IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE OF ARTHUR WILSON PAGE

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PREFACE

The business community today is increasingly aware of its public responsibilities. To help fulfill them, most companies of size and stature encourage both junior and senior executives to perform a share of the volunteer services needed to operate our community, state, regional and national governments and other necessary services.

It was not always so. Fortunately for our society, there have always been, however, some companies and some individuals who do more than their fair share to compensate for the laggards. The American Telephone and Telegraph Company is considered one such public spirited corporation. And Arthur Wilson Page, its vice president for public relations from 1927 to 1947, probably did more than any other to give the telephone companies their reputations for being "good citizens."

This is the story of the periods of government service performed by Arthur W. Page before, during and after his telephone company days. It spans nearly half a century, from the era of the muckrakers to the day when top level business executives such as Charles E. Wilson, Neil McElroy, Roger Blough, Robert McNamara, and many others, serve the government in extremely important positions.

There is much more to the Arthur W. Page story than government service: his corporate public relations activities; his career as a private consultant and public relations counselor; his long service for the Free Europe Committee; his "begging" for innumerable worthy educational and charitable causes. All of these are beyond the scope of this paper, but would provide interesting data for a biography of this remarkable man. I hope that the sons and daughter of Arthur W. Page will commission such a work to be done.

I am indebted to many wonderful people for their help in researching and preparing this manuscript--too many to include here. But special thanks are due Professor Scott M. Cutlip of the University of Wisconsin School of Journalism for obtaining the Arthur W. Page Papers for the Mass Communications Research Center, Wisconsin Historical Society, and for his wise counsel and guidance, and to my wife, Hy, for her assistance, encouragement and inspiration.

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CHAPTER I

ARTHUR WILSON PAGE--A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Late in his life Arthur Wilson Page estimated that he had spent more than one-third of his entire business working career in the service of o[illegible]rs--principally Federal, state or local governments and educational and charitable activities.

These extracurricular activities ranged from unofficial adviser to several United States ambassadors serving in foreign lands, to atomic public relations for the War Department. They included a lifelong dedication to the improvement of education for Negroes in the South, and the betterment of opportunities for small farmers in the Appalachian Mountains of North Carolina. Such diverse interests as the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Cold Spring Harbor Biological Association, a college for girls in Istanbul, and the philanthropic Carnegie Corporation claimed his time and attention.

Arthur Page served all of these and more during his full lifetime with characteristic enthusiasm, rare good judgment and devotion to their causes. For he would never lend his name to a cause unless he could contribute effectively to its success.

Yet, despite these burdens and many more, this

remarkable man found time to play a creditable game of golf, sail his own boat in amateur competition on Long Island Sound, hunt birds and small game in many parts of the country, and to fish the lakes and streams of the United States and Canada.

Arthur W. Page created three separate successful business careers among all of his public services. First, he was a writer and editor of World's Work Magazine and other periodicals of Doubleday, Page & Company from 1905 until 1927. Second, he became a vice president for public relations, and a director, of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company from 1927 until 1947. Then, at the age of 64, he established a new career as a business consultant and public relations counselor.

With so many important interests evident, a public service biography of Arthur Wilson Page would probably require three volumes, as it did for his illustrious father, Walter Hines Page. The focus of this thesis will be narrower. It will attempt to illuminate only the major periods of government service performed over the span of his lifetime.

These services will be limited to the following:

a. Psychological Warfare duties during World War I.

b. Duty as an Advisor at the London Naval Conference, and other miscellaneous official and unofficial service prior to World War II.

c. Service as Chairman of the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation during World War II.

d. Duty as Special Assistant to the Secretary of War during World War II and as Public Relations Advisor to the War Department after the war.

e. Chairmanship of the Working Group of the Cabinet Committee for the study of nation-wide transportation matters during the Eisenhower administration.

f. Service as Project Director for a study of the present and future rapid transit needs of the New York-New Jersey area for the bi-state Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission and the Port of New York Authority.

In order to put these duties into proper context, this brief biography of Arthur W. Page will include only details necessary to a proper understanding of his periods of government service.

The Formative Years

Arthur Wilson Page was born in Aberdeen, North Carolina, on September 10, 1883, only seven years after the Yankee army of occupation left the area.[1] Son of the distinguished journalist, editor, educator and diplomat, Walter Hines Page, Arthur inherited two vital forces that were to shape his life: a deep-rooted belief that more

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[1] The Reminiscences of Arthur W. Page (New York: Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, 1959), p. 1 (hereafter referred to as Reminiscences).

and better education for all mankind was essential to his proper fulfillment, and a proud understanding of the part that man's consuming desire for freedom had played in the growth and development of this country.

Of his father's interest in education, Arthur W. Page said:

> There was always in his mind a desperate desire for the best education possible, because that comes to people who have lived in a place where not many people have it. If education is easy to get and everybody has it, there's not such a premium on it. But if you've lived in a place where there was good talent that wasn't educated, you have a desperate feeling about getting the best education and the most you could. Now, that was much more strong in his (mind) than it was in mine.[2]

Arthur spent his summers, as well as his earliest years, with his grandfather who had established a sawmill and a short logging railroad in Aberdeen, North Carolina. Winters he spent with his parents in the North, where his father was successively editor of the New York World, Forum Magazine, and the Atlantic Monthly.

It is apparent that these early years, and particularly the summers in the South, made a deep impression on young Arthur. The effects can be noted throughout his life. For example:

a. His interest in conservation of our natural resources probably began here in the "sand country" of

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[2] Ibid., p. 6.

North Carolina. The family owned large holdings of land, for land was extremely cheap in that area. They logged the pine forests and then moved on to another section. There was no thought of reforestation; it would have been uneconomic at that time. The "timber is a crop" concept developed years later was unheard of in those days.

One of Arthur Page's early works for the magazine World's Work was his piece, "The Statesmanship of Forestry," that appeared in the January, 1908, issue. The article dealt mainly with the government's methods of perpetuating our forests and what forest products meant to the future of the United States.[3]

Interestingly enough, the famous golf and winter resort of Pinehurst, North Carolina, is built on 5,000 acres of this logged-off land purchased from the family of Walter Hines Page in 1895 by James W. Tufts. In addition to natural reforestation of the area, extensive landscaping was undertaken, and now this is one of the most famous beauty spots and resorts of the country.[4]

b. Education for all was a consuming interest for Arthur Page throughout his life. It started in Aberdeen where the lack of educational opportunities was so obvious

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[3]Arthur W. Page, "The Statesmanship of Forestry," World's Work, Vol. 15 (January, 1908), pp. 9739-9757.

[4]Webster's Geographical Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Company, 1955), p. 885.

and was holding back the natural talents and latent abilities of whites and Negroes. In an apology for the South at the time of the famous Scopes trial, Arthur Page pointed out that the grip of the churches over people tightened and became more dogmatic primarily because a "generation grew up in poverty and ignorance" after the Civil War. Each year now sees, he said, the "entrenched lines of ignorance being pushed back--this is another battle which when won will liberate more millions from the Fundamentalist hold on Southerners."[5]

For twenty years Arthur Page served in many capacities, including Chairman of the Board, of the Southern Education Foundation, and particularly the Anna T. Jeanes Fund of that Foundation. This fund was used for the exclusive betterment of education for Negroes in the southern states. This little known but highly effective program provided funds to assist Negro teachers to become better qualified in their profession so that they could, in turn, give a better education to their pupils.

c. Still another effect of Arthur Page's early North Carolina boyhood was his lifetime interest and support of the Farmers Federation of Asheville, North Carolina. This amazing organization, the brainchild of

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[5]Arthur W. Page, "The Meaning of the Dayton Trial," The Spectator, Vol. 135 (July 25, 1925), pp. 134-135.

retired minister James G. McClure, was dedicated to improving the economic lot of the small Southern Appalachian mountain farmer. It is a fascinating story in itself and worthy of comprehensive study.

Arthur W. Page attended the public schools at Cambridge, Massachusetts, and then entered the Lawrenceville School in New Jersey, a preparatory school for Princeton University. He graduated in 1901. He retained an interest in Lawrenceville School for many years, and occasionally spoke at its Commencements.

By this time Walter Hines Page was editing the distinguished Atlantic Monthly magazine and was a good friend of Charles W. Eliot, the progressive president of Harvard University. Following his determination that his sons would have the best education obtainable, Page arranged for his son Arthur to enter Harvard.

Arthur W. Page obtained the beginnings of a liberal education at Harvard, and further developed an insatiable appetite for American history. He wrote for the college magazine, The Advocate, and edited it for a time. During his summer vacations he had worked for his father on miscellaneous assignments for the magazine, World's Work, of which his father had become editor. This publication was founded by the firm of Doubleday, Page and Company at the turn of the century and became extremely important to the business, intellectual and social development of Arthur W. Page.

Beginnings at World's Work Magazine

Upon graduation from Harvard in 1905, Arthur Page went to work immediately for his father on World's Work, subordinating his own desires to become an architect to his father's wishes. From copy reading, proof reading and various other assignments he quickly graduated to writing jobs. His first article appeared in the January, 1906, issue of World's Work and was titled "The Cotton Growers."[6] This feature was a broad overview of cotton farming and harvesting methods throughout the South's cotton belt.

Some of the other articles he wrote during these years clearly indicated Page's interest in education, business and government. As early as September, 1910, Page questioned, "Are the Colleges Doing the Job?"[7] and expressed the conviction that the colleges are public service corporations, and the public--which supports them in one way or another--has a right to the best service that can be had.

Another series on the conservation of our natural resources, and development of our electric power and waterway capabilities, indicated his interest in this

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[6]Arthur W. Page, "The Cotton Growers," World's Work, Vol. 11 (January, 1906), pp. 7049-7059.

[7]Arthur W. Page, "Are the Colleges Doing the Job?" World's Work, Vol. 20 (September, 1910), pp. 13431-13439.

field. His article on "How the Wright Brothers Discovered Flight" showed remarkable reporting skills;[8] and his story of "Communication by Wire and Wireless"[9] was perhaps partly responsible for his later interest in the telephone business.

A complete listing of Page's World's Work and other magazine articles is contained in Appendix A. It was this investigation, reporting and writing experience that helped give Arthur W. Page insights into the broad spectrum of American life which shaped and tempered his entire life. It was this training that sharpened his sensitivity to conditions and situations in business, education, government and personal lives that allowed him to offer workable, sound solutions to a myriad of problems --and to seem to do it almost intuitively!

Arthur Goodfriend, USIA executive and author of The Twisted Image and other books, and long time friend of Page, retains "the image of a man whose kindness and compassion were harnessed to excellence of mind and firmness of character. Whenever we [the U. S. Government during World War II] were in trouble, we turned to him and

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[8] Arthur W. Page, "How the Wright Brothers Discovered Flight," World's Work, Vol. 20 (August, 1910), pp. 13303-13318.

[9] Arthur W. Page, "Communication by Wire and Wireless," World's Work, Vol. 13 (January, 1907), pp. 8408-8422.

were never disappointed."[10]

It was characteristic of these World's Work articles that they aimed to encourage some specific action by the reader. Walter Hines Page himself had a great capacity to write--"and he loved it as an art, but he wrote to get people to act. He'd have a purpose in his writing all the time."[11] He wrote so convincingly, for example, that O'Henry once said: "Page could decline a contribution to a cause with such skill that the recipient could take it to the bank and borrow money on it."[12]

Arthur Page learned his lessons well. He learned how to write to make people act, and he learned how to work harder than he thought possible. Of his work at World's Work he said:

> In practice you were supposed to do about as much writing and looking up of things in a month as you did in six months at college. That was the first time I really learned how to work. That was a sudden and violent change and it was accomplished without anything except just expectation. If this was what you were supposed to do, that's what you'd try to do. Well, you found out you could work a whole lot faster and better than you ever had before.[13]

This training was to pay big dividends to Arthur

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[10]Letter from Arthur Goodfriend, July 29, 1964.

[11]Reminiscences, p. 19.

[12]Literary Digest, Vol. 46 (April 12, 1913), p. 817.

[13]Reminiscences, p. 19.

Page, and to the clients and governments he served, later in life.

Walter Hines Page and Woodrow Wilson, fellow educators and scholars, had much in common and were good friends. Page was one of the men who encouraged Wilson to run for the presidency in 1912 and later loaned Wilson the services of a competent staff writer, Frank Parker Stockbridge, as a publicity man.

After his election, Wilson asked Walter Hines Page to serve as ambassador to the Court of St. James. Since Page was not a rich man, it was necessary for Wilson to obtain a private subsidy for Page to help maintain the prestige and special duties of the post. He obtained this, in the amount of $25,000 per year, from Cleveland Dodge.[14]

Arthur W. Page succeeded his father as editor of World's Work, starting with the June, 1913, issue. This new position restricted the young man's activities so that he was no longer able to travel across the country researching stories and articles for the publication, but instead assigned these jobs to the magazine's other writers and concentrated on editorials and the duties of an editor. However, in 1916 during the famous Battle of the Somme, Arthur Page traveled to the Western Front as a war

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[14]Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1931), IV, pp. 32-34.

correspondent.

The lot of the war correspondent in those days, however, was not so glamorous and lacked the freedom of World War II. Page was disappointed that "all was scheduled and controlled, no galloping around seeing things."[15] However, he was able to gather enough information for a World's Work article on trench warfare, "Why the Allies Expect to Win," which appeared in the February, 1917, issue. It also served as background for Page's book, Our 110 Days Fighting.

Aide to the Ambassador

It also appeared at this time that the U. S. Department of State had no plan or program to keep its overseas representatives informed of what was going on, politically and economically, in the United States. For Walter Hines Page, who had for years been in the thick of the news and political fronts, this was intolerable. To fill this void, he asked Arthur to keep him abreast of developments. For the entire period of his father's diplomatic career, Arthur Page wrote weekly 15 to 20 page letters telling what was happening in business, government, politics, and what the state of mind of the U. S. people was about the war.

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[15] Reminiscences, p. 39.

Arthur Page had really started something. This task took an inordinate amount of time and investigative trouble--but it insured that he, too, was well and fully informed on the temper of the time. Furthermore, he was to find that many other U. S. representatives overseas, including Hugh Gibson, Henry L. Stimson, Walter Gifford, and Winthrop Aldrich and others, would also depend on him for this same type of information. Foreign service posts of these diplomats covered the globe from Canada to the Philippines and Brazil, Mexico, and often to England. The varied content of these letters will be indicated later in this paper; unfortunately, few of them have been retained in the available Page papers.

Walter Hines Page was outspoken in his sympathy for the British cause, despite the thin veil of neutrality his government was following. He believed, long before the American government or the people were convinced, that this war was truly our war and that we could not long shirk the responsibility of active support of the Allied cause. It is apparent that he communicated this feeling to Arthur, and that the son carried these convictions into the similar circumstances preceding our entrance into World War II.

The burden of diplomatic representation of a neutral country with a traditional friendly country at war, and subsequently the pressures of office of the two

powers now allied in the Great War, were too much for the health of Walter Hines Page. In the summer of 1918, Arthur W. Page went to London to see his father and attempt to convince him to resign for reasons of health and return to the United States.

The doctors recommended that Walter Hines Page spend a week in Scotland resting before the ocean voyage home. And since younger son, Ralph Page, was enroute to the United States from his unit in France, it was decided that he would accompany his father. Arthur had been approached by members of the United States Army and asked to serve in the new-born propaganda pamphlet service. With a promised rank of Captain, Arthur Page served in France in the G-2-D Section of American Expeditionary Forces until near the Armistice. This period will be more fully covered in Chapter II as the first period of active government service performed by Arthur W. Page.

Walter Hines Page died soon after his return to the country he had represented diplomatically since mid-1913. Arthur W. Page then became a vice president of Doubleday, Page and Company, and full-time editor of World's Work.

Circulation of World's Work, as well as most other magazines then in existence, had grown tremendously during and immediately after World War I. In the changing 1920's, however, F. N. Doubleday, senior partner of Doubleday, Page and Company, sensed the possibility of a large

circulation for a magazine devoted almost entirely to pictures. He proposed to turn World's Work into such a magazine.

Arthur Page agreed that there was a potential market for such a publication, but objected to such a transition for World's Work, which was primarily a serious journal of world progress in business, agriculture, government and the arts. Page felt that this would be a disservice to the serious readers of the magazine, and that a separate one, in the picture format, should be started if Doubleday wanted to capitalize on pictures.

A New Beginning

In 1927, Walter Gifford, who had been elected president of the American Telephone & Telegraph Company earlier that year, discussed a book about the Bell System with Arthur Page. Page advised him that such a book would not pay and would have to be commissioned by the company. Page also told Gifford that, in his opinion, the public relations value of such a book would be questionable.

During the discussion, Mr. Gifford commented on the editorials Page had been writing in World's Work about the responsibilities of business toward its customers and its publics. He said that since Page was adept at telling business how it should act responsibly, he should try putting these edicts into practice--as a member of the

AT&T management team.[16] Page told Gifford that if he was serious about the offer, and was not hiring him as a publicity man, but would consider the good performance thesis as AT&T general policy, then he, Page, was interested. They made a deal on the spot.*

Thus Arthur Wilson Page, who had started at Doubleday, Page and Company in 1905 at $1,200 per year and resigned in 1927 as a vice president at $35,000 per year, joined the American Telephone & Telegraph Company as a vice president for public relations at the same salary, $35,000 per year. This is one of the few instances of AT&T's selecting a senior officer from outside the organization.

After Arthur Page left Doubleday, Page and Company, F. N. and his son, Nelson Doubleday, converted the World's Work into a picture magazine. It lasted scarcely a year and a half. Doubleday also sold the successful American Home magazine, and The Country Life died.[17]

In answer to a request from a graduate student asking about the demise of World's Work, in 1957 Arthur Page said:

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[16] Ibid., p. 70.

*Some discrepancy here. Arthur W. Page may not have had the AT&T job before he left Doubleday, Page and Company. The only one who could confirm this, Walter Gifford, is not well enough to be questioned clearly.

[17] Ibid.

> The death of the World's Work was the result of a divergence of views by its publishers. It didn't die of natural causes. But that does not mean that it would be alive and successful now if it did not change to meet the changing conditions which you are studying.[18]

Neighbors Arthur W. Page and Henry L. Stimson had become firm friends. Page's country place, called County Line, at Huntington, Long Island, was near the Stimsons' Highhold. Stimson had been serving his government ably as Secretary of War in the Taft administration, 1911-1913; he had been consulted by the State Department in the Tacna-Arica Controversy between Chile and Peru; he became an extraordinary envoy to Nicaragua in 1927, and Governor General of the Philippines in 1928.

During this venture in the Far East, Stimson was particularly perturbed by the lack of information he received from the United States. He, as Walter Hines Page had in England, chafed under this lack of two-way communication and soon came to depend on Arthur W. Page for comprehensive summaries of business, political and international news of importance. Page wrote lengthy letters to Stimson on a regular basis and often cabled him the American press reactions to important speeches, policies and actions taken by Stimson in the performance of his duties.

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[18]Letter to Walter D. Anderson, September 13, 1957, in Box 53 of Arthur W. Page Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison.

It was quite natural that when Stimson was recalled from the Philippines to become Secretary of State in the Hoover administration, he should seek the continued assistance of Arthur W. Page.

According to the New York Times, Arthur W. Page's name was brought forward prominently by "informed circles" as a probable successor to Nelson T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State, following the latter's appointment as Minister to China. "He is said to be a close friend of Secretary Stimson, and is understood to be a Democrat who voted for Hoover last November."[19]

In his Reminiscences, Arthur Page remembers it this way:

> He /Henry L. Stimson/ asked me when he first went down /to Washington/ as Secretary of State if I'd go down as Assistant Secretary, but I couldn't see any way of making a living from there on, which I had to do, by being Assistant Secretary of State, so I didn't do that.[20]

In 1930, however, when Stimson asked Page to accompany him to the London Naval Conference as an adviser, he accepted. According to Page, the term adviser "just meant 'helper.' He had to have an adviser, because that's the only legal title available. He had a naval adviser and a civilian adviser."[21]

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[19] New York Times, November 15, 1929, 27:1.

[20] Reminiscences, p. 56.

[21] Ibid.

Arthur Page was the civilian adviser and spent three months with the delegation which finally produced a treaty limiting the naval tonnage of the major powers. This tour of duty will be covered a little more fully in Chapter III.

During the period of the Great Depression, Arthur W. Page was preoccupied with the great problems of business in turbulent times, and maintaining for American Telephone and Telegraph Company its status and good will with the communities it served. But he continued to serve and support the many charitable and worthy organizations in which he believed so sincerely.

War Clouds Gather

Page also kept a watchful eye on the international scene. Remembering his experiences in World War I, he often expressed, in his letters to friends, the thesis that Great Britain had maintained the peace of the world for many years by its benevolent domination of the seas. He believed that the United States should also be exercising its influence toward the maintenance of peace in the world since it would probably emerge from the Depression as the world's strongest power.

In a letter to his mother dated June 16, 1938, Arthur W. Page expressed some of the strongly-felt sentiments that were to contribute to his future government service:

> During some ten years since the war, as you know, there has grown up a school of thought that did not believe anything worth fighting for. Moreover, they did not believe that you got it /sic/ if you did fight for it. Consequently, they believe in neutrality and no responsibility and by working on the nationalistic feelings then current they persuaded most of the people in this country that if we took any responsibility we might help some other nation and that aiding another nation was akin to treason to the United States, even if the same act is beneficial to the United States.
>
> This pusilanoumous, yellow, narrow conception--unfortunately participated in for a while by the British at the same time--finally produced Japan in Manchuria then in China, Mussolini in Ethiopia, Hitler in Austria and lack of control of the war in Spain. This malicious policy of peace has produced two wars without titles (Spain and Ethiopia) and a fair risk of world entanglement.
>
> It is only fair to say that taking responsibility would not have completely insured the risk of war either. But now we are beginning to wake up. A country may be neutral, but no man can nor can the feelings of a nation be neutral and it is very interesting to see the editorial in the Times, which I enclose.[22]

There was no question as to where Page's sympathies lay. He favored less and less neutrality and more and more assistance to Great Britain and France. With his trained sense of the public temper, he could also tell that slowly but surely the United States must be drawn into the conflict--for self-preservation if for no other reason.

In May of 1940, in answer to a friend, he wrote:

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[22]Letter to Mrs. Walter H. Page, Chocorua, N. H., June 16, 1938, referring to editorial in New York Times, June 15, 1938; Box 5, Arthur W. Page Papers.

"Dear Charlie, I can't write about the war. It is too fast for me--I can't figure out what minute is the next. But it does seem to me we had better get ourselves ready quick. Sincerely yours, Arthur W. Page."[23]

It did not take Arthur Page long, after Pearl Harbor, to embark on a government public service career that was to continue almost until his death. In February, 1942, the Secretaries of War (Henry L. Stimson) and of the Navy (Frank Knox) organized the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation. In May, 1942, Page accepted the Chairmanship of the Subcommittee on Radio, and on August 6, 1942, he accepted the Chairmanship of the entire committee. This was a job he was to hold until the committee was disbanded after the war. Chapter IV will cover this service in detail.

Toward the close of the war Page also became an adviser to Secretary Stimson for public relations. One of his first acts in this capacity was to write the press release announcing the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. This also will be covered more fully in a later chapter.

For his war-time service Arthur W. Page was awarded the Medal of Merit by a grateful government. The Citation is included in Chapter V.

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[23]Letter to Mr. Charles Cason, Jackson, Miss., May 21, 1940, Box 6, Arthur W. Page Papers.

During those busy war years Page also found time to maintain a high level of public relations for the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, and this must have been a monumental task during those shortage years. He found time to accept an appointment as a Trustee of the American Historical Association, Library of Congress Annex, in Washington, D. C.

Perhaps indicative of his look-ahead approach is a letter Page wrote to Dean William F. Russell, Teachers College, of Columbia University on December 23, 1942. Dean Russell was investigating ways of speeding up and automating the education processes during war time and had asked for Page's comments. Page wrote:

> Whether it travels by horse and buggy, railroad, or airplane, whether it wears homespun or clothes from the Lady /sic/ Garment Workers Union, whether it uses the lipstick of the Pharaohs or that provided by Yardley, human nature does not change much. It's hard to understand because while overall it doesn't change much in detail it is never the same. Yet it is the one important thing to know about. That is education.
>
> There will always be people that can be hired to hitch up horses or fly airplanes, but those who can handle men will be harder to find.
>
> Don't let's let education go to the technique of tending machines. Let's keep it focused on the great inspirational side of knowing about people.[24]

But all things could not continue as before. In June, 1943, Arthur W. Page resigned from the Board of

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[24]Letter to Dean William F. Russell, New York, December 23, 1942, Box 9, Arthur W. Page Papers.

Trustees of the Community Service Society of New York. The letter of appreciation and regret from the welfare organization cited him for 22 years of distinguished service to the organization as follows:

> In 1921 Page was elected to the Central Council of The Charity Organization Society (C.O.S.). He served as vice president of the Council for three years; a member of the Executive Committee for 16 years; as a member of the Committee on the School of Social Work since 1930; chairman of the Membership Committee for five years; and as a member of the Committee on the Bureau of Advice and Information for six years. In 1939 Arthur W. Page became a charter member of the Board of Trustees of the Community Service Society upon its merger with the Charity Organization Society. Also in the merged organization Page was first chairman for three years of the Institute of Welfare Research; served on the Advisory Committee on Public Interest; and was a member of the Health Committee.[25]

The more he saw and dealt with the problems of war, the more Arthur W. Page was concerned with the peace that would follow. He wrote many memoranda on his ideas of the peace-keeping force that would be needed and sent them to men of influence. On August 21, 1944, he sent such a memorandum to John Foster Dulles with a letter that said, in part:

> The most important piece of organization we have /to do/ is not the organization of the world, but the organization of this government and people so that foreign affairs reach the forks of the creek and the sidewalks of New York. If it is done well I'd be pretty sanguine of peace in the world.

Camouflaging the responsibility of the power of

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[25]Letter from Community Service Society of New York, June 11, 1943, Box 9, Arthur W. Page Papers.

> this nation to keep the peace by dissipating it through an international organization into the hands of people with neither power nor responsibility may tend to make us popular with the weaker brethren until the world blows up again and then we shall have to accept the responsibility of our power and use it with far more ruthlessness than we should ever have to do in peace time.[26]

It is noted that this letter to Dulles was written immediately before the Dumbarton Oaks Conferences, September-October, 1944, in which Dulles was a participant. Dulles was later to become United States Delegate to the United Nations. Page also expressed his sentiments after the San Francisco founding conference April-June, 1945. In a letter to Major H. Nugent Read in November, 1945, Page declared:

> But I have committed myself as skeptical of the United Nations or any organization now that tends to distribute world responsibility among other nations when many of them have not the capacity to accept any responsibility. I have felt and still do that it is most important to have the United States accept a large degree of direct responsibility for what goes on in the world without dependence on any other nation. Until we are ready to do this I don't think our cooperation will be really effective.
>
> I, then, am a heretic. I believe in isolated internationalism. . . .[27]

Feeling as he did about the United Nations, it was characteristic of Arthur W. Page to pitch in and help the

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[26]Letter to John Foster Dulles, New York, August 21, 1944, Box 11, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[27]Letter to Major H. Nugent Read, November 23, 1945, Box 12, Arthur W. Page Papers.

organization when asked. He was named, with his consent, as one of a Committee of Consultants in the New York City area to examine and recommend locations for the permanent home. An area in Boston and one on Long Island were the most likely, prior to the donation of the downtown New York property. Page examined all sites suggested, and submitted his report to the United Nations Organization in its temporary home in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel.

He had recommended the Long Island site because of its temperate climate, winter and summer; closeness to railroads, airlines and parkways; adaptability for radio transmission and reception; the availability of an airfield construction site nearby; and adequate recreation facilities.[28]

A letter of appreciation from Trygve Lie, Secretary General of the United Nations, closed this episode.[29]

Another extracurricular activity fell from Page's crowded schedule in January, 1945, when he reluctantly resigned from the board of the Southern Education Foundation. This organization, dedicated to providing better teachers for Negro education in the south, had prospered under Page's guidance and close watch on the investments

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[28]Memorandum to Huntington Gilchrist, United Nations, Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York, January 4, 1946, Box 13, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[29]Letter from Trygve Lie, United Nations, February 28, 1946, Box 13, Arthur W. Page Papers.

and expenditures of the funds. Now he felt it was time for others to take over and carry on the good work. In turning down another invitation to solicit funds for another worthy cause, Page expressed what he must have felt about continued "begging" for the Southern Education Foundation. He wrote: "In the words of the Army, that is abso-God-Damn-lutely all the begging any man should lend himself to if he expects to have any friends or acquaintances left."[30]

Another Beginning

Also in early 1946 Arthur Page decided to leave the Telephone Company ahead of the mandatory retirement date and start a third career as a business consultant and public relations counselor. This was to be a business with a difference--it was not selling a full service, departmentized public relations operating service--it was selling simply Arthur W. Page. The office was to open in January, 1947, and the American Telephone and Telegraph Company was to be his first client at $25,000 per year. Page offered this same arrangement to Winthrop W. Aldrich, head of the Chase Bank, on whose board of directors he was serving, and was quickly accepted.[31]

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[30]Letter to Major General Irving J. Phillipson, June 17, 1946, Box 13, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[31]Letter to Winthrop W. Aldrich, April 18, 1946, Box 13, Arthur W. Page Papers.

It is ironic that when Arthur W. Page opened his new office and applied for telephone service, the New York Telephone Company offered to make an exception and install the telephone out of priority order. Page would not hear of it but insisted that he be treated exactly as any other new business. For some months Business Consultant Arthur W. Page communicated only through a drop on the Chase National Bank switchboard.[32]

Meanwhile, Page was still a special assistant to the Secretary of War for public relations and, as will be indicated in later chapters, was still shuttling back and forth between New York and Washington.

April of 1946 was an eventful month. It offered Page another opportunity for government service as a member of the Board of Directors of the Panama Railroad Company. This wholly-United States-owned company operated the railroad across the Isthmus of Panama, a steamship line between New York and the Canal Zone, docks and harbor terminals on the Isthmus, coaling plants, commissary stores, dry and cold storage plants for supplies, the telephone system of the Canal Zone and other miscellaneous facilities. The Secretary of War, now Robert P. Patterson, was the responsible official and Arthur W. Page

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[32]Interview with sons of Arthur W. Page at Huntington, Long Island, September 8, 1964.

accepted the position.[33]

Ike and Arthur

Throughout the 1940's Page continued to serve the War Department and the Army in a consulting capacity. He became good friends with General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and later became one of his most staunch supporters for the presidency. He recommended a complete reorganization of the information operations of the War Department and said:

> I think they /the Army/ would have had one of the best /public relations/ systems that any service ever had, except by this time unification came up. By the time they unified the thing, you then had mixed it all up again.[34]

Dining often with General Eisenhower in the Chief of Staff's dining room, Page learned that Ike knew more about United States history than most industrialists; that he had a good perception of the economics of United States business; and that he was one of the best writers of the Army--the most facile and clearest--with wide knowledge and a very quick mind.[35]

> And the reason that the Second World War was done so extraordinarily well was that the Army had had a twenty-year period of teaching everybody in it exactly how they were going to do this, and watching them, and

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[33] Letter to Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, April 15, 1946, Box 13, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[34] *Reminiscences*, p. 61.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

marking them, [illegible] and over again.[36]

This leads rather naturally to the relationship between General Eisenhower and Arthur Page and Columbia University and the Presidency of the United States. The events provide an interesting insight into how Page thought, and how he was sometimes able to quietly influence some very important decisions.

As early as July, 1945, before World War II was even over, there is evidence that Page was considering Eisenhower for a top level education position. Much impressed by the Army's efficient methods of teaching millions of men complicated jobs in short time, Page wrote:

> General Eisenhower does not want to be Chief of Staff of the Army. He wants to be free of the restraints of Army Service to say what he pleases. He would like to be the President of a university.
>
> The first question that such an ambition on his part raises is--what does he know about education? There is an answer to that--perhaps not a good one--but something of an answer.
>
> In general, the Army has had to do a tremendous amount of teaching at all levels, but beyond that, an officer of Eisenhower's experience in the U. S. Army has been to school more than men in any other profession in the United States. The Army, not having soldiers to practice with, trained its commanders in the service and the staff schools and in the War College. That process went on, on and off, in his case from soon after he left West Point until he joined Marshall's staff.

The information about the General's ideas is

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[36] Ibid.

confidential but I thought that there might be just an off chance that it would interest you. General Lee did fairly well after the Civil War.[37]

Early in 1946 Page discussed with General Eisenhower the possibility of meeting with a dozen or so important industrialists who might help him to hold the Army together. The meeting was arranged and was held in New York in April, 1946, with 25 prominent bankers, lawyers and industrialists in attendance. The questions lasted until after midnight--and the next day some of them said they were in favor of Ike for President of the U. S.[38]

Page reports that Mr. Thomas Parkinson, head of Equitable Life Insurance Company, later suggested that Ike would be a good president for Columbia University after leaving the Army Chief of Staff job. But Ike could not commit himself at this time. Then, according to Page, Mr. Thomas J. Watson of International Business Machines brought up the idea again.[39]

General Eisenhower recalls in a recent interview that Thomas Watson, Thomas Parkinson and George Warren were members of a committee formed to select a new president for Columbia University. Arthur W. Page was not one of the committee, but was, according to Eisenhower, one of

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[37]Letter to Albert Milbank, New York, July 26, 1945, Box 12, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[38]Reminiscences, p. 65.

[39]Ibid.

the men who had talked with him about his availability for the position.[40]

Arthur Page was an influential trustee of Teachers College of Columbia, a long-time friend of Dean William Russell of that college, and had been close to Nicholas Murray Butler during much of his long tenure as Columbia president. The tone of the exchange of correspondence between Page and General Eisenhower at the time of the announcement also seems significant:

> Dear Ike:
>
> I am happy that you are coming to New York in a distinguished position. It offers a chance for public service in keeping with your past and a position of opportunity for the future. It is a great good fortune for Columbia and I think a happy solution for a difficulty--which few men experience but which you have--of reaching the top of the mountain with great reserves of energy and ability left unused.
>
> With regards,
>
> Sincerely yours,
>
> Arthur W. Page[41]

> Dear Arthur:
>
> Many thanks for your gracious letter. I truly appreciate your generous remarks and hope to have the

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[40]Interview with General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Gettysburg, September 2, 1964.

[41]Letter to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, June 25, 1947, Box 15, Arthur W. Page Papers.

pleasure of thanking you personally before too long.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Ike Eisenhower[42]

Bell System Public Relations

Before we get too far away from December 31, 1946, when Page resigned from American Telephone and Telegraph Company, some of his philosophy of dealing with the public should be included here because it gives further insights into the workings of his mind and his deep-felt beliefs.

Arthur Page wrote a book in 1940-41 which is still used by the various operating telephone companies as a reference book. It is called simply The Bell Telephone System, and it contains much of the wisdom that had made the Bell System renowned for its public relationships. Some examples will follow.

On the importance of communicating with employees Page had these words:

> It takes time and money and the patient effort of supervisors to inform employees of the reasons behind routines and about the fundamental policies of the company, and about anything else which they are likely to be asked by the public. Yet without adequate knowledge to answer, they cannot make the public appear reasonable and it is more difficult for them to be polite and helpful. To have such knowledge spread down through the ranks of an organization means that

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[42]Letter from General Eisenhower, June 30, 1947, Box 15, Arthur W. Page Papers.

> from the foreman up to the top management, all supervisors must look upon the process as one vital to the success of the business. Being reasonable and polite to the public must be done by the company as a whole. It is not a gesture--it is a way of life.[43]

On this same subject of the necessity of spreading information throughout the organization, Page said:

> This process of spreading information through the System, from management to the employees and from the employees to management--this effort to use the brains and capacities of everyone in the business in an orderly way, takes a vast deal of time and energy. It is infinitely harder than just giving or taking orders. Giving or taking responsibility always is.[44]

Time and again in his book, Page refers to knowledge of the military and the military method of accomplishing difficult objectives. He has this to say about how the military form of organization can be applied to the Bell System:

> Throughout history the military profession has probably been under more pressure to create effective organization of large numbers than any other. Frederick of Prussia was distinguished for precise training and was the model of his time. Steuben made good soldiers in far less time than it took Frederick and left them more initiative. Napoleon with his marshal's baton in every knapsack emphasized initiative. He also had in Berthier the beginnings of a modern staff. The Germans have developed the staff function in recent years to high degree. The staff is perhaps the greatest contribution to the art of management in the last half-century.
>
> In an ordinary infantry division roughly three-fourths of the men are privates, one-fifth

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[43] Arthur W. Page, The Bell Telephone System (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1941), p. 29.

[44] Ibid., p. 31.

non-commissioned officers and one-twentieth officers. That division also has service and supervision from corps and army staffs and the general headquarters staff. These organizations make the plans for the division by which it gets to the right place at the right time, with proper equipment, ammunition, food and everything else it needs, so that its maximum power may be used without waste or confusion.

The management of the Bell System works in the same manner. Instead of infantry, artillery, tanks or air forces, the telephone army has plant, traffic and commercial forces--business office representatives to take orders for service, accounting forces who prepare bills, operators who work the switchboards and construction crews, installers, repairmen who build and maintain the plant. All of these have supervisors of varying grades just as the army has corporals, sergeants, lieutenants, captains, majors, colonels and generals.[45]

In the military forces, routine operations are habitually reduced to S.O.P.'s--Standing Operating Procedures. Page makes several good points on this score in his Bell System book too:

Pretty much everything is settled by conference. Practically everything of any importance affects two, three, four or five departments and several /telephone operating/ companies or maybe all of them. When any matter comes up it is the staff job to think of who will be affected and how, and act accordingly.[46]

As much as people complain about them and as much acclaim as the public gives to people who slash red tape, the fact is that routine and red tape, if you want to use unpopular words, are essential to organized effort. But like most things they have to be used with judgment and discretion. . . . Initiative is also essential to successful organized effort, but it too has to be used with discretion. The bull in the china shop was full of initiative. Initiative tends

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[45] Ibid., p. 82.

[46] Ibid., p. 89.

to forget experience, and the routines and red tape tend to dampen initiative.[47]

This thesis should not leave Arthur Page's teachings on the value of two-way employee communications without this further example. In mid-1947 Page spent a week with the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company, Tacoma, Washington, on a consultant basis. In July, 1948, the company sent him a copy of a booklet published for company employees titled You and Your Company. Page wrote to Mr. J. P. Weyerhaeuser as follows:

> The pamphlet "You and Your Company" came in this morning and reminded me of the interesting and pleasant week I spent with you last year. The pamphlet is quite impressive and I am sure it will have a good effect especially if it is not left to do its work alone. By that I mean that if the top executives go over it with their subordinates and they in turn with those under them until finally the foreman discusses it with his gang, interesting and useful questions and reactions may travel back up the line.
>
> A great part of the workers in this country don't really grasp what they read without the added strengthening of the message by personal discussion. After that the document takes on a lasting meaning. Anyway, if the foremen know that they are going to have to explain the pamphlet, they will have done a good job on it for themselves.[48]

Perhaps the last important and time-consuming job of an extracurricular type that Page took on in the 1940's was the presidency of the Harvard Club of New York, which

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[47] Ibid., p. 91.

[48] Letter to Mr. J. P. Weyerhaeuser, Jr., Tacoma, Washington, July 7, 1948, Box 18, Arthur W. Page Papers.

he assumed early in 1949. As in everything he did, Page devoted a great deal of time, thought and energy to the task of insuring that the club maintained its reputation for quality, dignity and progress. Some of his courteous replies to irate members who complained about the rooms being too dark, or too light, or the food or service, are classics of restraint and consideration. From the volume of correspondence, this job was tedious, time-consuming and usually thankless.

Also, in the late 1940's Page played a small but interesting part in the approval of the Post Office Department for a memorial postage stamp. Mr. Evelyn Harris, son of Joel Chandler Harris, had been working for some time to win approval of a centennial stamp in 1948. His father, writer of the famous Uncle Remus stories for children, was born in 1848 and died in 1908. Although there is no formal correspondence in the files, there is indication from Evelyn Harris to Arthur W. Page that his extra "push" helped the cause. The commemorative stamp was issued in 1948.

The Marshall Plan

On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall spoke at Harvard University advocating a program of assisting European countries to recover. The "Marshall Plan," as it became known, started slowly through the

legislative mill, and it soon became apparent to its backers that a more concerted public effort would be required.

Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War after Henry L. Stimson's resignation at the end of World War II, and war-time assistant to Stimson, enlisted Arthur W. Page's help in returning Stimson to service. Between them they convinced Stimson to accept the job as National Chairman of the Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery.

Patterson was Chairman of the Executive Committee of this group. Other members were Arthur W. Page, Hugh Moore, Dean Acheson, Winthrop W. Aldrich, Frank Altschul, James B. Carey, David Dubinsky, Allen W. Dulles, Herbert H. Lehman, Frederick McKee, Philip D. Reed, Herbert Bayard Swope, Clark M. Eichelberger, William Emerson, Herbert Feis, Alger Hiss, Mrs. Wendell L. Willkie and Executive Director John H. Ferguson.

