

July 25, 1943

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has caused serious moral troubles, and the resultant living conditions have been bad. However, at the present time, the administration is engaged in re-arranging the housing set-up, and it is planned to ultimately allow each family to have a private room.

F. RECREATION

MR. M. NIELSEN is in charge of this division. He was formerly an Olympic champion, and has, for many years, worked in various boys' clubs. The only fault to be found with Mr. NIELSEN is the fact that he places too much stress upon organized recreation, and in some instances the Japanese would much rather engage in activities without the feeling that they were being regimented into it. However, the recreation program has worked out more or less satisfactory, although there are many problems. There is no structure in which movies may be shown, except the various mess halls. As a result, only a few people are permitted to see any moving picture at one time. There is also a need for a dance hall in the center.

The following forms of recreation have so far been set up in the Center: Fine Arts courses; evening recreation; golf club; softball courts; basketball courts; sewing for old ladies; flower making; Judo group; drafting, woodcraft; puppetry; leather work, carpentry, knitting; landscaping and gardening.

MEHRITT stated that his philosophy in the management of an evacuation center, is to prepare the evacuees to take a position in society after the war, and that he felt that many of the above would materially assist the Japanese in this respect.

G. RELOCATION

This Department is under the direction of Mr. WALTER HEATH, and the program at the present time is gaining momentum. There are now between twelve and fifteen Japanese Americans being relocated daily. The W. R. A. is opening an office in Chicago for the purpose of securing jobs for those individuals who wish to relocate in the Middle West. As an example of the work of the Relocation Division, it was pointed out that advertisements are being made to secure employment for former Terminal Island fishermen in the fishing industry, on the Great Lakes. Mr. HEATH was formerly in the Employment Department at Manzanar, before which time, he was in the Employment Division of the State of Montana as a certifying officer. The W. R. A. has suggested that the

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matter of relocation be under the Employment Division, but MERRITT does not approve of this procedure, because he feels that it calls for two different viewpoints, and for that reason, he has made relocation a separate department at Mansanar.

H. EMPLOYMENT

ARTHUR MILLER is the head of the Employment Department. MILLER was formerly connected with the State Relief Administration, and is described by MERRITT as being "steeped in the Governor OLSEN type of intrigue". MERRITT stated that MILLER has attempted to build his own political organization in Mansanar, and for that reason, MERRITT is going to request his dismissal. MILLER has charge of all of the family records in the Center. As an example of MILLER's inefficiency, MERRITT cited that there are presently forty-two boys employed by the Mansanar Post Office to deliver mail, but that the Postmaster, Mr. DEPUTY, has recently decided that he needs only sixteen boys. It is therefore necessary that employment be found for the boys who will be let out of their positions, and although requested by MERRITT to do so, MILLER has been unable to find any employment for them.

I. SENIOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

This position is held by EDWIN HOOOPER. Mr. HOOOPER has been in Government service for twenty-three years, most of which was spent in the Indian Service. He has a thorough knowledge of personnel, property control, cost accounting, procurement, warehousing, budget, and finance. HOOOPER is well acquainted in California, and has a perfect civil service record. At the present time, he is reorganizing the warehouse system. Mr. HOOOPER's wife is Director MERRITT's private secretary. HOOOPER was described by MERRITT as being the most able man on his staff.

In connection with the administration of the Center, MERRITT pointed out that, since its inception, the Center has been unfortunate in the men who are in charge. He stated that MR. TRIGGS, the first Project Director under W. C. C. A., was an able man, but that his successor, MR. NASH, also under W. C. C. A., who was in charge from May, 1942, to September, 1942, had no ability along the lines necessary to properly act as Director of an evacuation center. When the W. R. A. took over, for a time MR. COVERLY was made acting Project Director. However, this was only temporary, and for that reason, COVERLY was not in a position to make any permanent readjustments or plans. The same was true for Mr. KIMBALL, who succeeded COVERLY.

MERRITT stated that since he, MERRITT, had been appointed permanent Project Director, he was going ahead and reorganize the Center.

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J. AGRICULTURE

Mr. MCCONNELL, who was formerly with the Soil Conservation Service, is in charge of the Agricultural Project. He is described as an able and skillful man. He has also been employed for a number of years by one of the larger fruit or vegetable packers in Southern California, in which capacity, he was the supervisor of a thousand acre ranch.

To date, there has been little trouble with the evacuees employed in agriculture. For the most part, they are hard-working and conscientious individuals. At the present time, it is planned that 300 acres will be placed under cultivation in the coming season, from which it is hoped to obtain enough vegetables to care for all of the needs of Mansanar during the season. During the past year, vegetables of the value of \$10,000.00 were produced. The amount of land placed under cultivation will depend largely upon what arrangements can be made for the securing of water for irrigation. This problem has not yet been worked out.

MERRITT stated that, in connection with the agricultural program, he has been considering a plan for raising approximately 12,000 chickens in the Center, introducing pigs and dairy herds, and raising beef cattle. To date, this is all in the formative stages, and no definite action has been taken. There are also at Mansanar, MERRITT stated, pear and apple trees which have been neglected for a number of years. It is hoped, however, that during the coming season, 10,000 lugs of pears and apples will be harvested.

K. PUBLIC WORKS

This division is under the control of HERBERT BROWN, formerly of the Indian Service, who is an irrigation engineer, Army engineer, and civil engineer. BROWN served in the World War. MERRITT stated that he had formerly had some differences with BROWN, but these have now been adjusted, and he at the present time feels that BROWN is one of his most capable assistants. He remarked that on December 6th, under BROWN's direction, the lights, water, heating, and sewage departments were kept operating, and the 350 Japanese engaged in this work have stayed on the job.

L. FIRE DEPARTMENT

FRANK HAHN, formerly a Captain in the Los Angeles Fire Department, is in charge of the Fire Department. There is a decided lack of equipment in the Center, considering the fire hazards presented by the wooden

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gar paper structures. At the present time, there is only one fire engine in the Center, besides which, there are one or more fire extinguishers in each building. HERRITT stated that HAHN has done an excellent job in holding fire drills and organizing fire crews and fire wardens in each block. However, the fire hazard will always be a serious problem in the Center.

H. INDUSTRIAL SECTION

MR. CHAMBERLAIN and MR. HARKLE supervise the Industrial Section. The following projects were carried on under their supervision:

1. Clothing factory, employing 150 people, engaged in pattern making, cutting, and sewing. It is planned that 50 people will be trained each thirty days in this factory. The articles produced will be sold to the residents through the stores in the Center.
2. The Bean Sprout Project. In this Project, men are being trained in the production of bean sprouts, for which there is a large commercial demand.
3. Toy factory. From scrap lumber in the Center, toys are being made, which are being distributed to the pupils in the Center Schools.
4. A sewing machine repair shop has been installed.
5. Men are being trained in the work of typewriter repair and manufacturing.
6. A dish manufacturing project has been started, and a ceramic plant is being set up, to make kitchenware from materials which, for the most part, are readily available at the Center. This kitchenware is presently in great demand, because of the scarcity of materials, and it is planned on turning out ten to twenty people each ninety days who are capable of performing this work.
7. A mattress factory is presently operating.

In connection with the above projects, HERRITT stated that all of the materials being produced are used in the Center at the present time, but that an attempt is being made to develop a mail order business through the cooperative enterprises, and it is hoped that, in the future, any surplus goods produced will be sold to the general public, the proceeds going to the Center residents.

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N. MOTOR POOL

All of the automobiles and trucks in the Center are handled by a Caucasian dispatcher. These vehicles are driven by Japanese. However, in the event it is necessary for any of them to leave the Center, a Caucasian accompanies the vehicle. There is a Caucasian crew of mechanics employed by the Motor Pool, it having been found that the Japanese cannot be depended upon in an emergency. MERRITT stated that after December 6th, it had been found that three of the Center trucks had unaccountably broken down, and it was believed that they had been sabotaged by the Japanese mechanics employed on the Motor Pool.

MERRITT stated that, since December 6th, he had attempted to make the Caucasian Section of the Camp entirely independent of the Japanese, and as a result, that area is independent insofar as food, automobiles, sewage, light, and housing are concerned. He pointed out that in the event of another riot, it will be possible to shut off all lighting, sewage, and close all of the mess halls in the Japanese area, and still not affect the Caucasian area.

O. MESS

The head of the Mess Section is JOE WINCHESTER, formerly employed by the State Relief Administration. WINCHESTER is described as a good buyer and administrator, and the food at the Center, although not fancy, is wholesome and substantial.

The unit cost of meals in the Center is, at the present time, 4½ cents per day. Strict efforts to keep within the rationing requirements have been made.

MERRITT pointed out that there have been very few complaints from the evacuees about the food in the Center.

P. ASSISTANT PROJECT DIRECTOR

Mr. WED CAMPBELL, formerly employed by the Indian Service, was, up until recently, the Assistant Project Director. MERRITT stated that CAMPBELL was young and lacked experience and maturity of judgment, and as a result, had been responsible for some of the dissension in the camp. CAMPBELL is no longer at the Center, having recently been transferred to the W. R. A. Property Department at San Francisco.

The present Assistant Project Director is BOB BROWN, who, although young, is very capable. BROWN is a graduate of the University of Southern California, and while a student, ran the student employment service

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at the University. He is interested in music, and at one time, was engaged in booking bands and other entertainment. In this connection, he has been employed by the Olympic Games Committee in Los Angeles and the Tournament of Roses in Pasadena. He was formerly the leader of an orchestra, but gave this up to become a schoolteacher at Big Pine, California. He was formerly employed during summer vacations at Yosemite Park, as a tour manager, later becoming publicity man for the Yosemite Park Service. He was later employed as Publicity Director for the Inyo-Mono Association, and as a result of his efforts, the tourist travel to Inyo and Mono Counties increased 60 Per Cent in two years. He was the first employee hired at the Manzanar Reception Center, and until recently, held the position of Publicity Director there. He is considered by MERRITT to be an excellent contact man, well acquainted with all of the prominent Japanese in the Center, and very able to fill the position of Assistant Project Director.

Regarding the physical set-up of the Center, MERRITT stated that the 10,000 evacuees are divided up into thirty-six blocks. In each block, there are fourteen barracks, one recreation hall, one mess hall, one ironing room, one laundry, one man's toilet, and one women's toilet.

Regarding employment, MERRITT stated that at the present time, there are 4,200 workers in the camp. He stated that there are five or six hundred others who are well able to work, but do not do so. He believes that these five or six hundred are roughly divided up into the following: Two hundred Kibei; 200 Issei, and 200 young boys. MERRITT admitted that there was not enough constructive work in the Center to employ everyone. He stated that one of the reasons for this was the lack of available agricultural land.

Both MERRITT and COLZENS then stated that they wished it understood that the W. R. A. had never considered Owens Valley as a good site for a relocation Center. MERRITT produced figures which showed that, of the 10,000 residents in the Center, 6,306 were available for work and 4,215 were now working. He stated that there were 3,621 who could be considered as non-employables.

MERRITT mentioned the recent visit of the Spanish Consul, FRANCISCO D'AMAT, following the riot of December 6th. D'AMAT came to Manzanar with a representative of the State Department, and interviewed many of the Issei in the Center. At that time, no one in the camp was working, and D'AMAT told MERRITT that the Issei had advised him that they would return to work only if the Spanish Ambassador so directed. At MERRITT's suggestion, D'AMAT telephoned the Marquis DE FONTANA, Consul of the Spanish Embassy in Washington, and

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advised him that Manzanar was a good place and that the Issei wanted to know if they should go back to work. According to MERRITT, DE PONTANA stated that the Ambassador said, "Tell the damn fools to go back to work". D'AMAT is then supposed to have told the Issei to return to work. They did not immediately return to work, however, because when the Nisei were advised, they stated that they would not immediately return to work, because if they did, it would appear that they were obeying the orders of the Spanish Consul. However, after waiting two days, both Issei and Nisei returned to work.

Shortly thereafter, a group of the workers approached MERRITT and stated that they were going to strike. MERRITT advised them to go ahead, if they desired, but to remember that the Spanish Ambassador had told them to work. As a result, no strike occurred. MERRITT pointed out that the residents of Manzanar frequently correspond with the Spanish Consul.

RELATIONSHIP OF ADMINISTRATION AND RESIDENTS

MERRITT and COLLINS were asked what methods were used to present to the residents the problems confronting the W. R. A. COLLINS stated that at the Gila Relocation Center, the Project Director, twice each month, met with the City Council and block managers, and at these conferences, many of the problems were discussed. MERRITT stated that at Manzanar, meetings were being held by the Project Director with the evacuees. Two different groups were being contacted in this connection. The first were the block managers, who are elected by the people, approved by the Project Director, and paid by the W. R. A. These block managers meet with the Project Director every Friday, and bring in questions, which are discussed in an informal manner. The second was the Group of 108. This group is composed of three representatives from each block, who meet with the Project Director twice each month. These individuals are selected by the people, and have no official recognition from the W. R. A. These meetings are of a much more formal nature than the block managers' meetings, and have developed only since the riot of December 6th. Under the Group of 108, there have been formed an advisory committee having nine members, an executive committee of four members, and a judicial committee of ten members. In addition to the above groups, there is also the Peace Committee, which has been previously referred to, and which is composed of Jews in the Center. The Peace Committee was formed primarily for the purpose of assisting the internal police in maintaining law and order in the center. MERRITT pointed out that the leaders who are now developing at Manzanar are much stronger than those who were formerly in power, and he feels that the Center is now in a much better condition than formerly, in that all of the representative groups are agreed on peace and wish no more riots or beatings.

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HERRITT was then asked concerning his former allegation as to how many beatings had actually resulted from contacts had with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He was unable to mention any, except that of FRED YAYAMA. (It has been previously noted that YAYAMA has been prominent in the Japanese American Citizens League, the Anti-Axis Committee, and in public statements of loyalty.)

On the following day, Wednesday, January 20, 1943, HERRITT was asked for the names of those individuals who had been beaten at Manzanar. He at that time claimed that these names were in the possession of Mr. THROCKMORTON, Project attorney, who was not at that time at the Center. He advised that he would secure these names and forward them.

WILLARD E. SCHMIDT and JOHN SYLVE were also on that date questioned regarding beatings. They stated that the records of the Police Department contained all of the beatings and acts of violence in the Center, up to and including December 6th, and they furnished summaries of each of these cases. They stated that the only additional instances which might be in the possession of THROCKMORTON would be those beatings which had occurred since December 6th. (It will be noted that a review of these summaries of beatings and threats at Manzanar has been made. It does not appear that any of the beatings have occurred solely as a result of contacts had with the F. B. I.)

Respectfully submitted,


Special Agent.

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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Washington

July 15, 1943

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION NO. 100

Subject: Separation of evacuees of doubtful loyalty from loyal evacuees

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

I. Policy.

It shall be the policy of the War Relocation Authority to place in a separate center those persons of Japanese ancestry residing in relocation centers who by their acts have indicated that their loyalties lie with Japan during the present hostilities.

The policy herein announced is not to be considered a substitute for the policy governing the removal of aggravated troublemakers from the relocation center in which they may reside and their transfer to the Leupp Center, another relocation center, or an alien detention camp; and the provisions of Administrative Instruction No. 95 shall remain in full force and effect. Persons resident at Leupp Center shall not be transferred to the Center designated under Section II of this instruction except with the specific prior approval of the Director.

II. Designation of center for evacuees of doubtful loyalty.

The Tule Lake Relocation Center in the State of California is designated as the center which is set apart for the residence of persons of Japanese ancestry residing in relocation centers who have indicated that their loyalties lie with Japan during the present hostilities. The center shall hereafter be known as the "Tule Lake Center".

After segregation is completed, Persons in residence at the Tule Lake Center will not be eligible to receive seasonal or indefinite leave; nor shall present policies with respect to evacuee government in relocation centers be applicable to the Tule Lake Center. The entire area will be appropriately guarded.

All policies of the War Relocation Authority with respect to food, clothing, health, education, employment within centers, public assistance grants, consumer enterprises, and evacuee property and legal services, will continue to be applicable at the Tule Lake Center until further notice. An enumeration of the portions of administrative instructions applicable to relocation centers that are not to be applicable to the Tule Lake Center is now being prepared.

III. Persons to be placed in Tule Lake Center.

- A. All persons in the following categories shall remain in the Tule Lake Center, or shall be transferred to that center, as the case may be:
1. All persons who have formally asked for repatriation or expatriation to Japan and have not retracted their requests prior to July 1, 1943.
 2. All persons who, at the time of the registration for Army service and war industries purposes, answered question 28 of Form WRA-126 Rev. or DSS Form 304A in the negative, or failed or refused to answer it, and (a) who have not changed their answers prior to the date of this instruction, and (b) who are in the opinion of the project director loyal to Japan.
 3. All persons to whom the Director has denied leave clearance. This category will include persons in the following classes after hearings have been held and if and when leave clearance has been denied under Supplement XII to Administrative Instruction No. 22, Revised: (a) Persons about whom there is an adverse report by a Federal intelligence agency; (b) persons who have answered question 28 negatively and who changed their answers prior to the date of this instruction, or who answered such question with a qualification; (c) persons who have requested repatriation or expatriation and retracted such request prior to July 1, 1943; (d) persons for whom the Japanese-American Joint Board established in the Provost Marshal General's office does not affirmatively recommend leave clearance; and (e) persons about whom there is other information indicating loyalty to Japan.
- B. Members of the immediate family of a person who falls within one of the three categories set forth in paragraph A above shall upon their individual request be permitted to remain with such person in the Tule Lake Center, or to accompany him to that center, as the case may be. If minor members of the immediate family who do not themselves fall within one of the categories set forth in paragraph A above object to residence at the Tule Lake Center every possible assistance shall be extended in helping to work out appropriate arrangements along the lines suggested in Section VI-D of Administrative Instruction No. 65, dealing with minor children of persons being repatriated. For the purpose of determining what is an immediate family the guides set forth in Section XII of Administrative Instruction No. 27 shall be followed.

- C. Where one member of an immediate family residing in a center other than the Tule Lake Center falls within one of the three categories set forth in paragraph A above, but he or some other member of such family is so ill or infirm that removal will in the opinion of the project medical officer endanger life or seriously impair health, all members of the family shall be permitted to remain in the center of residence so long as such condition continues.
- D. Persons resident in the Tule Lake Center who do not fall within one of the categories set forth in paragraph A above, but who are so ill or infirm that their removal will in the opinion of the project medical officer endanger their lives or seriously impair their health shall be permitted to remain in the Tule Lake Center so long as such condition continues. Members of their immediate families, as defined in paragraph B above, shall upon request also be permitted to remain in the Tule Lake Center so long as such condition continues.

IV. Priorities of movement to Tule Lake Center.

- A. In general, persons will be moved to the Tule Lake Center in the following order of priority:
1. Persons who have applied for repatriation or expatriation and have not retracted their requests prior to July 1, 1943, with the exception of those whose names are furnished by the Director as being persons who may soon embark for Japan. Persons falling within this exception shall be permitted to remain in the relocation center until further notice.
 2. Bachelor Kibei falling within the second or third category set forth in paragraph III-A above. For the purpose of this paragraph "bachelor Kibei" shall mean a male citizen evacuee, unmarried as of the date of this instruction, who has spent a total of three or more years in Japan since January 1, 1935.
 3. All others.

These priorities may be modified from time to time as to particular relocation centers, and priorities will be established for other persons to be moved to the Tule Lake Center.

- B. The first movement to the Tule Lake Center of persons falling within paragraph IV-A-1 above shall be from the Granada, Minidoka, Jerome, Rohwer, Heart Mountain, and Central Utah relocation centers. After such persons have been moved from these centers, movement of persons from the Manzanar, Colorado River, and Gila River relocation centers shall be arranged. Priorities between relocation centers for movement of persons to be segregated for other reasons shall be established from time to time.

V. Preparation for transfers to Tule Lake Center.

- A. The project director of each center other than the Tule Lake Center shall immediately prepare a list, by categories, of all persons in the center (1) who have requested repatriation or expatriation without retraction prior to July 1, 1943, or (2) who have been denied leave clearance (first and third categories listed in paragraph III A above). Each such person shall be promptly notified in writing that he will be transferred to the Tule Lake Center at a date which will subsequently be made known to him. The notice shall further specify a time and place at which he and his immediate family, if any, should appear for an interview.

The project director shall cause each such person and his immediate family, if any, to be interviewed for the purpose of determining (1) whether such person is able to travel and if so whether special travelling accommodations will be necessary (to be confirmed in case of doubt by the project medical officer); (2) what members of the immediate family wish to accompany him; and (3) what further assistance is needed by the evacuee or his family. The interviewer shall notify the evacuee of the provisions of paragraph VII hereof, dealing with transportation of property, and assist in filling out Form WRA-156 if the evacuee wishes property to be transported thereunder. Members of the immediate family may be interviewed separately wherever it is deemed advisable in order to arrive at their true preference.

Each project director shall inform the Director by wire not later than August 10 of the number of evacuees to be transferred under this paragraph, and the family groupings and health problems involved.

- B. The project director of each center other than the Tule Lake Center shall also immediately prepare a list of persons in the center who fall within the second category listed in paragraph III-A above. If the persons on such list have not already been interviewed for the purpose of determining whether they are loyal to Japan, the project director shall promptly interview them for such purpose and make his determination, striking from such list the names of those who in his judgment are not loyal to Japan.

The project director shall give each person on the list prepared under this paragraph B a notice and additional interview in the manner prescribed in paragraph A, and the project director shall notify the Director of the number of evacuees to be transferred and the family groupings and health problems involved. No more than 10 days should elapse between the receipt of the names at the project and the notice to the Director.

VI. Preparation for transfers from Tule Lake Center.

- A. The project director of the Tule Lake Center shall immediately prepare two lists containing the names of the following classes of persons:
1. All persons falling within the three categories set forth in paragraph III-A above, who are to remain in the Tule Lake Center, together with their immediate families (hereinafter called the Resident List). If all the persons falling within the second category set forth in such paragraph have not already been interviewed for the purpose of determining whether they are loyal to Japan, the project director shall promptly interview them for such purpose, and make his determination, striking from the Resident List the names of those who in his judgment are not loyal to Japan, together with the names of the members of their immediate families, and adding such names to the list provided for immediately below.
 2. All other persons (hereinafter called the Removal List).
- B. Each person whose name appears on the Removal List shall be promptly notified in writing that the center has been selected as the center of residents for evacuees loyal to Japan; that if his relocation is not arranged for prior to the time WRA determines it is necessary for him to leave he will be transferred to another center, unless he is physically incapacitated; that he is requested to appear at a designated time and place for an interview; and that at that interview he will be requested to express preferences for transfer as between Central Utah, Granada, Heart Mountain, Jerome, and Minidoka, which preferences may have to be disregarded but will be heeded if possible to do so.

The project director shall cause each such person to be interviewed, preferably by family groups, to determine: (1) whether the evacuee is able to travel and if so whether special travelling accommodations will be necessary (to be confirmed in case of doubt by the project medical officer); (2) whether he would prefer transfer to Central Utah, Granada, Heart Mountain, Jerome, or Minidoka (listing all in order of preference, and making it clear that his first preferences may have to be disregarded); and (3) what further assistance is necessary. The interviewer shall notify the evacuee of the provisions of paragraph VII hereof, dealing with transportation of property, and assist in filling out Form WRA-156 if the evacuee wishes property to be transported thereunder.

During the month of August a special effort will be made to facilitate the relocation of residents of the Tule Lake Center who are on the Removal List. No person on the Removal List shall be permitted to request repatriation or expatriation, or to change his answer to question 28 from an affirmative to a negative or other answer raising real doubts as to loyalty, until the large movements under this instruction to and from the Tule Lake Center have been completed.

The project director shall inform the Director by wire not later than August 20 of the number of evacuees on the Removal List who have been processed for transfer to another center, the family groupings and health problems involved, and the respective preferences expressed for Central Utah, Granada, Heart Mountain, Jerome; Rohwer and Minidoka. If at all possible, processing should be completed by that date. If it is not, the project director shall thereafter wire such information to the Director weekly until processing has been completed.

- C. Each person falling within one of the three categories set forth in paragraph III-A above (whose name will appear, together with the names of the members of his immediate family, on the Resident List) shall be promptly notified in writing that he has been designated to remain in the center. If there are members of his immediate family who do not fall within one of these categories, he shall further be notified of that fact and requested to appear at a designated time and place, together with such members, for an interview.

Such interview shall determine whether any such family member wishes to leave the center (it being made clear to him that it may be difficult for him to leave the center unless he exercises the option now). If he wishes to leave, his name shall be added to the Removal List, the interviewer shall proceed with the interview, and such person shall be processed, as if his name had originally appeared on the Removal List.

- D. As additional applications of Tule Lake residents for leave clearance are denied, the names of such persons shall, if on the Removal List, be transferred to the Resident List, and they shall be promptly notified that they are no longer eligible to leave the center.

As additional applications of Tule Lake residents for leave clearance are granted, the names of such persons shall, if on the Resident List, be transferred to the Removal List, and such persons shall be processed as provided in paragraph B above.

VII. Transportation of property of transferees.

- A. All evacuees transferring from one center to another under this instruction shall be notified to carry with them, as hand baggage and checkable baggage, sufficient clothing and necessary household and personal effects to maintain them for at least 60 days, in view of transportation and other administrative difficulties that will necessarily be involved in transporting their property separately.
- B. All furniture and other property in the apartments of such evacuees or stored in warehouses at the center of departure shall be crated and transported to the center of destination upon request of the evacuee presented to the project director upon Form WRA-156. Shipment to the new center at Government expense shall be in addition to transportation furnished under Administrative Instruction No. 78. The cost shall be borne by the center from which the evacuee is transferred.

VIII. Responsibilities in connection with movement of transferees.

A. Washington office

1. Upon the basis of information furnished him from time to time by the project directors under this instruction the Director will determine the time of movement and the number of evacuees to be transferred in each movement from one center to another. A tentative schedule of initial movements will be furnished to the project directors at the earliest possible date.
2. The Director will make all arrangements for common carrier facilities for the movement of each group of evacuees, and for military escort where necessary. He will further obtain any military permits that may be necessary for the travel of evacuees in the evacuated areas.
3. The Director will wire each project director concerned, at least five days before the date of departure, of the number of persons to be transferred and the family groupings involved, the transportation facilities arranged for, the time of departure and arrival, and all other details in connection therewith. (Ordinarily this will merely confirm a tentative schedule already furnished to the project directors.)

B. Center of departure

1. The project director of the center of departure shall be responsible for completing all other arrangements to be made at the center in connection with each movement. He shall designate a suitable WRA representative to accompany each

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J. EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

- Mr. Tolson ✓
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Carson
- Mr. Coffey
- Mr. Hendon
- Mr. Kramer
- Mr. McGuire
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Beahm
- Miss Gandy

December 7, 1942

FWC:PC
Received: 1:25 A.M.
Transcribed: 9:15 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. D. M. LADD

RE: Disorder at the Camp of the
War Relocation Authority
Fred Tayama Victim

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASHMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

War Relocation Authority

SAC Hood of the Los Angeles Office called to report an additional outbreak at the camp of the War Relocation Authorities which occurred at 6:30 P.M., December 6th. Mr. Hood stated that he had previously sent in a teletype to the Bureau concerning [REDACTED]

Mr. Hood advised that Fred Tayama, who had been beaten up on the previous evening, disappeared from his hospital together with a Japanese doctor. Tayama had evidently received notice that his assailants were planning to return to the hospital to kill him, so he decided to flee from the hospital.

Shortly thereafter, his assailants held a meeting at the camp of the War Relocation Authorities, and trouble resulted from this meeting. The Military Police were called in to put down this disorder and had to use tear gas to accomplish this purpose. None of the details of the meeting or the extent of the damage caused by the uprising were known to Mr. Hood at this time. He advised further that he would call tomorrow regarding this.

The camp authorities requested that Mr. Hood send some agents to the camp to help in controlling the trouble-makers and to put down the riot.

Mr. Hood declined to send any agents for the reason that this was a matter which the Military Authorities were handling and the Bureau might probably be made the "goat" of the Tayama incident if it entered into this case. The Bureau's attitude in this case would be fully discussed with G-2 today, according to Mr. Hood.

Mr. Hood also stated that he was not going to permit his agents to visit this camp on other matters until this case has been cleared.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 5/29/81 BY SP4GRM/iam



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Respectfully,
RECORDED
F. W. CROFT
100-140363-1114
8 DEC 8 1942

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/2/81 BY SP4 Rml/nem

Los Angeles, California
August 13, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

RE: CONDITIONS AT MANZANAR RELOCATION
CENTER, Manzanar, California

On August 12, 1943, Mr. RALPH MERRITT, Project Director, Manzanar Relocation Center, at Manzanar, California, telephonically contacted the Los Angeles Field Division and advised Special Agent [redacted] that he objected to the presence of Special Agent [redacted] at Manzanar on August 12, 1943. Agent [redacted] appeared at the Relocation Center with Special Employee [redacted] for the purpose of conducting a discreet inquiry regarding Kendo and Judo activities in Manzanar.

This investigation was requested by the Bureau by letter dated July 24, 1943, wherein the Bureau advised that the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, had furnished information that these groups were semi-nationalistic in character. It is also noted that, during the recent survey made by Inspector MYRON GURNEA of War Relocation Centers, Mr. GURNEA reported that Kendo clubs had been active in the Manzanar Relocation Center and recommended in his report that, inasmuch as Judo is semi-nationalistic, no paid Judo instructors be employed. The Bureau advised that recent publicity has been given to the undesirability of allowing the Japanese in relocation centers to form such organizations.

Mr. MERRITT stated that he had furnished Agent [redacted] with what personal information he had regarding Kendo and Judo groups and had even made it possible for Agent [redacted] to interview several of the leaders to obtain additional information. He advised that Agent [redacted] had requested permission to examine the files of thirty-four Japanese individuals designated as being the leaders of these groups by Mr. MERRITT and by the Japanese interviewed. Mr. MERRITT pointed out that the examination of these files would indicate to the Japanese residents that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was interested in the groups and was interested in the leaders. It was further stated by Mr. MERRITT that any such inquiries would undoubtedly cause unrest among the Japanese population at Manzanar. He alleged that such inquiries made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation are viewed with alarm and suspicion by the Japanese residents and cause the Japanese to become very uncooperative with the camp officials.

Mr. MERRITT stated that the officials at Manzanar were now in the process of segregating the loyal from the disloyal Japanese. He stated that this was being done by a system of questionnaires and personal interviews of

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*Let's check up on this
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WMP
AC
Garcia
81-443 WMP*

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MEMO. FOR THE DIRECTOR

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August 13, 1943

RE: CONDITIONS AT MANZANAR RELOCATION
CENTER, Manzanar, California.

the Japanese who were required to appear before two hearing boards, which have been set up at the camp. Mr. MERRITT furnished no details as to the set-up of these two boards. He stated that if the inquiries of Agent [redacted] were continued, he was of the opinion that the Japanese would not answer questions put to them when they appeared before these boards and, in this way, the camp officials would be unable to properly segregate the loyal and disloyal Japanese.

Mr. MERRITT stated that it was impossible for him to withhold the interest of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from the Japanese residents, inasmuch as most of his assistance is obtained from Japanese personnel, and that via the "grape-vine" method every person in the camp knows immediately when an Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation comes through the gate. He stated that the files at the present time were being worked on by Japanese persons in connection with this segregation program. He stated that the program would not be completed until sometime in November, at which time he would be very happy to make the files available to us, pointing out, however, that by that time many of the Japanese now at the camp would no longer be there, having been transferred to other camps.

(He stated that Agent [redacted] has failed to outline in detail the purpose, nature and extent of his investigation. It was definitely pointed out to Mr. MERRITT that, while we were willing to work through his office when making investigations at the camp, we could not and would not give him a detailed account of our activities, of our information or of the progress of the investigation. He stated that he realized this, but that he did not think that we were furnishing him with as much information as he was entitled to have. He stated that he thought he would furnish Agent [redacted] with the information desired at this time, however, that if Agents of this Bureau wanted any further information or desired to conduct any further inquiries, he would definitely refuse to allow such inquiries or interviews and will not permit them to be conducted until such time that he feels sure the morale and peaceful nature of the camp will not be upset. He pointed out that inquiries into Kendo and Judo groups at the present time would seriously interfere with the segregation program, and this was the reason for his unwillingness to cooperate with the Bureau.

|| He intimated that he would correspond with his superiors at Washington and explain that he did not approve of Bureau inquiries at the present time. He stated that if the subject matter of the present inquiry was important and necessary, he, of course, had no objection; however, he did not desire to cooperate if the matter was only of a routine nature. He was advised by Agent [redacted]

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MEMO. FOR THE DIRECTOR.

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August 13, 1943

RE: CONDITIONS AT MANZANAR RELOCATION
CENTER, Manzanar, California.

that the matter was important; that it was definitely necessary, otherwise the Agent would not be at the camp making the inquiries. Mr. MERRITT then stated that he did desire to receive one or two days' notice from this Bureau when any Agents contemplated visiting Manzanar on official business. He did not disclose the purpose of this advance notice, except to say that he could then make "proper arrangements" so that the Japanese would not become unduly alarmed.

Mr. MERRITT was advised by Agent [redacted] that this Bureau does not give advance information to anyone of any proposed or planned investigations; that we were not at liberty to put persons on notice of our arrivals and departures in advance. He became excited over this and stated, "Well, I am not a criminal and I have the right to know". He desired that Agent [redacted] request Mr. HOOD to make the necessary arrangements for notifying Mr. MERRITT in advance of contemplated arrival of Agents at the camp. Mr. MERRITT was advised that his request would be furnished to Mr. HOOD, but that our instructions were as outlined above, and any deviation therefrom would have to receive Mr. HOOD's express approval.

Mr. MERRITT then generalized by complaining that he gets too many inquiries from various government agencies regarding conditions at the camps. He stated that, in his opinion, most of these inquiries were unnecessary and are only for the purpose of obtaining information to attack the camp. He referred to the recent Dies Committee hearings and stated that many of the unfavorable comments made during these hearings were due to the free access camp officials have given to government agencies. Agent [redacted] advised Mr. MERRITT that Mr. MERRITT's difficulties with other government agencies were not known to him and, therefore, he had no comments to make.

In concluding the telephone conversation, Mr. MERRITT stated that as long as Agent [redacted] was out at the camp, he would furnish him with all the information that Agent [redacted] desired, but that he would appreciate the Bureau deferring any further inquiries or investigations at the camp until after November and until after the segregation program is completed. Mr. MERRITT was advised that we would consider his request, but that, of course, we could not make any promises.

It is expected that Agent [redacted] upon his return from the present road trip, will have considerable additional information regarding this

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Advance notice should be given.
H.

MEMO. FOR THE DIRECTOR


- 4 -

August 13, 1943

RE: CONDITIONS AT MANZANAR RELOCATION
CENTER, Manzanar, California.

incident and such information will be obtained from Agent [REDACTED] and forwarded
to the Bureau immediately. b7c

Respectfully submitted,


R. B. HOOD
Special Agent in Charge

[REDACTED] b7c

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAR 14 1943

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CLASS. & EXT. BY SP4/AM/...
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF DECLASS. 2/26/91

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Carson
- Mr. Coffey
- Mr. Hendon
- Mr. Mumford
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

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John Strickland
1944

FBI SALT LAKE CITY
DIRECTOR

3-15-43

1-59 AM MWT AR

MUTE RAYMOND HIROSHI HIRAI, [REDACTED] INTERNAL SECURITY
J, AEC. SUBJECT APPREHENDED TODAY BY BUREAU AGENTS AT MOAB RELOCATION
CENTER AND PRESENTLY HELD IN COUNTY JAIL, MOAB, GRAND COUNTY, UTAH.
USA NOTIFIED.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

Rec'd from [unclear] 5-12-43

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 6/1/80 BY [signature]

CONFIDENTIAL Los Angeles, California
January 25, 1943

28973

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR M. E. GURKHA

RE: SURVEY OF THE MANSANAR RELOCATION
CENTER, OWENS VALLEY, CALIFORNIA
INTERNAL SECURITY J
ALIEN ENEMY CONTROL

CLASS. & EXT. BY [signature]
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 6/1/80

There is being hereinafter set forth the result of interviews conducted at the Mansanar Relocation Center on January 18, 19 and 20, 1943. It will be noted that some of the information is several times duplicated. No attempt has been made by the writer to organize the material, the information being presented in the order and sequence in which it was originally furnished. There is being set forth in parentheses information obtained from a review of the files of the Los Angeles Office.

On Monday, January 18, 1943, Mr. ROBERT COZZIENS, Regional Director of W. R. A., during the tour of the Mansanar Relocation Center, advised that there are, at the present time, approximately 10,000 residents at that Center. There are 36 blocks in the Center, each block containing 14 barracks. There are usually four families to one barrack. However, this distribution is not uniform, not all of the families being of the same size, and as a result, it has been necessary in some cases to house several families in one apartment. The W. R. A. is attempting to remedy this situation by erecting more partitions in the barracks, and by installing doors on the sides of the buildings, in addition to those on either end, as at present.

COZZIENS pointed out the area within the Center which is presently available for agricultural purposes. The soil in the area is capable of producing farm products, but is so porous that an unusually large quantity of water is required, the amount necessary being from five to eight feet. The annual rainfall in the locality averages only about seven inches. Under present arrangements, the amount of water available for irrigation is sufficient only for approximately 300 acres. If more water is obtained, more acreage can be put under cultivation.

COZZIENS stated that there is a camouflage net factory at the Center, but that it has not operated since the riot on December 6, 1942. It is not known whether this project is now open. Some of the material used in producing the nets is still on hand, but the Army has recently removed some of this.

At the sewing factory, COZZIENS presented Mr. HABERLE, who was in charge of this project. The sewing factory has, at the present time, approximately 150 sewing machines and is engaged in making uniforms for the police.

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20376

January 25, 1943

RE: SURVEY OF MANJIMAR RELOCATION CENTER
INTERNAL SECURITY J - ALIEN ENTRY CONTROL

20374

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

force and hospital staff. It is planned to considerably increase the variety and amount of this output. In addition to the sewing machines, the factory also has a cutting room and a pattern making department. Mr. HAYKLE is also in charge of the wood-working shop, where children's toys are being made out of scrap lumber.

Next visited was the carpenter shop, where it appeared that benches, chairs and tables were being made. COZYNS advised that most of the machinery used in this project was obtained from the U. S. A.

A tour was made of the Center Hospital under the guidance of [REDACTED] X-Ray specialist. The hospital is a 250 bed structure, consisting of clinics, general wards, children's wards, maternity wards, tuberculosis wards and contagious disease wards. [REDACTED] stated that the technical equipment in the hospital is excellent. b7c

COZYNS later pointed out that there has recently developed a certain amount of friction between DR. LITTLE, Medical Director of the Center, and DR. JAMES GOTO, who had been ~~temporarily~~ responsible for organizing the hospital and who was the Medical Director prior to DR. LITTLE's arrival. Several of the other doctors employed at the hospital have complained about DR. GOTO's activities and his lack of ethics. As a result of this dissatisfaction among the members of the hospital staff, it has been decided that DR. GOTO shall be transferred to some other relocation center. Because of the fact that DR. GOTO has a large following, it will be necessary to handle this matter with diplomacy, in order to avoid a disturbance in the center. GOTO

COZYNS pointed out a pavilion which is under construction, and is to be used by the Judo Group in the Center. He indicated that this project had not been encouraged by the U. S. A., but that since the funds for the erection of the structure were being furnished by the Judoists and the labor being performed by them, the U. S. A. had allowed them to proceed with the building.

Regarding the various work projects in the Center, COZYNS stated that the group that appears most satisfied is the one engaged in agricultural activities. These men are all conscientious in the performance of their duties. He attributed this largely to the fact that the Caucasian in charge of agriculture has a good knowledge of the men and their problems, and also to the fact that the Japanese so employed were doing jobs for which they were fitted.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JAN 25, 1943

RE: SURVEY OF MANZANAR RELOCATION CENTER
INTERNAL SECURITY J - ALIEN ENEMY CONTROL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

28975

COZZENS estimated that 90 Per Cent of the Nisei in the Center would willingly work if it were not for fear of being severely criticized or injured by the pressure group in the Center. The only remedy is segregation of those apt to be part of this pressure group. He listed the following as being logical groups to segregate from the loyal Nisei in the Center:

1. Kibei
2. Issei bachelors
3. Those requesting repatriation
4. Married Issei having no children
5. Other known trouble makers

On the afternoon of January 18th, a conference was had with ROBERT COZZENS and RALPH P. MERRITT, Project Director. MERRITT pointed out that Manzanar is different from other relocation centers, for the following reasons:

1. It is the oldest center.
2. More mistakes have been made at Manzanar than at other centers.
3. The buildings constructed are poorer.
4. Other centers have profited by the mistakes made at Manzanar.
5. The population at Manzanar is predominantly Issei. If all of those residents under the age of 18 years were omitted, there would remain 52 Per Cent Issei and 48 Per Cent Nisei and Kibei. If all those under 24 years were omitted, the ratio would then be 65 Per Cent Issei to 35 Per Cent Nisei and Kibei.
6. The Kibei group at Manzanar is larger than at any other center. There are approximately 800, of whom 150 to 200 have returned to the United States from Japan since 1936. This latter group is considered by MERRITT to be the most dangerous element in the camp.
7. The residents have less of a feeling of camp pride. The morale is low, and little effort has been made by the residents to beautify their surroundings.
8. Manzanar has had more administrators than other centers; two while it was under the control of the W. C. C. A. and three since the W. R. A. took over. These administrators were; (a) MR. FRIEGS; (b) MR. NASH; (c) WED CAMPBELL (formerly Assistant Project Director); (d) COVERLY (formerly acting Project Director); (e) KIMBALL (formerly acting Project Director); (f) MR. MERRITT (permanent Project Director since November 24, 1942).

20378

M. GANGS

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Historical Documentation Manzanar, California

Wednesday, November 11

Report No. 82

Compiled by Joe Masacka & Togo Tanaka

MANZANAR POLICE OFFICER ATTACKED BY 'GANGS'

Who: [redacted] investigator, Manzanar internal
police force.

When: At 8:00 p.m. Tuesday, November 10

Where: In front and at the side of the Young Women's
Association dormitory, 19-14, where the Imais live.

How: Approximately 15 young men, unidentified by name,
but described through speech, mannerism and wearing
apparel as "Terminal Islanders", were seen loitering
around the building for half an hour before the assault.
They were lined up on both sides of the barrack,
apparently waiting for [redacted] to show himself.

At 8:00 p.m., [redacted] stepped outside the barrack
to escort one of the girls attending a club cabinet
meeting at the Y.W.A. to her home. He carried his
police flashlight. [redacted] was at the door.
As he turned his light on half a dozen silent figures
waiting at the barrack side, each man turned his
back; collars of peacoats were turned up. Then,
suddenly and without warning, he was assaulted from
behind. Approximately 15 young men beat and kicked
him as he rolled on the ground. [redacted] screamed.
A truck came to a stop at the intersection of blocks
19 and 13. The attackers apparently believed it to
be a police car; they fled into the dark.

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[redacted] was taken to the hospital for examination.
Extent of injuries: external bruises, right swollen eye, possible internal injuries.

Why: Occasion for the attack appears to be the fact that [redacted] in line of duty as a member of the Mansanar Police force, uncovered the attempted smuggling of intoxicants into Mansanar by returning Terminal Island best furlough workers. This incident occurred the same day. The first of three Greyhound buses arrived at Mansanar Tuesday at about 11:30 a.m. It was parked at the side of the police station awaiting arrival of Military Police for baggage inspection. Friends and well-wishers thronged the bus. One of the returning workers, identified by police as a San Pedro "Terminal Islander", raised his window and attempted to pass his pea-jacket to a girl bystander. [redacted], standing nearby, said: "You're not allowed to pass anything out of the window." The girl pushed the pea-jacket back; in the process, a bottle of liquor fell out of the jacket, smashing on the ground.

Police commissioner Willard Schmidt issued a warning. Ropes were thrown around each bus, spectators kept back, each returning worker was frisked, baggage more closely inspected.

A group of boys, identified by blue denim jackets with lettering: "San Pedro Federal Pen." and "San Pedro Yorgores", stood in the back, shouting at Mr. [redacted] "Pre-American" and "Stoolpigeon". Heard muttered in Japanese were such expressions as "Nihonjin doshi de sonogurai no koto wa yurushitemo iinoni." (Among Japanese, these little things could be overlooked).

ATTACK ON POLICEMAN LATEST IN SERIES OF "GANG" ASSAULTS

Mansanar gangdom is usually identified by the people as one of three groups:

- (1) Terminal Islanders, known as "Yorgores" also, or the "San Pedro Gang"
- (2) The "Dunbar Gang"
- (3) The "Blood Brothers Corps", known also as "Yubo Kesahidan".

CASE HISTORIES:

(1) Terminal Island Yogyores

This group has been the most active to date in committing acts of physical violence. Numerically, it is reputed to be the largest "gang", claims varying between "200 to 500 guys". Actually, according to police authorities, there are not more than 20 or 25 habitual troublemakers among the group; they are young men in their late teens or early twenties. They are almost uniformly characterized by: (1) their previous occupation has been either that of fisherman or cannery worker; (2) their deep resentment against the government and anyone in authority, as a result of the manner in which they were evacuated; (3) their outspoken bitterness against what they describe as "unjust imprisonment of my old man by the F.B.I." (Almost all Terminal Island older men--the fathers of these youths--were taken into custody) (4) their crude manners, uncouth dress and speech, the latter being a mixture of Japanese and English to a greater extent than is usual among the Nisei.

(Center of the Terminal Island colony is Block 9, which is solidly made up of San Pedro evacuees; an overflow into blocks 8 and 10 cares for most of the remainder, although they are dispersed throughout the Center.

According to residents who have moved away from Block 9 because "we weren't from Terminal Island," the San Pedrans are intensely partisan, making it virtually "impossible" for "Outsiders" to live with or among them.

THEIR RECORD in gang violence:

- (a) In sports & recreation--Terminal Islanders usually excel in sports. In softball, two of their teams, the "Yogyores" and the "Marlins" led their respective leagues. However, they were both involved in fist fights on the diamond to the extent that they gained a reputation among other teams for being "Bellicose" and "always looking for a fight."

In one championship game in a major league, the contest was never decided because it developed into gang fight which put a player on the opposing team in the hospital. Dances at Manzanar invariably require police protection because of "hoodlum gate crashers." Sponsors invariably blame "The Yogores" as among the troublemakers; also, without exception, they "never come alone, always in groups of eight or ten or more." An undetermined number (because victims have said they were afraid to report to the police for fear of retaliation) of individuals have been beaten and assaulted by "the San Pedro gang" in these minor outbreaks.

- (b) In Project employment-- In work at Manzanar, Terminal Island young men tend to stick together in gangs; they are usually found in jobs requiring physical labor, very seldom in office jobs. They display an almost characteristic scorn for "white collar workers." Frequently heard by them: "Anyone who works in the administration office is a stooge for the kettch."

--The linoleum laying crew (app. 100 workers), with one or two exceptions, was made up of Terminal Islanders. Many of their number were accused of showing favoritism repeatedly, and of exacting "tribute" in the form of refreshments or money given in advance "for a fancier and cleaner job." Because they were well organized, they displayed an attitude of independence in their work. They carried over their dislike of certain individuals into their work; one block leader, who was singled out, complained of a "terribly messy" job in his office, accused layers of splattering the walls of his barrack.

-- It is generally believed throughout the center that the distribution of lumber and plaster board for barrack insulation has been controlled by Terminal Islanders. The statement is frequently made that the "San Pedro Gang", by intimidation and threats, have made this possible. At this date, Mess Hall 9 is the only one in the center which is completely insulated.

- (c) In their relations with other residents-- There is no doubt that to the majority of Manzanar people, "Terminal Island" has become a label synonymous with "gangism." For instance:

--On block 35, a Terminal Island woman, [redacted] (husband in detention) was accused by neighbors as having threatened her immediate neighbor, a [redacted] who allegedly had complained of "too much noise at night" by the [redacted]. "I'll get the San Pedro gang after you," [redacted] is reported to have said one day. Next day [redacted], suffering from high blood pressure and a stroke, was hospitalized. Threats & intimidation, in the form of loud talk by men visitors, heard through the thin partition by [redacted] daughter, reportedly aggravated the situation. The [redacted] are moving to block 29.

--On block 12, a [redacted] was placed in charge of plaster board distribution. A Terminal Island family on that block was accused of taking more than its share and making closets & shelves. Upon [redacted] protest, he was threatened: "You'd better shut up or we'll get the San Pedro gang to beat you up." He shut up.

--At the Hospital one day, a police patrolman stopped a burly youth who entered without a permit. The youth turned on him: "Listen, guy, lay off or else my Pedro gang will see you later." He was not stopped further.

--At the Children's Village Hallows'en party, the youngsters were playing games. Three somewhat grimy little boys sneaked into the room. When told the party was for invited guests, they told the superintendent: "We're from Terminal Island; we can go anywhere we please!"

--On Block 26, residents last week gathered at their mess hall to see the motion picture, "Tin Pan Alley" which a resident, [redacted] had secured. Over a hundred youths "crashed" the gate, crowding 26 residents out; a commotion resulted, there was a near-fight. The crew in charge of the projector later said: "The d___ San Pedro bunch again!"

--In the schools, particularly high school, teachers have begun to associate their "worst discipline cases" with "Terminal Island". There is a tendency for these students to wish to ridicule and embarrass their teachers, apparently enjoying such discomfiture. They are described as "brazen in back talk, discourteous, making frequent apparently derogatory remarks in Japanese." Teachers point out that "gangism seems to be carried over into the schools." This is particularly true in the open fields and in large crowds.

*Bake
Matsuda*

(2) The "Dunbar Gang"

Center residents are not as familiar with the nature or origin of this "gang" as they are of the Terminal Islanders. Numerically, they have been reported to be composed of between 50 and 85 fellows, in their late teens & early twenties. Their alleged "ringleaders" seem to have come from downtown Los Angeles: Boyle Heights, Little Tokio & the Market district. They have sometimes been referred to here as "the soot suit boys with Filipino haircuts." Not all of them, however, bear this stamp. A larger proportion of boys associated with this "gang" (fairly or not) have landed in the Manzanar jail. (than the Terminal Islanders)

The alleged leaders of this "gang" and a concentration of the so-called membership is said to reside on blocks 26 and 21.

There have been attempts by at least two of their spokesmen to disclaim accusations levelled against the "Dunbar Boys". "We take the blame for everything bad that's done around here when it isn't any member of our group that does them," they have said.

Spokesmen: Generally recognized as leaders of youths labelled as "Dunbar boys" are Tom Watanabe, formerly of Los Angeles, once a worker in the camouflage factory, now a truck driver, a young man in his early twenties who lost his wife and two babies in childbirth at the Manzanar Hospital. Others frequently mentioned are Sakaye Kasunaga, Hideo Kunitomi. One Manzanar character, Bob Matsuda, is more often than not, associated with both the "Yogore" and "Dunbar" gang. He has a local record (police) and a reputation that claims he is a "graduate of Preston Reformatory" and an ex-seaman.

Their local reputation: Blame for petty theft cases here has been generally placed on the "Dunbar gang". Whether this is justified or not is difficult to determine because the "gang" is not a formal organization. Rather, it is described by some residents as a "loose association of hell-raisers." The Administration, through its community services

Citizen Federation last record

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1

THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **LOS ANGELES**

FILE NO. **100-16163**

REPORT MADE AT — LOS ANGELES	DATE WHEN MADE 2/16/43	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 12/1,2/42	REPORT MADE BY [REDACTED] b7c ahb
TITLE MANZANAR CITIZENS' FEDERATION		CHARACTER OF CASE INTERNAL SECURITY - J	

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:

Subject organization inactive due to relocation of principal leaders. No further activity contemplated by Federation.

**ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED**

DATE 6/1/81 BY SP4 QRM/pm

REFERENCE:

Report of Special Agent [REDACTED] Los Angeles, 10/7/42.

DETAILS:

AT MANZANAR RELOCATION CENTER,
OWENS VALLEY, CALIFORNIA

100-16163-37
100-16163-37
100-16163-37
KOSI ARIYOSHI, upon interview, advised that he still retained the title of Chairman of subject organization. He stated, however, that for the past two months, he had been absent from the Relocation Center on furlough doing farm work in Montana. According to ARIYOSHI, shortly after the formation of the Manzanar Citizens' Federation, the War Relocation Authority announced that they were putting into effect a self-government plan known as the Manzanar Self-Government Charter. It appeared at that time that the War

APPROVED AND FORWARDED: *R.B. Hood*
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

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100-16163-37
100-16163-37
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Relocation Authority plan for self-government was similar to that sponsored by the Manzanar Citizens' Federation and for that reason, it was decided to temporarily withhold any activity on the part of the Citizens' Federation in order to avoid any conflict with the War Relocation Authority. In addition to this fact, many of the leaders of the Federation availed themselves of the opportunity of working in the beet and potato fields in Idaho, Montana, and Utah; and for a period of approximately two months, they were absent from the Center doing this farm work.

ARIYOSHI also stated that there appeared to be a general feeling of resentment on the part of the Issei toward the Federation and for that reason no attempts have been made to hold meetings since October, 1942.

ARIYOSHI stated that no further activity was contemplated by the Federation and that it could be considered to have disbanded due to lack of interest. He also pointed out that he, together with CARL KONDO, JAMES ODA, and SHO ONODERA, and CARL YONEDA, had enlisted in the United States Army as interpreters and were leaving the Center on or about December 2, 1942, for Savage, Minnesota to attend the Army Language School at that place.

These men, according to ARIYOSHI, were the leaders of the Federation and by reason of their departure from the Center, the organization could be considered as defunct.

CARL YONEDA, JAMES ODA, and SHO ONODERA were also interviewed by the Reporting Agent. All advised that subject organization had disbanded and no further steps would be taken by the group.

- C L O S E D -

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1

SLC File No. 100-4392

This Case Originated at LOS ANGELES

Report Made at SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH	Date 6-21-43	Period 4-23, 6-15-43	Report Made by [REDACTED]	DB
Title UNKNOWN SUBJECTS (Subversive Activities at Manzanar Relocation Center, California)			Character of Case INTERNAL SECURITY - J	

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:

Outline of events leading up to the Manzanar incident as outlined by JOE KURIHARA set out. KURIHARA admits being brains and instigator of the Manzanar incident and of disturbances prior thereto.

- RUC -

REFERENCE:

Report of Special Agent [REDACTED] dated 12-7-42, at Salt Lake City.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/2/81 BY SP6/BML/SPM

DETAILS:

Additional investigation in this case is predicated [REDACTED] received by Assistant Special Agent in Charge LEO C. FULTY from [REDACTED] Informant stated that he had been advised that certain individuals at the Hoab Isolation Center had been talking rather freely about the Manzanar incident and that they were also talking of the part which they played in this incident.

AT NOAB, UTAH

Mr. F. S. FREDERICK, Internal Security Chief, advised that

Approved & Forwarded <i>Jay C. Newman</i>	SAC	Do Not Write in These Spaces
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2 Phoenix		[Handwritten]
4 Salt Lake City (1 14-26)		EX-36 2043

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Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

Los Angeles, California
December 18, 1942

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/1/81 BY SP4/PLM/SPM

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Re: INTERNAL CONDITIONS AT
MANZANAR RELOCATION CENTER
INTERNAL SECURITY - J
ALIEN ENEMY CONTROL

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to my letter of December 7, 1942 captioned "CON-
DITONS AT MANZANAR WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY PROJECT, MANZANAR, CALIFORNIA",
and my letter of December 8, 1942, captioned as above.

Pursuant to a request of the War Relocation Authority officials at
Manzanar as set forth in reference letter dated December 8, 1942, the ques-
tion of the prosecution of minor offenders against Federal laws was discussed
with United States Attorney LEO V. SILVERSTEIN on December 17, 1942. Mr.
SILVERSTEIN stated that it was impossible to determine what events would oc-
cur at the relocation center in the future and for that reason no policy can
be established at this time as to the prosecution of future offenders. There-
fore the facts in each case must be presented to the United States Attorney
for an independent ruling as to whether prosecution will lie.

The matter of the recent riot at Manzanar and in connection there-
with the possible internment of the alien Japanese leaders as dangerous enemy
aliens was also taken up with Mr. SILVERSTEIN. (Reference is being made to my
letter dated December 7, 1942.) Mr. SILVERSTEIN at this point introduced Mr.
EDWIN J. PLATT, JR., as the representative of EDWARD J. INNES, Director of the
Alien Enemy Control Unit of the Department. The opinion of Mr. PLATT was
asked by the United States Attorney as to the possible issuance of Presiden-
tial warrants for these individuals. Mr. PLATT advised he had been sent to
Los Angeles several days ago by Mr. INNES, the War Relocation Center in Wash-
ington having requested that approximately 100 alien Japanese agitators at
Manzanar be placed in the custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice by the Alien Enemy Control Unit. Mr. PLATT had this morning returned
to Los Angeles after spending the past two days at the Manzanar Relocation

*Mr. Silverstein's letter dated
on Dec 17, 1942, is in a file
1/15/43*



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December 18, 1942

- 2 -

Letter to Director

Re: INTERNAL CONDITIONS AT
MANZANAR RELOCATION CENTER
INTERNAL SECURITY - J
ALIEN ENEMY CONTROL

Center. He said that he had found that the recent disturbance at the camp was not the result of a pro-Axis clash with the pro-American aliens, but was rather a dispute between various factions in the center. The matter is an internal problem to be settled by the War Relocation Authority and the internal security of the United States is not involved. At the present time twenty-four individuals, most of whom are American citizens, are being held at the Inyo County Jail at Independence, California, by the Military Police stationed at the Manzanar Relocation Center.

PLATT pointed out that the investigation conducted by the War Relocation Authority had uncovered nothing to warrant the internment of any of the individuals involved, nor was the War Relocation Authority able to produce the names of 100 Japanese aliens in the camp who could be considered trouble-makers, and therefore the proposal of removing this number from the center has been discarded. The Alien Enemy Control Unit is not contemplating the issuance of a Presidential warrant for the apprehension of any of the aliens involved in the recent disturbance. Mr. PLATT stressed that since the problem was one of internal management by the War Relocation Authority, there was no reason for the Enemy Control Unit, the United States Attorney, or the F.B.I. to take any steps in the matter. He explained that the War Relocation Authority has the authority to segregate the various factions and individuals and that such a plan of segregation is now being worked out.

During the course of his discussion, PLATT pointed out that the Japanese were placed in evacuation centers because it was obvious that many, or most of them, were sympathetic towards Japan. It was brought out that if it were practical to conduct thorough investigations and interviews of all of the Japanese in the various evacuation centers, that possibly the majority would be found to be sympathetic towards Japan, feeling that Japan was justified in the present war, believing that the Japanese emperor is divine, and generally displaying an attitude such as would warrant their internment as dangerous enemy aliens if they were at large. However, since they were evacuated and placed in the camp under supervision for the very reason that they were considered sympathetic towards Japan, it does not appear that Presidential warrants for their arrest should now be issued. PLATT advised that the Military Police are still at the center for the purpose of maintaining peace and order.

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Legionnaire. Facts presented to U.S. Attorney as to possible violation of Public Act 503 for holding Japanese-language meeting and advised no jurisdiction.

- C -

DETAILS:

Investigation in this case is predicated upon telephonic information received from Mr. ROY NASH, Project Director, Manzanar Japanese Relocation Center, Manzanar, California, by Special Agent [REDACTED] on August 10, 1942. Mr. NASH advised Agent [REDACTED] that on the night of August 8, 1942, a meeting was held in Kitchen Number 15 at the Manzanar Relocation Center at the instigation of a certain group of Kibei. This meeting was conducted almost entirely in the Japanese language and was attended by approximately six hundred people. According to Mr. NASH, there were several speakers and many of the speeches were of a subversive nature. He advised that some of the speakers asserted they had been denied their citizenship rights and that they wanted Japan to win the war. According to Mr. NASH, the main offenders at the meeting were JOE KURIHARA, RAYMOND HIRAI and BEN KISHI. Mr. NASH stated that the meeting became quite boisterous and it was necessary for the Administration to step in and stop the meeting. b7c

On August 11, 1942 a letter was received from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] telling of the above mentioned meeting and including a report on all that happened at the meeting, including verbatim statements by the speakers. This report was typewritten by [REDACTED] from memory on the morning following the meeting. Portions of this report will be quoted in the body of this report and it has been initialled by [REDACTED] properly dated and placed in the instant file in the Los Angeles Field Division. b7d

AT MANZANAR, CALIFORNIA

The reporting agent proceeded to the Manzanar Relocation Center at Manzanar, California and on August 12, 1942 interviewed Mr. NED CAMPBELL, Assistant Project Director of the Center, who advised that Mr. NASH had left for San Francisco the night before and would be away from the Center for several days. On behalf of Mr. NASH, Mr. CAMPBELL stated that subject BEN KISHI had spoken to members of the Administration and requested that the Kibei citizens (American-born Japanese who have been educated in Japan) be allowed to conduct a meeting in the Japanese language on the night of August 8, 1942. Mr. CAMPBELL stated that KISHI acted as chairman of the meeting and had stated to him after the meeting that he would take the responsibility for what happened.

Mr. CAMPBELL further advised that the greatest agitator at the meeting was subject JOE KURIHARA, an American citizen of Hawaiian birth, who, unlike KISHI, was an aggressive leader and one of the few Japanese in the Center who would openly tell Administration leaders what he really felt.

CAMPBELL said that KURIHARA served in the United States Army during the last war and was apparently very resentful of the fact that he had been evacuated. Mr. CAMPBELL advised that subject KURIHARA had apparently made speeches on numerous occasions, agitating the Japanese against cooperation with the American Government, and that as a result of such speeches he had called him in and asked him if he were willing to bring criticism upon ten thousand Japanese because of his own activities. Mr. CAMPBELL stated that apparently he was willing to do so as he had not altered his attitude.

