crisis"—and that not every patient gets through it. He tells of one patient who felt so threatened by sight (which would have meant his leaving the Asylum for the Blind, and his fiancée there) that he threatened to tear his eyes out; he cites case after case of patients who "behave blind" or "refuse to see" after an operation, and of others who, fearful of what sight may entail, refuse operation (one such account, entitled "L'Aveugle Qui Refuse de Voir," was published as early as 1771). Both Gregory and Valvo dilate on the emotional dangers of forcing a new sense on a blind man—how, after an initial exhilaration, a devastating (and even lethal) depression could ensue.

Precisely such a depression descended on Gregory's patient: S.B.'s period in the hospital was full of excitement and perceptual progress. But the promise was not fulfilled. Six months after the operation, Gregory reports,

we formed a strong impression that his sight was to him almost entirely disappointing. It enabled him to do a little more . . . but it became clear that the opportunities it afforded him were less than he had imagined. . . . He still to a great extent lived the life of a blind man, sometimes not bothering to put on the light at night. . . . He did not get on well with his neighbours [now], who regarded him as "odd," and his workmates [previously so admiring] played tricks on him and teased him for being unable to read.

S.B.'s depression deepened, he became ill, and, two years after his opera-

THE DAY THE TIMES NEVER ONCE MENTIONED MICHAEL OVITZ



STEVENSON

tion, he died. He had been perfectly healthy, he had once enjoyed life; he was only fifty-four.

Valvo provides us with six exemplary tales, and a profound discussion, of the feelings and behavior of early-blinded people when they are confronted with the "gift" of sight, and with the necessity of renouncing one world, one identity, for another.

A major conflict in Virgil, as in all newly sighted people, was the uneasy relation of touch and sight—not knowing whether to look or feel. This was obvious in Virgil from the day of the operation, and was very evident the day we saw him, when he could hardly keep his hands off the pegboard, longed to touch all the animals, and gave up spearing his food. His vocabulary, his whole sensibility, his picture of the world, was couched in tactile—or, at least, nonvisual—terms. He was, or had been until his operation, a touch person through and through.

It has been well established that in congenitally deaf people (especially if they are native signers) some of the auditory parts of the brain are reallocated for visual use. It has also been well established that in blind people who read Braille the reading finger has an exceptionally large representation in the tactile parts of the cerebral cortex. And one would suspect that the tactile (and auditory) parts of the cortex are enlarged in the blind, and may even extend into what is normally visual cortex. What remains of the visual cortex, without visual stimulation, may be largely undeveloped. It seems likely that such a differentiation of cerebral development would follow the early loss of a sense and the compensatory enhancement of other senses.

If this was the case in Virgil, what might happen if visual function was suddenly made possible, demanded? One might certainly expect *some* visual learning, some development of new pathways in the visual parts of the brain. There had never been any documentation of the kindling of activity in the visual cortex of an adult, and we hoped to take special PET scans of Virgil's visual cortex to show this as he learned to see. But what would this learning, this activation, be like? Would it be like a baby first learning to see? (This was Amy's first thought.) But the newly sighted are not on the same starting line, neurologically speaking, as babies, whose cerebral cortex is "equipotential"—equally ready to adapt to any

form of perception. The cortex of an early-blinded adult such as Virgil has already become highly adapted to organizing perceptions in time and not in space.

An infant merely learns. This is a huge, never-ending task, but it is not one charged with irresolvable conflict. A newly sighted adult, by contrast, has to make a radical switch from a sequential to a visual spatial mode, and such a switch flies in the face of the experience of an entire lifetime. Gregory emphasizes this, pointing out how conflict and crisis are inevitable if "the perceptual habits and strategies of a lifetime" are to be changed. Such conflicts are built into the nature of the nervous system itself, for the early-blinded adult who has spent a lifetime adapting and specializing his brain must now ask his brain to reverse all this. (Moreover, the brain of an adult no longer has the plasticity of a child's brain—that is why learning new languages or new skills becomes more difficult with age. But in the case of a man previously blind, learning to see is not like learning another language; it is, as Diderot puts it, like learning language for the first time.)