In his first pronouncement as National Chairman, Stimson said:

> The reconstruction of Western Europe is a task from which Americans can decide to stand apart only if they wish to desert every principle by which they live. And as a decision of policy, it would be the most tragic mistake in our history. We must take part in this work; we must take our full part; we must be sure we do enough.[49]

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[49]Memorandum of National Chairman Henry L. Stimson, Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery, Box 69, Arthur W. Page Papers.

President Harry S. Truman, giving his support to the Committee, said: "The last two decades have taught us the bitter lesson that no economy, not even one so strong as our own, can remain healthy and prosperous in a world of poverty and want."[50]

On March 3, 1948, Page wrote to Stimson as follows:

> The Stimson Committee has been going some time now. I think it has done a useful job in arousing and informing public opinion in favor of the Marshall Plan. It is hard to set any exact value on its accomplishments but I am sure it has been very worthwhile and most acceptable to those in the battle for the plan in Washington. . . .[51]

Later that same month the bill passed Congress and was signed by the President. The phenomenal success of the program is now history.

The Early 1950's

The first two years of the decade of the 50's was relatively quiet, from an official government service standpoint, for Arthur W. Page. But for the entire decade, and a little before, Page was deeply involved in a quasi-official organization--the National Committee for Free Europe.

Ambassador Joseph C. Grew had the idea after World War II. His aim was to help the refugees and political

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[50] Ibid.

[51] Letter to Henry L. Stimson, March 3, 1948, Box 70, Arthur W. Page Papers.

exiles from the six Iron Curtain countries of Eastern Europe, so that they could furnish democratic leadership when the countries regained their freedom. After World War I such people were the core of the governments of the freed nations.[52]

So Ambassador Grew sparked the formation of a committee and Arthur W. Page was one of a distinguished list of sponsors. Also included were General Dwight D. Eisenhower; Allen W. Dulles; James B. Carey of the CIO; William Green of the AFL; H. F. Armstrong, editor; Adolph A. Berle, Jr.; Francis Biddle; Robert W. Bliss; Lieutenant General Hugh Drum; Mark Etheridge; Charles R. Hook, president of American Rolling Mills Company; Arthur Bliss Lane, former Ambassador to Poland; Henry R. Luce; Charles Spofford, lawyer; Charles P. Taft; Matthew Woll of AFL; James A. Farley; and Spyros Skouras and Darryl Zanuck of the motion picture industry.[53]

From that day until his death in 1960, Page spent a prodigious amount of time, money and energy on the National Committee for Free Europe, and its operating and fund raising agencies.

The operating arms of the Committee are Radio Free

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[52]Memorandum to Advertising Council, undated, Box 44, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[53]New York Times, June 2, 1949, p. 29.

Europe and Free Europe Press. The fund-raising appendage is the Crusade for Freedom.

Page started off running--in 1950, with General Lucius D. Clay as Chairman of the Crusade for Freedom, he served on the Crusade Committee and as Chairman of the Public Relations Committee of the National Committee for Free Europe.

In 1951 Arthur W. Page also served as a member of the Committee for Free Asia, Incorporated, and served a dual purpose of keeping Allen W. Dulles, chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, informed of how the committee operated. Page's good friend, San Francisco attorney A. Crawford Greene, was a member of the Executive Committee of the Committee for Free Asia, and it appears that Arthur W. Page had a hand in getting him interested in the work.

In June of 1953 Page became Chairman of the Executive Committee of the National Committee for Free Europe. Perhaps his most challenging duty was to find a public-spirited influential citizen to take on the Chairmanship of the Crusade for Freedom each year. The list of chairmen is impressive: General Lucius D. Clay; President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower; Henry Ford II; Eugene Holman, president of Standard Oil of New Jersey; Gwilym A. Price of Westinghouse; and finally, W. B. Murphy, president of Campbell Soup Company and a graduate of the University of

Wisconsin.

Indicative of the fact that obtaining such men was not always easy is a Page tribute to Earl Newsom, New York public relations counselor, for helping to "land" Murphy:

> What a man is Newsom! He stands upon the burning deck when all the rest have fled; thinks up three candidates where no one else had any, and delivers the first of the three.
>
> There would be no Crusade without Newsom and he is never without my gratitude and admiration.[54]

Page's public relations know-how shows up in other ways, too. When he had convinced Eugene Holman in 1956 to accept the Chairmanship of the Crusade for Freedom, he then got President Eisenhower to write a personal letter of thanks to Holman for accepting the job, another from Secretary of Commerce Weeks, and then arranged to have Vice President Nixon kick off the Crusade with a dinner. Page also drafted a speech for Holman to deliver at the kick-off dinner.

In 1955 the name of the National Committee was changed to simply the Free Europe Committee, Inc. When Whitney H. Shepardson, long-time president of the committee, finally resigned because of overwork, Page hired General Willis D. Crittenberger, who had been heading the Greater New York Fund, for the presidency and this established a fine working relationship.

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[54]Letter to Earl Newsom, October 29, 1959, Box 81, Arthur W. Page Papers.

In November of 1956 Page became President of Crusade for Freedom, Inc., the fund-raising arm of the Free Europe Committee.

As part of his duties for the National Committee for Free Europe, Page made several trips to Europe to inspect facilities and view progress. Although never a vindictive man, Page apparently found one public servant in Lisbon during a trip in 1954 who was not cooperating in the Radio Free Europe program to the extent considered necessary. Upon his return, Page wrote to his friend, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, on June 21, 1954, that the American Ambassador to Portugal was incompetent and should not be there. Page suggested that the ambassador be moved because he was retarding the American aims in Europe. On June 24, Dulles replied as follows:

Dear Arthur:

> Thank you for your kind words about me in your recent letter. I anticipate an improvement in the near future in the post you mentioned, and appreciate your candor.
>
> Sincerely yours,
>
> (s) Foster
> (t) John Foster Dulles[55]

It is significant that a new ambassador to Portugal, a career diplomat of experience and stature, assumed his

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[55]Letter from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, June 24, 1954, Box 35, Arthur W. Page Papers.

duties on January 24, 1955.

Perhaps the most disheartening part of Page's service for the Free Europe Committee and its associated agencies came in a six-month period in the winter of 1957-1958 when Fulton Lewis, Jr., in his radio talks and syndicated newspaper columns attacked the entire Free Europe Committee, the Crusade for Freedom, and most especially Radio Free Europe. Lewis went so far as to claim that Radio Free Europe was manned by Marxists, and that the Free Europe Committee was a group of misguided souls who were being bilked by the boon dogglers, the junketeers, and the wastrels.

The public relations talents of Arthur W. Page were much in evidence in this fight. In the first place, his counsel was to wait and see--that Fulton Lewis, Jr., reached a very limited audience and that free-swinging retaliation would actually do more harm than good by widening the arena of the conflict and goading Mr. Lewis to even more irresponsible charges.

Instead, the Free Europe Committee simply provided Mr. Lewis with facts about the operations of the organization and offered to counsel with him at any time. In the matter of employee and volunteer worker morale, more specific actions were taken, and included the following memorandum written by Arthur W. Page for distribution to all Crusade workers:

> Mr. Fulton Lewis has volunteered his criticisms of the policy of the Free Europe Committee which consist of some specific statements and a great deal of opinion. Those specific statements which were in error have been pointed out. No comment has been made on his opinions. He has a right to them.
>
> Mr. Buckley now proposes that he set up a committee to examine Lewis's comments and then investigate Free Europe Committee and expects Free Europe Committee to be guided by his committee's recommendations. This is to say, that his committee is to take over the policy making of Free Europe Committee.
>
> This is the function of the Board and Officers of Free Europe Committee which will continue to carry out its duties.
>
> If Mr. Lewis, Mr. Buckley and his committee wish to do propaganda into the satellites, there is no reason why they should not go through the considerable efforts of organizing their own agency to do so and work at it to see if they can gain an audience and influence in those countries. They can be in complete control of their enterprise.[56]

The whole thing appeared to be a personal vendetta carried on by Fulton Lewis, Jr., against person or persons unknown. At any rate, the public relations techniques used by Arthur W. Page were most effective, and the Crusade for Freedom probably didn't so much as pause.

Arthur Page's philosophy about the Free Europe Committee is pretty well summed up in a letter he wrote to Mr. Harold V. Smith, president of the New York USO Defense Fund:

Dear Mr. Smith:

I worked on and for the USO most of its life. I am

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[56] Memorandum to Crusade for Freedom workers, March 26, 1958, Box 64, Arthur W. Page Papers.

a firm believer in its usefulness.

However, for the last three years I have been somewhat over my head in the Free Europe Committee and the Crusade for Freedom--this being the most active available warfare against the Soviets.

Not having anymore a large organization to draw on for help in such matters, one major enterprise of this kind is about all I can manage.

I am spread so thin now that I hardly cast a shadow on a sunny day, so if you will forgive me, I shall not pretend to do anything more.[57]

More Early 1950's

Page was often called on to help defend big business--or felt compelled to do so because of his firm beliefs on the subject and his prior association with the American Telephone and Telegraph Company. He connected the two very closely with individual freedoms and enterprise. Several examples will illustrate this point and give some insights into how this man thought:

a. In 1951 the N. W. Ayer Company, which was the agency handling the Bell System advertising account, was publishing a series of advertisements defending bigness in business. Page sent this memorandum for Mr. George Cecil of that agency for any use he cared to make of it in the campaign:

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[57]Letter to Harold V. Smith, New York, USC Defense Fund, January 23, 1956, Box 44, Arthur W. Page Papers.

DO BIG PROFITS COST YOU MORE?

Big profits are made by well run concerns.
Well run concerns make things cheap.
Big profits and cheap prices generally go together.
Low profits and poor production usually go together.
Do you buy your vegetables from the worst run farm in the community?
Do you select your automobile from the least successful motor manufacturer?
Do you deposit in the poorest bank in town?
It isn't always so but a company with good profits usually means good value to the purchaser and good wages to its workers.
There are no profits in Russia.[58]

b. There is a notation in the Page Papers of the Third West Point Student Conference on United States Affairs to be held in 1951. The event is an annual affair sponsored by the United States Military Academy and by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. This conference brings together approximately 125 seniors and outstanding juniors from colleges around the country for a four-day study of United States foreign policy and affairs. Arthur Page served on the board of the Carnegie Corporation, which approved the funds for this annual event. It is held at West Point.[59]

c. In another memorandum, dated April 30, 1952, Arthur W. Page relates how freedom in education began in Germany. An American educator, probably Dean William Russell of Teachers College, was asked by the American

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[58]Memorandum to George Cecil, N. W. Ayer & Co., 1951, Box 63, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[59]Letter from the United States Military Academy, November 15, 1951, Box 27, Arthur W. Page Papers.

Occupation of Germany Forces to devise a method for making the German education system democratic.[60]

The teachers were those who had taught through the Hitler regime. There was no other source of trained teachers. The books were the same. There were no other textbooks. There were three school systems in the city--technical schools, lower schools and upper schools. Each had a superintendent. All three reported to and took orders from Berlin.

The American's suggestion was simple. Leave everything as it was except cut off communication from Berlin. Put the three superintendents under a locally elected school board. When the school board is controlled by local people, they will practice responsibility, and after a little while the schools will teach it, and then they will change the textbooks because local responsibility is a sign of free citizens and contrary to autocratic or despotic rule.

d. In October, 1954, although out of chronology here, is an example of Page's defense of big business and business executives, which is of interest. In a letter to Adolph A. Berle, Jr., commenting on the latter's book, The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution, Page made these

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[60]Memorandum on Education, April 30, 1952, Box 63, Arthur W. Page Papers.

comments among others:

> From my experience I would think that a good deal of time that top executives have spent together, has been devoted more to creating these standards than to finding ways to violate the Sherman Law.
>
> My own experience in this particular may interest you. I was asked to leave the editorship of a magazine and become a vice-president of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company to see if I could translate into action the practices I advocated in my editorials by which a big business could satisfactorily serve a democracy.
>
> After a while I became a director of AT&T not because I did these things well but because the Company was desperately in earnest in this matter. Later I became a director of Kennicott, Prudential, Westinghouse, Continental Oil and the Chase National Bank for the same reason.
>
> During the last twenty years the professional managers and the directors of publicly owned companies have become infinitely more conscious of the trusteeship responsibilities to their stockholders and for clearer conceptions of the necessary obligations of big business to the consumer, the worker and the country in general. . . .[61]

e. For the final example we must reach forward into 1958, but the point seems to fit here out of its chronological order. In a letter to W. D. Herring, Chairman of the North Carolina State Board of Education, Mr. Page says:

> I am glad you sent me a copy of your talk on education for it is full of horse sense and that is a necessary antidote for some of the curious notions that circulate from time to time.
>
> We have been plagued for 150 years with Thomas

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[61] Letter to Adolph A. Berle, Jr., October 13, 1954, Box 37, Arthur W. Page Papers.

Jefferson's editing of George Mason's bill of rights. For Mason's words "all men are born equally free" Jefferson substituted "All men are born free and equal. . . ."

As long as we have a considerable proportion of our population Negroes the situation will continue, for the Negro is the only immigrant to this country who did not come voluntarily to better himself and he is the only one who had accomplished little for himself in the country of his origin. So it is normal enough that educating him into competence is a long process. But however long it takes no one has suggested any better way of increasing his competence than by education. . . .[62]

Page took on another extracurricular duty in the early 1950's when he was elected an Overseer of Harvard University in 1951 and served until 1957. He took this duty most seriously and seldom missed a meeting. He participated fully and actively in all the business of the school, including a monumental fund raising drive.

Indicative of his dedication to the duties of an Overseer is this letter to Mrs. Kermit Roosevelt in June, 1955:

Dear Belle:

I appreciate your asking me to lunch to meet General Romulo, for I have a particular interest in what happened at Bandung.

But I am sorry to say that I cannot attend. On that day I shall be attending Harvard Commencement as an Overseer. On this occasion, their top hats and frock coats give them a similar rank and significance as the red coats and halberds give the beef eaters at

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[62]Letter to W. D. Herring, December 19, 1958, Box 58, Arthur W. Page Papers.

Buckingham Palace on state occasions.

With regrets,

Sincerely yours,

Arthur W. Page[63]

The 1952 Election

It is apparent from perusal of the Page Papers that Arthur W. Page did a great deal toward the nomination and election of Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952. Page took no outright part in the Republican Convention or in the later campaign, but he worked tirelessly within his own sphere of influence.

Page compiled all the speeches of Eisenhower he could find--war-time talks, post-war talks as Chief of Staff, speeches at Columbia University and while Supreme Commander in Europe. Page applied these thoughts to the issues of the day and came up with some thoughtful answers as to where Ike stood on the important foreign, domestic and economic problems of the times. Then he communicated these thoughts to his friends and acquaintances.

There was also an apparent mutual respect and friendship between Eisenhower and Page that had grown since the close associations of World War II. As early as 1946 Arthur Page talked with Ike about the presidency of

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[63]Letter to Mrs. Kermit Roosevelt, June 6, 1955, Box 42, Arthur W. Page Papers.

the United States. Page noted at that time that Eisenhower considered duty to his country above all else, but that he would not run for the presidency "on the blood and struggle of the Army."[64]

It is certain that Arthur W. Page was one of the "doers" who convinced Eisenhower to make himself available for the presidency. In April, 1952, he wrote to General Eisenhower at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe as follows:

Dear Ike:

> Will Russell [Dean of Teachers College, Columbia University] brought me your pleasant message. I am glad that you still look upon me as a friend of yours in spite of the fact that I have been exerting my amateur efforts to get you into the most difficult fix a man can get into in this country.
>
> I try to convince myself that my actions flow only from the highest motives but in my honest moments I have to confess that my mental comfort will be greatly enhanced when you get there and the outlook for my boys will be improved, so maybe my motives are not a hundred percent altruistic.
>
> As ever,
>
> Arthur W. Page[65]

The Mid-1950's

The years 1953, 1954 and 1955 were characterized by several small government service jobs, and one large one--

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[64] Reminiscences, p. 65.

[65] Letter to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, April 21, 1952, Box 28, Arthur W. Page Papers.

the study that Arthur Page prepared for the Cabinet Committee on Transport Policy and Organization. This latter project will be covered more fully in Chapter VI.

In July of 1953 Page was asked to serve as a consultant to the National Security Council on a matter pertaining to continental defense. An aide to the National Security Council reported that President Eisenhower directed that Arthur W. Page be asked to serve in this group.[66]

The group of consultants, under the general stewardship of General Robert Cutler, then a Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, met in Washington in August for a period of approximately two weeks. In September the group was recalled to Washington to hammer out the final report.

Under Eisenhower the National Security Council was a forum for vigorous discussions against a background of painstakingly prepared and carefully studied papers. All views were fully aired and differences of opinion were not swept under the rug, but were fully exposed. Brilliant consultants with no special interests, no axes to grind, were "selected because of broad and diverse backgrounds of experience and as representatives of segments of our

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[66]Letter from Richard L. Hill, National Security Council Special Staff, The White House, July 27, 1953, Box 32, Arthur W. Page Papers.

country, both in terms of geographic location and individual occupations."[67]

Arthur W. Page was an ideal consultant, according to General Eisenhower, because he had no set of preconceived notions that he would apply to a set of circumstances. He would listen carefully, examine all the facts and circumstances, come up with a conclusion and then act on it. Arthur Page, said Eisenhower, "absorbed, analyzed and concluded."[68]

The letters of appreciation that followed are enlightening. The personal letter from President Eisenhower, dated September 25, 1953, reads:

> In addition to what I said at the conclusion of yesterday's Council Meeting, I want to put in writing this expression of my appreciation for your contribution to the Council's considerations of the continental defense issue. I know that your work required you to spend a considerable amount of time in Washington during the heat of August, and also to return for a number of days in September. The combined conclusions of the Consultants, as read to the Council Meeting yesterday, were very interesting and helpful in focusing attention on critical issues. These combined conclusions will be circulated to the Council members.
>
> It is always a help for us who are carrying the day-to-day load of government responsibilities to obtain the expression of the views of people who, coming from different parts of the country and different types of endeavor, have a fresh and objective point of view.

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[67]Robert Cutler, "The Development of the National Security Council," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 3 (April, 1956), p. 454.

[68]Interview with General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Gettysburg, September 2, 1964.

> The Council has derived a real benefit from the advice and suggestions of the Civilian Consultants who have been associated with it this year, and your contribution on this particular issue of continental defense repeats again this helpful assistance.[69]

On September 26, 1953, Robert Cutler wrote Page adding his thanks and commenting:

> . . . it seems to me that the Consultants this time materially helped in identifying key points and, by emphasis, in clinching them. As one who labored in the vineyard, I can testify to the effect which your views had on the Council's temper, just at the right time.[70]

In his reply dated September 30, 1953, Page writes to Cutler thanking him for his kind words and:

> On the other hand, I certainly deserve no thanks for I am as much interested as any other citizen of this country to see it safe and prosperous. I have every reason to lend a hand if it will do any good.[71]

Writing on this subject in 1964 Cutler recalls that Arthur Page was a member of the first consultant group on national security policy. He says:

> Ike admired Page and gave me his name (who didn't?) . . . Their job was to be indoctrinated by the top brass to what the Hell it was all about and then discuss and report their views on our first full-dress basic U. S. Security Policy statement, following the long studies by experts known as "Operation Solarium." . . . It was a way of getting brilliant outside minds to see what we were proposing to do over-all and tell

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[69]Letter from General Eisenhower, The White House, September 25, 1953, Box 32, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[70]Letter from Robert Cutler, The White House, September 26, 1953, Box 32, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[71]Letter to Robert Cutler, September 30, 1953, Box 32, Arthur W. Page Papers.

us whether we were on a sound line or nuts.[72]

In discussing this consultant role of Arthur Page, General Eisenhower made these points:

a. Consultant Groups were used to batter the administration's ideas against brains that had not been wrestling with the problems and could, therefore, be more objective.

b. Broad subjects were covered by these groups, such as the political implications of using atomic weapons, or the feasibility of using long-range ballistic missiles for defense.

c. He (Eisenhower) was a great admirer of Arthur Page and talked with him often about many problems. Although Bobby Cutler would prepare the list of consultants, Eisenhower would always add some names. Page was one that he added.

d. Eisenhower considered Arthur Page one of the ablest men he knew, with great wisdom--not impressive looking--almost professorial in appearance--but a wise man.[73]

The other minor service that Page performed for the government in this period was to assist Under Secretary of

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[72]Letter from Robert Cutler, August 20, 1964.

[73]Interview with General Eisenhower, Gettysburg, September 2, 1964.

Commerce Walter Williams in the preparation of a statement of the Publications Policy of the National Bureau of Standards. The Bureau's publication of the results of tests on a commercial product, AD-X2 battery additive, in early 1953 sparked the need for a policy. The policy that emerged was that the Secretary of Commerce would decide when commercial products would be tested and whether or not the results would be published. Walter Williams thanked Arthur Page for his help in preparing the statement, and later notified him that the policy had been implemented.[74]

Honorary Degrees

Arthur W. Page received the first of two honorary degrees in the mid-1950 period. On July 1, 1954, Columbia University made him an Honorary Doctor of Laws. The citation reads:

> ARTHUR WILSON PAGE for the degree of Doctor of Laws. Editor, business executive, and for two and a half decades vice-chairman of the Trustees of Teachers College; trusted adviser to our government and to important industrial and public service organizations; wise in counsel, clear in vision; a New Yorker who knows well the United States, and an American who understands the world; studying with concern, but with full confidence and faith, the future for which he has helped so effectively to prepare us.
>
> Grayson Kirk
> President[75]

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[74]Letters from Under Secretary of Commerce Walter Williams, June 16 and August 30, 1954, Box 35, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[75]Citation and Certificate for Honorary Degree, Columbia University, July 1, 1954, Box 75, Walter W. Page Papers.

Page was also something of an adviser on the writing of citations for honorary degrees and was consulted a number of times by educators. In one case, his war-time friend, Major General Frederick Osborn, was engaged in writing citations for honorary degrees for Harvard in the absence of one dean and the illness of another. Osborn sent his draft on Dumont Clarke, a mutual friend, to Page for "suggestions on improvements or its entire rewriting" and said he was "embarrassed at his own inadequacy." Page's complete reply is quoted:

Dear Fred:

Don't change it.

As ever,

AWP[76]

Again, in 1959 Walter W. Page was honored, this time by Williams College of Williamstown, Massachusetts. The citation reads:

> ARTHUR WILSON PAGE, Doctor of Laws. A distinguished editor and publisher who became a pioneer in the field of public relations as Vice President of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company. Wise counselor of the Department of the Army and of Harvard University, which he has served as an Overseer. Eloquent exponent of the view that we shall make faster progress in solving our national problems if more Americans attain a real understanding of our country's past.[77]

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[76]Letter to Frederick Osborn, May 19, 1955, Box 41, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[77]Letter from the Office of the President, Williams College, June 19, 1964, with citation.

The last sentence of this citation refers to Arthur Page's lifelong endeavor to convince institutions of higher education that the study of American history should be more concerned with what the people did with their liberty, and not so much with what the governments did. His success in this venture will be covered shortly.

Apropos of this thought is an exchange of correspondence with ex-President Herbert Hoover in 1956. Page wrote:

> Dear Mr. Hoover:
>
> May I add my gratitude to that of the many others who appreciated your speech to the Convention.
>
> I still re-read your books of many years ago on American Liberty. Many other people write on the history of the American Government. Many discuss the Bill of Rights, the Constitution, etc. But few seem to realize, as you always have, that the test of a Republic is the performance of its citizens and their performance is based on the opportunity and freedom they have to perform.
>
> We need more analysis of the results of freedom.
>
> With congratulations and admiration.
>
> Sincerely yours,
>
> Arthur W. Page

Mr. Hoover replied on September 4, 1956:

> Dear Arthur:
>
> I deeply appreciate your writing to me about that speech. You were most generous.
>
> Yours faithfully,
> Herbert Hoover[78]

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[78]Letter to Herbert Hoover, August 23, 1956, and Hoover's reply, September 4, 1956, Box 47, Arthur W. Page Papers.

Before we leave the mid-1950's, it is interesting to note that Page saw nothing in the years from 1905 to 1955 to change his views on the efficacy of public relations and advertising. We have seen that Page left World's Work Magazine to put into action with American Telephone and Telegraph Company the editorial opinions he had been expressing about responsibility of business. Now, fifty years after his first editorial position, he writes two letters which have the same theme:

> I have read Yutzy and Williams on a "New Perspective on Public Relations." It is a very well done and interesting piece. But what a complex business getting on with the public has become!
>
> I suppose it was always so, but when people didn't try very hard to solve the problem they never even found out how big and tough it could be.
>
> But if you read this piece and then read similar efforts of twenty years ago, you will see that things have moved along.[79]

> Dear Abbott:
>
> I am glad to get the report. I have a feeling that the U.S.I.A. will have a continuously better opportunity to develop for I think it is beginning to dawn on those in authority that propaganda like advertising is a slow growth depending on truth and repetition. There is a lot of planting before there is too much harvesting. But if the U.S.I.A. can go on planting the harvest will be good.
>
> As ever,
>
> AWP[80]

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[79]Letter to Pendleton Dudley, New York, June 1, 1955, Box 42, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[80]Letter to Abbott Washburn, Dep. Director USIA, Washington, D. C., April 4, 1955, Box 41, Arthur W. Page Papers.

Looking back thirty years to 1925, Page forecast the continuation of the trend toward responsibility in business. In an article titled "The Revolution Toward Capitalism," Arthur W. Page says that the main result of the "silent and beneficient revolution since the war" has been the wide and great distribution of wealth and the high average standard of living. "The public has overcome the fear of trusts held 20 years ago, for now the public owns more and more of the big corporations."[81]

The Late 1950's

By 1956 Arthur W. Page, by his own admission, was beginning to slow down. Yet it was between 1956 and his death that a massive "A Program for Harvard College" was launched, with Page as one of the major solicitors, and raised $82.5 millions; it was during this period that Page served as Project Director for the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Program which proposed the ill-fated "loop" program of revolutionary rapid transit for the bi-state New York-New Jersey area; and the period in which his long-sought new approach to history teaching in the colleges and universities finally came to fruition. The "loop" project will be dealt with in detail in a later chapter.

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[81] Arthur W. Page, "The Revolution Toward Capitalism," The Spectator, Vol.134 (May 23, 1925), pp. 838-839.

Another project on education with which Arthur Page was associated was the plan to finance higher education through a program supported by the nation's leading charitable foundations and major corporations. This plan was reported rather fully in Business Week as "20 Businessmen Set Out to Start New Trend in Financing Education."[82]

As mentioned earlier under the heading of Honorary Degrees, Arthur W. Page had for years been trying to improve the teaching of history in our universities. He expressed it this way:

> The history of the United States is the history of a unique experiment with personal liberty and opportunity. It is the story of what the people have done with liberty after they got it. The people are the players, the government is the umpire. To understand the game it is better to watch the players rather than the umpire.[83]

Page won his point to the extent that a Center for the Study of the History of Liberty in America was established at Harvard in 1958. Then Page gave himself the self-imposed job of raising $350,000 to support the work. His long-time friend and fellow public relations counselor, Earl Newsom, asked Page how he got into this. Part of Page's reply was:

> Well, it was this way. My three boys graduated from Harvard College and not one had been given any

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[82] Business Week (September 13, 1958), pp. 78-84.

[83] Letter to Eugene Holman, Chairman of Board of Standard Oil of New Jersey, August 22, 1958, Box 57, Arthur W. Page Papers.

> understanding of his country; why it differed from others, what gave it its exhuberant strength, etc. The same was true of all the other boys. The boys had not been taught much of anything about their country except its politics, for that was what the professors specialized in, for the academic world seemed to have missed the point that the history of this country was what the people did when they were free, rather than what the Government did in inspiring their activities.
>
> Likewise, it seemed to me that I had noticed a good many men, high in management, who knew the techniques of their business better than they understood the relation of big business in a democracy like ours. Also, Eisenhower, when he was still Chief of Staff, told me several times of his dismay at similar ignorance of the men and officers in the Army.
>
> . . . It seemed to me that something ought to be done about the teaching of history in our colleges. So I set about trying to do something. That is the tale.[84]

Director Oscar Handlin expects the Harvard Center to continue its work for another four years. Approximately 30 volumes will be published, he believes, from work done at the Center.

Some of the Center's works already published by Harvard University Press include: Dimensions of Liberty, by Oscar and Mary F. Handlin; A People Among Peoples, by Sydney V. James; The South Carolina Regulators, by Richard M. Brown; Aliens and Dissenters, by William Preston; The Life Insurance Enterprise, by Morton Keller; Status and Kinship in the Higher Civil Service, by Sidney H. Aronson; The Democratic Republicans of Massachusetts, by Paul R.

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[84] Letter to Earl Newsom, New York, August 21, 1958, Box 57, Arthur W. Page Papers.

School of Journalism
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
Madison 6, Wisconsin

Goodman; and Individualism and Nationalism in American Ideology, by Yehoshua Arieli.[85]

Similar projects have been undertaken at the University of North Carolina, Page's native state, and at Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts.

1960

Arthur Wilson Page remained extremely active almost until the day of his death. In March of 1960 he entered the hospital for two operations, which were to be scheduled a few days apart. He suffered from diverticulitis.

On May 9 he was back in his office, still anxious not to miss a moment's enjoyment of his work. However, he returned to the hospital in August and passed away September 5, 1960, a few days before his 77th birthday.

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[85] Letter from Oscar Handlin, Director, Harvard University Center for the Study of the History of Liberty in America, October 26, 1964.

CHAPTER II

OVER THERE

In late 1916, during the famous Battle of the Somme, Arthur W. Page went to France as a War Correspondent for World's Work and toured the front lines. He was disappointed that he had to follow a planned route and was not free to do as he pleased--but this remark was made in the light of his experiences in World War II.[1]

However, from the experience he wrote an article, "Why the Allies Expect to Win," for the February, 1917, issue of his magazine, and he discoursed at length on the French General Nivelle's method of taking trenches. This experience was to provide valuable background information for his straightforward series, "The Truth About Our 110 Days Fighting," which appeared in the April, May and June, 1919, issues of World's Work. These were later published in a book titled Our 110 Days Fighting.[2]

The United States Enters the War

Scarcely a month after Page's article on why the Allies expected to win the war, the United States declared

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[1] Reminiscences, p. 39.

[2] Arthur W. Page, Our 110 Days Fighting (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1920).

war on Germany and the Central Powers. In retrospect, it seems that Arthur W. Page showed remarkable restraint in not entering government service sooner. For it was over a year before this 35-year old believer in liberty and in the rightness of Great Britain and France became directly involved in overseas service.

Page did, however, become involved in government service in World War I in a way that was to be typical in later years--he was asked to fulfill a specific job and did so gladly and with efficiency. Arthur Page sailed for England in the summer of 1918 to see his father and to accompany him back to the United States, if possible. The Ambassador was seriously ill and forced to resign from his arduous duties.

The doctors prescribed a rest in Scotland for the Ambassador before the long sea voyage home. Since Arthur's brother, Ralph, was returning from France through London at this time, it was arranged that he would accompany their father to the United States--for Arthur had been invited to join the Army by this time.

How the suggestion or request for Arthur Page's services came about is not entirely clear. However, a letter from Page to Edward P. Lilly in the Historical Section of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,[3] says

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[3]Letter from Arthur W. Page to Edward P. Lilly dated

that Hugh Gibson suggested to General D. E. Nolan that he send for Arthur W. Page. Gibson was a long time friend of the Pages and was then First Secretary of the U. S. Embassy in Paris, later to be Minister to Belgium and the countries in exile. Page lived with Gibson in Paris for the remainder of the war.

General Nolan was the G-2, Intelligence Officer, of General Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and was anxious to establish United States propaganda operations. He had just received the nucleus of such an operation from the United States. His offer to Arthur W. Page was to accept a commission as a Captain in the Army, and to come to Paris to utilize his publishing experience in the preparation of the propaganda material.

The Propaganda Beginnings

On April 13, 1917, just a week after the declaration of war by the United States, the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy wrote a joint letter to the President. This letter recommended the creation of a Committee for Public Information, later to be called usually the Creel Committee, in which the two functions of censorship and publicity could be joined. This followed closely the ideas expressed to Grosvenor Clarkson of the Council of National

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December 1, 1942, Box 19, Folder 3, in Arthur W. Page Papers, MSS US 51AF, Wisconsin Historical Society.

Defense by leading newspapermen and publishers. Clarkson had asked for comments of these distinguished members of the Fourth Estate with their opinions and suggestions as to the kind of censorship the United States should impose in case of war.

Among those who had submitted their ideas and suggestions on the subject were Mark Sullivan, then editor of Collier's, Arthur W. Page of Doubleday, Page & Company, Frederick Palmer, William Hard and Roy Howard.

The Committee on Public Information was formed by President Wilson on that same day, with George Creel as the civilian head. Other members were the proposing Secretaries of State, War and Navy.[4] One source says that on April 14, 1917, the Committee started its saturation of allied, neutral and enemy countries with the details of America's war objectives. It introduced commissioners into every foreign neutral and allied country. Mr. James Kerney, the Committee's principal representative in France, set up offices in the Maison de la Presse and in June, 1918, was disseminating, in cooperation with the French committee for propaganda, facts about America's war preparations to Germans at home and at the front.[5]

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[4]James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, Words That Won the War (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1939), p. 4.

[5]John C. W. Field, Aerial Propaganda Leaflets (Sutton Coldfield, England: Francis J. Field, 1954), p. 24.

It was not until February, 1918, that the War Department General Staff in Washington, D. C., seriously considered the need for a propaganda operation, primarily directed toward reaching enemy soldiers. Major Charles H. Mason has been credited with recommending the "utilization of the psychological factor of the strategic situation" as a weapon of war.[6]

Captain Heber Blankenhorn was given the job of organizing the psychological subdivision of the Military Intelligence Branch. By this time the German uses of propaganda had become so noxious as to cast discredit on the very word; so the word "propaganda" was discarded for the less worldly title of Psychological Subsection of Military Intelligence Branch.

Blankenhorn and six other officers sailed for France in mid-July. The staff included Captain Walter Lippmann and Lieutenants Ludlow Griscom, George N. Ifft, W. P. Miltenberger, E. M. Woolley and Charles Merz. Lippman was later to become famous as author of his classic Public Opinion, and other books, and as a world-renowned columnist and reporter. Merz was later to be editor of the New York Times.[7]

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[6]George G. Bruntz, Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1938), p. 37.

[7]Historical Division, Department of the Army, "Reports of Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F., Staff Sections

Reporting to General Headquarters at Chaumont on July 25, 1918, Blankenhorn's group was set about the task of first learning all they could about the past, present and future planned propaganda activities of the French and British, and of analyzing the effective efforts of Germans in the propaganda field. Both French and British had stepped up their leaflet activities in the Spring of 1918 as a result of seeing, in the cases of the Russian reverse and the crushing defeat of the Italian armies in September, 1917, how effective propaganda was in those campaigns.

By August, 1918, the French had dropped 25 million pamphlets over the German lines.[8] The British dropped 1.6 million in June, 1918, 2.1 million in July, and in August built up to well over 100,000 per day--"a deluge of English poison raining down from God's clear sky."[9]

It is here that we speculate somewhat on how Arthur W. Page joined the section known as G-2-D, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces. The recollection of Arthur W. Page that Hugh Gibson had General D. E.

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and Services," United States Army in the World War 1917-1919 (Part II) (Washington, D. C., 1948), p. 122.

[8] Ibid., p. 121.

[9] Sidney Rogerson, Propaganda in the Next War (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1938), p. 102.

Nolan "send for" him, and the lack of any mention of Page by Blankenhorn in connection with his meetings with Lord Northcliffe and his propaganda staff in London, indicates that Page probably joined the unit at Chaumont, France, in August. In a letter to Edward P. Lilly on November 22, 1948, Arthur Page reports, "I was attached to this group in Paris in my store clothes, a commission being requested from Washington."[10]

The center of the American propaganda activity was Room 65 on the floor above General Pershing's office in Damremont Caserne, Chaumont, France. Major A. L. James of General Nolan's G-2 staff was the direct contact man, and Captain Blankenhorn was in charge of the propaganda sub-unit.

According to the official U. S. Army history, Major James placed distribution in charge of Captain Blankenhorn, assisted by Lieutenants Ifft, Griscom and Miltenberger, all stationed at General Headquarters. Editing was in charge of Captain Walter Lippmann, assisted by Mr. Arthur W. Page and Lieutenant E. M. Woolley stationed in Paris. Lieutenant Charles Merz was stationed in London, presumably to maintain liaison with the British propaganda

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[10]Letter from Arthur W. Page to Edward P. Lilly, November 22, 1948, in Arthur W. Page Papers, MSS US 51AF, Wisconsin Historical Society, Box 19, Folder 3.

forces.[11]

As Arthur Page remembers it, Walter Lippmann was in the "unit for a few minutes"[12] and then "went on to other work."[13]

Again, according to the official U. S. Army history, in Paris the editors and printing directors had desk room at the office of the military attache and at the headquarters of the French commission for propaganda against the enemy.[14] But in his letter to Mr. Lilly of November 22, 1948, Arthur Page remembers it this way:

> The French Intelligence Section in Paris provided us with a translator--an Alsatian who was competent, helpful and amusing--but once in a while drunk.
>
> I hired an office, bought a second hand portable typewriter and engaged a French typist who said she knew English. On this she was an optimist. The French printer with whom we dealt did not know English and I have always had an impediment in my speech which exactly covers the French language.
>
> However, by sign language and the good-will and help of the French we got the material out.[15]

The Purposes of American Propaganda

The purpose of propaganda, insofar as the U. S. Army

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[11] Historical Division, U. S. Army, op. cit., p. 122.

[12] Reminiscences, p. 47.

[13] Letter to Edward P. Lilly, November 22, 1948, loc. cit.

[14] Historical Division, U. S. Army, op. cit., p. 123.

[15] Letter to Edward P. Lilly, November 22, 1948, loc. cit.

was concerned, was to contribute to the general demoralization of the morale of the enemy military forces, and in specific sectors to break the fighting spirit of particular units and to bring about desertions from particular units at critical times.[16]

Within General Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, the specific instructions were: First, edit and distribute leaflets for strictly military purposes, inducing desertion and surrender. To do this, the leaflets needed to dispel the common German rumor, fostered by their own leaders, that Americans killed all prisoners, and that the American Army was weak in numbers and equipment. Arguments must be simple, accurate, factual, "plain soldier" and aimed at or below the private soldier mentality. The second aim was to prepare the leaflets for strictly military purposes but in a larger sense to undermine morale by presenting the immorality of the German political position. These leaflets would be distributed over civilian populations, too, for their indirect effect on military morale.[17]

Captain Heber Blankenhorn was more eloquent, but probably less accurate, about the purposes of American military propaganda in an article in Harper's Monthly in

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[16]Historical Division, U. S. Army, op. cit., p. 121.

[17]Ibid., p. 122.

late 1919:

> To the American propaganda officer in France it was the vehicle of a passionate faith in the righteousness of America's war; it was the chanting of crusaders, the word winged against delusions beneath enemies' helmets, a strife to shorten our soldiers' work. It was truly democratic peacemaking, most openly arrived at."[18]

The function of the Committee on Public Information, the Creel Committee, was primarily to reach the German people. However, this organization was somewhat jealous of its prerogatives, and apparently never did surrender to the military all of its missions in the theaters of operations. The military was careful not to infringe on any of the civilian Creel toes.

In his reminiscences, Arthur Page states that the George Creel organization was reaching the German people, and that G-2-D of GHQ was aiming at the German soldier.[19] Page also reports in his November 22 letter to Edward P. Lilly:

> At the time we began operations, George Creel's civilian propaganda organization was full of enthusiasm and there were very specific instructions that the Civil Propaganda organization outranked the military. I don't think this bothered the military except that the army did not want to be given propaganda to drop on the enemy troops which was written without consultation with the military who knew the situation at the front.
>
> My instructions from General Nolan were that the

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[18] Heber Blankenhorn, "The War of Morale--How America 'Shelled' the German Lines with Paper," Harper's Magazine (September, 1919), p. 511.

[19] Reminiscences, p. 46.

> Civil Propaganda people were supreme, that we were to maintain the most cordial relations and do exactly what they said but that he did want the military propaganda to reach the front and he didn't want anything else to.
>
> Happily for us James Kearney [sic], editor of the Trenton True American and Creel's No. 1 man in Paris was a most wise and reasonable man.[20]

In a later clarification of the statement that General Nolan did not want any other military propaganda to reach the front, Page said that the Creel Committee was to be the final authority on what leaflets would be dropped, but the military G-2-D had pamphlets and the Creel organization did not, so the Army's leaflets were used.[21]

It was apparent that there was no conflict, and probably much excellent cooperation, at the working level between officials of the Creel Committee and the military forces of G-2-D. The principal narrators of the Creel Committee's work say: "In the work from neutral bases, the CPI was the important American group, but for straight trench propaganda and for aerial operations the CPI was ancillary to the Military Intelligence Branch."[22]

Mr. Creel himself is somewhat more categorical. Writing in Literary Digest after the end of the war he

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[20]Letter to Edward P. Lilly, November 22, 1948, loc. cit.