Mr. CAMPBELL advised that another of the speakers at the meeting was RAYMOND HIRAI, an alien Japanese, who has on several occasions severely criticised the camp management. He said, however, that HIRAI was apparently very eccentric and that he believed [REDACTED] b7c
CAMPBELL advised that he did not believe that proclamations of the Western Defense Command concerning the conduct of Japanese in the temporary War-time Civil Control Administration centers applied in the permanent War Relocation Authority centers, as the internal government of the permanent centers has been left entirely up to the W.R.A. He said that they had never received any copies of the rules and regulations set out by the Army for such conduct, as had the administration leaders in the temporary centers, and therefore he knew of no such rule forbidding meetings to be held in the Japanese language.

Mr. CAMPBELL later said that subject HIRAI on several occasions has called Mr. NASH a dictator and made several statements concerning him which were untrue. He said that HIRAI boasts that he has spoken to Mr. NASH in such terms to his face, but as a matter of fact, Mr. NASH has never met HIRAI or talked to him and does not know him when he sees him. CAMPBELL said that he could not look on HIRAI as any more than an eccentric person.

Mr. CAMPBELL called in Mr. HENRY BROWN, who is in charge of the engineering and construction work at the Center and for whom subject KURIHARA had once worked. Mr. BROWN stated that KURIHARA used to be supervisor of the carpenter crew at the Center and as such was a very good worker and a leader. He said, however, that a request had been made on the part of the Administration that he must move from his home in Block 28, inasmuch as it was desired to use that block, located near the Center Hospital, as a place of residence for certain persons desiring special diets, particularly those suffering with diabetes. KURIHARA refused to move until Mr. BROWN personally made the request. In order to save face he did, in fact, move but quit his job with the carpenter crew. Mr. BROWN stated that he hated to lose him as he had always been very cooperative up until that incident.

At the suggestion of Mr. CAMPBELL, the reporting agent interviewed Mr. ROBERT L. BROWN, Assistant in Charge of Project Reports, and Public Relations officer of the Center. Mr. CAMPBELL thought that BROWN was better acquainted with the instant situation and with the feelings of the Japanese in general in the Center. BROWN stated that he believed the Kibei meeting of August 8th had grown out of the recent organization of the Manzanar Citizens Federation, an organization initiated by former leaders of the Japanese-American Citizens League, although this organization was to be separate from the national

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Note: The foregoing is merely a preliminary report. The Historians believe such activities as the 'Blood Brothers' to be symptoms of ills besetting all relocation centers as the result of failure to make a just and necessary separation of evacuees based on attitudes and loyalties in the war."

[REDACTED] after discussing the bulletins and posters mentioned in the above-quoted bulletin, stated that statements had been repeatedly made that the lives of the Caucasian administrators of the Center and of the pro-American Japanese would be greatly endangered if a beachhead were established by the Japanese Army any place on the Pacific Coast. According to the plan, if the Japanese Army succeeded in establishing a beachhead, the administrators and the pro-American Japanese would immediately be killed and the occupants of the Center would immediately proceed to the vicinity of the Japanese Army and attempt to join their forces. At this time [REDACTED] stated that there might be twenty to twenty-five really dangerous men in the camp. He states that they are, however, unidentified with the exception of the following four men: JOE KURILKA, HARRY UYENO, BEN HISHI and SALS SATEISHI.

[REDACTED]

After the trouble experienced in attempting to set up a form of self-government at the Manzanar Relocation Center, the question of furlough of evacuees arose. The question was whether or not the evacuees should obtain outside employment and thereby obtain for themselves a greater amount of money, and as to whether or not their treatment outside the Center would warrant their leaving the Center. Subversive elements again advanced the argument that it would be against the policy of the Ruler of Japan to have any of the evacuees leave the Center and go out and work, as in so doing they would be working to assist the war effort. The argument was again advanced that they were in a prison camp and that they should do nothing to assist the United States but merely resist passively. The following bulletin obtained from [REDACTED] will undoubtedly explain the situation better than [REDACTED] own words; this bulletin is being returned to [REDACTED]

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"EFFECT OF FURLOUGH ON EVACUEE ATTITUDES TOWARD
Permanent 'Outside' Relocation

At this writing, nearly two-thirds of Lanzaar's 1000 furlough workers have returned to the Center.

The amount of money they earned, the experiences they encountered, the labor they performed, the opportunities they discovered, the discrimination and race prejudice they faced, the friends they made--all these individually and collectively--have combined to influence, to one way of thinking or another, evacuee attitudes toward (1) permanent outside relocation and (2) post-war planning.

It is too early to state whether the sum total of furlough experiences has exercised a favorable or adverse effect upon evacuee relocation on a permanent scale. More important factors, such as the immediate job or opportunity on hand, would exercise greater influence. But to the extent that these recent experiences are related and repeated throughout the Center, their effect on evacuee attitudes can be gauged.

TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS:

- (1) Approximately 15 per cent of those who have returned from Idaho and Montana say they are 'fed up' with race prejudice, discrimination. They are 'thoroughly disillusioned', for various reasons.
- (2) About 10 per cent 'wouldn't go out again under any circumstances,' actively advise others that 'a Japanese can't get equal treatment.'
- (3) Roughly half or 50% of those already returned want to 'go out again', talk in terms of 'next spring's harvest', say they 'made some money.'
- (4) Furlough workers who feel that 'there isn't much choice between staying in Lanzaar and getting \$16 a month without breaking your back and going out on furlough to run into discrimination' generally prefer to 'go out if there's a chance to get back on our feet.'
- (5) The majority feel that 'the general American public isn't ready to receive an Oriental U.S. citizen' without some display of racial prejudice or discrimination, that wartime relocation is only for those fluent in the English language.

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FURLOUGH

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(6) Only a very small percentage, possibly 2 or 3%, returned with enthusiastic reports about 'outside relocation'; generally, every furlough worker could relate examples of a 'hostile world' on the outside, more than the 'fine friends we made' or 'the swell treatment we got' although these latter were very numerous.

It should be noted, in this connection, however, that the more likely applicants for permanent relocation who went out on furlough are generally among those who have not yet returned, probably have intentions of remaining outside as long as possible.

The range of experiences of furlough workers is wide enough to furnish both proponents and opponents of permanent relocation with further evidence to support their respective stands:

Against relocation: 'They guarded us like cattle on the trains; we couldn't even get off at the stations. They refused us admittance to the movies; we couldn't get a meal at the cafe. They had a sign: "No Japs." We had to spend a night in jail, there was no other place to go; the farmer tried to gyp us, broke our contract. The W.R.A. man, instead of representing us, stuck up for the farmer. Everywhere we went, we felt unfriendly eyes on us. American citizens? Ruh!'

For relocation: 'Where we went, the people were very good to us. The children had evidently been told about our coming. When they saw us on the street, they would wave their arms and say "Hello." It certainly made us feel good. We made money, mostly on potatoes. We dressed up to go into town and weren't discriminated against at all. I went to shows, ate steaks in cafes. Of course, we avoided saloons and beer parlors and places like that. There were many Mormons where we went, and their influence seems to have helped a lot. Of course, the curfew on us was in effect. I'd rather be on the outside.'

One current development in Manzanar, attributed by some to furlough reports, is revival of a resettlement plan by a number of evacuees on farm land available in Colorado. It is interesting to note that the guiding light in this program is not a citizen, but an alien, reportedly equipped with the required capital.

S u m m a r y: Furlough has had these favorable effects:

- (1) Evacuee incomes have been boosted, returning workers have brought back knick-knacks and goods; generally these have been morale lifters.

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- (2) Friendly contacts with farmers have increased likelihood of permanent relocations, encouraged others to think in terms of relocation.
- (3) Unexpected, pleasant experiences have balanced the picture of race prejudice, hostility, difficulty on the outside that is held almost unanimously by Manzanar residents.
- (4) The fact that 1000 workers have been able to go out--this fact alone--has done much to lift the oppressive weight of the widespread feeling at the outset of the Manzanar project that 'this is like a federal penitentiary.'

Fur lough also has had these unfavorable effects:

- (1) Bitter experiences of the 15% have added to disillusionment, have strengthened the feeling typified by those who say 'this is a race war; talk of democracy is for propaganda; just look at what happens to you if your color is the wrong one.'

Recently the Military Intelligence Service has been recruiting men among the Nisei groups for service as translators and interpreters in the Southern Pacific theater of war. As a result of this activity by MID all persons contacted have received threats. About 30 applicants were ready to enlist in the MID, and as a result of the threats only 16 are apparently ready to enlist.

[REDACTED] advises that while he has not seen a "black list" he definitely understands that such a list is in existence. All members of the Center who have volunteered for duty in the Military Intelligence Service, those who have been outspokenly in favor of cooperation with the American authorities, members of the Japanese American Citizens' League who have advocated cooperation with the American authorities, and others who are thought to be loyal to the United States are on this black list.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was questioned as to whether or not there might be any fund in existence for the protection of those who might be involved in riots or disturbances at Manzanar. He stated that he could not say as to that. He related that he had heard such a fund was in existence at Poston but that to his knowledge no such fund was in existence at Manzanar.

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In talking generally, the following summary may be written concerning the situation, according to [REDACTED]

First, the pro-Japanese sentiment, instead of decreasing as American successes continue, has tended to increase. The Japanese people are convinced of the invincibility of the Japanese Army and Navy and refuse to believe that the United States is successful. There is considerable dissension in the camps because of the food conditions and because of low wages. An example was given in regard to the Caucasian doctor at Manzanar. It was stated that this doctor was a young intern and that he received a salary of \$3200 a year. On the other hand, a Japanese doctor, who prior to his relocation had a practice amounting to from \$15,000 to \$25,000 per year, now receives \$18.00 per month and is required to do most of the work at the camp. Again, the comparison is made between the \$16.00 a month wage of the laborers in the camouflage netting industry and the \$.75 per hour wage of the civilian laborers. Further, it may be stated that the radical element of the camps seems to favor a program of peaceful resistance until such time as an offensive action against the Pacific Coast is started by the Japanese Army.

[REDACTED] made the statement that whatever the undercover organization is which is attempting to punish those who are not in accord with the policies of the more radical element, it is certainly well organized; and he thinks that the organization is not confined within the camp but is organized with communication between the various camps.

b1

The following pattern of persecution and threats was presented by [REDACTED]

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1. Those persons who attempt to aid in the war effort or who attempt to aid the Government are threatened and, in the instance of Poston, beaten. The policy of the radical element is to do everything to embarrass the Government.
2. Don't join Government Intelligence units because by so doing the wrath of the "Son of Heaven" and of the Japanese Army will descend upon you and upon all Japanese when the Japanese Army invades.

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- 3. What right does the Japanese American Citizens' League have to ask for Selective Service, improve Camp conditions and make other improvements when such action jeopardizes the well being of all Japanese when Japan takes over.

At the conclusion of the interview [REDACTED] stated that the four persons whose names are set out above as being dangerous individuals - that is, JOE KURIBARA, HARRY UYENO, BEN KISHI and SAM TATEISHI, should in his opinion be immediately removed from the camp. He stated that these individuals have made the statement that since they are American citizens they are immune from any activity by the Government such as internment. He continued that he did not think that they should be removed from the camp and allowed to go free, since such activity would immediately make them heroes in the camp.

b7D

Inasmuch as there are no further leads to be covered in the Salt Lake City Field Division, this case is being

REFERRED UPON COMPLETION TO OFFICE OF ORIGIN

~~SECRET~~

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

Los Angeles, 13, California

September 4, 1943

Director, FBI

Dear Sir:

RE: RALPH PALMER MERRITT;
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated August 24, 1943, to the Los Angeles Field Division, entitled KENDO AND JUDO CLUBS, KANZANAR RELOCATION CENTER, KANZANAR, CALIFORNIA, requesting information regarding the background of the above-captioned individual.

The Bureau's attention is invited to the report of Special Agent [redacted] dated August 25, 1943, at Washington, D.C., entitled as above, which report sets forth the results of the inquiry made at Washington, D.C. regarding MERRITT. Additional information regarding MERRITT is set forth in a memorandum dated August 26, 1943, which was prepared by the Los Angeles Field Division. Two copies of this memorandum are forwarded herewith.

The Los Angeles Field Division is conducting no further investigation regarding MERRITT unless instructions to the contrary are received from the Bureau.

Very truly yours,

R. B. HOOD
SAC

Encl. (2)

[redacted] b7c
62-2453
cc 100-19299

100-111-362-8
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SEP 13 1943
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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DATE 6/2/81 BY SP4JRM/ajm

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~~FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SEP 13 1943~~

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4



Center Tule Name Hirai, Roy Hiroshi Sex M Age 27 Family No. 17058-A
(last name) (given name)

ADMISSION ADVICE

For August 6, 1943 194
month day

Other Names or Id. Numbers _____
(Check applicable squares.)

Citizen ; Alien . If Alien, Certificate of Identification No. _____

Source:
1. Birth. Mother _____ Father _____
(last name) (given name) (last name) (given name)

- 2. Transfer from other R.C.
- 3. Temporary Detention | Release
- 4. Internment Camp | by _____
- 5. Institution | Parole
- 6. Group leave
- 7. Short-term leave
- 8. Indefinite leave
- 9. Other _____

Previous Address Dayton, Washington

Previous Employer or Sponsor Blue Mountain Cannery

Frank R. Dent
Reporting Officer

WRA-177

Bureau Budget No. 13-2029-43
Approval Expires 7-31-44

6-4122-2029-44-09

*cc Joe, Don, Sam
Lewin
Wynlow 9/9/43*

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Center Manz. Name [REDACTED] (lost name) (given name) Sex M Age 21 Family No. 93

ADMISSION ADVICE For May 17 1943
month day

Other Names or Id. Numbers Manz. Ident. # 350-D

(Check applicable square.)

Citizen : Alien . If Alien, Certificate of Identification No. _____

Source:

- 1. Birth. Mother _____ (last name) (given name) Father _____ (last name) (given name)
- 2. Transfer from other R.C.
- 3. Temporary Detention
- 4. Internment Camp by _____ Release
- 5. Institution by _____ Parole
- 6. Group leave
- 7. Short-term leave
- 8. Indefinite leave
- 9. Other _____

Remarks: Address prior to evacuation: _____

b7c

Previous Address Havre, Montana

Previous Employer or Sponsor Gt. Northern Railway

Reporting Officer _____

WRA-177

Bureau Budget No. 19-2029-43

Approval Expires 7-31-44

6-4129-2011-1-1

cc - Sue [unclear]
Burt 8/25/43
Warp: [unclear]

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V. [unclear]

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20471

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

CC-287

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. E. A. Tamm	✓
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
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Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
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Tele. Room	
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Miss Beahm	
Miss Gandy	

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

June 18, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

RE: MANZANAR RELOCATION CAMP
Manzanar, California

Reference is made to your request for the facts relative to the testimony before the Dies Committee hearings in Los Angeles, California, attributed to one Alfred A. Cohen by the Los Angeles newspapers. It is noted that Cohen allegedly stated that the War Relocation Authorities, in connection with a riot held in the Manzanar Relocation Camp on the anniversary of the bombing of Pearl Harbor, actually shipped to an abandoned C.C.C. camp the Japanese who attempted to quell the riot, rather than the Japanese who instigated and participated in it.

According to the Bureau files, one Fred Yamaya, a resident of the Manzanar Camp, was set upon and beaten by five or six masked men at approximately 9 p.m. on December 5, 1942. Yamaya had been outspokenly anti-Axis and had headed the Anti-Axis Committee of the Japanese-American Citizens League in Los Angeles prior to the war. He was beaten about the head, but was not seriously injured. One Harry Uyemo (Kibei) was immediately arrested by the Internal Police of the Camp as a suspect and was taken to the Inyo county jail, at Independence, California. The Camp authorities, on the following day, also sought one Joseph Y. Kurihara for questioning in connection with this assault. It should be noted that Kurihara is the same individual who dominated a meeting held in August of 1942 at the Manzanar Camp, at which time considerable agitation took place. Kurihara freely stated that he was bitter toward the United States and one hundred per cent loyal to Japan. He boasted that he would continue interfering with anything that aided the United States until he was apprehended by the FBI or the Army. His attitude was apparently brought about because of the fact that he served in the United States Army during the last War and therefore did not think that he deserved to be evacuated.

On December 6, 1942, the Manzanar authorities found Kurihara presiding at a meeting attended by a crowd of several hundred people. Thereafter, he acted as spokesman for a committee of five Japanese representing a mob of about a thousand to two thousand evacuees, which had gathered at the Camp headquarters, demanding the release of Uyemo. Besides Kurihara, this committee consisted of Genji Yamaguchi, Shigetoshi Tateishi, Soikichi Hashimoto, and Tadao Nakagawa. Mr. Ralph Merritt, the Camp Director, told the mob that if they would disperse he would bring Uyemo back, and it was purportedly so agreed. It is reported, however, that Kurihara merely spoke to the mob in Japanese, telling them that they had won a victory and should disperse and reassemble at 6 p.m., at which time they would force Merritt to release Uyemo from the Camp jail.

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b7c

Manzanar

bx



51 AUG 2

7 JUN 17 1974

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
Uyemo was thereupon returned to the Camp jail from the Inyo county jail. At the appointed time, a crowd gathered around the jail and proceeded to attempt to break in and release Uyemo. It decided to compel Mr. Merritt to grant this release. The Military Police finally had to be called in to restore order, and, after having made unsuccessful attempts to disperse the mob with tear gas, fired on the mob, killing one person and wounding ten.

At about the same time the crowd gathered around the Police headquarters on December 6, 1942, it was learned that another meeting was in progress at one of the mess halls in the Camp, and that the individuals participating in this meeting had decided to go to the hospital and get Fred Tayama and kill him. They proceeded to the hospital in search of Tayama, but were unable to find him as he was hiding under a bed. They thereupon joined the crowd around the Police headquarters. Shortly thereafter, Tayama was taken to the Military Police barracks for safety.

As of December 9, 1942, the following Japanese were in military custody in jail at Lone Pine, California, as a result of the disturbances. All of the Japanese held in military custody had been implicated in the riot.

NameDate and Place of Birth

✓ Ted Kichiji Akahoshi
 ✓ Sokichi Harry Hashimoto
 ✓ Raymond Hiroshi Hirai
 ✓ Tomatsu Kono (Kibei)
 ✓ Joseph Y. Kurihara
 ✓ Tokuji Kurosumi
 ✓ Tom Yadao Takagawa
 ✓ Kozo Fred Ogura
 ✓ Kazuo Suzukawa
 ✓ Shigetoshi Tateishi (Kibei)
 ✓ Harry Y. Uyemo
 ✓ Ernest Kinzo Takayama (Kibei)
 ✓ Genji George Yamaguchi
 ✓ Keiji Arataka



Unknown

b7c

After December 6, 1942, none of the work projects in the Manzanar Camp were operated. Misdemeanors in the Camp had previously been handled by a judicial committee consisting of four Japanese and three Caucasians. This committee, however, did not function after December 6, 1942. In view of the situation which existed at Manzanar during the period of these riots, the Camp was placed under complete military control during the riots, and this control continued for a period of days thereafter until peace had been restored.

While being interviewed by Inspector Gurnea on January 18, 1943, in connection with Mr. Gurnea's survey of all relocation centers, Mr. Ralph Merritt, Director of the Manzanar Camp, stated that the situation at Manzanar at that time was still most unsettled, with the atmosphere being very tense, and that any incident was liable to stir up the residents to a point where another riot or disturbance might occur. In connection with the riot of December 6, 1942, Mr.

Merritt stated that twenty-six people believed to be trouble makers were arrested, ten of whom were later released and returned to Manzanar, while the remaining sixteen were sent to a temporary camp established by the War Relocation Authority at Moab, Utah. It is thought that this is the abandoned C.C.C. camp mentioned by Allred Cohen in his testimony.

The names of all sixteen Japanese individuals sent to Moab, Utah, do not appear in the Bureau files. It should be noted, however, that on March 15, 1943, the following four Japanese aliens were apprehended by Agents of the Salt Lake City Office at Moab, upon authority of Presidential Warrants previously issued by the Alien Enemy Control Unit of the Department:

Sokichi Harry Washimoto
Raymond Hiroshi Hirai
Genji George Yamaguchi
Billy Genji Tanabe

Their apprehension was based upon their implication in the disturbances at Manzanar, which have been outlined above. They were immediately turned over to the Immigration and Naturalization Service to be held pending internment, this internment having been ordered by the Attorney General on March 5, 1943.

Respectfully,

What has happened
to them?
H.

D. M. Ladd

What has happened to
Uyeno + Kurihara?
also where is Toyama
now?
H.

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

JKM:EK

August 24, 1943

Mr. Dillon S. Myer
Director
War Relocation Authority
822 Barr Building
910 17th Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/2/81 BY SP2/ML/epm

Dear Mr. Myer:

During the course of an investigation conducted by this Bureau at the Manzanar Relocation Center, difficulty has again been encountered because of lack of cooperation on the part of the Project Director, Mr. Ralph Merritt.

The particular investigation involved concerned Kendo and Judo activities, and Mr. Merritt stated that if it were a "routine investigation," he did not desire to cooperate.

I would like to point out to you that the investigations conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation involving matters having to do with the internal security of the country and the war effort are of an urgent nature and not what he appears to mean by the phraseology "routine." Nevertheless, there is always a lot of controversy in connection with investigations of this type at War Relocation Centers, and if this attitude is to continue, we will of necessity refrain from entering these establishments; and if called upon by any committee to explain, it will, of course, be incumbent upon me to advise of the lack of cooperation and the hostility

Mr. Tolson toward FBI investigations which have been evidenced by representatives of the War Relocation Authority.

- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Mumford _____
- Mr. Piper _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

RECORDED & INDEXED

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

AUG 26 1943

8/24/43
P.A.
P.L.

SECTION
MAILED
★ AUG 26 1943 ★
F. M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

11 AUG 30 1943

20464

Manganar Relocation

Director

- 3 -


October 19, 1942

RE: MANZANAR RELOCATION AREA
WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
MANZANAR, CALIFORNIA

He did ask if these persons stayed away whether this Bureau would conduct investigation to locate them and he was advised that notification of their disappearance should be made to the office of the Provost Marshal. I will appreciate being advised whether the Bureau, as a routine matter, would authorize the institution of investigation to locate persons who may disappear from these camps, or whether this is something which should be handled entirely by the military authorities or possibly be handled by the Bureau on the request of the military authorities.

A Special Agent has just returned from a visit to Mansanar, and a separate report is being forwarded to the Bureau with reference to present conditions at this camp.

Yours truly,



R. B. HOOD
Special Agent in Charge

RBH:hk

20118

7/23/45
1
May 22, 1945

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Julius A. Goldwater
The Buddhist Brotherhood in America
532 Bonhill Rd., Brentwood Heights
West Los Angeles, California

Dear Mr. Goldwaters

Regarding letter of April 24, 1945, written in
behalf of Mr. Yoshiro Kaku, now a resident of Leupp
Relocation Center.

Sincerely yours,

D.S. Myer
Director

Lechliter:ls
5/19/45

(Files sent to Confidential Files)

FILE COPY

59.055 (Kaku, Yoshiro)

12286

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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9
16
20

Form No. 1

THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA**

SU FILE NO. **100-4917**

REPORT MADE AT Salt Lake City, Utah	DATE WHEN MADE 7/19/46	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 7/16/46	REPORT MADE BY [REDACTED] b7c MEM
---	----------------------------------	---	--

TITLE RAYMOND HIROSHI HIRAI, was: Toyo Hirai, Raymond Ray	CHARACTER OF CASE ALIEN ENEMY CONTROL - J
---	---

31
R-1

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:

Attorney General under date of 4/16/46 issued order releasing Subject. Disposition sheet submitted.

- RUC -

Reference:



Bureau File 100-140363.
Bureau letter to Salt Lake City, July 9, 1946. b7c
Report of Special Agent [REDACTED]
Salt Lake City, Utah, May 27, 1943.

Details:

Reference Bureau letter reflected that the Attorney General under date of April 16, 1946 had issued an order directing that Subject be released from interment.

A disposition sheet is being submitted to the Bureau as an enclosure.

ENCLOSURE: TO THE BUREAU
Disposition sheet

**ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 6/3/81 BY [Signature]

REFERRED UPON COMPLETION TO OFFICE OF ORIGIN

APPROVED AND FORWARDED

[Signature]
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES

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- 2 - Salt Lake City

100-140363-126

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F B I
JUL 29 1946

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[Handwritten initials and signatures]

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100-140363

SAC, Salt Lake City

John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

July 9, 1946

RAYMOND HIROSHI HIRAI
ALIEN ENEMY CONTROL - J
Your file: 100-4917

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 6/3/81 BY *spj/gm/pan*

Reference is made to my letter dated March 30, 1943, in which you were advised that on March 5, 1943, The Attorney General ordered the internment of Raymond Hiroshi Hirai.
For your information, I have received from the Attorney General a copy of another order dated April 16, 1946, directing that Raymond Hiroshi Hirai be released.

63 JUL 19 1946 *b7c*

RECORDED

SE 31 100-140363-125
F B I
EX 25 53 JUL 10 1946 *b7c*

gmc

Mr. Thomas M. Cooley, II
Director, Alien Enemy Control Unit

March 20, 1946

John Edgar Hoover, - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

① [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b7c

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DATE 6/3/81 BY SP8 RML/PM

Alien Enemy Control - J

Reference is made to your memorandum dated January 8, 1946, and my memorandum dated January 18, 1946, which did not include the above captioned persons.

A review of the Bureau files reflects no derogatory information concerning the above seven subjects which has not already been furnished to you and, therefore, in accordance with my previous memorandum, I defer to your judgment in this matter.

COMMUNICATIONS DATE - 3/20/46
[REDACTED] *b7c*

RECORDED

100-140363-124

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

JUL 3 1946

DEPT. OF JUSTICE

36
57 JUL 16 1946

20538

In the Matter of

RAYMOND HIROSHI HIRAI
Alien Enemy

D. J. File No.
146-15-2-12-4231

ORDER

The above-named alien enemy having been interned by order, dated March 5, 1943, & ; and it appearing from a reconsideration of all June 21, 1944 the evidence bearing upon this matter that said alien enemy should be released; NOW, THEREFORE,

IT IS ORDERED that said order, dated March 5, 1943, & be, and June 21, 1944 the same hereby ~~is~~ vacated and set aside; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that said alien enemy be released.

Tom C. ...

ATTORNEY GENERAL

APP 16 1946

Dated, _____

52
11 11 1946
26
52 July 1st 1946
11-9-46

100-140363

20537

5th

Mr. Tolson ✓
 Mr. E. A. Tamm ✓
 Mr. Clegg ✓
 Mr. Glavin ✓
 Mr. Ladd ✓
 Mr. Nichols ✓
 Mr. Rosen ✓
 Mr. Tracy ✓
 Mr. Carson ✓
 Mr. Coffey ✓
 Mr. Hendon ✓
 Mr. Kramer ✓
 Mr. McGuire ✓
 Mr. Harbo ✓
 Mr. Quinn Tamm ✓
 Tele. Room ✓
 Mr. Nease ✓
 Miss Beahm ✓
 Miss Gandy ✓

Federal Bureau of Investigation
 United States Department of Justice
 Washington, D. C.



June 21, 1943

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 1/2/81 BY sp4/CM/rom

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

FBI SURVEY OF JAPANESE RELOCATION CENTERS

HARRY Y. TENO
 1085 TASMAN DR. #175
 SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

b7c

For your information, there is set out below a summary of the details relative to certain difficulties experienced by Inspector Gurnea at the time he was making a survey of the Manzanar Relocation Center, Manzanar, California. It should be noted that while making his survey of all relocation centers operated by the War Relocation Authority, Inspector Gurnea apparently received full cooperation from all of the personnel contacted with the exception of Mr. Ralph B. Merritt, Project Director of the Manzanar Camp.

On Tuesday, January 19, 1943, Mr. Merritt was interviewed by Inspector Gurnea. At the beginning of this interview Merritt was asked to what extent the Manzanar Relocation Center was self-supporting. He thereupon wished to be told what the FBI was driving at. He asked whether this was an investigation of the Project Director, and stated that he did not understand the Bureau's position. It was pointed out to Mr. Merritt that the survey was being conducted at the expressed request of Mr. Dillon Meyer, Director of the War Relocation Authority. Merritt was advised that the only interest the FBI had in the matter was to lend assistance to the War Relocation Authority, and that the Bureau had in no way requested permission to conduct an investigation of any War Relocation Center.

Mr. Merritt then stated that Agents of the Bureau have, from time to time, interviewed informants at Manzanar, which informants have later been beaten up because of their association with the Bureau. Merritt also pointed out that although there have been known trouble makers at Manzanar, the FBI has refused to remove them because they are citizens of the United States. With respect to this, Mr. Merritt was advised that the Bureau had neither the legal right or the authority to remove any individuals, whether citizens or otherwise, on its own volition. It was explained to him that citizens could not be removed unless there was a violation or an alleged violation and unless the United States Attorney had been consulted and expressed the opinion that prosecution could be had, whereupon the citizen would be taken into custody with due process of law. With respect to alien evacuees, it was explained that the only manner in which the Bureau could remove them would be to present the individual cases to the United States Attorney, following which a warrant could be issued and the individual removed to be taken before a hearing board, who would determine whether he should be interned or returned to a relocation center. Whether the person was a citizen or an alien, the Bureau could, of course, in no way be responsible for the ultimate disposition of his case. It appeared to Mr. Gurnea that



53 JUL

E. J. Hoover
W. J. Clegg
W. G. Clegg

20447

3. Japanese who called to see Nash were ordered outside. "He must think we are a bunch of Indians or Negroes the way he bosses us around with contempt" were their opinions.
4. He has maneuvered to place the camp's Police Department under the Administration. This Police Department is the only department in which the masses had complete confidence. This move tends to suppress abuses of the whites toward the Japanese as it was in the case of immoral practices of [redacted] with [redacted] and alleged to be also with [redacted] and others. Politicians in Police Department in camps will take away the last vestige of protection. The Police Department should be free and independent. The Police Department has been stern but humane, considerate, and just.
5. Every man in camp now fears the mail being censored.
6. Nash is using the "yes-men" block leaders as his stooges and completely controls the "Free Press" through Public Relations Department.
7. Lemons and sugar used freely by the administration offices for lemonade once in the forenoon and once each afternoon out of camp ration, and often sugar is ladled only 1 teaspoonful to a person. This is ordered by Nash. The boy who put up a kick is now transferred to another job. Brush cutters and hard laborers heard about it, and they 'hollered' also cooks 'hollered' because Nash's selfish demands interfered with cooking schedule.
7. Nash has "hired" [redacted] ex-butler to [redacted], for his private home and asked [redacted] to be his maid but was refused, she said she is [redacted]
8. Dearth shortage in medical personnel. A white doctor was to come to be head of Medical Department, but Nash and [redacted] and his wife [redacted] motored to Independence for "dinner" and sent wire stating no white help needed as the Medical Department is O.K., etc. Whereas, no department needs reform more than Medical, but "No decent doctors will work under [redacted]" is the charge. Thus hundreds of mothers feel badly about hospital's incompetency with shortage in help with many children with measles now are left with vomit on their clothes and lack of attention.
9. Nash first spoke here about a month ago and "promised" freedom of walks to the hills and to have sentries removed, etc., and that he "understood" minority problems because he was head of Negroes and Indians, but after one month nothing is kept. Rather, he has become dictatorial, undemocratic, and intimidating as exemplified in that fake, bluff speech about San Francisco's being attacked, etc.

I know that Japanese will cooperate 100%, but it will not be under Roy Nash's tactics because he is a Little Caesar, vain and intimidating. We need a man who is inspiring and democratic and one who knows how to work with us

ALL
b7c

and not one who lies, bluffs, and intimidates like Hitler.

I may soon be kicked out of here because police are now under Nash and he may find out that I am writing to you, but I can fight from outside for justice also!

10. News is that Eisenhower is out. Belief and rumor are that all the Heads from Washington down to various camp directors are Jews! There seems to be lots of resentment on that score because they feel that they are prejudiced and they want unquestionable white Americans of stern but humane views in charge of camps, not a cheap politician who swells up like a toad when he gets to lord over us in distress! I am confident of 100% cooperation when many of these grievances are remedied. Thus with all departments in camp in confusion, lack of confidence in leader, Nash, with questionable immoral practices by Nash's [redacted] in collusion with the most despised Jap girl in camp, [redacted] in collusion with the administration, holding down the job of Chief Personnel Department for Japanese, refusing jobs to competent applicants and favoring friends and cliques; no wonder there's a very bad morale here now. I know you will check into these and remedy them. Nash should go! Come over if you can. We trust you both and we will show you these conditions and will tell you the truth.

This breaking down of morale and confusion due to bad management by Roy Nash, this camp Director, and his tactless stooges must be remedied. I am confident that whole-hearted cooperation by the citizens and residents of Manzanar is possible by restoring to them confidence in their leader. Roy Nash is not the man for this camp.

b7c

Mr. Merritt had previously been of the opinion that the Bureau could act as it saw fit in any cases where trouble makers were involved.

With reference to the so-called beatings of the Bureau's informants, Mr. Merritt requested to know how the FBI was going to handle interviews at the Manzanar Center in the future. It was pointed out to him that apparently due to the conditions at the center those individual evacuees who desired to cooperate with the Government, including the War Relocation Authority and other agencies, were placing themselves in a dangerous position. It was further pointed out that a premium was apparently being placed on disloyalty and noncooperation since it was the consensus of opinion among the evacuees that those who did not cooperate might live in security. Mr. Merritt was told that it was the duty of the United States Government toward the evacuees to assure that any individual who wished to exhibit his loyalty to the United States could do so without fear of physical violence from the disloyal element, and if this protection was not given to loyal Japanese, the Government was failing in its obligation.

In connection with the allegation that informants have been beaten as a result of their contacts with Bureau Agents, Inspector Gurnea secured a list of violations, beatings and threats which had taken place in the camp. This list, which was complete only up to December 6, 1942, was comprised of a total of twenty-five cases, and of the victims in these case only one, Fred Tayama, could be considered as an individual who had give information to this Bureau on conditions existing at Manzanar. Furthermore, it would appear that Tayama's background made him the object of physical violence rather than his cooperative attitude with this Bureau. He was formerly Chairman of the Southern District Council of the Japanese-American Citizens League and was one of the founders of the anti-Axis Committee which was formed to aid the agencies of the United States Government in protection against subversive activities among the Japanese. He has been very outspoken with respect to his loyalty to the United States.

Mr. Merritt then stated that if a Congressional Investigative Committee were to come into the Manzanar Center and ask him the cause of the riot of December 6, 1942, he felt that he would have to say that the FBI was responsible. He stated that as a result of this riot it had been necessary to remove informants of this Bureau from the center. In this connection, a list was secured of all individuals removed from the Manzanar Center as a result of the riot, and of the sixty-six persons who were moved, only two could be considered as having given information of value to the Bureau. These are Fred Tayama, who has been referred to above, and Togo Tanaka. Tanaka, like Tayama, had been prominently associated with the Japanese-American Citizens League, and had been employed as a documentary historian for the War Relocation Authority. He, likewise, has been very outspoken as to his loyalty to the United States.

At this point, Mr. Merritt was told that whether his allegations as to the informants of the Bureau being the cause of disturbances were true or not, it is, nevertheless, the duty of the United States Government to protect any Japanese who desired to cooperate. Mr. Merritt replied that the matter of protection depended upon the method in which that duty was carried out and stated

that he did not wish any FBI Agent to interview any individual at the Center henceforth. He stated that if interviews were necessary, he would arrange to have the desired persons transported to Lone Pine, California, or to a ranch he owned some twenty miles north of Manzanar. It was pointed out to him that this would not be a practical solution since it was not possible to foretell the names of individuals who would be interviewed during the course of an investigation. It was again stressed that whether informants were to be interviewed or not, and how they were to be interviewed, and whether having been interviewed they were beaten because of that fact, were secondary factors, and that the primary problem was the protection of those Japanese who were making efforts to be loyal. It was pointed out that protection must be furnished, if not by the War Relocation Authority then by the United States Army.

In view of his insistence that the beatings at the Center were the result of individuals having served as informants or having been interviewed by Agents of this Bureau, Mr. Merritt was requested to name those individuals whom he considered in this category. He was unable to name any except Fred Tayama, although he subsequently submitted a list of seven individuals. All of these persons are known to the Bureau as having been active in Japanese politics and very outspoken in their loyalty to the United States.


With reference to the organization of the internal security unit in the camp, Mr. Merritt stated that he had found it necessary to "build up a Police Department at Manzanar in order to protect himself from the FBI." In explanation of this statement, Merritt said the Bureau had been using informants in the Center, thereby causing dissension. He said that the FBI had been sending checks to informants at the Center, and said that he had been told by the Post Office Department that Fred Tayama, victim of the beating of December 6, 1942, had received a Government check through the mail in an envelope bearing the return address of the FBI. It was thereupon demanded that he produce the mail clerk that gave him this information in order that the statement could be proven false. He said that he did not know the name of the Post Office employee furnishing this information because he, Merritt, had received it indirectly in a communication from the War Relocation Authority in Washington. It should be noted that no individual at the Manzanar Relocation Center has received checks through the mail from this Bureau, and it was pointed out to Mr. Merritt that in the first place the Bureau does not have a checking account as such, since all funds handled through this Bureau by check are issued by the Treasury Department. Of further interest, it is known that the Wartime Civil Control Administration did send checks to some evacuees in Relocation Centers for services which had been performed prior to their arrival in the Centers. Mr. Merritt then asked the pointed question of whether or not this Bureau had any paid informants at Manzanar. He was advised that the Bureau had no such informants.

The interview as summarized above became quite heated on several occasions, and at one point Mr. Merritt was told that if he was going to be uncooperative and "cagey" the entire affair was a waste of time and it would probably be better if the survey of Manzanar were terminated at that point. He requested specific information as to what recommendations were going to be made as a result of the survey

20449

and was advised that these recommendations would be made to the War Relocation Authority in Washington, D. C. and not to individual Project Directors. Mr. Merritt eventually decided, however, to cooperate in the survey and ultimately furnished a complete picture of the administrative setup at Manzanar and gave all information requested of him.

Respectfully,


D. M. Ladd

Did we bring all of
above officially to
myers' attention?
L.

Statement of Mr. Ned Campbell:

1. What evidence was there for the arrestin' of Ueno?

Ueno was first picked up on suspicion, as Fred Tayama stated that he recognized him in the masked group that attacked him.. From my personal knowledge I knew Ueno to actually hate Fred Tayama and that he had opposed Fred on many moves.

As far as the actual arrest, that followed a careful check of Ueno's alibi and our finding that he was positively lying as to his whereabouts. We intended to make a further check of his alibi on Sunday morning.

2. Did you have any evidence of the development of unrest?

Yes, we had seen many instances of it and several of our advisers (Japanese) had constantly warned us of the ever increasing tension. However, it is my opinion that the events that led to the final blow-up followed in rapid sequence and I do not believe that we fully realized the rapidity with which they were moving a day or two prior to the trouble.

It is my belief that the sudden removal of 2 men by the FBI on Thursday may have been the cause of the beating of Tayama, as I know he was interviewed by the FBI shortly before they removed the 2 men.

The arresting of Ueno was probably only a part of the whole thing.

3. What was the temper of the committee when it called upon Mr. Merritt?

I have never seen people displaying the fanatical zeal that shown on these fellows' faces and in their eyes. There was determination and sufficient irrationalization so that I am convinced almost anything could have happened.

4. Was the outbreak in anyway connected with ^{WRA} WRA policies?

Undoubtedly, our inability in the past to remove and segregate certain cankers of unrest, gangsterism, disloyalty, etc. is a prime contributing factor to the whole difficulty at Manzanar. Such equivocation and procrastination has no place in a relocation center dealing with a complex diversity of Japanese peoples.

Undoubtedly the manner in which the new Camouflage proposal was introduced to the people and the plans surrounding it only added fuel to a smoldering fire that we knew existed.

Our failure to get out clothing allowances concurrently with other camps did nothing to alleviate the situation.

5. Was it because of dissatisfaction with the Administration?

Without doubt there was considerable dissatisfaction and doubt as to the honesty of myself and other members of the Administration due to a report.

made to Acting Project Director Mitchell on sugar, which was turned over
as written to a Japanese group, who were showing every evidence of causing
difficulty in arrest. A similar opinion arose out of this and at the
present time it is my feeling that the feeling is intense.

6. Could the second mob have formed if Ueno had been left in jail?

In all probability not, but I am convinced had not Mr. Merritt agreed to this
one point there could have been bloodshed of probably greater proportions
than occurred with the dispersing of the second mob.

7. Could the mob have been talked out of its temper by any Caucasian?

Definitely not.

8. Was there at any time a question of the safety of the lives of the Caucasian
personnel?

I have felt very definitely that there were and still exist certain fanatical
elements who because of the shooting have developed a hatred of all Caucasians,
that might be expressed against any one of several Caucasians.

9. How much physical damage was done to property?

2 automobiles were damaged by the afternoon mob in their line of march, both
maliciously.

3 Government automobiles were damaged by the evening mob, 2 seriously.

The police station building had one corner knocked off.

We know of an attempt to burn a building which was frustrated by the presence
of Mr. Hon.

There were minor damages, such as tearing some fire extinguishers, breaking
windows, etc.

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR M. E. GURNEA

-19-

March 30, 1943

RE: SURVEY, WAR RELOCATION CENTERS,
MANZANAR, CALIFORNIA

IMAI was the investigator assigned by Chief SCHMIDT to ascertain the writer of these letters, and in connection with this investigation, the letters were discussed with IMAI by Agents of this office on November 9, 1942.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. HOOD
Special Agent in Charge

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UYENO, Harry (Continued - 7)

57 $\frac{1}{2}$ cent is being spent for food here. This was released by somebody in the camp. Army claim .45 is maximum for this camp.

6. Suggested that they want exact price of delivery. Storekeeper to check on invoice.
7. In October they were 610 $\frac{1}{2}$ short on sugar, by November mess division did nothing about it. At Thanksgiving each mess were given 20 $\frac{1}{2}$ extra.
8. They are going to see that all sugar is accounted for.
9. In July claims they were 175 $\frac{1}{2}$ short on sugar, but he did not check on it.
10. Ueno told chefs that if anything was short to make complain and try to get it.
11. They plan to get 5 representative from block leader and 4 from work corp to investigate on food and sugar. (this was favored by committee).
12. Campbell and Kimball asked for extra sugar after Nov. 5. That was after mess complaint. They claim that unless they ask, they don't get nothing.
13. Ueno claim that all tenderloin is taken out from beef.
14. Cooks asked the mess division to get them knives, but they were told that they were scarce and on priority. But when the Chef paid for it they get it right away. They are going to check direct through Quarter Master and see if the Mess Division did put in a request for knives.
15. Administrative mess is getting more food than other mess. They have no invoice for delivery of food.
16. Ueno suggested that administrative mess buy own food.
17. Ueno claims at Poston 8 in each mess gets \$19. and rest gets \$16.
18. Ueno asked for about 150 sacks of special rice and the office told him that they were to get 70 odd

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

DL:L:KLW
Call: 11:10 AM

August 13, 1943

CC-287

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Mumford _____
- Mr. Piper _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Beahm _____
- Miss Gandy _____

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. E. A. TAMM

RE: MANZANAR RELOCATION CENTER

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

SAC R. B. Hood, Los Angeles, called with reference to the above-entitled matter. He advised that he has an agent and translator at this camp at the present time conducting some inquiries into Shintoism and Judaism in accordance with Bureau instructions.

Mr. Ralph T. Merritt, who is the head of the camp, called the Los Angeles Office yesterday and in Mr. Hood's absence, talked to one of the supervisors.

Mr. Merritt said that at the present time he is trying to segregate the loyal from the disloyal at his camp by interviews, questionnaires, etc. and he complained because the FBI's investigation was interfering with his work, i.e. upset the people, etc. Mr. Merritt was asked how long it would take for him to complete this segregation and he replied November.

Mr. Merritt asserted that he thought the FBI should call him before proceeding to his camp; that he should be apprised of what we are investigating and how we intend to do it. The supervisor replied that we could give him a general idea of our investigation but not the details nor the procedure; that it is not the Bureau's custom to notify people before we instigate an investigation.

Mr. Merritt said he didn't know whether or not he would cooperate with us. However, after the agent indicated the matter would be taken up with Washington, Merritt backed down and cooled off.

Mr. Hood stated he could see no reason why we should call Merritt to make arrangements, etc. I told him not to do it then.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/2/81 BY SP4 gml/npr



RECORDED
Respectfully,
INDEXED
D. M. Ladd.

100-140363-81
AUG 17 1943

58 AUG 29 1943

20456

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1

This Case Originated at LOS ANGELES

SIC File No. 100-4392

Report Made at	Date	Period	Report Made by
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH	6-21-43	4-23, 6-15-43	[REDACTED] DB b7c

Title	Character of Case
UNKNOWN SUBJECTS (Subversive Activities at Manzanar Relocation Center, California)	INTERNAL SECURITY - J

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:

Outline of events leading up to the Manzanar incident as outlined by JOE KURIHARA set out. KURIHARA admits being brains and instigator of the Manzanar incident and of disturbances prior thereto.

- RUC -

REFERENCE: Report of Special Agent [REDACTED] dated 12-7-42, at Salt Lake City. b7c

**ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED**

DATE 6/2/81 BY SP6 PML/SPM

DETAILS:

Additional investigation in this case is predicated [REDACTED] received by Assistant Special Agent in Charge LEO C. MULLY from [REDACTED] Informant stated that he had been advised that certain individuals at the Moab Isolation Center had been talking rather freely about the Manzanar incident and that they were also talking of the part which they played in this incident. b7D

AT MOAB, UTAH

Mr. F. S. FREDERICK, Internal Security Chief, advised that

Approved & Forwarded	SAC	Do Not Write in These Spaces
<i>Jay C. Newman</i>		157-1408-31-72
Copies of This Report		RECORDED
5 Bureau	CIF	INDEXED
5 Los Angeles		7178
2 Phoenix		5 JUN 28 1943
4 Salt Lake City (1 14-26)		EX-36 2043
50 JUL 19 1943		

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① ② oh 30, 1943

RE: SURVEY, WAR RELOCATION CENTERS
MANZANAR, CALIFORNIA

also an American Legionnaire, who has taken an opposite attitude to that of KURIHARA." On such occasions, according to Mr. TEMPLE, SLOCUM speaks for the benefits of American citizenship, and KURIHARA claims that there are no benefits for those of Japanese ancestry. On page 25 of the above report, there is set forth an argument had between SLOCUM and KURIHARA on July 28, 1942, at the first open meeting of the Manzanar Citizens Federation, and in this, SLOCUM stated that he was doing what he could towards expediting the military emergency.

On August 10, 1942, this office received a copy of a letter written to the W. R. A. by JOE BLAKEY and JAMES ODA, requesting that action be taken against leaders of the Kibei Group at Manzanar as a result of this August 8th meeting. The letter asks segregation of the loyal Japanese, and suggests "that the proper authority guarantee full protection at all times to those pro-American leaders, such as TOKIE SLOCUM and KARL YONEDA, whose security has been endangered by terroristic pro-Japan elements". The letter also says that at the meeting of August 8th, the pro-American speakers were surrounded by a riotous mob and given unbearable insults and threats of bodily injury.

In July, 1942, there was formed at the Manzanar Relocation Center, an organization known as the Manzanar Citizens Federation, the members of which were pro-American Japanese-American citizens. There was considerable opposition to this group from the pro-Japanese element in the Center, and several arguments were had between these factions at the meetings of the Federation. This is fully set forth in the report of Special Agent [REDACTED] dated October 7, 1942, at Los Angeles, entitled, "MANZANAR CITIZENS' FEDERATION, INTERNAL SECURITY J". In the above report, it is stated that SLOCUM several times in public meetings, proclaimed his loyalty to the United States. In a letter dated August 7, 1942, written by SLOCUM to this office, in which he tells of the second meeting of the Manzanar Citizens Federation, SLOCUM states that he and JOE KURIHARA got in a public argument, SLOCUM upholding the United States. SLOCUM at that time called himself "the recognized absolutely pro-American". SLOCUM at that time was threatened by the pro-Japan element, and as a result, required protection from the Manzanar Police Department. b7c

In a letter to this office dated August 23, 1942, SLOCUM states, "Threats, intimidations and violence of harm to body and limbs still persists for those who are pro-American. ARIYOSHI, who is considered cool-headed, warned me that I may be next on the beating list".

A letter from SLOCUM dated August 25, 1942, states, "Another man came to my house to warn me to keep my mouth shut if I did not want to get mobbed; I was not there; anyway, I am here pitching, just as ever".

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up until the time that that paper went out of business in May, 1942. During the last six months of its existence, TANAKA dictated the policies of that newspaper, and it was noted that it became strongly pro-American. TANAKA himself observed that this attitude met with disapproval from some of the alien pro-Japanese members of the community, and he pointed out that the circulation of the newspaper dropped considerably as a result.

[REDACTED]

After the outbreak of war, TANAKA was also an active member of the Anti-Axis Committee of the Japanese-American Citizens League, the publicly stated purpose of which was to assist the United States Government in the successful prosecution of the war.

[REDACTED]

After his evacuation to Manzanar, he held the position of Documentary Historian for the Manzanar Relocation Center, and in such position, submitted reports to the W. R. A. concerning events which transpired at the Manzanar Center. After his arrival at Manzanar, TANAKA continued to proclaim his loyalty to the United States.

In a letter dated July 15, 1942, from TOKIE SLOCUM, it is stated;

"Here at this camp there is a struggle for power between Japanese American Citizens League leaders under FRED TAYAMA, TOGO TANAKA, JOE MASAOKA, TAD UYENO and KIYOSHI HIGASHI against Chairman of the Block leaders AKAHASHI. . . to see which side is to rule the camp."

A memorandum in the file dated August 5, 1942, sets forth that NED CAMPBELL, Assistant Project Director of the Manzanar Relocation Center, in an interview with Special Agent [REDACTED] of this office, mentioned TOKIE SLOCUM, FRED TAYAMA, and TOGO TANAKA. CAMPBELL said that he felt that these individuals were "flag wavers" and their loyalty was questionable because of their pro-American ideas and statements.

TANAKA was one of the founders of the Manzanar Citizens Federation, which has been mentioned above, the original meeting at which the organization was founded having been held at TANAKA's home July 20, 1942. The report of Special Agent [REDACTED] dated October 7, 1942, at Los Angeles, entitled "MANZANAR CITIZENS' FEDERATION - INTERNAL SECURITY J", set forth complete

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information regarding the Manzanar Citizens Federation. It will be noted therein that this organization received considerable opposition from the pro-Japan element at the Relocation Center, and further, that the individuals associated with the Federation were looked upon with suspicion and distrust by the pro-Japan group in the Center.

In the report of Special Agent [REDACTED] dated November 16, 1942, at Los Angeles, entitled "JOSEPH Y. KURIHARA; HARRY YOSHIO UYENO, SEDITION", beginning on page 2 thereof, there is set forth a report of an argument had between TANAKA, KURIHARA and UYENO, in which TANAKA upheld the United States, and in which KURIHARA and UYENO vehemently opposed TANAKA's position. It will be recalled that KURIHARA and UYENO were allegedly the instigators of the riot of December 6, 1942, at Manzanar. b7c

TANAKA was one of the fifteen members of the Manzanar Commission on Self-Government, who, during November, 1942, received letters signed "BLOOD BROTHERS ASSOCIATION", criticizing the Commission for their pro-American actions and accusing them of persecuting the Japanese in the United States.

The files of the Manzanar Free Press reflect numerous references to TANAKA. It will be recalled that this publication is distributed to all residents of the Center. The issue of July 24, 1942, contains an article regarding the first meeting of the Manzanar Citizens Federation, and lists TANAKA as being one of those in attendance, and further, that one of the purposes of the organization was participation in the United States war effort. The Free Press issue of July 27, 1942, states that TANAKA was appointed Co-Chairman of the Manzanar Cooperative Enterprise. In the same issue was an article stating that TANAKA gave a speech entitled, "Preparing Evacuees for Post-War Conditions" at a meeting of the Manzanar Citizens Federation. In the issue of August 10, 1942, it is stated that TOGO TANAKA was one of those selected by the Manzanar Citizens Federation to organize a Citizens Council. The September 2, 1942, issue of the Free Press contains an article which set forth that TANAKA was named a member of the Manzanar Educational Committee. The September 14, 1942, issue states that TOGO TANAKA was one of seventeen members of a Commission named by the Project Director of Manzanar to plan a permanent self-government program. It will be noted that the charter which was drawn up by this Commission was strenuously opposed by the pro-Japan element at the Manzanar Center, and resulted in the rejection of the charter by the residents.

TANAKA was interviewed at Manzanar by Agents of this office on July 14th, August 12th, October 13th, November 10th, and December 1st.

TANAKA was removed from the Center on December 6, 1942, at the time of the riot, for his own protection, by the Center officials.

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TOGO TANAKA'S MOTHER AND FATHER

The files of the Los Angeles Office reflect no information concerning the parents of TOGO TANAKA. It is not believed that these individuals were ever interviewed by agents of this office.

FRED TAYAMA

FRED TAYAMA, a Nisei, was for several years prior to the outbreak of war, one of the leaders of the Japanese American citizens in the Los Angeles area. He was formerly President of the Los Angeles Chapter of the Japanese-American Citizens League, and at the time of the outbreak of war, was Chairman of the Southern District Council of that organization. Largely through his efforts, the Anti-Axis Committee of the Japanese-American Citizens League was formed, for the purpose, as previously stated, of assisting the United States Government in the successful prosecution of the war. Prior to the outbreak of war, TAYAMA was closely associated with the leaders of the Japanese Associations in Los Angeles, and for that reason, was looked upon with suspicion. After the beginning of war, however, he publicly proclaimed his loyalty to the United States, and on numerous occasions, publicly stated that he was loyal to the United States and was assisting the United States Government. As previously stated, the activities of the Anti-Axis Committee were deeply resented by the pro-Japan element in the Los Angeles area.

In a letter dated July 19, 1942, written by [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] a copy of which letter was furnished the Los Angeles Office by Bureau letter dated August 5, 1942, [REDACTED] stated; b7c

"The J. A. C. L. (Japanese American Citizens League) was severely criticized by many Issei because we did not put up a fight for our citizenship rights and civil liberties".

This undoubtedly refers to the actions of FRED TAYAMA immediately prior to the evacuation, when he, as Chairman of the Southern District Council of the Japanese American Citizens League, urged all Japanese to fully cooperate with the evacuation orders of General DeWITT. It was well known among the Japanese that TAYAMA cooperated with the various United States Governmental agencies.

In a letter received by this office on May 5, 1942, from TOKIE SLOCUM shortly after TAYAMA's evacuation to Manzanar, the following is stated;

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"Under the morale here in the camp, some things seem to have ruffled the fateful complacency of the younger element seems to be that; Special privilege was granted to GEORGE INAGAKI and FRED TAYAMA, two of the most rabidly pro Japan J. A. C. L. leaders, to be given passes by the Almighty TOM CLARK at the behest, it appears, of Lt. Commander KENNETH RINGLE of the United States Naval Intelligence, through Provost Marshal SEVERANCE of Pasadena and RUSSELL HOWLAND of Whitcomb Hotel, San Francisco, to them to use this Manzanar camp as a stop over place to sleep then proceed on . . . FRED TAYAMA is to be permitted to leave by Col. SEVERANCE through request of RINGLE, I heard, to get out of the camp any time to aid in resettlement soon. I know that Lt. Commander RINGLE was showered with a big pile of gifts, his office boy told me so and I since have heard so . . . it may be the way to get the passes out. Boys here are saying 'To hell with bribes!'".

The above is being quoted merely to show that there was apparently strong feeling against TAYAMA at Manzanar in May, 1942.

In a letter dated July 15, 1942, from the same source, it was stated that there was a struggle for power between the J. A. C. L. leaders under FRED TAYAMA, and the Chairman of the Block leaders, to see which side should rule the camp.

In a letter received July 8, 1942, from KENNETH HORTON, then Chief of the Manzanar Interior Police force, information is furnished relating to an argument between FRED TAYAMA and TED ICHIJI AKAHOSHI and FRED OGURA over TAYAMA's alleged Americanism.

A memorandum in the Los Angeles files dated August 5, 1942, sets forth that NED CAMPBELL, Assistant Project Director at Manzanar, in an interview with Special Agent [REDACTED] of this office, mentioned FRED TAYAMA as being a "flag waver" and stated that TAYAMA's loyalty was questionable because of his pro-American ideals and statements. b7c

TAYAMA was one of the founders of the Manzanar Citizens Federation, which organization has been previously discussed herein.

In a letter dated [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] regarding the riot at Manzanar on December 6, 1942, the following was set forth; b7c
b7D

"This trouble at Manzanar started due to NED CAMPBELL's

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(Assistant Project Director) lack of administrative ability. His favorites are all disliked by both the pro and Anti-Axis. Immediate cause was FRED TAYAMA's having passed a resolution at Salt Lake City Japanese American Citizens League to draft all Kibei and Nisei alike in all camps. This made both the loyal and disloyal mad at FRED for speaking for them without consent when he himself is of military age but not enlisted as yet. Boys and girls claim he was doing only typical FRED TAYAMA trick of publicity and Americanism".

The Los Angeles files further show a copy of a letter received by the local Office of Naval Intelligence from the same source, which sets forth, in addition to the above, that the residents of Manzanar were accusing FRED TAYAMA of having exploited the Japanese with his leadership in the J. A. C. L. when the war came, and also the fact that FRED TAYAMA's brother, HARRY TAMAYA, distributed food in the Center, and his brother TOM TAYAMA, ran Kitchen No. 24 where it was alleged, choice food was being served. ^{MARKY}

In the report of Special Agent [REDACTED] dated September 13, 1942, at Los Angeles, in the case entitled, "JOSEPH Y. KURIHARA, et al. INTERNAL SECURITY J, SEDITION, PUBLIC LAW 503", which has been previously referred to, and in which is reported the occurrences at a meeting of the Kibei at Manzanar on August 8, 1942, it is stated, on page 25, that during the course of a verbal battle between TOKIE SLOCUM and JOSEPH Y. KURIHARA concerning the Manzanar Citizens Federation, KURIHARA is supposed to have stated publicly that he did not want FRED TAYAMA to be Chairman of the Manzanar Citizens Federation because he, TAYAMA, had exploited the Japanese. b7c

Several articles regarding TAYAMA appear in the Manzanar Free Press, the issue of July 24, 1942, stating that TAYAMA was one of those in attendance at the first meeting of the Manzanar Citizens Federation, one of the purposes of which was participation by the Nisei in the American war effort. The November 14, 1942, issue of the Free Press carried an article stating that FRED TAYAMA was then planning to leave for the ten-day Japanese American Citizens League National Convention to be held in Salt Lake City. TAYAMA was to be one of the three representatives from Manzanar to attend this Convention.

The December 5, 1942, issue of the Free Press carried an article that FRED TAYAMA, one of the Center delegates to the National J. A. C. L. Convention in Salt Lake City, has returned to Manzanar.

It will be noted that at the Convention held in Salt Lake City, a resolution was passed, urging the United States to induct Japanese-American.

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Citizens into the United States Army. This action was resented by the pro-Japan element in the Centers.

TAYAMA was interviewed by Agents of this office on July 14th, August 13th, October 12th, November 10th, and November 30th, 1942.

It will be recalled that TAYAMA was beaten by unknown assailants on December 5, 1942, and that this beating precipitated the riot which occurred on the following day, December 6th.

KARL YONEDA

[REDACTED]

In March, 1942, he was evacuated to the Manzanar Relocation Center.

In November, 1942, he enlisted in the United States Army, and on December 3, 1942, left Manzanar to attend the Military Intelligence Japanese Language School at Camp Savage, Minnesota.

Since the time of his arrival at the Manzanar Center, YONEDA has consistently opposed the pro-Japan element at that place.

The files of this office contain a copy of a letter dated July 17, 1942, written by YONEDA to E. R. FRYER, Regional Director of the W. R. A., with copies to ROY WASH, Project Director at Manzanar, and DILLON S. MYER at Washington, D. C., which letter urges that only Nisei be allowed to hold office in the Center Government, and further, recommends segregation of the loyals and the disloyals in the Centers, together with an Americanization program.

In a letter dated July 10, 1942, received by this office from

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TOKIE SLOCUM, it is stated;

"At today's Block leaders meeting in Manzanar, a heated discussion took place as to whether Japanese or English language should be spoken. . . The only man who spoke in defense of our language and America was KARL YONEDA".

The July 14th issue of the PEOPLE'S WORLD, Communist publication, states;

"KARL G. YONEDA, waterfront worker taken from a \$45 a week job loading ships against the Axis, to be put at a \$3 a week job in a Japanese internment camp, where he continues his education and agitation against the Axis".

YONEDA was one of the founders of the Manzanar Citizens Federation, which has been previously discussed herein.

YONEDA was one of the speakers at a Kibei meeting of August 8, 1942, referred to in the report of Special Agent [redacted] dated at Los Angeles, California, September 13, 1942, entitled, "JOSEPH Y. KURIHARA, et al., INTERNAL SECURITY J, SEDITION, PUBLIC LAW 503". At this meeting, YONEDA spoke, advocating Japanese participation in the United States war effort. During the speech, he was thoroughly heckled and criticised. b7c

After this meeting, YONEDA, at a meeting of the Manzanar Block leaders, publicly accused one S. TATEISHI, another block leader, of having made statements against the W. R. A. administration. As a result of these accusations, a group of individuals came to YONEDA's residence and threatened YONEDA on August 23, 1942.