In the newly sighted, learning to see demands a radical change in neurological functioning and, with it, a radical change in psychological functioning, in self, in identity. The change may be experienced in literally life-and-death terms. Valvo quotes a patient of his as saying, "One must die as a sighted person to be born again as a blind person," and the opposite is equally true: one must die as a blind person to be born again as a seeing person. And here, blindness is no more a negative condition, a privation, than seeing. It is a *different* condition, a different form of being, with its own sensibilities and coherence and feeling. It is indeed what John Hull calls "deep blindness . . . one of the orders of human being."

ON October 31st, the cataract in Virgil's left eye was removed, and revealed a retina, an acuity, similar to the right. This was a great disappointment, for there had been hope that it might be a far better eye—enough to make a crucial difference to his vision. His vision did improve slightly: he fixated better, and the searching eye movements were fewer, and he had a larger visual field.

With both eyes working, Virgil now went back to work, but found, increasingly, that there was another side to seeing, that much of it was confusing, and

some downright shocking. He had worked happily at the Y for thirty years, he said, and thought he *knew* all the bodies of his clients. Now he found himself startled by seeing bodies, and skins, that he had previously known only by touch; he was amazed at the range of skin colors he saw, and slightly disgusted by blemishes and "stains" in skins that to his hands had seemed perfectly smooth. (Gregory observes of S.B., "He also found some things he loved ugly (including his wife and himself!), and he was frequently upset by the blemishes and imperfections of the visible world.") Virgil found it a relief, when giving massages, to shut his eyes.

He continued to improve, visually, over the ensuing weeks, especially when he was free to set his own pace. He did his utmost to live the life of a sighted man, but he also became more conflicted at this time. He expressed fears, occasionally, that he would have to throw away his cane and walk outside, cross the streets, by vision alone; and, on one occasion, a fear that he might be "expected" to drive, and take up an entirely new, sighted job. This, then, was a time of great striving and real success—but success achieved, one felt, at a psychological cost, at a cost of deepening strain and splitting in himself.

There had been one outing, a week before Christmas, when he and Amy went to the ballet. Virgil enjoyed "The Nutcracker": he had always loved the music, and now, for the first time, he saw something as well. "I could see people jumping around the stage. Couldn't see what they were wearing, though," he said. He thought he would enjoy seeing a live baseball game, and looked forward to the start of the season in the spring.

Christmas was a particularly festive and important time—the first Christmas after his wedding, his first Christmas as a sighted man—and he returned, with Amy, to the family farm in Kentucky. He saw his mother for the first time in more than forty years—he had scarcely been able to see her, to see anything much, at the time of the wedding—and thought she looked "real pretty." He saw again the old farmhouse, the fences, the creek in the pasture, which he had also not seen since he was a child; he had never ceased to cherish them in his mind. Some of his seeing had been a great disappointment, but seeing home and family was not—it was a pure joy.

No less important was the change in the family's attitude toward him. "He seemed more alert," his sister said. "He would walk, move around the house, without touching the walls—he would just get up and go." She felt that there had been "a big difference" since he was first operated on, and his mother and the rest of the family felt the same.

I phoned them, the day before Christmas, and spoke to his mother, his sister, and others. They asked me to join them, and I wish I could have done so, for it seemed to be an affirmative time for them all. The family's initial opposition to Virgil's seeing (and perhaps to Amy, too, for having "pushed" it) and their disbelief that he *could* actually see had been something that he internalized, something that could literally annihilate his seeing. Now that the family was "converted," a major psychological block, one hoped, might dissolve. Christmas was the climax, but also the resolution, of an extraordinary year.

What would happen, I wondered, in the coming year? What might he hope for, at best? How much of a visual world, a visual life, might still await him? We were, frankly, quite unsure at this point. Grim and frightening though the histories of so many patients were, some, at least, overcame the worst of their difficulties and emerged into a relatively unconflicted new sight.

Valvo, normally cautious in expression, lets himself go a little in describing some of his patients' happier outcomes:

Once our patients acquire visual patterns, and can work with them autonomously, they seem to experience great joy in visual learning . . . a renaissance of personality. . . . They start thinking about wholly new areas of experience.

A renaissance of personality—this was just what Amy wanted for Virgil. It was difficult for us to imagine such a "renaissance" in him, for he seemed so phlegmatic, so set in his ways. Despite a range of problems—retinal, cortical, psychological, possibly medical—he had done remarkably well in a way, had shown a steady ability to increase his power to apprehend a visual world. There seemed no reason that, with his predominantly positive motivation, and the obvious enjoyment and advantage he could get from seeing, he should not progress further. He could never hope to have perfect vision, but he certainly

might hope for a life radically enlarged by seeing.