[21]Letter to Edward P. Lilly, December 1, 1948, loc. cit.

[22]Mock and Larson, op. cit., p. 249.

claims:

> Preparation of the matter was our job, handled by historians, newspaper men, advertising specialists, and even a "psychologist" now and then for good measure, but distribution was a military function. . . .[23]

Propaganda Operations

It is not the intent here to detail all the operations of the Blankenhorn propaganda operations. That is amply covered in the official U. S. Army historical documents and in books that have already been cited. Instead, this chapter considers the part that Arthur W. Page played in the operations, and how he evaluated them.

It was the end of August before the propaganda section was organized and started in business. The First Army, which the leaflets were to support primarily, was not activated as a separate unit until August 10, 1918, and did not engage in an attack until September 12 at St. Mihiel. The Army's propaganda force was to have a very short life.

Apparently the first leaflet produced was at the walk-in request of a combat commander who had been getting some German surrenders, and wanted more. The copy was written for the specific sector, printed by mimeograph,

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[23]George Creel, "How Our Publicity Offensive Ended the War," Literary Digest (February 8, 1919), pp. 58-60.

and sent across the lines in the unit's sector the next day. Blankenhorn comments, "Did you ever hear anything so amusing? The shop wasn't open yet, but we sold propaganda over the counter like meat."[24]

By September 6, 1918, Arthur Page's publishing unit in Paris had begun to ship leaflets to Chaumont for distribution over enemy lines. Later the shipments were to Bar-le-Duc for First Army distribution, and to Toul for the Second Army. From these points they were delivered by a force of three lieutenants and 17 enlisted men to airfield, or to balloon delivery points.[25] There were Germans captured at the First U. S. Army attack at St. Mihiel on September 12 with these American propaganda leaflets on them.[26]

From September 6, 1918, until the end of the war, more than 4,800,000 pamphlets or leaflets were sent by Page's Paris unit to the General Headquarters at Chaumont, Toul or Bar-le-Duc for air delivery across the German lines. During the week ending November 2, 1918, nearly a million leaflets were sent from Paris to the distributing

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[24]Heber Blankenhorn, Adventures in Propaganda (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1919), p. 48.

[25]Historical Division, U. S. Army, op. cit., p. 123.

[26]Memorandum in Arthur W. Page Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society, MSS US 51AF, Box 65, Folder 3.

points.[27]

The ideas underlying the American propaganda leaflets were simple and direct. They aimed to convince the German soldiers that they would be well treated if they surrendered, not killed; and that the American Army was so large and was growing so rapidly that the alliance with Britain and France meant certain defeat for Germany.

The techniques used were predictable and apparently successful. They included an extract of General Order Number 106 from GHQ, A.E.F. which prescribed proper treatment of prisoners and that they be fed the same ration as American troops. The propagandists shrewdly included in this leaflet the daily ration issued to American troops.

Several leaflets described in figures and pictures the rising growth of the American Army in France, in men and supplies.

Others showed maps of terrain previously held by the Germans that had been taken from them by American military actions, and contained a factual record of the guns, equipment and prisoners captured in these actions.

One of the most effective appeals, used extensively during the last few weeks of the war, were the speeches and pronouncements of President Woodrow Wilson on terms

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[27] Ibid.

for peace, peace aims, rehabilitation of conquered countries and peoples, etc. Speaking specifically of these items of propaganda, one author says:

> To facilitate speedy delivery of these speeches and other materials to the Germans, the Americans had a large printing establishment in Paris under the command of Captain /sic/ Arthur W. Page of Doubleday, Page and Co. The editorial work was under the direction of Captain Walter Lippmann, while Colonel House acted as unofficial adviser because of his knowledge of German psychology. . . . It was Colonel House who, after reading a letter from Bernard Ridder, suggested that the American propaganda should advertise American war-preparation and play up the inexhaustible resources of this country.[28]

Author Bruntz also pays tribute to the American surrender leaflet in these terms:

> But perhaps the most ingenious scheme for getting the enemy troops to desert was that used by the Americans. Our propagandists dropped a "prisoner leaflet" over the German lines which contained an extract from the orders prescribing the treatment to be accorded by the A.E.F. to the prisoners of war. Appended to it was a list of rations issued to the American soldier and prescribed for enemy prisoners. More than a million copies of this were sent over to the enemy. This was followed by postcards, in exact reproduction of the official German field post card, which contained an invitation to desert.[29]

The ideas for the various leaflets produced apparently came from several sources. Bruntz claims that Colonel House, close personal friend and adviser to President Wilson, was active in proposing the themes. Mr. George Creel gives major credit to President Wilson, and

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[28] Bruntz, op. cit., p. 62.

[29] Ibid., p. 111.

goes so far as to say: "They were our most effective weapons, and it was easy to mark their progress through the enemy country by the trail of ferment and disaffection that each one left."[30]

Paul M. A. Linebarger, on the other hand, minimizes the role of the Creel Committee on the military conduct of psychological warfare. He says:

> The civilians of the Creel Committee patronizingly claimed to have helped the G-2 men at A.E.F. Headquarters run psychological warfare. In the official history of Captain Blankenhorn's group, which centered from the very beginning on leaflet production, there is little reference to outside aid. Radio did not exist as a means of mass communication, and loudspeakers then surpassed an ordinary megaphone very little, if at all; hence communication with the enemy had to be through print. Leaflets were basic.[31]

Linebarger gives credit almost entirely to the military. He says:

> It was in the primary mission of combat propaganda --the inducement to surrender--that the Americans excelled themselves. They produced limitless appeals promising the Germans first class American food when they surrendered. Emphasis was indeed on all surrender themes--good food, humane care, privileges under international law, patriotic value of remaining alive, opportunity to return to loved ones, etc. But the Americans went over these variously, and came back to the topic of food. For an army of hungry men who knew their homeland starved behind them, the enumeration of things to eat had obsessive value.[32]

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[30] Creel, loc. cit.

[31] Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (Washington, D. C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1948), pp. 68-70.

[32] Ibid.

Arthur W. Page had little hand in the preparation of the leaflet material, apparently, other than in its mechanical production and printing. In his letters to Mr. Edward Lilly he says:

> I do not remember about the preparation of the texts of the leaflets, but they have practically no original writing in them. Once it was decided to use such matters as the American rules for the treatment of prisoners, the army ration for prisoners, the figures of German losses, etc., there was little opportunity for writing.[33]

And in his December 1, 1948, letter to Lilly, Page says further:

> I think that General Nolan and his subordinates at G.H.Q.--who had the British and French propaganda to study--originated the ideas for the pamphlets and that in the various times the General was in Paris and I was in Chaumont I got his ideas or perhaps actual copy. I see no record now of proof being submitted to him and I rather think that did not happen because of the limitations of time.[34]

Twenty-five leaflets and pamphlets were completed before the Armistice and one newspaper, a bi-language International Bulletin, was being prepared. Nearly five million copies were printed and distributed over the lines, under most trying circumstances. Then on November 10, 1918, Arthur W. Page received this telegram:

> CAPT ARTHUR W. PAGE, AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS NOV 10 1918
> CEASE SHIPMENTS UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. OUR WORK HAS BEEN TOO SUCCESSFUL.
>
> BLANKENHORN[35]

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[33]Letter to Edward P. Lilly, December 1, 1948, loc. cit.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Telegram from Heber Blankenhorn, November 10,

The Wayward Commission

The war-time War Department was not noted for its fast administrative actions on matters that were not critical to conduct of the war. The promised captain's commission for Arthur Page must have been in this category --or perhaps it could have been lost at sea.

In his reminiscences, Page recalls that the commission actually arrived in France about a week before the end of the war. Realizing that the war was nearly over and that acceptance of the commission would complicate the situation and probably delay his return to civilian life, Page declined to accept.[36]

Letters of appreciation sent to Page by General D. E. Nolan in December of 1918, and in 1925 by General Pershing, express regret that the commission did not clear the administrative hurdles in time to be tendered. Officially, this period of government service on a no-pay basis, ended with the armistice.

Meanwhile, the November, 1918, issue of World's Work contained this brief notice: "Mr. Arthur W. Page, editor until recent months, has entered the service of his country abroad and has temporarily, beginning with this

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1918, in Arthur W. Page Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society, Box 65, Folder 3.

[36] Reminiscences, p. 46.

number, severed all his connections with the magazine and its editorial policy."[37]

The severance was apparently complete, for the masthead of the magazine even deleted his name as a vice president of Doubleday, Page and Company, and it did not reappear until the March, 1919, issue. The April, 1919, issue again showed Arthur W. Page as editor.

Evaluations of the Effort

Opinions of the effectiveness of American propaganda in World War I are as varied as the people that express them. Here are several:

a. Capt. Heber Blankenhorn: (1) As a military weapon, especially after 1916, its /propaganda's/ use was so developed that entire eastern sectors were officially reported as "held by propaganda alone."[38]

Capt. Heber Blankenhorn: (2) The difficulties of keeping this intellectual offensive abreast of an advancing and victorious army were enormous. That they were overcome is shown by the evidence of well-thumbed propaganda leaflets in the hands of every two out of three German prisoners who came into our lines during the last days before the armistice.[39]

b. Mr. George Creel: Eight prisoners out of every ten captured by the Americans had our "stuff" in their pockets. . . .[40]

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[37] World's Work, Vol. 37 (November, 1918), p. 9.

[38] Heber Blankenhorn, Harper's Magazine, September, 1919, loc. cit.

[39] Heber Blankenhorn, Adventures in Propaganda, Preface, op. cit., pp. vi, vii.

[40] Creel, loc. cit.

c. Mr. Robert Herrick: . . . it is debatable whether allied propaganda has materially hastened the victory, but it is hardly debatable that it has been attended with evil consequences that may far outrun the scope of the present conflict. The real menace of propaganda is the discovery by governments and other interested agencies that this extension of advertising . . . can be readily utilized to sway and control democratic masses.[41]

d. US Army Historical Section: Evidence of effectiveness is contained in the many attempts the Germans made to suppress American propaganda; threats to kill any Germans with leaflets in their possession, and to kill aviators who were distributing leaflets when shot down. When interrogated on propaganda, only 25% of German officers admitted the effects of leaflets; 75% of German enlisted men, on the other hand, admitted the effects. To summarize, it appears that propaganda, American and Allied, helped materially to create an atmosphere of defeat, which helped to lower the enemy morale.[42]

e. Mr. Arthur W. Page: A propaganda enthusiast can almost prove that propaganda is more effective than artillery. A cynic, on the other hand, can quite logically convince himself that propaganda affects battles very little.

Tabulated mathematical results are hard to get. But several things are certain. . . . As is natural enough, propaganda would have little effect on the troops whose morale was good and whose courage and faith were high. On those who were beginning to weaken, its demoralizing effect was more apparent.

Propaganda that tells the truth and only the truth and which keeps its figures correct is certainly an effective weapon especially if it continues long enough and in sufficient quantity to establish confidence in its statements among the ranks of the enemy. It can do much to force his own command either to tell the truth or keep still. But this policy makes it incumbent on the propagandist to stick to the truth

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[41]Robert Herrick, "Paper War," Dial, Vol. LXVI (February 8, 1919), pp. 113-114.

[42]Historical Division, U. S. Army, op. cit., p. 124.

when the facts are unpleasant for him as well as when they are unpleasant for the enemy.

As long as airplanes can fly and print paper is cheap you can tell the enemy anything you want to but how much or how little he will believe (and believing act on) depends on the propagandists' skill and the enemy's morale. But even where it makes little impression, propaganda is worth while for, compared to anything else in war, it costs practically nothing in men or money to prepare and much can be distributed as a side issue by the air service.[43]

I enclose with the scrap book an estimate of the value of the propaganda to enemy troops which I wrote at the time. This is somewhat more conservative than Blankenhorn's book and other estimates at the time. But I still think it is a fact that propaganda has little or no effect on good troops--particularly if they are winning. I think it can help reduce the effectiveness of troops that are not in high morale--and it costs very little.[44]

Recognition

Arthur W. Page's work for the Army and his country was unpaid, but not entirely unrewarded. The following letter from the office of the Commander in Chief, A.E.F., contained in the Arthur W. Page Papers, speaks for itself:

December 26, 1918

Mr. Arthur W. Page
Doubleday, Page & Company
Garden City, New York

Subject: Services Rendered.

1. Please accept my thanks for the highly valuable

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[43]Memorandum in Arthur W. Page Papers, Box 65, Folder 3, loc. cit.

[44]Letter to Edward P. Lilly, November 22, 1943, loc. cit.

service performed by you in connection with the campaign of propaganda over the enemy lines. I am aware of the difficulties that were encountered and also of the energy and ability displayed by you in overcoming these difficulties.

2. As you are aware, recommendation that you be commissioned in the grade of Captain was forwarded to the War Department but the cessation of hostilities on November 11 caused the issuance of orders from the War Department prohibiting further promotions or the granting of new commissions. This was the only reason that your commission was not forthcoming, and I keenly regret that it was not possible to accord to you that recognition of your generous, efficient and patriotic work.

By direction:

/s/ D. E. Nolan
D. E. NOLAN
Brigadier General, General Staff
A.C. of S., G-2[45]

Perhaps the commission never arrived. Recollections of the participants of events half a century ago may be clouded. But an even greater recognition was extended in 1925 by this letter:

GENERAL OF THE ARMIES
Washington

July 15, 1925

Mr. Arthur W. Page
World's Work
Garden City, New York

My dear Mr. Page:

My attention has been recently invited to what might appear to be an oversight in the recognition of

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[45]Letter from General D. E. Nolan in Arthur W. Page Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society, Box 68, Folder 1.

the valuable services you rendered the General Staff during the war. I am quite familiar with the very great assistance you gave in connection with the practical work of propaganda in France. I recall that you were recommended for commission as a captain and regret that delay in forwarding the application and further delay in handling in Washington prevented the appointment.

The fact that you did not receive such a commission, however, does not of course lessen either the usefulness of your services or the satisfaction you should take in having made such a valuable contribution to the Allied victory. It gives me the greatest pleasure to extend to you my personal appreciation for what you did.

With very cordial regards, believe me

Sincerely yours,

/s/ John J. Pershing[46]

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[46]Letter from General John J. Pershing in Arthur W. Page Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society, Box 68, Folder 1.

CHAPTER III

THE COLONEL'S AIDE

> Then in the first days of 1945, he asked Arthur Page to come down to the Pentagon where Page was "given an office with practically nothing to do." As the days passed it slowly dawned on Page that he was there to listen to the Secretary, who wanted someone constantly by his side, "someone that he knew he could trust, that had no stake in the game, with whom he could talk about the atom."[1]

The friendship of Colonel Henry L. Stimson and Arthur W. Page spanned 35 years and is epitomized by the above quotation. They were great friends, yet there appears to have been always the "Aide to the Colonel" spirit running through their relationship.

An examination of the correspondence between these two suggests that it might have been similar to a stern father and spirited, but respectful, son relationship. The 16 years that separated them in age, and the fact that the Stimsons had no children lends some credence to this thought. In the Page Papers there are no letters addressed to "Henry" or "Harry," as Mrs. Stimson called him--and all of his letters to Page are formally signed with the full "Henry L. Stimson."

But the Page sons deny that this was the true

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[1]Elting E. Morison, Turmoil and Tradition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), p. 618.

relationship. They remember that they were like sons to Stimson and that a warm, friendly atmosphere prevailed between the two families. It is probable that in all things Stimson was a rather serious, thoughtful, reserved man.[2]

Perhaps this was also a measure of the man--for as Elting E. Morison says in the closing paragraph of Turmoil and Tradition:

> In the private letters, in the editorials, in the selected readings from the Testaments, in the published comments of great contemporaries the same points are always made. Trust, truth, justice, virtue, the reign of law, the call of duty, the shining example, the active service.[3]

Nowhere in the descriptions of Stimson will be found the adjectives "warm, friendly, outgoing, humorous, gregarious, jovial." Perhaps the fact that Arthur Page had all of these characteristics in abundance helps prove the "opposites attract" theory.

Soon after the Pages moved to County Line, and knew the Stimsons only slightly, the Colonel decided that the Pages should join the hunt. Arthur Page pointed out that he had not jumped horses very much, to which Stimson replied: "No man has ever lived who hasn't jumped a horse." Page reflected later that Henry L. Stimson "felt

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[2]Interview with sons of Arthur W. Page, Huntington, Long Island, September 8, 1964.

[3]Morison, op. cit., p. 654.

rather proprietary about people who moved onto Long Island."[4]

And always between the two men there was a deep, mutual, lasting respect and admiration.

Mission to Manilla

Upon the death of Leonard Wood in 1927, President Calvin Coolidge asked Wood's good friend, Henry L. Stimson, to accept the post as Governor General of the Philippines. Although just back from a difficult series of complicated negotiations in Nicarugua, Stimson accepted the call to duty and sailed for Manilla in February of 1928.

Stimson delivered his inaugural address the day he arrived in the Islands. Arthur Page responded with a letter telling him how favorably the message was received and reported in the press in the United States. Stimson was gratified with the response that Page had reported, but probably also recalled that in 1915 he had written these words to Winfred Dennison when the latter was serving on the staff of another Philippine Governor General:

> . . . after all, history is not often changed by speeches. . . . The course of history is made up by a long patient series of humble acts which gradually form the opinion and character of a nation and not by dramatic utterances.[5]

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[4] Ibid., p. 200.

[5] Ibid., p. 285.

Immediately in his administration Stimson realized two serious deficiencies: the lack of a proper staff of technical advisers, and the inadequacy of the communications network, both physically and conceptually, between the government in Washington and the Governor General in Manilla.

Mr. Stimson contrasted his position in the Philippines with that he held as Secretary of War in the Taft Administration. In that latter post he said:

> I had a chief to fall back on, a well-organized non-political department, and plenty of wise friends close at hand. Here I have none of these, and everything I say or do, and many things that I do not say or do, are under fierce scrutiny all the time.[6]

He also found that he was not getting the information about national affairs, internal policies, foreign trade and other matters that were of concern to him and to the conduct of government in the Philippines. He discovered that there was no governmental machinery established to permit such an exchange of information--it was all one way, from Manilla to Washington. "So far as support from Washington is concerned, it is so far away as to seem negligible," Stimson said.[7]

Characteristically, Stimson approached these

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[6] Ibid., p. 292.

[7] Ibid.

matters not only through official channels, but also through his trusted friend and "aide," Arthur W. Page. To Page he wrote asking him to contact anyone of influence who could help speed the Kiess bill through the United States Congress. This bill was specifically designed to provide the funds for the Governor General of the Philippines to hire technical advisers who could investigate the needs of the Islands and the ability of the departments to fill those needs.

The effort was too little and too late, however, and there was too much opposition in the Congress to pass the bill. Page had been able to do little except keep his friend advised of the progress, or lack of it.

(Stimson was a very determined man, however, and was completely convinced of the essentiality of these advisers. Since the United States would not supply them, Stimson ruled that the government of the Philippines must supply them, and he threatened to "withhold all future steps including the appointment of cabinet officers" until the legislature would vote the necessary funds. The Philippine strong men, Sergio Osmena and Manuel Roxas, rushed the bill through the legislature, and Stimson got his technicians.)

The problem on lack of communication and information proved more responsive to the Page treatment. Working with General Frank McIntyre, Chief of the Bureau of Insular

Affairs, Arthur Page helped convince the government officials that the need was real and urgent. A direct news wire between the offices of General McIntyre and Colonel Stimson was established. (It should be mentioned that Stimson was actually a Brigadier General in the Army Reserve, but preferred to be called by his World War I active duty rank of Colonel.) Small wonder that Stimson had great confidence in the ability of Arthur Page to get things done quickly and efficiently.[8]

Throughout the year that Stimson spent in the Philippines, the Bureau of Insular Affairs news wire and the letters of Arthur W. Page kept him informed of the important, and not so important, doings in America and around the world. The Colonel often expressed his appreciation to Page for this extraordinary service.

To Arthur W. Page it came naturally. He had started this "keeping our overseas representatives informed" back in the World War I days when his father was Ambassador to the Court of St. James. Now the "client" for the Page News and Special Events Service was on the other side of the world. And it did not stop with Stimson.

Walter S. Gifford, who had first employed Page to establish the American Telephone and Telegraph Company's

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[8]Letter to General Frank McIntyre, and reply, dated July 5, 1923, Box 1, Arthur W. Page Papers.

public relations department, was appointed as Ambassador to the Court of St. James in 1950 and served until 1953. Page started at once to give him by letter the business, political and social news that he knew Gifford would want and would not get any other way. Page's letter of November 8, 1951, is a good example; it covers in some detail all of these subjects:

a. The belief that General Dwight D. Eisenhower is becoming more available for the nomination for President of the United States, and would probably win the nomination in 1952.

b. Local elections in New York, Philadelphia and other eastern cities indicate that the publics are becoming aroused over the rise in crime and corruption.

c. Details of the Bell System Presidents' Conference held near Mobile, Alabama.

d. Rates and wages and activities of the CIO.

e. Mike Disalle's making a good case for the government.

f. Personnel changes taking place in A. T. & T.

g. The Truman-Eisenhower political discussion, and the Gallup Poll on popularity of candidates.

Another good friend and long-time business associate of Arthur W. Page succeeded Walter S. Gifford to the position as Ambassador to the Court of St. James. This was Winthrop W. Aldrich, who had been Chairman of the

Board of the Chase National Bank while Page was a director and public relations counsel. One of the earliest letters to Aldrich covered in detail the Eisenhower accomplishments, Korea, NATO, Russian attitudes, domestic cost of living, the recent rulings of the FTC and FCC, the Chase Bank status, Heritage Foundation, personnel changes at the Gulf Oil and Metropolitan Life, and other subjects.

On January 25, 1929, Stimson received a cable from his law partner, George Roberts, informing him that newly-elected President Herbert Hoover was considering him for a position as Attorney General or as Secretary of State. Stimson quickly cabled back that he would not accept the former (he really did not like the practice of law very well, except as "a means of making a living."), but would be willing to accept the duty as Secretary of State since that would help him supply "a permanent solution" to the relationship between the United States and the Philippines.[9]

Henry L. Stimson left the Philippines with the grateful shouts of the people ringing in his ears for what the New York Times called a "brilliant administration."[10] On March 28 he was sworn in as Secretary of State.

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[9]Morison, op. cit., p. 302.

[10]New York Times, February 24, 1929.

Stimson wanted Page to come to Washington as an Assistant Secretary of State, but Page was not a wealthy man and did not know how he would make a living during and after this service, so he turned it down and remained with the Telephone Company. He was not to give up his duties as the "Colonel's Aide" for long, however.

Immediately after the return of Stimson from the Philippines and his appointment as Secretary of State, Arthur W. Page wrote "Henry L. Stimson--A Character Sketch" for Current History magazine. It is a one-sided sketch telling of Stimson's accomplishments in the public service, but was honestly written and meant to reveal the subject's qualifications for the important Cabinet post. A great deal of Page's emphasis is on Stimson's dedication to public service--and some of the same words could describe Arthur Page. Here are a few:

> He is peculiarly public minded. He is thinking, talking to people and studying public affairs all the time. Mentally he is in the public service, while he is practicing law, just as he is when he is holding office.
>
> He refuses to be hurried into making up his mind. The building of a policy in his mind is a very painstaking task. Once that is done, he has at hand not only the elements of the main problem, but all their implications, even into the third and fourth generation.[11]

Stimson's success in negotiation, in dealing with

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[11] Arthur W. Page, "Henry L. Stimson--A Character Sketch," Current History, Vol. 30 (April, 1929), p. 7.

> men, is due to a clarity of thought and a frankness and honesty of discussion that inspires trust. He gets on with people in the pinches. He breeds confidence in tight places.[12]

> Stimson is by nature, training and interest a public official--a professional in the intricate business of governing on the American plan. . . . He is at home in the public service.[13]

The London Naval Conference

The first major attempt at limitation of the navies of the great powers was undertaken at the Washington Conference of 1922. Until that time, limitation of any armament of any power was considered visionary; after the conference naval limitation was considered to be a good possibility. The limitations imposed by that conference were still in force, but the uncontrolled portions were causing international friction. The London Conference was planned to reaffirm the precedent of naval limitations and to place limitations on the heretofore uncontrolled parts.

Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the United States were the major powers concerned. The conference was to open in London on January 21, 1930, after months of painstaking preparation. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, an Army Colonel and ex-Secretary of War, was the Chief United States Delegate.

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[12] Ibid., p. 10.

[13] Ibid., p. 11.

Stimson had asked Arthur W. Page to accompany him as an Adviser. It might have been because Page was a long-time student of international affairs, but not necessarily a believer in current policy. (On December 8, 1930, Arthur Page wrote that the more he sees of the people who run the League of Nations, the less he believes in it. As indicated in Chapter I, he felt somewhat the same way about the United Nations organization after World War II.)

Perhaps Stimson wanted Page for his usefulness in getting along with people, be they diplomats or members of the press. For Stimson was not good with the press. ". . . he seemed to feel that reporters always wanted to know more than was good for them, or for him, or for the welfare of the body politic. He therefore told them as little as possible, which ordinarily was very little indeed."[14]

It certainly was not for Page's experience with navies that he was chosen, for sailing on Long Island Sound was the extent of his nautical ability. Probably Stimson wanted Arthur Page to be there "to listen to the Secretary who wanted someone constantly by his side, 'someone that he knew he could trust, that had no stake in the game. . . .'"[15]

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[14] Morison, op. cit., p. 337.

[15] Ibid., p. 618.

Page himself characterized his role as that of a "helper" rather than adviser. This is borne out by an examination of the records of the London Naval Conference contained in the National Archives, Washington, D. C. A few days after the opening of the conference a press conference was held by Arthur W. Page and a Mr. Wilson. After giving the news of the day's events, Page made this statement to the press:

> In the work here, our object has been to try to keep the press informed as well as possible on current affairs and any other questions, and we find that it would be easier if there were more of us, and in that circumstance I am particularly happy that Mr. Wilson, who has been in this very much longer than I have, is going to take it on.
>
> This introduction of mine is like most introductions. The fellow that the crowd knows best is introduced by the fellow they know least. That is the regular procedure. Many of you do know Mr. Wilson and have known him so I don't need to say any more about him. You will find us both going on with the job of trying to be as useful to you as possible, both as to current news and any other things you would like to know. Mr. Wilson is in 515 and I am in the little room, you can always get me there. Either one of us will always be available.
>
> If I am not there, I will have somebody there to tell you where I am. That doesn't mean the Secretary won't have press conferences, but he will not have his daily ones as we had hoped for at first. The pressure of the work made it difficult for him. We hope he will have as many as possible and we hope from time to time the other members of the delegation will also. That is about the end of the tale I know tonight, unless there are some questions.[16]

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[16] Transcript of press conference, Tuesday, January 21, 1930, 6:00 p. m. in Record Group 43, London Naval Conference, 1930, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D. C.

The press arrangements made by Arthur Page seemed to work well, at least for a while. The policy appeared to be full disclosure directly after a meeting, telling what had happened, a summary of who said what to whom, within security restrictions. At a 12 noon press conference on Tuesday, January 28, 1930, the final question from an unidentified correspondent was: "I move a unanimous vote of thanks for the new method that has come forward of giving us news. This is beautiful."[17]

The officer conducting the conference, Mr. Marriner, seconded the correspondent's motion.

Yet there lingered a considerable amount of home front press criticism of the proceedings in London. Some of this has been blamed on the delegation for not keeping the Department of State and the President better informed of the activities.

Morison reports:

> There was also the matter of communicating with the home base. Cotton's letters and cables suggest that men in the State Department were not always sure they knew what their chief was going to do next and Dawes believed that Stimson did not make enough of an effort to keep the President informed of what he was doing at the moment.[18]

When it appeared in early April that the conference would be successfully terminated soon, the press reports

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[17] Ibid., Tuesday, January 28, 1930, 12 noon.

[18] Morison, op. cit., p. 338.

in the United States seemed to continue on their pessimistic note. Nothing that was coming from London seemed to be aimed toward dispelling this relative gloom. It became necessary for the President and the Under Secretary of State, Joseph Cotton, to cable to Stimson that "We both deem it essential that you commence now to give to the news that comes out of London a clear note of exultation in your success."[19]

Although Stimson was not one given to expressions such as "clear notes of exultation," he did express confidence in the treaty as an end to naval competition between the United States, Great Britain and Japan. Both Hoover and Stimson stoutly maintained that the treaty was a considerable achievement. It was signed in London on April 22, 1930, and accepted by the U. S. Senate in special session that summer.

The conference had droned on for more than three months, amassing voluminous records and tonnage statistics. Adviser Page was there (at a salary of $1.00 per month--a U. S. Treasury check for $ .97, dated January 31, 1930, is among the Page Papers, his uncashed pay for January 2-31, 1930) with little to advise on.

> But even if we accomplished little, the Colonel deserves a medal for hard work. At that time I could take as much punishment as most people but when it was over I slept practically 24 hours on the boat. Keeping

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[19] Ibid., p. 336.

up with him at that time was a real job.[20]

Page did a commendable job in defending the treaty later in the United States and pointing out its real values. But the stage from which he could expound these views was severely limited. For example, an excellent address titled "The Meaning of the London Conference" was delivered by Page as the Commencement Address at Vassar on June 10, 1930, and later reprinted in the Vassar Quarterly. In this article Page says the London Conference accomplished four substantial things: (1) It continued and strengthened the principle of naval limitation; (2) it recorded the utmost confidence between the three largest naval powers by limiting all their ships of war; (3) it reduced the size of the navies of the three great nations; and (4) it gave France and Italy an added incentive to settle their differences.[21]

To his good friend, Ellery Sedgwick, Page wrote this somewhat idealistic assessment of the London Conference:

> The fact that you saw little accomplishment in the London Naval Conference keeps coming back into my mind. . . . The number of tons and guns does not seem to me the crucial point. But for the great nations to

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[20]Letter to Elting E. Morison, October 1, 1959, Box 60, Folder 4, of Arthur W. Page Papers.

[21]Arthur W. Page, "The Meaning of the London Conference," Vassar Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3 (July, 1930), pp. 137-141.

> agree to consult their neighbors about the means of defense which has been the very citadel of jealous nationalism does seem to me important. If Hughes at Washington gave birth (or rebirth) to the idea, Stimson at London kept it alive and made it grow.[22]

Mr. Page was probably ahead of his time and was perhaps flirting with the idea of mutual defense pacts as we know them today--but only as long as the pact, at that time, was between the United States and Great Britain. For his entire life Page was a strong advocate of the strong free powers accepting responsibility for maintaining peace throughout the world. The division of powers which results from organizations such as the League of Nations and today's United Nations was not, in his opinion, the road to stable, peaceful conditions in the world.

Another assessment of the London Naval Conference was made by Page nearly 30 years later in a letter to Dr. Elting E. Morison (who was then preparing the manuscript for Turmoil and Tradition):

> I agree that it /the London Naval Conference/ didn't stop the world sliding into Armageddon. But the real chances to stop the slide were later and it is my feeling that they were far less well handled than the Naval Conference.
>
> Hoover was more or less on the side of the Navy. . . . Stimson and Admiral Pratt didn't care whether we or the British got advantages by the definitions adopted to arrive at equality. They were greatly strengthened by the fact that the British Navy didn't

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[22]Letter to Ellery Sedgwick, Atlantic Monthly, Boston, dated October 17, 1930, Box 2, of Arthur W. Page Papers.

care how this question came out.

Pratt and Fischer looked upon the two fleets as allies. The result was a bettering of American-British relations.

On paper, the Treaty seemed to contain the Japanese which was the main purpose of the Conference.

However, in a fairly short time various of the Japanese, responsible for agreeing to the Treaty, were shot or committed hari-kari.

This led me to suggest to my boys, then in college, to join the R.O.T.C. and be somewhat ready for a war.

I always felt that the Colonel managed the Conference well, that it was worth trying to get the Japanese agreement on the assumption that they might keep it. None of us, at that time, expected Hitler to change world conditions.

With the Japanese we at least tried to keep the peace and balance of power. When Mussolini and Hitler came along, we let the issues go by default until the final act.[23]

Whether or not Japan was really believed to be so much of a villain in 1930 as Page says is hard to know. Hoover claimed the conference achieved its most important aim, parity with Great Britain, and has never changed this stand. Perhaps the events of 1941-45 helped color Page's thoughts on the Depression years meeting.

Relief from Duty

Arthur Page did not again serve Henry L. Stimson in his "aide" capacity until the Colonel accepted once more

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[23]Letter to Elting E. Morison, Peterborough, N. H., October 1, 1959, Box 60 of Arthur W. Page Papers.

the call to active service and became President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Secretary of War. That association of Page and Stimson will be covered more fully in another chapter.

After the death of Mr. Stimson in 1950, Arthur W. Page and McGeorge Bundy were named as co-trustees of the Stimson Papers. Included in this trusteeship, and with the financial and hearty support of Mrs. Stimson, was the supervision of the selection of a biographer to chronicle the life and times of Henry L. Stimson. Dr. Elting E. Morison was selected, and cited often herein.

In the Foreword Dr. Morison says: "This book was written at the suggestion of Arthur W. Page and McGeorge Bundy, the trustees of the papers of Henry L. Stimson."

And on page 658 Dr. Morison says: "I am also and particularly in the debt of Arthur W. Page and McGeorge Bundy for the freedom given me to look for and to interpret in any way I wished the information to be found in the great collection under their trusteeship."

The satisfaction of Arthur W. Page with the selection of Morison is indicated in his letter to the author upon completion of the work:

> Being a Trustee to get a scholarly book written about a person you care about is as hazardous as having a portrait painted.
>
> I shall never do it again. I have done it twice, once with Hendrick, writing the life of my father, and now with you, writing the life of Henry L. Stimson. Each to me is an outstanding success. I'll take no

more risks with a perfect score.[24]

Upon completion of the book, Page and Bundy presented the Stimson Collection to the Yale University Library along with a fund suitable for perpetual maintenance. The services of the Aide to the Colonel had been completed scarcely a year before he, too, would pass away.

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[24] Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

RECALLED TO DUTY

> The United States fought this war to an amazing degree on a different basis from any heretofore. By a larger use of brains and materiel, instead of casualties, it is bringing most of our men back alive. By a greater use of brains and organization in recreation and human consideration, it is bringing them back not only alive but in their right minds.[1]

The United States was awakening, in 1940, to the fact that the war droning on in Europe was not going to be easily won by our traditional allies, even with our un-neutral support. The Selective Service Act became law, and National Guard units were being called up for a year of active service. Old camps were being reopened, and new camps were rising from the swamps of Georgia and the deserts of California.

The War Department's Mobilization Regulation 1-10, October 21, 1939, had authorized a War Department Welfare Advisory Council. The President had, in November, 1940, directed the Federal Security Agency to coordinate all the health, medical and welfare activities of the communities outside of military bases.

An Army, mushrooming from only 138,000 in 1935 to 1,460,000 in 1941, and ultimately to more than eight million in 1945, had little time for the niceties. It had to train

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[1] Letter to Lindsley F. Kimball, December 19, 1945, Box 13, Arthur W. Page Papers.

men for combat and technical jobs--how to fly and fight in airplanes--how to fight effectively as a team--and how to stay alive under all conditions.

The Navy exploded from 160,000 men in 1940 to nearly four million men in 1945 and was intensely preoccupied with the training of men to fight above, on and under the sea. It, too, had little time or personnel to spare for the morale, or welfare and recreational necessities.

Dr. Clarence Dykstra, president of the University of Wisconsin and then head of the Selective Service System, suggested on December 13, 1940, that the Secretary of War appoint a committee of civilians and War Department General Staff representatives to supervise a constructive system of educational and recreational work for selectees.[2]

On January 9, 1941, nearly a year before Pearl Harbor, the War Department Committee on Education, Recreation and Community Service was established. Frederick H. Osborn, later to be Major General Osborn and Chief of War Department Special Services, was named civilian head of the committee. Other members included Dr. Dykstra; Wayne Coy, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget; Charles P. Taft, Cincinnati City Councilman and later Assistant Director of the Office of Defense Health

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[2]Report of Fowler V. Harper, retiring chairman of Joint Committee, August 7, 1942, in Box 9, Arthur W. Page Papers.

and Welfare Services; Robert Sherwood, the New York dramatist; and Colonel L. Kemper Williams and Lieutenant Colonel H. F. Thompson of the Army.[3]

This committee did not last long. In less than a month Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, and Federal Security Administrator Paul V. McNutt had realized the value of a joint effort. The memorandum of understanding of these three was approved by the President on February 8, 1941, and announced to the public on February 12, 1941.[4]

The memorandum stated that the Army should be responsible for all welfare programs on Army posts, the Navy on Naval Stations, and the Federal Security Agency would coordinate all activities in the communities outside military installations. The new organization--called the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation--would also coordinate the programs of all government agencies and private agencies concerned with the welfare of troops, and would act as a link between the service programs on the one hand and the civilian programs on the other.

Duties of the Joint Committee--Pre-Pearl Harbor

The first few months were occupied with

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[3] Ibid.

[4] War Department Press Release, February 12, 1941, in Box 7, Arthur W. Page Papers.

organizational matters primarily. The United Service Organizations was established, and contracts were made with the government to supply personnel and government-built recreation buildings, and to operate welfare and recreational programs under the Federal Security Agency in "defense" communities.

A Morale Branch was organized within the Army, reporting direct to the Chief of Staff. It had been previously a division in the Office of the Adjutant General. In the Navy it was the Welfare and Recreation Section.

A Sub-committee on Education was established with Dr. Dykstra as Chairman and a total of 18 members. Camp Shows, Inc., was organized to accept gifts from the public and to send shows to military bases. This later became an affiliate of the USO.

Other advisory sub-committees organized were: Music, with 13 members; Radio, with 6 members; Religion, with 27 members; Hostesses, with 7 members; and Research with 6 members. A sub-committee on Athletics was organized later.[5]

A sub-committee on an Army newspaper was set up temporarily, with Egbert White as Chairman. When the study was completed and the plan presented, the sub-committee was terminated. It is interesting to note that

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[5]Organization Charts of Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation, Box 9, Arthur W. Page Papers.

Egbert White, as an Army officer, later became chief of the military newspaper, Stars & Stripes, in Europe.

The missions of most sub-committees are obvious, but two might be clarified. The sub-committee on Hostesses chose the girls who would operate the Service Clubs; the Research sub-committee tested the effectiveness of Special Service programs, and tried to measure troop morale.

After December 7, 1941

Once the United States was firmly in the war, the tempo of all war activities increased, including that of welfare and recreation. In October, 1941, Fowler V. Harper had succeeded Frederick H. Osborn as Chairman of the Committee. The latter had been commissioned a Brigadier General and was Chief of Special Services in the Army's Services of Supply.

In February, 1942, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy issued revised instructions to the Joint Committee. This memorandum restated the committee's responsibility for liaison with the War and Navy Departments, the Federal Security Agency and all other government or private agencies active in the field of welfare and recreation for servicemen. In the case of these civilian agencies, liaison would also be maintained with the President's Committee on War Relief Agencies.

The memorandum gave the Joint Committee the

responsibility for aiding and advising all branches of government which dealt with welfare and recreation matters. The Committee was also charged with keeping itself, and all of its sub-committees, informed of what other agencies of government and private agencies were doing in the same field.

Perhaps most interesting of the duties specified were those aimed toward keeping the public informed of the

> . . . various approved recreational and welfare programs being carried on for servicemen. In the discharge of this responsibility the Committee may have such access to the various military reservations as the Secretary of War (and Navy) may authorize for the purpose of making observations and surveys.[6]

The memorandum further directed the Joint Committee to report to Secretary of War Stimson, through the Assistant Secretary, from time to time concerning the operations and programs being carried on by the various operating agencies.

Sub-Committee on Radio

It is perhaps some measure of the man, Arthur W. Page, that up until now he had served the government in positions almost entirely unrelated to his own business and training. Except for the period of service as advisor to the Army on public relations, all of his government

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[6]War Department, Memorandum for Mr. Fowler Harper, February 3, 1942, Box 8, Arthur W. Page Papers.

service followed this pattern.

Arthur Page was introduced to the Joint Committee by three good friends. These were Frederick H. Osborn, who had been the original committee chairman; Arthur C. Farlow, an executive of J. Walter Thompson Company, who was then serving in the Special Services Division of the War Department; and Francis Keppel, who Osborn had installed as Secretary of the Joint Committee.

In May, 1942, Page accepted the position as Chairman of the Sub-committee on Radio. Also on the sub-committee, with rank as Special Consultants to the Secretary of War, were such distinguished men as Ralph Starr Butler of General Foods; William Paley of the Columbia Broadcasting System; Niles Trammel of the National Broadcasting Company; and John V. Reber of J. Walter Thompson Company.

(Although this is the first official position that Page held, it is not the beginning of his influence in connection with activities of the Joint Committee. During May, 1942, the Committee was informed that Carnegie Corporation of New York had voted to donate $50,000 to the USO for the year. The philanthropic foundation had denied the USO request the preceding year. Arthur W. Page was a member of the Carnegie Board.)