On August 25, 1942, YONEDA wrote a memorandum to ROY NASH, who was at that time Project Director of the Manzanar Relocation Center. Inasmuch as it is believed that this incident is the alleged beating of YONEDA referred to by Director MERRITT, YONEDA's account of the incident is being here set forth for the purpose of showing that the assault did not occur by reason of YONEDA's association with Bureau Agents. The memorandum reads;

"On Aug. 23rd, at 9 PM, 14 Kibei headed by S. Tateishi, former Block leader 23 and Ben Kishi, Chairman of the kibei meeting of Aug. 8th, came to my house and demanded that I retract my statement which was made at the Block Leaders Council meeting Aug. 14th . . . and some of them

MANZANANS

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

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Feshimoto, Sokichi (continued)

<u>Feshimoto, Otokichi</u>	Brother	Age: 39	Answer: Yes
Hisa	Wife	Age: 30	Answer: Yes
Raymond, Maoru	Son	Age: 4	Underage
Alice Emi	Daughter	Age: 3	Underage

Address: 18-11-3
I.D.No.: 3717
Health: Good
Job: Otokichi works at Kitchen 17
Plans: To remain in Manzanar.

<u>Tobori, Sazo</u>	Brother of Sokichi	Age: 50	Answer: Yes
Kane	Wife	Age: 44	Answer: Yes

Address: 33-12-2
I.D.No.: 1897
Health: Good
Job: Both are working at the kitchen.
Plans: Remain in Manzanar.

<u>Haku, Yoshiro</u>	Returned to Manzanar July 9, 1945		
Haku, Yutaro	Father	Age: 64	Answer: Yes
Yaku, Masu	Mother	Age: 59	Answer: Yes
Haku, Noburo	Brother	Age: 19	Answer: No
Haku, Satsuki	Sister	Age: 24	Answer: Yes

Address: 6-7-1
I.D.No.: 1150
Health: Family good. Yoshiro: Epilepsy
Job: Father is foreman of Maintenance; brother works for Recreation Department. Yoshiro was unemployed. Formerly, he was a block leader.
Plans: Remain in Manzanar.

Kishi, Toshikazu Ben

<u>Kishi, Kotomi</u>	Wife	Age: 23	Answer: No. Applied for change July 19, 1943
----------------------	------	---------	--

<u>Kishi, Chizuko</u>	Daughter	Age: 5 months	
-----------------------	----------	---------------	--

Address: 3-8-2
I.D.No.: 1461
Health: Difficult childbirth, March 24, 43. Condition good; discharged from the clinic June 9, 1943.
Job: Unemployed. Dependent on Clothing Allowance and Grants-in-Aid from the Community Welfare Department.
Plans: To join husband as soon as her Yes answer has been accepted and he is where they can join him.

12408

FAMILIES OF LEU DE DEUFF

Ego, Frank
Ego, JIM HARUO Brother Age: 20 Answer: Repatriation

Address: 35-1-5
I.D.No.: 968A
Health: Good
Job: Fire Department
Plans: To go to Tule Lake, and to return to Japan.

Endo, (Hitodami) Eisato
Endo, Toyono Mother Age: 48 Answer: Yes

Address: 12-13-2
I.D.No.: 1705B
Health: High blood pressure. Out-patient care.
Job: Unemployed. Dependent upon Clothing Allowance and Grants-In-Aid from the Community Welfare Division.
Plans: To remain in Manzanar.

Fukuchi, Frank
Fukuchi, Hanenosuke Father Age: 66 Answer: Yes
Fukuchi, Takeno Mother Age: 64 Answer: Yes
Fukuchi, Susumu Brother Age: 14 Underage

Address: 8-8-1
I.D.No.: 2934A
Health: Good
Job: Father employed at Kitchen 8.
Plans: To remain in Manzanar.

Fukuchi, Aiko Furugai Divorced wife Age: 20 Answer: Yes
Fukuchi, Hiroshi Hayward Son Age: 19 mo.

Address: 33-6-5
I.D.No.: 3 C
Health: Good
Job: Employed at Fitchen 29.
Plans: Received a divorce from Frank recently.
Desires to relocate with her nineteen months old son.

Hashimoto, Sokichi
Hashimoto, Genzo Brother Age: 41 Answer: Yes

Address: 19-4-4
I.D.No.: 2024B
Health: Good
Job: Garbage Crew
Plans: To remain in Manzanar. Believes he is too old to relocate.

Satow, Ichiro Roy
Satow (Seto), Kazuyuki Father Age: 52 Answer: Repatriation

Address: 12-14-3
I.D.No.: 3678
Health: Good
Job: Employed at Kitchen 12.
Plans: To return to Japan.

Suzukawa, Hazuo Returned to Manzanar and transferred to Gila River
Relocation Center with family, March 13, 1943.

Suzukawa, Reiko Wife Age: 28
Suzukawa, Michiko Daughter Age: 8
Suzukawa, Norio Son Age: 2

Tanaka, Masaaki
Tanaka, Fumiko Wife Age: 27 Answer: No
Tanaka, Akemi Daughter Age: 21 months old

Address: 19-13-2
I.D.No.: 3866
Health: Good
Job: Employed at Kitchen 19.
Plans: Desires to join husband although they have been
separated since they came to Manzanar. He does
not wish her to join him.
Memo has been sent to Mrs. Lucy Adams concerning
Mrs. Tanaka's desire for change of answer from
No to Yes. She did not make an application for
change on July 19, 1943, because she said that
she was told by a Caucasian at the Administration
Building that she should wait for word from
Mr. Merritt. Word was not sent.

Tateishi, Shizetoshi He is to be transferred from Topaz to
Manzanar on, or about, the 15th of September.

Tateishi, Yuriko Wife Age: 29 Answer: No. Applied
for change.
Tateishi, Toshio Son Age: 8 Underage
Tateishi, Bobby Masao Son Age: 6 Underage
Tateishi, Norio Wm. Son Age: 5 Underage
Tateishi, Johnny Yoshio Son Age: 3 Underage

Tateishi, Tokusaburo Father Age: 65 Answer: Yes

Address: 23-11-2
I.D.No.: 3927 - Father's 3928
Health: Good
Job: Unemployed. Father works on Rubbish Crew.
Plans: Husband is returning to Manzanar.

Tsuji, Koichi Bill

Tsuji, Toshiko	Wife	Age: 27	Answer: No
Tsuji, Larry Ryoichi	Son	Age: 8	Underage
Tsuji, Vivian Sanae	Daughter	Age: 6	Underage
Tsuji, Shigeo	Son	Age: 4 months	Underage

Address: 22-14-5
 I.D.No.: 1812
 Health: Good
 Job: Unemployed. Dependent on Clothing Allowance and Grants-in-Aid from the Community Welfare Department.
 Plans: Desires to join husband but answered No and has not applied for change of answer.

Ueno, Harry Yoshivo

Ueno, Yaso	Wife	Age: 39	Answer: Yes
Ueno, Yoichi	Son	Age: 12	Underage
Ueno, Ryo	Son	Age: 11	Underage
Ueno, Hiroshi	Son	Age: 7	Underage

Address: 22-3-4
 I.D.No.: 1821
 Health: Good
 Job: Employed at Fitchen 22
 Plans: To join her husband as soon as it is possible to do so.

Yamaguchi, Genji George

Yamaguchi, Chiyeko	Wife	Age: 28	Answer: No. Applied for change July 19, 1943
Yamaguchi, Takeshi	Son	Age: 5	
Yamaguchi, Makoto	Son	Age: 2½	
Yamaguchi, Sumiye Joyce	Daughter	Age: 4 months	

Address: 13-1-2
 I.D.No.: 3166
 Health: Good
 Job: Unemployed. Dependent on Clothing Allowance and Grants-in-Aid from the Community Welfare Department.
 Plans: To join husband as soon as possible. Answered No on loyalty question and has applied for change of answer.

Yokome, Yukio Roy

Ogura, Mrs. Kishino	Wife	Age: 46	Answer: Yes
---------------------	------	---------	-------------

Address: 25-2-1
 I.D.No.: 1766
 Health: Good
 Job: Unemployed. Roy Yokome's brother has been supporting Mrs. Ogura since Roy was transferred.
 Plans: Now waiting for transfer to Gila Project.

1
FAMILIES OF LEI IN ISUPP

Ego, Frank
Ego, Jim Haruo Brother Age: 20 Answer: Restriction

Address: 35-1-5
I.D.No.: 968A
Health: Good
Job: Fire Department
Plans: To go to Tule Lake, and to return to Japan.

Endo, (Mitodani) Hisato
Endo, Toyono Mother Age: 48 Answer: Yes

Address: 12-15-2
I.D.No.: 1705B
Health: High blood pressure. Out-patient care.
Job: Unemployed. Dependent upon Clothing Allowance and Grants-In-Aid from the Community Welfare Division.
Plans: To remain in Manzanar.

Fukuchi, Frank
Fukuchi, Hanenosuke Father Age: 65 Answer: Yes
Fukuchi, Takeno Mother Age: 64 Answer: Yes
Fukuchi, Susumu Brother Age: 14 Underage

Address: 8-8-1
I.D.No.: 2834A
Health: Good
Job: Father employed at Kitchen 8.
Plans: To remain in Manzanar.

Fukuchi, Aiko Furagai Divorced wife Age: 20 Answer: Yes
Fukuchi, Hiroshi Hayward Son Age: 19 mo.

Address: 33-6-5
I.D.No.: 3 C
Health: Good
Job: Employed at Fitchen 29.
Plans: Received a divorce from Frank recently.
Desires to relocate with her nineteen months old son.

Hashimoto, Sokichi
Hashimoto, Genzo Brother Age: 41 Answer: Yes

Address: 19-4-4
I.D.No.: 2024B
Health: Good
Job: Garbage Crew
Plans: To remain in Manzanar. Believes he is too old to relocate.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Manzanar, California

May 11, 1943

In reply, please refer to:

Prof. Att'y.

Inspection

Classified to SECRET
By W.C. 5-21-46
Security Officer W.C.

CASE HISTORY

Mr. Dillon S. Myer, National Director
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
17th and Eye Streets
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

In your letter of March 26, 1943, you requested further evidence for the Board of Review in regard to the ten persons sent to Mosb on February 23rd. In response to your request, we have made a more complete investigation of these cases, and I am transmitting herewith a copy of a memorandum to the Project Attorney from the Chief of Internal Security dated May 6th reporting on interviews with the staff members with regard to the ten evacuees in question and also a copy of the employment record of these evacuees. These documents are marked "Exhibit A" and "B" respectively.

You will notice from "Exhibit A" in particular that the staff members in general were not well acquainted with the evacuees in question, so that as far as the staff is concerned, most of these persons can not be considered trouble-makers; however, as indicated to you in my previous letter on the subject, we have information from reliable evacuee sources indicating that these persons were, prior to their apprehension, the focal point of unrest and disturbance at Manzanar.

The first day of actual registration at Manzanar was Friday, February 12th. There was considerable tension and excitement in the Center at the time. On or about February 15th, an open letter to Mr. Merritt was placed on the Block Bulletin Boards stating that the evacuation was unjust and there was no reason why any evacuees should volunteer for service in the Army. February 16th marked the final day for registration except for the Army interviews which continued for two or three weeks. By February 17th, it was quite apparent that the unrest in the Center was increasing.



Mr. Dillon S. Myer

page 2

May 11, 1943

There was a definite agitation against the Negotiating Committee of Four, which, since the riot, had constituted the de facto evacuee government of Manzanar. Mr. Ray Best knows four of the sixteen Manzanar evacuees, then at Moab; namely, Koichi Teuji, Harry Ueno, Frank Ego, and Bob Matsuda, wrote a letter to the Negotiating Committee dated February 14th accusing the Committee of double-dealing and of having betrayed "the people of Manzanar" - meaning the element which was sympathetic to the riot. Mr. Best has stated that these four evacuees compelled those of the remaining twelve who wrote Japanese to make copies of this letter which were transmitted to key people at Manzanar. A copy of this letter is attached as "Exhibit C." Some evidence of the sort of activity that was under way at Manzanar is found in a translation of a letter from Osamu Tanaka, 32-7-1, Manzanar, to his brother, Masaki Tanaka at Moab, postmarked February 17th, which includes the following:

"The letters came from you folks to several blocks are now being shown to the residents. Everyone will know before long. Yesterday Okamura of Block 33 was showing the letter to Sato. Tonight we will have a meeting in Higashi, Saika, Teranori's room in order to discuss the subject. Everyone will know about the Peace Committee before long. Be patient and take good care of yourselves till then. Maki comes here sometimes; don't worry."

A copy of the translation of this letter is attached as "Exhibit D."

On or about February 17th, reports were coming not only from members of the Peace Committee and the Negotiating Committee, but from individual evacuees - all to the effect that trouble was brewing at Manzanar and that we might very well have another riot unless preventive measures were taken.

I accordingly asked Bob Throckmorton and Bob Brown to investigate the situation and see if there was sufficient evidence to justify the transfer of known trouble-makers to Moab. These men worked out a list of eleven suspects by the following procedure:

June 18, 1943

ISOLATION CASE

Mr. Ray R. Best
Director, Leupp Center
War Relocation Authority
Winslow, Arizona

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

Dear Mr. Best:

Regarding enclosed memorandum from the Board of Review recommending that the ten Kibei who were transferred to Leab from Manzanar be retained at Leupp.

Sincerely yours,

D. S. Lyer
Director

Enclosure

IAS:ler:FSP
6-16-43

(File sent to Confidential Files)

FILE COPY

39.055 12312

The following is a telephone conversation between Captain MULLINS, Executive Officer, Intelligence Division, Ninth Service Command, Fort Douglas, Utah, and Mr. RALPH P. MERRITT, Manager of the Manzanar Relocation Center, at approximately 12:15 am, December 7, 1942:

Capt. MULLINS: Is this Mr. MERRITT

Mr. MERRITT: Yes Sir.

Capt. MULLINS: This is Captain MULLINS of the Intelligence Division, Fort Douglas.

Mr. MERRITT: Yes Captain.

Capt. MULLINS: I understand you had a little difficulty today.

Mr. MERRITT: Yes Sir.

Capt. MULLINS: I'm pretty hazy on it. Can you give me some of the details on it, Mr. MERRITT?

Mr. MERRITT: Yes Sir. The difficulty began last night with the beating up of a man who has been helpful to the FBI.

Capt. MULLINS: Do you know who the man was?

Mr. MERRITT: FRED TAYAMA.

Capt. MULLINS: I see.

Mr. MERRITT: This man was a prominent member of the Japanese-American Citizens League in Los Angeles and has been helpful to us as a pro-American influence in the camp. His apartment was entered last night when he happened to be alone by six masked men and who beat him up.

Capt. MULLINS: Were the masked men all Japanese?

Mr. MERRITT: Oh certainly, yes sir, all of them.

Capt. MULLINS: Must what seems to be the cause of the matter?

Mr. MERRITT: The roots of the matter seem to lie back several months and have been suppressed over a period of time. When I came here on the 24th of November, I found that a great many of these things have long antedated that time. I immediately put a staff on the job and have been on the job for quite some time. We worked all night Saturday night and developed a very strong suspicion of certain men, one or two of whom we kept in our own jail here on the Relocation center. Due to the crowded condition of our jail it was necessary to send one of the men to the County Jail in Independence.

Capt. MULLINS: What was the name of that man?

Mr. MERRITT: His name was UENO. He is in the County Jail in Independence.

He is held there by authority of the War Relocation for the public good and because we have no further room in our own jail.

Capt. MULLINS: What is the status of the occupancy of your jail?

Mr. MERRITT: Well, I had the Jail nearly full and with the addition of these suspects the jail was overcrowded and it was necessary to put UENO in the County Jail. The men all ready in the jail were there for a number of petty reasons of one kind or another all the way from throwing at a police-woman's window to traffic offenses.

Capt. MULLINS: All right, now, please go on from there.

Mr. MERRITT: Well, we went out all night on the investigation I speak of. Then at noon today, they held a big public meeting called by a group of American citizens, who we have pointed out a number of times were agitators for the FBI but under the law the FBI can not handle American citizens as they can handle aliens. These men called this meeting and immediately I went to the scene of the meeting outdoors, and they conferred and appointed a committee to meet me later.

Capt. MULLINS: Yes, go on.

Mr. MERRITT: A few moments later the entire group at the meeting, about a thousand people, marched down the main street to the police station headed by their committee. I demanded that they return to their homes before I would discuss the matter with them. However they refused to return; they threatened to close all of the mess halls tonight and demanded the release of this man that we had sent up to the county jail, as they wanted his return to the jail here in camp.

Capt. MULLINS: All right, I have that, now go on.

Mr. MERRITT: Well, thinking that it was best to put them in a position of breaking their promises before we call the Military Police, I negotiated an agreement with the committee to the effect that we would return the man at Independence to our local jail and held him there because we in the meantime had a release in our jail population so as to make that possible. They, on their part, would agree first that there would be no jail delivery attempted; second: There would be no more meetings held; third: They would cooperate fully in the attempt to check down those guilty of assault last night; and fourth: Hereafter discussions should be held through representative with me as provided in our local government provisions.

Capt. MULLINS: How did they react to this?

Mr. MERRITT: They agreed to this and the crowd dispersed and a complete restoration of quiet and serenity in the camp prevailed. An hour later Capt. HALL of the Military Police, our own Chief of

20411

Police, and I made a complete tour of the camp, which was in perfect order and complete peace had been restored.

Capt. MULLINS: At what time was that Mr. MERRITT?

Mr. MERRITT: At 3:00 PM.

Capt. MULLINS: Very well.

Mr. MERRITT: Then following my promise, I returned this man to our jail and he was met by the committee who were perfectly satisfied. Before him, I repeated the pledge that had been made on both sides. I stated that I had completed my side of the pledge that now if any further trouble happens, the responsibility was wholly and solely upon the committee of leaders who would break their promise if they held further mob meetings or tried any jail delivery. They agreed that I was correct and a binding promise was made and they shook hands on it.

Capt. MULLINS: Yes.

Mr. MERRITT: They then all dispersed and everything was quiet until about 6:30 pm when we were informed that there was a meeting going on in one of the mess halls and the purpose of that meeting was that some of the leaders would go to the hospital and kill the man who had been assaulted last night and who was in the hospital. Do you follow me?

Capt. MULLINS: Yes, I'm right with you.

Mr. MERRITT: Immediately I called Capt. HALL of the Military Police for his entire contingent and support which he instantly gave. I asked the Army to remove the man from the hospital, and by the time the mob had arrived at the hospital the man was gone.

Capt. MULLINS: I see.

Mr. MERRITT: The mob then turned and consolidated with another mob and advanced on the police station at the Main Quarters, Administrative Quarters, of the camp.

Capt. MULLINS: I see, that's on your own police not the Military Police.

Mr. MERRITT: That's on our police.

Capt. MULLINS: Yes.

Mr. MERRITT: The Military Police are to a half mile on the south of us.

Capt. MULLINS: I see.

Mr. MERRITT: They advanced on our WRA Administrative Quarters and our local

police force. At the moment they arrived, Capt. HALL had arrived with his entire contingent of Military Police; the men were fully armed; they set up their machine guns and the two groups faced each other. I then declared Marshal Law and turned the camp over to the full control of Capt. HALL who took charge.

Capt. MULLINS: Yes.

Mr. MERRITT: That was at 7:15 pm.

Capt. MULLINS: At 7:15 pm this evening.

Mr. MERRITT: Yes sir.

Capt. MULLINS: Yes.

Mr. MERRITT: Thereupon Capt. HALL talked to them for three quarters of an hour and they demanded the release of this man who had been brought back last night from the County Jail. They demanded his release completely from this jail at this time.

Capt. MULLINS: Yes.

Mr. MERRITT: The Capt. kept in touch with us and he then informed them that he would not release this man under any circumstances that they then were in a position of breaking their word and their contract made this afternoon in his presence with me that they were fully responsible for whatever might happen and that we would stand firmly in our position.

Capt. MULLINS: Yes.

Mr. MERRITT: After a short time of discussion the mob stood about, the Captain ordered them to disperse, they did not. He then turned loose teargas bombs on them.

Capt. MULLINS: Yes.

Mr. MERRITT: That had no particular effect and the crowd then began hurling rocks at the police station and the fellow we had in the police station appeared at the window with a club which he got from somewhere in there in his hand; he was promptly disarmed and then the Captain reported some of his force opened fire.

Capt. MULLINS: Yes.

Mr. MERRITT: We've got one man dead; another dying.

Capt. MULLINS: Now, wait a minute, who is the man dead? Do you have his name?

Mr. MERRITT: No sir, we do not know what his name is. He's Japanese. Of course all the wounded are Japanese and do not know his name.

Capt. MULLINS: The hospital reports eight wounded. That includes the one man dying?

Mr. MERRITT: No.

Capt. MULLINS: That's in addition to the one that's dying.

Mr. MERRITT: You see it's a little confused--it's been all in the darkness here--

Capt. MULLINS: Yes.

Mr. MERRITT: And we've not been able to get it fully correlated as far as we can catch it at the moment--there are either seven or eight wounded by buckshot and one man with a broken leg, and one man dead.

Capt. MULLINS: I see. They are all Japanese, though?

Mr. MERRITT: Yes. Nobody is injured on our side.

Capt. MULLINS: All right.

Mr. MERRITT: Captain HALL is in process of making the rounds of the camp. There is or rather are no public meetings being held, he dispersed them all; of course there are meetings of small groups inside of buildings; we'll hold the fort here without any question at all and Captain HALL has asked his headquarters for assistance to borrow, so far as men are concerned he has 135 men, 50 of whom are very new, and these men can't be--we need as much as 135, maybe more, in his opinion, and we can't work all the hours of 24.

Capt. MULLINS: How many men do you have in camp there, Mr. MERRITT?

Mr. MERRITT: 10,000.

Capt. MULLINS: 10,000 Japanese residents of Manzanar? What's the organization Capt. HALL has? Do you know the number of it?

Mr. MERRITT: Beg pardon? Just a moment. 332d Escort Guard.

Capt. MULLINS: 332d. I see.

Mr. MERRITT: He has done a swell job and our civilian staff here has met the whole situation the best we could but we have got to let those things run their course. We can't do much about them when a mob takes over.

Capt. MULLINS: No. Now the place is still under military control?

Mr. MERRITT: The matter will stay under military control and Captain HALL has asked his headquarters for the right to pick up the leaders in this thing, whether they be citizens or otherwise and take them out of here to a Federal Detention Spot, whether that be a jail or something.

Capt. MULLINS: I see.

Mr. MERRITT: So we can clean this thing up. Then when it's all cleaned up, it will be returned to normal but until that time, he remains in control.

Capt. MULLINS: Now do you have down there--is the seat of this trouble the independent cliche of Japanese there within the camp that foment this trouble?

Mr. MERRITT: I didn't quite clearly understand you. Would you be good enough to say that again?

Capt. MULLINS: I say, just what seems to be center of this trouble? There are certain groups of Japanese in the camp that stir up all of the trouble, cause the unrest there?

Mr. MERRITT: Certain group of people who are at the bottom of every one of the series of trouble that have happened--the troubles are of various kinds; There are troubles of pro-Axis, troubles that rise out of the old political relationship in the Japanese-American League, local troubles that happen within the camp with regard to certain incidents that have been here when the FBI have come in and used certain loyal faithful people, and they are charged as being "stool pigeons" and rats and the FBI, of course, go away without giving protection for these fellows and they are now taking the rap.

Capt. MULLINS: I see. Now what time did this actual shooting take place?

Mr. MERRITT: About 9:20.

Capt. MULLINS: About 9:20 tonight? I see. Then everything is under control right now? The Military Police there? What are your initials Mr. MERRITT?

Mr. MERRITT: RALPH P. MERRITT.

Capt. MULLINS: MERRITT. I see. All right, thank you, Mr. MERRITT:

Mr. MERRITT: Would you mind giving me your name again, so--

Mr. MULLINS: This is Captain MULLINS--M-U-L-L-I-N-S. Intelligence Division,

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO
OFFICIAL INDICATED BELOW BY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/21/88 BY SP-8/BJL/STP

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Acers _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Mumford _____
- Mr. Starke _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

(Handwritten initials)

This is outrageous,
send letter of
protest to Dillon
Myer & also send
memo to A.G. re
this extraordinary
attitude upon
part of W.R.A.

See Me _____

Note and Return _____

Remarks:

*Instruct S.A. to continue
investigation & without
any advance notice to Meritt
get a line on Meritt's back-
ground.*

14.
100-140363-83 *(Signature)*

ENCLOSURE

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

DL:KLW
Call: 11:10 AM

August 13, 1943

CC-287

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Mumford _____
- Mr. Piper _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Beahm _____
- Miss Gandy _____

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. E. A. TAMM

RE: KANZANAR RELOCATION CENTER

SAC R. B. Hood, Los Angeles, called with reference to the above-entitled matter. He advised that he has an agent and translator at this camp at the present time conducting some inquiries into Shintoism and Judaism in accordance with Bureau instructions.

Mr. Ralph T. Merritt, who is the head of the camp, called the Los Angeles Office yesterday and in Mr. Hood's absence, talked to one of the supervisors.

Mr. Merritt said that at the present time he is trying to segregate the loyal from the disloyal at his camp by interviews, questionnaires, etc. and he complained because the FBI's investigation was interfering with his work, i.e. upset the people, etc. Mr. Merritt was asked how long it would take for him to complete this segregation and he replied November.

Mr. Merritt asserted that he thought the FBI should call him before proceeding to his camp; that he should be apprised of what we are investigating and how we intend to do it. The supervisor replied that we could give him a general idea of our investigation but not the details nor the procedure; that it is not the Bureau's custom to notify people before we instigate an investigation.

Mr. Merritt said he didn't know whether or not he would cooperate with us. However, after the agent indicated the matter would be taken up with Washington, Merritt backed down and cooled off.

Mr. Hood stated he could see no reason why we should call Merritt to make arrangements, etc. I told him not to do it then.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6/2/81 BY SP4 GEM/npw



RECORDED

Respectfully,

INDEXED

D. M. Ladd.

100-140363-81

AUG 17 1943

58 AUG 29 1943

20456

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



JKM:EK
7:00 P.M.

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

August 21, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADD

Re: HIROSHI HIRAI
Impersonation;
Alien Enemy Control - J

CC-287

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. E. A. Tamm	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Carson	_____
Mr. Coffey	_____
Mr. Hendon	_____
Mr. Kramer	_____
Mr. McGuire	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Quinn Tamm	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Beahm	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

ASAC Hennrich, Washington Field Office, telephonically requested authority for an Agent to contact Leo Gitlen, Principal Attorney, Alien Enemy Control Unit, Department of Justice, to whom the subject allegedly represented himself as being connected with the FBI.

Authority for this interview was granted.

Respectfully,

J. M. Mumford
J. M. Mumford

RECORDED

24

100-146363-82
40 AUG 24 1943

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/2/81 BY SP4RM/npj



cc - Mr. Strickland

57 AUG 28 1943

20457

JKM:EK

August 24, 1943

Mr. Dillon S. Myer
Director
War Relocation Authority
822 Barr Building
910 17th Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/2/81 BY SP8/ML/ym

Dear Mr. Myer:

During the course of an investigation conducted by this Bureau at the Manzanar Relocation Center, difficulty has again been encountered because of lack of cooperation on the part of the Project Director, Mr. Ralph Merritt.

The particular investigation involved concerned Kendo and Judo activities, and Mr. Merritt stated that if it were a "routine investigation," he did not desire to cooperate.

I would like to point out to you that the investigations conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation involving matters having to do with the internal security of the country and the war effort are of an urgent nature and not what he appears to mean by the phraseology "routine." Nevertheless, there is always a lot of controversy in connection with investigations of this type at War Relocation Centers, and if this attitude is to continue, we will of necessity refrain from entering these establishments; and if called upon by any committee to explain, it will, of course, be incumbent upon me to advise of the lack of cooperation and the hostility

Mr. Tolson _____ toward FBI investigations which have been evidenced by representatives of the War Relocation Authority.

- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Mumford _____
- Mr. Piper _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

RECORDED & INDEXED

Sincerely yours,

15-SE33

John Edgar Hoover
Director

100-140363-8
AUG 23 1943

8/24/43
P.A.
P.P.

MAIL ROOM SECTION
MAILED
★ AUG 25 1943 ★
P. M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

11 AUG 30 1943

20464

Manzanar Relocation

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1

THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **BUTTE, MONTANA**

FILE NO. **47-3930**

REPORT MADE AT WASHINGTON, D. C.	DATE WHEN MADE 9-6-43	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 8-30-43	REPORT MADE BY [REDACTED]
TITLE RAYMOND HIROSHI HIRAI, with aliases: Hiroshi Hiral, Raymond Hiral, Toyo Hiral			CHARACTER OF CASE IMPERSONATION ALIEN ENEMY CONTROL - J

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:

Mr. LEO GITLEN, attorney, Alien Enemy Control Unit, Justice Department, recalls contact with subject at Ft. Missoula, Montana, when subject complained of procedure practiced by FBI in arresting him and remarked that he had been "helpful to the FBI," but that subject did not represent to him that he was an Agent of the FBI.

- EUC -

REFERENCE:

Report of Special Agent **[REDACTED]** dated July 8, 1943, at Butte, Montana.

DETAILS:

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. LEO GITLEN, principal attorney for the Alien Enemy Control Unit, U. S. Department of Justice, recalled having been contacted by subject when Mr. GITLEN was in charge of Alien Enemy Hearings, which were furnished the Italian seaman who were located at Ft. Missoula, Montana. He stated that GITLEN along with three other Japanese internees, asked for an interview with him and in this interview complained of the procedure which was followed by the FBI at the time of their original arrest. He remembers that they generally attempted to impress him with their loyalty to this country and in this connection he recalls that HIRAI remarked that he had previously been "helpful to the FBI." However, he feels certain that HIRAI did not make any representation that he was connected in any way with the FBI and he does not recall that subject made any offer of assistance to the Bureau.

REFERRING UPON COMPLETION TO THE OFFICE OF ORIGIN -

APPROVED AND FORWARDED <i>[Signature]</i>	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES
COPIES OF THIS REPORT 5 - Bureau 3 - Butte 2 - Washington Field		140 31 2 + 26 SEP 7 1943 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

COPIES DESTROYED 7/12/55 R-25/

DATE 6/2/81 BY SP4/PA/4
20470

b7c

Center Manz. Name [REDACTED] **REGISTRATION AUTHORITY** Sex M Age 21 Family No. 93
(last name) (given name)

ADMISSION ADVICE For May 17 1943
month day

Other Names or Id. Numbers Manz. Ident. # 350-D

(Check applicable square.)

Citizen ; Alien . If Alien, Certificate of Identification No. _____

Source:

- 1. Birth. Mother _____ Father _____
(last name) (given name) (Last name) (given name)
- 2. Transfer from other R.C.
- 3. Temporary Detention
- 4. Internment Camp by _____ Release
- 5. Institution by _____ Parole
- 6. Group leave
- 7. Short-term leave
- 8. Indefinite leave
- 9. Other _____

Remarks: Address prior to evacuation: _____

b7c

Previous Address Havre, Montana

Previous Employer or Sponsor Gt. Northern Railway

Reporting Officer _____

WRA-177

Bureau Budget No. 19-4029-43

Approval Expires 7-31-44

6-4122-2024-1-1

cc - Sue Los Angeles
Bufile 8/25/43
wmp: jrc

RECORDED

ba

57 SEP 30 1943

100-140563 87

F	B	I
14	SEP 8	1943

20471

4



Center Tule Name Hirai, Roy Hiroshi Sex M Age 27 Family No. 17058-A
(last name) (given name)

ADMISSION ADVICE

For August 6, 1943 194
month day

Other Names or Id. Numbers _____
(Check applicable square.)

Citizen ; Alien . If Alien, Certificate of Identification No. _____

Source:

- 1. Birth. Mother _____ Father _____
(last name) (given name) (last name) (given name)
- 2. Transfer from other R.C.
- 3. Temporary Detention | Release
- 4. Internment Camp | by _____
- 5. Institution | Parole
- 6. Group leave
- 7. Short-term leave
- 8. Indefinite leave
- 9. Other _____

Previous Address Dayton, Washington

Previous Employer or Sponsor Blue Mountain Cannery

Frank R. D...
Reporting Officer

WRA-177

Bureau Budget No. 13-2029-43
Approval Expires 7-31-44

6-4122-100-01-07

*cc Loo, Don 9/11/43
Wynlan 9/19/43*

RECORDED

100-140363-58
41 SEP 9 1943

4 SEP 15 1943

20472

Los Angeles, 13, California

September 4, 1943

Director, FBI

Dear Sir:

RE: RALPH PALMER MERRITT;
INFORMATION CONCERNING.

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated August 24, 1943, to the Los Angeles Field Division, entitled KENDO AND JUDO CLUBS, KANZANAR RELOCATION CENTER, MARLBOROUGH, CALIFORNIA, requesting information regarding the background of the above-captioned individual.

The Bureau's attention is invited to the report of Special Agent [redacted] dated August 25, 1943, at Washington, D.C., entitled as above, which report sets forth the results of the inquiry made at Washington, D.C. regarding MERRITT. Additional information regarding MERRITT is set forth in a memorandum dated August 26, 1943, which was prepared by the Los Angeles Field Division. Two copies of this memorandum are forwarded herewith. b7c

The Los Angeles Field Division is conducting no further investigation regarding MERRITT unless instructions to the contrary are received from the Bureau.

Very truly yours,

R. B. HOOD
SAC

Encl. (2)

[redacted] b7c
62-2153
cc 100-19299

9

100-111-362-8
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SEP 13 1943
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

RECORDED
&
INDEXED
47

1 ENCL
Filed with
case file.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/2/81 BY SP4 JRM/ajm

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SEP 13 1943
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

355
40 SEP 18 1943

20473

SU 100-4917

to his apprehension. At that time the subject advised that he had furnished information to Agent [REDACTED] of the Los Angeles Field Division. b7c

Inasmuch as there are no additional leads to be covered in the Salt Lake City Field Division, this case is being referred upon completion to the office of origin.

REFERRED UPON COMPLETION TO THE OFFICE OF ORIGIN

SU 100-4917

UNDEVELOPED LEADS

THE PHOENIX FIELD DIVISION

AT THE LEUPP WAR RELOCATION ISOLATION CENTER

Will interview Mr. RAYMOND BEST, Isolation Project Director and obtain from him information regarding statements made by the subject indicating that he was an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Will interview Mr. P. S. FREDERICK, Internal Security Officer of the Isolation Center along the same lines as above. In this connection it is to be noted that Mr. FREDERICK has interviewed many of the residents of the Moab Center, and possibly has interviewed the subject.

Will interview a [REDACTED] and obtain any information indicating that subject claimed to be a Bureau Agent. b7c

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

Los Angeles, California
March 4, 1943

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~
ATTENTION: MR. D. M. LADD

Director, FBI

RE: SENATE SUB-COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING
THE JAPANESE SITUATION

Dear Sir:

On March 2, 1943, Mr. GEORGE MALONE telephonically communicated with this office during my absence and that of the Assistant Special Agent in Charge, and stated he was calling for Senator CHANDLER of Kentucky and requesting that an Agent or two meet the Senator the following day at Manzanar Relocation Project for the purpose of accompanying the Senator on an inspection of that camp.

This matter was telephonically discussed with Assistant Director D. M. LADD and in accordance with his instructions I communicated with Mr. MALONE at the Ambassador Hotel and ascertained he has the title of Special Consultant for the Committee. He is the one who apparently compiles all of the information obtained in the investigation and writes the report. He was accompanying Senator CHANDLER and Colonel WILLIAM A. AIRD to Manzanar on March 3, 1943.

Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] proceeded to Manzanar to be there on the arrival of Senator CHANDLER and his party. The Agents were also accompanied by an interpreter in the event the Senator would desire to speak with any Japanese who did not speak English.

The Agents were definitely informed that they were not to furnish any information with reference to Japanese activities to the Committee, and any request for such information should be directed to Mr. Hoover's office in Washington. They were instructed to be of every possible assistance to the Committee.

The Bureau will be informed immediately upon the return of these Agents and furnished full details relative to the inspection trip of this Committee.

RECORDED 100-140363 42
EX - 2 F B I
Very truly yours 19 MAR 12 1943

R. B. WOOD
Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/1/81 BY SPV8274/74

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF Classification
DATE 3/26/59

COPIES DESTROYED 1/19/59 R-251



REH: AB 'C' I F

60 MAR 22 1943

DECLASSIFIED BY 3832
ON 8/12/78 VLS/CD

20257

"people in America. They are lynched and discriminated against without any reason but they are determined to fight for citizenship rights and democracy. We should encourage ourselves and use our citizenship rights."

According to [redacted] the next speaker was JAMES ODA, a Kibei, although ODA was not a scheduled speaker. ODA said, amidst heckling, "I am proud to be an American of Japanese origin. We should unite together and show the American people that we are just as good Americans as they are." b7D

The next speaker was an unscheduled speaker and was SHIGETOSHI TATEISHI, a Kibei and block leader of block 23. According to Source B, he stated, "I have Yamato Damashii. I want the following to be taken up at tonight's meeting: (1) Investigate who pocketed \$14,000. of canteen profits; (2) Reselection of block leaders; (3) Who authorized Campbell to make a contract to print the 'Free Press' and pay out \$2,000. of the canteen money; (4) Block 1 and 7 should not move out. This is the richest country in the world. Let's get lumber and get the school built. They gave citizenship to myself and my sons. Why don't they take it away? It is no good." The substance of this talk was verified by Source A's report, although Source A stated that he expressed his appreciation of the United States citizenship rights but felt that it meant very little.

According to the reports of [redacted] the next speaker, JUICHI UYEMOTO, was greeted with the shouts, "General Araki. General Araki." This is because he has a long mustache similar to that of the Japanese general named ARAKI. According to [redacted] he said, "I was born in Hawaii but I have spent most of my life in Japan. In fact, I spent thirty years in Japan. I came to America four years ago thinking America to be a country of the free and in general an ideal place, but I now find myself thrown in this dump like pigs." [redacted] verified that of [redacted] and had the following in addition, "I am surprised to see that the Japanese here are not united spiritually like in Japan. The trouble with the Japanese here is that there are too many 'Reds' among you." According to [redacted] report, this was the same man who stated aboard the train on March 23, 1942 on his way to Manzanar, that the Nisei should have nerve enough to kill the President. b7D

At this point, according to [redacted] TOKIE SLOCUM left the audience and several people shouted after him, "Get out, you dog." b7D

The next speaker, who was also unscheduled, was a Kibei named JAKE TERAQ. He made an announcement that he would like to have all Kibei now working on the camouflage project to quit work immediately and to ask the parents of the Nisei workers on the project to use their influence in getting their children to quit the project as soon as possible. [redacted] said that he also urged the Kibei to quit working on the Manzanar Free Press.

At this point Mr. TEMPLE and other members of the office staff arrived at the meeting and asked the chairman to adjourn the meeting. At this time KISHI stated, "Anything that happens at tonight's meeting I will be solely responsible for." [redacted] stated in his report that after the b7D

KAB:blj

DECEMBER 18, 1942

SAC, LOS ANGELES

RE: MANZANAR RELOCATION CENTER. REFER TELETYPE FROM SALT LAKE CITY OFFICE DECEMBER SEVENTEENTH LAST CONCERNING CONDITIONS AND POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS MANZANAR RELOCATION CENTER. FURNISH INFORMATION CONTAINED IN REFERENCE TELETYPE TO APPROPRIATE MILITARY AUTHORITIES YOUR DIVISION.

HOOVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 5/29/81 BY SP4 JRM/rpm

INITIALED IN
DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

DEC 18 8 45 PM '42
RECEIVED-DIRECTOR
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Nease _____
- Gandy _____

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

52 JAN 1 1943

11-29-77

RECORDED

100-140363-17

16 DEC 21 1942

Handwritten initials/signature

20180

Can't bring any of
all.
Why should these terrible
people. if one can call
them human beings be
paupered and treated
like kings.
What are they doing to
our boys over there?
My brother is over there
fighting like thousands
of other fine chaps. while
these things are being
fed and housed better
than our ~~ref~~ relief
people.
You are the man to settle

Copy made

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

Los Angeles, California
March 30, 1943

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/1/81 BY SP8RPM/epm

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF Classification
DATE 12/14/83

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~
PLEASE HOLD

Inspector M. E. Gurnea
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

RE: SURVEY, WAR RELOCATION CENTERS
MANZANAR, CALIFORNIA

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your letter to the
San Francisco Field Division, dated February 11, 1943,
a copy of which has been forwarded to this office by
San Francisco.

Pursuant to the request contained there-
in, the names of the following individuals have been
searched through the files of the Los Angeles Office,
and a summary of the information pertaining thereto
prepared in memorandum form:

- ~~ROKIE SLOCUM~~
- ~~FRED TAYAMA~~
- ~~TOGO TANAKA~~
- TOGO TANAKA's mother and father
- JOSEPH BLAMEY
- TOM IMAI
- KARI YONEDA

Very truly yours,

R. B. Hood
RECORDED
INDEXED
R. B. HOOD
Special Agent in Charge

ENCLOSURE

100-140363-70

12 APR 29 1943

20356



100-14777
WJM:AM
Enc.

DECLASSIFIED BY 3832
ON 8/18/78 US/CAD

EX-8

FIVE

Manzanar Relocation Center
4 copies of encl.
Behind file

Name TERUYUKI TERAQ, alias Jake Terao
Age [REDACTED] b7c
Birthdate [REDACTED]
Birthplace United States
Height 5 feet 5 inches
Weight 130 to 140 pounds
Build Husky
Complexion Yellow
Sex Male
Hair Black
Eyes Brown
Marital Status Married
Occupation Truck Driver, Clerk
Nationality Japanese
Citizenship United States

The following description was obtained from [REDACTED] b7c
of the Manzanar Interior Police Force:

Name SHIGETOSHI TATEISHI, alias Shigeo Tatsuishi
Age [REDACTED] b7c
Birthdate [REDACTED]
Birthplace United States
Height 5 feet 1 inch
Weight 110 pounds
Build Medium, very short
Sex Male
Complexion Light
Hair Black, bald half way back
Eyes Brown
Occupation Landscape gardener
Hobby Singing
Marital Status Married
Nationality Japanese
Citizenship United States

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

C L O S E D

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY *Tiles*

WASHINGTON

MAR 25 1943

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

To: Mr. D. S. Myer, Director
From: The Board of Review

The Board of Review has studied the cases of the ten Kibei sent to Moab from Manzanar on Tuesday, February 23. The names of the ten evacuees are as follows:

- ✓ Nakamura, Kioji
- ✓ Kimura, Ichijiro
- Sato, Roy
- Kodani, Masahara Dick
- Yokone, Yukio Roy
- ✓ Saika, Yoshio.
- Shibanaka, Yoshiichi
- ✓ Makihara, Wataru Jack
- ✓ Endo, Hisato (alias
Kitadani, Hisato)
- Higashi, Tsutomu

All of the ten are unmarried. They range in age from 19 to 29. Five of them have asked for expatriation and one wishes to go to Japan to take care of his parents but has not asked for expatriation. Four of the ten have not declared themselves as to their wishes with respect to expatriation. According to their statements to project officials, all are in varying degrees pro-Japan in their sympathies.

In the dockets submitted, there is little evidence that the ten evacuees have engaged in serious trouble-making at Manzanar. However, it appears that the dockets are incomplete. These dockets include Form WRA-26 (Revised) and accounts of interviews with the Project Attorney and the Chief of Internal Security. These latter statements may be considered self-serving documents. In his letter transmitting these dockets, Mr. Merritt said: "In order to get this information to you as soon as possible, we have not taken time to interview members of the staff or to obtain copies of the Army Registration Forms that were executed by a few of the evacuees in question. I shall obtain this information as soon as possible and forward



MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR M. E. GURNEA

-19-

March 30, 1943

RE: SURVEY, WAR RELOCATION CENTERS,
MANZANAR, CALIFORNIA

IMAI was the investigator assigned by Chief SCHMIDT to ascertain the writer of these letters, and in connection with this investigation, the letters were discussed with IMAI by Agents of this office on November 9, 1942.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. HOOD
Special Agent in Charge

20375

The meeting was conducted solely in Japanese. I caught the gist of the discussion, but, of course, not all of it. First, the fire-fighting equipment was displayed and explained. Then, the speaker, a Kibei fireman, explained what the block residents should do in case a fire started in the block. Then, discussion revolved around the nominating of people for the election two days hence. Two people were nominated--both Kibei. This was really against the rules since the election was supposed to be an Open Election with anyone over 18 eligible to vote or be elected.

On the day of the election, I was surprised to discover that no one had voted. By then, it was the last half-hour of the polls being open. Then, I found out that some people were not allowed to vote. Then it came out. Two nights previously, what I had thought was merely the nomination was in reality an appointment 'by the will of the people.' A farce was being perpetrated!

Since such an idea was not acceptable to a couple of us, we protested. At first, our protests were of no avail, but finally, a new election was called. Ballots were taken to each apartment and filled out while the person distributing the ballots waited for them at the door. This was the first time that I had ever seen an election run off in such a manner. The end result was that the two Kibei boys were elected.
Democracy in Action!

All of the New Commissioners who were elected met with the new Project Director, Mr. Ralph Merritt. The meeting dragged on and nothing was accomplished except that it was decided that final discussion would be tabled. Many of the people were outspokenly and vehemently against any type of self-government.

Some of the underlying thoughts which were expressed are:

'Since the army (and/or government) put us here, why can't it run us?'

'We've gotten along all right so far without self-government, why should we have it now?'

'What's wrong with the present set-up?'

'How can we have self-government in a place surrounded by barb-wired fences?'

The majority of the New Commissioners were Issei and Kibei. Only a very few were Nisei. Of the fifty-five Commissioners present, only about four or five were Nisei. This meeting was held on Thursday, December 3. The disturbances occurred Saturday, December 6. No doubt, minions of the 'Blood Brothers' were spotted among the new Commission.

The term 'Blood-Brothers' has been discarded now, I believe. The new name of the organization is 'The Black Dragon.'

DECEMBER 13:--

Today, I learned that the school teachers are now working in the Administration Building. Many of them have returned from Lone Pine and Independence and are again living on the Project. Apparently, schools will be closed until the beginning of January.

From a fairly reliable source, I have become cognizant of the following: Project Director Merritt feels that the residents of Manzanar do not want to return to work. He has decided to hire Caucasians to work in essential jobs unless the residents return to their places. If Caucasians are hired, the evacuees will not be permitted to work at all. That means that the evacuees will not receive any income.

Up to this date, Mr. Merritt has not issued any statement to the above effect, but he expected the people to go back to work without such a notice. He seems to have one point of view; the dominating society has another; the residents have none. Everything is not running smoothly between the Administration and the residents. One does not know what or how the other is thinking. There is no co-ordination or attempts at it anywhere.

From the same source, I learned that not all of the people shot on December 6 were shot in the back. One of the High School teachers who had gone to the Hospital to inquire about those who were shot was told by the doctors that there the statement that all victims were shot in the back was false.

DECEMBER 14:--

At noon today, an announcement was made during lunch that Mr. Merritt and Captain Hall of the Military Police would

MEMO FOR INSPECTOR H. E. GURNEA

-13-

January 25, 1943

RE: SURVEY OF MANZANAR RELOCATION CENTER
INTERNAL SECURITY - ALIEN ENEMY CONTROL

CONFIDENTIAL

28984

from time to time come to Manzanar and have interviewed informants who have later been beaten up because of their association with the Bureau. He also pointed out that, although there have been known trouble makers in the Center, the F. B. I. has refused to remove these individuals because they were citizens of the United States.

HERRITT was again told that the present survey was being made at the request of DILLON MEYER, but that if HERRITT was going to be coggy, no further attempt in this direction would be made. HERRITT then stated that Inspector GURNEA was the one who was being coggy, and accused him of not putting all of his cards on the table. He wished to know what suggestions were to be made as the result of this survey. In reply, he was advised that it was necessary that the entire picture be shown before any recommendations could be made.

HERRITT then stated that he had found it necessary to build up a Police Department at Manzanar in order to protect himself from the F. B. I. When asked what he meant by this statement, he said that the Bureau had been using informants in the Center, and thereby causing dissension. He stated that the F. B. I. has been sending checks to informants in the Center, and claimed that his authority for this statement was the Post Office Department, and that, more specifically, he had been told by the Post Office Department that FRED YAYAMA, victim of the beating of December 6th, had received a Government check through the mail, in an envelope bearing the return address of the F. B. I. He stated that he did not know the name of the Post Office employee who had furnished this information, because he, HERRITT, had received it indirectly in a communication from the W. E. A. in Washington. (It will be noted that neither FRED YAYAMA, nor any other informant at the Manzanar Relocation Center, has received any money from this office, nor has any written communication passed from this office to informants in the Center.)

HERRITT then stated that he felt that no branch of the Government should do any work, or perform any investigation in the Center, without the consent and knowledge of the Project Director. He stated that he was establishing an Intelligence Unit at Manzanar, through which he would obtain information regarding occurrences in the Center. This information would be turned over by him to the Police Department.

HERRITT again alleged that there had been numerous instances of informants of the Bureau having been beaten, and he wished to know how the F. B. I. was going to handle interviews in the Center in the future. It was pointed out that apparently, at the present time, those individuals who wished

13

CONFIDENTIAL

20388

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Salt Lake City, Utah
February 27, 1943

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

Director, FBI

Re: SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AT THE
MANZANAR RELOCATION CENTER

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is a transcript of a telephone call between Captain MULLINS, Executive Officer, Intelligence Division, Ninth Service Command, Fort Douglas, Utah and Mr. RALPH P. MERRITT, Manager of the Manzanar Relocation Center at approximately 12:15 A.M. December 7, 1942.

The Bureau's attention is directed to the statement of Mr. MERRITT in paragraph one, page six of this transcript, in which MERRITT states that certain groups of people are at the bottom of every one of the series of trouble that have happened -- the troubles are various kinds. There are troubles of pro-Axis, troubles that rise out of the old political relationship in the Japanese American League, local troubles that happen in the camp with regard to certain incidents that have been here when the FBI have come in and used certain loyal faithful people, and they are charged as being "stool pigeons" and "rats" and the FBI, of course, goes away without giving protection for these fellows and they are now taking the rap.

One copy of this communication and one copy of the transcript is being directed to the Los Angeles Field Division. This information is being submitted for whatever disposition the Bureau deems advisable.

~~DEFERRED RECORDING~~

Very truly yours,

Jay Newman
JAY C. NEWMAN
Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/1/81 BY SP4 QRM/SPM

100-4392
Enclosure
cc - Los Angeles

55 MAY 24 1943

100-14...-63
F B I
18 MAY 12 1943

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Handwritten notes:
403
of 2/27/43

Handwritten notes:
The
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Vertical stamp:
7 JUL 2 1943

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Los Angeles, California
April 10, 1943

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/1/81 BY SP8RML/SPM

Director, FBI

RE: JOSEPH Y. KURIHARA, et al.
SEDITION

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau File No. 100-140363, and to the report of Special Agent [redacted] dated at Los Angeles, California, November 16, 1942, entitled, "JOSEPH Y. KURIHARA; HARRY YOSHIO YENO, SEDITION". Your attention is directed to the fact that through typographical errors in the title and body of the report, KURIHARA's name was misspelled "KURIHURA". This information is being furnished in order that the Bureau indices may be changed accordingly.

Very truly yours,



R. B. HOOD
Special Agent in Charge

[redacted] b7c
14-86

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
55 APR 21 1943

C.I.F

RECORDED

EX-36

100-140363-57
B I
1 APR 13 1943



20283

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Los Angeles, California
April 20, 1943

RECORDED
INDEXED
MAY 19 1943

2893

Director, FBI

Re: CONDITIONS AT MANZANAR, CALIFORNIA
WAR RELOCATION CENTER

Dear Sir:

As of possible interest to the Bureau, I am enclosing a copy of a report obtained from [redacted] Investigator for the Tenney Legislative and Investigating Committee of the California Legislature, which report reflects the results of a general survey made by the Tenney Committee at Manzanar. It is understood that a preliminary survey has also been made at Tulelake, the other war relocation center in the State of California.

This office has been advised that the committee is going to make a detailed investigation at Manzanar. A copy of any report prepared will be made available to this office and the Bureau will be informed immediately concerning it. Efforts will be made to obtain a copy of the preliminary survey relative to the Tulelake project.

b7c

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RECORDED
Very truly yours,
INDEXED

106-140313-58
B
APR 23 1943



RBH:AB

C.I.F

R. B. HOOD
SAC.

51 MAY 3 1943

28999

April 7th 1943.

On Monday, March 29, 1943, Captain George Contreras and Lieutenant Al Guasti, accompanied by [redacted] counsel and chief investigator of the State Fact Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, went from Los Angeles to Bishop, California, for the purpose of conducting a survey of Manzanar Relocation Center and rendering a report thereon. Accordingly, the following report is herewith submitted:

On March 5th, 1942, Lieutenant General John De Witt issued an order excluding all Japanese from the area comprising the Western Defense Command. The execution of this order involved the removal of an estimated 110,000 citizens and alien Japanese to the several Relocation Centers, one of which was established in Inyo County near Independence, some 250 miles from Los Angeles. This Center, Manzanar, received the first contingent of Japanese evacuees on March 21, 1942, when 61 men and 20 women arrived there from Southern California. By June of 1942, control of the project was transferred from the War-time Civil Control Authority to the War Relocation Authority, which now exercises jurisdiction over the Center through the civilian Project Director, Ralph P. Merritt, and his assistant, Robert L. Brown.

When the undersigned visited Manzanar on March 30th, 1943, the Japanese evacuee population was 9,500 persons.

Immediately prior to visiting the Center, numerous persons were interviewed, including Kenneth L. Williams,

MAILED

100 - 1

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20285

b7c

DEW-5338
(11-4-21)

TELETYPE MESSAGE

Washington, D. C.
March 15, 1943

Teletype Message No. 72

Leroy H. Bennett ✓
Gila River Relocation Center
Rivers, Arizona

Advise how soon can expect dockets and WRA 26s on individuals removed from center under presidential warrants. Required in negotiations with Department of Justice.

D. S. Myer
D. S. Myer

JRProvinse HP

65201 ✓
3-0940 nobu-ct-p.

April 15, 1943

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a full-rate Telegram or Cablegram unless its deferred character is indicated by a suitable symbol above or preceding the address.

WESTERN UNION

1903

SYMBOLS

- DL - Day Letter
- NT - Overnight Telegram
- LC - Deferred Cable
- NLT - Cable Night Letter
- Ship Radiogram

A. M. WILLIAMS
PRESIDENT

NEWCOMB CARLTON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

J. C. WILLEVER
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

The filing time shown in the date line on telegrams and day letters is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination.

VU241 38 GOVT NL 8 EXTRA=MOAB UTAH 14. 8 2 6

B R STAUBERS= ✓

RELOCATION PLANNING OFFICER WRA BARR BLDG WASHDC=

KOICHI TSUJI, HARRY QENO, FRANK EGO, TSUTOMU HIGASHI, HISATO KITADANI, KENTARO TAKATSUI, YOSHIO SAIKA HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM ISOLATION CENTER TO GRAND COUNTY JAIL AT MOAB UTAH POPULATION REMAINING 42=

R R BEST PROJECT DIRECTOR BY F F FREDERICK CHIEF OF INTERNAL SECURITY.

Advised in

42=

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

12222

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Los Angeles, California
October 19, 1942

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/29/81 BY SP4 JAW/epm

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

RE: MANZANAR RELOCATION AREA
WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
MANZANAR, CALIFORNIA

Dear Sir:

On October 17, 1942, MR. NED CAMPBELL, Assistant Project Director, Manzanar Relocation Center, called on me in person at the office. He advised that presently MR. HARVEY COVERLY, Assistant Regional Director of this agency from San Francisco, is the acting Project Director at Manzanar. It is not believed, however, that he will retain this position for any length of time.

MR. CAMPBELL stated that he was calling in accordance with the request of his superiors and he wanted to thank me for the assistance which has been rendered to his agency by this office to date and to ask certain questions about matters of policy. He was most anxious to know what information would be furnished directly to him at Manzanar. He was informed that it is not possible to furnish him with any investigative or other written reports, and that the sole interest of this Bureau in the activities at Manzanar is from an Internal Security point of view, and that we conduct no investigations into administration and matters of policy of his agency. It was pointed out that whenever any information is received which is deemed to be of such importance that the officials at the Center should be immediately notified, that will be done. For example, we will notify them of any contemplated disorder, visits by pickets, or some such activity.

He is particularly concerned with the handling of visitors at the Center, as under the present rules, all such persons must receive a written pass from the Project Director or his assistant. Many unauthorized persons do get into the Area for various reasons, some through ignorance and others intentionally. He desired to know what steps could be taken for their prosecution. In accordance with the regulations set up by General DeWITT, these persons must have special passes, and it was pointed out that apparently their failure to do so would be a technical violation of Section 503 of the 77th Congress, and that whenever such instances come to his attention, he should communicate with this office by telephone if necessary, in order that appropriate action could be taken. He was advised the matter would be discussed with the United States Attorney and his office promptly advised of the opinion of that official.

He desired to know what authority the police on the project had to detain any trespassers or other persons, and he was informed that no answer could be given on this, as it is a matter of policy to be worked out by the administration as to how far they wanted to go in such activities, and secondly there were many legal problems involved therein which could not be passed upon by this Bureau.

100-140363-6

COPIES DESTROYED 4/25/72-251

1 ENCLOSURE

RECEIVED
OCT 23 1942
JAN 19 1943

FILE

20116

Director

- 2 -

October 19, 1942

RE: MANZANAR RELOCATION AREA
WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
MANZANAR, CALIFORNIA

It has just come to my attention that according to the plan set up by this Authority, applications for Japanese to move to another section of the country have to be passed upon by the F.B.I. I inquired of MR. CAMPBELL if he knew that this procedure had been adopted, as no such checks are made through this office, and it would not be possible to give any actual clearance to any individual. He stated that he recalled a letter of some type from his superiors advising that clearance through the F.B.I., ONI, and M.I.S., is obtained in these cases. It is possible this is done in Washington and it would be appreciated if the Bureau would advise this and the interested West Coast offices relative to the arrangements for such a check of applications leaving the Center for other area. In this connection, I am enclosing clippings from the "Pacific Citizen" which is published in Salt Lake City, Utah, quoting rules to be followed for obtaining leaves from the Area and it is noted that in paragraph 3 "E", the National Director will secure from the F.B.I. such information as may be obtainable. In the "Manzanar Press" of September 9, 1942, there is a statement to the effect that "clearance" is to be obtained from the F.B.I.

MR. CAMPBELL stated that they have had many problems at the Center and some of the former administration did get unduly excited and mismanage some of the affairs, but he thinks it is going considerably better at present. He stated that the people of Inyo County, in which the Manzanar Center is located, are very hostile towards all Japanese and in fact towards all persons who have anything to do with the camp; and that whenever a Japanese is seen away from the camp, it is assumed that he is away without authority and the camp officials are criticized.

He pointed out that as a matter of fact, there are many cases of where these individuals do leave the camp without authority, go back into the mountains and one individual told him about a series of lakes located fourteen miles away back in the mountains. The initials of some of these persons have been found carved in trees a considerable distance away from the Center. He stated that it is undesirable that they be away from the camp; however, it is impossible to have a sufficient number of military guards to be certain that there is no opportunity for any of these persons to be away. He stated there had been no actual cases of permanent desertion from the camp, but some people had been absent for a day or so. He feels that most of them go back into the mountains fishing, and while actually no harm can result from their being away, he admits there results an undesirable situation. No comment was made with reference to this matter by me.

20117

Declassified to Free
By SP-2-21-44
Security Officer -Bub

JUN 18 1943

Deletion Case
Confidential

Mr. Roy E. Best
Director, Los Angeles
War Relocation Authority
Tucson, Arizona

Dear Mr. Best:

Inclosed for your information is a copy of a memorandum from the Board of Review recommending that the following ten Nisei who were transferred to Momb from Wonsan on February 23 be retained at Loup until such time as you care to make further recommendations concerning their removal. I have approved this recommendation.

- E. Kimura, Sioji
- Kimura, Ichiro
- Sato, Roy
- Kodani, Masaharu Dick
- Yokura, Yuzio Roy
- Saika, Yoshio
- Shibayama, Yoshiichi
- Uchihara, Katsuro Jack
- Endo, Eiichi (alias
Kitadani, Eiichi)
- Higashi, Tetsuro

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

Mr. Merritt did not indicate whether a copy of his report dated May 11, 1943, together with the exhibits attached to that report, was sent to you. I have asked him to send you a copy if he has not already done so. Your attention is directed to the fact that Shibayama, Kodani, Endo and Saika were removed from Wonsan principally upon the recommendation of the Peace Committee or the negotiating committee, or both; E. Kimura was removed principally upon the recommendation of some of the evacuees who were transferred to the Death Valley Camp last December. The factual basis for these recommendations is not known and cannot readily be ascertained. Under the circumstances, however, I believe that their removal is proper. You are, of course, free to make further recommendations concerning these five men as well as any other men at Loup at any time you believe it wise to do so.