THE catastrophe, when it came, was very sudden. On February 8th, I had a phone call from Amy: Virgil had collapsed, had been taken, gray and stuporous, to the hospital. He had a lobar pneumonia, a massive consolidation of one lung, and was in the intensive-care unit, on oxygen and intravenous antibiotics.

The first antibiotics used did not work: he grew worse; he grew critical; and for some days he hovered between life and death. Then, after three weeks, the infection was finally mastered, and the lung started to reexpand. But Virgil himself remained gravely ill, for, though the pneumonia itself was clearing, it had tipped him into respiratory failure—a near-paralysis of the respiratory center in the brain, which made it unable to respond properly to levels of oxygen and carbon dioxide in the blood. The oxygen levels in his blood started to fall—fell to less than half of normal. And the level of carbon dioxide started to rise—rose to nearly three times normal. He needed oxygen constantly, but only a little could be given, lest his failing respiratory center be further depressed. With his brain deprived of oxygen and poisoned by carbon dioxide, Virgil's consciousness fluctuated and faded, and on bad days (when the oxygen in his blood was lowest and the carbon dioxide highest) he could see nothing: he was totally blind.

Much contributed to this continuing respiratory crisis: Virgil's lungs themselves were thickened and fibrotic; there was advanced bronchitis and emphysema; there was no movement of the diaphragm on one side, a consequence of his childhood polio; and, on top of all this, he was enormously obese—obese enough to cause a Pickwickian syndrome (named after the somnolent fat boy, Joe, in "The Pickwick Papers"). In Pickwickian syndrome, there is a grave depression of breathing, and failure to oxygenate the blood fully, associated with a depression of the respiratory center in the brain.

Virgil had probably been getting ill for some years; he had gradually been increasing in weight since 1985. But between his wedding and Christmas he had put on forty pounds—had shot up, in a few weeks, to two hundred and eighty pounds—partly from fluid retention



caused by heart failure, and partly from non-stop eating, a habit of his under stress.

So he now had to spend three weeks in the hospital, his blood oxygen still plummeting to dangerously low levels, despite his being given oxygen—and each time the level grew really low he became lethargic and totally blind. Amy would know the moment she opened his door what sort of day he was having—where the blood oxygen was—depending on whether he used his eyes, looked around, or fumbled and touched, acted blind. (We wondered, in retrospect, whether the strange fluctuations his vision had shown from almost the day of surgery might be explained, at least in part, by fluctuations in his blood oxygen, with consequent retinal or cerebral anoxia. Virgil could have been close to respiratory failure and anoxia even before his acute illness.)

There was another, intermediate state, which Amy found very puzzling; at such times, he would say that he saw nothing whatever, but would reach for objects, avoid obstacles, and *behave* as if seeing. Amy could make nothing of this singular state, in which he manifestly responded to objects, could locate them, was seeing, and yet denied any consciousness of it. This condition, called implicit sight, unconscious sight, or blindsight, occurs if the visual parts of the cerebral cortex are knocked out (as they might be by a lack of oxygen, for instance) but the visual centers in the subcortex remain intact. Visual signals are perceived and are responded to appropriately, but nothing of this perception reaches consciousness at all.

At last, Virgil was able to leave the hospital and return home, but to return a respiratory cripple. He was tethered to an oxygen cylinder, and could not even stir from his chair without it. It seemed unlikely at this stage that he would ever recover sufficiently to go out and work again, and the Y now felt that it had to terminate his job. A few months later, he was forced to leave the house where he had lived as an employee of the Y. This was the situation last summer. Virgil had lost not only his health but his job and his house as well.

By October, however, he was feeling better, and was able to go without oxygen for an hour or two at a time. It

had not been wholly clear to me, from speaking to Virgil and Amy, what had finally happened to his vision after all these months. Amy said that it had "almost gone" but that now she felt it was coming back as he got better. When I phoned the visual-rehabilitation center where Virgil had been evaluated, I was given a different story. Virgil, I was told, seemed to have lost all the sight restored the previous year, with only a few bits remaining. Kathy, his therapist, thought he saw colors but little else—and sometimes colors without objects: thus he might see a haze or halo of pink around a Pepto-Bismol bottle without clearly seeing the bottle itself. This color perception, she said, was the only seeing that was constant; for the rest he appeared almost blind, missed objects, groped, seemed visually lost. He was showing his old, blind random movements of the eyes. And yet sometimes, spontaneously, out of the blue, he would get sudden, startling moments of vision, in which he would see objects, quite small ones. But these percepts would then "vanish," as suddenly as they came, and he was usually unable to retrieve them. For all practical purposes, she said, Virgil was now blind.