The principal duties of the Radio Sub-committee were to obtain radio-phonograph units for the troops

overseas; to broadcast music, news and entertainment programs via short wave from New York and San Francisco to our forces overseas; to obtain transcriptions of popular radio programs for shipment overseas; and to continue carrier radio research at Camp Indio, California, toward better overseas short wave programming.[7]

Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation

The work of the sub-committee was scarcely under way before Arthur Page was called on for a bigger, tougher job. A letter from Brigadier General Osborn notified Page that Fowler V. Harper was resigning as chairman of the Joint Committee because of the press of his other government work on the Manpower Commission, and that Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson wanted Page as Harper's replacement. He agreed to take the job.[8] The formal letters of invitation from Secretaries Stimson and Knox were sent to Page in early August and he replied promptly.[9]

Arthur Page inherited a powerful group of individuals on the Joint Committee. In addition to the military

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[7]Minutes of First Meeting, Sub-committee on Radio, May 15, 1942, Box 8, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[8]Letter from Brigadier General Osborn, July 24, 1942, and telegram acceptance, Box 8, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[9]Letters from Secretaries Stimson and Knox, dated August 4, 1942, and Mr. Page's letter of acceptance, August 6, 1942, Box 8, Arthur W. Page Papers.

members from both Army and Navy, it included the resigning chairman, Fowler V. Harper, Deputy Chairman, War Manpower Commission; Dr. Clarence Dykstra, Wayne Coy and Charles P. Taft from the original seven member committee formed more than a year before; Dr. Raymond B. Fosdick, Rockefeller Foundation, who had been chairman of a similar group in World War I; Mr. Channing Tobias, National Council, Young Men's Christian Association; Chester Barnard, President of the United Service Organizations; Richard F. Allen, Vice Chairman of the American Red Cross; Fred K. Hoehler, Director, American Public Welfare Association; and Robert E. Sherwood, New York dramatist.

To this distinguished group, Arthur Page sought and won the services of Miss Sarah Gibson Blanding, Dean of the College of Home Economics of Cornell University and later President of Vassar College. Miss Blanding proved especially valuable to the Committee in the area of welfare and recreation requirements of women in the service.

Committee meetings were held in Washington, usually once a month, sometimes oftener.

> Ordinarily there is not more than a day's other work in the shape of reading reports, etc., per month. Yet when a matter comes up which is particularly in the scope of a member and by spending time that member can really serve the Army or Navy, it is expected that the time will be available within reason. In other words, a Committee member exposes herself to special demands, but only when there is an opportunity to

really render service.[10]

Although military membership changed from time to time, especially during the later months of the Committee's life, those with the earliest and longest tenure were Brigadier General (later Major General) Frederick H. Osborn, Director of the Special Service Division, U. S. Army and his Deputy Director, Colonel Livingston Watrous; Captain C. C. Baughman, Director of Special Activities, Bureau of Naval Personnel and his director of Welfare Division, Commander John L. Reynolds; and Lieutenant Colonel David S. Barry, Officer in Charge, Morale Section, U. S. Marine Corps. These men and their successors represented the military agencies who were the operators of the welfare and recreational programs on the military posts and overseas.

In World War I the civilian agencies provided all the welfare and recreation services that the military received. Raymond B. Fosdick was the chairman of the committee that coordinated their functions. In his final report, he recommended that the military services provide the bulk of these services from their own personnel and financial assets; the civilian agencies would perform only those functions beyond the capability of the military forces. As a member of the Joint Committee during World

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[10]Letter to Miss Sarah Gibson Blanding, January 20, 1943, Box 9, Arthur W. Page Papers.

War II, Fosdick was to see his recommendations carried out and to help in their implementation.

The civilian operating agencies involved principally were the American Red Cross, providing invaluable services both in the U. S. and overseas; the United Service Organizations, which was a union of the YMCA, YWCA, the Catholic Charities, the Jewish Charities, the Salvation Army and other organizations interested in the morale and spiritual welfare of the military forces. One of the important jobs that the Joint Committee was able to perform was that of conciliation between these organizations when areas of operation and interest brought them into conflict.

In November, 1942, the composition of the Joint Committee was formalized by letters from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.[11] The appropriate offices of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps were named, the Red Cross, USO, the Assistant Director of the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services (later to be the office of Community War Services), and the Director of the American Public Welfare Association. The other members on the committee who did not represent any of these organizations were requested to continue to serve.

The Joint Committee remained with this composition

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[11] Letters from Secretary Stimson, dated November 11, 1942, and Secretary Knox, dated November 10, 1942, in Box 9, Arthur W. Page Papers.

until the Army's Chief of Chaplains raised the issue of representation in 1945.

What Did the Joint Committee Do?

Mission statements, couched in general terms, are not very helpful. They seldom tell what a group actually did. It is often the report of what methods a group used to accomplish its duties and responsibilities that is more important. This section will try to do that.

This committee took its work seriously. This is evidenced by the fact that in the 61 months from March, 1941, until April, 1946, the Joint Committee met 56 times. The sub-committees met countless times, and informal sessions among members were common.

A dedicated, though small, permanent staff carried on the work of daily contacts, administration, following the status of hundreds of programs, preparing agendas, etc. This task fell primarily on Francis Keppel, who Frederick H. Osborn had lured from Harvard to be Secretary of the Committee. (Keppel is now Commissioner of Education in the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare.) Later when Keppel left to be an assistant to General Osborn and then for active service in the Army, Miss Doris Goss took over until more lucrative civil employment was offered. Then Arthur W. Page arranged for John M. Russell, former executive with the Carnegie

Corporation and then serving as a major in the Army Engineers, to be released in September, 1944, from active duty and serve as Executive Director and Secretary until the Committee was dissolved.

Committee Meetings

A typical meeting of the committee, with Arthur W. Page presiding, was the 29th meeting held at 9:30 a. m., September 21, 1943, at the Pentagon. Subjects covered included:

a. Report on visits of Mr. A. B. Elias to military installations in Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana and Kansas, and future visits scheduled to Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

b. Reports of visits of Mr. James G. Hanes to North Carolina.

c. Plans for Miss Sarah Gibson Blanding to visit installations where WACS, WAVES and SPARS were on duty.

d. Report of William Leigh, USO, of his visits to Alaska, Newfoundland and the Caribbean.

e. Problems of finding good professional talent for Camp Shows and what steps were being and should be taken to assist this situation; i.e., increase in "GI" shows and recruiting of amateur civilian talent.

f. New paperback book distribution plan to bring out 30 new titles each month with 50,000 of each on automatic purchase.

g. Report of General Osborn's recent trip to England and status of all programs in which the Committee is interested.

h. Race relations that were causing some difficulties at some military camps, and what could be done to improve the lot of the Negro soldiers.

i. Proposed use of the ARC and the USO in the

orientation programs of the armed forces.[12]

It is significant that few of the items presented at Joint Committee meetings were simply for the information of the members. Members were kept constantly abreast of all programs by correspondence from the office of the Secretary. At the monthly meetings courses of action were decided upon--or decisions that had been made and implemented by the Secretary and the Chairman between meetings were reported. The emphasis was on action, accomplishment, and service.

The Committee was not the operating agency for the welfare and recreation programs. It had no jurisdiction over the operating personnel or the fiscal or legal affairs of the programs. Its authority came from its direct access to the two service Secretaries, but this was rarely used. Its influence, and ability to get action, came more from the personal and official friendships developed between the men in charge of the programs and the members of the Committee. In this, Arthur W. Page was extremely successful.

Field Visits

When the first, or "building," stage of the Joint Committee's program was completed, it started to evaluate

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[12]Minutes of 29th Meeting of Joint Committee, September 21, 1943, in Box 10, Arthur W. Page Papers.

its effectiveness. It was time, Arthur Page decided, that more formal reports be made to the service Secretaries in compliance with their original directive to the Committee.

The Committee had no system to obtain information about its programs except through the operating agencies, and these could hardly be impartial. "Yet such impartiality of viewpoint, coupled with the highest quality of judgment, were essential if good 'management' reports were to be made to the Secretaries of War and Navy, and were to guide future policies."[13]

It was clear that the Secretaries needed such reports. Although the pressure of winning the war was all-pervasive then, the Secretaries would eventually be held responsible by the government and the public if servicemen were not taken care of adequately in the camps and in the towns and cities. In their February, 1942, Memorandum the Secretaries had said: "The Committee may have such access to the various military reservations as the Secretary of War (and Navy) may authorize for the purpose of making observations and surveys."[14]

The members of the committee often visited specific installations themselves. However, they all were fully

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[13]Memorandum to Mr. Crawford Greene from Francis Keppel, July 27, 1943, Box 10, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[14]War Department, Memorandum for Mr. Fowler Harper, loc. cit.

employed with other jobs and were not free to be frequent observers. To remedy this, Page asked Mr. A. B. Elias, retired President of the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, and Mr. James G. Hanes, Chairman of the Board of the Hanes Hosiery Company, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, to be the impartial eyes and ears of the Committee. He had also hoped to get Mr. Crawford Greene, an attorney friend of San Francisco, to cover the posts in the West. However, the United States Attorney General ruled that Greene could not serve the government, even in this unpaid capacity, because his law firm handled claim cases against the United States Government. So Elias pitched in and covered the Western States, too.

The field visits were no mere formality. The representatives of the committee were asked to dig into and make judgments on three questions: (1) the status of relations between the post and the civilian communities nearby; (2) whether the facilities and personnel were accomplishing the welfare and recreation program reasonably well, poorly, or badly; and (3) what should be the first steps toward improvement at each particular camp.

In discussing these problems, representatives were expected to consider: (1) the opinions held by the officers and men about the nearby communities, and vice versa; (2) a comparison of the program to that of World War I; (3) A.W.O.L. and venereal disease rates of the camp;

(4) the general quality of the operating personnel, military and civilian; (5) design and size of the recreation facilities; (6) contact between the soldier and his home; (7) race relations in the camp and in the nearby communities; (8) adequacy of transportation between camp and town; (9) effectiveness of the Army and Navy orientation and "Why we fight" programs; (10) how well the men use the facilities and materials available, and (11) the attitudes of the men themselves.[15]

The contributions of these field visitors were enormous and varied. Mr. Elias, for example, visited 42 camps and stations in Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Kansas and Texas; he inspected more than 50 camps and stations in California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington and Idaho. He visited stations in Pennsylvania, Maryland and New Jersey, as well. His reports and recommendations covered everything from the need for better trained personnel to a different OPA classification for Service Clubs so they would not run out of Coca Cola and ice cream so early in the day.[16]

Mr. Manes examined all possible military installations in North and South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama,

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[15]Memorandum to Mr. Crawford Greene, loc. cit.

[16]Letter report from A. B. Elias, in Box 9, Arthur W. Page Papers.

Mississippi and Florida. At one point he reported:

> I have been delighted to find that progress in the camps I have visited, without exception, are /sic/ moving along nicely. To be sure, some of them are better than others. It is only natural that the activities at the camps reflect the efficiency of their officers and while they are all anxious to render their very best possible services, some of them are blessed with greater imagination than others, which helps tremendously.[17]

Mr. Fred K. Hoehler, The American Public Welfare Association member of the Joint Committee, toured the Virginia and North Carolina areas in 1942, with special attention to improving conditions around some of the bases. He worked out extensive plans with Governor J. M. Broughton of North Carolina for the control of prostitution around the camps in that state, and the medical and social rehabilitation of the prostitutes.[18]

In 1943 Mr. Hoehler went to North Africa to survey conditions there for the Committee.

Miss Sarah Gibson Blanding was also active in the field visit program and visited installations throughout the Midwest and the East where there were WACS, WAVES, SPARS and female Marines. Her report to the Committee covered housing, food service, hospital facilities, community activities for women, morale, etc. Her visits and the

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[17]Letter report from James G. Hanes, February 14, 1944, Box 10, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[18]Letter report of Fred K. Hoehler, November 9, 1942, Box 9, Arthur W. Page Papers.

reports resulted directly in improved conditions, better programming for women's welfare and recreational activities, and probably improved morale among the girls.[19]

After John M. Russell took over as Executive Director and Secretary of the Joint Committee in 1944 he visited the United States Armed Forces Institute in Madison, Wisconsin, and he made specific recommendations for "beefing it up" because of the big increase in business expected at the end of the war.[20]

Arthur W. Page made two trips to Europe on War Department business in 1944 and 1945 and conducted a good deal of Joint Committee business. However, these trips were made at the request of the Army and mostly concerned the Army. Therefore, they will be reported in Chapter V on War Department Public Relations.

Joint Committee representatives visited more than 80 per cent of all Army, Navy and Marine Corps stations in the United States, and many overseas.

Keeping the Peace

One of the problem areas that cropped up again and again during the life of the Joint Committee was the USO-ARC jurisdiction dispute. To avoid duplicating

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[19]Letter report of Miss Blanding, April 5, 1944, Box 11, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[20]Letter report of John M. Russell, December 4, 1944, Box 12, Arthur W. Page Papers.

facilities, the USO did not normally operate where the Red Cross was handling recreational matters. Conflicts arose when (a) Red Cross clubs used the services of USO-affiliated Camp Shows, Inc., and (b) when by War Department decision the USO was not permitted in the Philippines and China.

The first problem was satisfactorily mediated by the Committee to the agreement of the agencies, but the second problem was more difficult. The Red Cross monopoly in two Far Eastern countries did not set well with member agencies of the USO. The YMCA-YWCA, Catholic Charities and Salvation Army already had wholly-owned properties in those countries; it seemed senseless to them to abandon such operations simply because of a government-granted Red Cross monopoly.

One of the principal reasons for formation of the USO was to permit overseas commanders to deal with one welfare and recreation agency in an area, rather than a multitude. It appeared that this would be the case in the Far East unless some reason was inserted into the affair.

Arthur Page supplied the reason with a characteristically direct approach--to the Secretary of War. The USO was soon able to operate in these areas where they did not completely overlap with ARC facilities.[21]

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[21]Letter to Harvey H. Bundy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, January 18, 1945, Box 12, Arthur W. Page Papers, and letter from Lindsley F. Kimball, president of USO in 1945, October 23, 1964.

Overseas Extensions

The coordinating functions of the Joint Committee appeared to be so successful in the United States that in one monthly meeting it was proposed that the idea be extended to the oversea commands. The Secretaries of War and Navy quickly approved the idea and part of their policy statement reads:

> It is therefore desired that, in each theater of operations outside the continental United States, Joint Army and Navy Liaison Groups be established immediately at all appropriate command levels for the purpose of coordinating the activities of the armed forces and of the civilian agencies authorized to operate with them in the respective theaters pertaining to the welfare and recreation of armed forces personnel, including leisure time educational activities where liaison has not otherwise been specifically provided for. It is recommended that, wherever practicable in the opinion of commanders of the armed forces, these Liaison Groups be composed of such service personnel or their representatives as have been or may in the future be designated to assist in operating the details of such activities, and that representatives of the Red Cross and/or the USO be included wherever practicable.[22]

This policy statement was sent to all oversea commands by a War Department directive dated July 17, 1944. There is evidence in the Page Papers that such Liaison Groups were set up in the European Theater and the China-Burma-India Theater, but there is no report of their activities. Such emphasis from the top must have had a salutory effect on Welfare and Recreational operations.

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[22]Joint Statement of Policy by the Secretaries of War and Navy, July 5, 1944, Box 11, Arthur W. Page Papers.

however.

Demobilization Planning

In 1943, after the Joint Committee was satisfied that all major programs were operating effectively, it started to plan for the demobilization needs for welfare and recreation. Keppel, with his education background, was a leader in this field. He recognized that the problems of the Committee would center around the vastly increased need for education, welfare and recreation facilities immediately after an armistice and before demobilization was completed, the period of adjustment, the use of military skills in civilian employment, and in the retraining of many for different civilian jobs.

Keppel arranged a meeting between John E. McMillin of the Compton Advertising Agency and Colonel Francis T. Spalding of the Education office to discuss problems of demobilization preparations. Upon receiving a copy of McMillin's letter to Spalding after the meeting, Page wrote to Keppel:

> McMillin is 100 per cent right. The media and techniques /of reaching service men and women/ are not so difficult. A policy is difficult.
>
> What do you want to tell the boys? And if they learn what you tell them, what do you expect the results to be?[23]

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[23]Letter to Francis Keppel, August, 1943, Box 10, Arthur W. Page Papers.

Arthur Page was apparently not sold on the need for an elaborate re-education, re-training, re-adjustment program. He knew that the military forces could not and should not run employment services for returning men. And he had much more faith in the abilities of the young men and women than some of the government planners. His feelings are summed up in an August, 1943, letter to his fellow public relations practitioner, Pendleton Dudley:

> I read in the paper that there is going to be a great effort to provide jobs for the returning soldier men, and if not jobs, then education or vocational training.
>
> In all this discussion there is a little tendency to assume that these people coming back are somewhat helpless people; that they are of the kind that grow up in a regimented society in a totalitarian state; who need to be told what to think, what to do, when to play and how to laugh. There seems little expectation that the men themselves will have much ingenuity either to make jobs for themselves or get them. Yet they are coming to the greatest market in the world at a time when in all probability great sums of money will be floating around and when there will be no surplus of manpower. If these were Swedes they would think they had come to the land of plenty and opportunity.
>
> Many of these boys will come back with quite a little money accumulated--perhaps as much as it cost the Wright brothers to perfect the flying machine--$1,400--or as much as Henry Ford had to start the automobile business, and as much as thousands and thousands of people have had to start a small machine shop, garage, farm, hot dog stand, country store, specialty shop in town, a service station for furnaces and frigidaires, and a thousand and one other things. In fact, it may be that the bright boys will start their own business because if they get a job they will probably only be allowed to work 40 hours and not exert themselves at that, so that their chances of getting ahead will not be so good--while if they start

> their own business they can work as long as they like, produce as much as they want, and rise as fast as their capacities merit.
>
> I would love to see someone ask the question whether when the boys come out of the Army they will all be looking for somebody to take care of them, give them a job, guarantee security or whether some of them will still have the ambition and initiative to create some kind of life of their own.[24]

Arthur Page did, however, believe that some sort of a Guide to the United States was needed for returning service men. He believed that it should be non-official, published by Stars & Stripes or Yank, and could be light-hearted and humorous yet with important information and suggestions. Such a book, although official, was published by the Information Branch of the Information and Education Division of the Army, and served a useful purpose.[25]

Page also felt strongly about the need for trained Special Service officers and took the occasion of a periodic Joint Committee report to tell how he felt. In a letter to Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, Page recommended that Special Services be made a Corps of the Army with its own Table of Organization, and that its officers have school training in the same way that other arms and services of the Army do. Page also made this

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[24]Letter to Mr. Pendleton Dudley, New York, August 3, 1943, Box 10, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[25]Letter to Colonel Franklin S. Forsberg, New York Office, I & E Division, November 3, 1944, Box 12, Arthur W. Page Papers.

recommendation in later public relations documents, but was never able to convince those capable of making such changes.[26]

Despite extensive planning for post-war recreational needs, and exhaustive suggestions for the Joint Committee's active participation, little of the material was ever used. The operating agencies knew, too, that demobilization would bring huge increases in use of their facilities, and they prepared, as best they could, for that time. Nor is there any evidence that returning servicemen had any serious readjustment and reemployment problems.

Final Report

In January, 1946, the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation made its final operating report to the Service Secretaries. The highlights were:

a. Motion Pictures. The services had the largest movie circuit in the world, with 550 Navy theaters and over 1,100 Army theaters. Three new programs were shipped overseas each week for the duration.

b. Radio. Seventy hours of programs were provided overseas each week; 59 programs were donated, and 77 programs were recorded each week. By the end of 1942 Armed Forces Radio Service was distributing 2,500

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[26]Letter to John J. McCloy, September 24, 1945, Box 12, Arthur W. Page Papers.

transcriptions per month, and this increased to 120,000 monthly by December, 1945. The Army used 177 radio stations of its own, 54 foreign government stations, and 4,400 hours of short wave broadcasts per week from New York and San Francisco.

c. Professional Shows. USO Camp Shows sent 700 professional units overseas, and 500 units played in the United States. A total audience of over 155 million was estimated.

d. Soldier Shows. These became an important morale factor. One Marine show played to 1.1 million on 40 different Pacific Islands.

e. Athletics. Provided coaches, equipment, and league organizations.

f. Libraries. In addition to fixed and mobile libraries, 30 to 40 new pocketbook titles were sent overseas each month, and by September, 1945, more than 62 million books had been sent, as well as 120 million magazines per year.

g. Service Clubs, Ships Stores, Post Exchanges and Craft Shops flourished wherever there were American service men.

h. Education.

(1) It is understandable that anything that smacked of education received the full support of Arthur W. Page. USAFI had branches in London, Rome, Anchorage,

Brisbane, Manila, Cairo, New Delhi, Puerto Rico, Panama and New Caledonia. Enrollment in August, 1945, was Army, 870,000 and Navy, 350,000. Also 364 self-teaching educational manuals were issued to more than 16 million students. USAFI is still going strong, and is still in Madison, Wisconsin.

(2) Off duty vocational and academic courses were offered in overseas areas. American universities were established at Florence, Italy; Shrivenham, England; and Biarritz, France.

(3) Other services included foreign language guides, vocational training, accreditation and counseling.

i. Information and Education. Services such as these are essential to an effective fighting man. Radio was used extensively, and films such as "Why We Fight" series, "The Negro Soldier" and "Our Ally Britain" were produced and shown. Stars & Stripes published 1,200,000 daily in the European Theater, 200,000 daily in the Mediterranean, and 70,000 daily in the Pacific; and weekly editions were published in the CBI, Alaska, China and Persian Gulf Theaters. Yank Magazine grew from a circulation of 175,000 in June, 1942, to 2,400,000 per week at the end of the war. News-maps grew to 60,000 in the U. S., and 130,000 overseas by the end of the war.[27]

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[27]Report of Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation, May 1, 1946, Box 13, Arthur W. Page Papers.

Even by American Telephone and Telegraph Company standards, the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation had done a big job and done it well.

In a brief section on recommendations, the Joint Committee suggested that the Committee be reconstituted with new personnel and carry on its functions; that the programs of education, welfare and recreation started during the war be made a permanent part of the Army and Navy life; and that officers and men be trained and continued in the duties of operating these essential programs.

Final Meeting

The 56th meeting of the Joint Committee, held April 16, 1946, was the last meeting held on a monthly basis. Three members who had attended the first meeting February 14, 1941, were there--civilianized Frederick H. Osborn, Clarence A. Dykstra and Charles P. Taft.[28]

The Committee and its successor Civilian Advisory Committee, limped along until 1949, when it was finally dissolved. Arthur W. Page remained a member of the group, but the reconstitution of the United Service Organizations, Inc., was its only notable achievement.

Fortunately, the services have adopted the welfare

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[28]Minutes of 56th Meeting of Joint Committee, April 16, 1946, Box 13, Arthur W. Page Papers.

and recreation programs as permanent parts of their operations, and they regularly train personnel to carry on these important duties.

CHAPTER V

WAR DEPARTMENT PUBLIC RELATIONS

It appears from his correspondence that by the spring of 1944 Arthur W. Page was becoming restive. All major programs planned by the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation were running smoothly. The sub-committees and operating agencies were experienced and needed less supervision. Although its important work continued for two more years, the committee's biggest jobs were done.

The telephone companies, using Arthur Page's sure guidance set up years before, were sustaining good public relationships by being frank, honest and scrupulously fair. The Page sons (Walter H., Arthur W. Jr., and John H.) and son-in-law (Anderson F. Hewitt) were officers in the Navy and often serving at the four corners of the earth. War-time restrictions limited Arthur Page's family visits, and hunting and fishing trips.

Page probably thought he was not being active enough in the war effort.[1] His weekly visits to Washington had become routine but time-consuming. (He tried Army Air

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[1] Interview with sons of Arthur W. Page, September 8, 1964, loc. cit.

Corps "h[illegible]ike" air travel once and was stranded in Philadelp[illegible]. After that he rode the night trains to save working time.) He often saw Secretary Stimson, Assistant Secretary McCloy, and Chief of Staff Marshall on these trips, as well as tending to Joint Committee business. It was during one of these early 1944 visits to Washington that Arthur Page was asked to take on his next important Army assignment.

Prelude to Normandy

Secretary of War Stimson, General Marshall and Major General Frederick H. Osborn had an information problem. The invasion of Normandy was only a few months away. It was sure to be the supreme test of all the training, ability and sheer guts of our men--and our military leaders wanted to be sure every man was ready mentally as well as physically. Each had to understand why the U. S. was in this war and why he must fight for his country and freedom.

All military forces, as part of their training, try to instill fighting spirit into their men. But a "Why We Fight" lecture heard at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, doesn't have the impact of one heard on the way to the landing craft or transport.

So Arthur W. Page, civilian public relations practitioner and military welfare and recreation specialist, was chosen to help "get fighting ideas into men's

minds."[2]

Page was sent to assist Colonel Oscar N. Solbert (later Brigadier General) who was chief of Special Services for the European Theater of Operations. He expected the job to last a month or six weeks. Instead he stayed more than three months, until after the invasion of Normandy.

Prior to his departure on April 5, 1944, Page got to know one important part of military life--the hypodermic needle. On March 29, 1944, he was vaccinated for smallpox, and received the first of the three-shot series for Triple Typhoid, Tetanus and Typhus. Nothing in the Page Papers indicates his reactions or if he completed the series in Europe.[3]

On this trip, and a future one in 1945, Page had the assimilated rank of Colonel. Before he left, there had been some discussion with General Osborn about a commission in the Army. Arthur Page vetoed this idea because he believed he could be more effective as a civilian than as a "Johnny Come Lately" officer. Furthermore, if Page was commissioned in a grade junior to Colonel Solbert, it

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[2]Letter to Colonel W. B. Franey, July 18, 1944, Box 11, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[3]Minutes of 33d Meeting of Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation (JANC), March 1, 1944, Box 11, Arthur W. Page Papers.

might destroy their working relationship. And if commissioned in grade higher than Solbert, Page would have to take over the job and stay with it probably for the duration plus six months. There was also some question as to whether General John C. H. Lee would concur with such an assignment, and that would then require action through General Marshall or Secretary Stimson.[4]

So Arthur Page maintained his amateur standing--and wisely preserved his working relationships and firm and lasting friendship with Colonel Solbert. Page later wrote to the Secretary of War recommending Solbert's promotion to Brigadier General.

Pre-Invasion Orientation

In explaining to the Joint Committee on Welfare and Recreation what the Chairman was doing in London, Secretary Francis Keppel said:

> Mr. Page's job is to coordinate what is said to the troops through all the different media (Yank, Stars & Stripes, radio, news services, films, newsreels, etc.). He has drawn up a statement on information to be given the soldiers before the invasion which has been approved by general headquarters. Mr. Page sits in on staff meetings of officers responsible for getting the information to the troops and lays out a schedule of what should be told the soldiers from week to week.[5]

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[4]Letter from Major General F. H. Osborn, June 1, 1944, Box 11, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[5]Minutes of 35th Meeting, JANC, May 3, 1944, Box 11, Arthur W. Page Papers.

In an informal talk to members of the Information Department of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Arthur Page said it differently and characteristically:

> We spend considerable time and effort to try to persuade people in the Bell System--in print and otherwise--to be courteous and polite to the people they deal with. This was the same process in the Army in exactly the opposite direction. The job there was to persuade the men in the Army to be anything but polite to the Germans. The problem was to give the men in the invasion the maximum incentive to fight the Germans and the maximum knowledge of what kind of people they would be fighting and as much knowledge as possible to reinforce the training that they already had.[6]

Page outlined a program of orientation that he believed would improve the morale, determination and fighting spirit of the invasion troops. His plan called for simple, easy-to-understand ideas in Stars & Stripes and other soldiers' publications. Statements of Hitler and Goebbels were explained in the earthy language of G.I. Joe; combat veterans of the 1st U. S. Infantry Division told of their experiences fighting Germans in Africa, Sicily and Italy.

Evaluation of such a program is difficult. It was, at most, a tiny part of the immensely complex job of preparation. The invasion of Normandy may have been just as successful without the Page-planned orientations. On the side of negative evidence, the Army's historical

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[6]Transcript of informal talk by Arthur W. Page to Bell System employees, July 19, 1944, Box 11, Arthur W. Page Papers.

records report no failures on the beaches that could be traced to faulty or inadequate orientation. Page thought the efforts were effective and said simply, "There was considerable evidence to that effect from Normandy."[7] The battle was the pay-off.

The job did not stop with the successful invasion. Orientation and indoctrination is a continuing process. In addition to leaving a legacy of pre-invasion orientation aids, Page also set up a "lessons learned" and a "follow up" procedure. The motion picture films taken on D Day, D plus 1, D plus 2, and D plus 3 were assembled and analyzed. Film that had teaching value was selected, a sound track explaining the lessons was added, and the films were shipped to the fighting units as critiques of their performances.

Stars & Stripes

Page also recognized the hunger the men felt for their own printed newspaper, especially when they were cut off from their usual news supply. When men are assembled in a pre-invasion marshalling area and sealed off from contact with everything outside, Page said two things happen--attendance at church goes up 300 per cent, and attention to what is printed goes up about the same.

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[7]Letter to Colonel Franey, July 18, 1944, loc. cit.

He had some powerful allies in his efforts to get Stars & Stripes to the troops after the invasion. General Omar Bradley sent word from France that he wanted enough airplanes taken off military missions to deliver Stars & Stripes each morning from London.[8]

The importance of the paper to the troops was apparent when, early in the invasion, the Army Headquarters announced in the Stars & Stripes that one unit had taken a town when actually it had been taken by another. According to Page, the war nearly stopped then and there until credit was given to the proper outfit.[9]

The first Continental Edition of Stars & Stripes was almost started in a nearly-ruined print shop practically on the beachhead. On the evening before publication, however, two large shells damaged the press beyond repair.

When the advancing Army had cleared Cherbourg the Stars & Stripes staff moved in quickly and found a workable press and set up shop. The first continental edition was a great tribute to GI ingenuity. The press was no match for those of the London Times used for the edition printed in England; the paper "liberated" was partially damaged, and the printing job was not the best. But the

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[8]Transcript of talk by Arthur W. Page, July 19, 1944, loc. cit.

[9]Ibid.

troops were getting their own newspaper on the spot.[10]

Arthur W. Page was there, helping to start this edition so close to the lines. Lieutenant Colonel Ensley M. Llewellyn, officer in charge of the Stars & Stripes, Europe, wrote him in August, 1944, thanking him for his kindness and help in establishing the first continental edition of Stars & Stripes in Cherbourg.[11]

In his first letter to Colonel Solbert after returning to the United States, Page added this plea: "For Heaven's sake, get someone to send me Stars & Stripes regularly. I can't get on without my favorite daily."[12]

Immediate Follow-Up

Arthur Page was a man of action, although he often said, "I have long been of the opinion which recent events have confirmed, that God never meant me to hurry." In reporting on his activities in Washington after his trip to Europe, he said:

> I haven't got half the things done that I should have done in the time that I have been here. The plane went straight to Washington. I put in that day getting a little sleep and seeing my family who as a matter of fact were mostly in Washington. I also saw

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[10] Ibid.

[11] Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Ensley M. Llewellyn, August 22, 1944, Box 11, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[12] Letter to Colonel Oscar N. Solbert, July 19, 1944, Box 11, Arthur W. Page Papers.

> Osborn a little while and some of the others. Thursday and Friday I was in New York at telephone business. Saturday, back with Osborn seeing Bridgman and Sunday back in New York--and home to Long Island to sleep in my own bed for the first time.[13]

Arthur Page wrote Colonel Solbert the status of actions: to find a qualified deputy for Solbert; a recommendation that Colonel Spalding, from General Osborn's Education Division, be assigned as head of education in the theater; that newsprint for Stars & Stripes was getting top priority, etc.

Page also mentioned a subject that was to become more of a problem later and would require him to visit Europe again in 1945--the use of the soldiers' newspaper for publication of Army orientation material.

The Army regularly used Stars & Stripes and other soldier publications to inform the troops of important policies and orientation objectives. This looked like editorial dictation in some cases and was resented by the Stars & Stripes enlisted staff. They feared that if Stripes became a spokesman for the "brass" it would lose its ability to serve the fighting men. (The story of the irreverent group of journalists-turned-soldier who leaped from crisis to crisis to publish the European edition of the Stars & Stripes is told interestingly, although somewhat one-sidedly, in a book by two of the

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[13] Ibid.

participants.)[14]

Page's advice to Colonel Solbert in this regard was:

> If you have to change Wingert /a Stripes cartoonist/, do it with great care because all the correspondents in London know him and most of them know that we have used Stars & Stripes for Army purposes. This might mean that a hullabaloo would arise to the effect that not only in Africa but in E.T.O. the heavy military hand had stifled the soldiers' newspaper.
>
> I think I would tread a little lightly in this area and gain the ends you want by discussing objectives rather than ordering particular stuff in or out of the paper. The thing is going too well to jeopardize. However, I would sit down with Llewellyn /the officer in charge of Stars & Stripes/ and pick the Continental Editor with great care as one who would easily play ball.[15]

Colonel Solbert took Page's advice completely. He named Major Arthur Goodfriend, who had been writing the Army's soldier orientation material, as editor of the Continental Edition, Stars & Stripes. (Goodfriend later served in the Far East, and has written several books. The latest is The Twisted Image, published in 1963, a serious indictment of the operations of the United States Information Service in India.)

Of Goodfriend's efforts toward pre-invasion training of our troops, Page said:

The success /of the orientation program/ was largely

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[14] Bud Hutton and Andy Rooney, The Story of the Stars and Stripes (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1946).

[15] Letter to Colonel Solbert, July 19, 1944, loc. cit.

dependent upon the finding of a genius there who could translate all this into G.I. language, and he was able to do that because he was a genius and also because he kept himself informed on the state of mind of the boys in the Army. He was a major, but every six weeks he goes up to a replacement center, ships down to a fighting unit and goes in as a replacement private. He stays about a week and then comes back. That is his refresher course.[16]

Recalling this procedure, Goodfriend said that he:

> . . . mingled with the men. Experienced their difficulties. Sensitized myself to their problems, points of view, etc. Learned at first hand loneliness of the replacement system, attitudes toward combat, outlook on the enemy, the U. S., allies, etc. Gained therefrom inspiration for writing (in Stars & Stripes and other Army publications) helpful to troops, and serving interests of U. S.[17]

But the trip was not without its minor tragedy. Page ruefully admitted in his July 19, 1944, letter to Colonel Solbert:

> . . . the greatest defeat since Pearl Harbor. After I nursed the bottle of Cherbourg brandy brought to me by the inimitable team of showmen, /Major Arthur/ Goodfriend and /Major Harry A./ Berk, through the dangers of high altitude in the plane, I left it a day in the Pennsylvania Station in New York in my bag. And what do you think the damn thing did? It blew the cork from heat and wasted its substance on all my clothes! This is a hard war![18]

Recognition

The three months Page spent in England and France

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[16] Transcript of informal talk by Arthur W. Page, July 19, 1944, loc. cit.

[17] Letter from Arthur Goodfriend, October 7, 1964.

[18] Letter to Colonel Solbert, July 19, 1944, loc. cit.

were most useful to the Army. General F. H. Osborn wrote:

> It has been a superb job and my own very deep thankfulness for the sacrifice you have made in doing it is secondary to the deep satisfaction you must feel for the job you have done for the enlisted man.[19]

But perhaps more meaningful to Page was the letter that Colonel Solbert sent to General Osborn. It sums up so many of the Page qualities mentioned before--ability to work with others, analyze problems, coordinate actions--so well that it is quoted in its entirety:

> Through your help in making Arthur Page available to this Theater and, particularly, to this Division, the Morale Services Information, Orientation, and Education activities have been greatly improved. Mr. Page has given the program the added direction and impetus it needed.
>
> Today, as a result of Mr. Page's influence, through his keen insight with the many and diverse problems, and by virtue of his ability to work, not only with the immediate staff, but also with the personnel of higher echelons, Morale Services play a more distinct and vital role in this Theater.
>
> Mr. Page has been of invaluable assistance to me personally, and I know his ideas and help have been an inspiration to those members of the staff with whom he worked. He is respected for his ability and judgment. He has the capacity to analyze a problem in a simple way, and to coordinate diverse interests. Whatever orientation, publications, radio, and education may have been, they are vastly improved, both in their routine activities and their over-all policies because of Mr. Page's coordinating efforts.
>
> I realize that he is needed back in New York as well as in Washington. I hope, however, that you will find it possible to include in your plans the thought that Mr. Page may return to this Theater, for the

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[19] Letter from Major General F. H. Osborn, June 1, 1944, loc. cit.

battle here is the pay-off.

> Just as Major Bork has been of help in field surveys and in connection with personnel problems, Arthur Page has been of inestimable value in developing editorial policies and procedures and in setting standards which give the Information, Orientation, and Education activities caste and prestige. Major Bork and Mr. Page have both made splendid contributions. I am grateful to you for making them available to the Division, and I hope you will find it possible to send them back here to help finish the work they have had such a vital part in developing.[20]

Aftermath and Afterthoughts

In the months that followed, the problems of the Stars & Stripes and troop orientations remained in Arthur Page's mind. And the more it appeared that the war would soon be over, the more he thought about the need for a soldier's homecoming guide to the United States.

On October 11, 1944, he wrote to Colonel Franklin S. Forsberg, commander of the New York Branch Office of the Information and Education Division, and also officer in charge of Yank Magazine. Page suggested that Yank might prepare and run a series of articles on what the soldier might expect, and how to act when he got home. The series could be partially humorous, but with a lot of sensible information.

Forsberg passed the idea on to Lieutenant Colonel Paul G. Horgan, Chief of the Army Information Branch in

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[20]Letter from Colonel O. N. Solbert to Major General F. H. Osborn, July 10, 1944, Box 11, Arthur W. Page Papers. (Underlining added)

Washington, and plans for such a guide in booklet form were made. Horgan asked War Correspondent Ernie Pyle to write it, and he was considering it.[21]

Page also wrote to Colonel Solbert about the idea and what had prompted his thoughts:

> I have seen a number of boys back from various theaters. A number are entirely normal (and some of these have been through the worst stuff). These boys don't expect the home folks to understand what they have been through, but they are glad to get home and seem satisfied with whatever amount of hero worship they get, and they take hold of life easily and naturally.
>
> There is another group less balanced who feel that their families, friends and neighbors are in some way guilty because they do not feel the horror of war. That is a natural feeling but it can never be satisfied for no one can ever get by reading the realities which he gets by living through a thing. The result is, these men are a little resentful. They are more so when they discover that most people can't tell by their ribbons whether they have been in the Solomons or Salerno. Then, everyone here seems to be going on with life as usual and when the returning soldiers compare that with what they have been through it irritates them no end. Other returning soldiers vary between these extremes.
>
> So I have been wondering what might be told to the men that would ease their home coming. . . .[22]

Arthur Page knew at this time that the Information Branch of the Army was planning a soldiers' guide to the U. S. but he thought that "if Goodfriend wrote the stuff

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[21]Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Paul G. Horgan to Colonel F. S. Forsberg, October 28, 1944, Box 11, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[22]Letter to Colonel O. N. Solbert, October 27, 1944, Box 11, Arthur W. Page Papers.

for serriatum [sic] use in Stars & Stripes it might do more good. And both wouldn't hurt." He believed that such a series should ask these questions and give this advice:

a. What kind of a country do the men want to come home to? Do they want to find that their wives or girl friends have been in mourning for them and lost all gaiety? Most girls haven't had a very gay life while the men were away, and it may surprise the soldiers to learn that they want some sympathy for their war as well as giving some to the men. If the guide book can start the men thinking of others more than themselves, the adjustments will be quicker and easier.

b. The service men were picked as the fittest, in body and mind, of all the men in the United States. If they look upon themselves as men who have done their service for their country and now the country should care for them, then the future is not too bright. For that means that the unfit must take care of the fit. But if they believe they are the competent ones who have saved the country so that they can make something out of it, then both men and country will do all right, and the girls and old folks can quit working overtime at unaccustomed tasks.

c. It may seem curious to them that the bars, night clubs and race tracks are all full while they were fighting a war. It may not seem reasonable for one crowd to be

getting a tan, while another crowd gets Hell on the beaches. Yet the service men play the ponies and push the swinging doors whenever the opportunity arises. And none of this has kept the civilians from turning out more war material than has ever been done before.

d. What about strikes? No one should be A.W.O.L. when the country is at war. But there are always some A.W.O.L.s in the service, too. Strikes are indefensible, but knowing something of the union struggle in this country, did he really expect that there would be no strikes?

e. What all this comes to is that maybe someone ought to tip off the service men that the folks back home are mighty proud of them, eager to have them back, and mostly doing their damnedest to help win the war, but that they are still the very human people he left behind. They have had neither the terror nor the rewards of bravery. They have lived with petty annoyances and constant exhortations but no ribbons or medals. They would all like to be heroes, but none can achieve it.[23]

E. T. O. Revisited

In July, 1944, Colonel Solbert had written General Osborn expressing the hope that Arthur W. Page could be returned to Europe to help finish the work started by his

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[23]Letter to Colonel O. N. Solbert, October 27, 1944, Box 11, Arthur W. Page Papers.

pre-invasion visit. Now in early 1945 Solbert again asked that Page return for "general coordination of policy." Page flew out of New York on February 8, 1945, again to wrestle with the knotty problems of Stars and Stripes, Yank, and troop orientations.