FILE COPY

Enclosure
L. H. G. R. P.
6-15-43

Sincerely,
[Signature]
Director

12315-
39.055

Mr. Dillon S. Myer
page 3
May 11, 1943

Tsutomu Higashi had written a statement entitled "Opinion of one Kibei Boy" which contained the statement that "Issei are responsible for the education which lead Nisei in the wrong direction" and recommended that all the pro-American elements leave Manzanar so that the true Japanese alone would remain. Roy Yokome had come to Bob Brown and insisted that this letter be published in the Manzanar Free Press. Because of these activities, these two evcucues were placed on the list of suspects. The third name to go on the list was that of Roy Sato who had been involved with Bill Tanabe and Bill Kuga in telephoning the jail after the shooting on December 6th. Sato would have been sent to Moab because of his participation in the riot had it not been for the intervention of the Negotiating Committee which stated that Sato was about the only level-headed Kibei leader at Manzanar, and they felt it was desirable for him to stay here to keep the Kibei in line. Sato had been given a job on the Japanese section of the Manzanar Free Press, largely so that he could be kept under observation. Bob Brown had received reports that at the time of registration Sato had attempted to induce his co-workers on the Japanese section of the paper to print in Japanese a statement that no one should answer "Yes" on the loyalty question. Because of this report and because of his activities in connection with the riot, Sato was placed on the list of suspects. In addition to these three names, Bob Tlockmorton had a list of about ten names of Kibei who had been named in connection with the December riot. He and Bob Brown discussed this list with two leaders of the Peace Committee who stated that only three of the boys on this list should be sent away from Manzanar. These three were Osamu Tanaka, Kiyoji Nakamura, and Ichijiro Kimura. It was decided not to transfer Osamu Tanaka (Masaki Tanaka's brother with whom Roy Sato lived) because he was married and had two children. The other two boys, Nakamura and Kimura were roommates of Frank Ego who was then at Moab and they had been suspected of participation in most of the disturbing incidents that had occurred at Manzanar. The two members of

June 18, 1943

ISOLATION CASES

Mr. Ralph P. Merritt
Manzanar Relocation Center
Manzanar, California

Dear Mr. Merritt:

Regarding enclosed memorandum from the Board of Review concerning the ten Nisei who were removed from Manzanar to Mead on February 23.

Sincerely yours,

D. S. Lyster
Director

Enclosures

LAS:ler:FSP
(-16-43)

(File sent to Confidential Files)

FILE COPY

39.055 /23B

June 18, 1943

ISOLATION CASE

Mr. Ray R. Best
Director, Leupp Center
War Relocation Authority
Winslow, Arizona

Dear Mr. Best:

Regarding enclosed memorandum from the Board of Review recommending that ten Kibei who were transferred to Moab from Lees Ferry be retained at Leupp.

Sincerely yours,

D. S. Myer
Director

Enclosure

IAS:ler:FSP
6-16-43

(File sent to Confidential Files)

FILE COPY

Declassified in Free
By NSA 2-21-41 Date
Security Officer

JUN 18 1943

Informational
Confidential

Mr. Ralph F. Merritt
Maintenance Relocation Center
Manzanar, California

Dear Mr. Merritt:

Enclosed for your information is a copy of a non-removal
from the Board of Review which I have approved and a copy of a
letter to Mr. Roy Best concerning the ten Kibel who were removed
from Manzanar to hash on February 23.

If you have not already done so, will you please send to
Mr. Best a copy of your letter dated May 11, 1943, together with
the exhibits thereto, in order that Mr. Best may have a full
record of the ten men involved.

Sincerely yours,

Director

Enclosures

SAR
SS *quack*

FILE COPY

L. J. ...
6-16-43

12314
34555

5/24/43
100-140363
100-190274

100-140363-70

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6/2/81 BY SP4 RRM/psm

RECORDED

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. EDWARD J. KEENE
DIRECTOR, ALIEN ENTRY CONTROL UNIT

Re: SONICHI MABRY HASHIMOTO
GENJI GEORGE YAMAGUCHI
RAYMOND HIROSHI HIGAI
BILL KENJI YAMANE
Moab Isolation Center
Moab, Utah
Alien Entry Control - J

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

Reference is made to your memorandum of May 10, 1943, in which you stated that it had come to your attention that the above subjects, upon being apprehended by agents of this Bureau at the Manzanar Relocation Center for transfer to the Moab Isolation Center, had allegedly not been permitted to obtain their hats, coats or other personal effects, and that as a result arrangements had to be made for the subsequent shipment of these personal effects.

The Los Angeles Field Office of this Bureau, which covers the Manzanar Relocation Center, has advised that captioned subjects were not apprehended by special agents attached to that office, and that it had not been consulted in the matter. The Salt Lake City Field Office has advised that captioned subjects were apprehended by agents of that office on March 14, 1943 at the Moab Isolation Center, but that the subjects had not been removed from the Manzanar Relocation Center to the Moab Isolation Center by those agents. According to the Salt Lake City Office, the military authorities at Fort Douglas, Utah are of the opinion that captioned subjects were removed from the Manzanar Relocation Center to the jail at Independence, California

Mr. Tolson _____ by agents of the War Relocation Authority and that they were transferred
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____ from Independence, California to the Moab Isolation Center by the War
Mr. Clegg _____ Relocation Authority and were possibly accompanied by a military police
Mr. Coffey _____ escort. However, according to the military authorities, these subjects
Mr. Glavin _____ were at all times in the sole custody of the War Relocation Authority.
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____

In connection with the subsequent apprehension of the captioned
Mr. Rosen _____ subjects by agents of the Salt Lake City Field Office of this Bureau,
Mr. Tracy _____ Your attention is directed to the fact that on February 27, 1943 you
Mr. Carson _____ transmitted the originals and copies of residential warrants authorizing
Mr. Harbo _____ the apprehension of each of them. You requested that these subjects be
Mr. Hendon _____ taken into immediate custody and be delivered to the Immigration and
Mr. McGuire _____ Naturalization Service Officials for temporary detention pending intern-
Mr. Mumford _____ ment. Your attention is further directed to the following investigative
Mr. Piper _____ reports, a copy of each of which was transmitted to the Division of Records
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____ of the Department on April 24, 1943, and which reports reflect the
Mr. Nease _____ apprehension of these individuals on March 14, 1943:

Miss Gandy _____

28 JUL 2 1943

100-140363-20427

ORIGINAL FILED IN

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Manzanar, California
May 11, 1943

In reply, please refer to:
Proj. Att'y.

Isolation Center
Declassified to *File*
By *W.S. 2-21-46*
Security Officer *Dale*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Mr. Dillon S. Myer, National Director
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
17th and Eye Streets
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

In your letter of March 26, 1943, you requested further evidence for the Board of Review in regard to the ten persons sent to Moab on February 23rd. In response to your request, we have made a more complete investigation of these cases, and I am transmitting herewith a copy of a memorandum to the Project Attorney from the Chief of Internal Security dated May 6th reporting on interviews with the staff members with regard to the ten evacuees in question and also a copy of the employment record of these evacuees. These documents are marked "Exhibit A" and "B" respectively.

You will notice from "Exhibit A" in particular that the staff members in general were not well acquainted with the evacuees in question, so that as far as the staff is concerned, most of these persons can not be considered trouble-makers; however, as indicated to you in my previous letter on the subject, we have information from reliable evacuee sources indicating that these persons were, prior to their apprehension, the focal point of unrest and disturbance at Manzanar.

The first day of actual registration at Manzanar was Friday, February 12th. There was considerable tension and excitement in the Center at the time. On or about February 15th, an open letter to Mr. Merritt was placed on the Block Bulletin Boards stating that the evacuation was unjust and there was no reason why any evacuees should volunteer for service in the Army. February 16th marked the final day for registration except for the Army interviews which continued for two or three weeks. By February 17th, it was quite apparent that the unrest in the Center was increasing.



Mr. Dillon S. Myer
page 2
May 11, 1943

There was a definite agitation against the Negotiating Committee of Four, which, since the riot, had constituted the de facto evacuee government of Manzanar. Mr. Ray Best knows four of the sixteen Manzanar evacuees, then at Moab; namely, Koichi Tsuji, Harry Ueno, Frank Ego, and Bob Matsuda, wrote a letter to the Negotiating Committee dated February 14th accusing the Committee of double-dealing and of having betrayed "the people of Manzanar" - meaning the element which was sympathetic to the riot. Mr. Best has stated that these four evacuees compelled those of the remaining twelve who wrote Japanese to make copies of this letter which were transmitted to key people at Manzanar. A copy of this letter is attached as "Exhibit C." Some evidence of the sort of activity that was under way at Manzanar is found in a translation of a letter from Osamu Tanaka, 32-7-1, Manzanar, to his brother, Masaaki Tanaka at Moab, postmarked February 17th, which includes the following:

"The letters came from you folks to several blocks are now being shown to the residents. Everyone will know before long. Yesterday Okamura of Block 33 was showing the letter to Sato. Tonight we will have a meeting in Higashi, Saika, Teranori's room in order to discuss the subject. Everyone will know about the Peace Committee before long. Be patient and take good care of yourselves till then. Maki comes here sometimes; don't worry."

A copy of the translation of this letter is attached as "Exhibit D."

On or about February 17th, reports were coming not only from members of the Peace Committee and the Negotiating Committee, but from individual evacuees - all to the effect that trouble was brewing at Manzanar and that we might very well have another riot unless preventive measures were taken.

I accordingly asked Bob Throckmorton and Bob Brown to investigate the situation and see if there was sufficient evidence to justify the transfer of known trouble-makers to Moab. These men worked out a list of eleven suspects by the following procedure:

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Manzanar, California
February 24, 1943

In reply, please refer to:

PDO

0 - [unclear]
2 - [unclear]
3 - [unclear]

Declassified to *Jace*
By *He [unclear]*
Security Officer Date

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO: Dillon S. Myer
National Director

SUBJECT: Transmission of files regarding ten
evacuees recently sent to Moab

On Friday, February 19th, ten evacuees were apprehended at Manzanar and placed in the Independence Jail for investigation. They were questioned there by our Project Attorney, Bob Throckmorton and Chief of Internal Security, Jack Gilkey. On Tuesday, February 23rd, the ten were sent to Moab by bus.

An eleventh evacuee, Toyomi Wada, 14-11-2, was also scheduled for apprehension, but it was found that he was ill in the Manzanar Hospital. I shall make suitable arrangements with respect to his case after he is released from the Hospital which will probably be within a week. The ten evacuees in question are as follows:

Nakamura, Kioji	32-14-4
Kimura, Ichijiro	32-14-4
Sato, Roy	32-7-1
Koçani, Masahara Dick	14-11-2
Yoxome, Yukio Roy	25-2-1
Saika, Yoshio	21-7-4
Shibanaka, Yoshiichi	10-1-2
Makinara, Wataru Jack	36-12-5
Endo, Hisato (alias Kitadani, Hisato)	12-12-2
Higashi, Tsutomu	9-2-1

Mr. Throckmorton and Mr. Gilkey have each made written reports on their interviews with the above mentioned evacuees and I am sending to you copies of these reports along with copies of WRA Form 26 for each evacuee. To the WRA forms, I have attached copies of letters written by the evacuees from the Independence Jail to friends in Manzanar.

In order to get this information to you as soon as possible, we have not taken time to interview members of the staff or to



gB # 121E1
39.055

it to you."

The Board of Review cannot recommend to you what final disposition should be made of these cases until further evidence is submitted. We believe that none of the ten should be returned to Manzanar, and that further decision on final disposition of these cases should be postponed until Mr. Merritt's additional material is received.

John H. Province

John Province, Chief
Community Services

Philip M. Glick

Philip M. Glick
Solicitor

E. M. Rowatt

E. M. Rowatt
Deputy Director

COPI
EO

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

00-150

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

100-140863-70

May 13, 1943

RECORDED

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

Transmit the following message to :

SAC'S LOS ANGELES
SALT LAKE CITY

SOKICHI HARRY HASHIMOTO, GENJI GEORGE YAMAGUCHI, RAYMOND HIROSHI HIRAI, BILL KENJI TANABE, ALIEN ENEMY CONTROL J, REFER FIVE AC. DEPARTMENT STATES INFORMATION RECEIVED ABOVE SUBJECTS APPREHENDED BY BUREAU AGENTS AT MANZANAR RELOCATION CENTER FOR TRANSFER TO MOAB, UTAH, RELOCATION CENTER AND THAT AT TIME OF APPREHENSION SUBJECTS NOT PERMITTED TO OBTAIN HATS, COATS, OR OTHER PERSONAL EFFECTS THUS NECESSITATING ARRANGEMENTS FOR LATER SHIPMENT OF SAME. BUREAU RECORDS REFLECT SUBJECTS APPREHENDED BY SALT LAKE CITY OFFICE AT MOAB, UTAH, AND DELIVERED INS FOR TEMPORARY DETENTION PENDING INTERNMENT. LOS ANGELES OFFICE ADVISE BY RETURN TELETYPE DATE SUBJECTS REMOVED FROM MANZANAR TO MOAB, UTAH, AGENCY HANDLING REMOVAL, AND WHETHER REPRESENTATIONS AS TO SUBJECTS NOT BEING ALLOWED TO TAKE PERSONAL EFFECTS ARE TRUE IF REMOVAL HANDLED BY BUREAU AGENTS. SALT LAKE CITY OFFICE ADVISE BY RETURN TELETYPE DETAILS SUBJECTS' APPREHENSION AT MOAB, UTAH, AND WHETHER ALL NECESSARY PERSONAL EFFECTS ALLOWED SUBJECTS AT TIME OF APPREHENSION AND TRANSFER TO CUSTODY OF INS.

HOOVER.

COMM. STAMP
5-13-43
ON ORIGINAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6/2/81 BY SP4GRM/ups

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

20426

May 10, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. J. EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

It has come to my attention through representations of Sokichi Harry Hashimoto, Genji George Yamaguchi, Raymond Hiroshi Hirai, and Bill Kenji Tanabe, that they were apprehended at the Manzanar Relocation Center and transferred to the War Relocation Center at Moab, Utah, by your agents in accordance with the provision for the apprehension of potentially dangerous alien enemies. However, in the course of this apprehension the above named persons allegedly were not permitted to obtain their hats, coats and other personal effects that would be required. As a result arrangements had to be made to ship their clothing and personal effects.

I refer this to your attention in order that your agents in the course of future apprehensions of Japanese aliens at relocation centers may eliminate this burden of transferring clothing and personal effects subsequent to apprehensions.

Very truly yours,

Edward J. Ennis
Director

RECORDED

JUN 17 1943

ORIGINAL FILED

20425

[REDACTED]

b7c

On April 9, 1943, a letter was directed to this office by the Los Angeles Field Division which reflected that the files of the Los Angeles Field Division contained no pertinent information regarding Subject other than he was removed from the Manzanar Relocation Center by the W.R.A. shortly after the riot of December 6, 1942.

RALPH P. MERRITT, Director of the Manzanar Relocation Center, advised that this individual was deemed by the W.R.A. to be an agitator and trouble maker in the Center and at the time of his removal complete information regarding his activities was furnished to the W.R.A. at Washington, D.C. MERRITT further stated that a W. R. A. Board of Review, headed by [REDACTED] studied the charges made against the Subject and according to MERRITT then transmitted the information to the Alien Enemy Control Unit with the request that he be proceeded against as an enemy alien. MERRITT indicated that upon receipt of the information from the W.R.A., the Alien Enemy Control Unit caused a residential warrant to be issued for the apprehension of this individual. MERRITT stated that he did not, at the present time, have this information available but that if desired by this Bureau it could undoubtedly be obtained either through the W.R.A. headquarters in Washington, or the Alien Enemy Control Unit.

b7c

A review of Subject's application for Certification of Identification reflects that he bears Alien Enemy Registration Receipt Card number [REDACTED]. It reflects also that he has one brother, [REDACTED] residing in this Country. His father and mother reside at Fukuoka Ken, Japan. Other information in this application is not relevant to this investigation.

b7c

A Disposition Sheet is being submitted to the Bureau.

Inasmuch as there are no further leads to be covered in this case, this case is being referred upon completion to the office of origin.

ENCLOSURE TO BUREAU:

1 Disposition Sheet

REFERRED UPON COMPLETION TO THE OFFICE OF ORIGIN

20424

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Origin: LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

File No. 100-4917

Made at: - SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH	Date: 5/27/43	Period: 5/6/43	Report made by: [REDACTED] MD
Title: RAYMOND HIROSHI HIRAI, with aliases: Toyo Hirai, Raymond Ray			Character of Case: ALIEN ENEMY CONTROL - J

SYNOPSIS: Subject ordered interned by Attorney General 3/5/43. [REDACTED] set out. Los Angeles office has no definite information concerning Subject. Disposition sheet submitted.

[Handwritten signature]
-RUC-

REFERENCE: Report of Special Agent [REDACTED] dated 4/5/43 at Salt Lake City, Utah.
Bureau letter dated March 30, 1943
Bureau file 140363

DISPOSITION SHEET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/2/81 BY SA JGR/m/400

DETAILS: AT SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH:

On March 30, 1943, a letter was directed from the Bureau to the Salt Lake City Field Division which reflected that the Bureau had received from the Department a copy of an Order dated March 5, 1943, in which the Attorney General ordered that Subject be interned.

On April 13, 1943, a copy of [REDACTED] was forwarded to the Salt Lake City field Division. It is as follows:

[REDACTED]

Approved: *[Signature]* SAC

100-140363-69 RECORDED & INDEXED
Do Not Write in These Spaces

- Copies of this report
- 5 - Bureau (Encl.)
 - 2 - Los Angeles
 - 1 - G2 Fort Douglas
 - 1 - ONI San Francisco
 - 1 - IANS, Salt Lake City
 - 1 - USA, Salt Lake City
 - 3 - Salt Lake City (1-AER File)
- cc Div. Rec
Oni & G2
6-7-43
EAB:IN

18 JUN 1 1943

20423

21 JUN 21 1943

COPIES DESTROYED 11/9/52 R-251

b7c
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b7c
b7c

Report of Special Agent [redacted] dated April 5, 1943, at Salt Lake City, Utah in the case entitled, "Sokichi Harry Hashimoto, Internal Security - J, Alien Enemy Control."

Report of Special Agent [redacted] dated April 2, 1943, at Salt Lake City, Utah in the case entitled, "Genji George Yamaguchi, Internal Security - J, Alien Enemy Control." b7c

Report of Special Agent [redacted] dated April 5, 1943, at Salt Lake City, Utah in the case entitled, "Raymond Hiroshi Hirai, Internal Security - J, Alien Enemy Control."

Report of Special Agent [redacted] dated April 5, 1943, at Salt Lake City, Utah in the case entitled, "Bill Kenji Tanabe, Internal Security - J, Alien Enemy Control."

It should be noted that the Salt Lake City Office has advised that captioned subjects, upon their apprehension, were immediately placed in the Grand County Jail at Moab, Utah by the arresting agents. Through arrangements previously made with the United States Attorney at Salt Lake City, the captioned subjects were taken into custody by the Deputy United States Marshal on the same day of their apprehension, and on the following day they were removed to the Salt Lake County Jail. At the time of their apprehension, they were wearing trousers, shirts and shoes ordinarily worn at the Moab Isolation Center, and since they did not request permission to take any personal effects with them to the local jail, no personal effects were removed to the jail from the Isolation Center. These subjects were subsequently interviewed at Salt Lake City by an agent of this Bureau, at which time they continuously complained that they had not received their baggage from the Kanzanar Relocation Center, but made no complaint relative to not having received any personal effects which they might have had at the Moab Isolation Center.

In view of the above, it is suggested that if any further action in this matter is desired by your Unit, it should be taken up with the War Relocation Authority which apparently is the agency that was instrumental in transferring captioned subjects from the Kanzanar Relocation Center to the Moab Isolation Center.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

UNDEVELOPED LEADS:

THE LOS ANGELES FIELD DIVISION

At Manzanar, California, will continue to gain further information concerning the Manzanar Citizens' Federation, its activities, its leaders and its purposes.

ACME BEER & ALE

Bohemian Distributing Company

2254 EAST 49TH STREET • TELEPHONE KIMBALL 1181
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

December 7, 1942

Mr. Walter Winchell
New York Daily Mirror
New York City, N.Y.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

W 15

Dear Mr. Winchell:-

DATE 5/29/81 BY SP4 RML/1200

In your enviable position as a publicist I should like to call your attention to the present situation prevailing at the Manzanar Japanese Relocation Center near Lone Pine, California, brought to my attention several times by one of our representatives whose reliability is unquestioned.

In view of the fact that this particular Japanese Center is now under martial law due to disturbances there fostered by alien Japanese, the facts brought to my attention are interesting. A personal investigation among Lone Pine business people may provide you with further proof of what I have to say.

This man Merritt, who is in charge of the Center, has a stubborn Japanese secretary who makes it very difficult for Americans to gain entry to him. He is described as a "weak sister" by Lone Pine people. I understand there have been occasions when he has permitted certain interned Japs to leave on fishing trips in the mountains.

Although meat and other articles of food are scarce in Lone Pine and Bishop, the Japs get plenty of it. Japanese have been seen throwing Swift's tenderized hams into the garbage cans after extracting the center portions of the ham.

Alien Japs have told the driver of our distributor in that territory something like this: "We are going to win this war. You had better treat us right or we'll sure take it out on you after this war is over."

Near Lone Pine is a school for preliminary flying instruction. The Army has failed to furnish cooking equipment for this school, the students eating in Lone Pine restaurants. With the present shortage of food these students have to take their chances with other Americans while the Japs get their fill.

Cordially yours

[Redacted signature]

Acme Brewing Company
Bohemian Distributing Co.

67c
20140

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTORS FOR
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JAN 8 1943

copy to Mr. Winchell

Handwritten notes and scribbles

Council of the Japanese-American Citizens League prior to evacuation, and more recently a delegate to the National Japanese-American Citizens League held in Salt Lake City in November, 1942.

Subject UIENO was identified by TAYAMA as being the leader of the group which assaulted him. As a result, UIENO was on December 5, 1942 removed from the Manzanar Relocation Center by the W.R.A. and placed in the Inyo County Jail at Independence, California. On the following day the residents of Manzanar in several mass meetings protested the incarceration of UIENO and demanded his return to the Center. At one of the mass meetings a committee of five was appointed to meet with the W.R.A. Officials and demand the return of UIENO. Subject KURIHARA was one of this committee of five.

Upon KURIHARA's assurance to Director MERRITT that there would be no further disturbance, UIENO was returned to the Center. However, a further riot developed, as a result of which it was necessary to call in the Military Police to maintain order and to remove TAYAMA and other known loyal Americans from the Center for their own protection. As a result, both UIENO and KURIHARA, together with fourteen other individuals considered to be the leaders of the disturbance were removed by the W.R.A. from Manzanar to a separate camp at Moab, Utah, where they remain at the present time.

ROBERT BROWN, Assistant Director of the Manzanar Relocation Center, advised that according to reports received by him from the Director of the Moab Relocation Center, subject KURIHARA has, since his arrival there, indicated that he regrets his activities at the Manzanar Relocation Center. According to BROWN, UIENO has continued to conduct himself in such a manner as to cause dissension and disturbance at the Moab Center, as he did at Manzanar.

Assistant Director BROWN furnished a copy of a letter dated February 11, 1943 written by [redacted] from Moab, Utah, to [redacted] at Manzanar. [redacted] was one of the sixteen individuals removed from Manzanar after the riot on December 6. This letter read in part as follows: b7c

"According to the individual letters we received yesterday from the Washington W.R.A. headquarters, it was decided by the authority that we, sixteen of us, are not allowed to return to Manzanar. . . .

"Here I would like to make a report of the recent happenings among us.

"While I was kept in the Lone Pine jail without offence, UIENO, the central figure of the incident, once challenged BEN KISHI and myself saying that 'those who went to Idaho for best topping are traitors.'

20403

MEMO FOR INSPECTOR H. GUNTER

Jan 25, 1943

RE: SURVEY OF MANZANAR RELOCATION CENTER
INTERNAL SECURITY J - ALIEN ENEMY CONTROL

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MERRITT was asked as to the location of judicial jurisdiction in the Center, and replied that the Project Director has jurisdiction of all crimes. MERRITT stated that he has set up a judicial committee, before whom offenders are brought. He said the procedure was that after a crime was committed, the police would make the arrest and bring them before the judicial committee without attorneys. The judicial committee would then hear the evidence and make a recommendation to the Project Director as to the action to be taken. The Project Director would review the findings of the committee and make his decision. According to MERRITT, this procedure was set up at the direction of DILLON MYER, National Director of the W. R. A.

On Tuesday morning, January 19, 1943, WILLARD E. SCHMIDT, acting National Director of Internal Security, was interviewed at the Manzanar Police Department. At that time, SCHMIDT explained that all cases received by the Police Department were listed numerically, in the sequence received. Three types of case cards are maintained in the Department, one being a casualty card, on which is recorded the name of the casualty, and the type. SCHMIDT stated that this card could be used for either damage done to property or persons. A second type of case card is known as the "Lost and Found Card", which lists the name of the person losing or finding property, and a description of the article. The third type of card used is the crime card. On this, there are blanks in which are to be inserted the name of the subject, victim, offense committed, and such other data. When cases are assigned for investigation the reports are supposed to be submitted by the officer conducting the investigation, and these reports are clipped or stapled to the crime card. Actually, however, it was found that in very few instances had written reports been made. SCHMIDT stated that, in each case, the following items were indexed: Crime, Subject, and location.

In addition to the above record, there are also maintained in the Police Department personnel folders on each member of the Japanese Police Department. All of the above records are maintained under the supervision and control of one of the Caucasian members of the Department.

A simplified version of the filing system used by the Bureau, was explained to SCHMIDT. It was suggested that the assignment of an arbitrary classification number to the particular types of cases handled by the Police Department, together with the serialization of each document in the case file, would, to a great extent, simplify the filing system. These matters were considered by SCHMIDT and Chief GILKIN, and both agreed that the proposed system would be an improvement.

SCHMIDT stated that in view of the unsettled conditions at Manzanar, a Caucasian police force of forty or fifty members should be maintained at

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Manzanar for the present, this number being later reduced to about ten men. According to him, at the present time, in all of the W. R. A. Centers, the Caucasian police staff consisted of only two men, but it had been decided to increase this number to six. It is SCHEMIDT's plan to conduct a school for the newly hired Caucasian officers, in order that all of the police systems in the various Centers may be uniform. In this connection, he stated that if, at Manzanar, there was established such a school, the forty or fifty Caucasian police needed there at the present time could be on hand and at the same time receive training in Center police work. By the time this course was completed, the need for that number of officers at Manzanar would be ended, and the men who had received training could then be sent to the other relocation centers.

SCHEMIDT stated that there had been no official uniform adopted by the W. R. A., the force of each Center having selected their own type of uniform. It was pointed out that the standardization of uniforms for all of the Centers is considered essential.

SCHEMIDT stated that since the riot of December 6th, a group known as the "Peace Committee" had been formed to assist the Police Department. This Committee is composed of men prominent in Judo activities in the Center. The Judo group numbers between two hundred fifty and three hundred, having increased to this figure from about fifty or seventy-five members in the past few months. SCHEMIDT did not feel that this group is reliable, and is of the opinion that since Judo is almost a nationalistic religion with many of the Japanese, this organization could become a source of danger. He stated, however, that Director MERRITT felt that this Peace Committee would render great assistance to the Police Department, and for that reason, SCHEMIDT is accepting. He intends, however, to closely observe their activities.

SCHEMIDT stated that he had not, as yet, had an opportunity of examining all of the police departments, nor all the W. R. A. Centers, but that he was of the opinion that the record system maintained by the Manzanar Department was far superior to that in any other of these Centers. He pointed out that the police in the other Centers were, at times, reluctant to admit that there had been any trouble or disturbance in the Center, feeling that perhaps it would be a reflection on the Department. This is one of the matters which SCHEMIDT intends to remedy. SCHEMIDT was advised that a uniform record system for all of the Centers is needed. It was further pointed out that copies of all investigative reports in each department should be forwarded to the National Director of Internal Security, in order that there be one Central Clearing House for all information involving the various Centers.

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SCHMIDT stated that, at the present time, the Japanese police force is in fear of the disturbing elements in the Center, and that on each occasion when the Japanese force was called upon to perform some duty, serious consideration must necessarily be given to the pressure which will be exercised on them by the other residents of the Center. In this connection, he pointed out that pressure would prevent the transfer of Japanese police from one Center to another. At this point, it was emphasized that until the residents are shown that law and order will prevail, there is no place to start in the formation of a strong Japanese police force.

SCHMIDT pointed out several problems that had confronted the internal police both at Manzanar and at other evacuation Centers. In most of the Centers, there is only one telephone switchboard, which in some cases is operated by a Japanese. All calls for the Center officials, as well as the military police, must pass through this switchboard.

The mail situation is another problem at Manzanar. Until recently, all mail, even that going to the administration, has been delivered by Japanese carriers. SCHMIDT stated that in some instances, mail directed to him had been opened. SCHMIDT was asked what, if any, censorship of incoming mail or packages was made. He advised that all packages brought into the Center were supposedly examined by the military police. There apparently is no cooperation between the military police and the internal police in this connection. Those packages entering the Center through the mails are not examined unless they are sent in by individuals. SCHMIDT suggested that it was advisable to have all packages examined at the time they were opened by the military police. He stated that under the present W. R. A. regulations, there are no rules except those set forth by the local W. R. A. officials, which would prevent liquor being brought into the Center. He pointed out that this has been the cause of some difficulty in the past, in that returning furlough workers have attempted to bring with them intoxicating liquors.

Regarding the riot of December 6th, SCHMIDT stated that immediately after the shooting and death of one of the residents, approximately four thousand of the Center residents wore black arm bands. He also pointed out that it appeared that many of the Japanese in the Center, prior to December 6th, had stocked up on various commodities as though in anticipation of a general strike. He suggested this as evidence that the recent disturbance was planned, rather than spontaneous.

SCHMIDT also mentioned that, recently, between eleven and twelve A.M. there have been reports of broadcasts in the Japanese language having been heard in the Center. There are many radio technicians at Manzanar. This matter is being referred to the F. C. C. by SCHMIDT.

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Another problem for the Police Department pointed out by SCHMIDT, was the fact that there is apparently opposition from the W. R. A. officials to the fingerprinting of residents.

SCHMIDT had, prior to the riot of December 6th, commenced a police school, which was attended by the Japanese members of the Department. This is now continuing. In it, SCHMIDT and SILKIE are instructing the Japanese in investigative technique and report writing.

In order to dispel the feeling on the part of many of the residents that anyone who visits the Police Department does so for the purpose of informing on fellow evacuees, SCHMIDT has had the Police Department take over other duties disassociated from criminal work, in order that the residents will not think it unusual for one to appear at the Police Department. In this connection, he stated that the Department now issues all passes for those wishing to enter or leave the Center. He has also frequently pointed out the existence of a Lost and Found Department at the police station. These things, he feels, will make it possible to get more of the Japanese to come voluntarily to the police department, and in that way, more information will be obtained regarding Center activities.

On the afternoon of Tuesday, January 19, 1943, a further interview was had with Project Director RALPH F. MERRITT and Regional Director ROBERT GOZZENS. Just prior to this interview, there was a discussion between MERRITT and Assistant Project Director BOB BROWN regarding a request from the W. R. A. to send an official from the Center to Washington, D. C. for the purpose of discussing, with the Selective Service Board, the induction of Japanese American citizens into the United States Army, and the objections of the Nisei to a 4-C classification. MERRITT stated that he had heard nothing that would indicate that the Nisei object to a 4-C classification.

At the beginning of the above interview, MERRITT was asked to what extent the Manzanar Relocation Center was self-supporting. MERRITT thereupon wished to know what the F. B. I. is driving at. He asked if this was an investigation of the Project Director, and stated that he did not understand the position of the F. B. I. He also stated that Chief SCHMIDT had, that morning, received a letter from DILLON MEYER suggesting that he remain at Manzanar temporarily until his actual status could be determined. MERRITT wanted to know if the F. B. I. was coming into the Center and set up an internal police system. It was explained to MERRITT that the present survey was being conducted solely at the request of Mr. MEYER. MERRITT then stated that he considered it essential to have a solution of the problems existing between the F. B. I. and the administration. He stated that Agents of this Bureau have

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to cooperate with the United States Government were placing themselves in a dangerous position, and that it was one of the duties of the United States Government to see that any individual who wished to cooperate and show his loyalty to the United States, could be assured that he could do so without fear. (It will be noted, in connection with the allegation that informants of this office have been beaten as a result of their contact with Agents of this office, that a report of all violations, beatings, and threats of individuals was obtained from the Police Department, and of the twenty-five victims in the cases so listed, only one, FRED YAYAMA, could be considered an informant of this office. In connection with FRED YAYAMA, it will be noted that he was formerly Chairman of the Southern District Council of the Japanese American Citizens League, and was one of the founders of the anti-Axis Committee which was formed to aid the agencies of the United States Government in the protection from subversive activities among the Japanese. YAYAMA was also a delegate to the National Convention of the Japanese American Citizens League, held in Salt Lake City last November. In all of these positions, as well as in numerous public speeches and debates, YAYAMA had been outspoken in his loyalty to the United States.

MERRITT was advised that the exact procedure relating to the handling of interviews in the Center, was a matter of policy which should be settled between Mr. HOOVER and Mr. MEYER.

MERRITT then stated that if a Congressional investigative committee were to come into the camp and ask him the cause of the riot of December 6th, he felt that he would have to say that the F. B. I. was responsible. He stated that, as a result of this riot,

(In this connection, it will be noted that in the list of sixty-six persons who had been removed from the Center, as a result of the December 6th riot, which list was obtained from the Manzanar Police Department,

YAYAMA, like YAYAMA, has been prominently associated with the Japanese American Citizens League, and since arriving at Manzanar, has been employed as Documentary Historian for the W. R. A., in which capacity he made reports regarding the events and trends in the Center. YAYAMA has also been outspoken in his loyalty towards the United States. Several of the remaining sixty-four individuals have been interviewed in connection with investigations of this office, but could in no sense be considered confidential informants. These are: TOM IMAI, Assistant Chief of Police at Manzanar; JOSEPH BLANEY and FRED UTEWO, both editors of the Manzanar Free Press. TOMOASA YAMAZAKI has on two occasions been interviewed, and it is believed that possibly, prior to evacuation, he may have been an informant of the San Francisco Office.)

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MERRITT was again advised that the United States Government is bound to protect any Japanese who wishes to cooperate with any Government Agency. He replied that this depended upon how it was carried out. He stated that he did not wish that any F. B. I. Agent interview any individual at the Center. He stated that if it were necessary that interviews be had, that he would arrange to have the desired persons transported to Lone Pine, a distance of ten miles, where they could be interviewed. He also suggested a ranch owned by him, some twenty miles North of Manzanar, as a possible meeting place. It was pointed out to MERRITT that this was not a practical solution, for the reason that it was not possible to forget the names of the individuals who would be interviewed in the course of an investigation. It was also stressed that the interviews of informants was a secondary problem, the primary one being the maintenance of law and order, and the protection of Japanese loyal to the United States; that at the present time, there appears to be a premium on those individuals who would refuse to cooperate, and for that reason, it is necessary that the Government furnish adequate protection, either by the W. R. A., or, if necessary, by the Army. MERRITT then said that the F. B. I. was apparently confused, and pointed out that the social life at Manzanar was different than it had been outside. COLLINS then stated that he agreed that it was necessary for the Government to furnish adequate protection to those individuals wishing to cooperate, but that the only present way of furnishing such protection would be to have martial law.

Inspector GURNEA stated that it was obvious that segregation was the best answer to the problem. COLLINS agreed that segregation is necessary, and remarked that after the trouble makers in the Center were separated, there will be no reason why the Agents of this Bureau could not enter the Center and conduct such interviews as desired. He stressed, however, that such segregation should be rapid, and that the Center officials should have the authority to move immediately and not be held up for several months by "red tape" in receiving permission to transfer the troublesome individual. MERRITT was then asked how many undesirables the records in his possession showed. Both MERRITT and COLLINS then stated that the records would not show the undesirables. He stated that it was necessary that the W. C. C. A. records be made available to them, and that although the W. C. C. A. had permission to turn over all information in their possession, to date this had not been done. They stated that Manzanar had been started by the W. C. C. A. in the first place; that the W. C. C. A. had made promises to the residents which the W. R. A. was not capable of fulfilling, and that this had been the cause of some resentment in the camp. They also stated that it was entirely possible that there are some "pinks" on the administrative staff at the present time, who had been placed in their positions originally by the W. C. C. A.

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HERRITT then decided to furnish a complete picture of the administration set-up at Manzanar, and began by giving his personal history. He stated that he had dealt in business with Japanese for many years; that he had faced a Japanese mob in Tokyo when the feeling against Americans was high; and that at the time of the rice riots in Japan, he had sold large quantities of rice to the Japanese Government, which had enabled them to break the riots as a result of which he had been honored by the Japanese Government. He stated that he had represented California fruit interests in the Orient for a number of years. During the World War, he held the position of Food Administrator on the West Coast, in which capacity he bought all of the food used by the Army, West of the Rocky Mountains. He also arbitrated all strikes except those in shipyards on the West Coast during the World War, and in addition, handled I. W. W. problems in California. He was one of the officials connected with the draft in the State of California during the World War, and in this connection, had refused the post of Adjutant General of the State. He was Comptroller of the University of California for ten years, and was one of the members of the Board of Regents of the University of California for ten years thereafter. He stated that he was a close friend of President HOOVER, and was very active in public life until a few years ago, when his health failed. At that time, he retired to a ranch in Nevada, where he remained until he was appointed Project Director at Manzanar.

He stated that the primary problem at Manzanar is the physical set-up. The property was originally taken over by the Army from the City of Los Angeles. A group of Army officers came to Owens Valley and met with HERRITT, at which time they told him that the Japanese were to be evacuated to that place, and asked him to work with them on the problem. He suggested that they confer with the Board of Supervisors of Inyo County, and advise them as to evacuation plans. The Army refused to discuss the matter with the Board, and as a result, incurred the enmity of the County officials. HERRITT also suggested to the Army that they negotiate with the City of Los Angeles for the property, but the Army refused to negotiate, and merely told the City of Los Angeles what they wanted and what they were going to do. As a result, they entered into a lease whereby they are paying seven times more for water than is necessary. He pointed out that water is a prime necessity for the Center at the present time, but that the W. R. A. does not know to whom to go to obtain this water. He stated that all water necessary could be obtained from the City of Los Angeles, if a satisfactory deal were made, but that at the present time, the W. R. A. does not know who the lessor of the property is; it may be the W. C. C. A. or the Army, or some other body.

HERRITT stated that the City of Los Angeles hates Manzanar, and now has a lobby in Washington working against that Center. The residents of Owens

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Valley also oppose Manzanar. As a result of this feeling, it has been deemed necessary by the Project Director to confine the Japanese to an area of one square mile, which has caused much unrest in the Center. In general, the public relations of Manzanar are bad. The landlord is the City of Los Angeles, and most of the people in Owens Valley are employed by the City of Los Angeles. The City is charging \$4.25 per acre foot for water, when a fair price would be less than \$1.00 per acre foot. For electricity, the City is charging 1.8 cents, when the actual cost is only 2 1/2 mills. He stated that it takes four to seven feet of water to irrigate the land at Manzanar each year, and as a result, the irrigation costs at a rate of \$4.25 are prohibitively high.

COLLINS at this point remarked that in the other evacuation Centers, the W. E. A. has selected the sites, and has advised and consulted with the local people before establishing centers in any locality.

MERRITT stated that the residents of Manzanar can be divided into four groups: schoolchildren, mothers, workers, old men. He then went on to list the various Departments at the Center. These are as follows:

A. SCHOOLS

There are 2500 schoolchildren in the Manzanar Elementary Schools, and an additional 1100 attending High School. There are also adult educational classes held evenings. At the time of the erection of the Center, no provision was made for schools, and this is something that has been worked out by the W. E. A. Buildings have been built and teachers hired, and although the quarters are bad, they have, for the past several months, been operating the school system. At the present time, they are about sixteen teachers short in the grammar schools, but this difficulty is being overcome by doubling up on the classes. MERRITT stated that, all in all, he felt the schools at Manzanar were doing an excellent job at very little cost.

B. WELFARE WORKERS

MERRITT stated that, usually, welfare workers are looked upon as "starry-eyed people", but that this situation does not exist at Manzanar. The Welfare Department here is under the direction of MARGARET MATTHEWS D'ILLE. Mrs. D'ILLE was formerly a Y. W. C. A. secretary in Tokyo, and at the outbreak of the World War, joined a Red Cross unit with which she served in Harbin, China. She speaks Japanese, and has a firm knowledge of Orientals. MERRITT considers her the ideal woman for the job of social worker at the Center. She has contact with the physical, religious, and moral side of the community. She is sixty-three years of age, and holds the title of Counselor. She handles all grants and aids in the Center.

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August witnessed further in-group solidarity. As a result of the Kibei Meeting, Director Nash issued an official bulletin reinstating the WRA ban on the use of Japanese in public meetings.⁷⁷ This decision revitalized earlier Issei grievances, and further aroused the Kibei's anti-administration stand. This month also saw the "enforced" resignation of those Block Leaders deemed cooperative with administrative policy.⁷⁸

The Issei-Kibei coalition had developed an effective organization. On August 21, when elections were held to select Block Leaders in those blocks whose incumbents previously had been appointed, JACLers were ousted and supplanted by Issei or Kibei. In Block 4, for example, Karl Yoneda was defeated by an Issei who amassed ninety-three percent of the votes cast. Yoneda correctly evaluated the reasons behind his defeat in a communication forwarded to the administration, explaining that the Issei-Kibei bloc had criticized him on the following grounds:

- 1) Circulated petition for Second Front and wanted to send all Japanese American soldiers on front line duty and let enemy shoot them first.
- 2) For America's war effort and urged many citizens in the block to work on camouflage nets.
- 3) That he is a dangerous 'red.'
- 4) Married to white woman and does not follow Japanese customs. He washes son's clothes, while wife works on camouflage, let's [sic] wife go to meetings, etc.
- 5) Stooge for administration and also informer because he has been seen with [Tokie] Slocum on many occasions.
- 6) Spoke at Kibei meeting against them.
- 7) Spoke at Citizens Federation meeting for America.
- 8) Responsible for all meetings, in camp, to be conducted in English.⁷⁹

Viewing himself as a scapegoat for pro-Japan elements, Yoneda believed this opposition to him politically significant. The overriding

Concerning Sugar Problem at Mangalore

According to the sugar rationing every person is entitled to eight ounces per week, but less than seven ounces has been received. When the explanation was demanded, however, the administration gave no satisfactory answer on some pretext or other, while there were popular criticisms and rumors such as, that Mr. Campbell was caught by the police when he was transferring sugar to outside, but the latter overlooked it; and that the mess hall employees have been using it in questionable manner. To settle the problem the employees' association was organized.

According to its investigation following facts were revealed. For the month of October, 1942 6,100 pounds of sugar was short; again for July about the same amount was short; and there was a short in other months. When it passed for the administration for explanation, the latter said that it was partly consumed in the hospital and that it was stored for later use in manufacturing soy sauce. But upon investigation it was revealed that the hospital never received such an amount of sugar.

Why did not the administration obtain sugar separately for industrial use for manufacturing

any cases, since ~~its~~ manufacturing was already decided upon at the beginning of September, 1942? (For this purpose more than three hundred pounds was already used at this time.) It was only after the sugar problem became a heated issue in the early part of November that the W.C.P. acquired the forms for industrial use of sugar thru the San Francisco Regional Office of W.C.P.

Also in spite of the fact that Mr. Kimball, the project director, announced on the transcript that these that the said amount of sugar (5100 lbs) would be compensated for during November, 1942, there had not been any. The reason is obvious: there was not the amount of sugar in the warehouse for such purpose.

If the administration did not wish to be pressed hard on the responsibility of the sugar problems, why didn't it make prompt disavowment instead of shifting its responsibility to me as one of the charges? It is the most self-contradictory policy to shift his own guilt to other person instead of condemning himself!

Harry G. Kerco

Ugno-san

I note in your book that you fault Joe Masaoka and another person for your having ended up in Moab, Leupp, then transferred to Tule Lake. You no doubt have seen the enclosed document already.

The iron cage must have been brought to the Manzanar after the riot. Note the observations of the Spanish Council.

I have papers, which I cannot presently locate, which give interesting insight

into the so-called 'Black Dragon'
Society in terms of the 'relocation
center' dissident activities. Someday
I shall send copy to you.

SUBJECT: ^{one U . Y v r r s H . 7 M} Mass Meeting of the Manzanar Work Corps
Representative Assembly

PURPOSE: Introduction of Candidates

DATE: Monday, October 19, 1942

TIME: 7 p.m.

PLACE: Mess Hall #22

Introduction of candidates to the Fair Practice Committee and the chairmen of the standing committees will be made.

The speakers will be Mr. Harvey M. Coverly, Acting Project Director, and Mr. Ned Campbell, Assistant Project Director.

The public is urged to attend.

George Matsumura
Temporary Executive Secretary
Manzanar Work Corps

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

CANDIDATES FOR FAIR PRACTICE COMMITTEE

from

PROFESSIONAL GROUP

<u>Name</u>	<u>Project Unit</u>	<u>Address</u>
1. Akiyama, Kametaro	Block Leader (14)	14-6-3
2. Izuno, Dick ?	Block Leader (12)	12-11-1
3. Masunaka, Koichi	Block Leader (19)	19-6-3
4. Ozawa, H. K.	Block Leader (26)	26-1-4
5. Shikami, Joe	Block Leader (17)	17-1-2
6. Furuta, Shigeo	Block Leader (3)	3-11-2
7. Marumoto, Yoshio	Legal Aide Department	35-6-4
8. Sato, Justus	Manufacturing	29-8-1
9. Nagao, Tosh	Camouflage	22-13-4
10. Shima, Takeo	Orchard	2-4-2
11. Sugihara, Yoshio	Farm	25-3-4
12. <u>Isotani, Jack</u>	Kitchen #27	27-14-2
13. Mitsuata, Shizuo	Children's Village Kitchen	22-6-2
14. Masunaga, Mido	Kitchen #25	25-11-4
15. Higashi, Kiyoshi	Police Department	28-11-3
16. Oshio, Harry	Motor Pool	6-13-3
17. Matsumura, George	Employment	5-14-2
18. Kubota, Robert	Fire Department	13-8-1
19. Kikuchi, Miya	Social Welfare	34-7-4

CANDIDATES FOR THE CHAIRMENOF
STANDING COMMITTEEOff-Project Committee

<u>Name</u>	<u>Project Unit</u>	<u>Address</u>
1. Tayama, Fred	Project Research	28-11-2
2. Kageyama, Kay	Records Office	33-13-3
3. Nakamura, Gen	Drafting Department	28-7-4
4. Shinno, George	School Project	26-11-1
5. Itami, Dave I.S.	Free Press	28-8-1

Educational Committee

<u>Name</u>	<u>Project Unit</u>	<u>Address</u>
1. Aono, John	Block Leader	29-2-4
2. Asaka, Alice	Social Welfare	16-10-3
3. Wakatsuki, Riku	Head Dietician	16-12-2
4. Onodera, Sho I.S.	Community Service	19-9-4
5. Ishizuka, Henry	Manufacturing	23-8-4
6. Chaman, Yemi x	Hospital	29-7-1
7. Uyeno, Tad I.S.	Free Press	12 -1-4

Investigation Committee

<u>Name</u>	<u>Project Unit</u>	<u>Address</u>
1. Masuyama, Eizo	Block Leader	25-3-3
2. Ono, George Takeshi	Maintenance	23-6-3
3. Tonai, Gunji	Freight	9-5-2
4. Yamada, Rinzo	Mess	1-12-2
5. Uyeda, K.	Dry Goods	2007-4

CANDIDATES FOR FAIR PRACTICE COMMITTEE

from

MISCELLANEOUS GROUP

<u>Name</u>	<u>Project Unit</u>	<u>Address</u>
1. Enseki, Frank	Carpenter	7-5-2
2. Nakamura, Yoshio	Dentist	10-1-3
3. Kuga, Bill ^E	Timekeeping	2-2-1
4. Murakami, Henry	Project Research	9-2-1
5. Inazu, Taizo	Housing	25-12-1
6. Hayashi, Masao	Night Checker	15-11-2
7. Ozone, Koichi	Night Checker	17-6-4
8. Yamasaki, Tomomasa	Free Press	32-6-3
9. Anzai, Kiyoharu	Sanitary Inspector	34-3-4
10. Kijima, Kenji	Kendo Instructor	13-11-3
11. Matsumoto, Lillian	Ass't. Sup't.	Childrens Village
12. Abe, Seizo (Rev.)	Social Welfare	4-2-3
13. Oda, Hiromi (Rev.)	Social Welfare	28-2-2
14. Mary, Susana (Sister)	Social Welfare	19-7-5
15. Niwa, Ujio	Social Welfare	29-8-2
16. Tayama, Chiyo —	Social Welfare	28-11-3
17. Shimizu, Fumi	Recreation	27-6-2
18. Yokota, Tsugio	Dry Goods	14-12-2
19. Yashiki, Mineichi	Dry Goods	32-9-3

S. J. Hayakawa

MILL VALLEY

May 17, 1986

Dear Mr. Ueno:

I got your letter and article, "Hostages of War," in this morning's mail. I read it at once, with great interest and sympathy. Certainly a nation's state of war brings out the worst aspects of human nature.

However, I cannot think of the WWII experience of Japanese-Americans without placing it in the context of 80 or more years of anti-Oriental propaganda and legislation that emanated from California starting very soon after the Gold Rush: the anti-Chinese riots, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the Japanese Exclusion of 1925, the Alien Land Law, etc. etc. And when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, every anti-Oriental fear was aroused. In view of this fact, I have always been impressed with the fact that things were no worse than they were.

I enclose my own testimony of April 28 before the House Subcommittee in Washington. I am afraid we shall never be able to see eye to eye on the relocation issue, but I hope you will agree that some good came out of it. Japanese-Americans are doing extraordinarily well in American society -- making money, being prominent in the learned professions and in business, being elected to public office -- all achievements that my own father would never have imagined possible when he was a young man. *He returned to Japan with my mother when I was 18 + in college.*

When I am asked again to speak on the subject of the Japanese-American experience in America, I shall not for get what you ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ have written on the subject.

I wish I had known Dillon Myer. Opinions about him differ so drastically! Didn't the evacuees honor Mr. Myer over and over again for his kind and just treatment of evacuees when the camps were finally closed? And you write about him as some kind of racist Hitler! Different people must have had very different experiences with him! I must look more deeply into this subject.

Thank you again, Mr. Ueno, for writing and sending me your article. I am enclosing a copy of my testimony of April 28 (I guess I already said this), but let me add that I shall welcome your comments.

With all good wishes,

S. I. Hayabawa

No Secretary —
please forgive the
unprofessional
typing.



National Council for Japanese American Redress

925 W. Diversey Parkway

Chicago, Ill. 60614

October 21, 1984

Sponsors, Redress Legal Fund

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*Amy Yoshinaga

*designates *umm.*
contributors of \$1,000 or more.
Some remain anonymous.

Mr. Harry Ueno
1690 Creek Drive
San Jose, California 95125

Dear Mr. Ueno:

We are writing to you again as a plaintiff. Our attorneys filed our appeal brief on Friday, October 12. For your information, enclosed is a copy of the Statement of the Case and Summary of the Argument.

The JAACL filed an amicus curiae brief on the same day.

The United States has until November 13 to file their response. We must file our reply to their response by November 27.

Sincerely,

(Mrs.) Emi K. Fujii

Enc.

C.L. Hsia disputes the accuracy of Wan being assassinated in 1916. According to Hsia, he died a natural death in 1943. Private conversation, Hsia to the author, 25 December 1984.

35. Correspondence, S.C. New to Way-sung New and Wai-tsu New, 12 March 1915; correspondence, S.C. New to Way-sung New, 9 April 1915; Papers of S.C. New.

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

JACL IN QUEST OF JUSTICE. By William Hosokawa (William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1982. 383 pp. \$15.50.)

William Kumpe Hosokawa has won his spurs in newspaper journalism but among his own racial public his prestige is much less secure. His evacuation productions have come to be considered so stereotyped that they generate little excitement or popular acclaim. Pro-JACLism today tends merely to fuel latent antagonisms. He is viewed as a well paid hireling subverting his not inconsiderable talents and literary reputation to espouse the questionable virtues of a racially discredited organization. What makes him do this, besides the modern increment of the twenty pieces of silver, is his strong relationship and devotion. His extreme fanaticism fires up the vocal opposition.

JACL in Quest of Justice is his latest book and the third attempt to sell his particular concept. The knowledgeable readers would be impressed by its semi-fictional character. There are passages, such as the Ushi saga, which is left incomplete by omitting the Doi incident that cost the League a hefty \$30,000. Then, the author is silent on the Cam Harmony episode that created an assassination plot. In fact, these are not isolated examples. The book is replete with partial and total omissions that color and distort the history of JACL. There are errors in interpretation and misleading premises predicated either on lack of information or altered to suit the author's purpose.

The book is divided into three definable sections: the years of a embryo organization; the traumatic internment years; and the post reconstruction era. The first phase is a tortuous excursion into committee affairs which is punctuated with the simplistic hopes and aspirations of grandeur readily admitted that died aborning. But the author of noble intents is created to secure favorable opinion. One may well wonder, too, at the author's habit of voluminous quotations from his past works. It seems a rare thing for an author to recommend his own previous works as a guide or authority to readers anxious to acquire additional insight.

It is natural that the evacuation should be the focus of controversy. Hosokawa is candid in his admission that he had in mind a response to the critics in writing this book. We must not forget that he is the literary voice for the League and that with rare exceptions he touts its policies. Hosokawa, however, disappoints us in his failure to plow significant new ground. He appears content to offer merely the trite ab-

unconvincing platitudes of the glib orator from Utah, Mike Masaoka. This prompts the acid observation: "The author seems compelled to tell the same tale over and over, as if endless repetition is the only way to get people to believe him" (Raymond Okamura, *Pacific Citizen*, 17 December 1982).

Most of his racial critics presuppose that the author's paid status automatically identifies him as a biased writer and tend to feel it unimportant to itemize the issues at contention. In addition, the lack of a forum leads to distortions which frequently go unchallenged. But it is essential that the primary issues which fractured Japanese American society and polarized it be laid out for critical examination. In reality, there are only two key issues involved—betrayal and usurpation—from which secondary matters arise.

The perception of betrayal is perhaps the most aggravating item confronting the JACL wartime leadership. Its claim of no other recourse but to accept the indignity and humiliation of mass evacuation has fallen on deaf ears. It is difficult to accept in light of legal assistance volunteered by such civil libertarians as Wayne Collins, Ernest Besig, and Max Radin, an emissary for a group of Berkeley academicians. These offers were all refused. The League likened such action as "sabotaging the war effort." Despite Hosokawa's contrary assertion, hearing boards for selective evacuation were also rejected. As Masaoka contended: "The family unit should be kept together" (JACL National Emergency Council Conference Report, 1942, 14).

This left the third and least desirable of alternatives—civil disobedience. High level Washington officials were also troubled over the prospect of noncompliance. The suggestion that the consequence would have resulted in wholesale massacre is not quite as realistic as it is made to appear. The Roosevelt administration was sensitive toward reprisals to United States citizens in Japan-occupied territories. Any massive slaughter would have been reined in by this restraint. The wartime leadership turned its back on all of these choices and zealously embraced one hundred percent collaboration.

The JACL opted for mass evacuation even before the President issued Executive Order 9066. In-house historian Togo Tanaka pinpoints mid-February and the Maryknoll auditorium in Los Angeles as the first public push by the League for mass evacuation. A "shocked" audience heard Masaoka's proposal (Grodzin Letter, 21 January 1943, Bancroft Library). It was the sixteenth of February when Masaoka spoke before the Bay Region Council for Unity. He urged us to go quietly to inland concentration camps to "sit out the war under protective custody." National president Saburo Kido propounds this the-

ory of our becoming "a ward" in his address which is cited in the Hosokawa book (p. 366). It was this proposal which inspired the now familiar epithet "sold down the river." It was obvious that we were being betrayed.

Masaoka advised us that in this fashion we would be "demonstrating our loyalty" in response to a dissident inquirer. If the suggestion has a familiar ring, it was first proposed by California Congressman Leland Ford in mid-January. Putting it into proper perspective, we should remember that it was this selfsame Congressman who assailed resettlement later as "undoing the very thing" evacuation was intended to accomplish, "namely keep them locked up in concentration camps."

None of this is told the readers. Hosokawa wants us to believe that the League was forced to accept mass evacuation at the March 10 Special Meeting when in fact it was February 23 when Masaoka appeared before the Tolan Committee. His testimony so enraged the distinguished Methodist dean, Frank Herron Smith, that he confronted Masaoka in the corridor and heatedly charged: "You have betrayed your people!" (Fumiko Okuma to James Omura, 23 February 1942). For this outburst, Dean Smith was added to the League's Enemies List announced at a subsequent public gathering.

To the Japanese American public who have resigned themselves to accepting the military mandate of removal, it is still disturbing to them the zealotry with which League leaders embraced the proposition. Their pride is scarred by such gutless servility as "willingly; gladly; cheerfully; and happily" that tumbled unrestrained from the lips of JACL spokesmen. Those words cut deep into our sensibility and are a constant reminder of our humiliation in being deceived into being pied-pipered into concentration camps.

The other issue is usurpation of power which is less understood because of the secretive nature involved. The Nisei were long considered the heir apparent to succeed Issei community leadership. The League regarded itself as the chosen but it felt harassed and stymied by community hostility and distrust. By the early Forties, the League was aware of further erosion of its prospect particularly in southern California where three opposition groups (the Retail Produce Workers Union, AFL Local 1510, United Citizens Federation of Los Angeles, and the California Young Buddhist League) had emerged and had grown to a substantial size of a thousand or more. Combined, they represented well over 4,000 members compared to the League's 5,767 as of the end of 1941. Its goal was threatened by time as increasing number of intellectual Nisei rallied to rival groups.

Pearl Harbor was the catalyst that enabled the JACL to entrench

itself. Issei leadership was vulnerable. The JACL had already been functioning as a racial spy ring as far back as 1938 in Seattle, spreading to Los Angeles and to San Francisco as relations worsened. Though the F.B.I. pinpointed only 770 as dangerous, an astronomical 5,428 alien Japanese were seized in which the League played no inconsiderable role. We have already learned from the Curtis B. Munson once-secret Report that this power-grab obviously was a key issue at his three-day conference at national headquarters. Munson proposed squeezing power from the hands of the Issei and transferring it to the JACL.

With the toppling of Issei leadership, the JACL pursued diligently sole designation as the representative for the Japanese American population. The League was not beyond bad-mouthing a rival group in which Tom Clark of the Justice Department expressed an interest. It freely engaged in deception to secure the favors of high government officials. Its own inhouse historian confesses it ballooned its membership to "impress" the government (Togo Tanaka: Unpublished History of JACL, Bancroft Library). The actual figure was nearer to seventy-five hundred with the influx of sixteen additional chapters after Pearl Harbor. It is interesting to note the phantom "20,000" figure is still being referred to and is cited without corroboration today in books on the evacuation.

In addition, the League offered unquestioned cooperation. The two hundred delegates, with a lone exception, to the San Francisco National Emergency Conference—to which the balance of its racial society was excluded and denied participation in its own destiny—pledged to become F.B.I. informers (Hoover to Biddle, 2 February 1942, FBI 62-65880-15X). League historian Tanaka admits top officials were committed to inform. This pledge was a powerful inducement and we now know how widespread it was fulfilled in the internment camps. Once installed in power, the League performed more as an adversary rather than a representative to the Japanese American population.

The Committee on National Security and Fair Play is castigated by Hosokawa but his charge that it favored mass evacuation is untrue. It was a singularly stabilizing influence in the midst of hysteria and later smoothed the way to reabsorption of evacuees in West Coast communities. The allegation by the author refers only to limited displacement near military posts and strategic installations. The Committee was a staunch advocate of hearing boards and selective evacuation.

The most explosive issue to confront the internees was the draft. Though the resistance was a significant factor in the history of the evacuation, it finds no place except as an aberration in Hosokawa's

book. Thus, its decisive role is obscured by revisionism. He also comes down extremely hard on the Fair Play Committee of Heart Mountain and dubs them "unsavory characters," an opinion not shared by scholars and historians. Hosokawa studiously avoids telling his public that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals vindicated the leaders of the group.

Reinstitution of the draft was bound to foster repercussions. The volunteer program had ended in failure. The President had been advised that it "would hardly be fair" to impose normal draft procedures after evacuating them (Elmer Davis to President Roosevelt: Personal Files 4849, Hyde Park, 10-2-42). Two hundred eighty-five military resisters agreed with Davis, as did 3506 No-No Boys and 5,589 renunciants. The military resisters received a 1946 Christmas amnesty from President Harry Truman; while the imprisoned No-No Boys received individual Presidential pardons. The renunciants were restored their citizenship through the dedication of Wayne Collins. But tolerance and sensitivity comes hard to writers such as William Hosokawa and a group such as the Citizens League.

The issue today is Redress! Monetary redress—much like the evacuation—provokes divergent attitudes. Supporters see it as a symbol of a nation's genuine regret of wrongful acts committed, but not so the author who pictures it as "cheapening the sacrifice" we made. This could only be if our incarceration was offered as a favor. Though it may fit the JACL mold, the great body of those affected did not consent to it. Hosokawa—like his political counterpart, S.I. Hayakawa—is a vigorous foe of compensation. It may well be that his soul is not degraded by the evacuation or his dignity besmirched. Words alone cannot vindicate the grave injustice we suffered.

Hosokawa in *JACL in Quest of Justice* does not address his contemporaries. The book is aimed at posterity who inherits only the printed records and must rely upon its veracity. So this book and others of similar nature need to be corrected and revisionisms not allowed to go unchallenged. We should also be wary of after-the-fact wisdoms mentioned herein of Masaoka and Kido uttered long afterwards and unsubstantiated. Our literature is cluttered with such unreliable hindsights.