I was shocked and puzzled when Kathy told me this. These were phenomena radically different from anything he had shown before: what was happening now with his eyes and his brain? From a distance, I could not sort out what was happening, especially since Amy, for her part, maintained that Virgil's vision was now improving. Indeed, she got furious when she heard anyone say that Virgil was blind, and she maintained that the visual-rehab center was actually "teaching him to be blind." So in February of 1993, a year after the onset of his devastating illness, we brought Virgil and Amy to New York, to see us again and to get some specialized physiological tests of retinal and brain function.

As soon as I met Virgil, at the arrival gate at LaGuardia Airport, I could see for myself that everything had gone quite terribly wrong. He was now almost fifty pounds heavier than when I had met him in Oklahoma. He was carrying a cylinder of oxygen strung over one shoulder. He groped, his eyes wandered, he looked totally blind. Amy guided him, her hand under his elbow, everywhere they went. And yet some-

times as we drove over the Fifty-ninth Street Bridge into the city he would pick up something—a light on the bridge—not guessing but seeing it quite accurately. But he could never hold it or retrieve it, and so remained visually lost.

When we came to test him in my office—first using large colored targets, then large movements and flashlights—he missed everything. He seemed totally blind—*blinder than he had been before his operations*, because then, at least, even through his cataracts he could detect light, its direction, and the shadow of a hand moving before him. Now he could detect nothing whatever, no longer seemed to have any light-sensitive receptors: it was as if his retinas had gone. Yet not totally gone—that was the odd thing. For once in a while he would see something accurately: once, he saw, described, grasped a banana; on two occasions, he was able to follow a randomly moving light bar with his hands on a computer screen; and sometimes he would reach for objects, or "guess" them correctly, even though he said he saw "nothing" at such times—the blindsight that had first been observed in the hospital.

We were dismayed at his near-uniform failure, and he was sinking into a demoralized, defeated state—it was time to stop testing and take a break for lunch. As we passed him a bowl of fruit, and he felt the fruit with swift, sensitive, skillful fingers, his face lighted up, and he regained his animation. He gave us, as he handled the fruit, remarkable tactile descriptions, speaking of the waxy, slick quality of the plum skin, the soft fuzz of peaches and smoothness of nectarines ("like a baby's cheeks"), and the rough, dimpled skin of oranges. He weighed the fruits in his hand, spoke of their weight and consistency, their pips and stones; and then, lifting them to his nose, their different smells. We included an exceedingly clever wax pear among the real fruit, with its realistic shape and coloring, it had deceived sighted people completely. Virgil was not taken in for a moment: he burst out laughing as soon as he touched it. "It's a candle," he said immediately, somewhat puzzled. "Shaped like a bell or a pear." While he may indeed have been, in von Senden's words, "an exile from spatial reality," he was deeply at home in the world of touch, in time.


But if his sense of touch was perfectly



preserved, there were now, it was evident, just sparks from his retinas—rare, momentary sparks, from retinas that now seemed to be ninety-nine per cent dead. Bob Wasserman, too, who had not seen Virgil since our visit to Oklahoma, was appalled at the degradation of vision, and wanted to reexamine the retinas. When he did so, they looked exactly as before—piebald, with areas of increased and decreased pigmentation. There was no evidence of any new disease. Yet the functioning of even the preserved areas of retina had fallen to almost zero. Electroretinograms, designed to record the retina's electrical activity when stimulated by light, were negative, and visual evoked potentials, designed to show activity in the visual parts of the brain, were absent—there was nothing, electrically, going on in either the retinas or the brain that could be recorded. This could not be attributed to the original disease, retinitis, which had long been inactive. Something else had emerged in the past year and had, in effect, extinguished his remaining retinal function.