The problems were usually the same--the editorial staffs thought they should have complete freedom to print what they wanted to please the enlisted men. Sometimes this violated policy--more often it was derogatory to "the brass."

The military services are not and cannot be democratic. Yet the policy was to give the widest latitude to soldier publications so long as discipline and order were not affected. This was a fine line and often gave harried editors, with some justification, the feeling that they had too many bosses. So Arthur Page dug into this thorny problem, and was able after only a few weeks to work out solutions that proved effective for the remainder of the war. Essentially, the arrangements made during Page's visit still govern the operation of Stars & Stripes in Europe. The two main provisions were:

a. The Stars & Stripes was placed directly under the Theater Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. This gave the paper freedom from nit-picking criticism and instructions from a variety of general officers. The paper was to continue on the basis that it would run itself

unless it made mistakes sufficiently bad to warrant removal of the editors by the Theater Commander.

b. Secondly, the orientation program was in effect taken away from General John C. H. Lee, Commander of the E. T. O. Supply Services, and placed directly under General Ben Lear, Eisenhower's deputy for all American forces in the Theater. General Lear personally added some of his famous "impetus" to the program and directed that all commanding generals involve themselves deeply in the orientation of troops.[24]

Page was confident that the program would pick up:

> I haven't any doubt now that the I & E program will have steam behind it, because Lear is in a position and has the intention to discipline even divisional generals and anybody else who doesn't pay attention to this matter. The question now is how good will the contents and the staff work be, for while there is a considerable amount of brains in the numerous bodies with which I & E ETO has been supplied, the proportion of brains to bodies is not as high as it should be. . . .
>
> So while like everything else in the Army there is a crisis about once a week in the I & E and vast amounts of excitement, I think it is really in pretty good shape.[25]

Further Assessment

Naturally, Arthur Page had looked into matters which concerned his Joint Army and Navy Committee on

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[24]Letter to Arthur C. Farlow, March 28, 1945, Box 12, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[25]Ibid.

Welfare and Recreation while in Europe. In December, 1945, at the request of Lieutenant Colonel de Sanchez of the European Information and Education Section, Page listed some of the accomplishments in a memorandum inclosed with this letter:

> I can't do what you say because I've got a lot more to do than I can attend to. The best I can do is to enclose a rough memorandum. It isn't careful or balanced but it will indicate a general direction of thought.
>
> Since I have been back here I have spent a lot of time toward having the Army organize so that I. & E. and public relations will be as integral a part of the Army as the intelligence section or the artillery.
>
> The fact that this was not so was our fundamental difficulty and most others stemmed from it.
>
> . . . For I was then and am now happy to have had a chance to have a hand in I. & E. and I got a lot of satisfaction from being with a crowd that struggled so cheerfully and valiantly with perpetual crises and constant adversity.[26]

The points contained in the inclosed memorandum were these:

> a. I & E should be an integral part of the Army organization. Unless it is in peace time, it can't function well in war.
>
> b. Stars & Stripes needs planning, better staff, responsible publisher. Relations with commands in the field should be worked out in advance.
>
> c. Radio was a confused picture and the SHAEF staff did not understand it very well. It did well for the troops, even so.

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[26]Letter to Lieutenant Colonel Peter de Sanchez, December 3, 1945, Box 13, Arthur W. Page Papers.

d. Pocket books distribution was good but could have been better. It did not reach its full potential.

e. USAFI courses were fine, but unit schools and the universities program was not so good. Better education officers and planning needed.

f. Orientation periods. It is hard to achieve the effect desired unless hard work, careful planning go into them.

But all of these things were done magnificently considering the conditions under which they were carried on. Now is the time to correct the mistakes.[27]

The long-lasting effects of Page's 1945 visit are also spelled out in a letter received from Francis Keppel, former secretary of the Joint Committee, who was now serving in France in the E.T.O. Special Services:

I have heard any number of times comments about the contributions you made on your visit here. As I look back, I realize that you maneuvered us into realizing what the priority jobs were and taking the necessary steps to getting them under way. In the general confusion of Paris, this is awfully hard to keep in mind and we all wish you were back.[28]

Aide to the Colonel Again

Arthur Page was not to have much time to get back to telephone business or even to Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation affairs. On April 5, 1945, Secretary of War Stimson asked him to come to Washington on a full-time basis for duty as a temporary

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[27] Ibid.

[28] Letter from T/5 Francis Keppel, March 17, 1945, Box 12, Arthur W. Page Papers.

Special Consultant.

The New York Times reported the appointment and said that Page would work with Major General A. D. Surles, Chief of the Bureau of Public Relations. There was no disclosure of the nature of the duties, according to the Times, but the "War Department has been stressing its interest in acquainting the public thoroughly with all phases of redeployment and demobilization problems."[29]

Business Week ran a picture of Page with this cut line:

> For Diplomacy. For weeks the War Department has pondered the necessity of having thoroughly to acquaint the public with some of the hard facts which must be faced after V-E Day in switching men and materials from Europe to Asia. To put over this tough assignment, the department has enlisted Arthur W. Page, vice-president of American Telephone & Telegraph Co., as special consultant to Secretary Henry L. Stimson. His job: to refine the Army's usually heavy-handed public relations techniques.[30]

Page did discuss redeployment plans with the Bureau of Public Relations. He, his Joint Committee staff, and the Special Service officers in Europe had helped prepare these plans. Francis Keppel, especially, had directed the work of the Joint Committee in preparing the morale, welfare, and recreation plans for redeployment.

Arthur Page also during this time made a thorough study of the organization of the information and public

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[29] New York Times, April 6, 1945 (8:6).

[30] Business Week, No. 815 (April 14, 1945), p. 34.

relations offices of the Army and made some specific recommendations which resulted in sweeping changes later. This will be covered in a later section of this chapter.

By June 11, 1945, Page believed he had completed his work in Washington. He wrote a memorandum to Secretary Stimson asking for his release from consulting status, saying in part:

> About the first of April you asked me to comply with General Surles' request that I help the Bureau of Public Relations in presenting its redeployment plans to the public.
>
> That has been done. As the Army's redeployment plans were well made, the public has accepted them with a large measure of approval.
>
> From now on the principal concern of the Bureau will be on other matters such as universal training, etc. . . . I think, therefore, it is as wise as it is necessary for me to retire but I should be glad to come down for a day or two at a time any time that I could be of service to you, General Surles or anyone else in the War Department.
>
> And I am grateful to you and the General for giving me an opportunity to do a little in this aspect of the war effort.
>
> I ought now to go back to my New York responsibilities.
>
> I have been away from the Telephone Company seven out of the last twelve months on War Department matters. . . .[31]

But Arthur Page was not to get away from the Pentagon so easily. He found that Secretary Stimson had

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[31] Memorandum for the Secretary of War, June 11, 1945, Box 12, Arthur W. Page Papers.

much more in mind than redeployment of forces:

> But it was a month after I got there before I discovered what the Colonel was really bothered about. It was the atomic bomb.
>
> He had a great conscience about whether he ought to use this doggoned thing or not, and if so, how. What he wanted to do was to have somebody he could talk it over with. . . .[32]

Perhaps, as suggested by Dr. Elting E. Morison in Turmoil and Tradition, Stimson simply wanted someone he could trust by his side during the difficult atom decision. But there are so many indications that Stimson and others sought Page's advice on such a variety of important questions that his role was probably more than listener. For example, John J. McCloy, who was Undersecretary of War under Stimson and has had a continuing distinguished public service career, says of this war time period:

> Arthur Page was an excellent team worker during the war and he had the very close confidence of Secretary Stimson. His judgment and advice not only on public relations matters but indeed on many thorny problems which arose during the war was, in my judgment, invaluable. He had a very calm and objective approach in his consideration of any problem and his recommendations were always provocative and useful. He was one of the wisest men I have ever known. He was a man of such foresight and character that I found myself talking over with him problems that were arising during the course of the war if not daily, I should say at least weekly, during my entire service there. I also know how closely he was associated with Secretary Stimson. The Secretary had him at his home at Woodley in the evenings on very frequent occasions and he relied heavily on his advice. Not only did Secretary Stimson consult with him but people such as Secretary Lovett,

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[32] Reminiscences, op. cit., p. 58.

> Harvey Bundy, Bob Patterson, General Marshall and those in the higher echelons of the military constantly called upon him from time to time for his judgment.[33]

There are several other references that seem pertinent and suggest that Arthur Page's counsel to the Secretary may have helped sway him toward use of the bomb. In a letter to old friend Gavin Hadden, Page says:

> I don't think anyone will ever succeed in describing the curious atomic atmosphere of the last part of the war. Working with a secret is an unnatural state of affairs and for those of you who did it a long time I should think a very considerable strain. I have no instinct to tell everybody everything but it is agin /sic/ nature to have something on your mind you can't tell anyone. . . .[34]

And in his Reminiscences, recorded in 1956, Arthur Page says:

> That was a most interesting thing to be mixed up in. It was very distressing to me, not because I had any question about what to do about weapons you've got when you're fighting. I didn't have half as much conscience about it as he /Stimson/ did. But it really is a most bothersome thing to have something on your mind you can't talk to anybody about, and something that is sufficiently important so that you find yourself almost changing your normal answers to ordinary questions, because of this element that you can't mention.[35]

Page also reveals in his oral biography that Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer had full confidence in the nuclear components of the bomb produced, but did not believe that

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[33]Letter from John J. McCloy, September 17, 1964.

[34]Letter to Gavin Hadden, Alexandria, Virginia, December 29, 1954, in Box 39, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[35]Reminiscences, loc. cit.

the detonating devices would work properly.

Perhaps the most revealing evidence is in a letter Page sent to George L. Harrison in July, 1945. Harrison, a New York banker serving as a Special Consultant to Secretary Stimson, was Alternate Chairman of the Interim Committee established to advise the President on the use of the atomic bomb. (Other members of the committee were James F. Byrnes; Ralph A. Bard, Under-Secretary of the Navy; William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State; Dr. Vannevar Bush, president of Carnegie Institute of Washington, D. C.; Dr. Karl T. Compton, president of Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Dr. James B. Conant, president of Harvard University.)

Page's letter reveals that by July 18, 1945, only two days after the first atomic weapon was detonated at Alamogordo, New Mexico, he knew that severe material and psychological damage to Japan was forthcoming and would be decisive by August 15. Significantly, he refers to "natural forces" being on our side, and the "power of the universe":

> I would think that by the 15th of August the destruction in Japan will be sufficient materially and psychologically to justify the President in saying to the Japanese that as <u>natural forces are evidently on our side</u> and as we have no intention of destroying their people or their religion they might well capitulate to the <u>power of the universe</u>. Such surrender would mean relinquishing their conquests, the end of their war-making plants, the surrender of their navy and an occupation at the pleasure (which it wouldn't be) of the victors long enough to see that they

disbanded their army and went to work at peacetime efforts--the only high officers to be punished being those who ordered the maltreatment of American prisoners.

I don't think we gain anything by being soft on this latter point, for the Jap is a savage and cares little for human life, but I think he will feel that he got away with something if his guilty are not punished.

Up until very recently I didn't think such an offer was properly balanced by the punishments he was getting. He still has a big army at home that hasn't fired a shot. But by August 15th I think the balance of punishment will be enough to convince him that we are not just soft-hearted and tired. . . .[36]

Announcing the Atom Bomb

Arthur Page wrote, or perhaps rewrote, the public announcement President Truman made of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6, 1945. In his Reminiscences Page gives credit to Arnette* in Stimson's office for the first draft; Page condensed and rewrote it. Arnette prepared the longer, more detailed explanation of how the miracle was accomplished for release by Secretary Stimson simultaneously with Truman's statement. Stimson did not change a word of either statement; however, Page thinks that Truman made minor changes in his.[37]

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[36] Letter to George L. Harrison, The Pentagon, July 18, 1945, Box 12, Arthur W. Page Papers. (Underlining added.)

[37] Reminiscences, op. cit., p. 60.

*Believed to be Lieutenant Colonel Charles T. Arnett, who served on the War Department General Staff from 1943 through 1946. He retired from the Army in 1947 and died in 1954.

In writing to a friend nearly ten years later, Page recalls: "That war period seems a long time back now. It seems another world. In that period I wrote the first atomic message for Truman. I haven't even a copy of it now."[38]

The Truman statement is a clear, unemotional summary of what happened at Hiroshima and the events that led up to the manufacture and use of the bomb. It does not mention the moral issues that the President and his advisers wrestled with, and which would be nagging some of them later. It gives full credit to the scientists, industry, labor and the military for an extraordinary achievement. And it warns Japan that its rejection of the Potsdam ultimatum of July 26 brought on this terrible destruction of Hiroshima and that "we shall destroy their docks, their factories and their communications. Let there be no mistake; we shall completely destroy Japan's power to make war."

The statement also points out as an important and humanitarian effect that man's ability to release atomic energy "ushers in a new era in man's understanding of nature's forces. Atomic energy may, in the future, supplement the power that now comes from coal, oil, and falling

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[38]Letter to Gavin Haddon, loc. cit.

water. . . ."

The opening paragraphs of the statement, showing the Page touch and his "power of the universe" theme mentioned earlier, are reproduced here:

> Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on Hiroshima, an important Japanese Army base. That bomb had more power than 20,000 tons of TNT. It had more than two thousand times the blast power of the British "Grand Slam" which is the largest bomb ever yet used in the history of warfare.
>
> The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have been repaid manyfold. And the end is not yet. With this bomb we have now added a new and revolutionary increase in destruction to supplement the growing power of our armed forces. In their present form these bombs are now in production and even more powerful forms are in development.
>
> It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. The force from which the sun draws its powers has been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East. . . .[39]

The complete text of both statements is in the New York Times, August 7, 1945.

Information School

Concurrently with his advisory duties in the atomic field, Page also worked on plans for reorganization of the Army's information services and for the establishment of an Army information school. While the Army's Morale Services were combined under General F. H. Osborn, Page had often recommended the establishment of a school to

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[39] New York Times, August 7, 1945, p. 4.

train officers in the skills needed to operate the program continuously. He contended that a special corps was needed, for the skills were not easily attained for use only in war time.

When these services split to become Special Services under General Byron, and Information and Education under General Osborn, Page seemed to apply most of his talents toward the public relations segments. Two of his specific recommendations, before returning to his New York business responsibilities at the close of the war, were (1) that the Army establish facilities to train officers in the theories and techniques of public relations, information, legislative liaison and education, and (2) that the Army work up a "book of all the answers" which could be widely distributed throughout the Army to make it easier for every soldier to explain the Army to the public.[40]

Page observed that the practical relations of the Army with the people who support it and who in war make up the bulk of it, is not a subject of instruction to any extent at the United States Military Academy at West Point, or in the Service or Staff schools. He believed rightly that the same was true of the activities of the information, education, legislative liaison divisions, all of

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[40]Letter from General Williston B. Palmer, USA-Ret., July 16, 1964.

which are in the broad sense public relations.[41]

Late in 1945 the Pentagon decision makers agreed that an information school was necessary. Brigadier General Williston B. Palmer, a distinguished combat commander who had been with troops all during the war, was named as the first commandant. General Palmer, later to be promoted to four star rank and named as Vice Chief of Staff, knew little about public relations but understood fully how to go about establishing a military school and staffing it with the best qualified people available.

Upon the suggestion of Arthur Page, General Palmer:

> . . . asked for help, in the form of an advisory committee or "board of regents" from Colonel Bryan Houston, then on the point of leaving the Army to return to Young & Rubicam, one of the biggest (advertising) agencies. Colonel Houston did set up such a group, and it was invaluable, not least because its members could make the Secretary of War take an interest in his infant public relations school that he would never have extended to me.[42]

General Palmer did not recall who the members of the committee were--and Bryan Houston, now chairman of the Fletcher Richards Company in New York, wrote:

> I simply don't remember. The Committee was set up at Arthur Page's suggestion. It included a number of fairly prominent people in the communications business, because we felt that that would be helpful to General Palmer--but I would be afraid now to even try to

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[41]Memorandum dated May 30, 1945, regarding Army's public relations problems, Box 12, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[42]Letter from General Palmer, loc. cit.

guess who the people were.[43]

Unfortunately, then, the first "Board of Regents" of the Army Information School must remain anonymous. But Arthur W. Page was variously called "Chairman of the Board of Regents" of the school by Brigadier General Edward J. McGaw who succeeded General Palmer,[44] and "father of the Army Information School" by General Palmer's Assistant Commandant, Colonel Frank Dorn.[45]

It was not until January 23, 1946, that General Palmer was given Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, as the home of the new information school. It took only another month to gather the faculty and equipment necessary and open the first class. And on March 12, 1946, General Palmer wrote to Page and asked him to address the first class:

> . . . You personally are more responsible, I believe, for the establishment of this School than any other individual. I shall never feel that the School is properly inaugurated until you come here to address us.
>
> Aside from your paternal responsibility, nobody else is so well qualified to tell the faculty and students what they should hear. The outstanding public relations of the Bell System, your personal distinction in the field, and your knowledge of the War Department's problems, all make your contribution

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[43]Letter from Bryan Houston, New York, September 25, 1964.

[44]Letter from Brigadier General Edward J. McGaw, November 7, 1947, Box 15, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[45]Letter from Colonel Frank Dorn, March 19, 1947, Box 15, Arthur W. Page Papers.

here indispensable. . . .[46]

Arthur Page accepted the invitation and spent April 7 and 8, 1946, at the school. His talks then became a regular part of the curriculum. He talked again in September, 1946, but missed the January, 1947, class because he was in Chile. However, he repeated on March 14, 1947. For the October, 1947, class Page suggested that they get Arthur Hays Sulzberger of the New York Times as guest speaker, which they did. In 1948 Page arranged for the class to get a two-hour public relations briefing from the American Telephone and Telegraph Company. The wisdom of these talks must have spread, for Page was asked to address the nation's highest military school, the National War College in Washington, D. C., in 1947.

In August of 1948 the Army Information School followed the trend toward unification of the armed services and became the Armed Forces Information School. It was moved to Fort Slocum, near New Rochelle, New York. The other services did not respond wholeheartedly to the idea of having the Army train all public relations people, however, and Lieutenant General Floyd L. Parks, one of the Army Chiefs of Information in the early unification days, wrote to Page:

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[46]Letter from General W. B. Palmer, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, March 12, 1946, Box 13, Arthur W. Page Papers.

> I am distressed, however, to see the present trend. I am afraid that all the services are going to suffer. I hear rumors that the Navy and Air Force are going to pull out of the Armed Forces Information School which we have at Fort Slocum. They have always been lukewarm about it, but heretofore we have had a Secretary of Defense who kept them participants. I don't know that Mr. Wilson realizes the school exists and, of course, the rumor here may not be correct. However, it seems to me that this is no time for us to quit training people to get the facts out to the public promptly and correctly and in a way which the industry can use. . . .[47]

The other services did, in fact, pull out of the school and it continued for nearly ten years as the U. S. Army Information School. In September, 1964, however, the Secretary of Defense directed that the school be organized as a Defense Information School. It is once again training officers and enlisted men and women of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines.

Arthur Page's suggestion for a "book of all the answers" finally was fulfilled. General Palmer explained it this way:

> After I got the School going, I set up a small group in the Pentagon under Colonel Devere P. Armstrong to produce that. It was quickly called "The Army Almanac" because of my insistence that it must be a document of bald facts completely devoid of the turgid self-praise so dear to the ears of branch-conscious officers, just facts like the World Almanac.
>
> . . . It finally appeared in print in September, 1950, as The Army Almanac. . . . Amazingly, in 1959 /it/ was republished as a commercial venture "in

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[47]Letter from Lieutenant General Floyd L. Parks, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, October 19, 1953, Box 32, Arthur W. Page Papers.

response to popular demand" by the Stackpole Company of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. I know nothing as to why; the whole subject passed out of my cognizance in 1947.[48]

New Organization for War Department Public Relations

Ostensibly assigned to the Bureau of Public Relations to help with the Army's redeployment plans, Page spent a good deal of time in May, 1945, studying the Army's organization for public relations, internal information and education, and legislative affairs. His simple, earthy memorandum on the subject made so much sense that it had far reaching effects on Army thinking and actions. Parts of it, now called the "Page Report," are quoted below; the entire memorandum is at Appendix B:

> The Army is now faced with several rather immediate public relations problems which require positive plans.
>
> (1) Passage of a universal training law.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> (4) Establishment of a new and better conception of the Army in the minds of the public.
>
> The last is a fundamental and long time objective which if accomplished makes all others easier.
>
> It is fundamental in human nature to fear size and suspect authority as being arbitrary. The Army is both large and authoritative. To be popular it will have to take great pains to enlighten the public that its fears of Army size are groundless and that Army authority is used reasonably and fairly and that it is not arbitrary. . . .

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[48] Letter from General Palmer, July 16, 1964, loc. cit.

It is a vital job, therefore, if we are to have any effective national defense that the Army be reasonable, articulate, and public minded. . . . The Army must convince the public that it is the servant of the people . . . .

The Army can learn or teach anything it really wants to. It is as capable as any other organization . . . to present its case to the public but I think it will have to make some changes if it really desires to achieve this end.

There are two ways of building an organization to handle public relations. One is to get outsiders who profess to know what public reactions will be and train them to know the Army. The other is to select men in the Army who know it and let them learn the public relations job by study and practice. It is after all chiefly a matter of common sense and application to the job.

I am sure this latter method will be more effective.

It might appear that the Army had such a public relations department now. It has in appearance but not in fact. The essence of the Army is the regular officer corps. No one in the regular officer corps--including General Surles now head of BPR--would be in public relations if he could help it. PRO service is no road to promotion. There is almost a feeling in the regular services that an understanding of the public, which the Army serves, is unmilitary and not fitting for a soldier. . . .

The fundamental problem of the Army's public relations is to change this attitude of the Army itself. No group of smart public relations people from the outside or inside either can for long make a thing appear different from what it really is.

. . . Public relations is far more than handling the press. It is a way of life. It must be as instinctive as discipline. It can not be applied like a salve from the outside with much of an assurance of success.

In a very short time, however, a fundamental change can be effected if the Army (1) puts a fair sample of its best regular officers in public relations jobs, (2) recognizes them for effective service in that capacity, and (3) makes a good public relations

background part of the basis of every officer's continuous training, and (4) carries out the positive duty of explaining itself to the public all the time which will naturally flow from the new attitude.

Army public relations in its broad sense is the Army's relations with the public and the public's representatives in Congress which is chiefly a reflection of public attitude. If the public likes the Army, the Congress will likewise. If the public does not understand and like the Army, it is dangerous for Congress to like it.

Public relations broadly speaking includes the work of the L & L (Legislative & Liaison) Division and the I & E (Information and Education) Division. Information to troops is in the long run public relations, for the troops are the public temporarily in the Army.

These three functions combined are vital to the Army and therefore to the welfare of the nation. That they are well done is more important in peace than in war time because the emotions and necessities of war get support for the Army in war which they do not provide in peace time.

The most effective way to get Army public relations to the position in which it should be, to operate most effectively, would be to coordinate all three activities under a Deputy Chief of Staff who would have at least three stars, strengthen the present personnel of these divisions, particularly with regular officers, and let it be understood that the relations of the Army with the public are of paramount concern to the Army and that it intends to become proficient in handling them.

. . . I think it would be of great value to have an organization at a high level with the duty of instructing the Army on the one hand and the public on the other of the proper relations of an Army to the public in a democracy such as ours, an organization which would keep the Chief of Staff informed of the current of public thought, possible dangers ahead and above all an organization that would have positive plans for dealing with the problems anticipated. It should be ready to explain everything the Army does and intends to do and be in a position to protest any policy which can not be satisfactorily explained.

. . . And I am sure it is essential for the future safety of the nation that neither the officers of the

> Army or the public think of the Army as a thing apart, as a militaristic or autocratic unreasonable outfit. The natural fear and aversion of people to things that are large, powerful and not well understood can only be met by constant, intelligent and unremitting effort.
>
> The public will give the Army freedom to do its best job when the public has understanding of the Army sufficient to create confidence in its management and personnel and a conviction that it is actuated intelligently in the public interest.
>
> This being the truth, it can be demonstrated.[49]

This memorandum was circulated by the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff to Major General A. D. Surles, Director of the Bureau of Public Relations; to Major General Wilton B. Persons, Chief of Legislative and Liaison Division; and to Major General P. H. Osborn, Director of the Information and Education Division. Each gave enthusiastic support to the thesis. Copies of their endorsements are attached to the Page Report at Appendix B.

The next step was for the Office of the Chief of Staff to appoint an ad hoc committee consisting of Arthur Page, the three general officers named above, and representatives of the three major Army commands--Air Forces, Ground Forces and Service Forces. These commanders named Major General Elwood R. Quesada, Major General Lloyd E. Jones, and Major General C. F. Robinson, respectively.

The appointing letter directed that the committee:

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[49] Memorandum dated May 30, 1945, known as the "Page Report." (Underlining added.)

> . . . study and make recommendations concerning the future organization, functions, responsibilities and methods for effecting coordination of the Legislative and Liaison Division, the Bureau of Public Relations, and the Information and Education Division.

The committee report was required not later than September 10, 1945.[50]

On September 8, 1945, the Committee presented its report to the Deputy Chief of Staff. The unanimous recommendations were:

> a. That the principles, as expressed by Mr. Page in his memorandum, are sound and should be adopted as policy by the War Department.
>
> b. That these principles can best be put into effect by combining the Bureau of Public Relations, the Legislative and Liaison Division, and the Information and Education Division, under one policy head with the three components remaining independent as to operation.
>
> c. That the names of the Bureau of Public Relations and the Legislative and Liaison Division be changed to Public Information Division and Congressional Division, respectively, and that the Information and Education Division be known as the Army Information and Education Division.
>
> d. That the general function and mission of these three divisions remain primarily as before except as given greater unity and coordination under a single policy head.
>
> e. That the position of these functions of the War Department be made a part of the organization of the War Department, as indicated on the attached chart (TAB F).[51]

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[50] Letter of War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, August 18, 1945, Subject: Appointment of Ad Hoc Committee, With Page Report, Appendix B.

[51] Report of War Department Ad Hoc Committee, September 8, 1945, attached to Page Report at Appendix B.

Policy decisions in the Pentagon are not often made quickly. When such decisions require reorganization within the military departments they may take months or even years to win final approval.

It must be something of a record, therefore, that it took only twenty days from the date of the Committee Report to the press release announcing the reorganization as a fait accompli. On October 1, 1945, Brigadier General Luther L. Hill (who had been recommended for the one star rank by Arthur Page in a memorandum to the Secretary of the Army) sent to Page a copy of the September 28 press release with these words:

> I seem to recall an axiom to the effect that deeds which men do live after them. The inclosed memo for the press is illustrative of the principle even though the quotation may be all wrong. You have not been in these parts personally for quite a while but your thoughts and ideas have flourished and come to life. . . .[52]

Parts of the September 28, 1945, press memorandum, attached to General Hill's letter, read as follows:

> All the information services of the War Department have been brought together under a single policy head, known as the Director of Information, the War Department announced today. The agencies included in this reorganization, in line with general War Department policy to achieve maximum operating economy, are the Bureau of Public Relations, the Legislative and Liaison Division of the War Department Special Staff, and the Information and Education Division, Headquarters, Army Service Forces. . . .[53]

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[52]Letter from Brigadier General Luther L. Hill, War Department, October 1, 1945, with inclosure, Box 12, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[53]Ibid.

The press memorandum named Major General Surles as the Director of Information, Brigadier General Hill as the chief of public relations, Major General Persons as chief of legislative liaison, and Major General Osborn as chief of the information and education functions. Each of the three organizations would continue to operate independently under the over-all policy direction of the Director of Information.

So far so good! But there was one more recommendation in the Page Report that was unfulfilled--his suggestion that the three activities be coordinated "under a Deputy Chief of Staff who would have at least three stars. . . ."

General Eisenhower became Army Chief of Staff November 19, 1945. One of his earliest actions was to name Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins, a distinguished soldier with a brilliant war time combat record, to the position of Director of Information. General Collins assumed the duties in December, 1945, and served as the Army's Chief of Information until August, 1947. From there he stepped up to be Deputy Chief of Staff, Vice Chief of Staff, and finally Army Chief of Staff from 1949 to 1953.

Several paragraphs of a letter from General Collins sum up his experiences with Arthur Page's recommended Army information organization:

I came to know Mr. Page well and greatly admired

him. His advice and counsel to me were invaluable.

Mr. Page had recommended the establishment of the Office of Chief of Information to the War Department with responsibility for the three major fields of Army information: 1) information for the Congress, 2) the public at large, and 3) the Army's own internal information and education program. Mr. Page felt that these three fields of information should be coordinated and that it would be better to have a senior Army man in charge rather than a civilian. As I recall it, his phrase to me was that he felt it was easier for a military man, thoroughly familiar with the Army and its problems, to learn the necessary techniques of public and Congressional information than for a civilian to become thoroughly conversant with the Army's procedures and problems even though he might be an experienced public relations man.

This view of Mr. Page's was reinforced by his firm recommendation to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff that the person assuming the post of Chief of Information should be a senior officer and that he should attend all important meetings conducted by the Secretary or the Chief of Staff that involved Army policies. He felt that this was essential in order that consideration would be given to the impact of these policies or proposed courses of action might have on the Congress, the public at large, and on Army morale.

Mr. Page's proposals were put into effect and I did attend all major conferences and was often called in by the Secretary or the Chief of Staff for immediate discussion of problems as they arose.

Based on the advice of Mr. Page, and the firm conviction of General Eisenhower, we established the basic policy in our relationships with the press and the Congress of furnishing prompt and complete disclosure of the facts whenever the Army's actions or its policies were attacked. As far as practicable we answered every attack--of which there were many in the period immediately following World War II--on the thesis that we had nothing to hide; that if we had made a mistake, we would frankly acknowledge it and state what corrective action had been taken; but at the same time would make clear that we were proud of the Army and its achievements, and intended to answer all unjust criticism.

> I do believe that these policies proved successful and had much to do with ending the period of harassment to which the Army was subjected immediately after World War II. . . .[54]

Thus the recommendations of Arthur W. Page for the organization of the War Department information activities were approved in their entirety, implemented quickly, and proved successful. Although unification and subsequent reorganizations of all the military services changed the basic structure somewhat, and separated the Congressional activities from information, the Page principles remain valid today.

* * *

For more than ten years after the end of World War II, Arthur Page maintained a lively interest in the Army and served many aspects of its public relationships. These final pages will treat these services more or less chronologically; however, many of the actions overlap, and some span several years.

Unification of the Armed Forces

In 1944 Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson urged that the Army, Army Air Forces, Navy and Marines be unified. Page was skeptical. He and Harvey H. Bundy, Special Assistant to Stimson, thrashed it over at some length in

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[54]Letter from General J. Lawton Collins, USA-Ret, Washington, D. C., July 24, 1964.

this vein:

> What do you mean by unified army service? One Secretary of War--undersecretaries for ground, sea forces, air forces, etc.? One General Staff? Under such a set-up, is there unified procurement and unified scientific research and dealing with scientists? Does the Secretary of War sit with the General Staff as representing the President, or does the President deal directly with it. . . .? Does the unification mean a common personnel policy for all men in uniform? . . .[55]

The bill unifying the armed forces was signed July 26, 1947, by President Truman, who then named James V. Forrestal as the nation's first Secretary of Defense. The Army's public relations operators were then faced with the problem of accomplishing an important mission with a new set of ground rules. They sought the help of Arthur Page in two ways: (1) to provide General Omar Bradley, Army Chief of Staff, a memorandum on Army public relations to guide his thinking and to aid him in testifying before Defense reorganization committees, and (2) to testify before the Committee on the National Security Organization of the Commission on Reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government.

Page's memorandum explains simply why the Army has and needs an excellent organization for public relations; why public relations training for all officers is essential; and how the Army's attitude must always be public-

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[55]Letter to Harvey H. Bundy, Washington, D. C., July 9, 1945, Box 12, Arthur W. Page Papers.

oriented. Then he talks of the Army's organization for information activities under the new Department of Defense:

> There is a question now of what relation this Army organization has to the Secretary of Defense's office. It must get overall national defense policy from the Secretary of Defense's office. It must answer to that office any queries it has as to Army occurrences or answer any public or newspaper queries on Army matters referred to the Army by the Secretary of Defense's office.
>
> The Secretary's office can't handle all the questions about all three Services put to it by the press and public. It must decentralize and let each handle its own. The Public Relations Officer of the Secretary of Defense would be responsible for overall national policy and for coordinating that in the public relations activities of all three Services.
>
> I had a similar job for twenty years in the Bell System which is organized on military lines. It was with us and I am sure it would be with the Services--totally impossible to centralize in Washington public relations which actually happen all over the United States--and abroad; policy, yes, but application, no; application must be local and fast.[56]

Page was soon invited to appear before the Committee on the National Security Organization. An August 17, 1948, letter from William H. Strong of the Committee says, "I find in the Army, incidentally, that the doctrine you prescribed for them still seems to be the cornerstone of their public relations policy."[57]

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[56]Letter to General Omar Bradley, June 11, 1948, with inclosure, Box 18, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[57]Letter from William H. Strong, August 17, 1948, Box 18, Arthur W. Page Papers.

Ferdinand Eberstadt, chairman of the Committee on National Security Organization, was a long-time friend and business associate of Arthur Page. As early as August 20, 1945, Eberstadt wrote to Page asking about his ideas on organization of the military establishment at the Executive level.[58] At that time Eberstadt was performing government service for Navy Secretary James V. Forrestal, who was later to be the first Secretary of Defense and charged with matters of military reorganization.

On September 21, 1948, Arthur W. Page testified before the Committee on the subject of public relations in the military establishment. He included a review of the present situation and recommendations as to organization, procedures and operations for the future, aimed at integrating the policies of the three departments but maintaining them separately as to operations.

In response to Chairman Eberstadt's letter of appreciation, Arthur Page wrote these prophetic words:

> . . . I was happy to go. There were but two simple ideas I would like to stress:
> (1) Merger will come with a Defense Secretary who picks the other three secretaries and has their loyalty.
> (2) Public relations is institutional and should be in the hands of the uniformed men so that it will permeate the whole service.[59]

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[58]Letter from Ferdinand Eberstadt, August 20, 1945, Box 12, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[59]Letter to Ferdinand Eberstadt, September 27, 1948, Box 19, Arthur W. Page Papers.

The public relations and information services of the military departments remained separate and decentralized as recommended by Page. Today the trend seems to be toward centralization of these functions at the Department of Defense level. The Army opposes this trend and would welcome an articulate, authoritative, influential civilian spokesman such as Arthur W. Page.

Universal Military Training

In 1945, 1946 and 1947 the administration and the military services were advocating universal military training as a way of maintaining peace throughout the world. It was an uphill and losing battle in a country tired of war, but Arthur Page was one of the staunch backers of General Marshall in this program.

As was his custom, Page worked quietly behind the scenes. He prepared material for use by those testifying for the legislation; he wrote innumerable letters to influential people of his acquaintance urging that they support the legislation--or at least stop fighting it.

Typical of his arguments are these extracted from a letter to a prominent radio commentator:

> Your radio comments on the testimony on universal military service seem to have a pessimism based on ideologies. You say that because France had universal service and fell, universal service is no good. As a matter of fact, pretty much all the world is at war, those that had training and those that didn't. . . .
>
> . . . At present it would seem that we have a chance to give the world a long period of peace if we

have the power to prevent aggressors as well as the tolerance not to arouse resentments. Under present circumstances it would seem that the power depends on universal training, the tolerance upon our character and intentions. . . .

Now one other point. Is it correct to say that we are breaking American tradition by having universal training? In colonial and revolutionary times we had "trained bands." We have had a trained National Guard for 100 years. And all this time the power to draft has been in existence. We used the draft in the Revolution (Virginia and Massachusetts), in the Civil War, World War I, and World War II. . . . Every major war has been on the draft basis. In other words, two ideas have been with us always--(1) the citizen had the responsibility to defend his liberty and his country and (2) he needed training to do it.

What is being proposed now is that, because of the speed of modern war, we do the training before the shooting starts, in the hope and expectation that no one will start shooting if we are thus trained. . . .

Neither preparedness, nor unpreparedness will automatically and of itself maintain peace. It is doubtful if moral suasion (unpreparedness) even well managed will maintain peace. Preparedness managed with tolerance and character would seem to have a chance.

If it has, why not go to work on that chance with enthusiasm?[60]

The Lockhart Report

A few months after he had taken over the job as Director of Information and the Page reorganization had been operating, General Collins wanted an outside impartial analysis to see how the public relations plan was working. He asked Arthur Page to name someone who would be capable

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[60]Letter to John W. Vandercook, National Broadcasting Company, New York, June 20, 1945, Box 12, Arthur W. Page Papers.

of making such an analysis.

Page recommended Jack H. Lockhart of the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain.[61] General Collins asked Roy Howard for the loan of Lockhart for two months to make such an evaluation and recommendations.

Lockhart started to work May 1, 1946, and completed his study and reported to General Floyd L. Parks, Director of the Bureau of Public Relations, on June 3, 1946. This report is still a classic in the analysis of Army public relations and is still quoted frequently. It concerns both general policies and specific applications. It is considered "must" reading for every Army Information Officer.

Most of the report is just good common sense and many of the points sound exactly like Arthur W. Page. For example:

> 12. If the Army is good, the story will be good--and public relations will be good. If the Army is bad, the story will be bad and the result bad. In the end, public opinion about the Army reflects what the Army itself is. That is the whole secret of Army public relations.
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> 13. All any public relations group of the Army can do, in the long run, is present the Army as it is, not as it ought to be or would like to be. No more than that can be expected or achieved. . . .[62]

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[61] Letter to Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins, April 9, 1946, Box 13, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[62] The Lockhart Report, July, 1948, Box 13, Arthur W. Page Papers.

Recruiting Advertising

For years Arthur Page had worked with N. W. Ayer & Son, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company's advertising agency. The Ayer company also handled the Army's recruiting advertising.

It seemed a natural to Page that Ayer experts and the Army information operators could benefit from a mutual exchange of ideas and information. In a letter to General Collins, Page suggested that (1) the N. W. Ayer account executive on the Army account, and appropriate officers of the Office of the Director of Information, should be in closer touch and coordinate their activities; and (2) that General Palmer should invite C. L. Jordan of N. W. Ayer & Son to talk to the officer class at the Army Information School about recruiting advertising and how it is done.[63]

A subsequent letter from the president of N. W. Ayer & Son to Arthur Page said that General Collins and C. L. Jordan had met and agreed to coordinate the information, public relations, advertising and recruiting efforts, and that Jordan was scheduled to address the Information School at an early date.[64]

The honeymoon did not last very long, however. In

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[63]Letter to Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins, May 29, 1946, Box 13, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[64]Letter from H. A. Batten, N. W. Ayer & Son, June 20, 1946, Box 13, Arthur W. Page Papers.

the summer of 1948 Arthur Page received a letter from Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall asking him to serve on a committee to advise him on the advertising of recruiting matters. Page replied, in an unusually but understandably severe tone:

> I think I am disqualified from serving on the board to advise on the recruiting advertising. The Army had a large and well-qualified agency (N. W. Ayer) which I thought was doing a good job. The Army changed from this agency to a small one of good reputation but no experience in this particular kind of work. That it seems to me loses experience and time. Continuity and continuing team work between client and agency seems to me the most economical and effective way to do advertising. As the Army has recently decided to work on a different principle I wouldn't be an appropriate advisor.
>
> As you know I have a great interest in the Army and I am happy to devote time to it where I think I can be useful. I don't think I can in this so I am going to ask you to excuse me.[65]

The small agency that won the Army account from N. W. Ayer & Son was the Gardner Advertising Agency of St. Louis. Just two years later the account went to the Grant Advertising Company, and in two more years to Dancer-Fitzgerald-Sample. The latter agency held the account for ten years and it seemed that the Army might have learned a lesson. In 1963, however, the Army moved the account to still another agency, Ketcham, McLeod and Grove.[66]

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[65]Letter to Secretary Kenneth Royall, August 2, 1948, Box 18, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[66]Letter from Major Matthew W. Irvin, Associate Editor, Army Information Digest, Alexandria, Virginia, November 1, 1964.

Apparently the Army has not yet learned the value of continuity and continuing team work between client and agency advocated so long ago by Arthur W. Page.

Flight Pay Board

Arthur W. Page had served as an adviser at a Naval Conference; he was public relations consultant for the Army ground forces; his committee on welfare and recreation included Army, Navy and Marines; and now he was called on to "look into" flying pay for the air arms of the Army and the Navy! Small wonder that General Eisenhower later considered him a superior consultant on a variety of difficult matters!

In February, 1947, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal and Secretary of War Patterson asked Page to serve on a board to examine flying pay for Navy and Army air personnel. They asked for a "completely fair and judicial consideration of the problem by men of highest ability and unimpeachable non-interest and integrity."[67]

Other members of the board would be John Lord O'Brian, prominent Washington attorney; Roane Waring of the Memphis Transit System; and Albert F. Jaques, vice president of the Prudential Insurance Company, who would be Executive Secretary of the Board. The members were

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[67]Letter from Secretary James V. Forrestal and Secretary Robert P. Patterson, February 27, 1947, Box 14, Arthur W. Page Papers.

classified as Expert Consultants to the Secretaries.