What has been discussed to this point represent but a fraction of the author's misinformations, omissions, and distortions. Constraint of allotted space forbids our comments on the Bendetsen affair incorrectly analyzed herein; the *faux pas* of the Colorado Alien Land incident and the ABC; the hostility of inland populations of Japanese ancestry to influx of evacuees; and numerous others. It is important for people to fully understand that books written for the JACL are

orchestrated distortions. It is best exemplified by the late Wayne Collins who soberly cautioned us that we "are still being lied to by our apologists" (Michi Weglyn's *Years of Infamy*, [New York, 1976], 268).

"McCloy was to become a staunch friend of the Nisei," sayest Hosokawa. We should be outraged!

James Omura
Denver, Colorado

PAWNS IN A TRIANGLE OF HATE: THE PERUVIAN JAPANESE AND THE UNITED STATES. By C. Harvey Gardiner (Seattle: Washington Press, 1981. 222pp. hardcover, \$27.50.)

NAMIDA NO ADIOSU: NIKKEI PERU IMIN BEIKOKU KYOSEI SHUYO No Ki (The Memoirs of Seiichi Higashide, A Japanese-Peruvian Internee in U.S. Concentration Camps). By Higashide Seiichi (Tokyo: Sairyusha, 1981. 345 pp. hardcover, ¥1,900.)

Between 1942 and 1944, approximately 1,800 Japanese Peruvians were deported from Peru and transported to the United States where they were placed into internment camps. These Japanese Peruvians represented eighty percent of all the Japanese who were shipped into this country from Latin America by the American government. Among these people, there were Issei who were naturalized Peruvian citizens as well as Peruvian-born Nisei. A little over a thousand were repatriated to Japan, many in exchange for American citizens in the hands of the Japanese government. In the postwar period, less than a hundred were readmitted into Peru by the Peruvian government, while the remainder, after a prolonged legal battle were granted the right to stay in the United States.

Japanese immigration to Peru commenced in 1899 with the arrival of 790 contract laborers shipped by a Japanese emigration company. Between that year and 1923, almost eighteen thousand contract laborers landed in Callao. Subsequently, Japanese immigration assumed a pattern of wives, relatives, and friends being summoned to Peru by wartime contract laborers who had established themselves economically. By 1940 the Japanese Peruvian population numbered 17,598 and was concentrated heavily in the Lima-Callao metropolitan area. In terms of prefectural origins, Okinawans were most numerous, comprising over half of the total population. Occupationally, Japanese Peruvians engaged mostly in small business and agriculture. Looked upon with a mixture of fear, suspicion, and hatred by Peruvians, they

lived socially apart from the larger society. In May 1940 anti-Japanese riots occurred in Lima and Callao, auguring what was to happen to many Japanese Peruvians with the outbreak of the Pacific War.

In the first book, C. Harvey Gardiner narrates the wartime story of the Japanese Peruvians. In his view they were caught between Japan, Peru, and the United States as "pawns in a triangle of hate." He begins with the American and Peruvian government background. Once the attack on Pearl Harbor took place, the United States urged the Peruvian government to arrest and detain all citizens of the Axis powers believed to be dangerous. To facilitate this goal, the Lima Embassy compiled a list of Japanese Peruvians considered to be dangerous by its staff. In addition, the United States requested that the Peruvian government hand over these persons as potential exchange hostages for American citizens held by the Japanese government. For its part, the Peruvian government had reason for turning over Japanese Peruvians to the United States. Motivated by racial considerations, it wanted to rid Peru of what it deemed an unwanted alien element. Through diplomatic negotiation, the two governments sealed the fate of those who were eventually arrested without charge, detained without hearing, and deported without cause. According to Gardiner, the majority were powerless people who by no stretch of the imagination could have posed a threat to Peruvian society, much less to the security of the Western hemisphere. In this diplomatic process, the author is most critical of Ambassador Henry R. Norweb and Third Secretary John K. Emmerson who played key roles in Peru on the American side.

Upon arrival in the United States, the Japanese Peruvians were charged with violating American immigration regulations and held in the custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service as illegal entrants. There were initially interned in INS internment camps at Kenedy and Seagoville, Texas, and later at Crystal City, Texas and Santa Fe, New Mexico. In complete sympathy with the Japanese Peruvians, Gardiner sides with them by narrating their internment experience from their perspective, which he juxtaposes with the inhumane, unjust, and callous acts of the Peruvian and American governments. In writing this valuable historical account, he draws upon a wide range of primary sources—manuscripts, government documents, published works, as well as interviews and correspondence with the Japanese Peruvians.

The second book is an autobiography by a Japanese Peruvian who was an internee. A native of Hokkaido, Higashide Seiichi first immigrated to Peru in 1930. In 1941 he operated a retail store in the town of Ica located south of Lima. Active in community affairs, he was the head of the Ica Japanese Association and a board member of the

R E P O R T S

NATIONAL EMERGENCY CONFERENCE

Japanese American Citizens League

I N T E R N A L S E C U R I T Y

Kiyoshi Higashi, Chief of Police

Manzanar Relocation Center

Chairman

*Friends of Fred Toyama
Harris from Terminal B2*

BACKGROUND: Everywhere in America, and particularly on the West Coast where large numbers of Japanese have lived, there has been a marked absence of crime among our people. Police blotters seldom carried Japanese names. The criminal incidents rate among Japanese was negligible.

Pride, family training, neighbor and public opinion were strong preventives to irregular conduct. It is these same forces that have been deterrents to lawbreaking in the centers. During the period when evacuees have been busily engaged in making furniture, cupboards, and closets for their physical comfort, internal security statistics have been remarkably low.

Now, with more leisure time, dormant forces are beginning to create disturbances. That has seemingly appeared to most Caucasian administrators as a placid community life, in reality, covered a cauldron in which differing ideologies, unmixable as oil and water, seethed and boiled. Surface indications of this internal strife have appeared from time to time. However, center officials have usually dismissed these symptoms with an academic leniency.

The real threat to peace and order within the centers will not come from individual lawlessness. The bombshell that will shatter these communities will be the blow-off of (1) accumulated resentments, (2) harbored injustices, (3) racial discriminations, (4) pro-Japan convictions, and (5) real and fancied grievances. As time goes on, rather than a settling process, mob outbreaks, mass demonstrations, gang atrocities and acts of terrorism will recur frequently.

WRA administrators must realize the dynamite they are dealing with; they must be realistic; they must not encourage the mushrooming of small incidents by condoning with official laxity; individuals advocating constructive attitudes and activities must be shielded from vengeful harm; delinquent elements in each camp must be recognized and intelligent yet stern methods must be instituted to curb them.

WARNING: The handwriting on the wall is the insurgence of "Nippon Benzai" groups. These elements will use every dissatisfaction to fan the flames of trouble. Unless measures are taken to cope with them, the entire WRA program is jeopardized. The control of any center by intimidation or the outbreak of violence by this group will bring down the hue and cry of the press that the WRA is coddling pro-axis sentiment; that the army should run the centers.

Despite circumspection in drawing up any plan of self-government, there is an inevitable peevishness among some of the residents. These "join-ers" will attack provisions in the constitution, or the people elected, or their method of election. It is very likely that these snipers are the spearhead of an organized opposition that operates sub rosa feeding the fires of discontent.

It is also likely that this underground movement is allied or identical to the pro-Japan elements in the center. For this reason the forces of law and order must absolutely predominate in the center. The judiciary code of the center Constitution must be rigidly enforced; at no time must the sinister groups of intimidation, of coercion, or of blackmail gain the upper hand, as they have in some communities.

If those who believe in America are to continue to live side by side with those who have lost their faith in America, then the forward-looking, wholesome people in the centers must be protected from those who jeer and taunt and threaten them.

COURTS: Under present rulings, felonies are taken outside the center and tried in the county. Destruction of center property constitutes a felony and becomes liable to the same procedure. Shifting of trial outside the center means a prejudiced court in the eyes of many residents.

The Judiciary code drawn up by representatives of the center is the law. Infractions are tried and sentences, subject to Project Director approval, meted out to offenders. While the panel of the Judiciary Committee includes both Caucasians and residents, the Japanese serving thereon have frequently become the target of intimidation and coercion. Already, conditions have become such that in some centers, law-abiding elements have been driven to cover, thus rendering themselves ineffective and non-assertive.

Fair Practice and Grievance Committees function in the various centers as conciliatory and arbitration boards to adjust work conditions and worker's controversies. Here, too, unsatisfactory decisions often become personal grudges and members of such boards are sometimes waylaid and beaten.

FIRE AND POLICE PROTECTION: Cognizance of the fire hazards inherent in the all-wood type of center construction has led to the placing of fire extinguishers in all dwellings. However, telephones or some fire alarm system should be made available in every block. Most imperative, however, is the need for frequent fire drills in the schools, which are barracks converted to classroom use. Should flames start in these fire-traps, panic and casualties are probable.

Police organization in the light of recent events should be a four-phase program:

1. Trailing of sentenced offenders should be strict isolation except for definite visiting hours. No visiting should be permitted at windows of jailhouses nor should refreshments be brought in to prisoners and a general partying be tolerated during the visiting period.

Segregation of known troublemakers to a separate center must be accomplished in the interests of peace and order. The "RA" policy of lenience has resulted in covering the decent center population to submission to terrorist rule. Unless this is done, agitators will continue to foment trouble and eventually call down upon evildoers and "RA" administration a strict military surveillance and perhaps even congressional investigation.

2. Policing and records are a matter of intelligent mechanics. Naturally, men of known integrity should be engaged in patrol work; otherwise, unscrupulous policemen may attempt to curry special privileges for themselves and families or their groups.
3. Investigative Police, like their undercover counterparts in the cities, should have their fingers and ears on the "danger areas" and "sore spots" of each community. Advance warning of outbreaks should be forecasted and serious demonstrations averted. Violations of the Judiciary Code should be duly investigated with full utilization of modern police procedures.

4. Classroom instruction in fundamentals of police work should be started in all centers as a special inducement to attract and hold high caliber men. How to write a report, how to investigate, fingerprint classification, handwriting and typewriting identification, police photography, how to identify by pictures, plaster casting of footprints, first aid, Judo, search and evaluation of evidence should be among lecture subjects.

GANGSTERISM: Gangs which have run amok of the police have usually been infused with resentments and injustices fanned alive in them by pro-Japan persons. These gangs have directed their assaults against individuals who have been prominent in community activities whom they label as "administration stooges" or "JACL guys." Generally, their attitude has been one of brahmadocio because of seeming immunity against legal punishments.

RACKETEERING AND GAMBLING: To date no racketeering has been uncovered in the centers. LICUOR has been smuggled in by Caucasian workers. Dismissal of such bootleggers has stopped illicit liquor trafficking. Police are often challenged with:

Is liquor contraband?
What WRA ruling prohibits liquor purchases?
Does possession and drinking constitute a legal violation?
Is the act of bringing in liquor to the centers or mail orders of liquor a punishable crime?

Gambling in a vice sense does not apparently exist. Reported cases have seldom passed the friendly stage.

PRO-JAPAN ELEMENTS:

Wholesale experiences of the racial evacuation and living within centers surrounded by barbed wires and watchtowers are in the eyes of many *primo facie* evidence that a future in this country is hopeless for us. These, too, they believe are indisputable arguments that Japan's is the righteous cause.

So those who espouse Americanism, participation in the armed forces of the country, work on defense projects, and relocation are particular objects of enmity and persecution.

Numerically, this pro-Japan element is small but the damage their insidious propaganda can do to the peace and order of the community should not be too lightly regarded.

CONCLUSION:

Internal security should be exactly what its title connotes. Reports issuing from some centers indicate that security of life and limb for those bespeaking constructive attitudes does not exist. On the other hand, malefactors have been so condoned that their nefarious beatings of decent citizens continues not only unabated but with increasing frequency.

A warning note must here be again emphasized. As community leaders leave on individual relocation, the centers are drained of the spark plugs which give momentum to WRA policies. The elements which maintained hopeful attitudes of personal re-establishment may disintegrate. The centers may become hotbeds of unrest and incandescence. Truly, a great many of the evacuees may become persuaded to remain as wards for the duration. With such a spirit rampant within the centers, WRA administration may of necessity become transformed into a prison administration to maintain peace and order.

* * * * *

Report of a police officer attacked and background of
gangsterism in Manzanar

Compiled by the office of HISTORICAL DOCUMENTATION --
Toyo Tanaka - Joe Masaoka
November 11 Manzanar

MANZANAR POLICE OFFICER ATTACHED BY 'GANG'

Who: Tom Tamotsu Imai, investigator, Manzanar internal police force. Biog.-- 28, married, formerly of San Fernando, a '31 graduate of San Fernando High School; before evacuation, he was engaged in flower growing; he served as President of the San Fernando Japanese American Citizens League. At Manzanar he has served on the Consumer Cooperative Education Committee, the Commission for Self-Government. He and his wife are supervisors for the Y.Y.A. dormitory.

When: At 8:00 p.m. Tuesday, November 10

Where: In front and at the side of the Young Women's Association dormitory, 19-14, where the Imai's live.

How: Approximately 15 young men, unidentified by name, but described through speech, mannerism and wearing apparel as "Terminal Islanders," were seen loitering around the building for half an hour before the assault. They were lined up on both sides of the barrack, apparently waiting for Mr. Imai to show himself.

At 8:00 p.m., Mr. Imai stepped outside the barrack to escort one of the girls attending a club cabinet meeting at the Y.M.C.A. to her home. He carried his police flashlight. Mrs. Imai was at the door. As he turned his light on half a dozen silent figures waiting at the barrack side, each man turned his back; collars of peacoats had been raised. Then, suddenly and without warning, he was assaulted from behind. Approximately 15 young men beat and kicked him as he rolled on the ground. Mrs. Imai screamed. A truck came to a stop at the intersection of blocks 19 and 13. The attackers apparently believed it to be a police car; they fled into the dark. Mr. Imai was taken to the hospital for examination. Extent of injuries: external bruises, right swollen eye, possible internal injuries.

Why:

Occasion for the attack appears to be the fact that Officer Imai, in line of duty as a member of the Manzanar Police force, uncovered the attempted smuggling of intoxicants into Manzanar by returning Terminal Island beat furlough workers. This incident occurred the same day. The first of three Greyhound buses arrived at Manzanar Tuesday at about 11:30 a.m. It was parked at the side of the police station awaiting arrival of Military Police for baggage inspection. Friends and well-wishers thronged the bus. One of the returning workers, identified by police as a San Pedro "Terminal Islander", raised his window and attempted to pass his pea-jacket to a girl bystander. Officer Imai, standing nearby, said: "You're not allowed to pass anything out of the window." The girl pushed the pea-jacket back; in the process, a bottle of liquor fell out of the jacket, smashing on the ground.

Police Commissioner Willard Schmidt issued a warning. Ropes were thrown around each bus, spectators kept back, each returning worker was frisked, baggage more closely inspected.

A group of boys, identified by blue denim jackets with letter: "San Pedro Federal Pen." and "San Pedro Yogores", stood in the back, shouting at Mr. Imai: "Pro-American" and "Stoolpigeon." Heard muttered in Japanese were such expressions as "Nihonjin doshi de songurai no koto wa yurushitomo inoni." (Among Japanese, these little things could be overlooked.)

ATTACK ON POLICEMAN latest in series of "gang" assaults

Groups:

Manzanar gangdom is usually identified by the people as one of three

- (1) Terminal Islanders, known also as "Yogores" or the "San Pedro Gang"
- (2) The "Dunbar Gang"
- (3) The "Blood Brothers Corps", known also as "Yuhc Keshhidan."

CASE HISTORIES:

- (1) Terminal Island Yogores

This group has been the most active to date in committing acts of physical violence. Numerically, it is reputed to be the largest "gang," claims varying between "200 to 500 guys." Actually, according to police authorities, there are not more than 20 to 25 habitual troublemakers among the group; they are young men in their late teens or early twenties. They are almost uniformly characterized by: (1) their previous occupation has been either that of fisherman or cannery workers; (2) their deep resentment against the government and anyone in authority, as a result of the manner in which they were evacuated; (3) their outspoken bitterness against what they describe as "unjust imprisonment of my old man by the F.B.I." (Almost all Terminal Island older men-- the fathers of these youths--were taken into custody); (4) their crude manners, uncouth dress and speech, the latter being a mixture of Japanese and English to a greater extent than is usual among the Nisei.

- (Center of the Terminal Island
- (Colony is Block 9, which is
- (solidly made up of San Pedro
- (evacees; an overflow into
- (blocks 8 and 10 cares for most
- (of the remainder, although they
- (are dispersed throughout the
- (Center.

According to residents who have moved away from Block 9 because "we weren't from Terminal Island," the San Pedrans are intensely partisan, making it virtually "impossible" for "outsiders" to live with or among them.

THEIR RECORD IN GANG VIOLENCE:

- (a) In sports and recreation-- Terminal Islanders usually excel in sports. In softball, two of their teams, the "Yogores" and the "Marlins" led their respective leagues. However, they were both involved in fist fights on the diamond to the extent that they gained a reputation among other teams for being "Bellicose" and "always looking for a fight." In one championship game in a major league, the contest was never decided because it developed into gang fight which put a player on the opposing team in the hospital. Dances at Manzanar invariably require police protection because of "hoodlum Gate crashers." Sponsors invariably blame "The Yogores" as among the troublemakers; also, without exception, they "never come alone, always in groups of eight or ten or more." An undetermined number (because victims have said they were afraid to report to the police for fear of retaliation) of individuals have been beaten and assaulted by "the San Pedro Gang" in these minor outbreaks.
- (b) In project employment-- In work at Manzanar, Terminal Island young men tend to stick together in gangs; they are usually found in jobs requiring physical labor, very seldom in office jobs. They display an almost characteristic scorn for "white collar workers." Frequently heard by them: "Anyone who works in the administration office is a stooge for the kot-toh."
--The linoleum laying crew (app. 100 workers), with one or two exceptions, was made up of Terminal Islanders. Many of their number were accused of showing favoritism repeatedly, and of exacting "tribute" in the form of refreshments or money given in advance "for a fancier and cleaner job." Because they were well organized, they displayed an attitude of independence in their work. They carried over their dislike of certain individuals into their work; one block leader, who was singled out, complained of a "terribly messy" job in his office, accused layers of splattering the walls of his barrack.
--It is generally believed throughout the center that the distribution of lumber and plaster board for barrack insulation has been controlled by Terminal Islanders. The statement is frequently made that the "San Pedro Gang," by intimidation and threats, have made this possible. At this date, Mess Hall 9 is the only one in the center which is completely insulated.
- (c) In their relations with other residents--There is no doubt that to the majority of Manzanar people, "Terminal Island" has become a label synonymous with "gangism." For instance:
--On block 35, a Terminal Island woman, Mrs. Honda (husband in detention) was accused by neighbors as having threatened her immediate neighbor, a Mrs. Ohashi, who allegedly had complained of "too much noise at night" by the Hondas. "I'll let the San Pedro gang after you," Mrs. Honda is reported to have said one day. Next day Mrs. Ohashi, suffering from high blood pressure and a stroke, was hospitalized. Threats and intimidation, in the form of loud talk by men visitors, heard through the thin partition by Mrs. Ohashi's daughter, reportedly aggravated the situation. The Ohashis are moving to block 29.
--On block 12, a Mr. Matsumura was placed in charge of plaster board distribution. A Terminal Island family on that block was accused of taking more than its share and making closets and shelves. Upon Mr. Matsumura's protest, he was threatened: "You'd better shut up or we'll get the San Pedro gang to beat you up." He shut up.
--At the Hospital one day, a police patrolman stopped a burly youth who entered without a permit. The youth turned on him: "Listen, guy, lay off or else my Pedro gang will see you later." He was not stopped further.
--At the Children's Village Hallowe'en party, the youngsters were playing games. Three somewhat grimy little boys sneaked into the room. "Then told the party was for invited guests, they told the superintendent: 'We're from Terminal Island; we can go anywhere we please!'"
--On Block 26, residents last week gathered at their mess hall to see the motion picture, "Tin Pan Alley" which a resident, T. Betsuin, had secured. Over a hundred youths "crashed" the gate, crowdin' 26 residents out; a commotion resulted, there was a near-fight. The crew in charge of the projector later said: "The d _____ San Pedro bunch again!"

--In the schools, particularly high school, teachers have begun to ascribe their "worst discipline cases" with "Terminal Island." There is a tendency for these students to wish to ridicule and embarrass their teachers, apparently enjoying such discomfiture. They are described as "brazen in back talk, disconcerting, making frequent apparently derogatory remarks in Japanese." Teachers point out that "gangism seems to be carried over into the schools." This is particularly true in the open fields and in large crowds.

(2) The "Dunbar Gang"

Center residents are not so familiar with the nature or origin of this "gang" as they are of the Terminal Islanders. Numerically, they have been reported to be composed of between 50 and 85 fellows, in their late teens and early twenties. Their alleged "ring leaders" seem to have come from downtown Los Angeles: Boyle Heights, Little Tokio and the Market district. They have sometimes been referred to here as "the zoot suit boys with Filipino haircuts." Not all of them, however, bear this stamp. A larger proportion of boys associated with this "gang" (fairly or not) have landed in the Minzener jail. (than the Terminal Islanders)

The alleged leaders of this "gang" and a concentration of the so-called membership is said to reside on blocks 26 and 21.

There have been attempts by at least two of their spokesmen to disclaim accusations levelled against the "Dunbar Boys." "We take the blame for everything bad that's done around here when it isn't any member of our group that does them," they have said.

Spokesmen: Generally recognized as leader of youths labelled as "Dunbar boys" are Tom Watanabe, formerly of Los Angeles, once a worker in the camouflage factory, now a truck driver, a young man in his early twenties who lost his wife and two babies in childbirth at the Minzener Hospital. Others frequently mentioned are Sakaye Kazunaga, Hideo Kunitomi. One Minzener character, Bob Matsuda, is more often than not, associated with both the "Yojoire" and "Dunbar" gang. He has a local record (police) and a reputation that claims he is a "graduate of Preston Reformatory" and an ex-seaman.

Their local reputation:

Blame for petty theft cases here has been generally placed on the "Dunbar gang." Whether this is justified or not is difficult to determine because the "gang" is not a formal organization. Rather, it is described by some residents as a "loose association of hell-raisers." The Administration, through its community services division, has looked upon the problems raised by this particular group as being a case of social maladjustment. A program to bring the club under Young Men's activities has been undertaken.

How they gained their notoriety:

In gangs, these youths have intimidated, threatened, and physically assaulted individuals. In this respect, their case history parallels the record of the Terminal Islanders, only on a smaller scale.

Disturbances in the camouflage net factory in July and August were traced to workers boasting they were "Dunbar boys." Loitering, interfering with other workers, rolling dice, playing cards during working hours, inciting a strike, were charged to them.

Threats against the Minzener hospital staff, which reached their height in September, were traced to the "Dunbar Boys." A threat against the life of the hospital head was openly made by a member of the gang. Other members of the medical staff were the targets of loud threats. This followed the deaths of Watanabe's wife and babies.

The general impression that boys in this gang are "lazy and shiftless" has gained as a result of the Idaho furlough work. A group labelled as "Dunbar" is reported to have been the only group of workers fired from their jobs at Shelley, Idaho.

An attack upon two members of the Free Press staff, Joe Blamey, a cripple, and James Oda, in late August by Toshi Akashi, assertedly egged on by Bob Matsume and a large gang of youths who crowded around the barrack where Blamey and Oda lived, drew attention to the "Dunbar Gang."

Manzanar's "chronic jail inmate," a Frank Fukuchi, is generally associated as a "Dunbar boy."

(3) The 'Blood Brothers Corps'

This appears to be an "underground movement" political in nature. Unlike the "San Pedro Gang" or the "Dunbar Gang," no member of this group has come out into the open and acknowledged himself as a "Blood Brother."

Their activities to date:

(a) On October 31, 1942, bulletins written in Japanese appeared on Mess Hall bulletins in violation of center regulations which require approval of every poster. Translated, the bulletin read:

"Attention: We do not recognize any necessity for a self-government system. We should oppose anything like this as drawing a rope around our neck. Let the Army take care of everything. Stop taking action which might bring trouble to our fellow people.

--BLOOD BROTHERS CORPS CONCERNED
ABOUT THE PEOPLE"

(b) On Friday and Saturday, November 6 and 7, the members of the Manzanar Commission on Self-Government received letters via mail from the "Blood Brothers." The following 17 persons, comprising the commission, were recipients: Frank Chuman, Dr. James M. Goto, Jack Iwata, Rev. J. I. Kasuitani, Mrs. Miya Kikuchi, Choyoi Kondo, Joe Mascock, Miss Chiye Mori, Rev. Shin'o Nagatani, Frederick Ours, Tojo Tanaka, Walter Watanabe, Frank Yasuda, Sho Onodera, Roy Tashimi, Kiyoshi Higashi, Tom Imai.

There were two sets of letters, both in Japanese, apparently written by two different persons.

Following is a literal translation of the shorter of the two letters:

"Think of the shame the American Government has put us into. Think of the disruption of properties, and the imprisonment of the nisei.

"To start a self-government system now is nothing but a dirty selfish scheme. As the Army put us in here without regard to our own will, we should leave everything up to the Army, whether they want to kill us or not us.

"Because this is the only way the American Government can think of as a means of absolving itself from the blame of misconducting its affairs, the government thought of a bad scheme, that is, this formation of the self-government system.

"The hairy beads (white) are out to actually run the Government, while using you people who can be used. It is evident if you read article I of the Charter and can be proved by the facts of the past. You fellows who are acting blindly are big fools.

"If you do such things as those, which tighten the noose around the necks of your fellow people, some day you will receive punishment from Heaven, so beware.

--BLOOD BROTHERS CORPS "HIGH
TORY FOR THEIR FELLOW PEOPLE"

Following is a translation of the longer of the two letters: (Both translations by Mike Dave Imai of the Information Office.)

"Calling you fools who are running around trying to set up a self-government system.

"Think back! The fact that the positions, the properties, and the honor which our fellow Japanese built up and won by blood and sweat during the past fifty years have all been stamped and sacrificed by the arrogant and insulting American government after we have been put into this isolated spot.

"For what are you beating around? What use is there for establishing self-government? Especially with such a Charter so full of contradictions? Although we are ignorant people, we can foresee the tragic results which will come out of this self-government.

"Remember that the majority of our people are absolutely against the self-government system. What do you think of the fact that six months ago, in Santa Anita, the same attempt which you are now trying, was made, to organize a self-government. But it broke down before it materialized.

"Leave everything completely as the Army pleases. If you nincompoops realize the fact that you are Japanese, why don't you assume the honorable attitude which is typical of Japanese. What a shameful sight you are about to present by being fooled by the sweet words of the Government. By so doing, you are inviting suffering to your fellow Japanese.

"The fellow Japanese are all like fish laid on the cutting board, about to be sliced. To jump around at this stage is a cowardly thing to do. Better lay down and let the government do as it pleases, either cook us or fry us.

"You should remain calm and conduct yourselves like nationals of a first class power. Give more thoughts and deep reflections as to your attitude.

--BLOOD BROTHERS CORPS WHICH IS
CONCERNED OVER FELLOW NATIONALS"

Commission members have expressed the opinion that the serious tone of the letters is lost in the English translations.

(c) Additional posters have been tacked on mess hall bulletin boards in the last week. Police investigations have been under way. The latest posters carried messages condemning those who had torn down earlier "Blood Brother" missives.

Because of the anonymous character of activities to date, definite identities have not been ascertained.

However, certain individuals, because of their past activities and utterances made in public, are under suspicion and have been questioned. Previous remarks, phrases, and statements attributed to such individuals, have a remarkable similarity with language in letters and posters, according to investigators. These individuals, unlike members of the "gangs" previously described, are reported to be older (usually in their late thirties and older) and appear to have control in the mess hall division where they are most active.

Their procedure and technique is described by some residents as "typically Japanese. They give one warning in advance to save their conscience, then assassinate. They already have two persons picked out who will be martyrs to the cause."

Names associated in center gossip and rumor with this movement include: Harry Yeshio Ueno, Heitsu Tsuji, Joe Kuribara, each of whom has denied any connection with either the organization or movement.

* * * * *

Report on Lanzetta's sub rosa organizations

Compiled by the office of HISTORICAL DOCUMENTATION

Tojo Tanaka - Joe Masackr.

November 18 1942

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS:

Survey on "Underground" Groups

Posters and bulletins, quietly tacked up on mess halls and latrines in the

dark of night, have regularly carried the messages of Manzanar's "underground" groups to center residents during the past month.

Contents of these notices definitely indicate that their authors consider themselves much in the same light as "underground" forces in Europe seeking to liberate oppressed peoples.

Two signatures appear with greatest regularity on these posters which attract a curious reader audience:

- (1) Southern California Blood Brothers Corps
- (2) Manzanar Black Dragon Society

Coverage of these bulletins is center-wide; when they appear, they almost invariably appear on all 36 blocks simultaneously.

Language in which they are written: without exception, bulletins have been in Japanese, sometimes in pen and ink, at other times in brush scroll. They are intelligible, coherent statements, almost always closing with an editorial note.

Illegality of their activity appears to be recognized by the authors not only in their manner of circulating their work, but in their frequent warning's appearing on the notices: "Anyone who tears this down is a dirty dog of a stooge."

Subject matter of bulletins varies: Earlier attacks against self-government and the proposed Manzanar Charter have now been switched to heated tirades against the proposed new camouflage net factory program calling for 650 full time workers. (Only 100 are currently employed). Other targets of the Blood Brothers and Black Dragons have been: (1) the Community Cooperative stores ("An obvious plot to impoverish we Japanese")--(2) the Education program--"We don't need a useless American education" (Note--This point of view is not shared by the overwhelming majority of residents; the "underground", apparently sensing this, dropped its attack as quickly as it got under way)--(3) Furlough work--"The white man reduced us all to poverty, destroying 50 years of work built up by blood and sweat of our elders; they told us to get out of California because we weren't needed; now they want to use us again--as economic serfs; don't go out on furlough!" (Note--When over 1000 went out of Manzanar on furlough, the subject changed to attacks on local conditions)

WHO ARE THE BLOOD BROTHERS AND BLACK DRAGONS?

How numerous are they?

On the not-too-dependable basis of writing, both on bulletins and in letters sent by persons signing themselves as "Blood Brothers Corps" and "Black Dragon Society", the two groups appear to be one and the same. Center rumors lend equally undemonstrated confirmation.

Publicly, individuals engaging in the activity have successfully cloaked themselves in anonymity. It is not definitely known who they are, or how many of them "belong". Police, investigating handwriting on bulletins, disclosed that "half a dozen different sets of handwriting" have been distinguished to date; one suspect, a bachelor described as "Japanese" in type, was apprehended posting a bulletin.

Privately, persons who have been most outspoken in voicing opinions on subjects written in the bulletins have been charged--by rumor--as "Blood Brothers" or "Black Dragons".

For instance:


Witness A is suspected and accused as a "Blood Brother." The accuser is one of opposite political views (re: the war). The accused denies the charge, saying: "I have spoken openly; I don't have to run around in the dark putting up bulletins or sending anonymous threat letters. But I agree wholeheartedly with everything in the notices and in the letters. One thing we must not forget is that this is a race war; do we have equality? Did we ever have equality? Why even in Manzanar, the "White man eats in an exclusive white man's dining room..."

"Less than 20" persons are actually performing the mechanics of the "underground" work is the consensus of residents generally. A group of men and women gathered around a bulletin posted on a mess hall wall discuss the matter:

Judith Krantz on Chronicling the Jet Set • The Warriors' J.B. Carroll

WEST

WAR & REMEMBRANCE



*America's concentration camps
held a people whose code of honor demanded
that they forget their shameful internment.
But their children now insist they must
remember, and seek justice.*

HARRY Y. UENO
1085 TASMAN DR. #175
SUNNYVALE, CA 94089

SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS/FEBRUARY 22, 1987

WEST

FEATURES

Cover story: Remembering the lost years

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By Susan Faludi



UPI/BETTMANN NEWSPHOTOS

Last week, on the 45th anniversary of the order that interned Japanese-Americans, the camps' survivors and their children observed Remembrance Day. Here, they share some of those memories.

Not-eager-for-prime-time player

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By Bill Sullivan

Joe Barry Carroll wants to have as much control over his life as he does over the basketball.

DEPARTMENTS

Interview: Judith Krantz

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No matter how often she's asked, she won't appear on *Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous*. After all, she has her *Scruples*.

Uncivil Liberties

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Home: A new design team blasts off

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Sisterhood can be powerful—and this one is powerfully creative.

The Far Side


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Cover photograph: the Ikeda family in the internment camp near Poston, Ariz., courtesy of George Ikeda

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
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UPI/BETTMANN NEWSPHOTOS

Seattle-area Japanese-Americans prepare to board trains that will take them to the Manzanar internment camp. At right is the notice informing Santa Cruz County residents of the internment order.

Remembering the Lost Years


They thought that loyalty to their country meant forgetting that it had deprived them of their property, scattered their families, imprisoned them in the wilderness. But sometimes only memory can set things right.

A MAN IS 63 AND HARD OF HEARING. HE IS WALKING HIS DOG IN A desert. The dog is all he has. Soldiers have taken away the rest: job, home, family. They have taken him and a great many other old men to a camp in the desert, a camp with barbed wire and watch-towers.

The dog races ahead and wriggles its warm small body under the barbed wire. The old man hobbles forward, calling to the dog to come back. A sentry on the watch-tower yells after the old man to stop, but he is hard of hearing and keeps moving. The sentry shoots the old man dead.

This happened in America. The date was April 11, 1943.

continued



By Susan Faludi

REMEMBERING

THE TANFORAN SHOPPING CENTER in San Bruno is halfway between San Francisco and Silicon Valley, a block from the Interstate 280 exit ramp. Inside are bright lights and music.

Saturdays are always mobbed, but the crowds thin toward the farthest wing of the mall. That's where the less-favored stores rent space, Pretty & Plump, Wicks n' Sticks, Donut World. That's where, obscured by potted plants, under the stairs and behind a trash can, you can find the plaque for the people forced to live here in another time. The plaque is posted on a low stand; to read it requires stooping.

The plaque is really to honor the thoroughbreds that ran here on the old race track. The people are an afterthought.

"Tanforan Racetrack opened in 1899," the plaque says, "and had racing seasons until it burned down in 1964. Many famous horses raced and won here. In 1942, Tanforan became a temporary assembly center for over 4,000 persons of Japanese ancestry who were to be interned for the duration of World War II."

Near the plaque, a bronzed statue of Sea Biscuit, "the world's champion money winner," towers over mall shoppers. There are no statues of the Japanese people at the Tanforan Park Shopping Center. There are no monuments to the thousands of families led here at gunpoint by American soldiers to sleep in the manured straw of the race track horse stalls, to line up for roll call at dawn and dusk, to endure midnight searches by armed guards for such "dangerous contraband" as hot plates, earrings and sewing scissors.

Of course the people lived here for only half a year before they were shipped out to other, more distant "relocation centers" in the deserts. This was only the first stop on a long journey. But after Tanforan nothing would be right again—for the people or their children.

"It is like a cracked dish," the doctor told George Ikeda. The doctor was speaking of the elderly Japanese gardener's dislocated vertebrae, dislocated on the way to the camps 41 years ago by the billy club of a police officer who didn't like "Japs." But he could have been talking of many things. "It is like a cracked dish," the doctor said. "You can use it, but it's going to be like that for the rest of your life."



Guard towers kept watch on Japanese-Americans, though no evidence exists that any internee had ever been engaged in espionage.



Mess halls such as this one at Manzanar broke down Japanese family unity. "My 10-year-old wouldn't eat with the family," a camp survivor recalls sadly.

MEMORY, THE ADAGE GOES, is the solace of the aged. The years take away the savings, the health, the beloved, but always

there will be the memories.

Last week, on Feb. 19, the Japanese people sent to the camps 45 years ago gathered around the country for Remembrance Day.


This is the day in 1942 that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 empowering the military to round up all 120,000 Japanese residents on the West Coast. This is the day that California, Oregon and Washington became a "military zone," and every Japanese resident in it a subject of the Armed Forces. Remembrance Day is like any other annual memorializing: candlelight processions, readings, prayers in church. With one exception. It has been observed only in the past four years.

For almost three decades following the war, American library shelves held only two major history books on the government-ordered detention of West Coast Japanese. The barracks and barbed wire in the 10 camps spread from California to Arkansas were torn down immediately after 1945 and rarely were they spoken of again. Of a war distinguished by atrocities on all sides, Americans tend to know the least about their nation's own contribution. The internment of the Japanese pales in comparison to the period's more notorious horrors. But these camps happened to us.

A hallucinatory quality clings to the story of the internment of the Japanese, as if the events themselves make sense only when perceived as imaginary. There is too much dissonance, too many contradictory chords resisting reconciliation. There are the contradictions of stripping civil liberties from people—two-thirds of them U.S. citizens—as a way of safeguarding American freedoms. There are the contradictions of incarcerating an entire race while fighting a war against a nation incarcerating an entire race. When the Jews were freed from Dachau, it was the Japanese-American 442nd Regiment, the most decorated U.S. Army regiment in World War II, that threw open the gates—while their relatives waited for them at home behind barbed wire.

The Japanese who spent up to five years in the camps, who lost \$4 billion in farms, businesses and personal property, whose families were broken up and homes never seen again—they for a long time doubted their own versions of the past. "I half-suspected that the place did not exist," Jeanne Wakatsuki Houston wrote in *Farewell to Manzanar* of the camp in the California desert where she spent her childhood. "So few people I met continued

GEORGE IKEDA: "We Were Ashamed"



THE SMALL TRACT HOUSE OFF EL CAMINO Real is a jumble of national emblems, a rice cooker next to a child's Rambo duffel bag, a Japanese tea set beside a mantel lined with bowling-league trophies. For a long time, George Ikeda believed neither culture was his. "Put me down as a man without a country," he had finally told the American soldiers who interrogated the bewildered gardener for hours in 1943.

George Ikeda was a young man on his parents' 10-acre strawberry farm in Watsonville when the war began. He played in the fields with his six brothers and sisters till sundown, shooting at tin cans with a BB gun; at night he listened under the covers to the radio he won in a Kiwanis Club contest. He didn't know much about politics, but he did know that his Japanese-born father was not allowed to own property and had to rent their land in his sister's name. He did know that when he delivered strawberries to a white family one day, a little girl screamed and hid in her mother's skirts. "Look, Mama, a Jap!"

The strawberries were ready for harvest when the Ikedas were ordered to leave town. George remembers the family's "evacuation sale," the steady stream of strange white faces, rooting around in their possessions strewn on the front yard. "Things had just started getting a little good for my father. He had bought a Ford pickup for \$750. He sold it for \$150. We had to turn in everything like cameras, radios, guns. I sold my radio for \$5 but not my BB gun. I threw my BB gun in the canal."

The Ikedas arrived at camp in Poston, Ariz., on the Fourth of July. "It was 105 degrees. My mother's face swelled up like a balloon from the heat. It was terrible to see her like that. They gave us all these bags like big pillowcases and told us to go out to this pile of straw and fill them up. They were supposed to be our beds. We were ashamed. We didn't even talk."

In 1943, George Ikeda was sent to work in a cannery for three months in Brigham City, Utah, and then on to Pocatello, Idaho, to drive a truck for a produce company. "In Pocatello, I couldn't stay long because no one would rent to me and all my money went to living in a hotel."

Ikeda and another Asian, a Hawaiian man, boarded a public bus in Pocatello for the ride back to the camp. When the bus stopped in Flagstaff, Ariz., the white passengers filed into a coffee shop. Ikeda and the Hawaiian man were following along when a police officer

get our bags and leave the bus."

A War Relocation Authority officer looked into the incident later and reported in a letter filed in the National Archives, "Ikeda and his associate do not seem to have been at fault." No action was taken.

George's neck never stopped throbbing, but he didn't bother anyone about it. A month later, he was sent to Chicago to an Army tent-making factory. One night he was finishing a bowl of rice with the other Japanese laborers. "I remember I was eating with the boys when I first see those dots and it starts hurting all in my neck and head. I start seeing double. I get so sick I drop my chopsticks."

For the rest of his life, once or twice a month, George Ikeda will see the dots and know the sickness is not far behind. Then for a week he will vomit, he will faint, his vision will get so distorted he has trouble finding his way around his own house. Only 12 years ago did he finally see a doctor who X-rayed his neck and found the dislocated vertebrae. He was told, "It is like a cracked dish."

In 1943, the Japanese in the camps were ordered to sign a loyalty oath. They had to answer two questions: Would they serve in the Armed Forces and would they swear "unqualified allegiance" to the United States? "I took it as kind of an insult. Sending us over to fight when our parents were in prison. I told them to put my answer down as 'no, no.'" He later would change his answers to "yes, yes," but by then he had already been sent to Tule Lake Camp, a desolate stretch of nowhere in Utah, "the place for the no-nos," the place they also called "The End of the Earth." It was here that 20 young Japanese-American men were savagely beaten by guards.

When George was released from Tule Lake in February 1945, he volunteered for service in the Navy. He would remain in the military for years, cutting hair at the San Diego naval base barber shop. Later he enlisted in the Korean War and then extended his tour of duty for seven months. But the headaches and dizzy spells finally put an end to his barbering days.

In 1964, he and his wife moved to San Jose. Now 66, he tends the flowers at the homes of several wealthy high-tech executives in the Santa Clara Valley hills. "You see, maybe luck has finally come my way."

Last month, he prepared to take a vacation, only the second in his life. "They told me to take two weeks but I'm just taking one to be on the safe side." He is going to visit a country he has never seen before: Japan.

WRA-107 Rev. (2-29-41)
UNITED STATES WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Citizen's Indefinite Leave

The undersigned, **George Ryoji**,
a United States citizen, who has submitted to me sufficient proof of such citizenship, including this
Statement, is allowed to leave such area of the War Relocation Authority and to return to the United States for a period of 30 days, effective on the date of his departure from a relocation area and subject to certain conditions and restrictions set forth on the reverse side of this card, to go to the address of his residence at
Watsonville, California

Place of Birth: **Watsonville, California**
Date of Birth: **May 15, 1920**

Identification Number: **40958**

George Ikeda's mementos of internment include his identification card.

shouted after them. "I went over to the police car as I was told and leaned down to the window on the passenger side and said, 'Yes, officer?' politely, like I was taught to do. While I was talking to him, the other officer, a big guy like a football player, got out of the car and came around behind me. I felt something hit me hard across the back of the neck, and I fell down. The officer picked me up and pushed me in the back seat face down so I couldn't see. But the most humiliating thing was this: When the people all got back from the coffee shop, the officer got on the bus and announced, 'Couple of these damn Japs are on the loose.' And then we had to

REMEMBERING

in those years had even heard of it and those who had knew so little about it, sometimes I imagined I had made the whole thing up, dreamed it. Even among my brothers and sisters, we seldom discussed the internment. If we spoke at all, we joked."

As a child in San Francisco's Japantown, Ronald Wakabayashi would listen as his parents introduced old acquaintances. "This is Mr. So-and-So from Topaz Camp," they would say, lightly, and Wakabayashi, now director of the Japanese American Citizens League, remembers, "The way my parents would say it, I always thought they were talking about summer camp."

For 40 years, 120,000 Japanese kept the silence. Partly it was in disbelief at their own stories. Partly it was in shame; if they had been sent to these terrible places, they must deserve it. Partly it was in deep obedience to the code of "giri"—loyalty to the "father," whether the father of the flesh or the symbolic father that is the nation.

"We could never do anything that might bring harm to the United States because we have the sense of giri," says 81-year-old San Jose Buddhist minister Kyoshiro Tokunaga, a camp survivor, in his soft voice, "The true Japanese spirit is not narrow-minded. The true spirit is very wide."

The Japanese desire to put the best face, a false one, on their internment unwittingly served the purposes of the camp administrators. The War Relocation Authority, the military arm that supervised the camps, worked hard to paper over the realities of the experience—describing the barricaded compounds in the press as "reception centers" and releasing photographs of the "happy" Japanese families playing baseball and gardening. The Japanese played along: smiling for the cameras and helping to beautify the campgrounds. The result was a kind of unspoken collusion between victims and captors that lingered long past their parting.

In the end it would be the children of the camp survivors, the "sansei," who demanded a public accounting. The sansei wanted the memories of their elders, no matter how ugly, to be validated. The sansei wanted their parents to have a Remembrance Day.

The camps were peopled by the "issei," the Japanese-born alien residents, and their American-born citizen children, the "nisei."

The sansei are the nisei's children. Raised in the protest culture of the 1960s, they were taught that injustice to individuals should be met by press conferences and lawsuits, not silence, not giri. For a long time, they were unforgiving.

"We were rather cruel to our parents," says Wakabayashi. "We called them cowards." In his own family, he was angry that his father had carried a suitcase to work each day in early 1942, so he'd be ready to follow when the soldiers came. In other families, men and women actually volunteered to report to the camps early to help the Army build the barracks.

"The third generation asked their parents, 'How could this have happened?'" says San Jose's Rep. Norman Mineta, a nisei. As a 10-year-old, he was led away to the camps in his Cub

Scout uniform—first to the Santa Anita Race-track and then to the chill barracks of Heart Mountain, Wyo. Aboard the camp train, his Cub Scout troop voluntarily served as couriers for the Army. (At the race track, the congressman met up with old Sea Biscuit in a way. He had to shower in the horse's personal paddock.)

In 1979 the sansei of the Japanese American Citizens League, a central political lobby in the U.S. Japanese-American community, voted at its national conference to press Congress for legislation. They wanted the government-run camps investigated and the survivors compensated. When word got out, scores of nisei telephoned the league's office. "They were livid," Wakabayashi says. "They told us, 'Don't stir this all up; it will only mean trouble.'"

Returning to the past was in some ways going to be hardest for the nisei. "The issei at least had a strong sense of self to fall back on because they were raised in Japan," says Jeanne Houston. "But the nisei, they were taught that their culture was American. And then that culture rejected them."

"They felt so vulnerable," says Gary Okihito, ethnic studies professor at Santa Clara University and author of *Japanese Legacy*. "There was this fear that 'if we assert ourselves as Americans, we will be put down again.'"

Despite the reticence of the nisei, their children persisted. In 1980, Congress agreed to probe the camps. A government-appointed commission held 20 days of hearings and began taking testimony from 750 witnesses. For the first time, the nisei—and the shrinking numbers of elderly issei—were assembled to tell their stories.

The commission hearings unfolded a history that had begun long before Feb. 19, 1942. Anti-Japanese legislation limiting immigration and denying the right to own land or become citizens had been in effect since the turn of the century. In 1908 the Japanese Exclusion League, an anti-Japanese lobbying group, already had more than 100,000 members. The media—and the Hearst

'We could never do anything that might bring harm to the United States because we have the sense of giri,' says Tokunaga. 'The true Japanese spirit is not narrow-minded. It is very wide.'

papers in particular—had for decades operated a well-oiled propaganda effort against the Japanese. Fear of yellow peril was rampant. Even Bugs Bunny cartoons showed the famous rabbit calling Japanese children "slanty eyes" and "monkey faces." Japa-

nese in West Coast cities were shut out of jobs, apartments, restaurants. Schools were segregated; their shops were boycotted.

When the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, any remaining kid gloves came off. Newspapers stepped up the campaign with a daily stream of misinformation about Japanese attacks off the California shore. "Enemies within our gates," warned the *Mercury Herald* in San Jose. "Japs Subs Sunk Lumber-Carrying Freight Ship," said a *Los Angeles Examiner* headline for an article about a ship that, it turned out, actually sank in stormy weather.

Meantime, West Coast politicians were demanding the removal of Japanese; so many "enemy aliens" in one place was a threat to national security. (Of course, the German

continued

THE DAY WAR WAS DECLARED, Kyoshiro Tokunaga was teaching a class of Japanese students in Los Angeles. As was his habit, he led his students in the pledge of allegiance. "Your country is the United States, and you must be loyal to it." That is what I always taught my students.

He feels the same way today. Even now, criticism of the government makes him uncomfortable. "I have no bitterness," he says.

The particulars of his story are unimportant, he says, dismissing the darker scenes with embarrassed laughter. While telling of his camp years, he apologizes again and again for "taking too much of your time." He declines to pose for a current photograph because "publicity is not for me."

Kyoshiro Tokunaga had left Japan and moved to the United States with his parents when he was 13. His father had been a prominent lawyer and judge back in Japan. Tokunaga graduated from the University of Denver in philosophy. He moved to Los Angeles in 1933 and taught at three schools for Japanese children seven days a week.


Soon after Pearl Harbor, Japanese were no longer permitted to travel more than five miles or gather in groups. The Japanese schools were closed. Rumors circulated that police would soon be locking up ministers and schoolteachers.

"The day I was apprehended—I cannot forget it because it was March 13 and a Friday—I went to the post office to mail a letter to my friend and then I came home. I tried to open the door with the key and before I could do that, someone opened the door from the other side. I saw a 6-footer. Then I saw three of them. The first one showed me his FBI badge and said, 'Are you Mr. Tokunaga?' That's the first time anyone ever asked me my name from the inside of my own home." He laughs when he says this.

"They asked me to sign this paper so they could search the house. I looked around and the bookcases were all emptied, everything was on the floor. I said, 'It looks like you've searched already.'"

They led him to the Los Angeles

KYOSHIRO TOKUNAGA: "There Is a Karma for Nations"



jail and stamped his long fingers on a pad. After a while he was taken to an old Civilian Conservation Corps barracks outside of the city and fingerprinted some more. "We internees used to joke about all the fingerprinting. We say, 'We play the piano.'" Tokunaga wiggles his frail hands along an imaginary keyboard. He laughs again.

Two weeks later, he and other issei men were sent by train to a camp in Santa Fe, N.M. The shades were drawn so they would not know where they were going.

"When I was on the train, I felt very uncomfortable because I was ill and had a high fever. A black porter on the train, he came up and saw I was ill. He sort of squatted down near me and said in a very low voice, 'I can understand how you feel. We have been through this for hundreds of years.' Those few words were very comforting to me."

After two months, he was transferred again to Lordsburg, N.M., about 20 miles from the Mexican border. Lordsburg was where the "worst" alien men—the "dangerous elements"—were sent. "The

train stopped where there was no station. We got out and walked the three miles to the camp carrying our suitcases. There were guards with guns on the watchtowers."

Several months later, at midnight on July 27, 1942, a train with 100 new men pulled up to the place where there was no station. The men set out with their suitcases. But two were having trouble. One was a hospital patient suffering from tuberculosis, the other a cripple who had only been able to walk a few steps at a time ever since he broke his back stepping into a fishing boat. So they were left behind with three soldiers. A Jeep was supposed to come around and pick them up.

"About 6 or 7 in the morning the next day, we heard gunshots. We started to worry because all the other men had already come in hours ago. We went to the camp hospital, but they said they hadn't seen anything. We went to the commander's office and asked, but he wouldn't tell us anything. Then we were told that they had tried to run away and were shot. One was still alive but instead of bringing him to the camp hospital

they had driven him all the way back to Lordsburg, which was 30 miles away. That's where he died."

According to government records, no autopsy was performed and the two men—Toshio Kobata and Hirota Isomura—were buried that same day. In protest, the Japanese stayed away from the funeral and held a silent prayer in the barracks. One soldier was later brought before a court martial and cleared of wrongdoing. The Lordsburg townspeople raised \$400 for his "defense fund."

The men in Lordsburg camp were divided into three groups, H, M and W—Healthy, Medium Healthy and Weak. "The Healthy Club, we were given work details outside the compound, cleaning the officer's mess halls, the toilets in the bars and dance halls. Perhaps I shouldn't say this but we had sort of a strike. We said we didn't mind working in the camp but we thought we shouldn't be cleaning the dance halls and the bars for the Army. This made them very angry, and we were confined to our barracks as punishment. They only let us out to eat and use the latrines."

When the war ended, Tokunaga was not released. During his exit interview, he had said he was thinking of returning to Japan. In May 1946, the Army sent him with 2,000 other men to Crystal City Camp in Texas. "It was a hot and humid place. The cotton flowers were blooming. It was the first time I had seen them and they were very beautiful. I didn't feel like eating. I didn't go to the mess hall. I just got thinner and thinner." He weighed 116 pounds when he was freed.

Tokunaga asked for a second hearing and explained that he had changed his mind about leaving America. "America is my country and I feel I can better serve the community here." His request was denied and then inexplicably approved two weeks later.

A camp officer handed him a one-way train ticket for Denver and opened the gates. "My immediate thought was anxiety because I had been away from society for five years. I didn't know what I would find on the outside. When I got on the train, there was a white car and a black car. I didn't know where to go. To be on the safe side, I went to the black car. A conductor came over and said, 'You go over there in the white car.' And I thought, this is over for the Japanese but for the black people, they must come back from the war front, and they must return to different cars and different waiting rooms and different latrines."

"As a Buddhist I believe there is a karma for nations as well as people. The American karma is the actions and deeds of the past. It is something that we cannot escape."

After the war, Tokunaga returned to school for a doctorate in religion. He became a citizen in 1957, a minister in 1959. For the next several decades, he tended his congregation at the Buddhist Church on North Fifth Street in San Jose.

He is 81 now and when he speaks, he folds his papery hands in the shape of prayer, the thumbs pressed under his chin. "I joined the lawsuit because I hope that America will not repeat these mistakes. It is not the money I care about. Probably by the time it gets settled, I won't be in this world."

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and Italian "enemy aliens," whose mass internment was not advocated, were in far greater concentrations. There were four times more Germans, 11 times more Italians.) California labor unions circulated petitions demanding a "solution" to the "Japanese problem," a solution that, they made clear, should involve a purge of the Japanese from their midst.

Violence and vandalism aimed at the Japanese population swept up the coast in the wake of Pearl Harbor. In Los Angeles, a Japanese man was stabbed to death on a trolley. Outside Watsonville, farm houses were firebombed. In San Jose, the Japanese Buddhist temple on North Fifth Street was set on fire. In Tacoma, Wash., the decapitated body of an Asian man was found. The homicide was never solved.

Back in Washington, D.C., the War Department's more militant faction had captured the president's ear in the two months following Pearl Harbor. Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, commander in charge of the defense of the West Coast, the man who memorialized the phrase "a Jap is a Jap," wanted the lot of them out of his territory. Col. Karl Bendetsen, a Stanford-educated Army lawyer,

came up with a way to do it. His scheme, declaring Western "military zones" from which the Army could evict anyone they pleased, won him a promotion to general.

The War Department justified the removal of Japanese on the grounds of "military necessity." In DeWitt's 1942 Final Report, a fat study that went to the president, he concluded that there was widespread evidence of sabotage and espionage—particularly ship-to-shore signaling—among Japanese residents. Investigations by the Justice Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Federal Communications Commission flatly contradicted these claims. These agencies could not find a single case of Japanese residents collaborating with enemy forces. Even former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover stated in a confidential memo that "military claims of espionage were investigated and are unfounded" and that the Army "is getting hysterical." War Department officials, including John J. McCloy, assistant secretary of war, suppressed this memo and others. They altered some documents; others were destroyed.

Following *continued on page 20*

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
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
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
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Roosevelt's Executive Order 9066, the Japanese were given three weeks to leave the West Coast voluntarily and move to "free zones" in the East. At the same time thousands of elderly issei men, deemed "political leaders" because they taught school or preached at churches, were led away in the middle of the night and locked away in prison camps for the remainder of the war. (They had trouble finding real political leaders because the Japanese had virtually no political clout. The issei were not allowed to vote because they were resident aliens; the nisei were not yet of voting age.)

By March, soldiers with tommy guns started rounding up the rest of the Japanese. In the bureaucratic chaos that followed, hundreds of families were separated and sent to different camps. Men, women and children were searched, fingerprinted and tagged with identification numbers. They could take only one duffel bag each to the trains and buses that were waiting to haul them to commandeered race tracks, fairgrounds and livestock pavilions. Later they would be removed to old Indian reservations, abandoned prisons, makeshift barracks in dried salt beds, desert mesas and mosquito-infested swamps. Upon arrival in some of the camps, the people were ordered to strip and stand in line while the Army officers sprayed them with pesticide. Strangers were jammed together, nine and 10 to a single room with no furniture. At first there were no hospitals and dozens of women died in childbirth; epidemics of typhoid and dysentery raged.

The camps were patrolled by armed guards and, by the war's end, at least eight men would be shot and killed. One was a 30-year-old man whose job was to drive a supply truck in and out of the Tule Lake, Utah, camp. One day, for no apparent reason, as he was showing his ID card at the gate, a guard shot him in the stomach from five feet away. The guard was later fined \$1 for "unauthorized use of government property," referring to the bullet. This was the only shooting case in which a guard was reprimanded.

Beatings were not unheard-of in the camps. At Tule Lake Relocation Center in Utah, on Nov. 4, 1943, a group of guards cornered 20 young Japanese-American men and tortured them for hours. One of the young men had his skull gashed open with a baseball bat. The barracks walls were coated with blood and hair. When a Japanese doctor tried to administer aid, he was fended off by machine guns.

In Southern California, Dr. Rikita Honda, a 50-year-old Japanese man, was taken away for questioning by the FBI. A few days later, his body was returned to the family, the marks from wires tied around his wrists still apparent. The FBI told his widow it was a suicide; the case was never further investigated.

Others interned in the camps did inflict violence on themselves. At Jerome Relocation Center, as a train came into view, John Yoshida, 23, laid his head across the railroad tracks. In Manzanar, a despairing old man found a kitchen knife and jammed it into his stomach until he bled to

death. A Los Angeles woman, known around town as "Lady Bountiful" for her charity work, hanged herself rather than report to the camps.

Few Japanese dared to stay behind on the West Coast when the orders came to board the trains. Three who did—and were subsequently sentenced to jail terms of up to one year—lodged legal challenges in 1942, arguing that it violated constitutional rights, due process and amounted to invidious racial discrimination. The lower courts rejected their arguments and the cases were appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The government filed a brief in the court, contending again that the camps were a "military necessity" prompted by extensive proof of Japanese disloyalty. Two attorneys in the Justice Department, Edward Ennis and John Burling, attempted to discount this claim with the same stack of documents from the FBI and other investigatory agencies. Again, the War Department suppressed the documents. When the two lawyers tried to sneak in a reference in a footnote, the War Department officers discovered the footnote at the last minute and had the presses literally stopped and the footnote deleted.

The Supreme Court upheld the internment of the Japanese in December 1944, arguing that the action was justified because the nation "feared an invasion of our West Coast." Three justices filed a dissent, including Justice Frank Murphy who wrote that the decision "falls into the ugly abyss of racism."

The case, *Korematsu vs. the United States*, would become a classic in the law school textbooks, the only time in the 20th century that the highest court has found a "compelling reason" for racial discrimination.

While the war dragged on, the Japanese waited in the camps. When labor became scarce in 1943, the military ordered the camp administration to loan able-bodied Japanese men to work crews in the defense industry. As the casualty count grew overseas, 18,000 Japanese men were

The Supreme Court upheld the Japanese internment in December 1944. Dissenting Justice Frank Murphy wrote that the decision in *Korematsu vs. the United States* 'falls into the ugly abyss of racism.'

drafted out of the camps and into a segregated regiment, the 442nd, whose nickname was "Go for Broke" because they fought so valiantly for the American cause. They suffered 9,486 casualties; 600 were killed.

By the end of 1944, most of the Japanese families were released, but thousands of older issei men were held through the end of 1945. They were each handed a one-way train ticket and \$15. They were told to be careful whom they spoke to about their experiences; there were informants watching them everywhere. For the next four decades, the Japanese kept their thoughts to themselves.

WHEN THE CAMP SURVIVORS FINALLY appeared before the congressionally appointed commission in 1980, their words had a freshness that comes only with telling a story for the first time.

For a year and a half they talked into the microphones. A woman told how a guard pushed her with the

FRED KOREMATSU IS A THIN MAN who walks with some discomfort. Half his stomach was removed three years ago in an ulcer operation, the plague of those who hold much inside. His mother died of ulcers, a year after she was released from the camps.

Over his eyebrows are two faint scars, the past fading slowly from his forehead.

"What happened to me is incidental," he says, batting at questions with an age-spotted hand.

What happened to Fred Korematsu was unknown even to his children until a few years ago. His daughter, Karen, was sitting in her high school social studies class one day listening to the teacher tell how the Japanese were rounded up during World War II. The teacher was telling them about a landmark case, *Korematsu vs. the United States*, in which a man named Fred Korematsu from right here in San Leandro had refused to go to the camps. He had been arrested and then challenged the relocation order. He had taken it all the way to the Supreme Court. In the end, he had lost.

Karen ran home and demanded to know who this Fred Korematsu was.

"That was me," her father said after a while.

"Why didn't you tell me!" "Oh, you were so busy with school and all," he said, smiling, vague.


Fred Korematsu was 22 when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. His parents ran a nursery in Oakland, next door to the General Metals Foundry. They sold roses. They had come over from Japan in 1906 and arrived in San Francisco at the time of the great earthquake; when the steamer pulled into the harbor they saw the city, a blaze of red against the sky.

After Pearl Harbor, no one would buy their roses. At nights, the foundry would shine searchlights in the empty nursery and in the windows of their small home next door. One night, Fred was standing on the front stoop smoking a cigarette. A man peered over some bushes.

"Are you trying to signal someone?" the man demanded.

"No, silly. I'm having a cigarette," Fred said and went inside.

FRED KOREMATSU: "I Never Had the Time to Tell My Children"



Each night after that he could see the man standing behind the bushes, watching. "He would stand there until it was light." Later, Korematsu heard the man was paid by the foundry to spy on the family.