We remembered how Virgil had constantly complained of glare, even on relatively dull, overcast days—how glare seemed to blind him sometimes, so that he needed the darkest glasses. Was it possible (as my colleagues Kevin Halligan and Gerald Edelman suggested) that with the removal of his cataracts—cataracts that had perhaps shielded his fragile retinas for decades—the ordinary light of day had proved lethal, burned his retinas? It is said that patients with other retinal problems, like macular degeneration, may be exceedingly intolerant of light—not merely ultraviolet but light of all wavelengths—and that light may hasten the degeneration of their retinas. Was this what had happened with Virgil? It was one possibility—the Halligan-Edelman hypothesis. Should we have foreseen it, and rationed Virgil's sight, or the ambient light, in some way?

Another possibility—a likelier one—related to Virgil's continuing hypoxia, the fact that he had not had properly oxygenated blood for a year. We had clear accounts of his vision waxing and waning in the hospital as his blood gases went up and down. Could the repeated, or continuing, oxygen-starving of his retinas (and perhaps also of the visual areas of his cortex) have been the factor



"He must be very secure in his masculinity."

that did them in? The extinction, in either case, seems to be irreversible.

THIS, then, is Virgil's story, the story of a "miraculous" restoration of sight to a blind man, a story basically similar to that of Cheselden's young patient in 1728, and of a handful of others over the past three centuries—but with a bizarre and ironic twist at the end. Gregory's patient, so well adapted to blindness before his operation, was first delighted with seeing, but soon encountered intolerable stresses and difficulties, found the "gift" transformed to a curse, became deeply depressed, and soon after died. Almost all the earlier patients, indeed, after their initial euphoria, were overwhelmed by the enormous difficulties of adapting to a new sense; though a very few, as Valvo stresses, have adapted and done well. Could Virgil have surmounted these difficulties and adapted to seeing where so many others had foundered on the way?

We shall never know, for the business of adaptation—and, indeed, of life as he knew it—was suddenly cut across by a granituous blow of fate: an illness that, at a single stroke, deprived him of job, house, health, and independence, leaving him a gravely sick man, unable to fend for himself. For Amy, who incited the

surgery in the first place, and who was so passionately invested in Virgil's seeing, it was a "miracle" that misfired, a calamity. Virgil, for his part, maintains philosophically, "These things happen." But he has been shattered by this blow, has given vent to outbursts of rage: rage at his helplessness and sickness, rage at the smashing of a promise and a dream; and, beneath this, most fundamental of all, a rage that had been smoldering in him almost from the beginning—rage at being thrust into a battle he could neither renounce nor win. At the beginning, there was certainly amazement, wonder, and sometimes joy. There was also, of course, great courage. It was an adventure, an excursion into a new world, the like of which is given to few. But then came the problems, the conflicts, of seeing but not seeing, not being able to make a visual world, and at the same time being forced to give up his native competence—a torment from which no escape seemed possible. But then, paradoxically, a release was given, in the form of a second and now final blindness—a blindness he received as a gift. Now, at last, Virgil is allowed to not see, allowed to escape from the glaring, confusing world of sight and space, and to return to his own true being, the touch world that has been his home for almost fifty years. ♦

Managing the Human Climate

Guidelines on Public Relations and Public Affairs
by Philip Lesly

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Averting Being a Victim of the "Victims Movements"

Issues are increasing and activism is booming again. Virtually all of the issues listed in my Overcoming Opposition in 1984 are still prevalent, while AIDS, the ozone layer, the "politically correct" doctrine, issuance of condoms and permissive teachings to children, elderly abuse and demands of gays and lesbians have joined the list.

The climate of our times is focusing on those who claim to be victims -- of everything except their own failings. Together they form a majority -- a formidable array of opposition to established organizations and institutions. That heightens further the need for sophisticated strategy to survive.

Ability to fend off such activism now calls for a "vaccine" against unsound assaults, just as polio required the Salk and Sabin vaccines.

Unfortunately, sound strategy is different from the training and leanings of most heads of organizations and institutions. It calls for outside orientation, insightful analysis, creative original thinking and willingness to move into controversial areas before being provoked.

Here are the elements:

1. Take the initiative. Prevent the position of opponents from becoming the basis on which decisions will be made. Funnel early the soundest and most potent information into the opinion-forming process, before the opponents' material has had time to become entrenched.
2. Get the subject onto the public agenda so the media and politicians must address it. Establish a basis for their taking a sound position when they do.