The reason for the board is not entirely clear. It was mentioned that some members of Congress might propose legislation on the subject in 1947. The conclusion is that the Secretaries wished to have an outside civilian source to help them justify retention of the extra pay. However, their instructions to the board left it free to examine all phases of the subject and present its own convictions.

The board did just that. In its report of August 15, 1947 (which apparently was not published until December 1, 1947, for some reason), the board concludes:

> It is the opinion of the Committee that the different pay scale for flyers and non-flyers is not the best way to take care of the risks of flying, that the extra pay is not necessary to attract pilots, and that the extra pay to flying general officers is not warranted, and the flying requirements for the extra pay unnecessarily risks managerial (general officer) talent without adequate return to the nation for the risk.[68]

The committee recognized, however, that leadership was essential and it would be unrealistic to expect that general officers would forfeit their extra pay when promoted to that leadership rank. Therefore, the committee continued:

> Because it is so clear to the committee that a high morale among the general officers is essential to a

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[68]Report of Committee on Flight Pay, August 15, 1947, Box 16, Arthur W. Page Papers.

> good national defense program, it is of the opinion that while it disagrees with the theory of flying pay it does not recommend that it be discontinued unless the pay of officers in general is to be raised, for it is better to have some part of the officer corps adequately paid than none of it, even if the extra pay is, as the Committee feels, on the wrong basis.[69]

The Committee had spent a lot of their valuable time and effort to no avail. Upon completion of the report the group was thanked and informed that the whole field of military pay was undergoing further study and that flying pay would be considered at that time. So far as can be determined, no use was ever made of the committee report.

Small Jobs, Too

It must be clear by now that Arthur W. Page contributed his many talents to a wide variety of governmental projects. But there were many more small services, not large enough to bear the "project" label, but nevertheless requiring Page's time, effort and thoughtful consideration. Briefly, here are some of them:

a. A memorandum written August 24, 1945, for Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, special assistant to President Truman, on the philosophy of freedom for the use of the President.[70]

b. Dinner arranged in New York City in April, 1946,

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[69] Ibid.

[70] Letter to Hon. Samuel I. Rosenman, August 24, 1945, Box 12, Arthur W. Page Papers.

with 25 prominent business men to talk with Army Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower, about the nation's military posture.

c. A letter written to Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins about the tactics to use in opposing reduction in the Army's information services. Page quoted this passage from General Eisenhower:

> National security, as I see it, is a state of organized readiness to meet external aggression by a quick and effective mobilization of public opinion, trained men, proved weapons and essential industries, integrated into the most efficient instrument of armed defense, and reinforced by the support of every citizen, in the measure and form necessary for the preservation of our way of life.[71]

d. Another letter to General Collins September 17, 1946, commented on proposals to form an Army League, like the Navy League. Page recommended instead the establishment of groups of civilians in each area where the Army and civilian communities were neighbors for a good two-way channel of understanding. Page thought that if the time for an association came, these Army advisory groups could form the core of the organization.[72]

However, Page was not quite the first to suggest this pattern of civilian-military cooperation which has become the Army's Community Relations program. A case

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[71]Letter to Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins, September 9, 1946, Box 13, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[72]Letter to Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins, September 17, 1946, Box 14, Arthur W. Page Papers.

documented by Hunter M. Brumfield in 1949 in a Master's thesis at the University of Wisconsin states that the Community Relations program started several months earlier:

> Early in 1946, the commanding general of the Area (Third Service Command--now Second U. S. Army) made a direct appeal for civil assistance and cooperation with the Army to reinstitute certain community actions which had been abandoned after cessation of hostilities in late 1945. Thus was organized the first Army Advisory Committee, and a new pattern of Army-civilian relationship was begun.[73]

e. Service on the First United States Army's Greater New York Army Advisory Committee. Page served on the Press, Radio and Information Media Group of the committee which was headed by Julius Ochs Adler of the New York Times.[74]

f. Arthur W. Page accepted an invitation from the Commandant to talk at the National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D. C., on April 22, 1947; he also spoke on May 28, 1948, and on May 27, 1949. A copy of the 1949 speech and transcript of the question and answer period is in Box 22 of the Arthur W. Page Papers.

g. Page was invited to discuss his current thinking on Army public relations with Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray in late 1947. This was in further preparation for the reorganization of the military establishment

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[73]Hunter M. Brumfield, "A Pattern For Effective Community Relations" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1949), p. 89.

[74]Letter from General Courtney H. Hodges, March 6, 1947, Box 69, Arthur W. Page Papers.

under the unification law.[75]

h. A series of letters with General Floyd L. Parks, Chief of Information, in the 1950, 1951, 1952 and 1953 period concerned a variety of public relations subjects. On August 14, 1951, for example, Parks asked Page to serve on an advisory group for the Army's Troop Information Program. Page accepted and worked on some minor jobs for the group.[76]

i. After his retirement from the Army, General Parks and Page kept up a friendly correspondence on matters of mutual interest. Both were students of the Revolutionary War and exchanged stories. Two of Page's letters concern Revolutionary public relations:

> The earliest use of the phrase "public relations" that I have come across is the following quotation from"Light Horse" Harry Lee written while he was serving in the Southern Campaign in the Revolution.
>
> "One characteristic is applicable to most of our public relations and is particularly applicable to those from this quarter (the Carolinas). Exaggeration of successful operations, diminution of the adverse. From hence arise false hopes and operate on the exertions of the people."
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> So whether the Army knew it or not, it had always had the problem. You and I were just following tradition.[77]

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[75]Letter from Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, October 3, 1947, Box 16, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[76]Letter from General F. L. Parks, August 14, 1951, Box 26, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[77]Letter to Lieutenant General F. L. Parks, USA-Ret, March 26, 1956, Box 44, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[Here is] another quotation from Light Horse Harry Lee on public relations, written on April 2, 1781, to General Greene:

> "I think it would be politic in Government to tend to measures for the forming of a public press, as the proper communication of events would tend very much to stir up the patriotism of the people. It would also be politic to apply to their religious feelings and the influence of Preachers. By steps of this sort, the Government might probably put the State in a posture of defense during the absence of your Army."
>
> This young gentleman, you will see, was not so much troubled about how to get along with the press as he was troubled about how to get along without one.[78]

j. Successive Chiefs of Information made it a point to contact Arthur Page. Major General Gilman C. Mudgett succeeded General Parks in 1954 and referred some papers to Page for comment and concurrence. The most notable was the hard-hitting statement of General Matthew B. Ridgway which laid the responsibility for public, community and troop relations squarely on each commander. This statement, like the Lockhart Report, is still widely quoted in Army information circles.[79] Major General G. S. Meloy, Jr., followed Mudgett and also called on Page to remain among his civilian advisory force.

k. Arthur Page always seemed to find time enough to do the things he wanted to do--and keeping his family

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[78]Letter to Lieutenant General F. L. Parks, USA-Ret, April 12, 1956, Box 44, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[79]Letter from Major General Gilman C. Mudgett, June 15, 1954, Box 35, Arthur W. Page Papers.

"public" (sons and son-in-law) posted on interesting books, magazine articles, happenings, etc., was part of his life during the war years. All four men served with distinction as officers in the United States Navy. Mrs. Arthur W. Page, too, carried on her work as president of the Army Relief Society from 1928, when she assumed the position from Mrs. Henry L. Stimson, until after World War II.

Recognition--Medal for Merit

Although the Pentagon Public Relations in this chapter span more than ten years, it is fitting that the final word be on the Medal for Merit presented to Arthur W. Page on January 12, 1946. The Certificate for this highest of all civilian awards for service to the military reads:

> The United States of America
> To All Who Shall See These Presents, Greeting: This is to certify that The President of the United States of America in accordance with the Order Issued by General George Washington at Headquarters, Newburgh, New York, on August 7, 1782, and pursuant to act of Congress, has awarded the Medal for Merit to
> ARTHUR W. PAGE
> For extraordinary fidelity and exceptionally meritorious conduct. Given under my hand in the City of Washington this twelfth day of January, 1946.
>
> /s/ Dean Acheson
> Acting Secretary of State
>
> /s/ Harry S. Truman
> Commander-in-Chief

CITATION

> Arthur W. Page, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services to the United States. Mr. Page performed extraordinary service to the War Department in many difficult and important assignments as a consultant to the Secretary

of War. He was chairman of the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation; for a period of some six months in late 1944 and early 1945 he was overseas advising on problems arising from the information and education program of the Army; he is a member of an ad hoc committee which is concerned with special problems in public relations; and he was in charge of the initial publicity released on the use of the atomic bomb--perhaps the most significant event of our time. The several assignments have required the most careful and understanding treatment and he carried them out with great skill, rare good judgment, and the keenest insight into the human side of war. In all these matters the Secretary of War has relied heavily and with complete confidence on his judgment and advice. In carrying out his assigned duties he made a noteworthy contribution to the operations of the War Department at a time when it was charged with winning the greatest war in which this nation has ever been engaged. But for the splendid contributions and mature advice of Mr. Page many of the problems concerning the human aspects of the War Department's operations and its relations with the public might very well have caused serious damage to the war effort. Mr. Page has made a most noteworthy contribution to the war effort, for which the War Department and the nation are grateful.

/s/ Harry S. Truman[80]

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[80]Certificate, Citation and Medal for Merit awarded Arthur W. Page, Box 81, Arthur W. Page Papers.

CHAPTER VI

NEW FIELDS TO CONQUER

Living on Long Island gave Arthur W. Page a strong and lasting personal interest in the affairs of the Long Island Railroad. His seat on the Board of Directors of the Chase Manhattan Bank, and his close friendship with railway equipment specialist C. J. Symington and railway security analyst Fairman R. Dick, gave him an intimate knowledge of railroad financing. Page's other directorships, such as Westinghouse Electric, Kennicott Copper and Continental Oil, let him look at the railroads through the interested eyes of the large users of rail transportation.

There were other reasons for Arthur Page's long time interest in railroading. His grandfather had owned a short logging railroad in North Carolina when Arthur Page was a boy so he had a nostalgic interest in such things. He served the Pennsylvania Railroad as public relations counselor frequently. And he felt a companionship, according to his sons, with this railroad industry, which operated under Federal regulation much as did the operating companies of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company.

There are several references in the Page Papers to a book on the subject of national transportation policy written by Charles L. Dearing and Wilfred Owen of the

Brookings Institution of Washington, D. C.[1] The book was written, in part, at the request of the Hoover Commission on reorganization of the Executive Department of the government. It cited the growing need for fundamental revisions of our national transportation policy.

Dearing played an important part in the next job that Arthur Page took on for the United States Government in the first Eisenhower Administration. Page was appointed head of the Working Group of the Cabinet Committee on Transport Policy and Organization, and Dearing became one of his chief assistants. Before examining the circumstances of Page's appointment, the details of the duty, and its results, some of the conclusions drawn in Dearing's 1949 book are pertinent.

Dearing and Owen attributed largely to the government the tremendous growth of the American transportation industry and its contribution to the building of the country. However, they said there were many serious defects in the system as operating that needed fast remedial action. Some of these were:

> Other defects in national transportation policy stem from the failure of the government to modernize its regulatory program. Regulatory controls which were asserted in order to make private monopoly amenable to the public interest have been carried over into an era characterized by universal and intensive transport

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[1] Charles L. Dearing and Wilfred Owen, National Transportation Policy (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1949).

competition. . . . This problem arises primarily in connection with the type of rate regulation that controls the general level of railroad revenues.[2]

. . . if the carriers are not permitted to realize high earning in the midst of general economic prosperity, their prospects for continued solvency are poor. The record indicates clearly that without high earnings at the peak of the business cycle to compensate for inevitable losses during depression, it will be impossible to maintain and improve the railroad plant at the rate necessary to meet intensive competition and to assure the standby capacity necessary for national security.

It seems clear, then, that in the interest of preserving a financially stable, efficient, and progressive railroad system, some way must be found to remove unnecessary obstacles to prompt adjustment between carrier operating costs and the level of rates paid for the service.

A larger measure of discretion over general pricing policy should be restored to railroad management.[3]

If the potential contributions of the private enterprise system are to be realized, available traffic must be allocated among the competing forms of transportation in accordance with economic standards of price and service competition. This means at the minimum that all rates must reflect the true economic/ cost of performing transportation service. . . .

Initiative and responsibility for basic managerial decisions must be restored to private enterprise, particularly with respect to general pricing policy of the railroads.[4]

Dearing and Owen recognized that the problem was not entirely one-sided, however, and they criticized the managements and the communities, too:

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[2] Ibid., p. 371.

[3] Ibid., p. 373.

[4] Ibid., pp. 377-378.

> In the private sector, where the financial condition of the majority of carriers is notoriously weak, private management has been guilty of ill-advised expansion, failure to achieve maximum economy, and lack of alertness to the possibilities of the newer forms of transportation. Communities and other interested groups have multiplied these problems in numerous ways; for example, by tenaciously resisting the abandonment of obsolete plant and service. . . .[5]

Arthur Page was a firm believer in free enterprise, and freedom of individuals and businesses to manage their own destinies. Being a man of action, he could not sit idly by and watch the railroads deteriorate for reasons which were largely beyond their control.

In the early 1950's, Arthur Page talked with his good friend, President Eisenhower, about the plight of the railroads.[6] And he collaborated with Fairman R. Dick, a railroad financing specialist, on a study and report of the conditions of the Class I railroads throughout the United States.[7]

This plea for the railroads was printed and distributed widely to the President, members of his cabinet, members of Congress, Federal regulatory bodies, influential business men, and to anyone else who might act on the

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[5] Ibid., p. 351.

[6] Interview with General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Gettysburg, Pa., September 2, 1964.

[7] Arthur W. Page and Fairman R. Dick, A Plea For the Return of the Railroads to A Healthy Economy, 1954, Box 64, Arthur W. Page Papers.

matter directly or indirectly.

The plastic-bound booklet contains extensive charts on railroad earnings, density of freight and passenger traffic, revenue ton miles, statistics on freight and passenger traffic, innovations, improvements within financial capacity, age of equipment and trackage, safety record, value of stocks and bonds and who holds them, plus much more.

The narrative portion of the book [illegible]es these telling points:

a. The Interstate Commerce Commission is required by law to "initiate, modify, establish or adjust rates so that the carriers as a whole will earn a fair return upon the aggregate value of railway property." The ICC also said, as late as 1937, that "in the long run no private corporation can continue to attract private capital unless it is able to market stocks as well as bonds."

b. The ICC originally set 6% as a "fair return" and later removed the limit. But the rates that the ICC approved permitted the railroads to earn only 3.62% from 1921 through 1947. Only one year, 1942, did they earn as much as 6%.

c. The "fair return" actually must be a return that will attract capital. That is the only definition that will produce the results for the public desired by the Transportation Act of 1920. Page and Dick believed that a

7% return would be necessary to keep the railroads in a healthy condition and provide the public good service.

The book concludes:

> There is no other single opportunity which promises as much to the prosperity of the country as the return of the railroads to the American way of life, and no other single opportunity that can add to American efficiency and economic strength as the application of modern technology to our transportation system.
>
> The record shows that regulation has for 29 years been consistently a more serious hazard to the railroads than competition has been to any other industry. With this record, no one can be reasonably expected to invest new money in the railroads until the basis of regulation is changed.[8]

Arthur Page and his associates were not, of course, the only ones concerned with this problem of national transportation policy and regulation. The American Enterprise Association, a nonpartisan research organization which studies national policy problems, reported the results of its study of the same situation as follows:

> By 1946, however, it became apparent that the hodge-podge of enactments characterizing the development of our national transportation policy since 1887, involving attempts to compromise the conflicts between various competing and opposing carriers as they were brought under national jurisdiction, left the country and the industry with too much regulation, and a system better adapted to conditions no longer existing than to those of modern times. The function of government in transportation had extended far beyond public need and in many areas too little managerial discretion was permitted. . . .[9]

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[8] Ibid., p. 64.

[9] John H. Frederick, Improving National Transportation Policy (Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Association, 1959), p. 17.

> Due to their generally poor earning position common carriers have found it increasingly difficult to obtain new capital from private sources. The railroads are, however, in the worst position of all in this regard, for their net working capital actually declined between 1945 and 1957 and increased in 1958 only because their buying was reduced to a minimum. . . .[10]

The American Enterprise Association study also dwelt at some length on the possibility of the railroads sliding into nationalization. It believed that the danger signs could already be seen, among them:

> . . . Continuation of a regulatory environment where the railroads are not permitted to take advantage of their inherent cost advantages, or to obtain earnings sufficient to permit them to attract private capital. A continuing supply of investment money is needed to keep railroad properties equipped in a modern manner and of sufficient capacity to meet all reasonable demands for service. . . .
>
> There is still time to preserve the railroads as the "hub"of economic freedom," but there is a dangerous lack of concern for their pressing problems. . . .[11]

Genesis of the Cabinet Committee on Transport Policy and Organization

Early in his first administration, President Eisenhower established the President's Advisory Commission on Government Organization. Three of the members, Nelson A. Rockefeller, Milton Eisenhower and Arthur Flemming, submitted a recommendation to the President on April 28,

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[10] Ibid., p. 19.

[11] Ibid., p. 31.

1954, that national transport policy be re-examined. The Cabinet discussed the recommendation at its meeting May 12, 1954, and on July 12, 1954, President Eisenhower formally established the Cabinet Committee on Transport Policy and Organization.[12]

Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks was Chairman of the Cabinet Committee. Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, and Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization Arthur Flemming were the other members. The Secretary of the Treasury, the Postmaster General, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget were named as participating members. On February 9, 1955, the organization name was changed to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Transport Policy and Organization.[13]

Along with the job, Sinclair Weeks was given rather comprehensive guidance from the White House on what was desired. The memorandum of instruction from Sherman Adams, White House "Chief of Staff," read:

> The President's letter of July twelfth which established the Cabinet Committee on Transport Policy and Organization indicated the general purposes to which this Cabinet Committee would direct its efforts. We have all recognized the need for establishment of basic ground rules to guide the Government in exercising its many-sided responsibilities in the field of

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[12]Letter from Staff Director Arthur A. Kimball, President's Advisory Commission on Government Organization, September 26, 1955, Box 42, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[13]Memorandum from Sinclair Weeks, February 9, 1955, Box 40, Arthur W. Page Papers.

transportation and in its relationships with the transportation industry.

Therefore, in order to meet the President's request that the Committee report back to him not later than December 1, 1954, it is requested that your Committee channel its efforts toward the development of the following:

(1) A comprehensive statement of the nature of our national transport problem.

(2) A clear statement of the recommended national objectives of the Government with respect to the transportation industry of the United States.

(3) Recommendations as to the national policies which should be adopted to achieve these national objectives.

(4) The action programs which are recommended to be continued or undertaken to carry out these national policies.

(5) Recommendations for organizational changes in the Government structure, and administrative action needed to facilitate accomplishment of these policy objectives and action programs.

(6) Recommended facilitating legislation.

In connection with the development of these desired recommendations, it would appear necessary to determine the answers to the following questions, among others:

(1) Whether present regulation of the four principal forms of transportation is applied unequally in such a way as to constitute a serious impediment to the ability of one or more forms to compete with the others.

(2) Whether the regulation of all forms of transportation may be excessive in light of present competitive conditions in the industry, and if so whether such over-regulation constitutes a serious obstacle to sustained development of a modern and coordinated transport system.

(3) Whether promotional policies are in serious conflict with regulatory policies, and if so whether

this situation deprives the public of the benefits intended from each.

(4) Whether the effect of present regulatory and promotional policies taken together tends to weaken the common carrier forms of transportation on which we must rely heavily for the basic framework of public transportation in peacetime and to meet mobilization requirements, in favor of private carriers having no public obligations.

(5) Whether any form of transportation is operating substantially in traffic for which it is not best suited, and if so the extent to which such uneconomic use of facilities is the effect of current public policies.

The over-all, integrated national policies which the President has asked your Committee to recommend not only should be consistent with current national needs but as far as possible should assure the readiness and flexibility of the transport industry to meet defense mobilization requirements.[14]

With this formidable set of instructions and such a short deadline, Secretary Weeks looked for someone who could do a thorough, sensible and fast job. First he asked Arthur W. Page, his long-time friend and fellow-Harvard alumnus, to suggest some members for the staff. The booklet by Arthur Page and Fairman R. Dick, A Plea for the Return of the Railroads to a Healthy Economy, was apparently fresh in his mind.

Arthur Page suggested Mark Cresap of Westinghouse Electric, or Arthur C. Schier, traffic vice-president of General Foods, for the top job. He also recommended

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[14]Memorandum to Sinclair Weeks from Sherman Adams, The White House, July 14, 1954, Box 36, Arthur W. Page Papers.

Charles L. Dearing, author of the 19[illegible] book cited earlier, and then in the Office of the Secre[illegible] of Commerce, for membership in the group. Ernest W. Williams, Professor of Transportation at Columbia University, was also recommended by Page.[15]

Page showed such an understanding of the problem as well as willingness to help that Secretary Weeks, Secretary Wilson and Director Flemming on August 4, 1954, asked him to take the top job of the Working Group and to select his own staff. Page accepted and chose these men:

George Roberts--member of the law firm of Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam and Roberts, and a specialist in transportation law.

Dr. Ernest W. Williams, Professor of Transportation at Columbia University, and an authority in the area of railroad regulation.

Arthur C. Schier, vice president of General Foods Corporation, and Charles H. Beard, vice president of Union Carbide & Carbon Corporation. (These were the top traffic men in their companies and represented the large business users of all forms of transportation.)

Fairman R. Dick--member of the firm of Dick & Merle-Smith, railroad finance and equipment specialists.

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[15]Letter to Sinclair Weeks, July 22, 1954, Box 36, Arthur W. Page Papers.

and co-author with Arthur Page of the book cited earlier.

Charles L. Dearing--member of the staff of Brookings Institution and a Special Consultant to the Secretary of Commerce for transportation matters.[16]

The Page Working Group

With all of his interest and experience in the railroad business, it seemed perfectly natural that public relations counselor Arthur W. Page would be working for the United States Government in the field of transportation policy and organization. He slipped easily into the task with his characteristic enthusiasm, and apparently without a thought to the fact that this would be an unsung, unheralded and probably unrewarded job.

Sinclair Weeks recognized, as did Major General F. H. Osborn and many others before him, that Arthur W. Page could be counted on for superb results, no matter what the job. And the qualities needed for this transportation task were those expressed by General Osborn:

> He had an extraordinary quality of getting other people to develop his ideas so that they thought they were their own. He was always looking for effective results and never for credit. I think we all thought of him as the shrewdest, most competent public relations advisor and that he was the most patriotic and deeply motivated man we had ever known.[17]

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[16]Letter to Fairman R. Dick, August 4, 1954, Box 36, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[17]Letter from Frederick H. Osborn, New York, November 5, 1964.

Official notification of the appointment did not come until September 22, 1954, in a confirming letter from the Department of Commerce.[18] By that time, the Working Group was well into the problem.

After several meetings and discussions with members of the working group, Page wrote to Weeks telling him what the Group had determined to accomplish within the short time allotted:

> The policy we are endeavoring to formulate is:
>
> (1) To change regulation of rates so that the carriers will be able to price their services themselves and to act quickly. This will make them effectively competitive and this in our opinion is the best way to find out what are the inherent advantages of each kind of carrier for the public service.
>
> (2) A. To require that new capital expenditures for waterways for transportation have a certificate of convenience and necessity from the ICC based on a demonstration that the project will be self-supporting.
>
> B. That operational costs of all waterways be met by tolls.
>
> (3) That as the states have jurisdiction of the highways the ton mile tax and tolls--in other words user charges--will be levied on the trucks by the states as they see or feel necessity.
>
> (4) That we leave the termination of the subsidy to the airlines to C.A.B.
>
> (5) That particular penalties put on the railroads on the old assumption that they are rich monopolies, such as grade crossing expenses, cut rates for disaster relief, etc., be eliminated.

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[18] Letter from James C. Worthy, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, September 22, 1954, Box 36, Arthur W. Page Papers.

(6) That the long and short haul and the commodity clauses be eliminated from all modes of transportation.

The essence of the whole matter is more competition and less regulation except in one or two instances where some regulation is necessary and it is not unfairly applied. The chief example of this is the contract and exempt trucks and their trip lease habits which are unfair to the rest of the trucking industry. We are in opposition to Benson /Secretary of Agriculture/ on this.

We will also recommend the repeal of the taxes (3 percent for freight and 10 percent for passengers) on public transportation because it tends to drive transportation to the private carriers, and is therefore discriminatory. Maybe Humphrey /Secretary of the Treasury/ can't give up the money. Still it is not good for transportation.[19]

The Working Group held no formal meetings. It did entertain written briefs from representatives of the railroads, truckers, and waterways and talked with their representatives. The procedures were quite informal, and at no time did the working group assemble to hear competitive presentations from these shippers. Yet there are many indications in the Page Papers that every facet of the complex problem was considered.

The Working Group also made extensive use of the prior experience and facts and figures of members Charles L. Dearing and Fairman R. Dick. Dearing, operating from the Department of Commerce, took on the job of assembling the opinions tentatively agreed upon and circulating them

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[19]Letter to Secretary Sinclair Weeks, September 28, 1954, Box 36, Arthur W. Page Papers.

in draft report form to the entire Working Group. The schedule the group set for itself, after most of the data were assembled in September and October, 1954, was like this:

October 26--Working Group meet to hammer out what material should be included in the report to the Cabinet Committee.

November 2--Hearing to have in each Working Group member's hands the proposed draft of the Group's report.

November 4--Working Group to complete agreement on the draft report.

November 15--Submit final draft of Working Group to Cabinet Committee.[20]

How near consensus were the Working Group members is indicated in a letter from lawyer George Roberts when he reports that he cannot attend the October 26 meeting:

> I have no constructive suggestion to make about your declaration of policy. As I understand it, the chief use that we expect the railroads to make of their freedom to institute rates without the approval of the (Interstate Commerce) Commission is not to increase rates all along the line, but to reduce rates in order to attract business. I think the public generally believes that railroads could do that freely and easily now if they wanted to, and that railroads are not trying in any case to reduce rates but always to increase them. I do not think that in any of our literature to date there has been an adequate explanation of why individual rates to meet competition

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[20]Memorandum to the Working Group, October 20, 1954, Box 37, Arthur W. Page Papers.

> cannot be put into effect by the railroads easily and simply under the law as it now is. Unless we emphasize this point more, the reaction to what we are proposing will be that we are urging a substantial increase of rates all along the line.[21]

Indeed, the Working Group, and the Cabinet Committee, was later criticized in the press, and most especially by the motor truck and waterway operators for "selling out" to the railroad interests. Certainly there was little, if any, opposition to the reports which were largely prepared, after group consultation, by Arthur Page and Charles Dearing.

Report of the Working Group

Right on schedule the Working Group submitted its report to the Cabinet Committee. It contained a clear statement of the problem, a digest of the aims of the Cabinet Committee in compliance with the Sherman Adams directive, a restatement of the national transportation policy, and recommendations for action.

Highlights of the Report were:

> The Working Group did not find it possible to define the limits of the tasks which the various forms of transportation should perform in a transportation system best suited to the needs of the public. It believes that such a system can be achieved only by the exercise of a wide freedom for competitive experimentation which enables the purchaser of transportation to judge the adjustment of both services and cost

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[21] Letter from George Roberts, October 22, 1954, Box 37, Arthur W. Page Papers.

opportunities to his own requirements.

The Group believed the government policy prevented or severely limited the realization of that economic objective.

A vigorous common carrier system is essential to the country . . . yet historically all common carrier services, except pipelines, are financially precarious. The force of competition and the unusual obligations placed on common carrier transport argue for relieving these carriers as much as possible from restraints designed to meet conditions which have either disappeared or been greatly changed.

The Group noted that railroads are the only true common carriers. . . . able and required to afford transportation for all commodities between all points reached by its lines. No other type of carrier has similar obligations.

Unusual public interest attaches to a national policy which enables the railroad industry to exercise its capabilities and to enjoy such success in a competitive field as its abilities make possible. However, the developed public policy has given aids to other types of transport which have not been made available at the same time or in the same measure to the railroads.

The aim of the Working Group was to seek a program of revision of the public transportation policy which would tend to:

a. Relieve the financial distress of the common carriers.

b. Enable the spur of competition to be felt on the operations of the carriers to the end that inefficient managements were weeded out, the application of technical innovations speeded up, and the development of new rate and service concepts fostered.

c. Enable each form of transport freely to reflect its abilities in the market by appropriate experimentation in rates and service to demonstrate fully its possibilities for service to the shipping and traveling public.

d. Produce, by encouraging initiative of the

carriers, considerable economy in the performance of the total transport requirements of the nation.

The Working Group made seven recommendations for action, starting with a revision of the wording of the Interstate Commerce Commission's declaration of policy. The old policy said:

> It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy of the Congress to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this Act, so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, economical and efficient service and foster sound economic conditions in transportation and among the several carriers; to encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable charges to transportation services, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices. . . .

The revision recommended said:

> It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy of the Congress to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the provision of this Act to the extent required for the protection of the general public, without exemption by commodities or particular classes of traffic, but protecting bona fide private carriage, so administered as to encourage the maximum of competitive experimentation by each form of transportation to discover and to demonstrate and make effective its potential to the public in service and in rates subject only to the proviso that no carrier shall create unjust discriminations nor undue preferences or advantages, nor shall any carrier place in effect rates which fail to cover the direct ascertainable costs of producing the service to which the rate applies.

The other recommendations of the Working Group were:

2. Increased reliance on competitive forces in carrier rate making. Rate-setting authority was given ICC when railroads were the only carriers and could charge what the traffic would bear. Now these

precautions are no longer necessary.

3. Flexibility in the use of one form of transportation by another. . . . eliminate the provision that prohibits railroads from engaging in the trucking business. It should be open to them as to anyone else, based only on public convenience and necessity.

4. Elimination of the discriminatory taxes of 10% on passengers and 3% on freight. These cannot be collected from private carriers.

5. Restrict the intervention of executive agencies in the regulatory procedures. The Secretary of Agriculture had authority to intervene before regulatory bodies to exert official pressure on them to obtain preferential treatment for agricultural interests.

6. Require the government to engage in basic research for the railroads. . . . such as development of a coal-fired gas turbine locomotive. Government now engages in basic research for truckers through Bureau of Public Roads, for aviation companies through National Committee for Aeronautics, and for waterway companies through several government agencies.

7. Restoration and maintenance of a modernized and financially strong system of common carriers. Revisions needed in the areas of (a) agricultural exemptions, (b) bulk commodity exemptions, (c) contract carrier regulation, (d) trip leasing, (e) private carriage, (f) passenger service deficits, (g) governmental claims, and (h) the subsidy problem and user charges.[22]

Cabinet Paper

Mindful of the December 1, 1954, deadline imposed by the White House, the Secretary of Commerce and his Cabinet Committee wasted no time in considering the report of the Working Group. It was at once obvious that the Bureau of

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[22]Report of the Working Group, Cabinet Committee on Transport Policy and Organization, November, 1954, Box 37, Arthur W. Page Papers.

the Budget had an important interest in the recommendations, and Director Rowland Hughes and Assistant Director Harold L. Pearson were called into the consultations.

As might be expected, the Bureau of the Budget was hesitant to concur with such "potentially explosive" recommendations. It suggested that the Working Group be required to evaluate the cost effect of the agricultural exemption provisions, and the economic effect on "private carriers, contract and 'pseudo-contract' carriers, regulated carriers"; (all of the foregoing subdivided as to truck, rail and water). The Bureau also suggested that the Working Group estimate the cost to the government of abolishing its preferential rates--including the added cost to the Post Office Department.[23]

Arthur W. Page and his Working Group cohorts were able to convince the Cabinet Committee that the bold action approach recommended was best and that the recommendations should stand. Page was then given the job, or perhaps volunteered for it, of preparing the Working Group Report in the form of a Cabinet Paper for presentation to President Eisenhower. The drafts and re-drafts that are in the Page Papers indicate that Arthur W. Page spent much of the last days of November and early December, 1954, in cutting and polishing the Cabinet Paper.

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[23]Letter to Secretary Sinclair Weeks from Director Rowland Hughes, Bureau of the Budget, November 39, 1954, Box 38, Arthur W. Page Papers.

As a full-fledged CABINET PAPER--PRIVILEGED, the report emerged in Arthur Page's own handwriting. The statement of the problem, the requirements for a revised national policy, and the other recommendations were intact. As printed Cabinet Paper 6, dated December 8, 1954, the Working Group's labors seemed about to bear fruit.[24] Under separate cover Page sent Secretary Weeks a statement drafted for President Eisenhower to make in connection with a public announcement of the report of the Cabinet Committee.[25]

With these tasks completed, Arthur Page knew that there was still much to be done before the mills of the democratic process would grind out remedial legislation. But starting the wheels in motion was a great satisfaction to Page, and he wrote of his pleasure to President Eisenhower in this way:

Dear Ike:

> I think you would like to know that the men on the working group on transportation have taken great pleasure in the work and have derived great satisfaction from the opportunity given them to serve. And they realize and are impressed with the fact that this Administration has to an unprecedented degree the habit of positive planning ahead, rather than waiting

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[24]Cabinet Paper 6, December 8, 1954, Report of the Cabinet Committee on Transport Policy and Organization, Box 39, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[25]Letter with inclosure to Secretary Weeks, December 30, 1954, Box 39, Arthur W. Page Papers.

for problems to force themselves upon the government.

For them and myself, I want to thank you, as I have Sinclair /Weeks/, for letting us have this opportunity of practicing citizenship.

With best Christmas wishes to you and Mrs. Eisenhower.

Sincerely yours,

Arthur W. Page[26]

The President replied:

Dear Arthur:

Too seldom do I receive a letter such as yours of the twenty-second. I can only wish that more Americans would look upon government service as a privilege and an opportunity.

I hope you will find it possible to express my appreciation to each member of the Working Group on Transportation.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower[27]

Roadblocks

Brushing by the objections of the Bureau of the Budget was relatively easy; the Department of Justice turned out to be a more formidable foe. The legal minds of the Justice Department raised objections to many of the

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[26]Letter to President Eisenhower, December 22, 1954, Box 39, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[27]Letter from President Eisenhower, January 5, 1955, Box 39, Arthur W. Page Papers.

recommended actions, on the basis of their being unenforceable, illegal without extensive enabling legislation, impracticable, or otherwise not acceptable.

Philip Ray, Chief Counsel for the Department of Commerce, led the fight for salvation of the recommendations and succeeded to a large degree. Arthur Page kept the members of the Working Group informed, and Professor Ernest W. Williams assisted Ray in his on-the-scenes fight. Page reported the 90% success of the venture in these words:

> The delay to the transportation project occasioned by the belated intervention of the Justice Department has resulted in losing momentum.
>
> On the other hand, it is possible that some of the changes that are evolving will make it easier to pass in Congress.
>
> It will not be so forthright a document as we proposed but as I see it now, I think it will contain 90% of the essentials.
>
> The statement of policy stresses a reliance on competition.
>
> A maximum rate can be challenged by a shipper as unreasonable but he has to prove it--this is much the same as his right to prove a rate discriminatory. The evidence in both cases is comparison with other rates.
>
> But there is no provision for a general rate decrease by the I.C.C. based on earnings of the carriers.
>
> Suspensions are handled as in our original recommendation.
>
> The requirement for a long haul rate to equal the combined rates of its parts is abolished but a long haul rate which is lower than a short haul rate can be questioned if it is not based on competition.

All in all, it is as good as I expected we'd get when we first began but not so good as I hoped three weeks ago.

If it gets through Congress in the shape that it is now taking, it will be an immense improvement.

The credit for evolving a good document against the Justice Department's objections is chiefly due to Philip Ray, the Counsel for the Commerce Department. He has spent as much as ten hours at a stretch with the Justice Department's lawyers and, with Ernie Williams' help from time to time, he has out-talked these people in their own language.

This Battle of the Bulge that Justice started disorganized our plans and strategy but I think we'll get across the Rhine all right--but somewhat late.

What the road is like and the opposition between there and Berlin, I don't know.[28]

Other criticisms came from within the transportation industry itself--mostly the truckers and the barge operators. The railroad managers liked it, for the most part, but some complained that the report did not contain all the recommendations made to the Working Group by the Association of American Railroads.

One of the staunch supporters of the Committee's Report was David I. Mackie, Chairman of the Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference. He did a great deal to encourage passage of the Group's recommendations. His general attitude was:

This Report really says: Let a man run who can. It is a reflection of the American way--the principle

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[28]Letter to George Roberts and other members of the Working Group, March 2, 1955, Box 40, Arthur W. Page Papers.

under which this country has grown to its present stature. This very principle has been applied across the board in our industrial world. Equality of competition, circumscribed within reasonable limits, would now be applied to present-day competitive transportation.[29]

Cabinet Paper Revised

On March 23, 1955, a revised Cabinet Paper, embodying the agreements with the Justice Department, was prepared. Arthur Page probably did not participate in preparation of this revision because most of the changes appear to be legalistic hedging, redefinition of terms, and watering down some of the recommendations. The two most important recommendations--revision of the national transportation policy, and the policy of increased reliance on competitive forces in rate making--remained essentially unchanged.

Accompanying the Cabinet Paper to President Eisenhower was an Arthur Page touch--a special transportation message to be released by the President at the time he accepted or approved the report. This statement recalled the reasons for the report, who was on the committee, the recommendations made, and the President's request for legislative action by the Congress.[30]

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[29]Speech delivered by David I. Mackie, Chairman, Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference, before Railroad Public Relations Association, Broadmoor Hotel, Colorado Springs, Colorado, June 17, 1955, p. 7.

[30]Special Transportation Message, Cabinet Paper, March 23, 1955, Box 40, Arthur W. Page Papers.

On April 18, 1955, the White House released the text of the report of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Transport Policy and Organization, but did not release the special transportation message. In recalling the study nearly ten years later, General Eisenhower said he had studied the report at great length and thought that the Working Group had done a fine job. He was especially impressed by the emphasis on competitive pricing and how this would result in use of all transportation media in the best way possible--to permit each medium to serve in the area of carriage for which it was best fitted.[31]

Nine months after the President appointed the Committee it seemed as though the strenuous work was done. From the President and from the Secretary of Commerce, Page received letters of appreciation for the work of the Working Group. Weeks' letter is indicative of how hard and how effectively Arthur Page worked on this job:

> I enclose herewith a copy of the letter I have written to the members of the Committee.
>
> For you, my friend, such an expression is completely inadequate. You have been wonderful all the way through and when you so kindly mentioned my patience and persistence the other day, I couldn't help but think how much more appropriate the slogan were if turned right around in your direction.
>
> I hope we have done some good but whether or no, be sure it has been wonderful to have had you by my side

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[31] Interview with General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Gettysburg, September 2, 1964.

in this great endeavor which I am sure must sooner or later bear some fruit.

Thank you so much for everything and the next brawl I get into, I'll certainly be calling on you for assistance.[32]

Follow Through

Arthur Page was, indeed, a man of action. Now that his work on the transportation problem had been completed, he could have left the rest of the ball carrying to others. But that was not his style, and he started immediately to build a consensus for the report his group prepared. He seized the opportunity of a "thank you" letter from the President, for instance:

Dear Ike:

I appreciate greatly your letter about the work on the transportation matter. It took longer than we hoped but perhaps not longer than we should have expected.

At present, we of the sub-committee are working to build up support for it.

As I understand the situation, the White House Staff does not favor the presidential message originally contemplated. And I do not believe that is necessary.

On the other hand, the report is now a kind of orphan being a report to the White House and having no White House comment about it.

A statement that the subject is important and that the objectives are good and that it is hoped that Congress will begin its hearings as soon as it

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[32]Letter from Secretary Sinclair Weeks, April 18, 1955, Box 41, Arthur W. Page Papers.

reasonably can, while not being a commitment like a message, would remove any suspicion that the Administration had abandoned its interest which I fear will otherwise be exploited.

With many thanks for the opportunity.

Sincerely yours,

Arthur W. Page[33]

To which the President replied:

Dear Arthur:

Thank you for your letter. Tomorrow morning at the press conference I shall try to find a chance to make the kind of statement you suggest. It should not be difficult to do. With warm regard.

As Ever,

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And sure enough, at the May 4, 1955, Presidential Press Conference, Francis M. Stephenson of the New York Daily News did ask about this transportation report. The President replied:

The transportation report is a brilliant piece of work in its analysis of our difficulties and in the purposes it announced that it wants to achieve.

It was seven, I believe, seven Cabinet officers before whom appeared the transportation experts of the United States.

The purpose, of course, is to make competitive influences more governing in our whole transportation system, and looks forward to that kind of a result.

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[33]Letter to President Eisenhower, April 27, 1955, Box 41, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[34]Letter from President Eisenhower, May 3, 1955, Box 41, Arthur W. Page Papers.