After high school graduation, Korematsu and his friends signed up for the Coast Guard. Only Korematsu was turned away. He found a job as a welder in the shipyard, defense work. He had advanced to foreman when the Boiler Makers Union expelled him. He was late paying his union dues, he was told, even though his dues weren't owed for two weeks.

One evening, he showed up for his weekly Friday night card game with the old high school friends, now in the Coast Guard. "I knocked on the door, and one of them came out. He told me that they had each been called in by their superior officer. They had orders not to play with me anymore."

But none of that mattered so much at the time because Korematsu was in love with Ida Boitano. She was 19, Italian-American. She worked in a biscuit factory. Her

parents didn't approve of Ida's seeing a Japanese man so they had to sneak around.

That spring of 1942, signs were tacked up on utility poles all over Oakland. All Japanese must report to Tanforan Racetrack within 48 hours. Fred did not see how he could leave Ida. He told his parents he was staying behind and that he and Ida would run away and be married.

Korematsu saw an ad in the newspaper: Change your appearance with plastic surgery. He went to the San Francisco office of Dr. Bennett Masten and paid him \$100—all he had—to operate on his nose and eyelids.

When the bandages came off, Korematsu was still Japanese.

He moved to a rooming house in Oakland and for three days he stayed inside, afraid to be seen on the street. He threw away his driver's license and changed his name on his draft card to "Clyde Sarah." He would tell people he was "Spanish-Hawaiian," born in Las Vegas to parents who died in a fire. He got a job welding for a defense contractor in Oakland.

him. I liked him very much."

In court after court, Besig argued that Korematsu's constitutional rights as an American citizen had been violated. If the government really intended to round up "enemy aliens," as it claimed, Besig asked, what about German and Italian residents? For two years, he argued Korematsu's case unsuccessfully up the appeals ladder. On Dec. 18, 1944, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against him.

Meanwhile, Korematsu had been placed on five years' probation by the end of 1942 and sent to the camps. He joined his family in Tanforan. From there, they were sent to a camp in the desert near Topaz, Utah. They lived in a one-room tar shack with no furniture. "Nothing but wind and dust blowing around."

Korematsu helped build the camp hospital. He hauled sheetrock and dug wells. They paid him \$19 a month, the top salary at the camps. "No one knew what was going to become of us. My mother was very religious. I remember she went to many prayer meetings."

Two years later, his family was released. He came home to San Leandro, married and took two jobs as a draftsman to support his wife and three children. He worked day and night; weekends he coached Little League, advised the Boy Scouts and devoted many hours to his church. "So you see I just never had the time to sit down and tell my children about my past."

On Nov. 10, 1983, Fred Korematsu's conviction was vacated in a U.S. District Court in San Francisco. Federal Judge Marilyn Patel declined to issue a formal reprimand to the government. But in her words before the courtroom audience she said she hoped the Korematsu case would stand as a "signal of caution" to the government to uphold its constitutional duty to "protect all citizens from petty fears and prejudices so easily stirred" by war.

Under questioning at the police station, the story of Clyde Sarah and the dead parents quickly crumpled. Korematsu was sentenced to a year in prison. He never saw Ida again. He wrote her many letters. A year later, he would receive one back. Please, it said, do not ever write me again.

In the fall of 1942, a prison guard came to his cell and told him he had a visitor. It turned out to be Ernest Besig, a lawyer in San Francisco who wanted to challenge the relocation order. "Mr. Besig told me I was an American, and I felt like an American when I was with

him. I liked him very much."

Then he had to go home right away because his ulcers ached.

REMEMBERING

butt of his gun, trying to force her to drop her baby down the train steps. A Japanese doctor told how she struggled without medicine to aid the children in the camps who fell victim and died of measles, whooping cough, tuberculosis. "So much we left behind," said still another, quietly, "but the most valuable thing we lost was our freedom."

In 1981, the commission published a scathing 500-page indictment of the wartime policy, calling it "a grave injustice" inspired by "race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership." It called on the government to apologize, provide monetary damages and grant presidential pardons to those who were convicted of violating the order to go to the camps.

As a result, Congress is considering a bill this term that would offer to each of the remaining survivors a formal apology and \$20,000 to be paid over 10 years. The bill, first introduced three years ago, has yet to make it out of committee. The congressional body is said to be reluctant to touch the bill for reasons of "fiscal restraint."


Meanwhile, the sansei have talked their parents into seeking redress through the courts. Last year, because of their efforts, a federal appellate court ruled that 19 Japanese-American camp survivors may sue the United States for property losses. The attorneys hope to extend this to a class-action suit. Four of the 19 are from San Jose. The government has appealed the decision, and this term the U.S. Supreme Court will take up the case.

A team of sansei lawyers also filed separate federal lawsuits in 1983 to clear the names of the three Japanese-American men who were convicted during the war for refusing to report to the camps. One of them, Fred Korematsu, still lives in San Leandro. The lawyers sought two things: to vacate the convictions and have a court hearing to determine whether the wartime government engaged in misconduct. They did not seek any financial damages.

Their case was bolstered by a discovery in 1982 in the National Archives. Peter Irons, a history professor at the University of California at San Diego, was researching a book on the legal history of the camps when he unearthed some of the FBI, FCC and Justice Department reports suppressed in the war. These were papers that had not been read or known of for 40 years.

continued

HARRY UENO: "We Lost a Few Years"



WHEN HARRY UENO LEFT JAPAN AT 16 to join his country's merchant marines, it made his father sad. He wanted his son to finish school, but there was no money. As they were saying their goodbyes, he reminded his son that even a lowly sailor can shine. "My father told me then, and I will never forget this, 'Lotus flowers, they bloom in a muddy pond.'"

His parents had raised Harry and his two brothers on Hawaiian sugar cane plantations; the father stooped in the fields for 75 cents a day, the mother for 50. But they had returned in 1922 to their tiny Japanese village of Kuba, 10 miles south of Hiroshima. (Twenty-three years later, on the morning of "the Pikadon," the atomic flash, Harry's cousin and 70 neighbors would leave for work and school in Hiroshima. None would return.)

Crossing the Pacific, Harry was seasick for 25 days. When the ship docked in Tacoma in May 1923, he jumped overboard, swimming under the dock so he wouldn't be seen. He made his way toward the Midwest working in sawmills, moving toward Milwaukee, where one of his brothers lived. "But when I got there, my brother didn't speak Japanese anymore and I could hardly speak English so there wasn't much communication."

Eventually, Harry Ueno found his way to Los Angeles, where he married, raised three children and worked in the produce markets around Beverly Hills. Joan Crawford and producer David Selznick were among his customers.

In May 1942, the Ueno family took the camp trains to Manzanar, a cold and dusty blankness at the base of Mount Whitney, 4,500 feet high. "Because of the high altitude, they couldn't get the rice to cook all the way through and no one could eat it."

The Japanese waited in 45-minute lines three times a day for meals. To make the waiting bearable, Harry Ueno and some friends built a Japanese reflecting pond. Later they would plant tiny cottonwood seedlings in the middle of the compound.

Ueno volunteered to work as a cook in the mess hall. After a while he discovered the sugar supply was disappearing. Infants in the camp were dying because saccharin was being mixed in their formula as a sugar substitute. He poked around the warehouses, organized the kitchen workers, demanded an investigation. Eventually it came out that the guards were selling the sugar on the black

market.

The camp director called Harry Ueno into his office. "You probe too deeply; you will have trouble," he said.

On Dec. 5, 1942, a Japanese man was beaten up on the camp grounds. At 9 p.m. that same evening, the military police claimed that Harry Ueno was the assailant, a charge he denied. The camp director drove Ueno to the jail in Independence. "He told me, 'No one is going to know where you are, and you are going to be there a long time.' I told him, 'One day you are going to be in a much bigger jail.'"

The next day, Harry Ueno was brought back to Manzanar and placed in the camp jail. By evening a crowd of Japanese gathered around the jail in the cold, stomping their feet, singing. Toward evening, a sergeant screamed suddenly to the officers, "Remember Pearl Harbor! Hold the line!" The soldiers opened fire. A young man, 16, was shot in the back while running from the bullets. "He lay on the ground on his face, and he didn't move again." A mob gathered on the other side of the camp and began throwing stones and again the officers began shooting. Another young man, 19, was dead by morning.

For the next 3½ years, Harry Ueno would be shuttled from jail to jail all over the desert, each one more desolate. The seventh and last stop was a year of solitary confinement in the

stockade in Tule Lake. He was never charged with a crime; he was never given a hearing.

In a camp prison in Moab, Utah, Ueno was placed in the "isolation room." "They would try to scare us by doing their shooting practice against the wall." For dinner, a sneering guard dished up hotcakes drowning in ketchup and chili peppers. When Ueno complained, the director of the camp told him, "There's nothing but sagebrush out there. If someone disappeared, no one would ever find him."

One morning, Harry Ueno and four other men were summoned. A flatbed truck was waiting. On the back was a wooden box, 5-by-6 feet. The five men were forced into the box and the top was padlocked. They rode in the back of the truck this way for 11 hours down a potholed dirt road. "A couple of the guys in the box were so sick I shouted to the lieutenant, 'How about letting these two sick guys into the cab?' He said, 'I have instructions that no one is to be transferred out of the box.'" That evening, they were let off in county jail in Winslow and pushed into a cell with two beds and one blanket. Harry Ueno found out later it was an old prison for Indians.

By the time he got to Tule Lake stockade, Ueno had quit asking questions. "I sort of gave up politics. I raised flowers and kept quiet."

At the end of the war, he got \$15 and a train ticket to San Jose. His family was waiting for him in a shelter run by the Buddhist Church. No one would rent to them. Eventually Harry got a job with the railroad so they could live in a train company shack.

Later he would find work in the orchards. He grew cherries in Santa Clara Valley until he retired in 1972. Now he tends the Japanese plum and tangerine trees in his front yard and follows the progress of his two sons, one an electrical engineer for a computer company, the other an engineer at Lockheed who works on classified projects for the military. "Yes, we lost a few years," Ueno says. "But we don't feel bitterness."

Several years ago, Harry Ueno took his family back to Manzanar. He took photographs of his children playing in the swirling sand. The Japanese reflecting pond was dry. The barracks had been torn down. "I think they didn't want to leave any traces."

But the cottonwood trees were tall and very straight.

"Lotus flowers," his father had told him, "they bloom in a muddy pond."

PHOTOGRAPH BY GARY PARKER

REMEMBERING

With the help of these documents, the legal team persuaded two federal courts in 1983 and 1984 to vacate the convictions. But the federal judges did not grant a hearing to determine government wrongdoing. So one of the three men, Minoru Yasui, appealed to a higher court. Last November, while his case was pending, Yasui died of cancer at the age of 70, and the government declared the appeal moot. Relatives are seeking to continue the case.

In the end, the government may or may not come through for the Japanese survivors. But certain wounds have begun to heal as a consequence of bearing public witness to the camps' injustice. They are private injuries, between parents and children.

Midori Kimura, one of the four Japanese plaintiffs from San Jose involved in the Supreme Court lawsuit, says she is able at last to talk to her sons and daughters about the Heart Mountain, Wyo., internment center. Her husband fell sick "of worry" there and died of heart trouble a month after his release, leaving her alone after the war to raise seven children and work in a celery factory. "I cried many times inside, but I didn't like to show my tears to my children."

In bringing the family together, the story comes full circle. That is because for many of the Japanese who lived through the camps, the worst thing that happened was not the denial of civil rights, the bad conditions, the loss of land and money and hope. It was the fragmentation of the family, the central unit, and the strongest one, in traditional Japanese culture. In the camps, the parents lost their authority. The mess halls dished out the food. The guards directed the discipline. When they left the camp, thousands of children went their own way. "What the camps did was create families where parents were no longer necessary," says Donald Tamaki, a San Francisco attorney on the legal team representing the three Japanese-Americans. "That kind of displacement and depression breeds its own kind of problems."

Forty years later the memory of that division still has the power to undo Harry Ueno, 79, a camp survivor in San Jose. "My 10-year-old," he says, his voice trembling, "he wouldn't eat with the family."

The aging Japanese stood in congressional hearing rooms and before TV cameras to tell their stories. But the real audience they addressed was their children. The handing down of memories became a rite of passage that would bring nisei and sansei together for the first time. "It is like nerve endings growing back," says Wakabayashi. "The family has been restored."

For many of the survivors, that alone was worth the risk of speech. W

SUSAN FALUDI is a staff writer for West.



Midori Kimura: "I didn't like to show my tears to my children."

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PRE-EVACUATION

IA. The Activities and Relationship with Governmental Agencies Prior to December 7, 1941.

One of the key questions which arises when discussing JACL's relationships with government agencies, prior to Pearl Harbor, is whether the JACL as an organization was involved with intelligence activities which caused the arrests of Issei and Kibei community leaders immediately following December 7, 1941.

OFFICIAL POSITION

This is a key question of considerable long-standing. In fact, Mike Masaoka, National Secretary and Field Executive from September 1, 1941 to June 22, 1943 for the JACL, addressed this issue in great length in his "Final Report" written in 1944. What follows is an excerpt on the issue of JACL cooperation versus collaboration with U.S. Intelligence Agencies:

In connection with JACL's policy of cooperation with the federal agencies, two divergent rumors have materialized and grown into titanic proportions. One is that JACL did not cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Naval Intelligence, and other authorities charged with the internal safety of our country. The other is that JACL, in order to enhance its own position as leaders of the Japanese communities, turned in the names of all first generation leaders and asked for their internment. Some have even slyly suggested that JACL officials received a bounty for every name they turned in for investigation. Neither is true; both are lies! JACL did cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Naval Intelligence, and other agencies by furnishing them with all the information which we might have had at our disposal regarding the suspects the agencies questioned us about. This is the duty of every American. But, since we of the JACL are not, and were not then, trained investigators in counter-espionage, we were not able to furnish them with more than what was general community knowledge, that is to say facts or rumors relating to their ostensible business and sympathies, family relationships, and organizational ties. Most of us can't read, write, or speak Japanese well enough to understand much of what happened in the "inner sanctums" of the Japanese community; certainly our Americanism was too well known to

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encourage those interested in destroying our
from placing us in their confidence. In summary,
JACL did not institute a witch-hunt; neither did
we evade our duty as patriotic Americans
interested, as are other Americans, in protecting
our nation from espionage and sabotage. The
charge that the FBI, for example, paid us
twenty-five dollars each for the names and
information leading to the internment of a
Japanese alien is too ridiculous to warrant even
a reply. The answer to the question as to why
government investigators seemed to converge on
our office is obvious: it was easier for them to
obtain the general consensus on a person from us
who were pledged to cooperate than to try to
"dig" it out of some frightened by-stander.
(Masaoka, "Final Rept.", 4/22/44, pp.48-9, File
T 6.15, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

The previous excerpt has become the official party
line, of the JACL on the issue of cooperation versus collab-
oration with U.S. Intelligence agencies. Let us compare
this understanding with what was occurring within the
government at this time.

GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIONS

Historians have documented for us the fact that the
Japanese community was under surveillance by various federal
agencies as early as the 1930's. In June of 1939, then
President Roosevelt issued a memorandum for the purpose of
having this surveillance conducted in a more coordinated
manner. The agencies involved were the FBI, Military Intel-
ligence Division of the War Department, and the Office of
Naval Intelligence. (Kumamoto, "The Search for Spies: American
Counterintelligence and the Japanese American Community,
1931-1942", Amerasia Journal 6:2, 1979, p.52.) In fact, FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover informed all local law enforcement
that the President had directed all domestic investigation
on espionage and sabotage to be headed by the FBI.

Along with coordination of surveillance on the Japanese
Community, J. Edgar Hoover, in October of 1941, issued
orders to his field agents to obtain informants. "You are
instructed to take immediate steps to secure and develop
confidential informants of the Japanese Race." To be exact:

Hoover was asking for the recruitment of Nisei
informants. The FBI believed that Japanese
intelligence was avoiding the use of second
generation Japanese Americans only: this made
the Nisei unlikely saboteurs, and the FBI
convinced a few to become voluntary informants,

reporting on suspicious Issei activities. Among the informants were members of the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), by definition a predominantly Nisei and Sansei organization. Although it is improbable that more than a handful of JACL members became informants, Naval Intelligence records on the surveillance admit that "with the help of the JACL, which got to be very much on our side, these were Nisei people, we were able to pinpoint practically every agent that had any potential for mischief. (Ibid. p.57.)

Concurrent with the Federal government's increased coordination of Japanese surveillance and development of an informant network was a commensurate increase in attention by some within the JACL to the issue of loyalty to America. "Out of the habit of defining loyalty, talking about loyalty, interpreting it for both the Japanese and Caucasian communities, a segment of JACL leadership in 1939 and 1940 began to arrogate to itself the authority to judge and evaluate the loyalty of members of the Japanese community." (Tanaka, "History of JACL", File T 6.25, Ch. III p.12 JERS, Bancroft Library.) Tanaka does not specify all who made up this segment within the JACL, except to name National Vice-President Ken Matsumoto as one. Tanaka is also quick to distinguish Saburo Kido, National President during 1941 as not within this particular segment. In fact, Tanaka goes so far as to make a distinction in the activities of JACL on a geographic basis. "One detects a greater willingness on the part of top JACL leaders in Los Angeles to pass judgment upon Issei activities in Southern California." (Ibid Ch. IV p.22.) He goes on to say that "[a]n examination of correspondence between national officers for this period leads to the conclusion that hyper-sensitivity to possible subversive influences within the Japanese community centered more in Southern California leadership than in the north. (Ibid, p.23.)

This would be borne out by the existence of the Coordinating Committee for Southern California Defense, headed by Joe Masaoka and begun for the purposes of encouraging defense activities by the JACL in anticipation of war with Japan. "Among other duties, this body was charged with gathering information on subversive activities; this information was to be turned over directly to Naval Intelligence." (Tanaka, "Report of Manzanar Riot," File O 10.12, p.7 JERS, Bancroft Library.) The September 14, 1941 Minutes for a Special Session of the Southern District Council confirm the Coordinating Committee's existence, but little else in the way of a statement of purpose, function and duties. It will be later that we will see more about the nature of the CCSD.

Consistent with our understanding of what began to occur in the intelligence community after 1939, we are further informed by Togo Tanaka, JACL's unofficial historian, that:

[a]ll the National Officers of the JACL in 1940-41 had come into personal contact with federal investigative agencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Military Intelligence, and Naval Intelligence. Close personal relationships characterized most of these top contacts. Similarly, district and local chapter leaders of the JACL found themselves increasingly approached by representatives of not only federal, but state and local law enforcement and security officers. (Tanaka, "History of JACL", File T 6.25, Ch.III, p.14, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

This is corroborated by a letter dated December 4, 1940, on JACL National Headquarters letterhead from Hito Okada, Treasurer, to Saburo Kido, which indicates that the FBI had "visited" Howard Nomura, a chapter president in the Portland, Oregon region.

Regarding the excitement that I mentioned above, Howard Nomura, chapter president here has been visited by the FBI, and has been answering many questions in regards to Niseis and Isseis, especially about the different organizations. I understand they cannot understand the existence of the Junior Kenjin Kai. Neither can I. I hope this investigation here will clarify matters. (JACL Archives.)

In fact, when contacts were made by Intelligence agencies, "JACL representatives for the most part had responded with a patriotic zeal exceeded only by their public expressions of American Loyalty." (Tanaka, "History of JACL," File T 6.25, Ch.IV, p.21, JERS.)

How close were the "personal relationships" between top contacts in the JACL and Federal Intelligence agencies? More importantly, what kind of impact did those "close personal relationships have on the Japanese American Community at large?

KENNETH D. RINGLE, ONI

Tanaka informs us that one of the "close-working relationships between a JACL leader and federal agency well-known in Citizens' League circles was that existing

between the National Vice-President Ken Matsumoto of Los Angeles and Lieutenant Commander Kenneth Ringle of the Naval Intelligence Office in Los Angeles." (Ibid, Ch.III, p.14.)

In the Minutes of the Special National Board Meeting held in San Francisco between March 8 and 10, 1942, a report was made by National Vice President Ken Matsumoto on his activities between 1941 and 1942, in which he refers to his relationship with Ringle:

specifically though, an intimate friendship was made with the Assistant Naval Intelligence Officer of the 11th Naval District. This contact which was realized in January, 1941 has proven to be one of our most valuable assets and it can be stated, without fear of contradiction, that through this gentlemen, the good name of the JACL has reached out far and wide. (JACL Minutes, p.4.)

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Matsumoto continues his report with a chronology of his activities for 1941. He met Lt. Commander K.D. Ringle, Assistant Naval Intelligence Officer, 11th Naval District, in January of 1941. In March, Matsumoto worked with Ringle on a special invitational dinner given by the Intelligence Dept. of the 11th Naval District for all JACL Chapters in the Southern District. In addition to the 12 Southern District Chapters, three prospective chapters also attended. Attendance, in fact, was "100%".

Purpose of this dinner meeting was many fold. For one, this was an opportunity for the Nisei Leadership to clarify his position and remove any doubts of his status. This was an opportunity to establish contact with the vital branches of the United States Army and Navy, as well as the local Law Enforcement body. It was a chance to ascertain the attitudes and thoughts of the Nisei leadership during these strained days. Finally, it served to inspire young Nisei to take a more positive stand regarding his loyalty and allegiance. Needless to say, the meeting was most significant and momentous. (JACL Minutes, p.5.)

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Matsumoto's comments ring with more truth than he may have known. We know now that K.D. Ringle, fluent in Japanese, was conducting a two year study on the Japanese community. This study, under the auspices of Naval Intelligence, would be submitted to the military at the same time as the Munson Report, with a similar conclusion that the Japanese American "problem" was overblown and that this community was for the most part loyal to the U.S. Ringle's

report was one of the three intelligence reports "suppressed" by Justice Dept. Attorneys when the test cases were argued before the Supreme Court. The "rediscovery" of the Ringle Naval Intelligence Report by Peter Irons contributed to the Coram Nobis actions for Min Yasui, Gordon Hirabayashi and Fred Korematsu.

Can we conclude, then, that Matsumoto's work with Ringle was beneficial to the community at large? Referring again to Togo Tanaka's "History of JACL."

The Matsumoto correspondence for this period assumed that war with Japan was probable, even inevitable. As a result there was a far greater willingness on his part than on Kido's to point an accusing finger at individuals suspected of adhering to Japan as against the United States. Without doubt, Matsumoto, under the tutelage of federal investigative officials, played a prominent role in the conversion of JACL local leadership to the acceptance of the "security role" it assumed in 1940-41. This role is described variously, depending upon individual points of view. From the standpoint which ultimately came to prevail within the Japanese community, it was the role of "spies and stooges for the FBI." From the standpoint of JACL leadership, it was the role of "constructive cooperators for national defense." From the standpoint of men like Matsumoto, it was a brave service and contribution to the war effort to report to federal agents what they judged to be subversive and disloyal acts and utterances. To the majority of fear-ridden Issei and resentful Nisei, the activity assumed the aspects of a hateful witchhunt. (Tanaka, "History of JACL" File T 6.25, Ch.III p.15, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

We can also conclude that Matsumoto was an informant for the Office of Naval Intelligence. This is according to an April 21, 1943 Memo from the District Intelligence Officer to the Director of Naval Intelligence. The memo deals with a previous request that "the names of Eleventh Naval District informants in Japanese Relocation Centers who have volunteered for military service be furnished the Director of Naval Intelligence." (NA, RG 210, Entry 17, Box 2, File "Office of Naval Intelligence Rept.") The memo goes on to discuss Matsumoto in particular.

3. It is believed that three other individuals, two of whom in past months have left the relocation centers for outside employment, have volunteered or may do so in the near future. They are Iwao ISHINO, presently at Poston;

Edward YONEMURA, employed in Utah; and Ken MATSUMOTO, presently employed at Cincinnati, Ohio...

5. As additional names of informants entering the armed services become available, they will be forwarded to the Director of Naval Intelligence. (Ibid.)

While the document deals with informants in camp, it does confirm that Matsumoto was a Naval Intelligence informant prior to evacuation because he had relocated prior to the camps to Cincinnati, Ohio. This is documented in an April 13, 1942 letter from Lieutenant Commander Ringle to Milton S. Eisenhower.

I am enclosing extracts from a letter which I have just received from my friend, Ken Matsumoto, whom you will remember as national vice president of the JACL. He left here ahead of the evacuation order to accept a very good job with the Mayor Jewelry Company, 5th and Vine Streets, Cincinnati, Ohio. (NA, RG 210, Entry 17, Box 2, File "Navy Dept.")

Ringle himself wrote about Matsumoto in a letter to Professor E.N. Barnhart, dated April 23, 1951. The letter was written in response to Barnhart's questions about the role "American-Japanese" played in disclosing information to intelligence agencies at the outbreak of World War II. "I also refer you to the Japanese-American Citizens League, which was and is a standby pro-American Nisei organization, and to Ken Matsumoto, who was its National Vice President at that time and my very good friend and chief source of information. (Ringle, April 23, 1951, Courtesy Aiko Herzig.)

JACL AND RINGLE

How closely and officially did JACL as an organization work with Ringle? No indication from JACL archives, beyond the fact that Ringle's name and comments appear from time to time in Minutes of the Southern District Council Meetings. Minutes for a Special Session of the Southern District Council Meeting, dated September 14, 1941, mention Chairman Fred Tayama introducing Lt. Commander Ringle of Naval Intelligence as the guest of the day. JACL archives did not have a continuous record of S.D. Council Meeting Minutes. Minutes dated January 11, 1942 record comments from Ringle regarding the issues of membership for persons of dual citizenship. He assisted in drawing up a resolution requesting disfranchisement of American citizens connected with any Axis nations and made comments on "behaviors and precautions to be taken during this state of war." He was

not introduced as a guest. In fact from the context of the Minutes, it appeared that by this time, Ringle was a familiar figure at these meetings.

In a letter from JACL National President Saburo Kido to former President James Sakamoto:

When I visited Los Angeles during the latter part of March, Ken Matsumoto took me down to San Pedro to see Lieutenant Commander Ringle, who was instrumental in inviting the Southern California District Council members to a discussion group. During the course of our conversation the matter of holding similar meetings in various districts came up. Commander Ringle has written to Seattle and San Francisco and ascertained the officers in charge of the Intelligence Bureau. Lieutenant Commander Liebenow of Seattle replied favorably, stating that he would be delighted to cooperate with the JACL in the Northwest if he receives an invitation. I would suggest that either you or Tom Iseri. . . of the Northwest District Council contact him and arrange for a meeting. (Saburo Kido letter to James Sakamoto 25 April 1941 from Ichioka, A Study in Dualism: James Yoshinori Sakamoto and the Japanese American Courier, 1928-1942, Amerasia Journal 13:2, 1986-87, p.73.)

Matsumoto's report to the JACL Board at their special meeting, during March 8-10, 1942 confirms that Ringle had opened up channels for meetings in San Francisco and Seattle at the request of the JACL during 1941, but that there was no follow through. (JACL Special Board Meeting Minutes, March 8-10, 1942, p.5.) "Matsumoto informed Sakamoto that he had communicated with Kido about the arrangements with the Head of the Naval Intelligence of your district, the 13th.' Matsumoto assured Sakamoto that 'their office is ready to meet the JACL leaders at any time they wish, and I believe that it ought to be done at once.'" (Ichioka, "Sakamoto and the Japanese American Courier" Amerasia Journal 13:2, 1986-87, p. 73.) Apparently, there is no indication or evidence that any meetings between a JACL leader such as James Sakamoto and Naval Intelligence ever occurred in the Seattle region. (Ibid.)

What is the significance of JACL as an organization working with Ringle? Ringle's time spent in Southern California was for intelligence work. Additionally, he had "developed an effective system of Nisei informants (which he shared with the FBI)." (Personal Justice Denied, p.54.) One must conclude that Ringle's Southern California contacts and informants included members of the JACL from Southern

District Chapters, or even members of the Southern District Council itself, wittingly or unwittingly. Moreover, since Ringle shared his informants with the FBI, one must further conclude that the same JACL members of Southern District Chapters or Council again were FBI informants as well.

Was there then a difference of attitude among JACL leaders in Northern California and the Pacific Northwest, or were there similar contacts and occurrences?

PACIFIC NORTHWEST

According to Ichioka's article, James Sakamoto, former JACL National President and editor of the Japanese American Courier in Seattle "unquestionably believed that the Nisei should cooperate with federal agencies. In 1940 he said so in so many words: 'Every loyal American citizen ... will lend all possible support to the constituted authorities to see that subversive activities are promptly put down.'" When a Japanese spy was arrested sometime in June of 1941, Sakamoto uttered the warning that "every officer and every member of the [JACL] must be on the alert." (Ichioka, "Sakamoto and the Japanese American Courier", Amerasia Journal 13:2, 1986-1987, p.73.)

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA

JACL archives reveal a Resolution discussed by the Northern California District Council meeting in San Mateo, CA, dated November 16, 1941. The Resolution, composed by Mike Masaoka and adopted unanimously by the Nor. Cal. District Council was to have been sent to each chapter for consideration and approval, then sent to President Roosevelt. It is unknown if the Resolution was approved by anyone other than the Nor. Cal. Chapters. It does serve as an indication of the mindset of JACL as war with Japan loomed more imminent. The Resolution pledged all 55 chapters to:

exercise extraordinary vigilance and to report any and all cases of espionage and sabotage which may come to our attention to the proper government authorities, offer individual and organizational facilities and cooperation to intelligence agencies and to create in every chapter, special committees to serve our governmental agencies in any capacity to which we may be called... in the civilian as well as military defense of our country. (JACL Archives.)

A more curious indication of contact with intelligence agencies is found in two letters written by a Kazuo Oka, President of the Monterey JACL chapter. JACL archives

reveal a copy of his letter to President Roosevelt and one similarly worded to the Industrial Security Division of the U.S. Army. Oka also reveals his assistance to FBI agents both before and after Pearl Harbor.

Then, too, prior to my own evaluation and some two weeks before the Pearl Harbor incident, I endeavored to assist the Monterey, California agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Among those with whom I was in constant contact were Mr. Chas. "Chuck" Drussel and Mr. Tom Estop. If I remember correctly, they were affiliated with the San Francisco, Calif. offices of the FBI, the offices of, I think, Mr. N. Pieper. (JACL Archives, Letter to U.S. Army, p.6.)

The letter to Roosevelt also states, "I have cooperated both before and after Pearl Harbor with the Federal Bureau of Investigation..." (JACL Archives, Oka Letter to Roosevelt, p.1.)

These letters were written to the President and Army because Oka had just been discharged from a factory on the basis that defense work was being done and his presence constituted a threat to security. Both letters were lengthy defenses of Oka's own "security risk worthiness." That being the case, it is entirely possible that he overstates his case or that any assistance to the FBI was as an individual rather than as President of JACL, Monterey Chapter. However, Oka does mention specific FBI agents by name, making it unlikely that he overly overstates his case, and his position as JACL Chapter President no doubt made him a person the FBI would more likely prefer over ordinary individuals. At the very least, the position provided the individual with contacts and information not normally found.

POSTSCRIPT

Michi Weglyn, author of Years of Infamy, forwarded a copy of a letter written by the late Kay Sugahara, which was addressed to Congressman Robert Matsui. This copy was submitted in response to the JACL's Research Project pursuant to Resolution #7. In this letter, Sugahara claims that "[i]n the five years before Pearl Harbor, practically every leader of the JACL was working closely with the FBI, the ONI and Army Intelligence." (Courtesy Michi Weglyn.) While Kay Sugahara had been involved in the Anti-Axis Committee's intelligence activities, no government documents have been found to corroborate this claim that as early as 1936, JACL leaders worked with these intelligence agencies, to date.

IB. Response to Declaration of War with Japan

The most immediate reaction to the declaration of war with Japan that we see in the JACL archives is a notice or memo from National Headquarters to all member chapters. The notice, undated but with 12/7/41 penciled in the upper right hand corner, acknowledged Japan's attack upon the United States and that the "acid test" had arrived as far as loyalty to the country was concerned. It goes on to urge caution in personal conduct and to become involved in national defense. It also states:

The Federal government and the laws of this country will give protection to our parents as long as they are law-abiding. Those who have been under suspicion may be apprehended temporarily until their status is clarified. But there is no fear of concentration camps for the Issei as a whole at this time. (JACL Archives 12/7/41.)

It is unclear whether the National Headquarters was commenting in reaction to the FBI pick-ups of Issei on the so-called ABC lists or if it had some prior indication that such temporary apprehensions might occur.

DEFENSE COMMITTEES FORMED BY JACL

In the three major cities on the West Coast, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle, we see JACL members forming defense committees within their local chapters or regional district councils. In Los Angeles, the Southern District Council of the JACL formed the Anti-Axis Committee. In Seattle and San Francisco, they were called Emergency Defense Councils.

ANTI-AXIS COMMITTEE--LOS ANGELES

The Anti-Axis Committee was formed on December 7, 1941 and had their first recorded meeting on December 8, 1941. The Minutes to said meeting outline a purpose of pledging "the facilities of our entire organization and our individual services to our government in this great crisis" as well as "unequivocal repudiation of Japan" and "common objective of an American victory." (JACL Archives.) Its objectives were three-fold: "to cooperate with all national, state and local government agencies in their program in this emergency; coordinate citizen and alien activities; [and] get fair treatment for loyal Americans." (Ibid.) The committees' Executive Board members were made up of men, many of whose names have appeared in other contexts, most

notably as so-called or alleged FBI informants prior to and during camp. The chairman, at this point, was Fred Tayama. Executive Secretary was Kay Sugahara. The Board members were John Ando, Dr. Ishimaru, Frank Ishii, George Inagaki, Ken Matsumoto, Masao Satow and Togo Tanaka. Also present at this meeting, among assorted local government officials was Lt. Commander Kenneth Ringle of the 11th Naval District.

The Minutes contain a statement which was aired on the radio on December 7 at 11 p.m. by the Coordinating Committee for National Defense of the Southern District Council. It reads as follows:

We are all Americans pledged to the defense of the United States. Any disloyal act or word by any Japanese or American citizen of Japanese descent harms the United States. . .As Americans we now function as counterespionage. Any act or word prejudicial to the United States committed by any Japanese must be warned and reported to the FBI, Naval Intelligence, Sheriff's Office, and local police. Any menace to the security of our country must be thoroughly and completely wiped out. [Signed, Joe Masaoka, Chairman, Coordinating Committee for National Defense.](JACL Archives, Anti-Axis Minutes, 12/8/41 p.3.)

Later, the Southern District Council sent a telegram, dated February 16, 1942, to Attorney General Francis Biddle. It read, "we have cooperated with all Federal Agencies in apprehending subversives and have actually become informants for the FBI." (NA, RG 146, Entry 13, Box 782, Section 3, 2/14/42-2/16/42, Courtesy Aiko Herzig.)

ANTI-AXIS MINUTES REVIEWED

A review of the Anti-Axis Committee's literature and Minutes is quite illuminating. Both the Huntington Library and the JARP collection at UCLA's University Research Library-Special Collections possess copies.

The Anti-Axis Committee's Archives begin with a Bulletin, titled "Japanese American Citizens League Anti-Axis Committee of the Southern District Council." The Bulletin outlines the Committee's purpose, objectives and program, which were previously cited in this chapter. The Bulletin contains a "statement by Chairman Fred Tayama" which reads as follows:

The United States is at war with the Axis. We shall do all in our power to help wipe out vicious totalitarian enemies. Every man is either friend or foe. We shall investigate and

turn over to authorities all who by word or act consort with the enemies. (JARP Collection #2010, Box 310, SC-URL-UCLA.)

The Bulletin ends with notification that copies would be sent to the FBI, Naval Intelligence, Army Intelligence, local and state elected officials, and veterans' organizations.

The leaflet or Bulletin was also printed into Japanese. An accompanying English translation of the Japanese text indicates that the leaflet was "widely distributed throughout the Japanese Community in December, 1941 following outbreak of Japanese-American War". (Ibid.) The Japanese version of the leaflet, unlike the English version, listed by name all 50 of the Anti-Axis Committee members. Included are men such as Ken Matsumoto, George Inagaki, Joe Masaoka, Togo Tanaka, Lyle Kurisaki, Kay Sugahara, Fred Tayama, and Kiyoshi Higashi.

A chronology of log for Monday, December 8, 1941 indicates that courtesy calls were paid to Mayor Fletcher Brown, US Attorney William Fleet Palmer, and US Postmaster Mary Briggs. The ensuing notation reads "Anti-Axis Committee authorized to control daily vernaculars by authority of US Attorney and US Post Office." (Ibid, Box 310.)

The notation for Thursday, December 11, 1941 reads that "Lt. Commander K.D. Ringle (at closed meeting) before representatives of the Agricultural Dept., Treasury Dept., and Officials of the wholesale market, endorsed JAACL leadership and express full confidence in them." According to the Minutes, this resulted in restoration of normal operations at the Market. The next significant action took place on Monday, December 15, 1941, when the "[p]ublic relations committee represented by Fred Tayama, Kay Sugahara, Masao Satow and Ken Matsumoto met FBI Chief Hood and offered our services. Special vigilance committee will be formed by Lyle Kurisaki to cooperate with FBI throughout Southland." (Ibid, Box 310.)

On Tuesday, December 16, 1941 at 8:00 pm, the log indicates a meeting of the LA County Council of the American Legion. Fred Tayama spoke on behalf of the Anti-Axis Committee. Points three and four of the summary of Tayama's remarks before some 2000 Legionaries gives an insight into the frame of mind of the Committee members.

3. Keynote of the duration of this war must be constant vigilance against any subversive or subterfuge activity among issei and nisei to defeat our greatest opportunity to prove our stand.

4. The Japanese American Citizens League has complete control of our community and has earned the right to lead the community affairs. Recognition of our loyalty by governmental officials in this area is unprecedented [sic] in present emergency. (Ibid)

The next Anti- Axis document is a directory of the membership with the areas of responsibility highlighted. There was an Executive Board, led by Chairman Fred Tayama, Executive Secretary Kay Sugahara, and Coordinator Masao Satow. There were a number of committees such as the "control of the vernacular press Committee", headed by Dr. T.G. Ishimaru. This Committee's duties were "to keep close check in the vernacular newspapers to see that all the content of the newspapers are entirely in accord with the spirit of national defense." This committee derived its powers from US Attorney William Fleet Palmer and Postmaster Mary Briggs. The Intelligence Committee, which did not identify a chairman, was "to investigate all cases where loyalty to America is questioned. This committee is working in cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation." There was also a Family Welfare Committee. We shall read later in Togo Tanaka's words that intelligence work pre-empted much of the welfare activity.

The Anti-Axis Committee Archives also include actual Minutes of meetings. From the Minutes of the December 12, 1941 meeting we read that under the heading of Kibei:

Lyle Kurisaki, Robbin Kaneko, Masao Igasaki and Ken Matsumoto meet with the Kibei representatives Ted Okamoto and Akira Itami. The members reported that the Kibei were very confused and skeptical and were quite undecided about the present situation. Chairman Fred Tayama will call a general meeting of all Kibei for the purpose of explaining that in this critical time we are to stand together and if not the names will have to be turned over to the Federal Authorities. (Ibid, Box 310.)

The report of the Intelligence Committee indicated that Lyle Kurisaki was the Chairman and that the committee would "look into matters that have any casts of suspicion." (Ibid.)

That the Anti-Axis Committee was involved in working with Intelligence Agencies is clear from its own minutes. That this intelligence activity characterized and "worked to minimize, if not eliminate the welfare activities of the Committee" was the assessment of Togo Tanaka. And finally, that the Anti-Axis Committee, and hence, intelligence

activity was the only active expression of the JACL in Los Angeles is admitted in the December 13, 1941 Minutes. "The Anti-Axis Committee being in this emergency the only active unit of the Japanese American citizens League, we are temporarily absorbing the entire expense of the Los Angeles and Southern District Council Office." (Ibid.)

ACTIONS AND IMPACT OF ANTI-AXIS COMMITTEE

What the eventual impact of the formation and actions of the Anti-Axis Committee were might best be understood through the eyes of JACL's unofficial historian, Togo Tanaka.

The other influence which produced a clash of opinion within the JACL leadership and worked to minimize, if not eliminate, the "welfare" activities of the organization found expression in the formation of new committees which would report to federal and other authorities "acts and utterances of disloyalty" on the part of members of the Japanese community. This influence tended to vociferously denounce this [sic?] Issei as a group unworthy of American trust. The example of Southern California JACL behavior appears to have been an extreme case but is illustrative. (Tanaka, "History of JACL" File T 6.25, Ch.IV p.32, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

According to Tanaka, during the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and with the appearances of committees like that of the JACL's Anti-Axis, the impact of one man in particular would be felt strongly in the Los Angeles area. The outbreak of war would mark the return and ascension of one Tokutaro Nishimura Slocum, more commonly known as Tokie Slocum. (Ibid.) In fact, Tanaka would imply that he personally had felt Slocum's impact in a way which temporarily placed him behind bars.

On December 8, he [Slocum] had reclaimed a throne position in the disorganized structures of Japanese community activity by sitting in the council sessions of the newly organized Anti-Axis Committee and purging it of his "enemies." The Committee originally had come into existence the evening of December 7 under the auspices of the Rafu Shimpō. Both the publisher and English Editor [Tanaka] of that publication, unfriendly to Slocum before the war, on December 8 were in protective custody, arrested by the FBI. (Ibid p.34.)

While Tanaka would be released by the authorities, he continued to suspect Slocum was his accuser. One must wonder about the legitimacy of others who were likewise unfriendly to Slocum and found themselves among the jailed after Pearl Harbor. This experience undoubtedly colored Tanaka's perspective on the issue of Japanese American "intelligence work."

Slocum was the logical choice of the group to direct the activities which he described as "intelligence" work in the Japanese community. Members of the Anti-Axis Committee were charged with the task assigned by Slocum of turning in written reports about "disloyal and subversive" acts. The JACL had become an instrument of spying within the Japanese community. Meetings were held at which Army and Navy Intelligence officers invited the support of the group; questions most frequently raised by the JACL leaders attending was, "How can we know what is suspicious?" And the answer usually given was "When a man has been living and spending beyond his means, something may be fishy." American Legion and V.F.W. officials spoke to the Anti-Axis Committee, on occasion denouncing the Issei and especially the Central Japanese Association, and close contacts were maintained with the FBI. (Ibid, p.35.)

All of this is not to say that there was anything to "spy" on. Slocum himself would complain that no names were being turned in by the group. (Ibid.) As a matter of fact, the Committee's lack of success can be corroborated by another, equally unpopular member of the group, Ken Matsumoto. In his report of activities for the National Board in March of 1942, Matsumoto summarized the month of December 1941 as follows:

Participated the formation of the Anti-Axis Committee of the Southern District Council JACL. Almost from the outset, the position of the Vice-President as a member of the Committee, was a most precarious and unpopular one... The almost immediate downfall of the Anti-Axis Committee may be pointed to the inability of the local leadership gathered for the purpose to appreciate the significance of far reaching objectives particularly in these times. (Minutes, JACL Special Bd Meeting, SF, Mar 8-10, 1942, First Session, p.5.)

Regardless of its effectiveness, the consequences of the Slocum-led Anti-Axis Committee actions, the participation in its activities by high level JACL Southern District

Council and local chapter personnel and the fact that the Anti-Axis Committee used the office formerly used by the LA JACL chapter, "earned for the known Nisei leadership of the community the reputation of being "inu" [stool pigeon] in the months preceding mass evacuation orders." (Tanaka, "History of the JACL", File T 6.25, Ch. IV, p.35, JERS, Bancroft Library.) Tanaka wrote in his Documentary Reports at Manzanar that "[t]he only newspaper publicity which the JACL received at this time--in the metropolitan press--dealt with the spy detection activities of the Anti-Axis Committee. This had the effect of confirming in the minds of the Japanese--both Issei & Nisei--that the JACL was witch-hunting among its own people." (Tanaka, "Manzanar Riot," January 29, 1943, p.9, File O 7.50, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Tanaka also kept a journal of events from December 2, 1941 to April 3, 1942. The entry for 1/9/42 reads as follows:

Conversation in the Nakamura barber shop on East First Street between San Pedro and Los Angeles Streets this noon seemed typical of growing Issei resentment against the Anti-Axis Committee and the JACL which it represents. There is already considerable suspicion that the Anti-Axis Committee is an "inu" (dog) organization; there is, it seems to me, tremendous growing resentment against unfair "finger pointing" resulting in the arrest and detention of men whose families (sic) insist are completely innocent and will be exonerated. (Tanaka, "Journal" File A 17.07, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

It did not help matters that Tokie Slocum would repeatedly proclaim in public gatherings and meetings and to any who would listen:

...on December 7 night, I went over the top again, leading my buddies of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Naval Intelligence to arrest the Central Japanese Association leaders. . . I was personally responsible for the arrest of the Central Japanese Association members who are today in the safekeeping of the FBI. (Tanaka, "Journal" 12/2/41-4/3/42; 1/11/42, p.3, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Slocum would make these statements before the family members of those arrested in the CJA and would continue to, well into his camp experience at Manzanar. The "inu" label would follow Slocum and those JACL leaders around him into the relocation centers. According to Tanaka, actions such

as Slocum's and other vociferous members of the Anti-Axis Committee

discredited the JACL as a force for community leadership among both Issei and Nisei. By a twist of irony, many JACL leaders were Nisei whose parents had been rounded up in the FBI raids and the aggressive, vocal utterances of Slocum and others emphasizing the "vital importance of anti-espionage work" fell for the most part on deaf, if not resentful ears, even within JACL ranks." (Tanaka, "History of JACL" File T 6.25, Ch.IV, p.36, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

In his sharply critical article entitled "The Nisei Assume Power: The JACL, 1941-1942," author Paul Spickard informs us that one of the early actions of the Anti-Axis Committee was to send "Fred Tayama to a meeting of Kibei who had begun to form an organization less enthusiastically patriotic than the JACL. Tayama demanded that the Kibei cooperate with the JACL or he would turn their names over to the FBI. The Kibei had little choice but to acquiesce." (Spickard, "Nisei Assume Power" Pacific Historical Review 52:2, May 1983, p. 159.) We will see that Tayama eventually would participate in turning over the entire Kibei membership list in any event.

Peter Irons also chronicles the formation and activities of the Anti-Axis Committee in *Justice at War*. In fact, Irons characterizes its activities as "formal collaboration with the FBI soon after Pearl Harbor."

Two weeks later, a Committee delegation met with Richard Hood, who directed the FBI's Los Angeles Office. Hood chided his visitors for their earlier reluctance to "furnish any specific derogatory information concerning any organization or individual." . . . Members of the Anti-Axis Committee admitted the truth of this reproof but assured Hood that "they were now willing to inform on all individuals who appeared to be a danger to this country."

Over the next month the Committee met frequently with Hood and his staff and furnished the FBI with detailed information. In a report to J. Edgar Hoover on January 20, 1942, Hood listed a dozen "ardent supporters of the Japanese cause" fingered by the Anti-Axis Committee. This list included Kaoru Akashi, director of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Los Angeles. "A presidential warrant has been requested for the apprehension of this

individual," Hood noted to Hoover. Committee members also turned over to Hood the membership list of the Kibei Division of the Los Angeles JACL and the names of "pro-Japanese" Kibei leaders. JACL leaders joined the Anti-Axis Committee in providing information to the FBI , and "expressed no objection" to Hood's intention to share this material with other intelligence agencies. (Irons, Justice at War, pp. 79-80.)

Irons, as have many other authors, attributed Fred Tayama's beating at Manzanar as the "heavy price for his role as a government informer." (Ibid, p. 80.)

Review of the Hood to Hoover memo confirms that 1) there was a December 19, 1941 meeting between the LA field office of the FBI and the Anti-Axis Committee; 2) the prior reluctance to inform on the part of individuals underwent a change of heart as a result of Pearl Harbor; 3) frequent conferences were held between the FBI and Anti-Axis Committee; 4) members of the Committee had provided information which led to the arrests of several individuals; 5) members of JACL felt that the Kibei were the most dangerous group; 6) accordingly, the membership lists of the Kibei Division for LA and San Pedro were turned over; 7) more names were turned over; 8) the various intelligence agencies could share Anti-Axis' information. (NA, RG 220, Records of CWIRC, Box 8, Numerical File 7933-9213, File 8705a-8999.)

Contrast these assessments of the Anti-Axis Committee with that of National Vice-President Ken Matsumoto's recap before the National Board of the JACL. "...[O]ur entire efforts were devoted to intelligence work and some public relations." (Minutes, JACL Special Board Meeting, SF, Mar 8-10, 1942, First Session, p. 5.)

EMERGENCY DEFENSE COUNCIL --SEATTLE

James Sakamoto, one of the founders of the JACL and National President of the organization from 1936-1938, was one of its leaders in the Pacific Northwest. It was Sakamoto who, soon after Pearl Harbor, formed the Emergency Defense Council of what was then called the Seattle Progressive Citizens' League. This was the Seattle chapter of the JACL with its earlier moniker. (Ichioka, "Sakamoto and the Japanese Courier", Amerasia Journal 13:2, 1986-87, pp.54,74.)

Within this Council, a special committee was formed "to cooperate with the F.B.I." to report "subversive activities in the Community." Sakamoto notified the FBI that the Emergency Defense Council was prepared to "co-operate

in any way with your office" and "to do our share in the prosecution of the war to a victorious end." (Ibid p.74.)

This is confirmed by another account of what occurred in Seattle after Pearl Harbor.

An Emergency Defense Council was created within the JACL, its purpose being to cooperate closely with the Seattle Civilian Defense Control Offices. . . An important branch of the Emergency Council was its "intelligence corp" that was to cooperate directly under the supervision of the FBI, and it was an openly stated fact that Clarence Arai was the chief of this bureau. (Miyamoto, "The Seattle JACL and its Role in Evacuation," File 6.24, p.10, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

A week after Sakamoto established the Council at a regular meeting of the Seattle Progressive Citizens' League, Sakamoto, as chairman of the Emergency Defense Council, addressed the members present. He "spoke on the progress of the Defense Council and urged each member to volunteer his support in any way possible to prove his loyalty to America." (JACL Archives, Minutes SPCL 12/19/41 p.1.) He then introduced the various chairmen of working committees within the Council.

Mrs. Clarence Arai--Red Cross
George Ishihara--Civilian Defense
Clarence Arai--Federal Bureau of Investigation
Takeo Nogaki--Federal Reserve Bank
Ichiro Motosaka--US Defense Bonds and Stamps
Toshio Hoshida--Fiscal Agent
Secretary of the Council and Publicity--Bill
Hosokawa

Did the Emergency Defense Council conduct its activities similarly to those of the Anti-Axis Committee? Sakamoto's subsequent testimony before the Tolson Committee in February of 1942 gives some indications that they did.

I know definitely that our organization, both locally and nationally, has, let us say, "turned in" people whom we thought should be checked into . . . We have been working chiefly among the Japanese, and we have repeatedly stated at our meetings that it is our loyal duty to ferret out those among us who are disloyal, because our interest must be for America first, and secondly for ourselves. (Ichioka, "Sakamoto and the Japanese American Courier" Amerasia Journal 13:2, 1986-87, p.74.)

The Emergency Defense Council did turn over individuals according to WRA records also. Ruth McKee's "History of the WRA" states that:

On December 12, under the leadership of the JACL in Seattle (the place of the League's origin, in 1930) the Emergency Defense Council was organized. This group formed a civilian protection corps, a Red Cross Corps, a National Defense Stamp Campaign Corps, and an intelligence unit. This Council was active from the day of its organization, and the intelligence unit worked closely with the Federal Bureau of Investigation during the round-up of subversives. In other coastal cities, the JACL collaborated with the FBI, ONI, and MIS. (NA, RG 210 Entry 3 Box 3, File "McKee, Ruth-History of WRA, pp 1-130, Pearl Harbor to June 30, 1944, p. 30.)

One further item of note on the Emergency Defense Council is found in a statement signed by James Sakamoto and forwarded to the Secretary of State by William Hosokawa on January 23, 1942. The cover letter by Hosokawa is on Emergency Defense Council letterhead and lists Hosokawa as Secretary. Since Sakamoto had gone blind some years back, we must assume that the lion's share of the paperwork by the Council was performed by Hosokawa under Sakamoto's direction. However, returning to Sakamoto's statement, he proclaims:

We are actively cooperating now with the authorities to uncover all subversive activity in our midst, and if need be we are ready to stand as protective custodians over our parent generation to guard against danger to the United States arising from their midst. (NA, RG 220, Records of the CWIRC, Numerical File ____, File 5386a-87, Courtesy Aiko Herzig and Michi Weglyn.)

Thus, in addition to their informing duties, the Defense Council offered to be trustees and custodians of the Issei. This manifests a considerable commitment to the U.S. at the possible expense of the parent generation.

IMPERIAL COUNTY CITIZENS WELFARE COMMITTEE

The Imperial County Citizens Welfare Committee, sponsored by the Brawley Chapter of the JACL was an organization along the same lines as the Anti-Axis Committee and the Emergency Defense Council. Their stated purposes, objectives, and programs are similar to that of the Anti-Axis Committee. "We shall investigate and turn over to

authorities all who by word or act consort with the enemies." (NA, RG 210, Entry 16 Box 137, Subject Files 21.012, File #1 "April to June 1942".) It is interesting to note that the Executive Secretary of the Committee was Kay Nishimura, who later will be a key figure in the Poston incident. Additionally, Lyle Kurisaki was a member of the advisory board of the Committee. He, too, was caught up in events at Poston.

Whether Nishimura ever "turned over " anyone to the authorities is mentioned in passing in an Army Intelligence G-2 report. "The same source mentioned above also cited the incident when Kay Ishimura [sic], said to be a former FBI informant from El Centro was beaten up. (NA, RG 338 Entry 1 Box 12, File 323.3 Colorado River, Parker.)

Lyle Kurisaki was likewise beaten up at the Poston Camp. An Office of Naval Intelligence Report quotes from a letter of a confidential informant inside that camp. The source reveals that "Kay was attacked but was not hurt...Several days later, Lyle Kurisaki was attacked in his apartment." The Naval Intelligence Officer then writes:

The person referred to as "Kay" in line three of the above-quoted letter, is known to be Kay Nishimura, who supplied valuable information to the United States Naval Intelligence and Federal Bureau of Investigation representatives at El Centro, California, and who cooperated with those representatives in the translation of Japanese documents and papers. Lyle Kurisaki referred to in line six of the above-quoted letter, is known to be Lyle Kurisaki who furnished valuable information to the representatives of the United States Naval Intelligence and Federal Bureau of Investigation at El Centro, California. (NA, RG 220 Records of CWIRC, Box ____, Numerical File ____ File Number 26892-26899, U.S. Naval Intelligence Service, 11th ND, Investigative Report, December 7, 1942, Courtesy Aiko Herzig.)

The valuable information which Nishimura and Kurisaki provided the ONI and FBI was undoubtedly through the Imperial County Citizens Welfare Committee. The Committee had offices in Brawley and El Centro according to their letter-head. These intelligence reports confirm that the Committee carried out Point three of its stated program to "turn over to authorities all who by word or act consort with the enemies." (NA, RG 210 Entry 16, Box 137, Subject Files 21.012, File #1, "April to June 1942.")

IC. Response to Various Military Orders, Curfew

The response of one JACL chapter to the various military orders was reported after the fact by an assistant Community Analyst while interned at Poston. Paul Higashi wrote about the Monterey Peninsula Japanese in the Community Analysis Section Report for Poston.

During the evacuation, this JACL chapter acquired a disputable reputation amongst the people. It is reported that the JACL leaders were the first to leave Monterey for inland districts, thus exposing the residents to turmoil. They were left without an influential body to iron out the difficulties that arose during those trying periods. (Rept. No.60, March 16, 1945, p.3, Poston Rept. Officer, File J 1.85, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Higashi's reference to the report that JACL leaders left for inland district would place this sometime during the voluntary evacuation period but prior to the freeze order, which then eliminated travel out of the restricted zones.

In another part of California, we see that shortly after the March 11, 1942 establishment of the WCCA and the voluntary relocation period, the Imperial County Citizens Welfare Committee wrote to Attorney General Francis Biddle. In a letter dated March 17, 1942, Shigeo Imamura, Executive Chairman requested group evacuation on behalf of close to 1600 Japanese residents, under the auspices of some organization like the JACL.

As a result of a recent survey taken by our offices, we find that out of the approximate 1600 Japanese residents both citizen and alien, the majority would like to evacuate in a group under some recognized organization such as the Japanese American Citizens League. (NA, RG 210 Entry 16 Box 137, Subject Files 21.012 File #1 "April to June 1942.")

SUICIDE BATTALION AND HOSTAGES

For lack of a better place to discuss this topic, it will be addressed here. Both Michi Weglyn and Richard Drinnon refer to the suggestion by Nisei leaders to form a "suicide battalion" with family members serving as "hostages" to stave off the impending evacuation of Japanese Americans. (Weglyn, Years of Infamy, Morrow:New York, 1976, p. 38; Drinnon, Keeper of Concentration Camps, Univ. of Calif:Berkeley, 1987, p.77.) The actual source of this suggestion was Mike Masaoka himself. In his "Final Report", written on April 22, 1944, Masaoka writes:

Two ideas which we seriously considered at that time illustrate to what extremes we Japanese Americans were willing to go to safeguard our homes and associations. One was to form a volunteer "suicide battalion" which would go anywhere to spearhead the most dangerous missions. To assure the skeptics that the members of the "suicide battalion" would remain loyal, if such guarantees were necessary to quell the objections of the professional agitators of the west, the families and friends of the volunteers would place themselves in the hands of the government as "hostages." When this idea was informally discussed with a high military official, we were informed that it was not the practice of the government to require "hostages" or to sponsor such "suicide battalions." (Masaoka, "Final Report", 4/22/44, Insert 3, after p.53, File T 6.15, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Was this the genesis of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team? Michi Weglyn thought so. "Though Masaoka's brash proposal was summarily rejected at the time, it would be later reconsidered and implemented by the military, notwithstanding their initial insistence that America did not believe in the concept of hostages or of a segregated battalion--except, of course, for blacks." (Weglyn, Years of Infamy, Morrow:New York, 1976, p. 38)

ID. The Decision to Cooperate with Evacuation

PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF EVACUATION

The issue of JACL's prior knowledge of evacuation and possible role in requesting such governmental action is not a new issue. Like the other issues in this report, it has long been rumored that the JACL asked for evacuation, that the organization knew about it in advance and either did nothing to prevent it or worked only for their own self-interest. Most recently, these rumors have seen new light through the writings of James M. Omura, wartime English editor of the Rocky Shimpo and longtime thorn in the side of JACL. In his multi-part essay on the autobiography, They Call Me Moses Masaoka and the JACL which appeared in the Vox Populi Column of the Rafu Shimpo in April of 1989, Omura raises the issue of prior knowledge by the JACL of evacuation. For his support, Omura refers to a taped interview of Lee Murata. The relevant portions read roughly as follows:

That was when brother Mike came out, needed financial backing to combat the public. . . . The time I'm referring to when Mike come out 1940, before the declaration of war, before Pearl Harbor, 1939, could've been spring '39, we were warned from Mike, that we should be thinking about possibilities, what could take place in the event of war... conditions tense...prepare ourselves--with this mind of thinking, people in the area, the young people, we made a trip through the state, through the eastern part of the state warning people, take care of belongings get papers, whatever necessary, legal documents in order to be looking for the worse--possibility of evacuation possibility of being put into concentration camps--limited to traveling, funds frozen, all those things brought out to our group at one time, Mike came out and warned us. Denver? I don't know. Don't know when he spoke to Denver group-- to our group in Lupton, he come out and and forewarned us of the possibilities of outcome in event of war and s well as I could try to explain it myself, I made the trip through Ft. Morgan Hills, Atwood, Cedrick Hills, of the results of the outcome of war, in the event of war...(inaudible)...This was before the war, before Pearl Harbor-1939, early 40, maybe cause I make the trip late 40, early 41 'cause I made the trip-- they were through harvesting, maybe getting ready for spring, don't remember anymore. These are the possibilities and these are the something that JACL are concerned about.

With that thinking, made the trip to inform about the possibilities. (Oral History Tape, Lee Murata, Buddhist Church Lounge, Denver, CO Box 394, Tape 249, Counter Number 536-600, JARP Collection, UCLA.)

During the course of this interview, the interviewer, Joe Grant Masaoka tries to clarify with Murata whether in fact it was Joe Grant and not Mike Masaoka and whether it was after Pearl Harbor that the described events took place. While Murata's response seems confused when it comes to placing the precise date and year, Murata was certain that it was Mike Masaoka, that he spoke before Pearl Harbor, that a concern over evacuation and camps was voiced and that as a result, Murata himself went on a speaking tour to carry warnings eastward. The tape of Murata, of course, can be explained away as the reminiscences of a confused mind. However, while a listener could conclude that there was confusion on the dates, there was no confusion in the interview about Masaoka's message and presence.

This tape by itself would not amount to much in the way of support for Omura's contentions. However, taken along with an even more puzzling document referred to by Omura in Part Three of his "Debunking JACL Fallacies", one must pause to consider. On February 9, 1942, ten days prior to Roosevelt's issuance of Executive Order 9066, Attorney General Francis Biddle wrote a memorandum to his assistant James Rowe. The heading read MEMORANDUM FOR ROWE. It states:

Please note the attached memorandum from Mr. Hoover to the effect that the Japanese-American Citizens' League want us to evacuate its members and alien parents. I think we should begin exploring with Mr. McNutt the possibility of having some refugee camps for the Japs, which we will need.

(initialed) FB
Francis Biddle
Attorney General
(Dept. of Justice Memos,
File A 7.01, JERS,
Bancroft Library.)