3. Don't attack opponents' position head-on. Don't debate. Use reasoned third-party facts -- augmented by an appeal to people's self-interest.
4. Appeal to the public's need to be well-informed on a crucial issue. Emphasize the importance of the subject to them and to society.
5. Use a "platform of fact" approach -- provide the foundation of sound, third-party information for consideration by all concerned -- not propaganda, arguments, exhortation or other self-centered approaches.
6. Establish the legitimacy of your position:
 - Show concern for the public first
 - Show concern about the consequences of the decisions
 - Base your case on information, not power
7. In ads and literature, use a headline that pulls the reader in and establishes his/her identity with it, but that is not provocative.
8. Get the audience involved and participants in the process. Provide a means for them to comment, argue or make contributions.
9. Demonstrate that this is an open, fair, responsible approach. Provide an opportunity for all to participate and be an unrestrained part of the opinion-forming process.

The Coming Demise of "PC"

Since all excesses create their own demise, the excesses of the "politically correct" thought police have begun an inevitable decline.

In Victorian times words like leg and breast were policed out of all media and polite conversation. Where are those taboos now? In the '60s it was illegal to use common Anglo-Saxon words in private conversations on the phone. Not only is Ma Bell no longer serving as thought police, its lines are carrying the heated language cable TV carries into countless homes. Now the "politically correct" posse is trying to make it a sin to use simple and accurate English in private conversations. (After all some people are stupid, not "intellectually challenged." Some are brutal, not "socially different." Some are crippled, not "otherwise abled.")

PCers believe that if you just won't mention an evil's name it will disappear.

In conflict between wishful thinking and reality, reality will always survive. Wishes that nothing bad existed are as ephemeral as castles in the sky.

Essential Inevitability of Conflict

One reason the PC police will fail is that they presume they can eliminate conflict. Don't let people think anything unfavorable of anyone, they say, and the world will become Eden again.

The error is that we would have no civilization without conflict. Progress is the result of someone opposing the old way of doing things, which inevitably riles those tied to old ways or old holdings. Nothing can advance without incentive, and incentive has to mean rivalry, trying to do better than other people. Moses conflicted with the sinners, Jesus' contribution conflicted with the established powers, Edison had to fight for acceptance of the light bulb, Pasteur had to struggle to establish the germ theory...

Competition, which is behind almost all improvements -- even among religions -- inevitably casts people into opposition with competitors.

Amity requires complacency and timidity. Amity is the enemy of change. Without change there can be no advance.

Unfortunately for the PC police, striving to be seen as better than others is the moving force in most people's lives, whether they want to be scientists, doctors, ballplayers or mothers.

Instead of trying to suppress people's urge to be better than others, ~~the PC police should be urging them on,~~ to really improve things.

The Chaos Cult and Calamity

The human being is an organism -- and by definition is organized. It depends on mutual accommodation of its parts, adjustment, cooperation and cohesion. So it's healthy when it exists in an orderly and organized milieu and suffers when its equilibrium is disrupted. Cancer is the result of cells overrun by disorder.

So it's significant that we are in an era of massive and intentional disorder -- an age of self-inflicted chaos.

• TV commercials consist of dozens of disordered images and sounds, none having distinct meaning,

none lasting more than a second, not conveying any meaning except jumble -- an assault on logic and coherence.

- Grungy clothes and patternless ties shout their wearers' rejection of the beauty and sensitivity created by orderly patterns.
- Art becomes more and more meaningless, intentionally rejecting orderly sequence of thought or emotion.
- Popular music continues to defy harmonious patterns.
- Many movies are series of violent and mindless scenes, adding up to little or no theme or experience the audience can empathize with.
- Major media devote themselves increasingly to attacking institutions and principles that have been built up over millennia to create and protect orderliness.

This inevitably is translated into disorder in society. It's no coincidence that family breakdown, crime, child abuse, random assaults, disorder at public events, riots, teenage alcoholism, drug abuse, rape and mental breakdowns have all increased far faster than before.

It's ironic that the same people, for example, who think up, produce, air and sponsor the most chaos-fostering TV commercials and shows have trouble with their kids' revolts and aberrant behavior. It used to be good advice that one did not foul one's own nest. But then birds have a survival instinct that seems absent among the creators of our present climate.

The trend toward chaos is so pronounced that there now are instruction books on how to live with it. The real need is how to live without it: If you want any control over your life and your loved ones', oppose decontrol and deconstruction wherever it pops up.