> The person to remember, of course, here is the general consuming public. They are the people who use the transportation, both the personnel transportation and the freight.
>
> There are details of that report that will be most argumentative, and will give rise to, I think, a very lot of discussion. And it should be so. But I think the basic principles are commendable. Certainly I approve of them perfectly, and the purposes they announce.[35]

Arthur Page was not satisfied with the President's endorsement of the committee report. Although legislation was introduced, as we shall see later, President Eisenhower had not specifically recommended that it be enacted. In a letter to Secretary Weeks, Page suggested that the President be encouraged to recommend the specific legislation. Page pointed out that President Eisenhower's State of the Union Message on January 6, 1955, had promised "legislation will be recommended to correct such policy deficiencies as we find" in the transportation services. Failure to do so, said Page, would be tantamount to abandoning the measure.[36]

There is no evidence that the President did issue a strong endorsement for the enactment of legislation based on the Committee Report. Arthur Page considered this a failure, on the part of his Group, to instill enough

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[35]Transcript of Presidential Press Conference, May 4, 1955, Box 41, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[36]Letter to Secretary Weeks, August 26, 1955, Box 42, Arthur W. Page Papers.

enthusiasm within the Administration for passage of their recommended actions.[37]

Legislative Process

At the request of the Administration, identical bills were introduced in the Senate and the House of Representatives to implement the recommendations of the Presidential Advisory Committee Report. On May 9, 1955, Senator George A. Smathers introduced Senate Bill 1920 for himself and for Senators Warren G. Magnuson and John W. Bricker. Representative J. Percy Priest introduced House Bill 6141 on May 10, 1955, in the First Session, 84th Congress.

Almost immediately after the bills were introduced, Arthur Page and the two transportation users who served on the Working Group--Arthur C. Schier of General Foods Corporation and Charles H. Beard of Union Carbide--were called to Washington to confer with Senator Magnuson and Congressmen Priest and Oren Harris. The Members of Congress wanted to be certain that the measures they had introduced were not railroad-instigated and sponsored. Page was able to document the fact that the study grew out of the recommendation of Nelson A. Rockefeller, Milton Eisenhower,

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[37]Letter to Charles L. Dearing, December 29, 1955, Box 43, Arthur W. Page Papers.

and Arthur Fleming in April, 1954.[38]

Page also tried to start a campaign to pressure Congress into some action on the Transportation Bill, as it was now called. He wrote to Secretary Weeks and suggested that twenty-five or thirty big freight users be encouraged to form themselves into a committee to endorse the Transportation Bill. This "spontaneous" committee could then have one of their number make a presentation to Congress. Page figured that with that number as a nucleus, any number could be obtained with little additional effort. And since those big shippers were also large users of truck transport, "their indorsement might even tend to reduce the truckers' high temperature."[39]

When Weeks said the idea was good but that the government could not lobby for any Congressional action, Page undertook the job himself. He wrote to many big company executives, such as this letter to Mr. Neil McElroy, Procter & Gamble Company:

Dear Neil:

I want your help.

The Cabinet Committee's Report on Transportation is now in the form of a bill before Congress.

As I headed the group who did the spade work on the

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[38]Letter to Philip Ray, Counsel for Commerce Department, May 17, 1955, Box 41, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[39]Letter to Secretary Weeks, June 24, 1955, Box 42, Arthur W. Page Papers.

report, I should like to get all the support possible for it.

Its most fundamental proposal is to free the railroads and trucks and waterways to compete with less regulatory interference by the Interstate Commerce Commission.

I am convinced that this will produce better and cheaper transportation for shippers and, therefore, for the consuming public--and likewise by moving traffic by the mode best able to handle it strengthen the trucks and railroads each in the area where it is best.

I am sending you a copy of the report.

If you and your transportation specialists agree that it merits support, I hope you will join a group of company heads who have large freight bills in a kind of committee to endorse the legislation.

Their endorsement should be powerful because

(1) they buy transportation and as the consumer pays all the freight bills ultimately, they are the consumers' agent when they buy transportation;

(2) in this capacity of representing the public, they are impressive because they collectively pay a good many hundred million dollars a year for freight;

(3) such an appearance before Congress by the representative of a group, which is neither in the railroad nor trucking business, but which uses both, would be more convincing than the arguments of the railroads or the truckers.

Harry Higgins, Charlie Hook, Bill Price and Given of Brake Shoe, would join. We need a good many more including, if possible, those who serve the public directly like the hotel people, etc.

With regards,

Sincerely yours,

Arthur W. Page[40]

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[40]Letter to Neil McElroy, President of Procter & Gamble Company, Cincinnati, July 22, 1955, Box 42, Arthur W. Page Papers.

Page sent copies of the Transportation Report with similar pleas for support before Congress to thirty-seven prominent business men and public relations counselors. The committee, in the form envisaged, did not materialize. How many of the men contacted took any further action to endorse the bill could not be determined, either.

In August and September, 1955, Arthur Page took further action to help the bill along. He appeared before the Business Advisory Council, an advisory group of influential business men, and urged their active support of the Transportation Bill.

Public hearings on the Transportation Bill were scheduled by the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce for September 19, 1955. To prepare Secretary Weeks for his scheduled appearance, Page wrote extensive text and notes on various parts of the bill that might prove controversial. He sent clippings, speeches and quotes to support the recommendations.[41]

But the Transportation Bill had too much organized opposition from the trucking industry and the barge lines, as well as a lack of enthusiasm from certain departments of the government. It failed to get out of committee and died without reaching the floor of either chamber of

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[41]Letter to Undersecretary of Commerce Louis S. Rothschild, August 22, 1955, Box 42, Arthur W. Page Papers.

Congress.

Short of Victory

There is often some comfort in failure. In the case of the Transportation Bill, it was down but not out. It would rise again with the pointed assistance of Arthur W. Page. As early as December, 1955, Page saw some hopeful signs. In a letter to fellow-Working Group member Charles L. Dearing:

> . . . As you look out from under the shade of the scholarly world what kind of assay do you give the ore we turned up?
>
> My estimate is about as follows:
>
> The facts were known. We discovered nothing new. But the facts were dormant. We gave them some life. How wisely or well I don't know. But considering the numbers engaged on our side and the time and money involved, we made a creditable contribution to renewed thinking and results.
>
> The results up to now are, I think, a changed attitude on the part of the I.C.C. and perhaps we contributed a little to the very obvious changed attitude on the part of railroad management.
>
> I think the momentum we started will not peter out without some legislation in the direction of our effort. Neither in men, time or effort was it a large one. If it dislodged long accepted precedents it has served a useful purpose.
>
> Perhaps our biggest failure was the failure to instill in the Administration an enthusiasm for this particular--and very important--way to increase the efficiency of our economy.[42]

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[42]Letter to Charles L. Dearing, December 29, 1955, Box 43, Arthur W. Page Papers. (Underlining added.)

In March, 1956, another indication that some good had come of the months of work was contained in another letter to an ex-Working Group member, Arthur C. Schier:

> Since our excursion into Washington the I.C.C. has granted the railroad 6% raise quickly.
>
> Maybe we influenced that some.
>
> Then they reverse a fairly common line of decisions in this case which you were good enough to send me. Now in this case they say that the law now is what we said it should be, but they had not previously been interpreting it that way.
>
> Maybe we had some influence on this.
>
> If I were arguing the matter, I should suggest to Congress that as the Commission now agrees to this principal [sic] the language of the Act might well be changed to make sure that no future Commission goes back to the old interpretation.
>
> I think the ferment will ultimately produce something. Maybe this is judgment. Maybe it is merely congenital optimism.[43]

Page continued to work for and applaud efforts toward more private enterprise and less government regulation and interference. The defeat of several legislative bills which would mean more government operation and development of resources was hailed in these terms to Secretary Weeks:

> Hells Canon [sic] privately developed!
>
> The Gore Bill defeated!

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[43]Letter to Arthur C. Schier, March 15, 1956, Box 45, Arthur W. Page Papers.

The Lehman Bill for Niagra lost in the shuffle!

I congratulate you.

It reminds me of the slogan at Verdun in World War I--"They shall not pass."[44]

Compromise

It was not until three years later, in 1958, that enough interest could be generated in Congress to reintroduce the Transportation Bill. Senate Bill 3778 was not the same bill--it was now called the Smathers Bill--but it was based on the bill introduced back in 1955. And Arthur W. Page had a hand in guiding Senator Smathers' thinking on the matter.

In May, 1958, Page wrote a memorandum to Senator Smathers with these important points:

> The national problem is how to get the best and cheapest handling of freight . . . even if that limits the hopes and ambitions of some carriers. The country has no obligation to furnish any carriers with guaranteed wage or profit. It should hire the most appropriate service at the least cost. . . .
>
> The policy of the ICC has been a kind of cartel policy to divide the traffic but not necessarily funneling it to the lowest cost facility for that particular traffic. Free and open competition would drive out the uneconomical and permit the best and cheapest service to carry the business.
>
> The subsidized ones call this "cutthroat and destructive" competition. The truck and barge lines say they would be hurt by this low-cost competition from rails. . . . in other words they admit they are not

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[44]Letter to Secretary Weeks, July 27, 1956, Box 46, Arthur W. Page Papers.

competitive rate-wise in these areas.

> If competition functioned and the barges, airplanes, trucks and rails concentrated on the traffic each could do best, there would probably be a series of consolidations, abandonments and rearrangements all to the public good, for these things happen when men see a prospect of profit from economy--if the profit is not at the hazard of a Federal agency's decision.[45]

Senator Smathers apparently worked at the Transportation Bill from two angles. First, he introduced Senate Bill 3778 which would implement a number of the recommendations of the 1954 Page Working Group. Second, anticipating that this bill might again fail of passage, Smathers introduced Senate Resolution 303 which authorized the Interstate Commerce Commission to make a study of national transportation policy and systems.

Probably much to Senator Smathers' surprise, both measures passed. A House-Senate Conference resolved certain disagreements between the two houses.

And the President signed the Transportation Act of 1958 (Smathers Bill) into law on August 12, 1958.

Smathers now had an approved Senate Resolution on his hands that was pretty useless. In writing to Charles J. Symington, New York railroad equipment specialist and security analyst, Smathers recounted the benefits of the new legislation, and then generalized:

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[45]Memorandum to Senator Smathers, May 23, 1958, Box 56, Arthur W. Page Papers.

> In my opinion, it is the most constructive piece of legislation enacted by Congress in the transportation field in the past thirty years. It is, without doubt, legislation in the public interest, and will assist substantially in strengthening, not only the railroad industry, the national transportation system, but the general economy as well.
>
> I am sure that you can fully realize that with this legislation just enacted, it will take some time before its effects can be felt on our transportation industry. This being so, it would be senseless and poor judgment to undertake a complete study of the transportation industry as contemplated by Senate Resolution 303. . . . without giving a reasonable period of time for the Transportation Act of 1958 to operate. . . .[46]

The main points of the Transportation Act of 1958 were:

(1) The I.C.C. was enjoined from holding the rates of one carrier artificially high merely to protect another carrier. This gave the railroads a chance to win back some traffic on which they could offer reduced rates, yet haul at a profit. /This was a "watered down" version of the Cabinet Committee recommendation./

(2) Limited the agricultural products which were exempt from I.C.C. control and thereby put the railroads in a better position to compete for agricultural traffic. /Another "watered down" version of the Cabinet Committee's recommendation./

(3) Plugged the hole where truckers could escape regulation by "buying" the goods from the shipper and then

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[46]Letter to Charles J. Symington from Senator George Smathers, August 4, 1958, Box 57, Arthur W. Page Papers.

"selling" them to a consignee who was to get them in the first place. Trucker then acted as a private carrier hauling his own goods and was not subject to I.C.C. regulation. /This was one of the original Cabinet Committee recommendations./

(4) Broadened the powers of the I.C.C. to permit that agency to approve discontinuation of unprofitable passenger runs without reference to individual states. /This was an implied but not stated recommendation of the Cabinet Committee. The Committee aimed to take powers away from the I.C.C. rather than give additional ones, but this part of the Act, in effect, freed the carriers from duplicating state regulation./

(5) The I.C.C. was given authority to alter rates set by state regulatory agencies if they were improper. /This was not a Cabinet Committee recommendation but did, in effect, reduce regulation on the carriers./

(6) The Government guaranteed loans made by private lenders to railroads to help improve service, obtain equipment, etc. /This was not the way the Cabinet Committee believed railroad financing should work. This step meant more government, more regulation, rather than less./

(7) Repealed the 3% freight tax. /This was recommended by the Cabinet Committee; however, the 10% tax on passengers was not lifted./[47]

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[47] Memorandum, "What Congress Did to Help the Railroads," August, 1958, Box 58, Arthur W. Page Papers.

Evaluation

Senator Smathers' generalized evaluation of the Transportation Act of 1958 appeared earlier. But what value can be placed on the work that started back in April, 1954? Ultimately, but not directly, the Working Group Report resulted in, or at least paved the way for, the 1958 Act. It is this entire continuum that must be assessed.

First, what did the railroads think? Generally, they were grateful for some relief even though it fell short of meeting their urgent needs. A publication of the Missouri Pacific Railroad said it this way:

> We'll make the most of the new legislation adopted by Congress to relieve railroads of some of the unfair government regulation under which they operate. It was only a modest beginning in a very large program that must be carried out if the railroads of the country are to have a successful operation. We hope this new legislation will serve as a check to the serious deterioration in the railroad picture. It should be understood, however, that it will do little to improve rail earnings in the immediate future.
>
> The one article that would have been of greatest benefit--freedom to meet competition price-wise--has been so watered down, it's questionable if it will enable the railroads to meet truck and barge competition. Missouri Pacific takes the position that all carriers--truck, barge, train--should be free to name rates that reflect their inherent advantages so long as they are not discriminatory between commodities and markets, and return a profit to the carrier. All things being equal, the shipper could then choose the form of transportation that offers the best service at the lowest cost.[48]

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[48] Missouri Pacific News Reel, August, 1958, Box 57, Arthur W. Page Papers.

And what did Arthur W. Page, a most interested spectator, think the Working Group had finally accomplished? He made this evaluation in October of 1959:

> My own estimate of the results are (1) that as the recommendations were for a radical change in regulation, the report did not immediately result in legislation. It is unusual for a new idea to be accepted quickly; (2) that it did change the thinking in the railroad world; (3) that it did result in a lot of education in interested parts of the public and in Congress; (4) that it paved the way for the Smathers Bill, later. . . .
>
> I think it is inconceivable that the Nation will continue to suffer poverty-stricken rail service with the danger that it fall into government hands. I doubt if the Country will rectify this by taxing the airlines and trucks commensurate with rail taxes. But I do think the public will agree to give the railroads more freedom from regulation so that they can compete to their full ability on their present tax basis.[49]

Out of the Tunnel

Perhaps the most meaningful of all is the present business climate in the railroad industry. Arthur Page's guarded optimism expressed throughout his work on the transportation study is vindicated by business reports such as this extract from Time:

> People who play with trains have been hurt, especially people who invest in railroad stocks. The Dow-Jones index of 20 railroad stocks needed a full 35 years to climb back to its 1929 high. But since it passed that mark last February, the rail average has been moving upward, reaching an alltime peak of 208.95 three weeks ago. Last week, as the stock market

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[49]Letter to Walter M. MacLean, October 8, 1959, Box 60, Arthur W. Page Papers.

generally fell in a long-anticipated correction, the rail average did better than the industrials, closed at 202.50.

All the signals show that the railroads are pulling out of their tunnel. They have been sped along by recently relaxed Government policies on rates and mergers, a refreshing enlightenment on the part of some labor unions, and the railroaders' own hustle.

From a postwar low of $7.7 billion in 1961, revenues of the nation's 102 Class I railroads rose to $9.6 billion last year, are likely to top $10 billion in 1964. Helped by liberal depreciation schedules and favorable tax rulings, rail profits last year achieved a six-year high of $651 million, should climb at least another $50 million this year. . . . Traffic is also rising. So far this year, the roads have carried 5% more freight than in the same period of 1963. . . .

New equipment and new ideas are partly responsible for the railroads' rise. . . . At the same time, the regulatory climate in Washington has changed. Switching from its policy of helping one form of transportation at the expense of another, the Interstate Commerce Commission has lately permitted railroads to reduce some rates to compete better against trucks and barges. . . .[50]

The radical, new idea that the railroads could emerge from their serious financial plight if given more freedom and less regulation seemed to be catching on.

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[50]"Railroads," Time Magazine, June 12, 1964, p. 98. (Underlining added.)

CHAPTER VII

THE "LOOP PROGRAM"

Arthur W. Page was not an "expert" in defense matters, yet he had been called in by the United States Government as one of the first consultants on national defense during the Eisenhower Administration. He was not an "expert" in the technology of national transportation, but the Secretary of Commerce entrusted him with preparation of a Cabinet Report to the President on national transport policy and organization.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower said Arthur Page was chosen for the tough consultation jobs because "he was so honest and with so much integrity that you could trust him to examine any problem thoroughly and come up with a solution. Although his business was not transportation, I had great confidence in his ability to analyze any business problem and come up with a solution."[1]

It was not surprising, therefore, that a New York-New Jersey government agency should also seek the services of Arthur Page when it had a tough business problem. While he was still deeply involved in preparing the national transportation Cabinet Paper, Arthur Page was being

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[1] Interview with General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Gettysburg, September 2, 1964.

considered for his next transportation job--Project Director of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Survey, for the Bi-State Port of New York Authority and Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission.

The Trans-Hudson Commuter Problem

In 1955 there were more than 150,000 residents of New Jersey commuting to New York City daily. Although commuters from Westchester had increased to 87,000, and from Long Island to 132,000 in that year, New Jersey still accounted for the largest number.

The two big surges of commuter traffic occurred between 7:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., and from 4:00 to 7:00 in the afternoon. Nearly 85% of the eastbound traffic funneled into the area of Manhattan from 59th Street to the Battery.

While automobiles and buses carried most of the off-peak travel, railroad facilities carried half of all commuters, and nearly two-thirds of the rush hour traffic. If the commuters using the railroads were to use automobiles, it is estimated that twenty new expressway lanes in New Jersey, ten vehicular river tunnels, and 250 acres of parking space in Manhattan would be required.

Although 150,000 commuters from New Jersey in 1955 was an impressive number, it was 10,000 less than traveled the same routes in 1925, and 20,000 less than in 1950. Furthermore, in 1955 the New Jersey commuters traveled by

rail, private automobile and bus, while in 1925 almost all commuter travel was by railroad facilities.[2]

These statistics are significant for the economy of the entire area, because these New Jersey commuters earn at least $1 billion annually, and spend most of it where they live. They provide New York City with essential skills and abilities necessary for the metropolis.

The statistics are even more significant for the suburban and commuter railroads. Their patronage was declining because of the competition of automobiles and buses; because the industrialization of New Jersey was bringing new job opportunities to that state; and because commuter rail travel was time-consuming and uncomfortable.

Most railroads lose money on passenger travel. Short-run commuter travel with most of the traffic concentrated into two short periods of each day is the most costly. Yet Federal and state regulatory agencies require the carriers to perform "in the public interest" and prescribe the rates they can charge. Reliable consultants estimated that the New Jersey suburban and commuter railroads were losing $13 million annually in the mid-1950's on their passenger services.

The result was a continually deteriorating rail

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[2]Report of the Project Director to the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission, May, 1957, p. 14, Box 52, Arthur W. Page Papers.

passenger service across the Hudson to Manhattan. In 1955 commuters rode most of the same coaches that were in use in 1930. Of the 1,300 cars in service on the New Jersey suburban service, only about thirty were relatively modern and only 150 were air conditioned.[3]

The situation was becoming critical. In 1954 enough people on both sides of the Hudson became enough concerned to do something about it. By authority of the State Legislatures of both states, their trans-Hudson efforts were merged to form the Bi-state Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission. The mission of the group was to study the problem thoroughly and report a politically and financially feasible solution.

Bi-state Organization

The two states had a long history of inter-state cooperation, especially as concerned the Greater New York City area. The Port of New York Authority, a bi-state agency of New Jersey and New York, was formed in 1921 to deal with area transportation and terminal facilities, and to improve and protect the commerce of the New York-New Jersey Port District. Formed as a self-supporting public corporate organization, it is managed by six commissioners appointed from each state. They serve without pay.

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[3] Ibid., pp. 19-20.

This cooperative effort proved to be an historic step toward the elimination of a state line in the day-to-day meeting and handling of mutual problems. The Port of New York Authority has been singularly successful in managing port facilities, Hudson tunnels and bridges, bridges to Staten Island, the four metropolitan area airports (Kennedy, LaGuardia, Newark and Teterboro), and truck and bus terminals.

The Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission was formed almost in the mold of the Port Authority, with six commissioners from each state, and a co-chairman from each state. However, it was not expected to be a self-supporting or a permanent organization.

The Port Authority did not intend to relinquish its vital interest in the trans-Hudson River transportation problem, simply because a new agency was formed to study the problem. Its Executive Director, Austin Tobin, expressed his and the Port Authority's comprehension of the problem in a speech in October, 1954, soon after the new Transit Commission was formed:

> The critical need for a renewed and enriched regional planning effort in the field of transportation has been sharply emphasized by our own experiences over the past year or more.
>
> The development that we may look for in the necessary preservation of our existing suburban railroad service is in the field of public finance rather than in the field of construction. At some stage in the near future we must have public acceptance of the fact that the suburban communities themselves will have to

meet the cost of existing fixed rail service (to say nothing of any improvements) just as the subway deficits are met by the City of New York.

The present reorganization of the Long Island Railroad, with the communities granting substantial tax reduction, is a tentative step in that direction. Only on some such basis of community support will it be possible to reorganize the New Jersey suburban railroads, or to finance and construct any direct New Jersey rail connections with a new terminal in Manhattan. The problem facing the new Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission is, therefore, almost entirely a problem in the field of government finance rather than in the field of engineering.[4]

Memorandum of Understanding

The Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission lost no time in working out an agreement with the Port of New York Authority. It was recognized by all concerned that the Port Authority would have to supply most of the money for the Transit Commission's activities. The Memorandum of Understanding, dated January 4, 1955, and signed by the Executive Directors of each, had these important features:

a. A comprehensive survey of the New Jersey-New York commuter problem would be conducted by the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission.

b. A Project Director would be engaged whose sole function would be to coordinate the studies of the engineers, economists, experts in taxation, and authorities in public administration and planning, into a

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[4]Transcript of speech by Austin J. Tobin, Executive Director of the Port of New York Authority, October 6, 1954, Box 37, Arthur W. Page Papers.

complete and usable factual report. The report would be submitted to the Transit Commission and would be available to the Port Authority for use in planning for development of projects within its scope and jurisdiction. (The Port Authority could undertake the operation of transportation and terminal facilities only if competent authorities indicated that the facilities would be self-liquidating in the long run. Studies conducted for more than thirty years continued to show that suburban passenger and commuter railroads could not be self-supporting; therefore, a second bi-state agency was established rather than giving the entire survey project to the Port of New York Authority.)

c. The report would establish conclusively the facts as to:

(1) The area's future growth and distribution of population, industry, commercial centers, commuter habits, origins and destinations, etc.

(2) The feasibility of conventional transit improvements.

(3) The results of studies made by other metropolitan areas, what these areas were doing in the field of rapid transit and what parts of their studies might apply to the Greater New York area.

d. The report would contain recommendations on:

(1) The most promising system of integrated

rapid transit for interstate commuter traffic across the Hudson River and such related intra-state transit as might be feasible in connection therewith. The recommended system should meet the predicted needs of the area for at least twenty years.

(2) The type of transportation agency--private, state or bi-state--that should operate the system.

(3) A constitutionally sound, equitable and financially practical plan to meet debt charges and deficits, if such were inevitable.

(4) Plans to expedite and improve common carrier service by bus to "feed" the recommended rail route, or independently to serve the public in areas where rail rapid transit is not feasible.

(5) Plans for parking areas on the New Jersey side for passenger interchange from private automobiles to interstate common carrier service, both rail and bus.

e. The Port of New York Authority would finance the studies in the amount of approximately $500,000. The states of New Jersey and New York would each contribute $150,000. (When the bi-state agency was established, only $100,000 was appropriated for its investigations. The Port of New York Authority realized that this was inadequate and, in order to gain the benefit of the Commission's efforts, agreed to these financial arrangements. The studies finally cost the Port Authority about

$800,000.)[5]

Appointment of the Project Director

Soon after the agreement with the Port Authority was reached, Frank H. Simon, Executive Director of the Transit Commission, directed the search for an acceptable Project Director. The Port Authority, believing that the major job of the Commission was to be in the field of government finance for commuter railroads, suggested Ralph Watkins of Dun & Bradstreet, and several other capable men of finance. These were rejected by the Transit Commission. The Port Authority then "threw the ball" to the Transit Commission, and Commissioner/Treasurer Allen S. Hubbard of New York proposed Arthur W. Page.[6]

New York Chairman Charles H. Tuttle and Commissioner Carl Whitmore called on Arthur W. Page to discuss the matter. Encouraged by the reception and interest that Page showed, the two reported to the full Commission and proposed this resolution at the June 6, 1955, meeting:

> WHEREAS Chairman Tuttle and Commissioner Whitmore have this date reported on their conferences with Mr. Arthur W. Page as to his availability and willingness to serve as Project Director for all studies to be made by and for the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission pursuant to its statutory mandate; and

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[5]Memorandum of Understanding between the Port of New York Authority and the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission, January 4, 1955, Box 39, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[6]Interview with Roger H. Gilman, Director of Port

WHEREAS the Commission regarded these reports as most encouraging;

THEREFORE, be it resolved that the Commission unanimously and cordially invites Mr. Page to accept this appointment. The Commission tenders him a salary of $30,000 per annum, plus expenses; and will provide him with a suitable office and facilities and a personal staff of his own selection. The Commission contemplates that the studies will be of the character and extent set forth in its Interim Report of February 18, 1955, to the Governors and Legislatures of the States of New York and New Jersey, and will comprehend present and future mass transportation needs throughout the entire New York-New Jersey Metropolitan Area. The Commission assures Mr. Page of its full support and the full assistance of its staff. Commissioner Whitmore and the Chairman are requested to inform Mr. Page of this resolution and are authorized to consult with him as to all matters for its implementation.[7]

Arthur Page agreed to the terms. In a letter to Chairman Tuttle, however, he said his acceptance was contingent on the passage of the New Jersey bill authorizing the $150,000 contribution and its approval by the Governor. The New York Legislature had already approved the expenditure and the Governor had signed.[8]

There was still another delay. Governor Meyner was not entirely satisfied with the New Jersey element of the bi-state Transit Commission, and accepted their resignations in June. The commissioners who had unanimously

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Development, The Port of New York Authority, New York City, September 8, 1964.

[7]Resolution of Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission, June 6, 1955, Box 42, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[8]Letter to Charles H. Tuttle, June 20, 1955, Box 42, Arthur W. Page Papers.

approved the selection of Arthur W. Page as Project Director were gone and the Governor had not appointed replacements by the end of June.

In a June 20 letter to his friend Bayard F. Pope of the Marine Midland Trust Company, Page said: "I would do the job contingent upon the settlement of who are to be the New Jersey members of the Transit Commission and their acceptance of me."[9] (Page considered Pope an expert in the field of railroad financing and expected to call on him for financial advice in the conduct of the studies.)

These delays were finally settled. The Governor of New Jersey appointed new commissioners and they formally agreed to the selection of Page as Project Director. On September 21, 1955, the Transit Commission and the Port Authority formally requested Page to accept the position effective October 1, 1955.

The agreement stated the function of the Project Director was "to coordinate the activities of the various consultants and experts who will be engaged by the two agencies on the several phases of the survey, and to perform such activities as will be necessary to coordinate their studies into a complete factual report. . . ."[10]

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[9]Letter to Bayard F. Pope, Chairman of Executive Committee, Marine Midland Trust Company, June 20, 1955, Box 42, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[10]Letter from Frank H. Simon and Austin J. Tobin, Executive Directors of Metropolitan Rapid Transit

In addition to the $30,000 compensation, Page was furnished separate offices, staffed and equipped as he desired. Salaries and office expenses were to be paid by the Port Authority. Page accepted the terms and signed the agreement the same day.[11]

The appointment was announced to the press on the afternoon of September 26, 1955, and was carried in the morning New York and area newspapers on September 27. The New York Herald Tribune called it "the most comprehensive study ever [to be] undertaken of the New York-New Jersey rapid transit problem" and reported that Arthur W. Page said, when interviewed, "We can finish the work in less than a year. If our plan is any good and it is adopted, it ought to help take care of the bi-state transportation problem for the next twenty years."[12]

There were also many letters from friends and well-wishers congratulating Page for taking the job, or offering him condolences for accepting an impossible task. Typical is this from a fellow public relations practitioner:

> The straphangers and passengers of the Greater New York area don't know how lucky they are that you have such an untiring ear for the call of duty.

Commission and Port of New York Authority, respectively, September 21, 1955, Box 42, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Transcript of article from New York Herald Tribune, September 27, 1955, Box 42, Arthur W. Page Papers.

I think it's noble of you to undertake another one as tough as this.[13]

Page arranged for office space at 111 Broadway in New York City. Since the Project Director's job had first been offered, Page had tried to hire Harold Osborne as his Chief Engineer. Osborne had other consulting commitments with the city of Montclair, New Jersey, was Director of the Regional Plan Association, and reluctantly turned down the job. His Regional Plan Association did, however, serve effectively as a consultant on population, economic and land use studies of the New Jersey area. (The Association is a non-profit New Jersey-New York organization dedicated to the development of the area. Its studies were performed at cost.)

As his second choice, Page selected Forrest Brooks as his Project Chief Engineer. Brooks had been an engineer with the New York Telephone Company and was in semi-retirement when Page beckoned. The two proved to be an efficient team with each complementing the other.

Other members of the Project Director's staff were Joseph McC. Leiper, Project Technical Coordinator; Carl E. Veazie, Transportation Economist, and Allan K. Sloan, Transportation Planner.

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[13]Letter from Ralph C. Champlin, Vice President for Public Relations, The Pennsylvania Railroad, September 27, 1955, Box 42, Arthur W. Page Papers.

The Consultants

The studies required by the Memorandum of Understanding between the Transit Commission and the Port Authority were to be conducted by professionally competent consultants, selected by the Project Director with the concurrence of the two bi-state organizations. The types of studies were also prescribed in the agreement.

Arthur Page and his staff chose these consultants for the primary areas of study indicated. All of his selections were approved:[14]

a. Charles E. De Leuw, Consulting Engineer. Trans-Hudson Rapid Transit Plans.

b. Ford, Bacon and Davis, Engineers. Survey of Common Carrier Bus Transportation between Suburban Communities West of the Hudson River and New York City, and Measures for Reducing Out-of-Pocket Losses of New Jersey Commuter Railroads Under a Public Agency.

c. Coverdale & Colpitts, Consulting Engineers. Report on Four Proposals for Trans-Hudson Railroad Passenger Service.

d. Day & Zimmerman, Consulting Engineers. Proposed Alternate Rapid Transit Plans for Staten Island, New York, via the Proposed Narrows Bridge.

e. William Miller, Governmental Consultant. Legal,

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[14] Interview with Roger H. Gilman, loc. cit.

Administrative and Financial Feasibility Studies.

f. Regional Plan Association, Inc. Population, Economic and Land Use Studies of the New York, New Jersey, Connecticut Metropolitan Region.

g. William Wyer & Co., Consulting Engineers. Intra-State Transit in New Jersey.

Most of the consultants also engaged in studies of commuter origin and destinations, trends, habits, traffic flow patterns, and related data. They were also given added responsibilities as progress in the studies revealed areas of promise. For example, the De Leuw firm was given the additional assignment of studying the possibility of rail service to Staten Island via the Bayonne Peninsula as a replacement for the Battery-Staten Island ferry service.

Some radical departures from the existent transit system were studied in detail, particularly by the De Leuw / organization, which was primarily concerned with the trans-Hudson rapid transit plans. The proponents of the Monorail, other forms of aerial transit, and rubber-tired subway cars undergoing tests in Paris, were heard and their proposals evaluated in terms of New York area conditions. Some of them were very attractive. But each time the costs of junking the old system entirely and replacing it with a bright new one were computed, they always came to more than a billion dollars and sometimes as much as $1.5 billion. Arthur Page and the consultants agreed that

financing such a huge project would be virtually impossible.

So the aim of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Survey was to provide a "feasible plan to retain and improve trans-Hudson suburban passenger transportation service to meet the pressing needs of the New York-New Jersey Metropolitan Area." The recommended plan was to be "designed to give commuters and other travelers a faster and more comfortable ride with easier access to all parts of Manhattan."[15]

Page used his Chief Engineer, Forrest Brooks, much as a military chief of staff during the survey. Brooks kept his chief up to date on all aspects of the many studies in progress, particularly their technical engineering details. Brooks was the primary contact with the consultants because he spoke their language, but he seemed never to overstep his position and directed consultant actions only with Page's complete approval.

Page's great forte was his quick grasp of technical details as they applied or were related to population trends, commuter desires and convenience, judging public acceptance, administrative feasibility and public and private financing. His concern was for the long-harassed commuter, how to satisfy his transportation needs in 1956

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[15]Report of the Project Director, op. cit., p. 4.

and in 1976, at a cost that both the commuters and the communities could afford.

Page's concurrent work for the President's Advisory Committee on Transport Policy and Organization also gave him insights into the political and economic aspects of the problem.[16]

From time to time Page reported in person to the meetings of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission. He was in frequent, almost daily, contact with the Executive Directors of the Commission and of the Port Authority. He kept them abreast of the status of the studies, the time schedules, and the costs. He also reported the areas of study that appeared to show the most promise, such as this statement in an October 1, 1956, summary of progress:

> Basic rail system: Work performed principally by De Leuw. We favor at this time the extension of the New York Subway System into New Jersey, and of the several plans being considered, that of a closed loop crossing the Hudson at 59th Street and the Battery. Another extension of the Subway System appearing to have considerable merit could be described either as an open loop or all radial extension of the Subway System in such a manner as to intercept all the commuting railroads at various points, and also to serve Staten Island.[17]

Events proved that Arthur Page's first estimate of one year to complete the entire survey was optimistic.

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[16] Interview with Roger H. Gilman, loc. cit.

[17] Overall Summary of Progress to October 1, 1956, Box 47, Arthur W. Page Papers.

Once the program was under way, a more realistic appraisal of the work to be done was made and a target date for submission of the Project Director's final report was set as April 1, 1957, or about eighteen months from its beginning. The last of the consultant reports, due to Page by January 31, 1957, was nearly three months late, however, and delayed presentation of the final report by more than a month.

Report of the Project Director

On May 20, 1957, Arthur W. Page submitted the completed report to the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission. In a 53-page document, Page presented first his summary and recommendations for action; then the status of the commuter travel situation at that time; the details of the recommended plan; the administrative and financial plan to support the recommended plan; and then a resume of other plans studied.

The arrangement of the report shows the Page public relations touch. It quickly summarized the problem and the solution; the need, and then the details. Even the letter that transmits the report to the Commission seems carefully designed to elicit an affirmative reaction from the Commissioners:

> In 1920 the States of New York and New Jersey took an historic step toward the elimination of the state line in the handling of essentially Metropolitan Area matters. They established a Bi-State Commission to

study the Port of New York as a whole.

That Commission recommended that a Bi-State Authority be set up with wide powers to create and administer Port facilities. The wisdom of this proposal and its good effect have been apparent.

With similar objectives, the two states created in 1954 the present bi-state Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission to study and report on the Metropolitan Area transit problem.

This report of your Project Director recommends that the Commission follow the same course as its predecessor. The main and fundamental recommendation of the Project Director is for the creation of a new permanent Bi-State District to deal with metropolitan commuter problems.

Had the bi-state concept concerning transit been established earlier, there is little question but that the New York City subways would have crossed the Hudson into New Jersey as they crossed the East River into Brooklyn and Queens. It is logical, now that this concept is established on transit matters, to recommend that this be done. . . .[18]

The Page recommendations were based on several conclusions reached, namely:

a. Rail service was necessary to meet the travel needs of the New York-New Jersey Metropolitan Area. There was no other practical way to move the 75,000 or more trans-Hudson commuters who arrived in Manhattan each morning during the peak travel periods.

b. Good and ever-improving service was essential and would continue to be in the future. Shrinkage of rail travel and deterioration of service could be arrested only by providing a better transportation product. New Jersey residents should have as good rail access to Manhattan as do those of Long Island and Westchester.

c. The Metropolitan Area had an interest in the

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[18]Letter to Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission, May 20, 1957, Box 52, Arthur W. Page Papers. (Underlining added.)

retention and improvement of suburban service. About 150,000 commuters live in New Jersey--more than in any other suburban sector. These commuters earned and contributed to the regional economy at least $1 billion annually. Improved service would be beneficial both to business in Manhattan and the suburban community in New Jersey.

d. Public support would be necessary to finance the improved service. The profit incentive necessary to attract private capital would be lacking.

e. Whatever bi-state rapid transit system was devised would have to be under the jurisdiction of a permanent bi-state agency. The precedent of the Port of New York Authority had proved the efficacy of this system.[19]

The Page Plan contained the following four summarized recommendations. They are treated in more detail in the Project Director's Report, and individually in the reports of the consultants. All of these are available in the Page Papers for detailed study, if desired.

Recommendation 1: The creation of a Bi-State Rapid Transit Agency or District with wide powers to retain and improve mass transportation service between New York City and the surrounding areas. This agency could fulfill its mission by:

a. Improving railroad service delivering passengers to the West bank of the Hudson River.

b. Extending the New York City rapid transit system into New Jersey. This will be explained in Recommendation 3.

c. Obtaining authority from the states to:

(1) Construct new rapid transit facilities, and to acquire or otherwise control the suburban service properties of the railroads.

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[19]Report of the Project Director, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

(2) Operate the properties itself, or arrange for suitable operating personnel.

(3) Improve or expand service through modernization of existing plant wherever required.

(4) Initiate new services and/or abandon existing ones.

(5) Determine fares and standards of service on properties under its control.

(6) Contract for or operate bus feeder services where rail service is not justified.

Recommendation 2: The Bi-State District (suggested name: Metropolitan District of New York and New Jersey) retain and improve the New Jersey suburban railroad service and supplement it, where necessary, by bus transportation. This would include:

a. Improving the service, particularly by replacement of old cars with modern, air conditioned, soft-riding equipment.

b. Improving and relocating station facilities to provide adequate parking spaces, good access to highways, and proper spacing of stops to speed up schedules.

c. Consolidating duplicate services and terminals.

d. Providing adequate bus service where it is functionally and economically superior to rail service.

e. Making plans to meet the deficit of the service under its control.

Recommendation 3: The New York City rapid transit system be extended into New Jersey in order to speed up and improve service. The plan included these features:

a. A closed loop system, tunneling the Hudson River at the Battery and at 59th Street; using the Broadway BMT subway line for the Manhattan portion of the loop. On the New Jersey segment of the closed loop, transfer points would be available at each of the rail lines bound from the Hudson River, and each of the major highways south of the George Washington Bridge.

b. The entire closed loop would be double-tracked, permitting trains to operate in both directions, and giving commuters an easy choice for Upper Manhattan or Lower Manhattan. In addition, unrestricted transfer privilege within Manhattan would be allowed.

c. The ancient Hudson & Manhattan (a commuter line with tunnels from New Jersey to Lower Manhattan . . . but whose tunnels and cars are smaller than those of the New York Subway System and cannot be used interchangeably) would be improved and modernized, and would continue to complement the loop system with service to Newark, Jersey City and Hoboken.

d. Provisions would be made for future expansion of the system, including extension of rail service via the Bayonne Peninsula to Staten Island. The ferries could then be eliminated.[20]

The benefits of the loop program were mostly in the time saved. A train would complete the entire loop in approximately 41 minutes, so that no commuter need spend longer than 21 minutes enroute. Savings over older forms of transit would range from a minimum of 8 minutes to 23 minutes, each way. During peak hours, trains would run every two minutes in both directions.

Costs of the program were figured at $400 million; $345 million for construction and connections with the Broadway subway, and $55 million for replacement and modernization of equipment.[21]

Recommendation 4: The deficits of the proposed Bi-State Rapid Transit System be financed by a tax levy on the New Jersey-New York area benefited by the

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[20] Ibid., pp. 6-9.

[21] Ibid., p. 10.

transit improvements. The plan recognized that commuter service could not be self-supporting and needed to be financed in part by the communities served.[22]

The details of the plan, its financing, benefits, future extensions and possibilities, were explained in the report. The other plans considered were also discussed briefly, with reasons for their discard. For example, one attractive plan was called De Leuw Plan Number 1. It also recommended a closed transit loop but a different routing on Manhattan. All new subway construction was planned, instead of using the in-being Broadway line. There would be no connections with the New York Subway System.

The plan was attractive because it would permit complete modernization of equipment. There would be no need to build a system compatible with existing facilities. The drawback was the cost--it was estimated at $150 million more than the plan recommended by the Project Director.

Other alternatives considered were the extension of the New Jersey railroads into Manhattan; variations of the loop program including open loops on the New Jersey end; extensions of the cross-town Manhattan subways into New Jersey through four new trans-Hudson tunnels at 59th Street, 42nd Street, 14th Street and at the Battery; suspended Monorail transit; all-railroad (as contrasted to rapid

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[22] Ibid., p. 12.

transit) loop; aerial transit; rapid transit on the George Washington and proposed Narrows Bridges; more extensive use of the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad facilities; improvements of existing facilities, and several other miscellaneous proposals.