The file did not contain a copy of the accompanying memo from Hoover. Without the Hoover memo, it would be unwise to jump to any conclusions solely on this memorandum. It is possible that the memo refers to a number of voluntary relocation proposals which were being offered for consideration such as the Maryknoll Church proposal of relocating some Japanese Americans to an area outside of St. Louis. James Sakamoto had proposed a Model City Relocation plan at the Tolan Committee Hearings. However, the language is plain

about JACL requesting evacuation. Likewise the date places any such request well before Executive Order 9066, and well before the Tolan Committee Hearings in the West Coast.

a further argument against this memo referring to the Maryknoll or Model City/Sakamoto proposal is the reference to the need for "refugee camps." The Maryknoll proposal had a location in mind, outside of the city of St. Louis. Likewise, refugee camps seem inconsistent with the Model City proposed by Sakamoto in his Tolan Hearing testimony.

DECEMBER 7, 1941

In order to examine the decision of the JACL to cooperate with evacuation, it would be helpful to examine the foundation laid for the general concept of cooperation by the organization. With such an understanding, the decision on cooperating with evacuation may be seen in its proper perspective.

On December 7, 1941, following news of the attack on Pearl Harbor, both the National Office of the JACL and National President Saburo Kido, dispatched telegrams to President Roosevelt and other government officials. Both contain statements offering the organization's cooperation.

We pledge our services unreservedly to the officials and authorities of our country... The National Headquarters of the League has been collaborating with the officials in the National defense program and is now re-urging members... to cooperate in every way with the civic and federal authorities. (JACL Archives, Press Release, 12/7/41.)

...in this solemn hour we pledge our fullest cooperation to you, Mr. President, and to our country...we are ready and prepared to expend every effort to repel this invasion together with our fellow Americans. (Hosokawa, JACL: In Quest of Justice, Morrow: New York 1982, pp.130-1.)

In the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, public opinion, or at least public-official opinion, had not yet been roused and directed against Japanese Americans. However, in the beginning months of 1942, as public opinion turned into public hysteria and fear, the call for evacuation of the citizen children along with the alien parents arose.

MEETING WITH GOVERNOR OLSON

On February 6, 1942, California Governor Culbert Olson had a meeting with members of the Japanese community whom he had summoned to the State Capitol himself. Among those present were Saburo Kido, National President of JACL; Mike Masaoka, National Secretary; Ken Matsumoto, National Vice-President; Walter Tsukamoto, past-President of the National JACL; Togo Tanaka, English Editor of the Rafu Shimpo and Publicity Chair of the National JACL. Among the others were members of other Japanese organizations and individuals from around the state.

At this meeting, the Governor made a statement to the effect that the Japanese, both national and citizens, should be prepared to move out of the area at any time. After he concluded his statements, he then wanted to hear "attitudes and willingness to cooperate." One by one, those present gave their comments. Ken Matsumoto spoke to the effect that Japanese American citizen should be treated like any other citizens, with the Governor expressing dissatisfaction to such "reluctance." Similarly, Saburo Kido also felt that Japanese Americans should not be singled out and that their citizenship rights should be respected. The Governor was able to extract a vague commitment to cooperate from Walter Tsukamoto, although he too emphasized recognition for Japanese American citizenship rights. Mike Masaoka urged recognition for the distinction between American Citizens and enemy aliens as well as the need to have the "active cooperation" and "voluntary support" from those being moved. The remaining individuals basically reiterated the comments of the four previous speakers. After the meeting, there was the increasing fear that evacuation would come to pass. (Tanaka, "Journal" 12/2/41-4/3/42, File A 17.07; 2/6/42 pp.3-4, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

TOLAN COMMITTEE

In hearings held before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, House of Representatives, 77th Congress, during the latter part of February through the beginning of March 1942, JACL representatives in San Francisco, Seattle and Los Angeles, appeared and testified on the issue of evacuation.

Mike Masaoka, as National Secretary and Field Executive of the JACL, submitted a prepared statement into the record of the Tolan Committee Hearings. The portion on Evacuation follows:

...With any policy of evacuation definitely arising from reasons of military necessity and national safety, we are in complete agreement. As American citizens, we cannot and should not

take any other stand. But, also, as American citizens believing in the integrity of our citizenship; we feel that any evacuation enforced on grounds violating that integrity should be opposed.

If, in the judgment of military and Federal authorities, evacuation of Japanese residents from the West Coast is a primary step toward assuring the safety of this Nation, we will have no hesitation in complying with the necessities implicit in that judgment. But, if, on the other hand, such evacuation is primarily a measure whose surface urgency cloaks the desires of political or other pressure groups who want us to leave merely from motives of self-interest, we feel that we have every right to protest and to demand equitable judgment on our merits as American citizens. (Tolan Committee Hearings, Part 29, San Francisco, February 21 and 23, 1942; 11137.)

Thus in his statement, Masaoka agreed to cooperation on evacuation if it was deemed a military necessity. On the other hand, he did object to evacuation on the grounds that a discriminatory motive would be contrary to the rights of American citizens. Masaoka continued with recommendations on policy and procedure in the event of evacuation.

Shortly after the San Francisco Hearings were completed, hearings were held in Seattle and Portland, on February 26, 28, and March 2, 1942. James Sakamoto, founder and past-National President of the JAACL testified. He expressed opposition "to the idea of indiscriminate, en masse evacuation of all citizens and loyal aliens of Japanese extraction" and emphasized the desire of Japanese Americans to contribute to the war effort. However, "[i]f, finally, the decision is that Japanese must go, the committee is assured of the Japanese Citizens League's complete cooperation in the evacuation movement. Loyalty demands that orders, no matter what, be obeyed, willingly and efficiently." (Tolan Committee Hearings: Part 30, Portland and Seattle, February 26, 28, March 2, 1942, 11451.) Most notable in Sakamoto's comments on the issue of evacuation, was his proposal for a "model city" within the interior of the nation. (Ibid p. __)

SPECIAL NATIONAL BOARD AND COUNCIL MEETING, JAACL, MARCH 8-10, 1942

The Minutes of this emergency meeting of the National Board and Council in San Francisco reflect the final decisions made on cooperation with evacuation. The Board Minutes

indicate that Mike Masaoka read a statement of the National Board on the policy of the JACL regarding evacuation which did not depart much from his statement to the Tolan Committee.

1. We are opposed to the principle of evacuation, unless it is ordered by the military as a national defense measure and is applied to all persons, citizens and aliens alike, indiscriminately and without reference to race, color or creed.

2. If the military authorities believe that national safety requires the removal of "enemy aliens" from any regions or areas, we believe that all "enemy aliens" from all countries with which the United States is now at war should be removed, and that no one group or nationality should be singled out for special attention.

3. If it becomes necessary to remove citizens from these areas or regions, as designated by the military, we believe that all citizens should be treated alike and that no single block of citizens be singled out for special consideration or attention.

4. Even though our beliefs may not be recognized by the military and they should single out the American citizens of Japanese extraction, as they have done, for special attention, we believe that, as good American citizens, we ought to accept the word of those charged with the responsibility of national safety and that we should cooperate with them to the best of our abilities, trusting that our cooperation will inspire a reciprocal cooperation on the part of our government in the humane and reasonable treatment of our mutual problem. (Minutes, Special Board Meeting, JACL, March 8-10, 1942, p.4.)

That last phrase in Point Four would be a theme throughout the comments expressed by JACL leaders in their meetings with government officials during this special meeting of the National Board and Council. Saburo Kido made a comment to that effect to Tom Clark. "It has been our premise that the more we cooperate with you gentlemen, the more in turn you will cooperate with us." (Ibid, p. 5 of Conference.) James Sakamoto also made comments to the same effect that:

the government is going to cooperate with us to the fullest extent possible, so now it is up to us to cooperate with the government agents. To you people gathered here now...you have a job to do,

go back to your respective communities to get people working with the government in the evacuation order." (Ibid, Sixth Session, p.1)

The Special National Council Meeting approved of five resolutions, one of the most important being, "a resolution on the evacuation of Nisei as a measure based on military necessity and not a reflection on their loyalty." The second key resolution was to the President, and offered him "our sacred pledge that we will cooperate wholeheartedly in the evacuation program, and in any and all matters integral to the defense of our country." (Ibid, Resolutions, pp. 22-3.)

EXPRESSIONS OF INAPPROPRIATE SENTIMENT

After the statement of policy and resolutions for cooperation came expressions of what many have since considered to be inappropriate sentiment, given the conditions facing Japanese Americans in the U.S. On March 8, 1942, Saburo Kido gave a special message to the assembled delegates of the Emergency National Council Meeting at JACL National Headquarters in San Francisco. In his closing remarks Kido told the delegates "let us keep our chins up", "we are gladly cooperating", "we have been grateful to our Federal government", "we are glad that we can become wards of our government", "when we leave our homes, let us leave with a smiling face and courageous mien." (Ibid, Sixth Session p.1.)

Likewise, in Jimmie Sakamoto's comments at the same meeting, he urged his fellow JACLers, "so now it is up to us to cooperate with the government loyally and cheerfully." (Hosokawa, JACL: In Quest of Justice, Morrow: New York, 1982, p. 158.)

BETTER IN ADMINISTERING THAN OPPOSING EVACUATION?

An examination of the situation in Seattle during evacuation led Frank Miyamoto to conclude that "it seemed to me, the JACL was far more efficient in administering the process of evacuation than in organizing against it." (Miyamoto, "The Seattle JACL and its Role in Evacuation", File T 6.24, p. 26, JERS, Bancroft Library.) Miyamoto documented the work of the JACL in operating as an intermediary between the Japanese and the U.S. Employment Service, in acting as a clearinghouse for evacuation sales, and most importantly, in communicating information about evacuation from government agencies to the community. (Ibid, pp. 24-5.)

The weakness of the JACL in organizing against evacuation, however, may have had its basis in the

general political stand which it took from December 7 on...If the JACL was weak in organizing against evacuation it seems that this weakness arose from the stand the organization took... The Nisei were not in a position to condemn powerful governments in their action against weaker minorities. Out of this paradox it seems, grew the attitude of cooperation with the Army that prevailed among the JACL leader in Seattle throughout this period. (Ibid.pp.26-27.)

Consistent with Miyamoto's "The Seattle JACL and its Role in Evacuation" is an assessment of the JACL by the District Intelligence Officer from the 13th Naval District in a confidential report entitled "Japanese Evacuation and Relocation, in the Thirteenth Naval District (to March 10, 1943)." The Thirteenth Naval District encompasses the greater Seattle area and Pacific Northwest.

Under the heading of Japanese American Citizens League, the report indicates the following:

When it became certain that evacuation of the Japanese was inevitable, the local chapters of the Japanese American Citizens League seemingly cooperated wholeheartedly with the designated evacuation authorities, offering the services of their members as translators and interpreters and in Seattle, Washington, loaning their office at 517 Main Street together with clerical and stenographic staff, to the Provost Marshall and his staff and personnel of the Wartime Civil Control Authority. With the knowledge and approval of the United States military authorities in charge of the evacuation, the Seattle Japanese American Citizens League prepared, along military lines, an organization known as the "Evacuee Administration Headquarters", that was to be in charge of the internal administration of the Puyallup Assembly, under the Caucasian staff of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. (NA, RG 210 Entry 17 Box 2, File "Office of Naval Intelligence", pp.5-6.)

Since the rest of the report goes into the relationship between prominent JACL figures and the WCCA personnel at Puyallup, this avenue of examination will re-emerge in Section II B-Relationship with War Relocation Authority and Other Governmental Agencies.

However, it is quite clear from this excerpt what was the degree of cooperation offered by the Seattle JACL in

response to evacuation and in their efforts to facilitate rather than oppose it.

BRANDING ISSUE

During the Special Emergency Meeting of the JACL held in San Francisco, Mike Masaoka makes a statement, which, if truly ascribable to him, is outrageous and shocking. In the Report on Conditions in Distant States, a number of delegates report on the situation in the mid-west. Near the end of the session, Masaoka gives his report.

Mr. Mike Masaoka, reported on conditions in Wyoming, Nebraska, Colorado, and Montana. At the Tolan hearing, to fifteen telegrams sent to governors, nine answered. Eight were in the negative and one qualified. This state was Colorado. Colorado, Wyoming Nebraska and Montana will take Japanese, but the government must guarantee adequate protection. He recommends one of the three following methods:

1. Be put into Labor Concentration camps to be farmed out to large sugar beet combines as cheap laborers.
2. The Japanese internees be brought in for roadmaking.
3. The Japanese be branded and stamped and put under the supervision of the Federal government. (Minutes, Special Emergency Meeting, JACL, March 8-10, 1942, First Session pp. 15-16.)

Now then, who does the phrase "he recommends" refer to in that sentence? It could refer to Masaoka or to one of the governors of the four states mentioned. There are a number of plausible explanations to explain why it may appear that Masaoka suggested that Japanese be branded and stamped like cattle. It is possible that an error in transcribing the minutes occurred. Possibly it was one of the governors of the aforementioned states who suggested branding Japanese, which, if you think about the times, is highly plausible. However, there is one further matter to be considered. The Minutes of the March 8-10, 1942 meeting are not the original minutes. In fact, the Minutes were reprinted in 1971 in the Southern California JACL Office and contains an introduction by Mike Masaoka, dated December 31, 1970. His introduction states he had reviewed the Minutes recently. "In reading again, after some 28 years, the official Minutes of the special emergency meeting held by the National JACL Board and National Council in San Francisco in early 1942..." (Ibid, Intro p.1.) Thus, Masaoka had an opportunity to review the Minutes prior to its reprinting and had a chance to correct and typographical or transcription errors.

(Author's Note: An interview was scheduled with Masaoka in October. It was hoped that such an interview would clarify this particular point, but his poor health prevented it.)

IE. ACTIONS INITIATED IN THE COMMUNITY

KIBEI SURVEY

One of the actions instituted in the community by the JACL which drew a great deal of criticism was the Kibei survey. Following the assistance provided by the JACL in the registration of all alien Japanese required by the U.S. Government shortly after Pearl Harbor, the National Headquarters of the JACL was asked to conduct a survey of the Kibei in each local chapter. (JACL Archives, Bulletin #114.) Press release #81, dated February 13, 1942, indicates that the survey request must have gone out to each chapter sometime in the first two weeks of February. The purpose of the survey was two-fold, according to Bulletin #114. One was to provide the National Office with information on the Kibei, the second was to protect the Kibei, who were then the subjects of misinformation and innuendo.

The survey was to be conducted during the week of February 16-21, on forms provided by the National Headquarters, to be submitted in triplicate. Bulletin #114 stated that each individual chapter had discretion in the method utilized for the survey. While the Bulletin stressed the voluntary nature of the survey, chapters were warned that "those chapters who do not comply with this request will be reported to the authorities who requested the survey." No indication was given of who these authorities were. Moreover, the Kibei who might have been uncooperative were to be reported to the National office as well.

The form accompanying the Bulletin contained 23 questions of a rather basic nature. Identification information was requested, as was information on trips to Japan, religion, education and military experience in both the U.S. and Japan, hobbies and organizations. The survey ended with a question on dual citizenship and an attestation clause by the particular JACL chapter involved.

Subsequently, in Press Release #82, addressed "To all Kibei", National Secretary Mike Masaoka confronted the issue of opposition by Kibei to the survey. "Some of you have expressed the idea that this is a trap to convict you of some heinous crime for having gone to Japan at some time in the past." (JACL Archives Press Release #82.) Masaoka then proceeded to reiterate the purpose of the survey as being for the protection of Kibei to the extent that JACL could, with this information, prevent a case against the demand for Kibei internment. Then to encourage cooperation, Masaoka urged the following:

This survey is a purely voluntary one. If you have nothing to hide, it is better that you fill in the questionnaire. The mere fact that you may

have visited Japan should not be used against you. For your own protection, it is better to register with your local JACL office immediately. If you do not register, certain inferences may be made against you--and it is to prevent the excuse for such inferences that the National JACL is sponsoring this voluntary survey. . . The degree of your cooperation on such matters as these may indicate the degree of your loyalty to the United States; therefore, in order to help protect your own welfare, please cooperate with the only organization which is prepared to help you fight your legitimate battles for you as American citizens. (JACL Archives, Press Release #82 n.d.)

It is ironic that Masaoka offered as justification for the survey the need to combat unfounded rumors based purely on Kibei status, but himself indulged in the belief that cooperation and loyalty were linked.

Bulletin #117 dated February 18, 1942 from the National Secretary reiterated the issue of non-cooperation on the Kibei survey. Masaoka again stressed the need for specific facts about the Kibei. "If the Kibei desire our aid in this hour of their greatest need, it behooves them to cooperate with us 100%." Masaoka is also more firm in his conclusion that "the degree of your cooperation on this matter is the degree of your loyalty to the United States." (JACL Archives.)

Masaoka admonished the chapters by saying the following:

They (the Kibei) must be educated to realize that they must cooperate on such matters as these, for assuming for the sake of argument that the government desired information on them, the officials could easily look into the passport records and draw their own conclusions. Is it not better for them that they themselves voluntarily make these reports and thereby prevent inferences against their good faith and intentions. (JACL Archives, Bulletin #117, Feb 18, 1942, p.2.)

Were this the case, what then was the purpose of the Kibei survey besides providing the National JACL with information and providing a symbolic show of loyalty? If government officials could obtain information through passport records why then did they ask the JACL to obtain such information in a much less direct manner? And perhaps much less reliable as well?

The next press release issued, #87, indicated an extension of the deadline was requested by many of the Kibei themselves to allow until February 28 to complete the forms. No archival records from the JACL reveal any numerical or percentage data on responses, nor if any compilation of the information was done.

LT. BROWN, OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Some time following the Kibei survey, a memo was issued from the National Secretary to all Northern California District Council Presidents and Executive Secretaries regarding a request by Lt. D.M. Brown of Naval Intelligence in San Francisco. Masaoka informed the recipients of the memo that they were being appointed by National Headquarters as co-chairmen, "of a committee of information to fill out the enclosed confidential personal reports." (JACL Archives, Memo RE: Lt. Brown's Request, n.d.) Masaoka suggested that their committees be composed of the older American citizens of Japanese ancestry. "The idea is to have each of these committees go through the Japanese directories name by name and to furnish their pooled information regarding each individual listed therein residing in that region." (Ibid.)

The attached report form consisted of 25 questions, beginning with basic personal data, organizations active in or affiliated with, travel, military service, and hobbies. The next few questions ask about friends and acquaintances, relatives and approximate economic status. Question 19 asks if the person is "living better that he should considering his occupation and other signs." The next group of questions ask about religion, education and family size. Question 23 asks for the person's political sympathies and asks to elaborate on "attitudes of loyalty" and says "rumors, too should be included but they should be noted as rumors. Reasons for this section is to attempt to establish their true feelings." The questionnaire closes with an assessment of general public opinion of the person and a personal evaluation of same. The persons reporting were to disclose their names and addresses at the end, but were informed that the information was strictly confidential and that their names would not be divulged.

After these reports were sent out, another memo, undated, was issued, again to Northern California Chapter Presidents and Secretaries, expressing the National Secretary's feelings about the response to LT. Brown's confidential, personal reports.

This office has received rather disgusting information from a number of chapters to the effect that they would not cooperate wholeheartedly with this project. May I say that it

is this type of attitude on our part which makes the position of the Japanese American so questionable in this hour of crisis. . . They need this type of information to protect our groups, and unless we can furnish this information immediately, we may not be able to stem the tide of hysteria which demands that all of us, nationals and citizens alike, be moved out of this area for the duration... The information asked for is not one which can be called "spying" or "informing." You are merely asked to do what every other patriotic American may also be asked to do: Ferret out the bad in order to protect the rest of the community. (JACL Archives.)

It is arguable that every other patriotic American was necessarily being asked to go through the phone book and assess whether individuals were living beyond their means and to provide rumors regarding person's political attitudes. The "living beyond their means" questions would be one to haunt those Japanese living in rural areas of California who were, against all odds and poor land, able to eke out a living and then be accused of receiving funds from Japan for espionage because they had survived, much to the envy and dismay of their white peers. (Masaoka, "Final Report", 1944, p.62.)

In any event, JACL cooperation with Lt. Brown's project does go considerably beyond the bounds set forth in the so-called official position of the JACL, set forth by Masaoka in his Final Report. This is not just "furnishing them (FBI, ONI, MID) with all the information which we might have had at our disposal regarding the suspects the agencies questioned us about." (Masaoka, "Final Report", 1944 p.48.) Certainly in the eyes of those in the community, and indeed, those listed in the aforementioned Japanese directories, such actions as commenting on whether a person was living beyond their means, what rumors about their political affiliations were circulating and how the general public regarded the person did more closely approximate a witchhunt.

Lastly, it would appear from the tenor of the memos that Masaoka or at least the National Organization committed itself to performing the reports for Lt. Brown prior to obtaining any commitment or agreement from individual chapters.

"EXPLOITATION OF DISTRESS"

With the removal of Issei community leaders and heads of households immediately following December 7, 1941, came

the vulnerability of Issei wives and family. Did Japanese American citizens, in particular, the JACL, exploit the distress of these aliens? Was there cheating going on? According to Togo Tanaka "there is a considerable body of evidence, not all of it reliable, to indicate that it was not rare for Nisei individuals to take advantage of the Issei business man or farmer's weakened position and attempt literally to expropriate the latter's holdings." (Tanaka, "History of JACL", File T 6.25, Ch.IV, p.40, JERS, Bancroft Library.) Tanaka speaks specifically of the situation in the Imperial Valley of California. Given the fact that the position of Issei farmers was already tenuous due to the prohibitions against property ownership and certain leaseholds in the Alien Land Law, detention by the FBI directly resulted in great monetary losses.

In one instance, an Issei farmer was taken from his family and his home in the first week after the war. He had 80 acres of carrots ready for harvest, reportedly worth \$15,000 at the prevailing market price. Under the California alien land law regulations restricting Issei operations of leaseholds, the farm was legally under the operation of a Nisei. Under the circumstances, the Issei had no redress if the Nisei chose to pocket the \$15,000. In this particular case, the temptation reportedly overcame the Nisei: the Issei internee's wife and children went penniless. (Ibid pp.40-1.)

These recollections were based upon notes of a personal interview Tanaka did with Lyle Kurisaki in December of 1944. Kurisaki was one of the founders of the JACL chapter in Brawley, located in the Imperial Valley. According to Kurisaki:

I knew personally of 20-30 Nisei who cheated the poor wives of Issei internees. And I put the pressure on a lot of them and told them that the JACL wouldn't stand for any such monkey business. I wouldn't anyway. Trouble was, some of the JACL members were crooked too. (Ibid p.41.)

It would appear then that any exploitation perpetrated in the Imperial Valley was the result of individuals who happened to have been JACL members, at least in the Imperial Valley instance.

Rumors of exploitation again arise but in an unexpected context when Reports Officer Brown at Manzanar writes about the JACL. Quoting a Nisei he writes:

The Nisei felt that after the assets of the aliens were frozen that here was their opportunity

to further themselves economically, and there was a tendency to shove the older folks out of business.

At this time Toku Slocumb, as chairman of the Anti-Axis Committee publicized the fact that the JACL would help aliens in filing the proper forms, permits, etc. It is a common rumor that when applicants arrived they were sent by the JACL office secretary to the offices of the Pacific Service Bureau, which was headed by Higashi and Slocumb. There the Japanese paid various sums for services rendered; in some cases as much as \$25.00. It has been said, various Anti-Axis Committee members were suspected of reporting people to the FBI at \$25.00 a head and some have openly bragged about such duplicity in camp. (Manzanar, Correspondence, Center Staff Reports, File O 7.50, JERS, Bancroft Library, p.1.)

Robert Brown, Manzanar's Reports Officer, again reiterated this charge of exploitation in his oral history, taken by Dr. Arthur Hansen, at California State University at Fullerton on August 23, 1974. Brown was told of the rumor of a \$50.00 fee for travel orders for Issei by a Oko Murata, secretary to the doctor in the hospital.

JACL [was] "out to run a racket on the older Japanese before the evacuation order and that they helped put the finger on older aliens to get their business". Told of a fifty dollar "fee" deal for filling out travel orders for the older men who could not write English. (O.H. 1375, p. 42 JAOHP, CSUF.)

Togo Tanaka, likewise acknowledged the charge of exploitation by the Pacific Service Bureau for travel orders.

In the months between Pearl Harbor and April 1942 when evacuation was half under way, two stories about Tayama began to make the rounds. One was that his Pacific Service Bureau was making exorbitant profits from high charges for services which could be obtained free by walking several blocks to the Federal Building. These services included the filing of alien travel permits (then being required by the Dept. of Justice), transfer of business licenses, and the like. Another version of the story was that Tayama, through his connection with the JACL and the Anti-Axis Committee, instructed secretaries of these organizations to send individuals who went to these offices to send them upstairs to the Service Bureau

Office. It was charged that the JACL was rendering these services for free, that the Service Bureau charged a fee anywhere from three dollars to twenty dollars. Tayama did not deny that some individuals were referred to the Service Bureau by the JACL, but these only when the League was unable to help them. He said no exorbitant charges were made, that all his clients were not only satisfied but many very grateful; he denied any unethical practices and said that charges that he was exploiting aliens distress were outright distortions. (Tanaka, "Manzanar Riot," January 24, 1943, File O 7.50, p.9, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Another source also relates similar charges.

The JACL set up before the outbreak of was a subsidiary organization known as the Anti-Axis Committee. Its chairman was Tokie Slocum ...This group, once war was declared, publicized the fact that the JACL would help aliens in filing the proper forms and permits. Some of those who sought aid reported that they were sent by the JACL Office Secretary to the offices of the Pacific Service Bureau which was headed by Slocum and a Japanese American named Higashi; there the aliens paid varying sums for services rendered, in some instances as much as \$25. (NA, RG 210, Entry 3, Box 3, File "McKee, Ruth-History of War Relocation Authority, Pearl Harbor to June 30, 1944", [pp.131-247] pp. 146-7.)

Granted what Tanaka and McKee provide is documentation of stories or rumors which circulated about exploitation. However, these stories share some factual specificity with each other as to particular people, agencies and sums of money involved. Also, the fact that the National Headquarters saw the need to warn of fraud and JACL imposters, lends additional credence to these rumors.

It has been brought to the attention of the National Office that there are persons purporting to represent the Citizens League who are going around collecting funds from the community. Any activity of the JACL is well publicized and the identity of such persons should be familiar. (JACL Archives, n.d. circa January 23 or 24, 1942.)

As in the instances in Imperial Valley, any exploitation appeared to have been the result of corrupt individuals

who may have coincidentally been affiliated with JACL. The problem for both the JACL and those exploited was the inability to differentiate between the individual and the organization the individual represented.

INTERMENT PERIOD (1942-45)

IIA. JACL Position on Legal Test Case

BULLETIN #142

The issue of what JACL's position on a legal test case was clearly and unequivocally spelled out in Bulletin #142 of the JACL, Office of the National Secretary, dated April 7, 1942. This particular bulletin, issued and signed by Mike Masaoka in his capacity as National Secretary and Field Executive is entitled RE: TEST CASES. It specifically discusses the facts of Min Yasui's case. The third paragraph of the three page bulletin states:

National Headquarters is unalterably opposed to test cases to determine the constitutionality of military regulations at this time. We have reached this decision unanimously after examining all the facts in light of our national policy of: "the greatest good for the greatest number." [emphasis in original document.] (JACL Archives.)

The Bulletin goes on to discuss the justifications for such a position, especially in light of the fact that:

...self-styled martyrs who are willing to be jailed in order that they might fight for the rights of citizenship, as many of them allege capture the headlines and the imaginations of many more persons than our seemingly indifferent stand. We realize that many Japanese and others who are interested in our welfare have condemned the JACL for its apparent lackadaisical attitude on the matter of defending the rights and privileges of American citizens with Japanese features. (Ibid.)

Masaoka goes on to give a ten point argument for opposition to Yasui's or anyone else's test case. His ten points are: 1) cooperation in the war effort; 2) the JACL and its members had pledged total cooperation to the President; 3) cooperation with Federal Authorities will cause reciprocal cooperation; 4) our contribution to the war effort is to accept all army regulations and orders; 5) public opinion is opposed to any challenges of the Army and its authority; 6) we might win the case, but lose goodwill in the process; 7) any challenge might result in retaliation by the Army; 8) Attorney General Biddle said there was little chance the courts would challenge the military's authority; 9) the ACLU decided against a test case and they are the champions of civil liberties; 10) unfavorable publicity as seen in the headlines from the Yasui case. Masaoka ends by saying that "we are not giving up our rights

as citizens by cooperating with the government in the evacuation program." (Ibid.)

Ten days later, Min Yasui submitted a document entitled "Discussion of the Ten Points of JACL and explanation of the stand of Minoru Yasui", dated April 17, 1942. In this document, Yasui responds to Masaoka's arguments point by point.

There has been speculation that prior to his curfew violation, Min Yasui had sought the assistance of JACL. "Before deciding to test the curfew, Yasui had written to Mike Masaoka in San Francisco stating his intentions, and asking JACL's support. There is no record the letter was ever delivered." (Hosokawa, JACL: In Quest of Justice, Morrow: New York, 1982, p. 176.) This has been suggested as a reason for what seems to be a rather negative personal attack on Yasui in Bulletin #142.

Yasui did solicit the aid of local JACL chapters as well, although it is unclear exactly when this occurred.

YASUI, who had been an active leader in the Hood River, and later Portland chapter of the Japanese American Citizens League asked these chapters to offer moral support to his venture. These chapters were entirely in accord with YASUI who was encouraged and abetted by one Clarence Edward OLIVER of Portland, Oregon...The Seattle Chapter was also asked to lend its support, both moral and financial. Refusal on the part of the Seattle chapter to have anything (at least officially) to do with YASUI, led to less intimacy between the Washington and Oregon groups, and some split among the Seattle members. (District Intelligence Officer, 13th ND, Memorandum to Director of Naval Intelligence, Dated March 25, 1943, NA, RG 210 Entry 17 Box 2, File "Office of Naval Intelligence," p.18.)

We will continue with Yasui's story momentarily when examining the impact of the JACL upon the Civil Liberties League, Yasui's support committee at Minidoka.

**SPECIAL EMERGENCY NATIONAL CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 17-24, 1942
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH**

The policy of opposition to test cases is subsequently reaffirmed at the Special Emergency National Conference held November 17-24, 1942 in Salt Lake City, Utah. In the Sixth Session of the Conference devoted to "General Japanese American Problems", National Secretary Mike Masaoka

introduced ACLU attorney A.L. Wirin, who proceeded to discuss the various cases pending in court. Wirin reviewed Regan v. King, (effort to take away citizenship of Japanese Americans); Kawata (could Japanese aliens sue in court?); Brown v. Oshiro, (did military orders cancel or suspend contract obligations of those subject to evacuation?); Yasui (Constitutionality of curfew); Wakayama, (habeas corpus); Hirabayashi, (curfew and evacuation); Korematsu, (evacuation); Endo (habeas corpus). After an explanation of the constitutional and legal issues raised in the evacuation cases, the National Secretary states an interest in having JACL appear as a friend of the court (i.e. submit an amicus brief) in the Native Sons' case (Regan v. King) but not evacuation. "We are particularly interested in the suggestion that the JACL appear as a friend of the court in the Native Sons' and other suits against our civil rights. That does not refer to the evacuation cases." (JACL Archives, Minutes:Special Emergency National Conference of November 17-24, 1942, Salt Lake City, Utah, p.31.)

Discussion at the Sixth Session is then focused on an agenda item entitled "Philosophy of Court Cases." The National Secretary leads this discussion and explains the two differing points of view: 1) push the evacuation cases to determine their constitutionality or; 2) "soft peddle" them because of the danger of losing everything and gaining nothing through a court decision. After outlining these two points, the minutes indicate off the record discussion. Saburo Kido expresses his opinion that "evacuation is over and we are no longer concerned" although he too weighs the pros and cons of pursuing evacuation test cases. Others present continue discussion until the chair passes to another agenda item.

It isn't until the Thirteenth Session that any resolution of this issue appears. In addressing the "Project Division", under the project heading of "Civil Rights and Liberties" the National Secretary outline as a project, entering the Native Sons of the Golden West lawsuit as amicus curiae. On the evacuation cases, Masaoka states: "Although it is not our function to actively participate in the various court cases which are testing the constitutionality of the evacuation orders, we are bound to take official cognizance of them." (JACL Archives, Minutes, p.101.)

There was no objection to granting the "National Secretary the discretionary powers to put into effect as he sees fit the national projects on Americanism, Civil Rights and Liberties, Credit Unions, and Contests." (Ibid, p. 103.)

CIVIL LIBERTIES LEAGUE

More proof of JACL's policy on the Yasui case in particular comes to us from a different source and perspective. In a Memorandum from the District Intelligence Officer, Thirteenth Naval District, to the Director of Naval Intelligence, dated January 30, 1943 on the subject of Japanese Activities at Minidoka, Mike Masaoka makes several policy statements, on the Yasui matter. The Memo in question discusses the "Minoru Yasui defense committee's" recent name change to the "CIVIL LIBERTIES LEAGUE", made up primarily of former Portland, Oregon residents. The District Intelligence Officer or DIO identifies several Issei involved in fundraising activities for the Yasui committee. The DIO states that Mike Masaoka visited the Minidoka camp on January 23 & 24, 1943.

At a JACL meeting held on January 23rd, Masaoka declared that the organization of the Civil Liberties League was a "stab in the back" at the efforts of the JACL. Most of the Seattle Chapter leaders of the JACL have opposed the Yasui committee right along, contending that to help Yasui would be un-American. At this meeting all the leaders of the Civil Liberties League were present. . . and it was finally brought out that certain leaders among the Civil Liberties group were opposed to the JACL due to its failure to contest the orders of the military authorities in connection with curfew and evacuation. Masaoka, on the other hand, argued that it was the duty of the Nisei to cooperate with the government, not to fight it. (NA, RG 210, Entry 17, Box 2, File "Office of Naval Intelligence Rept.")

Attached is a copy of a circular by the Civil Liberties League outlining Yasui's case and requesting contributions to its fundraising drive. From the circular, we know that the support committee for Yasui was formed the previous month--approximately December of 1942.

Yet another ONI report fixes the date of the first meeting as December 2, 1942. The meeting attracted some 300 persons, partly in response to the publicity on the case in the Minidoka Irrigator, the camp newspaper. (DIO, 13th ND Memo to DNI March 25, 1943, NA, RG 210, Entry 17, Box 2,

File, "Office of Naval Intelligence", p. 21.) The same report is given on Mike Masaoka's reaction to the Civil Liberties League. It does add the following comments though.

The president of the former Seattle chapter of the JACL on being questioned as to his views stated, "You must remember Yasui was a reserve officer in the United States Army while at the

same time being admittedly a paid agent for Japan--You must remember this is war, and to aid Yasui is to aid a Japanese agent. Such an act is not American. (DIO, 13th ND Memo to DNI, January 30, 1943, NA, RG 210 Entry 17, Box 2, File "Office of Naval Intelligence Report." p.2.)

Jimmie Sakamoto was most likely, the person referred to who delivered the remarks on Yasui, as he was President of the Seattle Japanese Progressive Citizens League (read JACL) at the time of evacuation.

Masaoka's visit to Minidoka and comments directed at the Civil Liberties League served to quash the fledgling organization.

As a result of the attitude of the National governing body and the Seattle chapter of the Japanese American Citizens League, Dr. Tani, the real head of the YASUI committee, stated that the Civil Liberties League would disband and that any further support of Yasui would be, "by individuals and as individuals." (DIO, 13th ND Memo to DNI, March 25, 1943, NA, RG 210 Entry 17 Box 2, File "Office of Naval Intelligence", p. 22.)

The Civil Liberties League did in fact officially disband, although individuals such as Tani and others continued their fund drive.

Myron Gurnea's FBI Survey of Japanese Relocation Centers also contained information on this conflict. Referring to a WRA staffer by the name of Townsend, Gurnea writes:

He said that this effort had caused a division between the Japanese-American Citizens group in the camp and other members of the Nisei. He said that the JACL is definitely opposed to any further efforts to help YASUI in the instant case. (NA, RG 210 Entry 17, Box 1 Part II, Gurnea Report-Interviews with WRA Personnel, p.255.)

CHANGE OF POLICY

When did JACL's policy towards the evacuation and detention cases change? Interestingly enough, in the Thursday, February 18, 1943 issue of the Pacific Citizen an article on court reviews of evacuation orders indicates that according to Wirin, the JACL, having filed an amicus brief

in the Regan case, is considering doing so in the other evacuation cases if they are taken to the U.S. Supreme Court. (Court Reviews Army Orders on Evacuation, Pacific Citizen, February 18, 1943.)

Official communication of a policy change appears in the March 4, 1943 Bulletin #7, to all JACL leaders and National Board Members from National Secretary Masaoka. On page two under the heading of Civil Rights Committee, Masaoka informs the recipients of the Bulletin that the government has been making disturbing claims regarding the unassimilability of Japanese Americans, effect of dual citizenship on allegiance of the Nisei, schooling and indoctrination of Japanese Americans and so forth. As a consequence:

While we did not participate directly in these cases, it now appears necessary that we submit a brief as a friend of the court which does not challenge the constitutionality of the evacuation orders as such but strongly refuting the government's inferences concerning the loyalty of the Japanese American and the other "traits" attributed to the Japanese, citizens and aliens alike. We have instructed Attorney Wirin to prepare such a brief.

Should these cases testing the constitutionality of the evacuation orders be carried to the Supreme Court, we believe that the JACL should, and must, appear as "friends of the court" to question the broad constitutional powers involved. While this may seem to be a reversal of our policy, it actually constitutes an affirmation of our policy that we cooperated with the government in the evacuation program but that we did so under protest and without admitting its constitutionality. Evacuation is now an accomplished fact, and the military are no longer directly concerned, and therefore, by testing the constitutionality of these orders, we are not now hampering the war effort of our government but rather determining for once and for all the basic rights of military groups under our Federal Constitution. (JACL Archives.)

The second paragraph quoted poses several questions for the reader. Certainly, this is a change of policy, at least in regards to the National's position on test cases and constitutional challenges in court, particularly if any case reached the U.S. Supreme Court. It is curious then that Masaoka chose to phrase this change of policy as an affirmation of the JACL's overall policy of cooperating with the government in evacuation. Certainly Masaoka's statement

before the Tolson Congressional Committee in February of 1942 confirms that JACL never admitted the constitutionality of evacuation. However, this paragraph is strangely inconsistent with the ten point defense of "unalterable opposition" particularly given Masaoka's original concern that such cases were inconsistent with JACL's pledge of cooperation to Roosevelt, acceptance of all army regulations as their contribution to the war effort, fear of being labeled fifth columnists, etc.

After the issuance of Bulletin #7, articles in the Pacific Citizen began to publicize National JACL's amicus briefs and oral arguments in the Yasui and Hirabayashi cases. (April 29, 1943 and May 13, 1943) In the May 27, 1943 issue of the Pacific Citizen wherein A.L. Wirin reports on the Supreme Court Hearings, the role of the JACL is addressed. On page 8 of the issue of the Pacific Citizen, Wirin informs us that:

The JACL, it is to be remembered, did not take or press the cases to the Supreme Court; others determined that policy. Once the rights of the Nisei were before the Supreme Court for decision, the JACL felt a duty to make as adequate a presentation as possible to the court of the loyalty of the Nisei and the unjust discrimination of the military orders.

According to Mike Masaoka, "JACL submitted a 'sociological and human' brief to the U.S. Supreme Court on curfew" in the Hirabayashi case. (Masaoka, "Final Report", 4/22/44, p. 169, File T 6.15, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

As for the Korematsu and Endo cases, which were progressing more slowly than the Yasui and Hirabayashi cases, the Pacific Citizen on Saturday, October 14, 1944 announced that JACL filed an amicus brief on the unconstitutionality of evacuation. The 200 page brief was signed by Saburo Kido, National President of JACL and A.L. Wirin, then special counsel of JACL.

No amicus was filed on behalf of Endo, however. The 1946 Biennial Minutes indicate that "since the Endo case was being argued at the same time, we did not think it necessary to file a separate brief on the same points" (Minutes, 1946 Biennial p.9.)

IIB. Relationship with War Relocation Authority and Other Governmental Agencies.

RELATIONSHIP WITH WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL AUTHORITY

In a previous section dealing with the decision to cooperate with evacuation, a confidential Navy Intelligence Report from the Seattle area stated the following:

With the knowledge and approval of the United States Military Authorities in charge of the evacuation, the Seattle JACL prepared, along military lines, an organization known as the "Evacuee Administration Headquarters", that was to be in charge of the internal administration of the Puyallup Assembly, under the Caucasian staff of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. (NA, RG 210 Entry 17, Box 2, File "Office of Naval Intelligence", p.6.)

This ONI report was written after the fact. Another ONI document executed much earlier by Hartwell Davis, gives a more ominous description of the manner in which the internal administration was set up at Puyallup.

Attention is particularly invited to the military lines along which the Japanese staff (Enclosure A) has been set up. This group organized in Seattle prior to evacuation to the Puyallup Assembly center for the expressed intention of controlling the inner operations of the camp, was appointed by the Emergency Defense Committee of the Seattle Chapter of the Japanese Americans Citizens League. (NA, RG 210 Entry 17, Box 2, File WRA, Memorandum, DIO, 13th ND, to DNI June 15, 1942.)

There have been accusations and rumors that the JACL took on administrative roles in Assembly Centers and camps as a result of self-interest, rather than altruism. In Ruth McKee's "History of the WRA," she quotes Ken Nishimoto, a former WRA staffer and member of the 442nd Infantry Battalion in Italy as revealing that:

In the Assembly Period, the JACL members, because of their previous contacts with WCCA, were able to monopolize the more desirable jobs at the centers, and they had the name of being "more pro-administration than the administration." In one instance, a JACL member at Puyallup was appointed by WCCA as representative of the residents of the camp. He was disliked by the

community as a whole and would have been the last man in camp they would have chosen to represent them. (NA, RG 210 Entry 3, Box 3, File "McKee, Ruth-History of WRA (pp.1-130) Pearl Harbor to June 30, 1944, p. 58.)

Bill Hosokawa in JACL: In Quest of Justice admits as much that JACLers were prominent in the positions selected in Assembly administration.

The JACL Emergency Defense Committee in Seattle, with the encouragement of Army officers sent in to prepare for Evacuation, picked individuals to supervise operations in camp--to disseminate information, run recreation and education programs, look after sanitation, assign housing police the kitchens, maintain internal order. Jimmie Sakamoto as Council Chairman made the appointments from those close to JACL. It was not a democratic procedure, but the appointees were in place to ease the way through the inevitable maze of petty problems. (Hosokawa, JACL: In Quest of Justice, Morrow:New York 1982, pp. 172-173.)

In Frank Miyamoto's account, we are told that a group in the University YMCA and YWCA began to organize in the Assembly Center at Puyallup. However,

...they never gained authority to organize in Puyallup Center and as a consequence it was the JACL which shortly took the rein on control. The fact that the JACL gained control was due largely to its close relationship with the Army, which when the time of evacuation approached went directly to James Sakamoto and the JACL to carry out evacuation. One may well understand the feelings which developed among the defeated group or groups against the JACL when it was learned that the latter organization had gained its authority through cooperation with the Army. ...The general feeling expressed by one person who declared, "There's no use belonging to any other group than the JACL; now they carry the whip hand and we might as well follow along." (Miyamoto, Frank, "The Seattle JACL and its Role in Evacuation", File T 6.24, p.30, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Miyamoto relates a rumor to us about when the Army went to Sakamoto and asked him to organize the community to evacuate, he supposedly responded:

Since the Army has come to me with a duty and responsibility of this task I feel that I should

assume leadership in this matter." Whatever truth there may be in this rumor, Sakamoto assumed or was appointed to the leadership and he proceeded to organize for evacuation and the community in the Center by selecting leaders largely from his own group. (Ibid, pp. 30-31.)

Moreover, the manner of selection was not democratic. "By nature of selection procedure here selected to the staff were those known to this group, and no elective process was followed." (Ibid p.33) Consequently, "[t]here was considerable feeling among certain Nisei leaders who failed to gain appointment or who received lesser positions than they felt they deserved that Sakamoto and his group had by self-appointment gained control of the Assembly Center." (Ibid.)

Hostile feelings were not just directed towards the selection of leaders but towards the assignment of living quarters as well.

Rumors developed to the effect that it was those who were "in" with the JACL leaders who were getting the choice of rooms. This talk was entirely unjustified but sufficient instances of JACL members who arrived late and given better quarters made these rumors seem correct. (Ibid.)

The close association and cooperation by JACL members with the WCCA was also evident in the opening of the Manzanar Camp. In Michi Weglyn's Years of Infamy we read that:

Preferential treatment was especially pronounced at Manzanar, where nearly a thousand volunteers, JACLers among them, had come early to assist the WCCA in opening camp. Bendetsen noted after a visit that "there seems to be thrown throughout the center an attitude of favoritism and politics," and he referred to "politicians" who had come early "so that they might worm their way into the confidence of the center management. (Weglyn, Years of Infamy, Morrow:New York, 1976 p.300 n.19)

Hosokawa confirms the presence of JACLers in the volunteers who assisted the WCCA at Manzanar. "In the advance cadre sent to Manzanar to prepare the way for mass movement, members of JACL also were prominent." (Hosokawa, JACL: In Quest of Justice, Morrow:New York, 1982, p. 173.)

JACL Bulletin No. 1, dated 5/8/42, put a different "spin" on the involvement of JACLers in WCCA administration. Page two of the Bulletin reads:

JACL LEADERS ACTIVE IN RECEPTION & RESETTLEMENT CENTERS. Displaying the sense of civic responsibility which has made them active in JACL work, many JACL leaders are already at reception and assembly centers taking an active part in building a new life for the west coast Japanese. Among those at Manzanar are Kiyoshi Higashi, President of the San Pedro Chapter; Fred Tayama, Chairman of the Southern District Council, and others. At Santa Anita are Masao Satow, Shigemi Aratani, Kiyoshi Okura and others of the Los Angeles Chapter; Sam Fujita, Executive Secretary of the San Diego JACL, and many others. Howard Nomura, President of the Portland Chapter, is assistant director of the Portland Assembly Center. James Sakamoto, Past National President of the JACL, will have an official capacity at the Puyallup Assembly Center in Washington. (JACL Archives)

What then was the consequence of having JACL members in charge of internal administration? According to a footnote in The Spoilage,

[r]esentment against the JACL had been widespread in Tule Lake since its inception, owing partly to the control JACL leaders had exercised in the Walerga and Puyallup Assembly Center, from which Tuleans were recruited, and partly to the prominence they achieved in politics in the Tule Lake Center itself. (Thomas, Dorothy S., Nishimoto, Richard, The Spoilage, Univ. of Calif. Press: Berkeley, 1969, p.73n.)

Miyamoto also notes the distrust directed at JACL leaders in Puyallup Center.

As a consequence of disappointment of the people over the failure of their leadership to express resentment and rebellion that was latent among them, the tendency among the people was to view the JACL leaders with considerable distrust. The popular feeling was that the JACL Headquarters staff was a puppet organization of the WCCA who mixed with Caucasian administrators in order to gain special privileges for themselves while sick people were left to remain in unhealthy living conditions. Likewise in the matter of movement from one area to

another, staff members had special privileges of passes by which to effect passage from area to area. But this freedom was looked upon with envy by the rest of the evacuees. It was said that because of special privileges granted to staff members the latter assumed [an] attitude of superiority that they scarcely deserved in the light of their inferior status in the community in Seattle. Miyamoto, "The Seattle JACL and its Role in Evacuation" File T 6.24, pp. 44-5, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

On March 18, 1942, Executive Order No. 9102 established the War Relocation Authority. Milton Eisenhower was appointed as director. (tenBroek, Jacobus; Barnhart, Edward; Matson, Floyd; Prejudice, War and the Constitution, Univ. of Calif. Press, Berkeley, 1954, p.122.) Shortly after his appointment, Eisenhower traveled to San Francisco. On or about March 25, 1942 after meeting with General DeWitt at the Presidio, Eisenhower met with Mike Masaoka, thus beginning the formal relationship between the WRA and the JACL. In Eisenhower's own words,

I completed two other very important tasks during that first visit to San Francisco in late March. I met with a group of Japanese-Americans and we established an advisory council to represent those who were affected by the President's Executive Order. This was the wisest thing I did in that whole traumatic experience. The advisory council was headed by an attractive twenty-one year old Japanese-American, a Nisei, Mike Masaoka. He was secretary of the Japanese-American Citizens League, a graduate of the University of Utah, a man of great perception and heart. He was deeply respected by Japanese-Americans of all ages. After the establishment of the advisory council, I did not make a single major decision without conferring with this young man and, when necessary, with the advisory council. (Eisenhower, The President is Calling, Doubleday:New York, 1974, p. 117.)

Mike Masaoka's recollection is consistent with Eisenhower's that such a meeting took place and on the degree of influence Masaoka wielded over the development of WRA policy.

Immediately upon his appointment, Mr. Eisenhower flew out to San Francisco and conferred with the National President and Secretary regarding the problems incident to his post. At that time, JACL, submitted a long memorandum of recommendations and suggestions which I am certain, influenced major WRA policy thereafter. (Masaoka, "Final Report", 4/22/44, p.81, File T 6.115, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

The long memorandum to which Masaoka referred is the eighteen page document which will be examined shortly.

Eisenhower's meeting was not limited to Saburo Kido and Mike Masaoka. "At the invitation of the WRA, leaders of the JACL from all section of the West met with Director Eisenhower in San Francisco and made a number of constructive recommendations." (Ibid, p.83.) In these meetings, four main points were stressed to Eisenhower; 1) Restoration of Selective Service without reservation to all Japanese Americans; 2) Resettlement; 3) the President should issue a statement that the evacuation was not due to disloyalty; 4) there should be periodic meetings of representatives from all of the centers with WRA officials to air out problems: (Ibid, p.84.)

Immediately following the meeting of the advisory council with Milton Eisenhower, Mike Masaoka submitted a two page letter in response to topics discussed during that meeting. Dated March 28, 1942, Masaoka submitted nine names, including his own as persons who could aid Eisenhower. They included National President Saburo Kido; Chairman of the Southern District Council, Fred Tayama; Secretary of the Japanese YMCA, Masao Satow; Past President Dr. T.T. Yatabe; Executive Secretary of the Southern District Council, George Inagaki; Chairman, Northern District Council, Tom Iseri; National Treasurer, Hito Okada; and Agricultural Co-ordinator Nobumitsu Takahashi. What were these men to be called upon to do? Masaoka suggested the following:

1. Act as a consulting and advisory committee to present their view points and whatever new problems may be called to their attention by those with whom they may come into contact.
2. Travel from community to community and cooperate with and aid your office in not only selling your various ideas and explaining the reasons for them but also in urging cooperation and maintaining morale.
3. Checking upon the various chapters to see they are carrying out their assigned tasks.
4. Doing everything possible for those involved but actively cooperating with your

office in the movement.

5. Doing everything and anything which your office may call upon us to do. (JACL Archives.)

On page two of this letter, Masaoka wrote that "we are prepared to serve without pay and title, provided that we are able to move freely about in order that we might be able to render the greatest possible service." (Ibid.) He closed the letter by "trusting that these names will be approved for travel exemptions and that we will be able to cooperate with you in these troubled days, we remain... Japanese American Citizens League. (Ibid.)

This letter is significant for a number of reasons. It appears that the advisory council idea was Masaoka's or the JACL's. Also there has been speculation that certain JACL leaders were on the WRA payroll. This letter would substantiate an interest and willingness on the part of the JACL for such an arrangement. In fact, the willingness to serve was so great that pay and title could be bartered for freedom of movement.

The letter also commits the leadership of the JACL to a course of cooperation with and subservience to the WRA. Point Two of the letter is particularly disturbing in that the JACL leadership would be representing the WRA viewpoint and urging conformity with it, rather than representing their constituency to the WRA. While they would be serving as consultants to the WRA, they would be "selling" the WRA ideas to the Japanese American community. Point Four is consistent with the assessment that the JACL was better in administering evacuation than in opposing it. Point Five is a blanket commitment to Eisenhower and the WRA at a fairly early point in time; certainly too early to know what many of its policies would be and how the camps would be structured. This commitment is reminiscent of the JACL's pledge of cooperation to President Roosevelt. One wonders, having made such a commitment, how effective JACL leaders would be later when a difference in point of view or priorities arose.

APRIL 6, 1942 LETTER

Proceeding chronologically, the next document of major significance in the relationship between the WRA and the JACL is the eighteen page letter sent by Masaoka to Eisenhower, dated April 6, 1942. This is the "long memorandum of recommendations and suggestions" which Masaoka later felt "influenced major WRA policy thereafter." (Masaoka, "Final Report", 4/22/44, p. 81.) Before launching into the recommendations and suggestions, Masaoka begins with background information for Eisenhower. He takes

considerable pains to distinguish for Eisenhower the U.S. citizens among the Japanese population to be interned, from their parents the "enemy Aliens", and warns against treating both groups the same. (JACL Archives, pp. 1-2) He also notes the difference in age between the two generations and the fact that a majority of the population are from urban areas, so they shouldn't be treated as farmers. The Japanese have been model citizens and this should be maintained in camp. Masaoka stresses the importance of education while in camp. Moreover, the Japanese are more American than anything else and should be treated accordingly. Lastly, he says that there is no national organization aside from the JACL and that both generations "have greater confidence in our league than they have in any other organization or group or leaders, regardless of their nationality or affiliation. (Ibid, p.3.)

Masaoka again sounds the recurring theme of the JACL that the organization did not contest the military orders for evacuation "because we believe that cooperation on our part will mean a reciprocal cooperation on the part of the government." (Ibid, p.4.)

In discussing general policies, Masaoka writes that the projects should focus on five points:

- 1) to create "Better Americans in a Greater America";
- 2) to maintain a high and healthy morale among the evacuees;
- 3) to train them to cope with the difficult problems of adjustment and rehabilitation after the war;
- 4) to permit them to actually and actively participate in the war effort of our nation; and
- 5) to develop a community spirit of cooperative action and service to others before self. (Ibid, p. 4.)

These five points are quite innocuous in content. However, Masaoka proceeds to state that there should be as much interaction with "white" Americans as possible. (Ibid, p.5)

We do not relish the thought of "Little Tokyos" springing up in these resettlement projects, for by doing so we are only perpetuating the very things which we hope to eliminate: those mannerisms and thoughts which mark us apart, aside from our physical characteristics. We hope for a one hundred per cent American community. (Ibid.)

Thus Masaoka expresses the desire that assimilation would occur during the evacuation period to the point where only the physical differences between white and Japanese Americans would remain.

The letter goes on to advocate in favor of service in the armed forces regardless of whether one is in camp or not, and regardless of whether one volunteers or is drafted. (Ibid, p.5.) The importance of education is again stressed. Masaoka emphatically opposes any Japanese language schools and encourages Americanization. "Special stress should be laid on the enunciation and pronunciation of words so that awkward and 'Oriental' sounds will be eliminated." (Ibid, p.7.)

The remaining topics discussed are religion, sports & recreation, publications and radios, health & medical facilities, Japanese professional and specially-trained people, business and industry, agriculture, labor and wages, citizenship recognition, organization, private projects, induction or assembly centers, and finally semi-permanent resettlement projects.

What stands out in these topics are the suggestions of cooperatives, farming, credit unions, self-government by citizens only, and resettlement. These are suggestions which the WRA later implemented. Interestingly, the document advocated against "Hearing or Determining Boards or Commissions," in essence loyalty boards. (Ibid, p. 14.) The Buddhist faith would be permitted so long as church people did not engage in "other spheres of activity." (Ibid, p.8.) Many of Masaoka's recommendations were eventually adopted by the WRA, though by no means were all of them.

JUNE 6, 1942 LETTER

The next document which illuminates the relationship between the JACL and the War Relocation Authority is a rather curious letter, dated June 6, 1942. The document was addressed to Milton Eisenhower, and actually more closely resembles a memorandum rather than a letter. The heading reads "FOR: MR. EISENHOWER" with no address following his name. The document's contents attempt to define a Kibei for Eisenhower's benefit, who was still head of the WRA, but would soon step down on June 17, 1942. This particular memorandum is important for a number of reasons, having to do with its content as well as who it was written by and the letter itself.

In examining the content, we see three basic scenarios laid out to determine who exactly should be considered a Kibei. For instance, we are told,

...in the case of families, if the husband is Kibei and the wife Nisei, the family should be considered Kibei, and if the husband is Nisei, and the wife Kibei, the family should be considered Nisei. Inasmuch as the parents sent the

child to Japan in most cases, the parents should be held suspect, regardless of the number of other children which they may not have sent to Japan for study. In all cases, they may appeal their status. If the child under question is 16 years of age or more, he is entitled to elect whether he chooses to be placed in the same classification as his parents or not, provided that his parents are declared suspect. If the child is under 16, he assumes the status of his parents, but on becoming of age many have the privilege of election. (NA, RG 210 Entry 16, Box 379, File 39.050 "Loyalty Boards".)

The subsequent text explains the procedure a "suspect" may undergo to appeal a determination that they are Kibei, and therefore impliedly disloyal. The content is consistent with the file in which it was found at the Archives, that being loyalty boards. The document ends with a single sentence which reads "[i]ncidentally, we are in unanimous agreement as to the principle of segregation." (Ibid.) Three signatures follow: Mike Masaoka, Ken Matsumoto, and George Inagaki. All three were prominent National leaders of the JACL. Which brings us to the issue of the letter itself. The document was written on War Relocation Authority letterhead. We have three prominent JACL leaders making policy recommendations on who should be considered Kibei to Milton Eisenhower on WRA letterhead.

Let us digress momentarily for some additional background information. Bill Hosokawa relates the fact that during this time, "Masaoka and Inagaki were working tirelessly, traveling from Washington to Philadelphia to New York and back again for a series of conferences with WRA officials, American Friends Service Committee, the ACLU" and others. (Hosokawa, JACL: In Quest of Justice, Morrow: New York, 1982, p. 188.) "Accompanied on occasion by Ken Matsumoto, Masaoka and Inagaki called on Eisenhower to exchange views. Eisenhower welcomed all the input he could get to help cope with the responsibilities that had been thrust upon him." (Ibid.)

Thus, on one of the occasions when Masaoka and Inagaki were with Ken Matsumoto, they gave Eisenhower their thoughts and recommendations on how Kibei and Nisei should be separated or segregated. However, the use of WRA letterhead is puzzling. One obvious response is that there is no significance to the use of it. These three men just happened to use whatever supplies were readily available.

On the other hand, we can also draw a contrary inference, and conclude that the use of WRA letterhead and the memorandum format indicates that Masaoka, Matsumoto and Inagaki were in the employ of the WRA. This would be

consistent with the March 28, 1942 letter to Eisenhower from Masaoka in which the National Secretary offered the services of JACL's leadership to serve Mr. Eisenhower.

Confirmation that at least two of the three were indeed WRA employees comes in a May 23, 1942 memorandum written by Commander Kenneth D. Ringle of the U.S. Navy. The memo is addressed to Commander Wharton regarding "duty with War Relocation Authority." Ringle's duty with the WRA was "an assignment to prepare answers to various questions on policy regarding the handling of Japanese." Ringle goes on to write,

While in that office yesterday, I met Mike Masaoka and George Inagaki, both Nisei leaders with whom I am well acquainted and whom I previously put in touch with Mr. Eisenhower. These two men are serving as liaison and contact men officially with the War Relocation Authorities. [emphasis added] (Courtesy Michi Weglyn Collection.)

This letter, written by Commander Ringle along with the March 28, 1942 letter and the WRA letterhead document, taken together, forces us to conclude that Masaoka and Inagaki were WRA employees acting as consultants on important issues such as how to handle the Kibei and segregation. Not only that, but if the March 28, 1942 letter is any indication, they were selling these same ideas and urging cooperation among the Japanese American community.

We must ask what kind of influence did such documents and recommendations have on Eisenhower and the development of the segregation policy. We know from Ringle's memo that he thought so highly of Masaoka, and Inagaki that he thought, "it would be a good idea for a few of the officers interested in this question to meet the men during their stay." In fact, we see in a Memorandum of Understanding Between the War Department, "the Department of Justice and the War Relocation Authority Relating to Procedures for Separating Potentially Dangerous Evacuees from the Remainder" a great deal of similarity between the JACL suggestions and what was proposed in the draft MOU.

(k) Where the male head of the family shall be classified as potentially dangerous under the procedures to be established pursuant to this Memorandum such classification shall apply, also to his wife and to all of his dependents residing with him in his household, except that his wife and any of his dependents who shall be 16 years of age or over shall be given the option ... of declaring their preference to be separated from the male head of family...

(1) Where the male head of family shall not be classified as potentially dangerous under the procedures to be established pursuant to this Memorandum, his wife and all of his dependents under the age of 16 years, living with him in his household shall likewise not be classified as potentially dangerous, regardless of the classification that would otherwise apply ... (NA, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 286, File 39.050, pp.3-4.)

Both documents select the age of 16 as an age of self-determination. Both documents also permit an appeal where the applicant submits five (5) names to vouch and provide information for him or her. (Ibid. p.6.) Attached to the MOU is a note which reads: "For M.S.E. Dear Milton-This is a draft of the memo on Comm. Ringle's suggestion re: separation of potentially dangerous evacuees. The memos you gave me are also attached. P.M.G. June 8." (NA, RG 210 Entry 16 Box 286, File 39.050.) The P.M.G. most likely is Philip M. Glick, Solicitor of the War Relocation Authority. The National Archives file in which those documents were found had the WRA letterhead document immediately following the War Dept./DOJ/WRA MOU. Thus Glick was returning memos which Eisenhower had shown him earlier, along with a draft policy on segregation. The Masaoka/Matsumoto/Inagaki memo is the earliest JACL position on segregation and undoubtedly influenced national policy on this issue.

This is confirmed by a WRA source. In a section entitled SEGREGATION-Development of the Policy, Ruth McKee acknowledges two of the earliest suggestions on segregation came from Lt. Comm. K.D. Ringle and Mike Masaoka.

No policy shaped by WRA has received such painstaking attention and deliberative scrutiny as that of segregation...The first suggestions were offered in May, 1942, by Lieutenant Commander K. D. Ringle, a Naval Intelligence Officer detailed to WRA in its early months to assist in developing a program. (NA, RG 210, Entry 3, Box 3, File McKee, "History of WRA," p. 198.)

Ringle's plan was ultimately rejected because it focused entirely in the whole Kibei population. McKee goes on to discuss Masaoka's proposal.

In a letter of June 6, 1942, Mike Masaoka, Executive Secretary of the JACL, wrote to Director Eisenhower recommending segregation of a specific group of Kibei...(Ibid.)

**SPECIAL EMERGENCY NATIONAL CONFERENCE
NOVEMBER 17-24, 1942, SALT LAKE CITY**

The supplement to the Minutes of the above-references meeting held in Salt Lake City in November of 1942 by the JACL contain two references to the WRA. In Supplement No. 18 of the Minutes, under the topic of Resettlement, there are "three battle front" referred to, these being the home, government, and public relations. Under the government front, we read "Action on this front requires unceasing operations. Among major activities might be listed: Collaboration with the WRA.." (JACL Archives.) Perhaps collaboration was not meant in the pejorative sense, but merely that JACL would work with the WRA on the issue of resettlement.

Later in Supplement No. 25 on the issue of relocation, we see the reference "JACL will act as consultant, resource, and liaison with local committees, WRA, Manpower Commission, Social Service Agencies." (JACL Archives.)

**HOUSE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE, DIES COMMITTEE,
COSTELLO SUB-COMMITTEE**

In the words of author Michi Weglyn, the House Un-American Activities Committee of Congress, headed by Congressman Martin Dies, with a sub-committee headed by John M. Costello, was "the most unbridled campaign aimed at discrediting not only the evacuees but also their allegedly 'soft-on Japs' keepers." (Weglyn, Years of Infamy, Morrow: New York, 1976, p.151.) The main contention of Costello in the hearings, which began on June 8, 1943, was that "the JACL-dictated WRA was overfeeding, overpampering and over-releasing" Japanese Americans into inland communities. (Ibid, p.152.) The committee's chief investigator was Robert E. Stripling. His "strategy was to depict JACL as a dangerous, un-American organization, and then to show that JACL through Masaoka wielded undue influence over WRA." (Hosokawa, JACL: In Quest of Justice, Morrow: New York, 1982, p.225.) The headlines announced that confidential WRA policy directives were in the files of JACL'S Washington Office and of Masaoka's presence and participation in top level WRA meetings. (Ibid.) That the Costello Committee's contention was thoroughly discredited is undisputed by all authors and chroniclers of Japanese American history.

However, the testimony of Dillon Myer and Mike Masaoka as well as others does provide additional insights into the WRA-JACL relationship as well as into other JACL related issues.

Dillon Myer testified before the Dies Committee beginning on July 6, 1943. His testimony of July 7, 1943 was that "he meet in conference with either Masaoka or Kanazawa

once a week for about a year." (NA, RG 107 Box __, Entry __, File __, Courtesy Jack Herzig.) The purpose of these visits according to Myer was to learn of news for the Pacific Citizen newspaper. (Ibid.) Myer also received information from the JACL. "Witness stated that about two weeks ago he requested copies of Masaoka's reports to the National Headquarters from the Salt Lake Office of JACL, and that he had read most of Masaoka's reports. (Ibid.) Myer responded to the question of whether JACL was given confidential WRA directives by stating,

JACL received WRA administrative instructions and directives just as anyone else who requested them. ...the words "For Use of WRA Staff Only" on the directives did not imply, in any way, that the directives and instructions were confidential. (Ibid.)

Myer also testified that he and Masaoka discussed policy. "He admitted that he discussed policy with Masaoka on a number of occasions. He stated, however, that he had not discussed all major policies with Masaoka before adoption." (Ibid.) Why then did Masaoka's reports to National Headquarters such as one dated September 19, 1942 read as follows?

Myer put this up to me. Myer deals with us like he deals with his own staff. We have discussed every major policy with him before its adoption. Do not reveal any confidential material, and allow all matters of policy to be announced first by WRA. Congressmen would jump down their respective throats (WRA) if they knew the part we play in forming WRA policy. Do not reveal any confidential material as we are fortunate to obtain these directives. (Ibid.)

In fact, this attitude is supported by another JACLer. George Inagaki, in his report to the National Staff on January 18, 1943 wrote the following:

Confidential Matters:

WRA being so good about letting JACL in on important confidential matters, am deathly afraid that I might let something out or they might leak out elsewhere unintentionally. Ben Yoshioka was surprised at the confidence Holland had in us...Mike has done a heluva good job with the WRA. John Thomas expressed same thought. JACL must live up to it. (JACL Archives.)

The reason given for this is, according to Myers's testimony, "Masaoka was often expansive in his reports and

was given to exaggerations. He took credit for policies formulated by others." (Ibid.) In fact, the major by-product of the Dies Committee was the discrediting of Mike Masaoka.

When Masaoka was called to testify, beginning on July 3, 1943, he began with a chronology of his employment history. We are told that,

subject was appointed National Secretary of JACL by the National Board of JACL and resided in San Francisco at the time of evacuation. Witness was not evacuated and refused to state the reason therefor. Witness stated that he worked on the evacuation and volunteered information to Naval Intelligence. In May, 1942, he came to the Eastern Headquarters of JACL in Washington, D.C. (Ibid.)

The information volunteered to Naval Intelligence may very well be the "personal, confidential reports to Lt. Brown," which Masaoka urged JACL to undertake.

Masaoka also testified that he exaggerated the membership of the JACL.

Witness stated that at the time of evacuation JACL had 20,000 members, but that since evacuation this membership has fallen off to 5,000. Witness admitted that in May and June, 1943, JACL claimed a much larger membership and accredited this to the fact that in March, 1942, JACL decided to freeze its membership even though members had not paid their dues. Witness admitted the JACL publicly has claimed a membership of 20,000 and has reported this fact to Dillon Myer and the WRA. Doctor Matthews, Committee Investigator, produced a list of the membership of JACL taken from JACL records, and a count of the members listed showed 1800 regular members and 600 associate members. Witness stated that the list of 20,000 members is either in San Francisco or has been lost. Witness stated that JACL misrepresented and exaggerated its membership because it is the only group in a position to represent Japanese Americans in the United States. (Ibid.)

This testimony is remarkable for a number of reasons. Within the context of the relationship between the WRA and JACL, Masaoka is guilty of misleading Myer, the WRA and the government in general. Masaoka wanted the JACL and himself to be the voice of Japanese Americans, even if the numbers did not support such a position. One also detects an ends

justifies the means attitude in Masaoka's justification that the JACL was the only group in a position to represent Japanese Americans in the U.S. As a result, Masaoka "padded" the membership figures considerably. If JACL had only 1800 regular members and 600 associated members out of an internee population of approximately 110,000-120,000, exactly whose voice were they?

Moreover, the Committee questioned Masaoka on a statement in his September 19, 1942 report to National Headquarters which read, "we must increase our membership. Make everyone automatic members if necessary. Our membership does not cooperate with us." (Ibid.) His reply was "that the plan to make all Japanese-Americans automatic members was not effected. He stated that when he referred to non-cooperativeness of the membership, he was thinking of the militant minorities of the JACL." (Ibid.) One wonders at the audacity of a plan to make everyone who was Japanese American a member of the JACL ostensibly for the purposes of being able to make representations to the government.

In response to the claim that JACL was receiving confidential material from the WRA, Masaoka's response was that "he was merely exaggerating and 'liked to shoot the bull.'" He admitted that JACL received directives possibly before the public would be permitted to receive them." (Ibid.)

According to the Library of Congress' Legislative Reference Service Summary of this same testimony, Masaoka

admitted a tendency to exaggerate and a strong desire to put his organization in as good a light as possible. He also agreed that he had sometimes used big names to impress his own national organization. He had written of meeting Mrs. Roosevelt, Chief Justice Stone, Mr. Stimson, Mr. Knox, Mr. Biddle and others, but on questioning revealed that although he had met the first two, his contacts with the others had been indirect. (Costello Sub-committee, July 5, 1943, G-754, File T 1.03, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

He was again confronted with the following statement,

We are unable to obtain additional gasoline from WRA since an investigation might reveal that a Japanese pressure group is dictating their policies. (NA, RG 107, Box__, Entry__, File ____, Courtesy Jack Herzig.)

Masaoka's response was "that JACL did not dictate the policy of WRA, but admitted that JACL 'liked to feel that they had influence with WRA'." (Ibid.)

The remainder of Masaoka's time before the Committee was spent with the Committee confronting him with statements and Masaoka backing down from these statements. He did close his testimony by endorsing the need for segregation, but that it "should not be based entirely on answers to question 28 on the WAR Department questionnaire. Some considerations should be given the reasons for these answers." (Ibid.)

Another person who testified before the Dies Committee was Eastern Representative of the JACL, Joe Kanazawa. The Committee questioned Kanazawa on the content of a letter received from a Karl Konda of the Manzanar Center. The letter read:

It is difficult to hold on to democracy here at Manzanar. Issei and Kibei are pro-Japanese, and propaganda is Nisei. Nisei sabotage their own people under the JACL banner. Issei and Kibei outnumber Nisei by two to one. (Ibid.)

Kanazawa explained the letter and "stated that JACL has had bad leaders who have sabotaged their own people. He admitted that he knew of such a leader." (Ibid.) The Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service Summary of the Committee added this to the letter from Manzanar.

I saw a clique of rapacious Nisei riding down their parents and under the JACL banner sabotage their own people and even their fellow nisei... This was the type of man who ripped his fellow Japanese up the back with one hand and waved the flag with the other. (Costello Sub-Committee Un-American Activities, July 3, 1943, G-753, File T 1.03, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Kanazawa's response was that he "admitted that among the JACL members there probably were some who fitted the above description." (Ibid.)

Kanazawa's testimony also concluded with his statement "that JACL has advocated segregation of loyal from disloyal Japanese-Americans for some time." (NA, RG 107, Entry __, Box __, File __, Courtesy Jack Herzig.)

The result of the Committee's work was Senate Resolution 166, passed on July 6, 1943 which was a call for segregating the disloyal out of camp, and ultimately into Tule Lake. (Weglyn, Years of Infamy, Morrow:New York, 1976, p. 154.)

NEWSPRINT REQUEST FOR PACIFIC CITIZEN

On December 7, 1944, Saburo Kido wrote to Dillon Myer, requesting an increase in the number of copies of the Pacific Citizen, which had been limited due to a quota on newsprint. The request was based upon Kido's assertion that "inasmuch as we believe that the Pacific Citizen is a great contribution to the war effort in that it is serving the persons of Japanese ancestry and their friends." He then asked Myer to "contact Mr. Hanson and give your impression of the Pacific Citizen and our value to the government and to the war effort." (NA, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 471, File 71.505-JACL.) On the upper right hand corner of the letter is this notation, "1-2-45 Talked to Tajiri on phone DSM". Attached in the file and appended to the letter is a note paper which reads, "D.S. Meyer I think a discreet call to Hansen might be in order. The PC, after all, has been a pretty valuable organ for the program. T." (Ibid.)

Based upon the notation on the letter that Myer spoke to Tajiri on the phone, it is likely that the notepaper was written by Larry Tajiri, editor of the Pacific Citizen. He worked out of the Salt Lake City Office where Saburo Kido's letter originated. It is noteworthy to see that JACL was hoping to trade the support and cooperation provided through its organ, the Pacific Citizen for an additional 1,000 copies. One also wonders for what "program" Tajiri thought the Pacific Citizen was a valuable organ?

POSTSCRIPT

After the end of the war, Mike Masaoka, as National Secretary of the JACL wrote to M.M. Tozier, who was at one time, Acting Chief, Reports and Public Relations for the War Relocation Authority. The letter is addressed to "Toze" and asks for "a commendation of the Japanese American Citizens League in your reports for the way we have cooperated with the WRA and have supported pretty generally its program." (NA, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 471, File 71.505, JACL.) This letter stands as a concise summary of the WRA-JACL relationship during internment, characterized by cooperation and support to the government from the JACL.

MILITARY

At the JACL Special National Conference during November 17-24, 1942, Colonel Kie Rasmussen requested and obtained the assistance of the JACL in recruiting for the Military Intelligence Language School at Camp Savage.

Mr. M. Masaoka

How can we help you? You wish this group to return to the centers and urge their qualified persons to enlist-is that right?

Col. Rasmussen
Yes. (JACL Archives.)

The six page Minutes of the meeting with Rasmussen were found in JACL Archives, stamped Confidential, Not for Release or Publication.

One other reference to the military was found in JACL inter-office correspondence from Joe Grant Masaoka to the National Secretary and Headquarters for the period covering 4/29 to 5/15, 1943. On the top of the page we read:

FORT RILEY COMMANDANT DISTRUST NISEI SOLDIERS;
According to reliable sources, including letters from Nisei soldiers stationed there, all Nisei not sent out of camp in special assignment were confined to their barracks on the occasion of President Roosevelt's recent visit there.
Note to Joe Kanazawa: Could you please bring this to the attention of the War Department and prevent a recurrence? This has been a matter of much griping among Nisei and circulation of this incident is current within the centers. (JACL Archives.)

This is a reference to an incident where Japanese American soldiers were kept out of the President's view by being confined to their barracks. The implication was that the Commandant didn't want Nisei to be seen in uniform, that Nisei soldiers weren't worthy to wear their service uniforms. The Fort Riley incident is one of a number of incident involving Nisei soldiers. However, the JACL memo requesting a stop to such actions is the only reference in JACL documents which was found. Many of the incidents dealing with Nisei soldiers have come under the heading of military resisters, a topic which was not addressed in this study.

IIC. JACL Activities in Camp

GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF JACL IN CAMP

At the request of WRA Director Dillon Myer, the FBI undertook a survey of the ten camps. This survey was headed and the report written by Myron Gurnea. In it, Gurnea gives his official assessment of the presence of the JACL in camp.

One of the greatest causes for internal disorder has perhaps been the Japanese-American Citizens League. The members of the Japanese-American Citizens League have been very outspoken in proclaiming their loyalty to the United States. It is of course, commendatory that these individuals would be loyal to this country; however, there are some indications that their views are as political as patriotic. It is the consensus of opinion among the Japanese that the Japanese-American Citizens League in collaboration with the United States Government, "sold them out" and did not put up a fight to block relocation. This feeling is so predominant that the Japanese now refer to Mike Masuoko [sic], the national president of the Japanese-American Citizens League, as Moses Masuoko [sic], stating that he "led them out of California." Many of the individuals who received beatings have been members of the Japanese-American Citizens League, and as such are individuals who either cooperated with the Government agencies or were active in sponsoring loyalty programs. (Gurnea, FBI Survey of Japanese Relocation Centers, File E 11.00, p.7, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Gurnea's survey was made up of two parts. The above comments were contained in Part I. In Part II, Gurnea conducted interviews with WRA Personnel at each of the camps. In his interview of WRA Personnel at the Minidoka Camp, the following comments were made. "Stafford also stated at this point it is his desire to keep the Japanese-American Citizens League from indulging in any political activity in the center." (NA, RG 210, Entry 17, Box 1, Part II, Gurnea Report-Interviews with WRA Personnel, p. 280) Comments from personnel at Poston expressed that "[a] great number of the Japanese feel that the Japanese-American Citizens League sold them out to the Americans. For that reason there is a considerable amount of resentment among the Japanese toward the former members and officials of the Japanese-American Citizens League. (Ibid, pp.291-292.)

One of the main causes for resentment against the JACL stemmed from allegations that many of the leaders had been informants for government intelligence agencies and

continued in that capacity while in camp. We have already examined the former allegation. Now let us turn our attention to the latter.

NISEI STOOGES/JACL INFORMANTS

A Western Defense Command confidential Memorandum circa August 1942, indicated the Army's intention of utilizing informants from within the internee population for security purposes. The report recommended:

that Civil Affairs Division discover the Kibei leaders in all assembly centers and camps through security police, camp management, and the use of Nisei stooges in staging a similar meeting as was held in Manzanar. (NA, RG 338, Entry 1, Box 12, File 323.3, Manzanar.)

Attached to this Memorandum are letters written by Tokie Slocum, Karl Yoneda and Fred Tayama in response to meetings held by Kibei at Manzanar, conducted in the Japanese language.

In fact, Assistant Project Director Ned Campbell allegedly remarked that "I didn't know it, but there are Army and Naval Intelligence and FBI agents right here in camp, but don't you worry, they haven't got the power you think they have." (Tanaka, Documentary Reports, 6/42-7/42, pp. 122-123, File O 10.06, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

This is, perhaps, a good segue into the topic of whether any JACLers were involved in these roles and activities.

A number of the members of the Anti-Axis Committee of the Southern District Council of the JACL were highly prominent and outspoken in their work to aid Federal Intelligence Agencies prior to internment. As many Japanese Americans in the Los Angeles area eventually were interned at Manzanar, it follows that these same individuals would be prominent and outspoken in the same capacity at Manzanar. One of the most infamous of informants, both prior to and during internment was none other than Tokie Slocum.

At Manzanar, rumors that "Slocum is an FBI agent" cropped up as early as May, 1942, immediately following his arrival at the Center. These rumors were frequently traced to Slocum himself who privately let it be known among enough people for such circulation that he was in constant correspondence with agents of the FBI in Los Angeles as well as prominent officials in the veterans groups to which he belonged. (Tanaka,

"Report on Manzanar Riot," p. 34, File O 10.12, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Slocum had also let it be known what the results of his work with the FBI were. "Slocum also bragging on turning in 40 people to FBI." (Merritt Collection, #122, Box 17, "Law & Order Misc." File, SC-URL, UCLA.)

Tokie Slocum testified before Senator A.B. "Happy" Chandler of Kentucky, who had headed up another of the several state and congressional investigatory subcommittees which sprang up after the Manzanar riot." (Weglyn, Years of Infamy, Morrow: New York, 1976, p. 153.) Slocum responded to Chandler's question of what he was doing in camp.

So I went and put in 8 months over there and put in 8 months as an observer for the FBI, with the blessing of Mr. Hood, who is the head of the FBI in Los Angeles, and all the time I was there it was my duty, at \$16 a month, which is the standard salary of all internees in the camp, to make observations and analyses, trace down the rumors, gossips, and various subversive activities in camp and make reports to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and I was allowed postage and envelopes and that is all I asked. During that time I believe I was of some help to our government. (Merritt Collection, #122, Box 15, Chandler Investigation Folder, pp. 121-122, SC-URL, UCLA.)

According to another source, "there is ample evidence to support the statement Slocum created the impression at Manzanar that he was 'working for the FBI.' My personal opinion is that Slocum was never employed as a paid agent of the FBI but volunteered information and correspondence regularly." (Tanaka, "Report on Manzanar Riot," pp. 90-91, File O 10.12, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Slocum's activities are confirmed by other government sources. An FBI document, dated January 23, 1943 regarding "Tokutaro Slocum, Activities in War Relocation Centers, Internal Security-J," states "it is recommended that Slocum be contacted in Washington, D.C. and warned against representing that he has been employed by the Bureau." (Courtesy Michi Weglyn.) Since much of the document has been "blacked out", it is difficult to know the entire context of this statement. The reference to Manzanar and the date would indicate that the FBI's concern was over Slocum's testimony before the Chandler Committee, previously reviewed.

Another memorandum, dated August 14, 1943 from John F. Embree, Chief Washington Analyst of the WRA, to John H.

Provinse, Chief of Community Services also of the WRA, refers to Tokie Slocum's activities.

...little information of real significance to the military authorities in this country could come to the attention of this government via the Nisei. However, this does not mean that there have not been Nisei anxious to aid the intelligence agencies to the utmost of their abilities. Tokie Slocum, while not in all ways an admirable character, should at least satisfy intelligence agencies by his stool pigeoning activities. (NA, RG 210, Box 286, File 39.051, #2, "August 1943," p.2.)

A person who shared in Slocum's notoriety both during Anti-Axis days as well as at Manzanar was Fred Tayama. This should not be surprising. We have learned in an earlier section how Tayama was originally chairman of the Anti-Axis Committee but welcomed Slocum into the group and quickly turned over the reins of leadership to him.

A confidential WCCA Report from the Inspection and Fiscal Division on Manzanar, dated August 12, 1942, provides information on a number of Japanese Americans at this camp. The notes on Fred Tayama state that he "reports to FBI, G-3 Army, G-3 Navy." (NA, RG 338, Entry 1, Box 12, File 323.2 "Manzanar," p.6.) Later in the same document, Tayama is referred to as "Fred (FBI reporter)..." (Ibid, p.7.) The second reference misspells his surname as Toyaura, but given the context of Joe Kurihara, Ted Akahoshi and the Block Leaders Council, the reference had to be to Tayama.

Even a JACL document contains a reference to Tayama reporting to the FBI. George Inagaki wrote a memo to the National Staff dated Saturday, January 16, 1943, which was stamped received, January 18, 1943. The heading read, "Rumor from Manzanar."

Story is that Tayama's report to FBI or Naval Intelligence got into the hands of Slocum and the latter, in order to focus hatred away from self, circulated copy of letter among people in center. Believe it's just one of those reports, don't see how he could get a copy. (JACL Archives.)

Now the rumor isn't whether Tayama reported to the FBI or Naval Intelligence. According to the context, the rumor is whether Slocum got his hands on said report.

An entry in Ralph Merritt's diary should convert the alleged rumor into fact. Merritt was the Project Director at Manzanar during the Riot of December 6, 1942. His diary

entry for November 13th and 14th of 1945 when he visited the Tule Lake camp, recorded a visit with Joe Kurihara, one of the participants of the riot.

Said he wanted to apologize for trouble he had caused and then launched into story...
Tayama reporting to FBI. Slocum making copies of his reports (4 and 7) and giving to Kurihara.
(Merritt Diary, Merritt Collection #122, Box 17, File "Law & Order, Misc." p.1.)

If the last sentence of the diary entry can be read to mean that Slocum made copies of Tayama's reports, then Tayama made quite a few reports to the FBI and Slocum did indeed circulate copies.

Informants were not limited to Manzanar. An undated Memorandum from the District Intelligence Officer of the 11th Naval District (San Diego) to the Director of Naval Intelligence on the subject of "Activities of Inmates, Japanese Relocation Centers" writes:

1. From time to time this District Intelligence Officer has forwarded to the Director of Naval Intelligence information as to the serious anti-American and pro-Japanese activities carried out within the relocation camps at Poston, Arizona and Manzanar, California. The information has been obtained from informants within these camps, and believed to be reliable...

9. At the present time Lyle KURISAKI who has cooperated with this office, is on thirty days leave from Poston #1. His family is still in the camp and according to information, is being made to suffer serious mistreatment...

(NA, RG 210, Entry 17, Box 2, File "WRA", pp. 1-2.)

Kurisaki's work with the FBI and ONI prior to evacuation through the Imperial County Citizens Welfare Committee has already been addressed. This present Memorandum indicates that Kurisaki continued in his capacity and was an informant with the ONI while in Poston. Now, it is possible that the Memo meant to refer to his previous intelligence work. But, given the context that the Memo was discussing information obtained from informants within Poston and Manzanar, it appears that Kurisaki was such an informant.

SELF-GOVERNMENT

A secondary cause for resentment against the JACL during the internment period had to do with the issue of

self-government. As a cause of resentment, it was particular to the leadership and events at specific camps.

An early look into the conditions at the Minidoka Center reveal an initial expectation by members of the JACL that they would inherit the internal leadership. In a September 3, 1942 Memorandum from the District Intelligence Officer, 13th Naval District to the Director of Naval Intelligence, the DIO gives the following report.

The Japanese American Citizens League faction which was in charge of the internal administration at the Puyallup Assembly Center, apparently took it for granted that they would be asked to carry on similarly at Minidoka. This, however, has not been the case. The Relocation Authorities have decided that there shall be no group or clique control but a free government based upon elections after arrival of all evacuees. (NA, RG 210, Entry 17, Box 2, File "WRA.")

The DIO described the JACL faction as a "clique" and contrasts their internal administration at Puyallup with "free government" pursuant to elections at Minidoka, as if the two descriptions are mutually exclusive. Moreover, this description of the JACL group at Puyallup is consistent with what earlier commentators such as Frank Miyamoto, Bill Hosokawa, and Ken Nishimoto told us about the lack of elective process at Puyallup.

The Manzanar Camp also had its self-government woes. We are told that,

"in the early stages of Manzanar's development, there is little doubt that individuals associated with the two groups expressed this rivalry in efforts to secure key administrative jobs. In a real sense, there was jockeying and maneuvering for what may be described here as political control or leadership of the population. (Tanaka, Documentarian Report, January 25, 1943, File O 7.50, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

One of these two groups, of course, was the JACL. However, it is difficult to examine self-government and the JACL's role in any problems associated with it outside of the context of one of the most major disturbances at a camp, the December 6, 1942, Manzanar Riot.

MANZANAR RIOT

While most newspaper accounts at the time characterized the disturbance as Pro-Axis violence targeted at Pro-American victims, the primary sources from that era did not see it that simply. We will begin our examination of this incident from the point of view of one of the participants, Togo Tanaka, Documentary Historian at Manzanar.

The Manzanar Riot of December 6 was the logical outgrowth of pre-evacuation factional conflicts among evacuees, clashes of ideology intensified by War, and the unhealthy condition of accumulating resentment within the limited area of the Center. (Tanaka, "Manzanar Riot," January 29, 1943, p. 1-2, File O 7.50, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Tanaka identifies three groups at Manzanar as 1) the JACL, 2) those anti-JACL but more accurately, left-wing with some being communists, and 3) Anti-Administration-Anti-JACL, which unlike the previous two, had no pre-evacuation history but was primarily indigenous to Manzanar. (Ibid, pp.3-4.)

Tanaka continues and says that "on December 6, 1942, Manzanar was not unlike a powder keg. Groups I, II and II constituted exceedingly short fuses. One single incident--the attack on Fred Tayama and the subsequent arrest of Harry Ueno--ignited the whole barrel." (Ibid, p.9.)

The question remains whether JACL had any role in the resentments or actions which led to the "exceedingly short fuses" within Manzanar. Tanaka's response is yes.

Efforts of pre-evacuation JACL leaders to continue their activities within Manzanar were undoubtedly a contributing cause to the situation which eventually culminated in the December 6 riot. That the JACL, and the individuals who more or less stood impressed in the public mind as representing it (Fred Tayama, Togo Tanaka, Joe Masaoka, Tad Ueno, Tom Imai) as a group enjoyed little--if any--popularity from the outset of the project is generally conceded. (Tanaka, "Report of Manzanar Riot," p.46, File O 10.12, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

From this point on, the JACL group found itself excluded from administrative jobs, they complained about life in camp and about the Issei control over the Block leaders' Council, and finally kept in contact with Headquarters at Salt Lake City. Fred Tayama was the acknowledged chairman of the group. (Ibid, p. 47.)

The impression early gained among the Japanese speaking population that the JACL was persecuting the Japanese people, spying upon innocent Issei for the FBI (an impression due more to the activities of a single individual than to any group--that individual in the estimation of the JACL group being Tokutaro Slocum), that the JACL was, to translate a frequently used Japanese expression, "putting a noose around our neck." (Ibid, p.49.)

The next incident occurred when then Project Director Roy Nash made an announcement that the Block Leaders Council would be replaced by an elected council of U.S. citizens only. The reaction was "a camp-wide furor arose; it was directed principally against the JACL; its chief target was Fred Tayama, its lesser targets the individuals associated with him."(Ibid.) Even though an announcement explained that the restriction to U.S. citizens came from Washington, D.C., this did not dispel the rumors that the JACL was responsible. (Ibid, p. 50.)

Tanaka relates that part of the animosity was due to the failed effort by the JACL group to organize a "Manzanar Citizens Federation" in July and August of 1942. (Ibid.)

The next conflict developed when Fred Tayama, elected Chairman of the Manzanar Work Corps came into conflict with Harry Ueno, organizer of the Japanese Mess Hall Workers Union. (Ibid, p.51.) "A campaign of slandering ensued with unusual vigor, even for Manzanar." (Ibid, p.51.) Threatening posters from the Blood Brothers appeared.(Ibid, p.52.)

Another event which has a bearing on the timing of the attack on Tayama and the riot which followed was the JACL Convention held in Salt Lake City, Utah in mid-November. One of the convention's reported resolutions pledged the Nisei as willing to volunteer for the armed forces if given the opportunity to do so from the relocation centers. That this resolution was seized upon by the Ueno-Kurihara-Yamaguchi group to arouse intense anti-JACL sentiment in Manzanar was evident everywhere in the Center, and Kurihara was reported to have gone about various blocks announcing that "we're going to have another Poston riot here, only it will be a hundred times worse; we are going to kill all the dogs." (Ibid, p.52.)

Morris Opler, the Community Analyst for Manzanar writes of the impact of JACL advocating for the Nisei Draft upon the Manzanar Riot.

Many of the JACL leaders never entered Centers. From their Salt Lake City headquarters they issued manifestoes which were designed to assure the American people of the patriotism and pro-democratic views of those of Japanese ancestry in this country. They underestimated the disillusionment and the cynicism over such slogan which the people in the Centers felt. There grew a marked disjunction between the public statements of the leaders of the JACL and the material published in their journal, and what the people in the Centers were thinking. When the JACL advocated the formation of a Nisei Battalion, the smoldering rebellion broke out into violence and JACL representatives in Manzanar were intimidated or beaten up. This was an important factor in the incident of December 6, 1942. (Opler, "The Effects of the Nisei Draft at Manzanar," 3/11/44, Merritt Collection, #122, Box 23, File #9 "Registration 1944-1945, p.13.)

In fact, tension was already building when the announcement of the JACL Convention appeared.

Each Center was to name two official delegates. Obviously, with feeling against the JACL at fever pitch, there could be no open election of delegates at Manzanar. When some prominent young men of the Center, who were obviously preparing to go somewhere, were asked about their destination, they gave evasive answers. It was not until the men in question had left that a notice appeared in the Free Press, giving the names of these who had gone to Salt Lake City as "representatives from Manzanar." It was known that the JACL had been active in Second Front Petitions and in appeals that Americans of Japanese Ancestry be used in the draft. There was apprehension among the residents concerning what action the National body would take at this convention, especially since the JACL had been charged with speaking without authorization for all Japanese in America on other occasions of crisis. There were threats about what would be done to the "delegates" if they dared to claim that they represented the people of Manzanar or if they took any objectionable action which was in any way binding upon the residents of Manzanar. (Opler, "A History of Internal Government at Manzanar, March 42-Dec 42," 7/15/44, pp. 97-8, Merritt Collection, #122, Box 12, File #1, SC-URL, UCLA.)

Needless to say, Fred Tayama was one of the Manzanar delegates. He returned to camp on December 4, 1942. Coincidentally, the night of his return was marked by the removal of a Block representative by the FBI.

When Fred Tayama was beaten and Harry Ueno accused of being one of the attackers, the powder keg blew. To be fair, "JACL Activity" was by no means the only contributing cause to this event. Tanaka also lays blame at the "inadequate, ill-prepared or ill-advised Administrators," to the government decision of mass evacuation based upon race, and basic incompatibility of the conflicting groups. (Tanaka, "Report of Manzanar Riot," pp. 59, 46, File O 10.12, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Government sources, other than Opler also lay the blame for the disturbance, in part on JACL members. When Robert Throckmorton, the Project Attorney concluded his Memorandum to Ralph Merritt on the "events leading up to the Riot of December 6, 1942" he wrote the following:

Perhaps, the main significance of these comments is that they show that the primary reasons for the demonstration did not involve the question of loyalty or disloyalty or the fact that the anniversary of Pearl Harbor was at hand. The primary causes appear to be (1) those which led the people to believe that Ueno had been unjustly arrested; and, (2) those which led them to hate Fred Tayama, other JACL leaders and certain members of the Administrative staff.

(Throckmorton, 12/6/43, p.3, Merritt Collection, #122, Box 16, File "Law & Order," SC-URL, UCLA.)

Ralph Merritt himself, in a letter to Dillon Myer, dated January 7, 1943 referred to "the chief sources of the disturbance to the peace of Manzanar-the Los Angeles JACL crowd, headed by the Tayamas...and the Tanakas." (Merritt Collection, #122, Box 16, File "Law & Order Incident," SC-URL, UCLA.)

It may be fair to say that the actions of a handful of men, who were one of several contributing causes for the riot at Manzanar, should not bring down the organization to which they belonged. However, as was pointed out by one of those men, Togo Tanaka, these men, more or less represented in the public's mind the JACL. Any impact they had upon events leading up to December 6, 1942 was and has been perceived as JACL'S impact on the same events.

IID. Position and Action on Loyalty Oath

NO-NOs

After Registration, what were the JACL's position and actions towards those who answered NO to questions 27 and 28 of the "Application for Leave Clearance" first distributed on February 10, 1943?

Inter-office correspondence beginning May 19, 1943 from Saburo Kido to Teiko Ishida contains the following discussion:

Regarding the members who answered "no", Mike suggests that we send out a bulletin to all chapters that such members will be suspended. He believes this is necessary for our records; that is, we should be clear as to the loyalty of our members. Also we cannot accept anyone who has answered, "no." (JACL Archives.)

The response, dated May 21, 1943, from Teiko Ishida, to Kido offers this:

Mike certainly has had a change of heart. We felt right along that the no-no's should be segregated and no further effort be expended upon them. However, a bulletin to all chapters announcing that all "no-no" members would be suspended will be of no avail unless we have a list of such registrants. Furthermore, we must have this list of no-no's in order to refuse membership to certain individuals. Please have Mike secure such a list from the WRA before we can issue such a bulletin or know to whom to refuse membership. (JACL Archives.)

Kido writes another letter, dated May 25, 1943 to Hito Okada and Teiko Ishida, which begins with this paragraph:

As far as the "no-no" ones are concerned, I don't think we can possibly find out so the best thing is just issue the request to sign the loyalty pledge of all associated members. Then if there is a chapter, issue a special letter to the chapter that the "no-no" ones will have to be suspended until such time as the records are cleared. And if they have any reason for changing the answer to yes, possibly we can suggest to write to the WRA. It is the best that we do this and protect our position. (JACL Archives.)

The response, dated May 27, 1943, was that "we shall continue having our Associated members execute the Oath of Allegiance if they have not previously done so." Also, only two chapters would be requested to suspend their "no-no" members. This same information was also sent to Mike Masaoka by Teiko Ishida on the same date, May 27, 1943. (JACL Archives)

It would seem that JACL's position towards the "no-nos" was that they should be segregated. This was expressed by Teiko Ishida, a staffer at the Salt Lake City Headquarters Office. Not just segregated but "no further effort expended upon them." Interestingly, Masaoka was not of the same opinion initially, as was also reflected in Ishida's letter, but must have come around. What is both implied and expressed in this correspondence is the presumption that those who answered "no" to both questions were disloyal, and should be dealt with accordingly.

Contrast the JACL view with the concerns expressed to Dillon Myer by Ralph Merritt, Project Director at Manzanar. In his February 27, 1943 letter, he states:

On the other hand, it is important to determine whether the "no" answer on the loyalty question actually means a renouncing of citizenship or whether it is a protest indirectly arising from the pressures of the father who is a non-citizen or directly representing the outcry of a man who has, in his opinion, been ruthlessly and wrongfully deprived during the last year of his rights and position as a citizen. When all the motives have been reviewed it must be concluded that there is no such thing as a line of strict demarcation...It is my considered conclusion that the answer "No" has many shades of meaning and is prompted by many motives, some of which are attributable to our failures both past and present, and some of which may yet be modified and reversed without damage to the principles of American citizenship. (Merritt Collection #122, Box 15, File "Chandler", SC-URL, UCLA.)

Thus, unlike the JACL, Merritt saw no presumption of disloyalty in the "no" answer and acknowledged both the possibility of WRA errors and a means of rehabilitation.

On the other hand, the JACL was well aware of the confusion posed by Question #28, particularly to the Issei. Bulletin No. 3-D, dated February 23, 1943 from JACL National Headquarters listed a number of items of which the Washington representative was requested to seek clarification. "Confusion exists as to whether question No. 28 has been officially changed or not." (JACL Archives.)

The concern expressed was that Japanese nationals might become citizens without a country if they answered in the affirmative. The clarification was that "Question No. 28 has been officially changed by the WRA and recognized by the War Department. The justice of the Issei complaints was quickly realized." (JACL Archives)

On the issue of renunciation of citizenship, an April 13, 1944 letter to the War Relocation Authority from Teiko Ishida, now Acting National Secretary indicated JACL's position. "It is a matter of debate, but we agree with Attorney General Biddle that those who answered in the negative to question 28 heretofore have not expatriated. In other words they are still American citizens." (NA, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 142, General Classified Files 21.012, File #32, "April 1944.")

III. Position and Action on Resisters and the WRA
Segregation Process.

RESISTERS-HEART MOUNTAIN

The policies and positions taken by the JACL relative to the draft resisters at Heart Mountain were clearly and plainly spelled out in correspondence, bulletins, memoranda and in the editorials of the *Pacific Citizen*.

One document in which JACL's position was concisely put forth is a copy of a letter from Saburo Kido, dated April 3, 1944. On page two is a short paragraph dealing with the Heart Mountain Resisters. "The group at Heart Mountain definitely should be charged with sedition, especially the leaders. The FBI has been studying the situation in the centers and we were asked to loan them copies of the *Rocky Shimpo*." (JACL Archives.)

In Bulletin #9, dated April 11, 1944 from JACL in Salt Lake City, National President Saburo Kido introduced copies of letters sent to Kiyoshi Okamoto of the Heart Mountain Fair Play Committee and a Jack Nakagawa of Littleton, Colorado. We are told that "both letters were sent by Mr. Roger N. Baldwin, National Director of the American Civil Liberties Union." (JACL Archives.) Both letters inform their respective recipients of the moral strength and legal weakness of their refusal to accept the military draft. "The men who have refused to accept military draft are within their rights, but they of course must take the consequences. They doubtless have a strong moral case, but no legal case at all." (JACL Archives.)

This particular Bulletin and the refusal of Roger Baldwin to represent any of the draft resisters has led three historians to question the role of the JACL in this refusal of legal assistance.

What had occurred was that Kiyoshi Okamoto, head of the Fair Play Committee, had written to the ACLU for legal assistance in challenging the constitutionality of drafting internees. National Director of the ACLU, Roger Baldwin responded with the letter which was reprinted by the JACL in the aforementioned Bulletin #9 by Saburo Kido and which Baldwin had released to the press.

Thus the question which has been raised by Richard Drinnon, Douglas Nelson and Roger Daniels is why Baldwin made the letter public and what the JACL's role was in this action?

Douglas Nelson, in his *Heart Mountain: The History of an American Concentration Camp*, (Wisconsin State Historical Society: Madison, 1976.) pp. 153-54 indicated that there was

evidence which implied that Baldwin's action had been at the request of the JACL's Salt Lake City headquarters.

Likewise Roger Daniels writes, "what caused Baldwin to release his letter publicly is not clear, but a letter from Project Director Robertson to Dillon Myer implies that the JACL's Salt Lake City headquarters may have requested him to do so." (Concentration Camps:North America, Robert E. Krieger Publishing Co. Inc.:Malabar,Florida,1981, pp. 126-7.)

The evidence to which all three authors point is a letter dated April 17, 1944 from Guy Robertson, Project Director of Heart Mountain Relocation Project to Dillon Myer, Director of the WRA. The first two paragraphs from the letter follow below:

In our lead story, this week we carried a letter written by Roger Baldwin, National Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, and directed to Kiyoshi Okamoto, former leader of the Fair Play Committee within this center. The letter, mimeographed and released by the Salt Lake City Headquarters of the Japanese American Citizens League with the approval of the New York office of the ACLU, is the strongest documentary evidence that has come to our hands to support our contention that draft resistance is not only ill advised, but unsupported legally as a means toward securing full citizenship rights for Japanese Americans. (File M 1.09, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

We can determine from this letter that at the least, the ACLU and JACL worked in concert on the release of the Baldwin-to-Okamoto letter to the public. Nor were their joint efforts just in the logistics of releasing the matter to the public, but they undoubtedly shared in what both organizations must have anticipated as the impact upon the resistance movement and the Fair Play Committee as Heart Mountain. "[T]he major spokesman for civil liberties in the United States had supported the JACL line, whose adherents were jubilant: ACLU TAKES ISSUE WITH OKAMOTO was the Sentinel headline." (Daniels, Concentration Camps:North America, Krieger:Malabar, 1981, pp.126-7.)

Whether JACL had any hand in the content of the letter is not revealed by the Robertson-Myer letter. In Richard Drinnon's view, referring to the "ACLU-JACL-WRA axis" (p.301)

[e]vidence abounds that close working relationships kept the national line taut. Myer rode in tandem with Masaoka, as we

have seen, and also shared information and documents with Baldwin. On August 31, 1943, for instance, he sent Baldwin the "confidential" case history of Roku M. (NA, RG 210), the former chief of the warehouse at the Heart Mountain Hospital and currently an inmate of Leupp. In turn Baldwin shared data and views with Myer and the JACL Secretary-see, for example, his memorandum "for Ernest Besig, A.L. Wirin, Mike Masaoka," April 19, 1943 CHS 3580.

The next significant JACL document is one entitled VISIT TO CHEYENNE COUNTY JAIL WITH JAPANESE AMERICAN DRAFT DELINQUENTS. The interviewers were Min Yasui, who identified himself as an attorney and Joe Grant Masaoka, JACL Regional Representative. The purposes of the trip, according to the first page of this five page document, were two-fold.

By interviewing the boys in the Cheyenne County Jail, it was hoped that some indication of the processes of thinking and the manner of organization behind the draft resistance could be gained, so as to be able to work the best procedures and the most practical programs to counteract such influences in the relocation centers. In addition thereto, it if were possible to persuade any of the boys at the Cheyenne County Jail to reconsider his stand, it was felt that such repudiation would have some effect upon the draft-resistance group in the centers, and tend to dissuade others from following the same course of action. (JACL Archives, p.1.)

Many authors, Peter Irons included, have noted with some irony, the fact that Min Yasui attempted to dissuade these young draft resisters from taking a stand which was similar to his earlier challenge of the curfew restrictions. Yasui himself in this document attests to the similarity between his struggle and that of the draft resisters. In identifying himself in the document, Yasui states that he is,

a licensed attorney in the State of Oregon, who had attempted to secure a Supreme Court declaration of citizenship rights of the Nisei, identical to that which these Nisei draft violators are now seeking... (JACL Archives, p. 1.)

Regardless of this admitted identity in why Yasui had challenged curfew and why these resisters had challenged the draft, Min's purpose in this interview was to try to change their minds. Yasui "believed that a personal interview with these boys would reveal to them the legal fallacies of their

thinking and attitude. It was felt that a man who has had legal training and experiences in a county jail would have some effect upon the boys in the Cheyenne County Jail." (Ibid.) At a recent forum on the Heart Mountain Draft Resisters, the irony of what Min Yasui was attempting to do did not go unaddressed. "It was all right for Min Yasui to challenge the government and to fight for his constitutional rights, but it was wrong for us to do so." (Koshiyama, Mits, Pacific Citizen, Friday, September 8, 1989, "So. Calif. JACLers Throw Spotlight on Nisei WWII Draft Resistance Movement.")

Of particular note in the interview of the Heart Mountain Resisters is the content of a conversation between Yasui and Masaoka and Carl L. Sackett, the U.S. Attorney for Wyoming.

In talking to the U.S. Attorney, we pointed out that the actions of these boys was not a deliberate and intentional act of disloyalty, but rather an ineffectual and certainly ill-advised protest against the injustices and suspension of certain civil rights for the past two years suffered by those of Japanese ancestry. (JACL Archives, p.2.)

This is a remarkable statement in light of the earlier comments by Saburo Kido that these men should be charged with sedition and in view of the comments seen in the Pacific Citizen and Heart Mountain Sentinel editorials. Moreover, the conversation with Sackett took place prior to the commencement of any interviews with draft resisters. Nonetheless, it appeared clear from the interview document that neither Yasui or Masaoka felt the draft resisters were disloyal or seditious. Not only that, but that the resisters were willing to serve in the military once their citizenship rights were restored. This is confirmed later in the text when six of the 17 resisters who were housed in the Cheyenne County Jail (out of a total of 59 who were scattered in six jails throughout Wyoming) were interviewed.

Unanimously, they admitted they were fighting to secure court action in order to clarify their citizenship rights and status. Apparently, they believe that this is the last resort by which they can hope to gain a restoration of suspended civil rights, such as the right to return to the Prohibited Areas on the West Coast. None of the boys have signed expatriation papers. They continue to express a willingness to enter the Army, if their concepts of equality of treatment and citizenship are fulfilled. (JACL Archives, p.3.)

In fact, the basic issues of loyalty and willingness to serve in the military had been confirmed earlier during the registration period at Heart Mountain. As Roger Daniels tells us:

As it turned out, almost all of the key leaders of what I have called the "left opposition" remained at Heart Mountain after segregation because they had either answered "Yes-Yes" to the crucial questions or had so qualified their answers that they were not "eligible" for segregation. (Daniels, Concentration Camps: North America, Krieger:Malabar 1981, p.123.)

A flyer distributed at a public forum co-sponsored by the PSWDC JACL and the Southern Calif. Japanese American United Methodist Council also claimed that most the Heart Mountain Fair Play Committee Draft Resisters "answered 'yes' to both questions or had qualified their answers." (Flyer.)

All of this notwithstanding, two copies of the interview were furnished to the FBI's Denver Special Agent in Charge who then transmitted the same to the Director of the FBI. This is documented by an FBI Office Memorandum Cover Memo, dated May 26, 1944. (Courtesy Aiko Herzig.)

What then is the significance of draft resistance by "loyal" Japanese Americans and JACL's response to same? Perhaps Roger Daniels can best sum it up.

This account of the "loyal" Japanese American resistance-what I have called the "left opposition"-is highly significant. It calls into question the stereotype of the Japanese American victim of oppression during World War II who met his fate with stoic resignation and responded only with superpatriotism. This stereotype, like most, has some basis in reality. Many Japanese Americans, conforming to the JACL line, honestly felt that the only way they could ever win a place for themselves in America was by being better Americans than most. Whether or not this kind of passive submission is the proper way for free men to respond to injustice and racism, is, of course a matter of opinion. But it is important to note that not all "loyal" Japanese Americans submitted; the resistance of the Heart Mountain Fair Play Committee and of other individuals and groups in the other camps, has been almost totally ignored and in some instances deliberately suppressed by chroniclers of the Japanese Americans. The JACL-WRA view has dominated the writing of the evacuation's postwar history, thereby nicely illustrating E.H.

Carr's dictum that history is written by the winners. The authors of these works have in some cases been ignorant of the nature and scope of the "left opposition"; others, more knowledgeable, have either consciously underplayed it or suppressed it completely, hoping thereby, in their view at least, to manage and improve the image of an oppressed people. There are those, however, who will find more heroism in resistance than in patient resignation. (Daniels, Concentration Camps: North America, Krieger:Malabar, 1981, pp.128-9.)

PACIFIC CITIZEN

The first editorial discussion of the Heart Mountain Fair Play Committee in the Pacific Citizen was in Saburo Kido's column "Timely Topics" in the Saturday, March 25, 1944 issue, p.6. The title was HEART MOUNTAIN'S FAIR PLAY GROUP, and it read:

Any person who incites or encourages any citizen to evade the draft is assuming a grave responsibility. It is needless to say the offense constitutes sedition. One must remember that one of the most serious offenses a person can commit is to become a 'draft dodger'. A nation will not easily forgive or quickly forget anyone who refuses to serve when his country calls in a national emergency. It will be a tragic mistake to have young men who are 18 or thereabouts to become stigmatized as "draft dodgers" for the rest of their lives. (Pacific Citizen, vol. 18, Jan 1 to June 24, 1944.)

Again in a subsequent column, Saburo Kido wrote "... no one will be sympathetic or condone 'draft dodging'. This is one of the worst crimes that any citizen can commit." (Ibid, Saturday, April 1, 1944.)

In the same issue, Bill Hosokawa in his "From the Frying Pan" column, subtitled "Periodic Patriots in Relocation Centers", stated:

At first glance it would seem that the committees that have sprung up in the various relocation centers are all motivated by a sincere desire to seek a showdown, once and for all, as to the legal status of the nisei. Undoubtedly many of the individuals behind these committees are sincere, and their loyalty is beyond question. But there are others who can be identified only

as periodical patriots, individuals who protest their Americanism and demand their rights as citizens only when they are confronted with the task of fulfilling the responsibilities of that citizenship. (Ibid, p.5.)

Larry Tajiri wrote in an editorial called "The Bitter Harvest":

This act of defiance by 41 young men is the result of a combination of circumstances, misguided leadership and information, and strong pressures and influences. Its effect may be that of negating the victory of loyal Japanese Americans in winning the reinstatement of selective service, and may retard the eventual full restoration to Japanese Americans of the privileges of freedom which are the birthright of every American. By their action these young men, and those who prompted their action, have injured the cause of loyal Japanese everywhere. (Ibid, Saturday, April 8, 1944, p.4.)

HEART MOUNTAIN SENTINEL

Lauren Kessler, an associate professor of journalism at the University of Oregon recently published a study of camp newspapers. Kessler concluded that "the journalistic product that emerged reflected the fettered freedoms of internees, not the realities of internment." (Kessler, "Fettered Freedoms: The Journalism of World War II Japanese Internment Camps, Journalism History 15:2-3 Summer/Autumn 1988, p. 71.) Kessler examined the Heart Mountain Sentinel and found it "the most professionally produced and edited paper." (Ibid, p.73.) The Sentinel was edited by Bill Hosokawa. "The paper devoted considerable space to stories about Japanese American war heroes, the successes of relocated camp inmates and news of the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) a national accomodationist organization in which Hosokawa was active." (Ibid, emphasis in original.) In assessing whether the Sentinel maintained editorial independence, Kessler wrote that Hosokawa was "echoing accomodationist ideology," and avoided controversial issues. (Ibid.) "When the newspaper did recognize controversial issues, it invariably took the side of the administration." (Ibid, p.74.)

Nowhere was this more the case than when the issue of draft resistance arose.

But perhaps the best examples of where the Sentinel's sympathies lay was its ongoing editorial rebuttal of Heart Mountain's draft

resistance movement. The paper heralded the reclassification and drafting of Nisei as "a great news" early in 1944, mirroring the accomodationist line that being allowed to join the military was an unbeatable opportunity for Japanese Americans to prove their loyalty...The Sentinel called the draft resisters variously "stubborn and intensely bitter," "deluded youths," and warped-minded members" who made "wild-eyed statements" and "lacked both physical and moral courage." (Ibid, p.74.)

One editorial in particular captured the type of feelings brought out by the draft and opposition to it by the Fair Play Committee at Heart Mountain. It was published on March 18, 1944, and was titled "Provocateurs". The most strongly worded portions are reproduced below.

Since the announcement of reinstitution of selective service for nisei, Heart Mountain as has other centers, been infected by a new type of provocateur, who lacking both moral and physical courage is doing his utmost to discredit honest and straight-forward persons of Japanese ancestry. These Janus-faced individuals are using the same tactics that have been employed on other occasions. While their bulletins profess loyalty and plead good citizenship, they proceed rat-like with stealthy approach to intimidate and even threaten with bodily harm those who oppose them. (Heart Mountain Sentinel, March 18, 1944, p.4.)

This particular editorial also used such language as "slow-witted", "warped-minded", "wild-eyed", "foolhardy", "whimpering weaklings", "carplings of a small, vicious group" to describe the draft resisters and Fair Play Committee members at Heart Mountain. (Ibid.)

The July 1, 1944 editorial, which was written in response to the trial of 63 Heart Mountain Resisters, read as follows:

Loyal Japanese Americans as a whole condemn the Fair Play Committee and the action of the 63 defendants as being as serious an attack on the integrity of all nisei as the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. (Kessler, "Fettered Freedoms", Journalism History, 15:2-3 Summer/Autumn, p. 74.)

Kessler concluded,

in avoiding certain issues and toeing the

accomodationist line on others, the Sentinel published material that must have been pleasing to camp officials. For this reason, Hosokawa and Haruo Omura, who took over the editorship in 1944, undoubtedly experienced the freedom to publish what they wished. (Ibid.)

Indeed, Kessler is not the only author who characterized the editorials of the Heart Mountain Sentinel as "accomodationist." Roger Daniels also wrote that "the Sentinel, now under the editorship of Haruo Omura, ... [was] still following the JACL line..." (Daniels, Concentration Camps: North America, Krieger:Malabar, 1981, p. 123.)

RESISTERS--OTHER CAMPS

According to WRA statistics, as of September 2, 1944, the number of young men from the camps who refused to report for induction were 91. There were 55 from Colorado River or Poston, and 33 from Minidoka. The total number of those who refused to report for physical examination was 164. Broken down by camp, the numbers follow:

Central Utah	4	
Colorado River	14	
Gila River	0	
Granada	32	
Heart Mountain	84	(notation reads subject to revision)
Jerome	1	
Manzanar	0	
Minidoka	2	
Rohwer	3	
Tule Lake	24	

(NA, RG 210, Entry 3, Box 3, File "Semi-Annual Report-WRA, Printed Jan 1 to June 30, 1944, p.20)

A later table, in Weekly Report 41, for June 9, 1945 had a total of 157 who refused induction, 177 who refused to report for physicals. Out of 310 who were then arrested, 144 had been convicted, 97 in the process of being tried, 28 release, and 27 awaiting trial. (War Relocation Authority, Statistics Section, found in JACL Archives.)

The JACL was apparently concerned enough about the resistance at other camps to send Min Yasui to report on a meeting held at Granada-Amache on April 6, 1944. Yasui prepared a five page report on a discussion which took place between Hugh McBeth, a black civil rights attorney from Los Angeles and the family members of the young men who were incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution at Engelwood, Colorado for violation of Selective Service regulations. On the document was handwriting which read

"Saburo Kido" "Strictly Personal" and "Min Yasui requests that this be kept under wraps, Joe." (JACL Archives.) The content of the report is irrelevant to this study, since it is mostly a tirade on the question of race as it relates to the war and the United States.

A JACL inter-office correspondence dated June 29, 1944, reporting on activities between May 17, 1944 and June 24, 1944, began with the heading, "Amache Draft Situation Reported Getting Worse." The report also had news on the attorney for the "Amache Draft Delinquents." Based upon the discussion in the document, it seems there were some 14 "draft delinquents" who were going to trial. They had dismissed their individual attorneys and obtained the services of Samuel D. Menin, the same attorney who represented the Heart Mountain Resisters. No indication of policy was set forth, other than a concern that the previously appointed attorneys might serve the men better than Menin. (JACL Archives.)

Two documents which do offer the position of the JACL are a March 20th, 1944 letter to Frank Yamasaki and a March 30th, 1944 letter to Chaplain Yamada, both written by Saburo Kido, with copies sent to Dillon S. Myer. The relevant excerpts are set forth below.

Although we are in fully [sic] accord with all the principles set forth by your committee, we firmly believe that the Nisei must prove their loyalty by service first. We must be realistic in meeting this crucial test. If the Nisei produce a mass of "draft dodgers", and that will be the brand which will be attached to anyone who refuses to comply with the law, regardless of the reasons advanced, the fight for the restoration of any rights suspended will be that much difficult. Even the action of two at the Minidoka Relocation Center and the five at the Granada Relocation Center have had unfavorable repercussions. A draft dodger will not be easily forgiven or quickly forgotten by the nation...Every "draft dodger" is going to betray these staunch, loyal friends who have suffered humiliation, insults and threats besides loses in business in some instances. In one sense, the Nisei have come to pity and feel sorry for their plight to such a degree that their thinking is becoming self-centered.
(NA, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 471, File 71.505, JACL, "From 1942" pp.1-2.)

The excerpt from the letter to Chaplain Yamada:

When the 442nd Combat Team was organized, the

JACL supported it...The JACL was blamed as the "busybody" instrumental in having such a thing brought about when the draft was reinstated for the Nisei. We do not claim credit for this restoration of the Nisei to serve their country. ...We have fought any agitation which would influence the Nisei to violate the draft laws. (Ibid, p.3.)

A letter of acknowledgment written by Dillon Myer to Saburo Kido dated April 19, 1944 states "it seems to me that the position of the JACL is clearly set forth in these two letters." (Ibid.)

SEGREGATION

The earliest statement of JACL policy on the issue of segregation is the June 6, 1942 Memorandum on War Relocation Authority letterhead, signed by Masaoka, Matsumoto and Inagaki, discussed in the section of this study dealing with the WRA. The relevant portion reads "[i]ncidentally, we are in unanimous agreement as to the principle of segregation." (NA, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 286, File 39.050.) This is corroborated by the diary entry of Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, for Thursday, June 11, at 11:06.

Mr. Matsuoka [sic], Mr. Inigaki [sic]-conference Mr. Eisenhower present, they wanted segregation system set up in camps. We are disinclined to do it. Very agreeable interview. (Courtesy Michi Weglyn.)

The next discussion appears in an exchange of correspondence between Dillon Myer of the WRA and Mike Masaoka. In a confidential letter dated December 22, 1942, Myer replies to Masaoka, by air mail to a "wire of yesterday concerning the removal of disloyal evacuees. As you must know the problem of segregation is probably the most complex of the many complex problems developing out of the evacuation." (Myer, December 24, 1942, File T 6.11, JERS, Bancroft Library.) Apparently, Masaoka considered the issue urgent enough to send a telegram to Myer. In this letter, Myer proceeds to outline the difficulties and dangers of formulating a segregation program. He closes by asking Masaoka to submit a statement to Myer's committee on the subject. (Ibid.)

Masaoka responds in a letter dated January 14, 1943, via air mail, special delivery, out of the Salt Lake City Headquarters. The cover letter indicates that the "enclosed report is one which combines our thinking as well as our recommendations." (NA, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 559, File 711.505.) The statement is a "collaboration of certain of

our key people in the centers." (Ibid.) Titled "Confidential Statement," the five page document discusses the problem of "segregating 'loyal to America' Japanese from those who are 'loyal to Japan'." After outlining the difficulties in segregation and indicating that the bulk of both Issei and Nisei are at least passively loyal to the U.S. Masaoka emphasizes:

Notwithstanding these difficulties, it seems imperative to us that immediate action should be taken in every center to "pull out" those who are constantly agitating against this government or its representatives, or fomenting dissension and violence. The people in the center must be convinced beyond all doubt that the government means to protect the loyal and to enforce law and order at all times and for all persons. (Ibid, p.2.)

The reference in a later paragraph to the "agitation in Manzanar and Poston" leads to the conclusion that Masaoka's original telegram was in response to the uprisings there during November and December of 1942, as well as to the threats against JACL leaders there.

This is the approach offered by Masaoka.

Immediate action should be taken whereby, without warning or hearing, known agitators and trouble-makers are moved out of the relocation centers and placed in special camps of their own...We believe that, should they be forewarned of their approaching segregation, they would either create a militant sentiment against their removal or organize to resist it. Too, if hearings are provided, they might raise the cry that they were unjustly accused and tired, that they were "framed," etc. In order to avoid such arrangements and charges, we suggest that the WRA, upon completion of their investigation, should segregate, summarily all those whom they feel are dangerous to internal security. (Ibid, p.3.)

Masaoka lists those who are the troublemakers; single men without vested interests in the U.S., those released from Justice Camps, professional gamblers, pro-Japan Kibei, bachelors who lost everything in evacuation, members of the Toyo Club and Black Dragon Society. (Ibid.)

A further concern is that "practically every person who has been 'beaten up' in the centers is a member of our Japanese American Citizens League." (Ibid.)

What role did the JACL envision for itself in the segregation process?

Most of our chapter leaders have signified their willingness to name those whom they consider inimical to center welfare if their own names are not revealed. The names which they might submit could be checked with others who are reliable and are not members of the JACL in order to insure against possible prejudices simply because of organizational differences. (Ibid.)

Masaoka proposed a four step process.

1) the immediate apprehension and removal of known troublemakers, 2) the segregation of those who desire repatriation to Japan, 3) the placing of trained investigators within the centers to ferret out those who are disloyal, and 4) the selection of experienced internal security administrators and more careful appointment of departmental personnel. (Ibid, p.5.)

Thus, JACL had been an early and consistent advocate for segregation, though it was not until disturbances at Poston and Manzanar, as well as the beatings of JACL leaders, that specific measures were offered to the WRA. In the months after this confidential statement was submitted to Myer, we are told how the registration process also impacted upon the question of segregation.

After the registration of February, 1943, increasing pressure was brought to bear on the administration of the WRA by the Army, the Japanese American Citizens League, and all project directors, to segregate those who had refused to answer the questionnaire or who had answered the "loyalty" questions in the negative. (tenBroek, Jacobus; Barnhart, Edward; Matson, Floyd, Prejudice, War and the Constitution, Univ. of Calif. Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954, p. 161.)

Masaoka's "Final Report" also addressed this issue in the following manner.

The National President [Saburo Kido], in fact, welcomed the attack upon his person as the beginning of a campaign to cleanse and purge the relocation centers of undesirables and trouble makers. JACL demanded a segregation program whereby those professing disloyalty, causing continual trouble, or expounding un-American doctrines be taken out of the relocation centers

and placed in a special camp reserved for their kind. (Masaoka, "Final Report", 4/22/44, pp. 115-116, File T 6.15, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

We assume that answering NO to questions 27 and 28 of the Application for Leave Clearance was a profession of disloyalty according to Masaoka.

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