Acceptance--In Principle

Even before publication of his report, Arthur Page was embroiled in the political and public opinion sides of his survey. On May 16, 1957, he met with Mayor Robert F. Wagner, Jr., of New York City, and later the same day with Governor Robert B. Meyner in Newark to explain his proposal. On May 21 his report was presented at a New York press conference.

Press and public reaction seemed to be generally favorable. The plan was accepted--in principle, if not with great immediate enthusiasm. One interested observer, Roger H. Gilman of the Port Authority, sensed that New York City opinion was "guarded."[23] A review of the press stories and editorials appearing on the New Jersey side of the Hudson indicated that the feeling there was also generally favorable but a little hesitant.

The initial $400 million cost did not seem to worry the editorial writers nearly so much as the operation of the system at an estimated $12 million annual deficit.

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[23]Interview with Roger H. Gilman, loc. cit.

They did not seem to want to accept quickly the fact that this deficit was inevitable and would have to be paid by non-users as well as users of the transit system.

Based on population and full valuation of taxable property, the Page Report estimated that $4 million of the deficit should be paid by New York City's Manhattan area, and $8 million by the ten New Jersey and two New York counties west of the Hudson River. Page was careful to point out that New York's share of the deficit would be less than half of its annual deficit on the operation of the Staten Island ferries.

Arthur Page also attended the meeting with Governor Averell Harriman, and public hearings in New York on June 12, 1957, and in Newark on June 18, 1957. In each of these public meetings, Page insisted that a member of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission act as chairman. Page assisted with facts, figures and opinions, as appropriate, but did not take the leadership position.

The Critics Are Heard

It was inevitable that criticism, complaints and suggestions for modifications should be leveled at a plan of this magnitude. Nor was there complete agreement within the Commission itself and the Port Authority did not believe it should interfere with the Transit Commission's

deliberations.[24]

Some of the most vocal of the critics made these points:

a. The loop plan should make more extensive use of the Hudson & Manhattan tubes at the Battery, perhaps even use them for the sole Battery crossing. This argument was advanced by Herman T. Stichman, trustee of the bankrupt H & M, despite the fact that Page had explained to Stichman during the course of the survey why the H & M tubes were not suitable.[25]

b. The new loop system should further consider the possibility of using the rubber-tired subway vehicles being tested in Paris. Several of the commissioners seemed to be fascinated by this possibility, despite the billion dollar price tag.

c. The alternate loop plan with new construction on the Manhattan leg had many advantages and should be considered more fully. A majority of the commissioners eventually decided that this $600 million package should be recommended over the Page $400 million plan. However, it will be seen that none of these plans actually reached that advanced stage of development.

d. The trans-Hudson problem should not be separated from the similar problems of increasing commuter travel

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[24] Ibid.

[25] Transcript of New York Times article, June 13, 1957, Box 52, Arthur W. Page Papers.

from Westchester and from Long Island. One more complete, integrated transit plan should be worked out.

Additional hearings were held in New Jersey on September 10, and in New York City on September 17, 1957. These follow-up hearings were held to permit those citizens who needed extra time to study the proposals to now present their criticisms or suggestions.

Some of the criticisms that appeared at these and later meetings, as reported in area newspapers, were:

More extensive use of the H & M tubes and other facilities should be made. Herman T. Stichman, trustee of the bankrupt railroad, continued this plaintive cry.

The "Loop Program" would funnel New Jersey riders into the New York Subway System precisely at peak travel hours, thus reducing the service available for New York City residents. This criticism by Charles L. Patterson of the New York Transit Authority was in conflict with the Transit Commission's consultant's reports, but probably proved extremely damaging to the chance of success for the "loop program."

The New Jersey section of the loop would by-pass the business district of Jersey City. Therefore, the Jersey City Merchant's Council opposed the plan.

Interstate bus line operators claimed the expensive rail system was unnecessary. They recommended that road and river crossings be improved to permit flexible bus

transportation to handle the New Jersey commuters.[26]

The improved commuter service would make the New Jersey area so popular for residences that property values would rise to such an extent that new industry would be priced out of the market for good industrial locations. This warning was expressed by Carroll M. Shanks, president of the Prudential Insurance Company, on whose Board of Directors Arthur W. Page sat. Shanks thought this would be detrimental to the non-commuters and to the economy of the area in the long run.[27]

In addition to personally attending most of these meetings, Arthur Page also wrote statements and comments for various people to make at the hearings. For example, he prepared the statements for Chairman Charles H. Tuttle to present at the New York hearings, and for Co-Chairman Edward J. O'Mara to present at the New Jersey hearings.[28]

Page also prepared remarks to be made by W. W. Patchell, Vice President of the Pennsylvania Railroad, at the Newark hearings.[29] And he encouraged Chairman David Rockefeller, of the Committee on Lower Manhattan, to issue

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[26] *New York Times*, October 30, 1957, p. 31.

[27] Transcript of *Newark Star-Ledger* article, June 21, 1957, Box 52, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[28] Letter with inclosure to Edward J. O'Mara, September 4, 1957, Box 53, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[29] Letter to W. W. Patchell, September 4, 1957, Box 53, Arthur W. Page Papers.

a press release stating that the Committee was in favor of the formation of the permanent agency to devise and implement a bi-state transit program. Arthur Page was, indeed, as Son John said, a "behind the scenes" operator.

Half a Loaf

There was so much controversy over the "Loop Program," as the Page Plan became known, that the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission decided to attack first things first. In his Page-authored statement at the September 10, 1957, hearing in New Jersey, Co-Chairman O'Mara made this proposal:

> The Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission recommends the establishment of a permanent Bi-State Transit District responsible for metropolitan commuter problems. . . .
>
> It is contemplated that the first duty of the new agency would be to prepare and submit for approval to the Governors and Legislatures of the two states, a specific and detailed plan for financing, constructing and operating a coordinated commuter transit system.
>
> The Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission has, therefore, come to the conclusion that it will recommend to the Governors and the Legislatures of both states that a permanent bi-state transit agency be established, with the statutory authority to accomplish the following objectives:
>
> 1. To negotiate with commuter railroads, bus companies, transit agencies and other transportation organizations for the continued operation of services, and for whatever additional operations are required for an improved transit system. The legislation would include authority to arrive at understandings on all financial and other contractual arrangements pertaining to such a plan, propose a comprehensive plan of rapid transit, and to final approval by the Legislatures of both states.

2. Through discussions with public officials, local governing bodies and citizen groups within the Bi-State Transit District, to develop a financial plan for providing the financial support necessary to carry out the proposed transit improvements.

3. To submit to the Governors and Legislatures of both states the negotiated plan for improved trans-Hudson rapid transit, including the most effective use of existing commuter railroads and bus lines.

The new Bi-State Transit District which the Commission will recommend to the Governors and Legislatures of both states, would proceed promptly to prepare a final and specific transit plan including all of its engineering, administrative and financial aspects, for the legislative consideration of both states.[30]

It seems significant that in this statement and later reports, the emphasis is on obtaining the legislative approval of the Bi-State Transit Agency concept. The "Loop Program" seemed to be deliberately forgotten for the moment.

In January, 1958, after many conferences, hearings, and studies, the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission recommended that the Legislatures of the two states create a Metropolitan Rapid Transit District to develop and submit final plans for transit improvement.

The bill was introduced in the New York Legislature, passed unanimously, and was signed by the Governor.

In New Jersey, the bill was introduced and passed by the Senate. But the Assembly adopted a substitute bill

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[30] Inclosure to letter to Edward J. O'Mara, September 4, 1957, Box 53, Arthur W. Page Papers.

that greatly limited the powers of the proposed transit district. Also, the bill was conditional on the approval of a similar bill in the New York State Legislature.

In January, 1959, a year later, New Jersey legislators were still arguing about the transit district. Arthur Page commented, somewhat bitterly for him, on the procrastination:

> Neither Meyner nor the Jersey legislature has faced the fact that either the State or the Counties will have to put up some money to keep the trains running.
>
> I didn't expect acceptance of our report or instant action, for that is not the way of politics, but neither did I expect that the State of New Jersey was in a state that it can't act at all.
>
> With commiseration for your lot as a Jersey commuter.[31]

New York State could not agree to the New Jersey counterpart proposal and therefore took no action. In view of the stalemate, and with no hope of a compromise, the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission did not ask for an extension of its life. The four-year old bi-state commission expired with the end of the New York Legislative session in March, 1959.[32]

Assessment and Aftermath

Arthur Page saw some hope in the situation even as

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[31] Letter to O. B. J. Frazer, 67 Wall Street, Box 59, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[32] New York Times, March 2, 1959, p. 21.

the Transit Commission was dying. In a letter to New York lawyer Charles H. Tuttle, who had been New York Chairman of the Commission, he said:

> The papers report the end of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission with the comment that its work is unheeded.
>
> Nothing is further from the truth.
>
> You served a vital purpose for when you began, the press and the public were solidly of the opinion that no public money was needed for the maintenance of commuting.
>
> There is now a complete acceptance of the necessity for public funds. That enables /Governor Nelson A./ Rockefeller to do something and will, in time, force /Governor Robert B./ Meyner to do something.
>
> In other words, your perseverance started the ball rolling and set up, for your successor, a public attitude that makes progress possible.
>
> You will get no medal except the satisfaction of your accomplishment and the understanding of a few folks who were in position to see what went on.[33]

The self-supporting Port of New York Authority had contributed more than three-quarters of a million dollars to the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission. How did that organization feel about the results? Roger H. Gilman, Director of Port Development for the Port Authority, was closely associated with the project and knew Arthur Page well. During an interview in his New York offices, he expressed these opinions of his own about the Survey:[34]

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[33]Letter to Charles H. Tuttle, March 2, 1959, Box 59, Arthur W. Page Papers.

[34]Interview with Roger H. Gilman, loc. cit.

a. The Page Plan for the "Loop Program," with its $400 million initial cost and $12 million annual deficit, might have had a chance with the two state legislatures. In Page's words, it was just "bright and shiny new" enough to win public and political favor without creating too much resistance at the price.

b. When it became known that the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission favored the more costly plan for new construction on the Manhattan segment of the loop, the chance of success dropped appreciably. The $600 million initial cost, plus $17 million annual deficit, plus no transfer privileges on the New York City system, dulled any vestiges of enthusiasm for the loop program.

c. The New Jersey Legislature especially did not like the Transit Commission's favoring the more expensive plan. The legislators believed that New Jersey commuters would then be paying for more of the New York City Subway System than was warranted. Arthur Page, wise in the ways of public persuasion, probably had carefully gauged "what the traffic would bear."

d. Although the only question that came before the two state legislatures was whether or not to form a permanent bi-state transit agency, New Jersey legislators probably considered such an agency would be committed or at least partial to the $600 million plan.

e. There were disagreements on other phases of the

plan, including what kind of an agency (private, regional, bi-state) should run the transit program.

f. A relatively small number of people would use the facility--and the number from New Jersey was diminishing according to the studies. The idea of all the people having to help pay for a system used by only some of them was hard to accept in the field of public transportation, as it is in other essential services.

There have been several developments in the field of trans-Hudson commuter travel since the demise of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission. Those that have helped alleviate the critical situation somewhat are:[35]

a. Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller secured important tax relief for the commuter railroads so that their financial plight is now less precarious.

b. The Port of New York Authority now administers, on behalf of the State of New York, a plan for the purchase of modern commuter railroad equipment with funds guaranteed by the state.

c. New Jersey has given the commuter problem to a division of its Highway Commission. This organization has arranged subsidies for the commuter lines, authorized and encouraged consolidations of equipment, schedules and trackage, and rerouting of some carriers.

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[35] Ibid.

d. The Port of New York Authority took over the bankrupt Hudson & Manhattan Railroad, renamed it PATH (Port Authority Trans-Hudson), and is now rehabilitating the decrepit commuter line. This action seems to establish a precedent by authorizing this bi-state authority to use public funds to rescue a floundering private company which has no possibility of ever becoming self-sustaining.

e. The Narrows Bridge between Staten Island and Brooklyn has been completed and will carry some former trans-Hudson traffic. It was not built to accommodate a rail transit line, and this is consistent with the Page recommendations.

Since 1959 the states of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut have taken on more of the responsibility for the commuter railroads through their cooperating and coordinating Transportation Agencies. The states now accept the fact that the general public must bear a part of the cost of these public services.[36] It is too early to tell whether or not the public has given, as Arthur Page said, "a complete acceptance of the necessity for public funds" in operating the commuter railroads.

The "Loop Program" failed to win the full support of the people or of the State Legislatures. But it certainly revealed in startling detail the critical need for

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[36] Ibid.

some vigorous action to prevent the complete collapse of the trans-Hudson commuter service.

Interim and "stop gap" actions have been taken to check the continuing deterioration of the railroad commuter service. The continuing problem is now better recognized, and the responsibilities are more clearly defined and accepted. Perhaps Arthur Page would be content with that much progress and the promise of more to come.

EPILOGUE

EPILOGUE

A biographer usually has time to span the lifetime of his subject. He can put the high spots and the low into proper perspective, giving his readers a good composite. A thesis that reports only the stand-out periods of government service risks the possibility that the reader will judge the man from an incomplete assortment of parts.

I have tried to compensate in this case of Arthur W. Page by beginning with a fairly comprehensive biographical sketch; by quoting liberally from his correspondence and other writings; by interviewing friends and associates of Page and reporting their feelings toward him; and by quoting the friends and associates equally liberally, sometimes straining the test of pertinence to do so.

In each period of public service reported upon, I have tried to include enough personal glimpses and insights into the character of Arthur W. Page to help the reader gain the same admiration and empathy toward him that I feel. I gained a tremendous respect for this man by reading his writings on many unrelated subjects; by learning what he did under circumstances of stress; what his family, friends and associates thought of him. (For instance, daughter-in-law Mrs. John H. Page told me that she believed Arthur W. Page was the closest thing to a

saint that ever walked this earth. And his long-time associate in the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Mr. K. P. Wood, said that his esteem really amounted to hero worship.)

In spite of these attempts, I doubt that I have projected the remarkable spirit of Arthur W. Page. Perhaps this is because the government services he performed, while extremely important, were only a small part of his useful, productive life. So many of his services and good works were private or semi-private, not public, yet certainly for the greater good of mankind. Consider, for instance, his invaluable work for these organizations:

1) The Southern Education Foundation, which persistently provided funds to improve the education of teachers and to upgrade the standards of Negro schools in the South.

2) The Farmers Federation of Ashville, North Carolina, which made phenomenal progress in helping the Southern Appalachian farmers to help themselves, long before Appalachia became a target for the U. S. Government's anti-poverty program.

3) Radio Free Europe and the Crusade for Freedom. There is no doubt that Arthur W. Page was one of the dedicated, patient, resourceful men who made this program so successful year after year. His son, John H. Page, is now carrying on the Radio Free Europe fight in the fine

tradition of his father.

4) Teachers College of Columbia University; Harvard University; Bennington College, and other outstanding educational institutions. Page served variously as trustee, financial adviser, fund raiser, overseer, and in many other formal and informal positions for these schools.

5) Cold Springs Harbor Biological Association. This famous Long Island research institution was entirely supported for many years by the Henry L. Stimsons, John Foster Dulles, Arthur W. Pages, and other neighbors in the vicinity of Huntington, Long Island. Arthur Page also served as president and director of the institution and his son, Walter, now carries on the tradition.

And there were many more such services performed over the years. None was unimportant, for Arthur W. Page made it a firm rule to never associate himself with a cause, service or charitable organization unless he could make a real, working contribution to its success.

Arthur W. Page lived a full, active life. It often seemed that there were not enough hours in the day to do all that he did. He once said that he did not work any longer than other men--he just tried to get more done in the same number of hours. And he did! Whether it was by superior mental organization of his work, or some other personal system, I could not learn. I think that his mental processes were just keyed to a faster pace than

most.

In addition to his passion for work, the Page Papers are also filled with his exhuberance for life, a zest for living that was apparent in his family life as well as in business and public service. He was obviously deeply devoted to his wife, children and grandchildren and spent many pleasant moments with them hunting, fishing, sailing and relaxing. There are accounts of his travels to Mexico, Panama, Chile, Canada, England, Europe--usually on combined business and pleasure trips. There are records of his encouraging his children to travel throughout the United States and abroad, not on the plush guided tours, but on their own, meeting the people and making friends world-wide.

So far in this Epilogue I've tried to indicate the importance of Page's non-public good works and his own busy, full life. But there are still many facets of the Page character that need to be explored for a fuller appreciation of the man. I'll point out only a few:

1) The inspiring integrity of Arthur W. Page. It shows up clearly in the Page Papers and in the comments of his friends and associates. It was not a showy, boastful thing but was always there--never questioned, never doubted.

2) His gregariousness. A roster of Arthur Page's friends would read like a Who's Who of the world, yet he

was not impressed with his own importance. Friends and acquaintances were a tonic to him; he loved to encourage them to talk about themselves, their businesses, their experiences. He was a good listener as well as a good conversationalist. (He was a good public speaker, too, although he mentioned several times in letters that he had an impediment in his speech that limited his ability. When I mentioned this to his sons, it was the first they knew of any such impediment.) I think Arthur Page must have agreed with the Will Rogers comment, "I never met a man I didn't like."

3) His passion for American history and the study of what men did with liberty when they had won it. Perhaps it is not so unusual for a man to have this interest, but it is certainly out of the ordinary for a man with so many pressing, important things to do, to convince several major universities to carry on this "liberty" project. Page not only sold them on the project but helped solicit the money to get them started.

4) His generosity. There are many records of relatively small, unsecured loans made to friends and acquaintances who claimed to be in need. Some of these were repaid in dribbles over a 20-year period with no interest; some, I'm sure, were never paid. Although there are no "dun" letters in the Page Papers, there are many warm letters of appreciation Page sent to these creditors

for small repayments.

5) His perspicacity. Arthur W. Page was not reckless with money but was, in fact, shrewd and extremely knowledgeable in financial matters. He used this ability to help many charitable and business organizations conserve their capital, increase their earnings and improve their financial posture. There is an exchange of correspondence in the Page Papers that shows a canny Scotch streak, too. A company president wrote to Page reminding him that since he had been elected to the company's board of directors, he would be expected to buy some of the company's stock. Page replied that he had not forgotten but that he had anticipated a price adjustment in the stock and was waiting to buy--and had already saved several hundred dollars by the delay.

6) His refreshing personality. What a pleasure it must have been to talk or correspond with this man! Although his humor does not have a chance to shine in a report on his periods of government service, his papers are filled with delightful, humorous stories. He used humor and anecdotes extremely well to illustrate his points, much as Abraham Lincoln did. He had a genuine interest in everything and everyone and a calm, unruffled, never angry, never waspish manner. He seemed to be always patient, understanding and congenial, yet with a firmness and resolution that repeatedly carried his viewpoint.

7) His modesty. Page was not a colorful character, never flamboyant. Rather he was a quiet yet forceful behind-the-scenes worker who never asked nor expected credit for anything he did. He was content to do a good work that needed doing, and quick to praise the good works of others. The code of the United States Military Academy, "Duty - Honor - Country," expresses, I think, the ideals that Arthur W. Page lived by.

The great and near-great around Arthur W. Page used the words "wise, great wisdom, integrity, highly motivated, honest, sincere, highly principled, friendly, kindly, great" and many more, to describe him.

Still there must have been entries on the debit side of the ledger. As Project Director for the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Survey he produced a masterful plan for New York-New Jersey rapid transit but was unable to "sell" it completely to the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission or the State Legislatures. His Transport Policy Working Group won the approval of the Cabinet Committee but could not get the necessary strong backing of the President or the Congress. Some of Page's public relations and information plans for the War Department have been changed or discarded. And perhaps the London Naval Conference of 1930 would have won more support in the United States if Page had insisted that Henry L. Stimson be more responsive to the needs of the press and the American

public.

But there were no real failures here, for Page did not subscribe to the "all or nothing" dogma. He gratefully and wisely accepted progress in small doses, knowing that sweeping changes are not the way of politics, business or governments. He was a crusader, but used the "soft sell" techniques; he was an idealist and a fighter who never gave up, but did not insist on unconditional surrender.

The Arthur W. Page story is not complete when it tells only of his periods of public service spanning more than 40 years. These few appended thoughts do not complete the story but are an integral part of the composite that made Arthur W. Page one of the great men in the Twentieth Century development of our country.

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APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

ARTICLES IN WORLD'S WORK MAGAZINE

BY ARTHUR W. PAGE

Title	Date	Volume and Page
The Cotton Growers	January 1906	XI:7049-59
Communication By Wire and Wireless	January 1907	XIII:8408-22
Training for the Trades	February 1907	XIII:8552-7
Adventures of Daring Photographers	May 1907	XIV:8834-48
The Cotton Mills and the People	June 1907	XIV:8990-9002
The Age of Electric Servants	July 1907	XIV:9110-16
Running a River Through a Mountain	September 1907	XIV:9322-30
The Fight for a Land Conscience	November 1907	XV:9588-93
The Real Conquest of the West	December 1907	XV:9691-9704
The Statesmanship of Forestry	December 1907	XV:9739-57
One Ton of Coal to do the Work of Two	February 1908	XV:9933-7
The Rediscovery of Our Greatest Wealth	May 1908	XVI:10223-8
The Building of the Benguet Road	January 1909	XVII:22235-47
A Report to the Stockholders of the United States	February 1909	XVII:11205-13

APPENDIX A (continued)

Title	Date	Volume and Page
The High Cost of Living to Continue	April 1910	XIX:12770-2
How the Wrights Discovered Flight	August 1910	XX:13303-18
Are the Colleges Doing the Job?	September 1910	XX:13431-9
The Fight for Conservation	November 1910	XXI:13607-11
A Cotton Harvester at Last	December 1910	XXI:13748-60
What is "Scientific Management"?	February 1911	XXI:14045-50
"Safety First" Underground	March 1912	XXIII:549-63
The Novels That Sell 100,000	June 1913	XXVI:220-7
Who Governs the United States: Garrison of the War Department	July 1913	XXVI:293-301
Who Governs the United States: Houston of Agriculture	December 1913	XXVII:149-59
Mr. Bryan's Retirement and its Significance	July 1915	XXX:269-72
Why the Allies Expect to Win	February 1917	XXXIII:356-65
The Truth About Our 110 Days' Fighting	April 1919	XXXVII:622-35
- Part II	May 1919	XXXVIII:69-85
- Part III	June 1919	XXXVIII:159-183
The Meaning of What Happened at Chicago	August 1920	XL:361-77

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B

THE "PAGE REPORT" AND OTHER ALLIED PAPERS

Contents

1. Memorandum written by Arthur W. Page, dated May 30, 1945, on the subject of Army public relations, known as the "Page Report."

2. Comments on the "Page Report" submitted by Major General A. D. Surles, Director of the Bureau of Public Relations; by Major General Wilton B. Persons, Chief of Legislative and Liaison Division; by Major General F. H. Osborn, Director of Information and Education Division.

3. Letter of the Office of the Chief of Staff dated August 18, 1945, directing the appointment of an Ad Hoc Committee to study the information organization of the Army.

4. Report and recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee, dated September 8, 1945, with Organization Chart.

30 May 1945

MEMORANDUM

The Army is now faced with several rather immediate public relations problems which require positive plans.

(1) passage of a universal training law

(2) creation and continuance in the public mind of confidence in the Army's Pacific occupation plans.

(3) presentation to the public of the Army's government of Germany

(4) establishment of a new and better conception of the Army in the minds of the public.

The last is a fundamental and long time objective which if accomplished makes all others easier.

It is fundamental in human nature to fear size and suspect authority as being arbitrary.

The Army is both large and authoritative. To be popular it will have to take great pains to enlighten the public that its fears of Army size are groundless and that Army authority is used reasonably and fairly and that it is not arbitrary. And the Army suffers from the age long tradition that the military was the means by which kings, dictators, and men on horseback oppressed the people.

It is a vital job, therefore, if we are to have any effective national defense that the Army be reasonable, articulate, and public minded for the public is quite capable and quite likely to risk its existence from an enemy rather than accept defense on a basis it neither likes nor understands. The Army must convince the public that it is the servant of the people and is as great an asset to the common man, as an Army that was the servant of an autocrat was a danger to the common man.

The Army can learn or teach anything it really wants to. It is as capable as any other organization, business or otherwise to present its case to the public but I think it would have to make some changes if it really desires to achieve this end.

There are two ways of building an organization to

handle public relations. One is to get outsiders who profess to know what public reactions will be and train them to know the Army. The other is to select men in the Army who know it and let them learn the public relations job by study and practice. It is after all chiefly a matter of common sense and application to the job.

I am sure this latter method will be more effective.

It might appear that the Army had such a public relations department now. It has in appearance but not in fact. The essence of the Army is the regular officer corps. No one in the regular officers corps -- including General Surles now head of DPR -- would be in public relations if he could help it. PRO service is no road to promotion. There is almost a feeling in the regular services that an understanding of the public, which the Army serves, is unmilitary and not fitting for a soldier. It is my impression that the practical relations of the Army with the people who support it and who in war make up the bulk of it, is not a subject of instruction to any extent at West Point or in the Service or Staff schools. And the same is true to much the same extent of the activities of the Information and Education and Legislative and Liaison Divisions which are in the broad sense public relations.

The fundamental problem of the Army's public relations is to change this attitude of the Army itself. No group of smart public relations people from the outside or inside, either, can for long make a thing appear different from what it really is.

The officers corps by their actions, their contacts with the public, in what they say and write and how they handle their job will be the main dependence of Army public relations. If the whole corps has a fundamentally correct perception of the importance of the problem and a proper conception of the relation of an Army to a democracy such as ours what is said and done by the Army will automatically adjust itself to the public and there is no other way to get this result. Public relations is far more than handling the press. It is a way of life. It must be as instinctive as discipline. It can not be applied like a salve from the outside with much of an assurance of success.

In a very short time, however, a fundamental change can be effected if the Army (1) puts a fair sample of its best regular officers in public relations jobs, (2) recognizes them for effective service in that capacity, and (3) makes a good public relations background part of the basis of every officer's continuous training, and (4) carries out the positive duty of explaining itself to the public all

the time which will naturally flow from the new attitude.

Army public relations in its broad sense is the Army's relations with the public and the public's representatives in the Congress which is chiefly a reflection of public attitude. If the public likes the Army, the Congress will likewise. If the public does not understand and like the Army it is dangerous for Congress to like it.

Public relations broadly speaking includes the work of the L & L Division and the I & E Division. Information to troops is in the long run public relations, for the troops are the public temporarily in the Army.

These three functions combined are vital to the Army and therefore to the welfare of the nation. That they are well done is more important in peace than in war time because the emotions and necessities of war get support for the Army in war which they do not provide in peace time.

The most effective way to get Army public relations to the position in which it should be, to operate most effectively, would be to coordinate all three activities under a Deputy Chief of Staff who would have at least three stars, strengthen the present personnel of these divisions, particularly with regular officers, and let it be understood that the relations of the Army with the public are of paramount concern to the Army and that it intends to become proficient in handling them.

We are now facing some problems which the Army has got to explain to the public on a long range basis.

(1) operating governments in conquered territories and treatment of our occupying troops

(2) meeting the post war examination of the Army's record, particularly procurement.

(3) We hope the Army will have 700,000 or so of young men and their families to satisfy as to the values of universal training and that it is wisely and fairly done. If this is not done in 10 years 7,000,000 votes of the trainees will end universal training. This is the first time in our history when the enlisted man will control the fate of the Army. That is what universal training means.

I think it would be of great value to have an organization at a high level with the duty of instructing the Army on the one hand and the public on the other of the proper relations of an Army to the public in a democracy such as ours, an organization which would keep the Chief of Staff

informed of the current of public thought, possible dangers ahead and above all an organization that would have positive plans for dealing with the problems anticipated. It should be ready to explain everything the Army does and intends to do and be in a position to protest any policy which can not be satisfactorily explained.

I have seen these things work in industry. I am sure that they would be equally or more effective in the Army. And I am sure it is essential for the future safety of the nation that neither the officers of the Army or the public think of the Army as a thing apart, as a militaristic or autocratic unreasonable outfit. The natural fear and aversion of people to things that are large, powerful and not well understood can only be met by constant, intelligent and unremitting effort.

The public will give the Army freedom to do its best job when the public has understanding of the Army sufficient to create confidence in its management and personnel and a conviction that it is actuated intelligently in the public interest.

This being the truth, it can be demonstrated.

Arthur W. Page

WAR DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS
WASHINGTON

3 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF:

I believe Mr. Page's appraisal of the Army's public relations problem is accurate and his observations are sound. The point most to be accentuated is the steadily mounting importance of a recognition, on the part of the Army, that public opinion is a part of its structure.

Many officers will argue strongly that military reasons alone should govern military decisions. Nothing in their intensive military education has indicated that a public reaction is a factor in many planning decisions and in many of the command decisions that are made on a high level. In fact, some will contend that such a consideration is a sign of weakness.

The same officers will be stout advocates of teamwork in the field--of a military give and take that will assemble all material means to a given aim.

All of this non-recognition of the importance of public opinion stems from the inherent political difference between any military organization and a democracy. Taken in its narrow form, an Army is a regimented dictatorship which demands implicit obedience to the will of its commander. Those are the qualities which are needed to differentiate that Army from a mob and to make it successful in battle. Yet it is a strange and foreign thing to set in the midst of a real democracy. It is, as Mr. Page says, a feared thing if it is large.

Regardless of the technical soundness of its decisions, the Army's effectiveness as an instrument of national defense will be in direct ratio to public opinion as expressed in congressional appropriations, and in public confidence in its leaders.

It is evident that two things should be a part of basic policy in command and staff procedure.

First, the officer corps, in general, should be educated to the fact that the Army is a normal, necessary part of democratic life and that within its professional limitations, it thinks and acts and is in sympathy with democratic thought. Tact, patience, and intelligence in dealing with civilians should have an efficiency rating. It should be apparent that the Army as a whole is narrowing the gap by intention.

Second, the officers selected to deal with public relations from the top level down to posts, camps, and stations should not only be trained in dealing with the public, but just as particularly, they should be selected for their ability to command respect and confidence within the staff with which they work.

At the War Department level, it is not sufficient to deal with public relations problems on a contemporaneous basis. As Mr. Page points out, the public needs to be educated in and cushioned against major military proposals in order to allay their strangeness and overcome natural suspicion.

The bulk of dealing with public opinion on the War Department level--so-called public relations--is in the natural field of the officer charged with recommending policies for and operating with normal public publicity media. Closely related in policy, but not in operation, are the agencies dealing with Congress and with Information and Education within the Army. It would be more efficient if these three were linked up under one policy head. The operations of congressional relations and I & E are highly specialized and they should remain independent as operating units.

It would simplify administration and control, from the standpoint of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, if a single staff officer were charged with planning and coordination of what might be called activities in the public field as distinguished from the military field. His general mission, the end toward which he worked, are well expressed by Mr. Page.

/s/ A. D. Surles

A. D. SURLES
Major General, U. S. A.
Director

Incl.
Memo for Gen. Handy f/Col.
McCarthy, 6-6-45, w/attachment

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

12 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. I agree fully with the basic principles set forth by Mr. Page in the attached study on the Army and its public relations. I think that Mr. Page's comments sufficiently explain the advisability, or rather the necessity of coordinating the Army's public relations activities on a plane where they can and will perform effectively in making the Army an integral part of American thinking.

2. Public relations, used in the broad meaning of the term, cannot and will not be effective if it functions on the basis of covering up or apologizing for inept operations or as a "fire brigade" after the fire is well under way. Public relations, as Mr. Page so adequately explains, is molded by: (1) the honesty and logic of our own behaviour and (2) the way in which we present our behaviour to the public. This behaviour can be perfect and if it is improperly presented it will look wrong. On the other hand, our presentation can be equally as perfect, but if our behaviour is wrong, we fool no one but ourselves. This latter is the P. T. Barnum system of public relations, which is now an American anachronism.

3. Therefore, public relations in the Army is a meaningless term unless the Army's operations and behaviour are controlled in such a way that the public can easily recognize them as being both honest and efficient. This means that the creation of an elaborate public relations structure as a third leg on the body of the General or Special Staff would not accomplish the end we have in view. The War Department public relations structure must have an effect on our behaviour and if it is to have such an effect it must be in a position to influence decisions and policies of the Army. This it cannot do if located as an appendage where its opinion is asked on a "hit or miss basis," but where it neither has the authority nor prestige to influence policies and decisions that impinge upon the public. Time--and a very short time at that--will prove this need even more than ever in the post-war period.

4. In my opinion, the importance of public relations to the post-war Army warrants the establishment of at the least an Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff with

adequate rank to do the job, and charged with full responsibility to the Deputy and Chief of Staff for these vitally important matters. This will give the prestige and power of direction vitally needed for successful accomplishment of the War Department's relations with the American people and their Government. This officer will coordinate the activities of the Bureau of Public Relations, the Legislative and Liaison Division and the I & E Division (which latter may well be placed on a Special Staff level) and see to it that proper consideration is given to the public interest by all Staff and Command echelons of the Army.

5. The above step, while vitally important in any public relations program, is not of itself sufficient. From a long-range point of view, every individual who exercises the authority and prerogatives of the War Department as an officer of the Army must have instilled in him as a basic doctrine the true meaning of public relations. This would start with his preliminary education at the Military Academy or wherever he receives it and continue through his military career as it takes him into the Special Service Schools, the General Service Schools and the Army and Navy War College. If the officer starts right as a second lieutenant, the Army will be less concerned for him as he becomes a four star general. If officers of the Army do not generally understand the basic principles of public relations and appreciate their vital importance to the Army, nothing we can do at the top echelon can be fully effective.

/s/ Wilton B. Persons

WILTON B. PERSONS
Major General, GSC
Chief, Legislative and
Liaison Division

Incl.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY SERVICE FORCES
Washington 25, D. C.

Information and Education Division

4 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF:

Mr. Page's memorandum presents very cogently the need and some of the major means for improving the attitude of the public toward the Army after hostilities. I agree that there is a close relationship between Public Relations, Legislative and Liaison and Information and Education. If over any long period of time we have universal military training, it is likely that the attitudes formed by the men during their Army service will be the major influence on public opinion. If the public feels that civilians undergoing a year of Army training are given full information about what is going on in the world and the nation; are given opportunities for free discussion of that information, and are given opportunities in their off-duty time for education in fields of their own choice, much distrust of the public for the Army as a training agency in time of peace may be allayed.

It is important that the information given the soldier should be the same as that given the public. The proposal to set up a single head to direct these agencies seems desirable. Such a position would be attractive to the very high type of officer required to fill it successfully, and his constant contact with public opinion through the press, through Congress and through his knowledge of soldier attitudes, would all contribute experience valuable to the direction of each of these activities.

I would add the suggestion that the Army Pictorial Service be placed in the same group, since motion pictures are one of the most important means of informing both the public and the soldier. Actual production of film would of course remain with the Signal Corps.

On the whole, I agree with Colonel McCarthy that it would be better to set these agencies up in a section of the Special Staff, rather than in a special Deputy Chief of Staff created for that purpose.

I agree with General Surles that while the three agencies concerned should operate under a single directing

head, they should remain independent as operating units. The present Information and Education Division, including research on soldier attitudes as now conducted, is an integrated group of activities which should be kept together for the accomplishment of its full mission.

Under the central direction proposed by Mr. Page, each of these agencies could be used far better than at present for the purposes of preventative public relations. Separated, and without coordination, their effect on public relations is more likely to be simply remedial, with the Army always behind and taking a defensive position.

/s/ F. H. OSBORN

F. H. OSBORN
Major General
Director
Information and Education
Division

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

WDSCA 020 BPR (6 Jun 45) 18 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY GROUND FORCES
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY SERVICE FORCES
MR. ARTHUR PAGE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS
MAJ. GEN. SURLES, BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS
MAJ. GEN. PERSONS, LEGISLATIVE & LIAISON DIVISION
MAJ. GEN. F. H. OSBORN, INFORMATION & EDUCATION DIVISION, ASF (Thru CC, ASF)

SUBJECT: Appointment of Ad Hoc Committee.

1. The Chief of Staff has approved the organization of an Ad Hoc Committee to study and make recommendations concerning the future organization, functions, responsibilities and methods for effecting coordination of the Legislative and Liaison Division, the Bureau of Public Relations, and the Information and Education Division.

2. The Committee will consist of Maj. Gen. A. D. Surles (Steering Member), Mr. Arthur Page, Maj. Gen. W. B. Persons, Maj. Gen. F. H. Osborn, and a representative selected by each of the Commanding Generals of the three major commands and familiar with the attitude of soldiers in the field. The Commanding Generals of the three major commands should select their representatives and inform the Steering Member of the Committee (Gen. Surles) of their selection as soon as possible.

3. The report is desired as early as practicable

and not later than 10 September.

BY DIRECTION OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF:

/s/ H. I. Hodes

H. I. HODES
Brigadier General, GSC
Assistant Deputy Chief of
Staff

WAR DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS
WASHINGTON

8 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Coordination of Public Information Activities

DISCUSSION

1. Pursuant to the instructions contained in the letter of 18 August 1945 from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Tab A attached), the following action and recommendations of the Committee are reported.

2. Copies of the basic memorandum written by Mr. Arthur Page (Tab B), and the comments thereon by the Directors of the Bureau of Public Relations (Tab C), the Legislative and Liaison Division (Tab D), and the Information and Education Division, ASF (Tab E), were given to the members detailed to the Committee by the Air, Ground and Service Forces for their study prior to a preliminary meeting.

3. This meeting was held on 30 August 1945, at which time the matter under discussion was presented by the Director, Bureau of Public Relations. This was followed by an informal discussion of the factors affecting the problems.

4. The members of the Committee were requested to further study the problem with a view to resolving it at an executive meeting to be held as soon as Mr. Page could be present.

5. At this meeting, at which all of the members were present except Major General Elwood R. Quesada, AAF, discussion and action may be outlined as follows:

a. There was immediate unanimity of opinion as to the soundness of the principles expressed in the Page memorandum.

b. There was full agreement as to the consolidation of the Bureau of Public Relations, the Legislative and Liaison Division and the Information and Education Division under one policy head. There was some discussion advanced by one member of the Committee as to whether or not the Information and Education Division might properly belong under the immediate jurisdiction of G-3, War Department General Staff, but it was the final decision of the Committee that, while some of the functions of this Division properly belonged under training activities in the lower echelons, the Information and Education Division at the War Department level should be combined with public relations and congressional information.

c. The Committee was unanimously of the opinion that while these three divisions should be combined under a policy head, they should be independent as to operations.

d. With all other aspects of the problem agreed upon, the main discussion centered as to the proper place of these combined divisions in the organization of the War Department.

e. After full discussion of the factors involved, it was the unanimous opinion of the Committee that the officer charged with the formation of the policies and coordination of the functions of these three divisions should be at the level of the Deputy Chief of Staff. This decision was based in general on the proposals by Mr. Page that the major business of the War Department may be divided roughly into two categories:

(1) The administration and operation of the Army in its inherent technical military aspects, and

(2) The administration and operation of those functions which pertain to public opinion, the translation of that public opinion into legislative action through the Congress, and that part of the information and education of officers and men which are not strictly and technically military.

f. The Committee believed that there is now great importance, and that there will be increasing importance, to acquaint the public and our own officers and men with the fact that its professional defense forces are a normal and necessary part of a democratic state. It believes that immediate and marked action should be taken

to impress this fact upon the Army and upon the public.

ACTION RECOMMENDED

1. The Committee, therefore, recommends as follows:

a. That the principles, as expressed by Mr. Page in his memorandum, are sound and should be adopted as policy by the War Department.

b. That these principles can best be put into effect by combining the Bureau of Public Relations, the Legislative and Liaison Division, and the Information and Education Division, ASF, under one policy head with the three components remaining independent as to operation.

c. That the names of the Bureau of Public Relations and the Legislative and Liaison Division be changed to Public Information Division and Congressional Division respectively, and that the Information and Education Division be known as the Army Information and Education Division.

d. That the general function and mission of these three divisions remain primarily as before except as given greater unity and coordination under a single policy head.


e. That the position of these functions of the War Department be made a part of the organization of the War Department, as indicated on the attached chart (Tab F).

CONCURRENCES

L & LD	(WBP)	Wilton B. Persons, Maj. Gen., GSC
I & E	(FHO)	F. H. Osborn, Maj. Gen., U. S. A.
AAF	(ERQ)	Elwood R. Quesada, Maj. Gen., U. S. A.
AGF	(LEJ)	Lloyd E. Jones, Maj. Gen., U. S. A.
ASF	(CFR)	C. F. Robinson, Maj. Gen., U. S. A.

/s/ A. D. Surles
A. D. SURLES
Major General, U. S. A.
Director

Incls.
Tabs A, B, C, D, E, and F


SECRETARY OF WAR
CHIEF OF STAFF
DEPUTY
CHIEF OF STAFF
Public Information Div.
Congressional Division
Army Information and
Education Division
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF